Political Developments VI

Constitutional crisis

Death of Hisham paved the way for Walid bin Yazid (Walid II) to climb the staircase to power, in line with the will of his father Yazid bin Abdul Malik.¹  The first problem, which ascension of Walid II to the post of Amir ul Mu’minin created, was a constitutional crisis.  Umayyad Caliphate had no written constitution.  The principles of the constitution were, however, generally known to the rulers and the public.  They were rooted so deep in the society that it was impossible even for the caliph to modify them.², ³    At its launch Umayyad Caliphate had coined a rule that a sitting caliph had sole right to nominate the next caliph –  heir apparent (walī ‘Ahd).  The unanswered question was what would be the criteria to nominate a future caliph. Second Arab Civil War was an attempt to settle this question.  At the end of the war answer was clear.  It was only and only discretion of the sitting caliph whom he wanted to nominate.  The only criterion to be fulfilled was that the heir apparent should be a Muslim and a major.  Conventionally the sitting caliph considered only his family members including his sons, brothers and paternal cousins for the job.  It was not a hard and fast rule, anyhow.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz, for example, considered a non-family member for the job. (see above).⁴  The caliph had to nominate at least two heirs apparent.  One was the first in line and the other was second in line.  Mortality rate was high and sudden death was common phenomenon.⁵  Nomination of second heir apparent covered the risk of unexpected death of the first one.  The travel time within the country could be up to a month.  The post of caliph could not be kept vacant for more than one day to avoid any legal complications.  The nomination of second heir apparent also covered the risk of absence of the first one at the time of caliph’s death.  The system worked well.  However it had one flaw.  The creators of the constitution had not pondered over it.  The functions of a caliph were well defined in the constitution.⁶  But it was not clear what will be the remedial measures if a caliph fails to fulfill those functions.  Can a caliph be reprimanded?  Can a caliph be impeached?  Can a caliph be punished for a crime committed by him?  If so what will the mechanism to do that?  The official ideology of Umayyad Caliphate rejected that anybody should contest for the post of a caliph.  Allah sent the prophets, and the last of them was Prophet Muhammad after whom the sequence of sovereign caliphs had started, they emphasized.  They are appointed by Allah himself, and if Allah doesn’t want anybody to be a caliph or remain a caliph, He will devise means of eliminating him.⁷

The second problem in the constitution was nomination of two heirs apparent at a time.  The second heir apparent could be a minor at the time of nomination.  Nobody knew what would be the political, economic and social situation of the country when he takes the reins of the government in his hand.  What if he turns out to be incapable to governing a country?  The nominating authority had already died, by definition.  Nobody could make amendment in the will.⁸

Walid II had image problem

Walid bin Yazid was only eleven years old when he got nominated for second in line for caliphate by his father, Yazid bin Abdul Malik.⁹  Males usually undergo tremendous changes in their personality at the time of identity crisis which coincides with puberty.  When Walid bin Yazid attained adulthood he turned out to be fond of alcohol, hunting and music.¹⁰  Alcohol drinking was not uncommon among rich Muslims.  They were, however, aware of the sensitivities around the issue.  Even the most powerful consumed alcohol privately and always maintained a position of denial of its use.  Walid bin Yazid differed.  He was the first Muslim caliph who drank alcohol publicly and didn’t hide the habit.¹¹, ¹², ¹³  Muslim historical sources attribute this problem solely to the personal trainer of young Walid bin Yazid.¹⁴  It is known to humans since time immemorial that social behavior of an adult is shaped by three factors, genetics, parenting, and the society.  What was not known in the past was ratio in which all three affect a personality.  Our modern research is discovering that parenting contributes only 25% towards the social behavior.  25% is due to genetics and 50% is result of the society in which an individual grows.  The culture of Damascus and Rusufah at large must have influenced young Walid bin Yazid.  It is known that many young members of house of Umayyads had indulged into such activities, including Maslamah bin Hisham – the son of the sitting caliph.

High moral expectation of higher government officials

Umayyad Caliphate always made sure that the higher government officials had a respectful prestige.  Any person with a tarnished reputation of being alcoholic dropped out of the short list at the screening stage.¹⁶  Morally notorious people were not acceptable to the general public.

Hisham’s headache

The time Walid bin Yazid became first in line to caliphate, his overt alcohol drinking, hunting and music and dance parties became a headache for Umayyad Caliphate.  Hisham bin Abdul Malik anticipated that if Walid doesn’t change his manners, the very foundation of Umayyad Caliphate may crack.¹⁷  After initial rebukes, advises, and criticism, Hisham appointed Walid bin Yazid to lead the pilgrimage of Muslims in 735 CE in a hope that his good public behavior during the Hajj would mend his image.  Walid proved true to his reputation and behaved in the same way during the pilgrimage.¹⁸  Tired, Hisham bin Abdul Malik kicked Walid bin Yazid out of his house and he started living at Azraq – a place in desert.¹⁹²⁰  Hisham cut down Walid’s allowance to compel him to mend his ways.²¹   At the same time Hisham started efforts to amend the will of his brother Yazid bin Abdul Malik in such a way that his own son, Maslamah becomes first in line for the caliphate.²², ²³  Hisham’s personal interests could be behind such move but it is known that Maslamah understood the sensitivities around such activities as alcohol drinking.²⁴  He behaved in a required way when Hisham appointed him leader of pilgrimage in 737 CE.²⁵  He had participated in campaigns against Byzantine, which were used as a tool to prop up the stature of young members of Umayyad house before they became a governor or caliph. 

Walid II immensely unpopular

Hisham could not amend the will of his brother and Walid II assumed the post of caliph at the death of Hisham by default.  It appears that Walid’s objectionable activities did not stem from his bad habit.  He consciously did not perceive anything wrong in them. His subjects were appalled.  The government officials tried their best to defend Walid II by maintaining that Allah brings to power through whomever He wishes to strengthen his religion.²⁷  Some dignitaries consoled their minds by assuming that the news of bad habits of the caliph were simply rumors.²⁸  In any case, people at large are realistic.  They understood the situation very well.  The caliph was spiritual head of Muslim community.  One of his duties was to lead the salat at the capital.  Leaders of salat all over the country were proxy to the caliph.  People started pondering how they could pray their salat behind a sinful person.²⁹  Walid bin Yazid became unpopular within months of assuming power.

The aristocracy called Umayyad Caliphate had started producing rulers with average political skills.³⁰  Walid II was one of them.  The challenges his government inherited were mammoth.  Walid had no idea how to tackle them.  Hisham and his officials had transferred large amounts in their personal accounts.  The government treasury was empty.³¹    Some sections of the military had not received their stipends in a timely fashion.  To flatten his decreasing popularity graph, Walid II announced a big spending package in the form of government handouts without consulting any expert on the matter.  The package included raise of ten dirhams per month in the salary of soldiers all over the country and an additional increase of ten dirhams for the Syrian Troops.  It also included government funding to buy perfumes and clothes for large families and provision of a personal caretaker to all disabled and blinds in the province of Damascus.³²  Soon Walid found it impossible to finance his grandiose scheme.  Main source of central government revenue was Iraq – the biggest province of the country.  Walid II started squeezing the governor of Iraq to send more revenues.³³  Walid II had no idea that money didn’t grow on trees in Iraq and that the governor won’t be able to fulfill Walid’s wishes.  The governor convinced the caliph that an easy source could be Khalid bin Abdullah, the ex-governor of Iraq, who had amassed wealth during his fifteen years rule over Iraq, and was still sitting on a treasure in tune of fifty million dirhams.³⁴   Walid II allowed the governor of Iraq to torture Khalid bin Abdullah to milk money out of him, and that he won’t mind if Khalid dies in the process.  The heinous torture did not produce any amount but a murder case.³⁵   Ex-governor Khalid bin Abdullah hailed from the southern tribe of Bajilah.³⁶  Overwhelming majority of the Syrian Troops stationed in Damascus belonged to the southern tribes, collectively called Yamanniyah.  The Yammaniya division of Damascus Troops took the murder as an offence committed against them.³⁷  Not only this, Walid II tried to squash money out of his fellow Umayyads.  He arrested all the sons of Hisham bin Abdul Malik and searched for their wealth and confiscated whatever he could find.  Arrest of Hisham’s family could be a personal vendetta, but he grilled others as well.    He had prepared a list of one hundred Umayyads whom he wanted to bulldoze.  The list was available in public domain.³⁸ The Umayyads did not find any reason to support the caliph.  Only a handful of Umayyads remained in Walid II’s camp.  They were all part of government machinery.  One of them was Muhammad bin Marwan, the governor of Jazira. Further, a central ruler of any country has to be at work 24/7.  Walid II’s passion for hunting compelled him to take off for days frequently.  The official circles developed an impression that he avoided public engagements.³⁹

Borders neglected

Ya’qubi criticizes that Walid II was unconrcned about his outlying regions and that all the regions were in an uproar.⁴⁰  Ya’qubi might be justified.  Walid II was pensive about internal affairs.

Sind remained aloof from the center.  My words.  Immediately after assuming power, Walid II appointed his own man, Yazid bin ‘Arar as lieutenant governor of Sind.  Yazid made eighteen raids and earned fortunes but didn’t pay the center anything, as was the tradition in Sind during later years of Hisham.⁴¹

Hisham government had controlled Ifriqiya after hardest efforts.  Walid II government could not maintain it.  Baladhuri reports that Abdur Rahman bin Habib, who was grandson of ‘Uqbah bin Nafi’, was immensely popular.  He subdued the whole region and chased lieutenant governor Ḥanẓalah out.⁴²  If Ifriqiya was not under good control of Umayyad Caliphate how could Spain be?  The petty fights for power marred the Spanish politics.⁴³

Nasr bin Sayyar had brought some peace in Khorasan.  Walid II government was in dire need of money.  Something was expected from there.  Instead of making arrangements for proper management of the district, Walid II government sold all the rights of Khorasan to Umar bin Yusuf, the governor of Iraq.⁴⁴  Nasr received a demand notice from the governor of Iraq to send him tax money.⁴⁵  Nasr got so confused between the province and the center that he didn’t send to either of the two.⁴⁶

Raiding Byzantine Rome was not a big deal for Umayyad Caliphate.  The routine continued.  However, this time it was not under supervision of province of Syria, where the caliph used to be in charge.  All raids were organized by the province of Jazira.⁴⁷

The only exception, where Walid II government did something was Cyprus.  Even there its role appears to be trivial and probably it was completions of a task already in pipeline from the previous government.  According to Tabari, Walid II ordered Aswad bin Bilal, the commander of the navy, to sail to Cyprus and give the population a choice of either go to Byzantine Rome or to Syria.  Some of them chose Syria and other Byzantine Rome as their abode.⁴⁸

Conspiracy against Walid II

Within a few months of his rule, Walid II successfully created a lot of foes and very few friends.  The most vociferous of his foes was Yazīd bin Walīd, his paternal cousin and the son of ex-caliph Walid bin Abdul Malik.⁴⁹   This ever designing, soft spoken, young man saw an opportunity for himself in Walid II’s unpopularity.  He claimed that he had invited Walid II to the Book and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad – a generic phrase used during era of Umayyad Caliphate to declare political intentions against anybody – and Walid II has flatly refused to pay heed.⁵⁰  Yazid bin Walid had hence concluded that Walid II didn’t believe in religion (kāfir) and his blood was licit.⁵¹  A few officers of Yamaniyah division of Syrian Troops agreed with him in secret.⁵²  Yazid bin Walid started preparing grounds for his plans.  He organized a group of handful but dedicated civilians who were apt to spread fake news about Walid II’s each and every action.  When Walid II nominated his two sons Ḥakam and ‘Uthmān to take over caliphate after him, one after other, they spread an idea all over the country that the two were still minor and constitutionally disqualified to be nominated for such office.⁵³  In fact Hakam had attained majority and was a husband and a father.⁵⁴  Still, many in the country believed in the fake news spread by this small group – a direct result of Walid II’s unpopularity.⁵⁵  Walid II had received intelligence reports about the activities of his cousin.  He neglected them.  Walid II believed that his office was stronger than him and will protect him.  Nobody could touch the caliph in this country, he imagined.⁵⁶, ⁵⁷

Murder of Walid II

One day, when most residents of Damascus had abandoned the city to spread out in the desert to prevent transmission of plague, and caliph Walid II was away on a hunting excursion, Yazid bin Walid entered the city with ten officers of Yamaniyyah.  They had reached the city from the desert mounting on donkeys and were unarmed to keep their movement low profile and undetectable.  About two hundred supporters joined them from inside the town.  At the night they entered the grand mosque of Damascus and captured all the government officials of the town.  They seized a cache of arms present in the mosque premises as well.  After arming themselves they quickly seized the treasury.⁵⁹  When the residents of the town woke up the next morning and became aware of the development, nobody had any intention to oppose the rebels.  Yazid bin Walid hired about fourteen hundred civilians at a lump sum rate of two thousand dirhams each.  He dispatched them to kill Walid II.⁶⁰  Walid II didn’t believe in his ears when he heard the news.⁶¹    He lost his wit and found no trick in his sleeve.  He, however, kept a brave face and ordered his entourage and the body guards to take the road to Iraq for possible escape.⁶²  The band sent by Yazid bin Walid halted Walid II at a village by name of Bakhrā, which had a citadel.⁶³, ⁶⁴   Walid II’s body guards abandoned him and he took shelter in the citadel.⁶⁵    Ten men climbed up the walls of the citadel to kill Walid II.  Walid II was reciting Qur’an at the time of his murder to simulate his murder to that of caliph Uthman bin Affan.⁶⁶  Walid II had an ignominious death.  Not a single eye shed tears for him.⁶⁷, ⁶⁸

Walid II got murdered on April 12, 744.⁶⁹

Third Arab Civil War

“Two tongues will never agree after me,” were the last words of Walid II.  He proved to be absolutely right.  Murder of Walid II was not the treatment of an ailment. It was actually the first symptom of the ailment, which is called the Third Arab Civil War by the Muslim historical sources, and which proved to be the terminal sickness for Umayyad Caliphate.⁷⁰  The chaos generated by the murder could not be tamed by anybody.

The illegal Caliph

Putting on the robe of caliphate on his own shoulders was a natural consequence of the murder for Yazid bin Walid (Yazid III). ⁷¹, ⁷²    He did not get any resistance from Damascus and its environs for getting oath of allegiance, where the slain caliph was very unpopular.  However, things did not go as smoothly in other parts of the county as Yazid III had anticipated.   He had not only sabotaged the constitution of the country but also had masterminded a murder.  Even if Walid II had committed unbelief and was liable to be killed, how on earth did it prove that Yazid III should be a caliph?⁷³  Yazid III was aware of the constitutional and legal problems he was in.  During his oath taking ceremony he discarded the very fundamental principle of Umayyad Caliphate’s constitution that it is only Allah who brings in a caliph and disposes him off.  He appealed the people for support, recognizing the role masses play in bringing in and disposing off a ruler.⁷⁴   He also discarded the notion that a caliph was responsible only to Allah and not to the people.  “If I obey the Book and the Sunnah of the Prophet, follow me.  Otherwise reject me,” was his rhetoric in the speech of oath taking ceremony.⁷⁵  On later occasions he also claimed that he had not acquired power for the sake of power. He wanted constitutional reforms in light of tenants of Islam and would accept consultation (Shūrā) as an institution authorized to install a caliph.⁷⁶  No body paid any heed to his bombastic eloquence.  People understood that it was a lip service to buy time to strengthen his own rule.  Their doubt on sincerity of Yazid III got stronger when he appointed his brother Ibrahim as heir apparent in line with previous constitutional traditions.⁷⁷, ⁷⁸

Yazid III’s uphill task

Legal debates aside, Yazid III had an uphill task at his hand.  He had to restore confidence in his government.  He came to power with pompous promises.  He promised in his speech of oath acceptance that he would not take money out of government treasury for himself, his wives and children.  Flow of tax dirhams from the provinces to the center would be stopped instantly.  He would not increase the rate of jiziya tax to the extent that the tax payers have to abandon farming.  Military would receive salary in timely fashion.   Furthermore, he would make the office of the caliph accessible to common people and he would introduce a system by which the soldiers on remote borders would be regularly rotated.⁷⁹  Fulfillment of promises needed money.  Umayyads around him gave first priority to their self interest. They did not want to surrender their wealth to salvage the Yazid III government.  To reconcile with them he restored all the wealth to their previous Umayyad owners which had been nationalized by Walid II.⁸⁰  Each action has a reaction.  Restoring their wealth meant Yazid III government had to cut some government expenditure.  The exchequer of the central government had reserves of forty-seven million dinars when Yazid III came to power.  He, actually, spent all of them and the last dinar of the treasury had dissipated when he died.⁸¹  Compelled with economic realities, Yazid III cancelled the government hand out package which Walid II had granted to the masses.  Scrapping the decision of Walid II, he reduced the salary of soldiers by ten dollars – a very unpopular choice.⁸²  The Umayyads had many groupings.  Some of them had eyes on the office of caliph.  They wanted to take advantage of any weakness of Yazid III.  One of them was Marwan bin Muhammad, the governor of Jazira.⁸³   He knew the cutting of grants to the civilians and the soldiers would be unpopular.  He aptly named Yazid III defective (nāqis) – the one who cuts grants.⁸⁴  When Yazid failed to pay the stipends to the troops stationed in Homs, they revolted.  Their demand was to restore the caliphate to Hakam bin Walid, the nominee of Walid II.  They will go back from their demand only if Yazid pays their stipends every Muharram and then monthly and makes it inheritable to their children.⁸⁵

Failures prominent feature of central government

Yazid III cold not handle the constitutional, legal, economic and political issues of the county successfully.  People could clearly see the uncertainty of the future.  Within weeks of his oath taking, whole country drowned into sheer chaos of all out war.⁸⁶  Umayyads were numerous.  Rich and powerful among them dreamt of becoming caliph.  The governors of rich and significant provinces hoped for enhancing their personal political base so the next caliph fails to dismiss them.  In doing this they attained a role of almost semi independent ruler.  The petti government officers at district level, like captains of the police force, the secretaries of the taxation or lieutenant governors, strived to consolidate their own authority so the future governor would depend upon them.  All of them – the Umayyads in and around central capital, the governors in and around provincial capitals, and the petti government officials in and around the districts – tried to attract support from common people to achieve their goals.  In doing so they divided the masses on religious lines, regional lines, nationalistic lines, tribal lines and whatever other line they could devise.

The military of the country broke down due to incapacity of the central government to pay them timely.⁸⁷  Each political aspirant recruited his own soldiers as much as he could pay for.⁸⁸  All land, from Khorasan to Ifriqiya, got divided among men who can easily be labeled as war lords.  This chaos, which Umayyad Caliphate could not contain, was slightly different from the previous ones.  Dying for a cause was no longer the only honourable option.  The leaders and the supporters both understood that all the religious, nationalistic or tribal slogans were to get a seat on government gravy train.  In Third Arab Civil War absconding alive from a battle field on slightest sense of defeat was more honourable option than to die fighting.

Challenge to the authority

The first hint of trouble came in the same week in which Yazid III assumed power in Damascus.  At that time the only province being governed by a scion of Umayyad house was Jazira and its territories Armenia and Azerbaijan.  When governor Marwan bin Muhammad of Jazira came to know about murder of his paternal brother Walid II, he raged with the passions of justice for Walid II.⁸⁹  He took into confidence the Syrian Troops stationed in Jazira and the provincial troops of Jazira.  He paid them in advance and marched towards Damascus in an aggressive posture to avenge the murder.⁹⁰  His passions of avenge subsided only when he reached Harran (Ḥarrān) and Yazid III, finding no way to defend against the big army, granted Marwan bin Muhammad governorship of Jazira unconditionally.  “You can govern all those areas which your father used to govern,” wrote Yazid III to Marwan bin Muhammad.⁹¹, ⁹²  Gaining semi independence from the central government was not the ultimate goal of Marwan bin Muhammad.  His eye was on Caliphate.  He just wanted to gain time, strengthen himself, and wait for the correct time to strike.

Marwan bin Muhammad was not the only Umayyad who could muster army and challenge the weak central government.  Many others had long military career and they had enough wealth to recruit soldiers.  One of them was Sulayman bin Hisham, the son of ex-caliph.  When Yazid III released all Umayyads from jail who were imprisoned by Walid II, Sulayman bin Hisham was beneficiary of this gesture.  Immediately after his release from Amman jail and restoration of his confiscated property, he challenged the authority of the central government.⁹³  Despite being wealthy, Sulayman bin Hisham did not have any province and its army to be used.  His challenge remained weak.  Yazid III could outmanoeuver him and could convince him that he should join hands with Yazid III to become chief of his army staff.⁹⁴  Umayyads of less social heights, who did not have much wealth or soliders at their disposal, like,  Abu Muhammad al Sufyani, Ḥarb bin Abdullah bin Yazid bin Mu’awiya, Yazid bin Khalid bin Yazid bin Mu’awiya, Yazid bin Uthman bin Muhammad bin Abu Sufyan, Yazid bin Sulayman bin Abdul Malik, and Muhammad bin Abdul Malik, tried their level best.⁹⁵  Soon they had to bow to the pressure from central government.

Yazid III government was not in a position to pay the military properly.  Sheer military action was out of question.  The government had to mix and match military use with diplomacy.   The strategy involved isolating some rebels, offering others government positions, paying to discontent soldiers whatever the government could offer etc. etc.⁹⁶  However, such challenges, which were the first of their kind in Syria, weakened the government writ in the province of Syria, which was the power house of Caliphs of Umayyad Caliphate.

Contracted sphere of influence

Yazid III’s government could establish uneasy peace in Jazira and Syria by making political compromises and paying grants.  No active bloodshed was going on in the two provinces, though obedience to caliph Yazid III was questionable.  Content with whatever he had achieved in the first six weeks of his government, Yazid III attended to Iraq.⁹⁷  One of the renegades who had murdered Walid II on orders of Yazid III was Manṣūr bin Jumhūr.⁹⁸   He was an over ambitious person. ⁹⁹ He knew that the Syrian Troops stationed in Iraq had unrest over murder of Khalid bin Abdullah.¹⁰⁰  Yaman among them were not very happy with Walid II’s handling of the matter and would support anybody who would topple Walid II.¹⁰¹   Mansur quietly slipped off the crime scene and reached Iraq with thirty supporters.¹⁰²    He could convince the Syrian Troops there by producing a forged document that caliph Yazid III had appointed him governor.¹⁰³   Syrian Troops believed in him and accepted his credentials.¹⁰⁴   Sitting governor, Yusuf bin Umar, found only five hundred soldiers who were willing to resist Mansur and even they refused to fight when it was actually needed.¹⁰⁵    Yusuf bin Umar fled the province.¹⁰⁶  Yazid III knew that Mansur bin Jumhur was not appropriate person to govern the largest province of the country.  When Yazid III got the first chance, he dismissed Mansur bin Jumhur in July of 744 CE.¹⁰⁷    He appointed Abdullah bin Umar, the son of late caliph Umar bin Abdul Aziz, in a hope that Abdullah had appeal among the religious elements and mawlas.¹⁰⁸   Syrian Troops accepted his nomination, as they considered themselves under command of the caliph.¹⁰⁹  This was the only nomination Yazid III could make during his tenure.  Abdullah bin Umar could establish some control over Kufa and Basrah, however, dependent districts of Iraq remained out of his ambit.¹¹⁰    

This was the total sphere of influence of Yazid III government.  Ifriqiya remained under thumb of Abdur Rahman bin Habib.  Yazid III did not even bother to appoint anybody as lieutenant governor there.¹¹¹  Egyptians killed their governor and Yazid III failed to send anybody to take over.  People of Hijaz chased away their governor.  Yazid III could not establish his governor there. ¹¹²  Sistan drowned into bloody warfare between Tamim and Bakr bin Wa’il tribal brigades of the army and any government agent could not satisfy both of them at a time¹¹³ 

Tribal conflict of Khorasan

Economic turmoil, which comes along with political turmoil, is particularly stimulating for group based hatred of all sorts.  Tribalism, which is termed ‘aṣṣabiyah by Islamic sources, thrived every where.¹¹⁴, ¹¹⁵  Some regions were particularly affected.  Khorasan was one of them.  Initially Nasr bin Sayyar, the lieutenant governor of Khorasan, considered the news of murder of caliph Walid II as misinformation.  He carried out private investigations before he could believe in it and take decisions in the light of new development.¹¹⁶    He had already withheld any tax money to the center or the province.¹¹⁷  Now he returned the central government portion of tax to the tax payers.¹¹⁸ The gesture must have enhanced Nasr’s goodwill among people.  Immediately after, he organized an oath of allegiance for himself until Umayyads finalize their differences in Damascus.¹¹⁹    Though People were generally happy with the leadership of Nasr, there was a problem.¹²⁰   As Nasr knew there was confusion in Damascus and Iraq, others in Khorasan knew too.  As Nasr could take advantage of the situation, others wished the same.  An ethnic entrepreneur appeared somewhere from out of the blue.  His name was Juday bin Ali al Kirmani.  He was a power hungry personality.  He instigated the soldiers belonging to Azd tribe of Yaman against Nasr’s leadership when Nasr was distributing salaries and grants in grand mosque of Merv.  He claimed Nasr was biased against the Azd when it comes to the distribution of salaries.¹²¹   Nasr wanted to nip the evil in the bud.  He arrested al Kirmani and locked him up in Merv Jail on July 14, 744 CE¹²²  Kirmani had started getting attention.  He could easily break the jail and escape due to presence of Azd sympathizers everywhere.  Realizing that keeping him in government jail would be impossible, Nasr placed Kirmani under house arrest.  Kirmani was not going to bow.  He defied the conditions of probation, came out of his house, and canvassed the people for his ideas.  This time Nasr decided to banish him from Khorasan and this is what he did.¹²³  When Kirmani had started fanning tribal chauvinism, Nasr had warned his fellow Arabs of the dangers of this kind of politics.  He told them that they were living in the midst of enemy and their unity was their most trusted armament.  Every time Nasr government faced Kirmani, it had to take support from those individuals who were not Kirmani’s sympathizers.  Nasr unintentionally became leader of Mudar instead of being leader of all Arabs in Khorasan.¹²⁴  Stage got set for a lengthy tragedy – Tribal Conflict of Khorasan.  Nasr figured out that Harith bin Surayj had still not lost his nuisance value.  He had potential to incite Tamim part of Mudar, weakening the Mudar alliance.  He could also use his links with the Turks and mobilize them against Nasr government.  Nasr asked caliph Yazid III to re-confirm Harith’s pardon and to restore his confiscated property to assure him that he is accepted back in the government circles.  Yazid III did so as it did not cost him much.¹²⁵  Both central and the provincial governments also re-confirmed Nasr bin Siyaar on his post.¹²⁶  It was, however, only an informal recognition of Nasr’s position in Khorasan.  Both governments did not have any power to appoint another man over Khorasan instead of Nasr. ¹²⁷ 

Kharijis active again

Whenever government weakens, the Kharijis raise their heads like mushrooms after the rain.  Around June of 744 CE a number of Khariji groups sprang up in and around Mosul, Marj and Shaharazur in the province of Jazira.  Quickly they coalesced to make a unified group.  The group started low velocity attacks on local government interests.¹²⁸, ¹²⁹    Governments of Jazira, Syria and Iraq were too busy to notice them.

Shi’a Alis not left behind

Shi’a element of the society was not going to abstain.  Umayyad Caliphate had made sure that descendants of Ali bin Abu Talib don’t leave Hijaz.  Whenever any of them reached Kufa the government was in trouble.¹³⁰  This time it was ‘Abd Allah bin Mu’awiyah, grandson of Ja’far bin Abu Talib.¹³¹  When central government became feeble, governors found themselves semi independent.  They no longer towed the central government policy in words and spirit.  Abdullah bin Mu’awiyah decided to take advantage of the situation.  He left Medina along with his brothers Hasan and Ziyad and headed to Kufa to get favours from governor Abdullah bin Umar bin Abdul Aziz.¹³²  Abdullah bin Umar might be trying to fit into boots of his father.  He treated them with generosity and granted them a stipend of three hundred dirhams daily.¹³³  Once in Kufa, Abdullah bin Mu’awiya found that the provincial government was infirm.  The town was in the midst of low profile tribal conflict.  Governor Abdullah bin Umar had to side with one tribe to supress the other.  Abdullah bin Mu’awiya started building links with the Shi’a Ali minority of the town.¹³⁴  Like any other political opportunist, Abdullah bin Mu’awiya did not limit himself to Shi’a Ali.  Gradually he flocked together people from wider range.  On the one hand he had displeased tribal brigades in his folds, like Yaman, on the other hand he had individual fortune seekers, like Mansur bin Jumhur.  Abdullah bin Mu’awiya also enlarged his circle of activities outside Kufa.  He could win supporters from Mada’in and other parts of the Swad.  He brought them to Kufa to swell up his numbers.   Mawlas and slaves of the town also joined the boat.¹³⁵  Within a few months Abdullah bin Mu’awiya was in position to challenge the authority of governor Abdullah bin Umar.

Distraught Caliph dies

Within few months of its tenure Yazid III government had come to a stand still.  The Caliph did not have any capacity to appoint or dismiss anybody.  The central government had lost all its sources of revenue including Syria and Iraq.¹³⁶  The Syrian Troops had broken their discipline and were willing to fight for anybody who paid them.  This was the state of affairs of Umayyad Caliphate when caliph Yazid III decided to die on October 12, 744 CE.¹³⁷  He was a young man of thirty-seven.¹³⁸  The cause of death is not known.  He is reported to be sick for a while and people around him knew it.¹³⁹  He could misrule the country hardly for five months.¹⁴⁰

Yazid III’s place in history

Yazid III has many records on his credit.  He was the shortest lived caliph in History of Islam up to now.  He had another distinction.  He was the first caliph in Islam who was product of an Arab father and a non-Arab concubine.¹⁴¹  Sources don’t shriek about this fact.  However, it is plausible that this fact was partially responsible for Yazid III’s failures.  Arabs regarded genealogy in high esteem.  Yazid III might have got a problem of image.

Yazid III tried to look like Umar bin Abdul Aziz.  Mention of the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet increased in the government statements.  Apology for previous misdeeds of Umayyads was in the air.  Look at the contents of a letter Yazid III wrote to Harith bin Surayj in Khorasan, “We have been angry on Allah’s behalf that His ordinances have been neglected and that His servants have sunk into every kind of excess.  Blood has been shed unlawfully and money has been seized illegally.  We wanted our actions in this community to be according to the Book of Allah, may He be praised and glorified, and the Sunnah of His Prophet.”¹⁴²  Yet Yazid III never became second Umar bin Abdul Aziz and Muslims of present day hardly know him.  The reason behind could be the antagonism of religious leaders of the time towards Yazid III.  They were fierce critic of Yazid III.¹⁴³

The Infirm Caliph

Yazid bin Walid had nominated his brother Ibrahim his heir apparent.  Ibrahim did not have any capacity to hold the government.  Many districts of Syria refused to recognize him as legitimate caliph.¹⁴⁴, ¹⁴⁵  Marwan bin Muhammad was not a kind of person who would sit idle and watch the match from the bleachers.  His province was immune to the malady with which whole country was suffering from.  He had crushed tribal hatred by force in the beginning of Yazid III’s tenure.¹⁴⁶  He possessed a reasonably loyal force.¹⁴⁷  The news of death of Yazid III again stirred ripples of revenge for murder of Walid II in his heart.  He hastily demanded restoration of Hakam bin Walid on the podium of caliphate.¹⁴⁸  The very next day he ordered his loyal forces to march towards Damascus to restore the office of the caliph to its lawful candidate.¹⁴⁹    On the way, whichever town he occupied, he took an oath of allegiance for himself, albeit only as amir.¹⁵⁰  Ibrahim sent whatever number of soldiers he could afford to stop Marwan bin Muhammad under command of his chief of army staff Sulayman bin Hisham.  This force met with Marwan’s advancing columns at ‘Ayn al Jarr in mid-November of 744 CE.  After primary encounters the soldiers of Ibrahim got hundred percent convinced that surrendering was their best option.¹⁵¹, ¹⁵², ¹⁵³ Way to Damascus was open to Marwan.

The last Umayyad in office

Ibrahim and his advisors could not understand Marwan bin Muhammad’s motives.  Hakam bin Walid was under arrest in Damascus since murder of his father.¹⁵⁴  When Marwan’s forces were encroaching Damascus, Ibrahim and company killed Hakam in desperation to physically eliminate the person for whose help Marwan was on the way.¹⁵⁵  Who on earth could be more thrilled on this murder than Marwan bin Muhammad?  He kept a stern face until his forces entered Damascus without fight.  A lackadaisical Ibrahim bin Walid joined Marwan bin Muhammad’s camp as a subordinate.  Marwan bin Muhammad (Marwan II) proclaimed himself a caliph and took oath of caliphate in Damascus on 29^th November 744 CE.¹⁵⁶  Marwan was conscious about the clause in the constitution of the country that a caliph should have been nominated by the previous caliph.  Officially, this was the clause in support of which he was marching around.  Marwan orchestrated a dramatic performance during his oath taking ceremony.  All of a sudden the dead body of Hakam appeared on the scene along with a co-prisoner of him, who was held in shackles.  The prisoner saluted Marwan II as caliph and told the audience that it was Hakam who had willed that Marwan should be the caliph in case Hakam perishes.  The prisoner also recited a piece of poetry composed by Hakam to this effect.¹⁵⁷  All Umayyad groups submitted to him, ever if they weren’t in love with him.¹⁵⁸, ¹⁵⁹

Marwan II Sidesteps Syria

Marwan II did not have potential to nominate his handpicked men over all the districts of Syria.  He gave a choice to people of all districts, including Damascus, Jordan and Homs to choose their own governors.  He did not even veto the choice of people of Homs.  It was Thabit bin Nu’aym, the instigator of tribal violence against Marwan II in Armenia few months ago.¹⁶⁰  Apparently Marwan II did not feel Damascus safe for him.  He favoured Harran to be his capital.¹⁶¹

Iraq and Syria – Wrestling ring

Marwan II’s successful capture of the office of caliph did not resolve the crisis.  Marwan bin Muhammad (Marwan II) represented the old school of thought – a caliph is appointed by Allah and a caliph is responsible only to Allah.  It inherently meant that the Umayyad clout around him should enrich themselves at the expense of masses because caliph didn’t mind it.  People should obey a caliph unconditionally or face his sword because a caliph would always succeed.  A caliph should do whatever he deems appropriate because only Allah could bring him to account, etc. etc.  His political ideology reflects in his deeds.¹⁶²

Marwan II had demonstrated publicly that Hakam bin Walid had willed him to be a caliph.   Common people hardly believed in this contrivance.  The warring lords of the country were sure that Marwan II would not have been a caliph if he did not have forty thousand loyal soldiers of Jazira.¹⁶³  All provinces, all districts, and all territories outside Syria and Jazira did not feel obliged to recognize Marwan II as caliph.

Abdullah bin Umar was holding the provincial government of Iraq flimsily.  He had accepted Ibrahim as caliph even when Ibrahim’s own province had rejected him.¹⁶⁴  Abdullah bin Umar knew one day there would be a fight between Ibrahim and Marwan II and the winner of the fight might be Marwan.  In that scenario Abdullah bin Umar would have to fight against Marwan to save his seat and he would need as many people for this purpose as possible.  Abdullah bin Umar had turned a blind eye towards the activities of Abdullah bin Mu’awiya in a hope that Abdullah bin Mu’awiya would bring the support of Shi’a Ali to him during such a war.  The news of Ibrahim’s defeat weakened position of governor Abdullah bin Umar.  Even the fleeing soldiers of Ibrahim from the battle field of ‘Ayn al Jarr joined hands with Abdullah bin Mu’awiya.¹⁶⁵  In November 744 CE, few days after battle of ‘Ayn al Jarr, even before Marwan II had taken oath of caliph, Abdullah bin Mu’awiya challenged authority of Abdullah bin Umar.¹⁶⁶  Their battle was unique.  In addition to arrows, both commanders threw promises of money to the soldiers of the opposite side.  Abdullah bin Mu’awiya’s side had relatively bigger portion of money seekers.  They abandoned Abdullah bin Mu’awiya exactly in the midst of battle.  Hard core Shi’a Ali element remained determined supporter of Abdullah bin Mu’awiya, though.  Abdullah bin ‘Umar gave full chance to Abdullah bin Mu’awiya to escape.¹⁶⁷  He fled to Tysfwn (Mada’in) and from there to Hulwan.  Runaway slaves of Kufa were his main companions.  Similar element supported him wherever he reached.  People welcomed him and he established his government over Jabal.  From there he quickly extended his domain over Māhān, Hamedan, Qumis, Isfahan, and Rayy.  After occupying Fars and Sistan he declared Istakhr as his capital.¹⁶⁸, ¹⁶⁹

The new political entity in Iran was a typical Shi’a Ali government.  This is the first government which used suras of the Qur’an on its coins.  Almost twelve coins issued by this government are known to the historians.  Most interesting is the use of the Qur’anic verse concerning the rights of the kins.

The successful escape of Abdullah bin Mu’awiya left only Iraq proper in Abdullah bin Umar’s hands.  All its dependent districts had attained semi autonomy.  Abdullah bin Umar did not perceive Marwan II to be strong enough to capture Iraq.  His design was to keep governing Iraq, probably until such time when further developments make clear who would be the lord of the ring.  Abdullah bin Umar started appointing his handpicked men over all government posts in Iraq.¹⁷¹  Marwan II did not want to giver Abdullah bin Umar a free hand.  He tipped al Naḍr bin Sa’īd al Ḥarashi, one of Abdullah bin Umar’s officers, as his governor of Iraq.  Obviously, Marwan II did not have strength to support Nadr.   Nadr banked on the tribal rivalry going on in Kufa to dislodge Abdullah bin Umar.  He won support of Mudar brigade of Syrian Troops stationed in the town.  Yaman brigades were left with no choice but to support Abdullah bin Umar.¹⁷²  Marwan was anxious to settle the matter in his favour.  He even sent a supporting cavalry of one thousand horsemen out of his Jazira loyal forces to Nadr.  Still, both groups clashed against each other halfheartedly for almost two months without any concrete result.¹⁷³  A new development just outside Kufa compelled both to shelve their differences and co-operate with each other, albeit temporarily.¹⁷⁴

Small Khariji uprisings had started in many towns of Jazira during five months of misrule by Yazid III.¹⁷⁵ They were fighting with each other for dominance and were coalescing with each other to gain strength.¹⁷⁶  During lifetime of Yazid III and afterwards, the governments at Jazira, Iraq and Syria were weak and shattered.  The Kharijis found a perfectly fertile soil to grow and spread.  Up to spring of 745 CE, Marwan had still not established himself in Syria completely, and government of Iraq was still being decided between Nadr or Abdullah bin Umar by a combination of armed conflicts, money payments and fanning tribalism.  Khariji strength rose to four thousand fully committed warriors under their leader  Ḍaḥḥāk bin Qays of Shayban tribe.  This was the largest army any Khariji leader had ever raised.¹⁷⁷  Traditionally, whenever Kharijis raised their heads in Jazira, they pressurized Iraq.  Again this time they marched towards Kufa. Combined forces of Abdullah bin Umar and Nadr were thirty thousand.  They include both the Syrian Troops and the Kufan division.¹⁷⁸  According to the pact between the two, Abdullah bin Umar assumed role of overall in charge of the army.  The two armies fought against each other at Nukhayla for a few hours.  As had been happening in previous such conflicts, only name of the Kharijis was enough.  As night fell, almost whole Kufan army absconded to Wasit.  Among them were big names like Nadr and Mansur bin Jahmur.¹⁷⁹¹⁸⁰, ¹⁸¹    Abdullah bin Umar did not feel it worth hanging on.  The next day he also fled to Wasit.  ¹⁸²  The cavalry, which had come from Jazira to help Nadr capturing government in Kufa returned to their origin.¹⁸³ Many middle rank leaders decided to shake hands with the Kharijis and join their ranks.¹⁸⁴  Dahhak entered Kufa triumphantly in May of 745 CE.  This was the first occasion in history of Islam that the Kharijis had captured a big city of this size.  He appointed his companion, Milḥān bin Ma’rūf al Shaybani, to look after the affairs of the town and left for Wasit to deal with the remnants of Kufan army.¹⁸⁵  Kharijis did not have means to scale a large military castle like Wasit.  Dahak’s warriors laid siege to Wasit.¹⁸⁶  Inside the town, Nadr and Umar bin Abdullah kept quarrelling with each other.  Both were still hopeful that one day the Kharijis would leave and they would be able to fight each other to decide the fate of the province.  That day never came.  After three months of siege, Nadr and his supporters got bored.  They left Wasit to join Marwan II.¹⁸⁷  Frustrated with the situation Umar bin Abdullah decided to come to terms with the Kharijis.  The Kharijis accepted Umar bin Abdullah and Mansur bin Jamhur ‘back in Islam.’  They prayed behind Dhahhak and ate with him at the same table.¹⁸⁸  The terms of the agreement were that Umar bin Abdullah would recognize Dahak’s right to govern Kufa and Dahhak would give Umar bin Abdullah a free hand to govern Wasit and other districts like, Kaskar, Maysan, Dastmaysān, the districts of the Tigris, Khuzestan and Fars, if it was possible for him.¹⁸⁹, ¹⁹⁰  While Dhhak was besieging Wasit, he sent his representative to Basrah who took control of the town without facing any resistance.¹⁹¹

Marwan II could not poke his nose in the affairs of Iraq for the time being.  He was not certain how Syria would behave. Syrian Troops scattered all over the province harbored covert tribal hatred at the time when Marwan II took oath of the office of caliph in Damascus.  Certain groups, like Qays, favoured Marwan II more than anybody else.¹⁹²   Ethnic entrepreneurs, like Thabit bin Nu’aym, were also there to fan such sentiments.¹⁹³  Trouble started on June 25, 745 CE when inhabitants of Homs announced that they would no longer obey Marwan II.  Soon the insubordination spread to Damascus, Palestine, Tadmur and other parts.  Marwan II had to come to Syria by himself to calm the province down.  He had his loyal Jazira forces and the private armies to do the job.  Marwan II executed the ring leaders of the insubordination wave, including Thabit bin Nu’aym.¹⁹⁴, ¹⁹⁵

While in Syria, Marwan II tried to re-organize the Syrian Troops, as they used to be power house of Umayyad Caliphate.¹⁹⁶  He also announced his heirs apparent to consolidate his grip on power.¹⁹⁷ At the same time he thought of attacking Iraq with full vigor to include it into his domain.

Syria was not as secure for Marwan II as he had believed.  He had to face another challenge yet.  Since Marwan II had dissolved Ibrahim from the office, he had compelled all Umayyads to remain present in his camp.  It was a kind of ‘arrest with honour.’¹⁹⁸  Marwan II had camped at Rusafah near Tadmur in connection with the last leg of his campaign against tribal uprisings in Syria.   The inhabitants of Tadmur were predominantly Banu Amir of Kalb who had supported Yazid III and Sulayman bin Hisham during their time.  Now they had showed hostilities towards Marwan II government.  One evening Sulayman bin Hisham asked to be excused from presence for a few days so he could look after his domestic affairs.  From there Sulayman gathered all those soldiers in Syria who had hostile sentiments to Marwan II.  They differed widely, from dissatisfied soldiers of Jazira forces, Sulayman’s own Dakhwaniya, battalions of Syrian Troops stationed at different towns of Syrian and private armies of the sons of Hisham bin Abdul Malik.  They gathered on a highway near Qinnasrin and blocked it.  Marwan II gave them a surprise attack, killing thirty thousand of them.  The survivors, including Sulayman, fled to Homs and sieged themselves in.  Marwan II followed them.  Sulayman knew he was in no position to fight against Marwan at Homs.  He sent a small cavalry to assassinate Marwan II.  After hearing the news of their failure, he left Homs towards Iraq to accept Dhhak’s Islam.¹⁹⁹, ²⁰⁰

By August of 745 CE Marwan II had pacified Syria by brutal force and was now ready to jump into the wrestling ring of Iraq.  He had already picked Yazīd bin Umar bin Hubayrah to be his governor of Iraq.  He provided ibn Hubayrah with his loyal Jazira forces.²⁰¹  Dahhak had anticipated that this day would come.  He did not have very large force at his disposal.  Apparently the Kharijis were governing over a big hostile population in Kufa.  On hearing the reports of Marwan II’s preparations, Dahhak moved his main columns to Mosul and captured the town and its surrounding lands.  Once master of Mosul, the Kharijis started building an army of paid soldiers.  They could gather almost one hundred and twenty thousand armed men.  The army included all kind of opportunistic elements including Sulayman bin Hisham and Mansur bin Jumhur.  It was easy for Marwan II to defeat such a disorganized mob.  He quickly intruded into environs of Mosul.  Marwan II was a master military strategist.  He spread his army in whole area and adopted the tactic of hit and run which was previously expertise of the Kharijis only.  Soon he killed Dahhak and many other Khariji leaders in an ambush attack.  Many of the paid Khariji soldiers lost their lives in such attacks.  Others got scared and started absconding.  Estimated number of the Khariji army decreased to forty thousand.  Seeing Khariji weakness, Marwan II sent Yazid bin Hubayra to attempt on Kufa.  The Khariji defense of Kufa was weak.  Still, the Khariji defenders of Kufa came out of the town and fought courageously to their last man.  Mansur bin Jamhar was the part of the force which the Kharijis had brought against Ibn Hubayrah.  He tactfully fled to Kufa and organized a second resistance with the help of those Kufans who had not sided with Dahhak and those battalions of Syrian Troops who were hostile to Marwan II.  Nothing worked.   Mansur bin Jamhur escaped.  Ibn Hubayra could enter Kufa and took its administration in his hands in May of 747 CE.  As an extension Ibn Hubayra moved on to Wasit to tackle Abdullah bin Umar.  Kharijis tried another attempt to dislodge ibn Hubayra from Kufa.  They sent a small army, whom Mansur bin Jahmur joined with his men.  This army got defeated easily.  Mansur bin Jumhur fled to Jabal, to join hands with Abdullah bin Mu’awiya and keep trying his luck.²⁰², ²⁰³

Marwan II remained entrenched against the Kharijis in and around Mosul.  If capability of using hired soldiers was the key to success, Marwan II was poised to succeed.  Khariji strength decreased day by day.  Only hard core ideologues remained in their folds.  Marwan’s strength was increasing day by day.  He could get reinforcements from Kufa in the form of eight thousand Syrian Troops stationed in Kufa.  Under pressure from all sides, the Kharijis decided to vacate Mosul and try their luck somewhere else.  They ran to Jabal and from there to Fars.  Mansur bin Jumhur was already there to help the running Kharijis financially as much as he could.  After chasing the Kharijis out of Mosul Marwan II returned to Harran, where he stayed until his last days.²⁰⁴

Ibn Hubayrah had got control of Kufa in May of 747 CE.  He did not rest for a single day.  He marched to Wasit, compelled Abdullah bin Umar to surrender and confined him.  Situation was bleak towards east of Wasit.  All dependent districts to Iraq were in the midst of turmoil.  Many of them were being governed by war lords, for example Sulayman bin Habib in Ahwaz, who had Khariji inclinations.  Some were in hands of a local Mawla, for example, Sabur which had fallen to Kurds.   Basrah was not governed by anybody at all after the Kharijis left.  The inhabitants of the town arranged with the local judge to guide them in day to day matters.  The largest political entity in that area was Abdullah bin Mu’awiya.  Since establishment of his authority there, he had attracted many members of Banu Hashim.  Some descendants of Abu Lahab were with him.  Prominent members of banu Abbas used to visit him.  When Kharijis ran from Mosul, they also joined hands with Abdullah bin Mu’awiya.  Sulayman bin Hisham was with them as well.  Marwan II and governor Yazid bin Hubayrah had to do something about them.  Yazid bin Hubayrah sent his forces to the region.  The forces cleared the whole area of resistance to Marwan II successfully.  They established the influence of Marwan II district by district, starting from Ahwaz and extending eastwards.  After his final defeat, Abdullah bin Mu’awiya ran to Khorasan.  Mansur bin Jumhur and Sulayman bin Hisham boarded a Sind bound ship to run away.  The Khariji’s scattered in all directions.  A group of them crossed the sea to reach Bahrain, where their leader ultimately got killed.  Another group of the Kharijis crossed the sea to reach Oman.  They got eliminated at the hands of local chieftains.  Still another group of the Kharijis ran to Kerman and after a few defeats there reached Sistan where it got perished in the fall of 747 CE.  Yazid bin Hubayra’s forces could bring the land up to fringes of Khorasan under order of Marwan II.²⁰⁵, ²⁰⁶

The ‘Ibadis in Hijaz

On August 25, 747 CE, when Marwan II’s governor of Hijaz, ‘Abdul Wāḥid bin Sulayman, was going to lead the people in Hajj, about seven hundred uniformed armed men appeared out of nowhere.  All the pilgrims got afraid.  The uniformed men introduced themselves a Kharijis and told the governor that their only intention was to perform Hajj without interference from the government.  The governor allowed them.²⁰⁹

This group of the Kharijis was ‘Ibādi.  Their spiritual leader was Abdullah bin Yahya who used to call himself Ṭāibl al Ḥaqq (the seeker of truth, or maybe justice).  Abdullah bin Yahya was a resident of Basrah but he had considerable influence in Hadarmaut because he had served as a Qadi there.  For the last few years Abdullah bin Yahya was utilizing the occasion of Hajj to disseminate his ideas and recruiting followers. Whoever got convinced of his intentions, moved to Hadarmaut from other parts of the county to build strength there.²¹⁰  When time was ripe, Abdullah bin Yahya chased the governors of Hadaramaut and Yamen out and took control of the region.²¹¹  It were disciples of Abdullah bin Yahya under command of Abu Ḥamzah Mukhtār bin ‘Awf al Azdi al Salīmi who had threatened governor Abdul Wahid.  After the Hajj was over, governor Abdul Wahid rushed to Medina, without making any security arrangements for Mecca, in case the Kharijis try to capture it.²¹²  The Kharijis sent a message to Abdul Wahid that he had not honoured the agreement he had entered into the Kharijis about the Hajj arrangements.  Abdul Wahid told them that it were actually they who did so.²¹³  Angered Kharijis captured Mecca.  From there they advanced towards Medina.  Combined aggregation of police force and the civilians of Medina came out of the town to defend themselves.²¹⁴ The Kharijis easily routed them.²¹⁵  They entered Medina on October 31, 747 CE, and used the pulpit of the Prophet to make speeches against the government and express their views.²¹⁶ Then they left for Wadi l Qura, probably with intentions over Syria.

By that time Marwan II had subjugated Syria and was not in fragile position anymore.  He sent a very well paid and well-armed army of four thousand Syrian Troops.²¹⁷  Most of the Kharijis died fighting.  The army chased them out of Medina, then Mecca and ultimately routed them in Yemen from where they had come.  Abdullah bin Yahya Talib al Haqq got killed in San’a.  Writ of Marwan II government established over Hijaz.²¹⁸

Hijaz and Yemen remained in control of Marwan II until his death.²¹⁹ However whole Arabian Peninsula never came under Marwan’s rule.  Local Kharijis belonging to Hanifa had taken control of Yamama and remained at the helm of affairs until Umayyad Caliphate ended.²²⁰

We can see there was a lot of opposition to the Umayyad rule during Marwan II’era.  Marwan II could partially succeed because the opposition was fragile and fragmented.

Borders of Marwan II

During Marwan II’s time uncertainty was of such a level in provincial capitals that people slept with one governor over them and woke up with another.  Obviously, border regions must be thoroughly neglected in such scenario.

Ifriqiya remained under control of Abdur Rahman bin Habib.  Marwan II exchanged gifts with him after coming to power.²²¹  It did not mean that Marwan II got any kind of control over this far off region.  It simply meant that Marwan II recognized the reality on ground.  Khariji ideology was rampart among Berbers.²²²  Caliph Hisham had hardly hid it under the carpet.  In fall of 746 CE Khariji Berbers became active again.²²³  This time they were under the influence of ‘Ibadi Kharijism.  The semi-independent government of Abdur Rahman bin Habib sent many campaigns to bring them to their knees.  Worst affected was Tlemcen (Tlemcān تلمسان).  Nothing worked.  Khariji sphere continued to expand until Abdur Rahman bin Habib got killed.²²⁴, ²²⁵  His brother Ilyās tried to hold against the Kharijis.  After Ilyas’s death his son Ḥabīb bin Abdur Rahman did the same thing.²²⁶  Both had blessing of Marwan II with them.  All failed.  ‘Ibadi Kharijis were the rising power.  They did not wane.²²⁷

In Spain Yusuf bin Abdur Rahman al Fihri, an opponent of central rule, was the most powerful politician from 747 CE onwards.²²⁸

We are not sure about the administration of Egypt during Marwan II’s time.  Probably it was not under his direct control because we hear of plans of Marwan II’s opponents to escape to Egypt after their defeat at the hands of Marwan’s forces.  Still we can assume that the administration of Egypt was at friendly terms with Marwan II.  Marwan II did not make any attempt to capture Egypt after taking oath of caliph.  It had been generally easy for anybody in charge of Syria in the past.

The regular summer raids to Anatolia in Byzantine Rome came to a dead end as soon as Yazid III died.  Ya’qubi notifies that there was no campaign against Byzantine Rome throughout rein of Marwan II²²⁹

Sind was out of reach of central government during last days of Yazid III.  Its lieutenant governor, ‘Arrār, had only nominal obedience to the governor in Iraq.  Sind had never sent any tax to the provincial government for years.  Province or center had not supported the lieutenant governor of Sind by any military force.  After defeat of Abdullah bin Mu’awiya, Mansur bin Jumhur had escaped to Sind.²³⁰  Mansur bin Jumhur appears to be affluent man.  He had boats loaded on camels when he reached the remote border district.  ‘Arrar felt threatened.  He ordered Mansur to halt at the western bank of River Indus.  Mansur quietly crossed the River at Sehwan and proceeded to Mansurah.  There he besieged ‘Arrar. After a while ‘Arrar accepted his fate and offered himself to the judgement of Mansur.  Mansur constructed a wall around his body after making him stand in an open field.  After capturing Mansura, Mansur sent his men to take control of Multan, Qnadabil and Daybal.  Mansur remained in charge of Sind until end of Umayyad Caliphate.²³¹, ²³²

Dog-fight in Khorasan

It is difficult to explain the conflict in Khorasan purely on tribal lines.  Salm bin Ahwaz was from Tamim.  He was right hand man of Nasr bin Sayyar, the leader of Mudar.  On night of April 14, 746 Harith bin Surayj of Tamim faction (‘ashīrah) of tribal warfare raided Merv.  Two raiders got captured.  Both of them were from Tamim.  Salm executed both of them without any hesitance, though before execution he acknowledged that he won’t spare them even if they were from Tamim.²³³  Salm bin Ahwaz remained loyal to the government of Nasr bin Sayyar because he was a government servant and the other Tamimis opposed the government because they did not get any share in the government.  Basically it was a fight for the pie whose pieces were getting smaller and smaller.

Each involved tribal leader had a program (sīrah) based upon religion but didn’t shun from popularizing his program in a particular tribal group.²³⁴  To complicate the situation, Kharijis also started siding with one tribal group against the other.  The non-Muslim Turks were politically non-existent because of the raids conducted by Nasr bin Sayyar by the end of Hisham’s tenure.  The newly converted mawlas were temporarily quiet.  The field was open for tribe based brigades of the military to fight without any interference from others.  During the tenure of Marwan II the tribal warfare of Khorasan went to the next stage.  It was a multilateral cut throat competition.  Nasr bin Sayyar’s Mudar performed comparatively better and he remained the formal lieutenant governor of the district.²³⁵

The Hashimiya movement

Marwan II had brought the core areas of Umayyad Caliphate under his realm by continuous warfare.  His authority over them was weak and he still had to re-organize a military force, an internal intelligence agency, and a network of bureaucrats to support him.  He never got time for all that. He had hardly finished re-occupation of Iraq, Hijaz and Yemen when all of a sudden a motivated army arose from Khorasan and started capturing his towns one by one by one.  These were the soldiers of the Hāshimiyah movement.  It was the beginning of a revolution – the Abbasid revolution.²³⁶, ²³⁷

The story of Banu Hashim

Descendants of two sons of Hashim, Abu Talib and Abbas had already parted ways completely at the end of First Arab Civil War.²³⁸  After end of Second Arab Civil War, when Umayyads became all in all, descendants of Abu Talib chose to remain dormant in Medina.  Muhammad, the son of Ali bin Husayn, lived an uneventful life in Medina.  He is reported to be four years of age at the time of murder of Husayn.²³⁹  He died at the age of fifty-seven in 735 CE.²⁴⁰  Ya’qubi exonerates him as ‘Abū Ja’far al Bāqir’ because he diligently sought knowledge.²⁴¹  He had four sons.  Two died at tender ages.  Only two survived into adulthood.  One of them was Ja’far.²⁴².

Banu Abu Talib had to come into contact with government higher ups occasionally.  When Caliph Sulayman stayed in Medina on his way to pilgrimage, for example, he seated Abdullah bin Hasan bin Hasan bin Ali bin Abu Talib next to him in a public gathering.  He called some Byzantine prisoners to slaughter them in front of people as a show of his authority.  He asked Abdullah to behead one of the prisoners.  Abdullah struck the prisoner with his sword so forcefully that not only the head separated from the trunk in one stroke, the metal chain broke as well.  Sulayman praised Abdullah saying that it was not the quality of the sword that worked, it was Abdullah’s ancestry.²⁴³  One can assume that such interactions between the Umayyad government and the descendants of Abu Talib were formality.  Abdullah had to visit the caliph because the later was in town.  The caliph had to seat Abdullah on his side because Abdullah had come to visit him.  The interactions don’t appear to be a choosing of either party.

Similarly, Banu Abu Talib had to use the government court system to settle their internal disputes.²⁴⁴  It simply symbolized acceptance of the government authority, rather than support to it.   They were apt to rebel whenever any of them got a chance.  Each of their rebellions was impulsive and ended up in producing a martyr.²⁴⁵

The behavior of descendants of Abbas was opposite to that of descendants of Abu Talib.  After end of Second Arab Civil War Ali bin Abdullah, the son of Abdullah bin Abbas, shook hand with the ruling Umayyads.²⁴⁶, ²⁴⁷ Once in Syria, Ali bin Abdullah developed special friendly relations with Caliph Abdul Malik.  He used to pay him social visits.  Both cracked jokes with each other.  Once Abdul Malik laughed at his son’s name “Muhammad bin Ali’.  He joked that such namesakes were no longer born in his armed forces.²⁴⁸  In 714 CE Ali bin Abdullah’s step mother accused him in the court of Caliph Walid of murdering his step brother.  Caliph Walid was so gentle to him that he accepted his defense that it was not he but his slaves who had committed the crime.  He gave him a lighter punishment of banishment to Ḥumaymah.²⁴⁹, ²⁵⁰  Ali bin Abdullah maintained his friendly relations with the caliphs of Umayyad Caliphate from Humaymah.  He was frank enough with caliph Hisham that he could beg money from him without hesitation.  Caliph Hisham was so informal with him that he could refuse paying him any money facetiously.²⁵¹  Ali bin Abdullah served as a captain in the armed forces of Umayyad Caliphate and his duty took him across the border in summer raids on Anatolia several times.  Rayṭā’ bint Ubaydullah, the mother of his most prestigious son Abu’ l Abbas was actually a widow of ruling Umayyad family.  He had talked to Umar bin Abdul Aziz for Rayta’s hand.²⁵²  This Ali bin Muhammad got affluent, earned much respect, and lead a successful life of seventy-eight years. ²⁵³

A revolutionary is born

Many times in history there is a fundamental and sudden change in political power.  Political scientists call it ‘political revolution’.  A common feature of any political revolution is that the population revolts against the government, typically due to perceived oppression.²⁵⁴ Necessary ingredient of a political revolution is a fundamental change in the constitution of a country.

The phenomenon of revolution is still not fully understood.  Political scientists are working on it.²⁵⁵  A common observation is that a revolution has its Intellectual protagonist.  The French Revolution was preceded by Rousseau and Bolshevik Revolution of Russia was preceded by Karl Marx.  The protagonist arms the future revolutionaries with revolutionary ideas.

Muhammad bin Ali, son of Ali bin Abdullah, was a true protagonist of a revolution.  He was a man of letters. He had knowledge of history and had a keen eye on present.  He used to tell his friends that there were three turning points in history of Islam.  One was the death of Yazid bin Mu’awiya (which made the caliphate hereditary), another was the completion of first hundred years of Islam (at which time the weakness of Umayyad rulers became apparent), and the last was the disturbances in Ifriqiya (which demonstrated that Mawlas could challenge the existing political system).²⁵⁶  Muhammad bin Ali used to boost confidence of his friends that it was very feasible to organize a cavalry of revolutionaries in Khorasan, use it to topple the central ruler of Umayyad Caliphate, and extract from the rulers the treasures hidden by them up to the lands of Maghrib.²⁵⁷  He was a motivational speaker and had capacity to imbibe hope in his listeners.²⁵⁸

Muhammad bin Ali started working on his revolution demurely in 719 CE (100 AH).

The philosophy of the revolution

Muhammad bin Ali claimed that Prophet Muhammad had said that the caliphate would ultimately slip out of hands of the Umayyads and would go to the descendants of Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib.  The Prophet had told it to only Abbas in secret and he did not bother to tell it to anybody else, including Ali.   The only person Abbas took into confidence about this Hadith was his son Abdullah.  Abdullah passed it to his son Ali, and Ali relayed it to his son Muhammad.  So it was a jealously guarded family secret.²⁵⁹

Mawla’s rebellions in Ifriqiya at the turn of first Islamic century convinced Muhammad bin Ali that time was ripe to divulge the Hadith of the Prophet about transmission of caliphate to at least some people outside his own family.²⁶⁰  He started talking about it to his confidantes.

Muhammad bin Ali was cognizant of the fact that Ali bin Abu Talib had served as a caliph and that time Muhammad bin Ali’s ancestor worked as his subordinate.  He also well understood that the descendants of Ali bin Abu Talib considered caliphate their birthright and many of them had fought to grab it.  To avoid any complications with the Alids, Muhammad bin Ali worked on a theme that caliphate would go to a ‘chosen one’ (al Riḍa).²⁶¹  This chosen one would be a descendent of Prophet Muhammad’s family but it was yet premature to tell who he would be.²⁶²

Official policy of Umayyad Caliphate was that Allah appoints a caliph and makes him guardian of religious knowledge of Prophet Muhammad.²⁶³  Shi’a Ali, on the other hand, believed that Prophet Muhammad had transmitted all his religious knowledge to Ali bin Abu Talib and since then one of his descendants had been a guardian of it.  A new theme about the religious knowledge of Prophet Muhammad emerged when Muhammad bin Ali became politically active.  Tabari informs us that once Abu Hāshim Abdullah bin Muhammad al Ḥanifiyah bin Ali bin Abu Talib went to Syria and met Muhammad bin Ali bin Abdullah bin Abbas.  He said to Muhammad bin Ali, “Cousin, I have religious knowledge (‘ilm) which I shall leave to you by default.  Do not divulge it to anyone; this authority which men long for will be in your family.”  He said, “I knew already; by no means let anyone hear it from you!”²⁶⁴ Ya’qubi also notifies the meeting of the two.  He adds some spices to the report.  According to this version Ali bin Abu Talib had told his son Muhammad bin Hanifiyah and Muhammad bin Hanafiyah had loyally relayed it to Abu Hashim Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Ali bin Abu Talib that the authority would go to the descend ends of Abbas.  Abu Hashim Abdullah also gave the blueprint of revolution to Muhammad bin Ali detailing where should he start from, whom he should bank upon and when to expect success.  Ya’qubi gives this event date of 716 CE, few years before Muhammad Ali became politically active.²⁶⁵, ²⁶⁶

Muhammad bin Ali named his revolutionary movement ‘Dawlah’.²⁶⁷  He named the propaganda of Dawlah as ‘Da’wah’.²⁶⁸  Word Da’wah had religious overtones.  Its meanings in Arabic are ‘an act of calling,  summoning, or inviting.’ It is used in inviting somebody to the true religion – Islam.²⁶⁹

Methodology of revolution

Muhammad bin Ali had observed the failure of multiple Shi’a Ali attempts on power due to their spontaneity without any fore planning.  He definitely didn’t want to repeat the mistake.  He chalked out an intelligent blueprint.  Muhammad bin Ali established an intricate network of communication for his revolutionaries.  Our modern research is demonstrating that the first pre-condition for success of any revolution is ability of the rebels to communicate with each other. The supreme leader of Hashimiyah revolution was going to stay in Syria, far from the ‘action’ and under the nose of caliph.  A liaison official was going to be stationed in Iraq.²⁷⁰  The liaison official was going to be the only link between the supreme leader and the Naqīb – leader of individual revolutionary cell.  Only the liaison official and some leading Naqibs were supposed to know who the supreme leader was.  The grass root level revolutionaries would strive for an ideology rather than for a personality.

The Dawlah did not instigate people to take up arms haphazardly.  It emphasized on preparing a party of political workers, well versed in the philosophy of the revolution, who could take up arms when commanded to do so.  The Naqibs used to organize study circles of the workers for their proper political training.  The attendees learned about Umayyad’s mismanagement of the country and their harsh treatment to the family of the Prophet.  They read books about apocalyptic battles (Kutub al Malāḥim)²⁷¹

Government of Umayyad Caliphate had no grit to stop anybody from performing Hajj.  It did not even have any means to pre-screen the pilgrims.  Its spies had no capacity to watch thousands of pilgrims for any anti-government activity.  The Hashimi revolutionaries and their leaders used the camouflage of Hajj for all their meetings.  Every year the leading Naqibs, the liaison official and the supreme leader reached Mecca and met without causing a single eyebrow to rise.  In these meetings they discussed the administrative matters of their movement, its financing and its future strategy. ²⁷²

Lastly, Muhammad bin Ali did not endeavor an impossible task to organize Dawlah in each nook and corner of the country.  He did a political analysis of existing discontent in the country.  He found Khorasan to be the most disturbed, most loosely controlled by central or provincial government, and most divided on political lines.  He decided to base his Hashimiyah movement there.

Nitty and gritty of Hashimiyah Revolution

In April of 719 CE lieutenant governor Jarrah bin Abdullah was facing major resistance from the Mawlas.  That time Muhammad bin Ali sent his liaison official, Maysarah Abu Riyāḥ, to Khorasan to initiate work on organization of resistance.  Two Arab helpers were with him.  The team discovered about seventy enthusiasts willing to support Muhammad bin Ali’s vision.  The team chose twelve people as Naqibs. They were a mixture of Mawlas and Arabs.  Their role was to develop the revolution further in their respective towns.  All of them received written plan of action from Muhammad bin Ali.  In turn, they also sent letters of promise to support to Muhamad bin Ali.²⁷³  The first attempt was not bad.

Slow take off

Revolutions do not take place by wishful thinking of leaders.  Revolutionary ideas might be present in a given society for decades but revolutions take place at their own timing.  At that time majority of society is dissatisfied with current political set up and the government is limited to an exclusive class.  People embrace the revolutionary ideas as a way to change the governing practices of the society.  Simultaneously, the government tries to curb down the revolutionary ideas violently.  Revolution never takes place against an inclusive government.

Around 723 CE Maysara died.  New liaison officer, Bukayr bin Māhān was ready.²⁷⁴  Bukayr bin Mahan and his Naqibs worked day and night but could not produce more than a few hundred enthusiasts.  The breakthrough came by the end of Hisham’s long malfeasance.

Ya’qubi reports that by the beginning of 740 CE, when Zayd raised flags of rebellion in Kufa, general public of Khorasan knew about the presence of the revolutionaries.  Increasing number of people joined them, even more sympathized with them.  There was hardly any town in Khorasan where a revolutionary cell was not functioning.   Yahya bin Zayd’s choice to escape to Khorasan after the defeat of the rebellion startled Caliph Hisham.  That was the time he summoned prominent Arab leaders and dignitaries to discuss the conditions in Khorasan.²⁷⁵

Umayyad Caliphate government of Khorasan fails to trace the revolutionaries

The revolutionary network of Hashimiyah revolution was so well organized that no police department of the country could bust into it.  Government spies had alerted the authorities in Khorasan as early as 720 CE about underground antiestablishment activities.  Government arrested a few suspects.  They all claimed to be non-political merchants performing their usual work peacefully without any involvement in other things.  Local soldiers not only witnessed in the courts to verify their claims, they also bailed them out assuming responsibility of their future conduct.   The provincial court had to release them.²⁷⁶

The revolutionaries worked under fake identity.  Not only they used a cover up trade for this purpose, as in above example, they used pseudonym as well.²⁷⁷  Sometimes they adopted a fictitious genealogical link to a powerful tribe in the area.  The courts had to be lenient with them on basis of their tribal affiliations, even if they were caught.²⁷⁸  They were cautious in their communications.  All letters contained code words which only the recipient could decipher.²⁷⁹

Despite many failures on the part of the provincial governments, examples are present where the provincial authorities could successfully get a revolutionary punished through the court system.  The punishments ranged from as lenient as lashing to as harsh as death sentence.²⁸⁰  Examples are also present where a revolutionary betrayed his fellows leading to arrest of many of his companions.²⁸¹  Still no government could reach to any leader of the movement.  The reason is simple.  No worker knew whom he was working for.  The problem could be on the government side as well.  All central rulers of Umayyad Caliphate from end of Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s government in 720 CE onwards had political cataract.  They could only see the Shi’a Ali and the Kharijis as their opponents.  They never suspected that anybody else could be behind the activities.  They had a fixed assumption that only one of Banu Abu Talib could be a brain behind Dawlah and limited the search for a leader among them.

Funding of the revolution

Big political movements cannot be sustained without monetary resources.  Ya’qubi reports presence of wealth in Muhammad bin Ali’s family.²⁸²  However, wealth of a single person can never be enough to cater the needs of an extensive secret network.  Hashimiyah movement had to devise some means.

All revolutionaries worked in Khorasan under disguise of being merchants.  They factually carried out trading activities.  Probably they imported silk from China and distributed it to Iraq and other rich cities of Umayyad Caliphate. ²⁸³  Their trading activities were so genuine that the local government could not dig out the political worker hidden behind a merchant.²⁸⁴

The merchant revolutionaries subscribed twenty percent of their income annually to support their political dreams.²⁸⁵  The money so generated was shifted in cash and kind to Mecca at the time of annual meeting.²⁸⁶  Muhammad bin Ali did not pocket the money.  He had designated a mawla of his for book keeping of this contribution.²⁸⁷

As the movement grew, so grew the amount of funds.  In 743 CE total contribution was two hundred thousand dirhams and clothes worth thirty thousand dirhams.²⁸⁸  In 744 CE it increased to twenty thousand dinars, and two hundred thousand dirhams in other currencies.  In addition the money was carried in the form of musk and other goods.²⁸⁹  In 746 CE it increased tremendously.   Three hundred and sixty thousand dirhams were cash.  A lot of money was carried in the form of sheer and heavy silk.  Still the rest of money was melted into small ingots of gold and silver and they were hidden in the linings of the merchant’s cloaks.  The package was so heavy that twenty mules carried it. Each mule had its own mounted armed guard.  They carried it through desert routes to avoid the highway police patrol of the provincial government.²⁹⁰

Internal disputes of the revolutionaries

The revolutionaries were not devoid of internal conflicts.  Major point of conflict was whose descendants would govern the country – Abu Talib’s or Abbas’s- in case the revolution succeeds.  The stance of Alids was well known in the country and there were die hard supporters for their stance.  Occasionally such a supporter entered into upper circle of the Hashimiyah revolutionaries.  He could have abducted the whole movement.  Muhammad bin Ali had to settle such internal conflicts tactfully.²⁹¹  It appears every time the conflict arose, Muhammad bin Ali’s vague doctrine – the chosen one would lead the country – worked.

Such disputes persisted throughout the struggle phase.  In a meeting of Naqibs in Merv in 746 CE, the president of the meeting warned his fellow Naqibs that they should remain alert lest anybody try to hijack the revolution in favour of Alids.  He said nobody should doubt that the Abbasid Imams are “a mine of Divine knowledge and the keepers of the legacy of the Messenger of Allah.”²⁹²

Two significant deaths

The Hashimiyah movement had its own low and high.  In the fall of 743 CE Muhammad bin Ali died at the age of sixty-seven years.²⁹³

Muhammad bin Ali was a visionary.  He knew that his sudden death could have jeopardized the movement if he did not prepare a number two at proper time.  Muhammad bin Ali had already prepared his son Ibrāhīm bin Muḥammad for the job.²⁹⁴  He took over seamlessly.  He was aware of all decisions and plans of Muhammad bin Ali and started working from the point Muhammad bin Ali had left.  Just after taking the charge of the movement Ibrahim bin Muhammad could send Bukayr bin Mahan all the necessary mandate (sīrat, full instructions how to proceed) and injunctions (waṣiyyah) and the middle tier leaders were more than willing to accept him as supreme leader.²⁹⁵

The second death was that of Bukayr bin Mahan who died in 745 CE.²⁹⁶  Again the death could not dent the movement.  Bukayr designated his son in law Abū Salmah Ḥafṣ bin Sulaymān as the liaison official.  Ibrahim bin Muhammad accepted the appointment without objection.²⁹⁷

The mysterious hero

The Hashimiyah movement had taken root in Khorasan, but despite all efforts it was not thriving. During the last years of his life Muhammad bin Ali was pondering over the causes.  If Hashimiyah movement had to succeed in Khorasan definitely, it had to distinguish itself from petty tribal politics.  It needed a tribe less face.  Abu Muslim Khorasan – father of Muslims and a resident of Khorasan – fulfilled the need. ²⁹⁸ Even now nobody knows who was he? One thing is sure that he was not an Arab.  If non-Arab, was he a slave or a mawla?    If he was a mawla, of which tribe or of which prominent Arab?  In their Hajj meeting of October 7, 743 CE the Naqibs introduced the name of Abu Muslim al Khorasani to the delegates.  Muhammad bin Ali asked, “Is Abu Muslim a free born man or a slave?”  They replied, “Īsā [the master of Abu Muslim] alleges that he is a slave but Abu Muslim himself says that he is free-born.”  Muhammad bin Ali recommended to “buy him and manumit him.”²⁹⁹  Few months later Bukayr bin Mahan, the liaison official of Hashimiyah movement, bought him.³⁰⁰  Bukayr had met Abu Muslim for the first time in Kufa jail where Abu Muslim was a personal servant of ‘Īsā bin Ma’qil.  Bukayr had got locked upped after being arrested on suspicion of being a Hashimiyah revolutionary.  Isa was a tax collector, serving jail because his superior governor had been dismissed.³⁰¹, ³⁰²

Abu Muslim becomes overall leader of Khorasan

Muhammad bin Ali had decided during his lifetime that Abu Muslim al Khorasani would be the new liaison official of the Hashimiyah movement.³⁰³  Probably he delayed the implementation of the decision because Bukayr had worked sincerely.  Death of Bukayr paved the way to Abu Muslim’s appointment.

In September of 745 CE, Abu Muslim was present in the Hajj meeting, where Ibrahim bin Muhammad saw him personally.³⁰⁴  Ibrahim bin Muhammad might be afraid that the Naqibs in Khorasan might reject Abu Muslim.  He arranged marriage of Abu Muslim with a daughter of one of the Naqibs and paid dowry personally.³⁰⁵  Still, when Abu Muslim reached Khorasan to take over the movement in the beginning of 746 CE, there were reservations among the Naqibs.  One of them raised objection to his young age and his capability to lead people.  Nobody objected to his lowly origin, though they might have considered it under the disguise of his age.  The differences resolved quickly because the appointment had come directly from the supreme leader.³⁰⁶

Decision to launch Abu Muslim was single most yielding decision of the supreme leaders.  He was a dynamic personality, who could win hearts on first sight.  The Hashimiyah movement not only thrived under his leadership, it grew to its full capacity.³⁰⁷

Dawn of Hashimiyah Revolution

The time Abu Muslim took overall command of the revolutionaries in Khorasan, carpet was fast slipping off the feet of the provincial governor.  Popularity of revolutionary ideas had spread to the government officers.  At least on two occasions Abu Muslim got caught at a road side blockade on a highway along with his ‘merchandise’ around March of 747 CE.  On both occasions the police officer involved was suspicious of true nature of the business.  On both occasions Abu Muslim took the police officer in confidence, informed him the true nature of his business, and the police officer let him go.³⁰⁸  Ibrahim bin Muhammad ordered Abu Muslim to let all revolutionaries come out of disguise in June of 747 simultaneously in all towns of Khorasan and start the revolution.³⁰⁹  The aim was to disclose the strength of revolution to the government.  Main gathering in this regard was at Safīdhanj, a village near Merv at the night of 9^th June 747 CE.  People had flocked from nearby villages and towns.  Abu Muslim unfurled two banners.  One was named ‘cloud’ and the other was ‘shadow’.  Explaining the significant of the names Abu Muslim told the rally that the way clouds cover the whole earth, the revolution would spread everywhere.  And the way cloud shadows everywhere, the revolutionary government will govern the whole earth at the end of time.  Abu Muslim recited the verse “Permission is given to those who fight because they have been wronged; surely Allah is able to assist them.”  (Qur’an 22:39).  All participants of the rally were clad in black, which became a symbol of the revolution.  That night inhabitants of many other villages around Merv lit fire at night as a show of confidence in the revolution.³¹⁰, ³¹¹  By 12^th of June 747 CE revolutionary convoys from distant towns had reached Fanīn, a village near Merv.  When a new convoy reached it chanted “Allah is Great’ and those already present responded “Allah is Great’.  Abu Muslim had arranged a camp type accommodation for them in the castle of Safidhan.³¹², ³¹³ 15^th of June 747 CE was Id ul Fitr.  Abu Muslim organized an extremely big prayer gathering in the grand open space (muṣṣalla.) of Fanin village as a show of power.  The usual feast after the prayer was open to all participants.³¹⁴  Everybody clad black and raised the revolutionary slogan, ‘O Muhammad! O Mansur.”³¹⁵  The Hashimiyah Revolution had erupted

Power struggle in Khorasan

Up to now Abu Muslim had been addressing Nasr bin Sayyar respectfully as “the amīr Naṣr” in his communiques.  Now, Abu Muslim disclosed his real intentions to Nasr and wrote to him “as for what follows, truly Allah, blessed be His names and exalted be His mention, reproaches certain folk in the Qur’an saying, ‘they swore the most binding oaths by Allah that if a warner came to them they would be more guided than any community, but when a warner came it only increased them in aversion, waxing arrogant in the land and plotting evil; but evil plots encompass only those who make them.  Do they expect anything but the way of the ancients?  You will find no changing in Allah’s way, nor any evading of the way of Allah.” (Qur’an 35:42 – 43).³¹⁶  Nasr got astonished at the letter.³¹⁷  He could quickly figure out the seriousness of the matter.  He wrote to the central government of Marwan II and the provincial government of Ibn Hubayra to urgently send reinforcements.  Both responded that Nasr should use his local resources to tackle the issue.³¹⁸  Nasr was clear.  Both had abandoned Khorasan.

Nasr sent a cavalry to Safidhanj where the revolutionaries were camping.³¹⁹  Abu Muslim’s fighters could easily push the cavalry back.³²⁰  Interestingly, the commander of the cavalry went back to Nasr all in praise for Abu Muslim.³²¹  This was the first clash between the government forces and the revolutionaries.³²²  The news of the outcome increased Abu Muslim’s popularity.  Within days his camp at Safidhanj got small for the people and Abu Muslim had to move to a bigger place.³²³  Now, Abu Muslim armed the revolutionaries, who were primarily civilians, to organize them into a militia.  The salary of each participant in the militia was only four dirhams, which sounds to be a pocket money of a volunteer rather than the remuneration of a professional soldier.  At the same time, he appointed security guards, a captain of the security guards, a qadi for the camp, an in charge of the chancery, and a leader of prayer, to complete his shadow government.  Salary of an officer was four thousand dirhams.³²⁴  Over the next few weeks, his revolutionaries blocked the roads leading out of Merv to Balkh, Abīward, Merv Rudh, Herat, Tarmidh, and Tukharistan, practically cutting off communication between towns of Khorasan.  They also started capturing peripheral towns wherever possible.³²⁵, ³²⁶

Khorasan was in the midst of tripartite tribal warfare.  The leaders of tribal fractions perceived Abu Muslim as a potential new entrant into the arena.  All of them opened negotiation with Abu Muslim to wee his support against the opponents.  At the same time they thought of setting their differences aside and give Abu Muslim a unified resistance so the new entrant could be ousted of the game.³²⁷  Abu Muslim had his own mindset.  He didn’t want to use his revolutionaries in petty tribal fights.  He intended at playing one tribal leader against the other pretending to be friends with one or the other.³²⁸  Abu Muslim’s strategy worked. The tribal fight didn’t cease.  The government forces could not give a unified fight to Abu Muslim.  They kept weakening each other.  On February 14, 748 CE, after eight months of political bickering, Abu Muslim and his revolutionaries entered Merv from one gate.  Governor Nasr bin Sayyar fled from the opposite gate.³²⁹  During the next few months Abu Muslim eliminated all tribal brigades by political manipulation, treachery and little fighting.  Not only this, he outmaneuvered the vestigial Kharijis, who were still active in Khorasan.  All towns of Khorasan fell under ambit of Abu Muslim.  Black flags hoisted all over Khorasan, from Samarkand to Herat.³³⁰

The oath of allegiance which Abu Mansūr administered on Hashimiyah forces on February 14, 748 after triumphant entry into Merv was: “I ask you for allegiance to the Book of Allah, may He be exalted and glorified, and to the Sunnah of His Prophet, Allah bless him and give him peace, and to obey the Chosen One (al Raḍa’) from the family of Allah’s Messenger. You must swear to do this by solemn oath and covenant with Allah, that [otherwise] your wives will be divorced and your slaves set free and you must go on foot to the House of Allah.  Pledge that you will not ask wage or pay until your superiors (wulāt) initiate it for you.  Even if enemy of one of you should be beneath his foot, you will not stir up strife except by the order of your superiors.”³³¹

Interestingly, the revolution copied the design and content of Abdullah bin Mu’awiya’s coins.  The coins issued by Abu Muslim in Khorasan included the same verse of the Qur’an about the significance of kinship, which Abdullah bin Mu’awiya was using as his political slogan on his coins.

The flood flows westwards

The revolutionaries did not wait for a single day after subsiding all resistance in Khorasan.  About ten thousand revolutionaries started their long march towards the core provinces of Umayyad Caliphate.³³³  A crowd of soldiers and other officials of Umayyad Caliphate started fleeing in front of them.  Each town the revolutionaries reached, the demoralized soldiers of Umayyad Caliphate prepared a combat, abandoned the effort after little fight and joined the fleeing crowd.  The effect of revolutionaries on the morale of the Syrian Troops can be gauged from an anecdote noted by Tabari.  About ten thousand soldiers died in the stampede that took place after a short combat with the revolutionaries at the city of Tus.³³⁴  The revolutionaries killed whomever they wanted to in this process.  Tus, Naysabur, Rayy, Hamedan and Isfahan, surrendered one by one.³³⁵  Governor of Iraq, Yazid bin Hubaiyrah had sent his troops to the dependent districts of Iraq to subdue any resistance to Marwan II government.  They had already chased Abdullah bin Mu’awiya away.³³⁶    This force had concentrated on Juzjan.  While on their long march, the revolutionaries diverted to Juzjan.  After a field battle on June 9, 748 CE, they defeated the troops of Umayyad Caliphate.  The revolutionaries not only killed all the soldiers they could, they did not spare even the Arab civilians, who were all Arab settlers and had sympathies with Umayyad Caliphate.³³⁷  The revolutionaries could not afford a pocket of resistance on their back while advancing towards Iraq and Syria.  On the way the number of the revolutionary forces swelled gradually.  By the time they reached Isfahan they were twenty thousand strong.  Governor Yazid bin Hubayra got panic. He organized a humongous force of one hundred and fifty thousand and sent it to halt the flow of the revolutionaries.  No soldier of Umayyad Caliphate was in mood of laying his life for the sake of the caliph.  After a sham encounter on March 18, 749 CE, the big army scattered.³³⁸  The civilians and soldiers of Nihavand gave some resistance.  They besieged themselves in the castle of Nihavand for three months.  Yet, time was not on their side.  The revolutionaries captured the town after breaking its wall with help of mangonels.  They killed all the Khorasani soldiers present in the town who were fleeing ahead of the revolutionaries town to town.  They spared the lives of the Syrian Troops and let them scatter.³³⁹.  When the revolutionaries reached Hulwan, they found the city abandoned by its forces and the governor.³⁴⁰  The number of people were continuously increasing in the revolutionary camp.  Both Marwan II and Ibn Hubayra had perceived the rise of revolution in Khorasan as a local fire whose flames they did not expect to reach their safe towns.  Now both felt the heat.  The last thing the revolutionaries wished was an open field encounter with combined forces of Iraq and Syria. They desired to tackle Iraq and Syria separately.  Now their commander sent a portion of the force, comprising of thirty thousand men, towards Jazira. This force defeated the advance forces sent by Marwan II at Shahrazūr on August 10, 749 CE.³⁴¹, ³⁴²  Marwan II knew the next target of the revolutionaries would be his capital Harran.  With speed of light he gathered all the Syrian Troops and the Jazira forces at his disposal and established a forward camp on the western bank of Great Zab River.  He dug trenches for his one hundred and fifty thousand or so soldiers and waited for the enemy.³⁴³

It was clear to Ibn Hubayrah that the rest of the revolutionaries, still entrenched in Hulwan, were preparing for assault on Kufa.  He gathered all the forces at his disposal, about fifty-three thousand in number, and marched towards Hulwan.  The revolutionaries dodged him to reach Kufa from the Anbar road.    After the ceremonial clashes with handful soldiers of Umayyad Caliphate the revolutionaries poured into the city during the last few days of August 749 CE.³⁴⁴  The town was in confusion.  Everybody clad black to welcome them rather than to resist them.³⁴⁵  Abu Salmah Ḥafṣ bin Sulayman al Khallāl, a long standing Naqib of Hashimiya revolution in Khorasan, acted as the leader of the revolutionaries in Kufa.³⁴⁶, ³⁴⁷  Ibn Hubayra got trapped in Wasit.³⁴⁸

Abu Salmah hurriedly sent small battalions to capture all the cities of Iraq, including Mada’in and ‘Ayn al Tamr.³⁴⁹, ³⁵⁰

Social background of the revolutionaries

All propaganda of Hashimiyah revolution was in Farsi.³⁵¹  This means the leaders of the Hashimiyah movement focused on an ethnic group rather than the whole population of Khorasan.  Lingua franca of the revolutionary force that swept from Khorasan to Kufa was Farsi as well.³⁵²  This was a revolution of Farsi speaking people.  However, there is no evidence to support that it was against Arabs.  The revolutionaries were more than willing to accept another Arab house after toppling Umayyads. ³⁵³, ³⁵⁴

Here and there the historical sources preserve what a revolutionary did for living.³⁵⁵  One can easily infer from this data that all the revolutionaries were civilians and trades people.  Some of them might be peasants but the data doesn’t support this hypothesis.  None of them was a high ranking government officer or a soldier.  Obviously it was frustration against the Hisham’s policies of taxation and government spending.  The revolutionaries wished confiscation of wealth amassed by the ruling house of Umayyads.  They were, however, least interested in nationalization of that wealth.

A large percentage of them were non-Muslims.   Tabari mentions presence of runaway slaves among the revolutionaries.  Their number was so great that Abu Muslim had to organize a separate brigade of them.³⁵⁶  The anonymous chronicler of 754 CE notes that many of them who participated in the last clash of the revolutionary war were Zoroastrians.³⁵⁷  Still, no doubt, the main body of the revolutionaries was Muslim.  It is apparent from the fact that their stated aim was to dislodge Umayyads from the government because they had suppressed the family of the Prophet and to replace them with a ‘chosen one’ from the descendants of the Prophet.

Last, but not the least, at no stage the runaway slaves opened their mouth against slavery.  They were interested in their personal freedom.  They were not fighting for abolition of slavery.

Ibrahim bin Muhammad arrested

A Farsi proverb goes ‘Each Faraoh has his Moses’ (har Fir’own ra Mūsa).  Leaders of Umayyad Caliphate could never imagine that the person who would bring their government down was operating right under their nose.  When Abu Muslim came out of disguise the Hashimiyah movement could no longer maintain the secret networking.  Marwan II government could intercept a letter which disclosed the true identity of the supreme leader of the movement.  Marwan II sent his police to Humaymah to trace Ibrahim bin Muhammad and arrest him.  Marwan II locked Ibrahim in Harran jail.³⁵⁸  Few days later Ibrahim bin Muhammad died in doubtful circumstances in Harran Jail.  Some traditionalists believe that he died a naturel death.  Others think he was poisoned by agents of Marwan II.³⁵⁹

In absence of the supreme leader, Ibn Muslim had personally supervised and guided all the active phase of the movement from capture of Merv to the capture of Kufa.

The ‘chosen one’ exhibited

The family members of Ibrahim bin Muhammad were bewildered at his death.  The brothers and sons of Ibrahim bin Muhammad were not sure if the revolutionaries, who had captured Kufa, would give them government like a cake in plate.  Some high ranking revolutionary leaders wanted a scion of Banu Abu Talib after death of Ibrahim bin Muhammad.³⁶⁰  Ibrahim’s family was afraid lest Banu Abu Talib take advantage of the situation in Kufa.³⁶¹ They hired camels and scooted to Kufa.³⁶², ³⁶³ Once in Kufa, they took residence in an inconspicuous house for many days.³⁶⁴  During this time they kept a low profile, developing links with those revolutionaries who would support them whole heartedly.³⁶⁵  Tabari tells us that they used arrows to select a candidate of Caliph from their family.³⁶⁶  The needle came on the name of Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Ali, Ibrahim’s twenty-eight years old brother.³⁶⁷  The family organized a small procession on 9 November 749 CE to take him to the grand mosque of Kufa.  There they announced him as Caliph and took oath of allegiance to him.³⁶⁸

Revolutionaries accept the new caliph

Apparently the common revolutionaries did not have any favourite personalities to be their leader.  Overwhelming majority of the revolutionaries had joined Hashimiyah only after the dawn of revolution. Probably their anger was against Marwan II.  They didn’t mind whoever governs the country after Marwan II.  Shi’a Ali portion of the revolutionaries might be interested in a personality from house of Ali, but they had yet not brought forward any name due to fresh routing our of Abdullah bin Mu’awiya.  Abdullah bin Muhammad did not have any trouble in sending his handpicked brothers to take command of revolutionary forces into their own hands and relieve the existing commanders from their posts.  Initially Abdullah bin Muhammad was doubtful.  As a trial he sent his Paternal uncle Abdullah bin Ali, the brother of Muhammad bin Ali, to take command of the revolutionary guards at Shahrazur.³⁶⁹  Nobody objected and the existing commander of the force stepped aside without hesitation.

The end of Kleptocracy

The revolutionary forces and the forces of Umayyad Caliphate faced each other for the last combat on January 25, 750 CE.³⁷⁰  Like a seasoned general, Marwan II organized his soldiers in fighting order, raised their moral by eloquent speech and ordered them to start displaying their utmost bravery to the enemy.  To his surprise, not a single soldier moved from his position.  ³⁷¹  Within minutes Marwan II could work out that his government was doomed.  He turned his face in opposite direction and started galloping along with a few loyal soldiers and family members, taking the central government treasury with him, abandoning his soldiers in the battle field.  The revolutionary army was in hot pursuit.

From Great Zab River to Mosul to Harran to Qinnasarin to Homs to Damascus to Jordan to Palestine to Egypt ran Marwan II.  The same scene repeated in each town.  First people saw a fearful caliph entering the town and leaving it hurriedly.  Second, after a while they saw the revolutionary guards filling the town streets.  Marwan II had not got time to make any announcement about the latest situation.  Inhabitants of the cities could guess from his body language that he was fleeing after a defeat.  They quickly clad black to save their necks.³⁷²

The regions of Egypt and beyond were already not under Marwan’s control.  He did not have any place to flee further.  He hid himself in the desert.  A scout party of the revolutionary guards could spot him, surround him and kill him.  August 6, 750 CE is the date Umayyad Caliphate died at the age of ninety years.³⁷³, ³⁷⁴

Marwan II’s descendants

Marwan II’s family members were with him at the time of his death.  Some got slain.  Two of his sons Ubaydullah and Abdullah fled aghast to Nubia.  They asked help from the ruler of Nubia.  He gently refused.  Both of them had to go to the unknown territory of Ethiopia.    Ubaydullah got killed at the hand of bandits in Ethiopia.  Abdullah remained vagabond for years.  He and his companions, including women, became bare footed and necked.  He aimed at reaching Yemen.  However, things had changed in the Islamic state.  He crossed the sea to Mandab and ended up working as a porter in Mecca.³⁷⁵

Banu Umayyah target of hate crime

Banu Abbas, as the new rulers are conveniently called, did not want any Umayyad comeback.  To assure they carried out a massacre of members of Umayyad house.  The massacre was totally disorganized and they killed whoever they could get hold of.  They included non-significant Umayyads commoners.³⁷⁶   The murderous spree included some people who don’t appear to be related in any way to Umayyads.  Their murder could be personal vendetta.  For example Umar bin Abu Salayman, a grandson of Abdur Rahman bin Awf got murdered.³⁷⁷  Confiscation of wealth of Umayyads was a stated objective of the revolution.³⁷⁸  Banu Abbas did not spare anybody in this regard.³⁷⁹  They even snatched those properties from members of Banu Umayyah which they had inherited from their forefathers without any involvement of the government.  Common people were not spared.  Properties allotted to them by the Umayyads were confiscated without any compensation.  ³⁸⁰  The Abbasids did not return Umayyad property in government ownership.  They distributed them among themselves.  Da’ūd bin ‘Ali bin ‘Abdullah bin ‘Abbās, for example, got the property of Maslamah bin Abdul Malik located in Iraq in allotment without paying a damn.³⁸¹, ³⁸²  Some Umayyad properties did not attract attention of Abbasids.  They remained in Umayyad hands.  Later on they lost protection of state and common people encroached on them.³⁸³, ³⁸⁴

The end

Thus the magnificent country called ‘Umayyad Caliphate’ and the first Islamic state ever built, whose ruler was technically supreme religious leader for whole ummah, shattered at feet of Hashimiyah movement in fragments and could never be repaired into a single country again.

End notes

1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 245, 246.  Year 125. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1053  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),87.  See also: Francesco  Gabrieli, “Al-Walid ibn Yazid: II Califfo e il poeta”, Rivista degli studi orientali, 15 (1934): 4 – 6.  AND Steven Judd, “Reinterpreting al-Walīd b. Yazīd,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 128 no. 3 (Jul – Sep) (2008): 439 – 458.
2. See the observation of the anonymous chronicler of 754 CE: “For this it has always been held as a norm among the Arabs, that they only accept all successions of Kings through prior nominations of Kings through prior naming by the princes, so that when the person dies removed from stumbling blocks they assume the governance of the regime.” (Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160)
3. Yazid bin Abdul Malik had made Hisham his heir apparent. Hisham was in Jazira.  Yazid bin Abdul Malik, later, wished to make his son Walid as heir apparent.  A middleman settled the matter between Hisham and Yazid and Yazid agreed to make Walid heir apparent after Hisham.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1030, 1031.)  Walid bin Yazid was fifteen at the time of his father’s death.  So Yazid bin Abdul Malik used to repent why did he appoint his brother Hisham heir apparent because his son had grown up.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),87. )
4. The constitutional principle of the right of sitting caliph to appoint a heir at his own discretion and any of his subjects is clear from a letter written by a certain Al Naḍr on June 13, 742 CE to all governors of the country on behalf of Walid II:  In the name of Allah, the Merciful, and Compassionate, give the oath of allegiance to the servant of Allah, al-Walīd, the Commander of the faithful, and to al Ḥakam, the son of the Commander of the Faithful, if he outlives him, and to ‘Uthmān, the son of the commander of the faithful, if he outlives al Ḥakam, to heed and to obey.  And if anything should happen to either of them, the Commander of the Faithful will appoint as his successor someone from amongst his sons or subjects, giving precedence to whom he wishes and holding back whom he wishes.  In this matter the oath and covenant of Allah are binding upon you.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 105.)
5. Hisham bin Abdul Malik himself wished to name his son Mu’awiya bin Hisham as heir apparent.  He died suddenly when he chased a fox for fun and his horse unseated him.  He died on the spot.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),82).  Christian sources show him dying in a war. However it is unlikely given the fact that martyrs were celebrities.  Islamic sources don’t attach any such honors to Mu’awiya bin Hisham.
6. The constitutional duties of a caliph are clearly defined in a letter written by Yusuf bin Umar, the governor of Iraq to his lieutenant in Khorasan Nasr bin Sayyar on May 21, 743 CE.  In this letter Yusuf establishes a preliminary premise that Allah had sent prophets to guide the mankind.  Prophet Muhammad was the last, and with his death He put a seal on any further revelations.  From it he deduces :  “Then Allah appointed His caliphs to follow in the path of Prophet Muhammad’s prophetic ministry, after He had taken His prophet unto Himself, and (after) He had sealed His revelation by Muhammad, in order that His rule should be accomplished, His Sunnah and His penalties established, and His precepts and laws adopted.  This was done so that, by His caliphs, Allah might confirm Islam, by them He might consolidate its sway, by them He might strengthen His rope, by them He might safeguard its sanctities, (and) by them He might administer justice amongst His servants and might maintain the common weal in His lands.  For Allah, most blessed and glorious, says: “And if Allah had not repelled some men by others the earth would have been corrupted.  But Allah is a Lord of Kindness to (His) creatures.” (Qur’an 2:251).  (Tabari reproduces the copy of the letter at: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),108, 115)
7. “Allah, may the utterance of His name be glorified, also said, “And when thy Lord said unto the angles: ‘Lo! I am about to place a viceroy (khalīfah) in the earth,’ they said: ‘Wilt Thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, hymn Thy praise and sanctify Thee?’  He said, ‘Surely I know that which ye know not.” (Qur’an 2:30).  So it is by the caliphate that Allah preserves those of His servants on earth whom it is His will to preserve and those whom He has appointed to inhabit the earth. It is in showing obedience to those whom Allah has appointed to rule on earth that there lies happiness for those whom Allah inspires thereto and who are made to understand it,” writes Yusuf bin Umar, the governor of Iraq to his lieutenant over Khorasan on May 21, 743 CE, explaining the theory that disobeying a caliph is a sin.  In the same letter Yusuf explains that, “The special repository of blessing bestowed on the community in this world, next to His caliphate which He established for them as a foundation and as a support for ruling them, is the covenant which Allah directed His caliphs to confirm and oversee for the Muslims in matters of moment; so that, whenever something befalls their caliphs, it might be an assurance of refuge, a shelter in times of calamity, a means of repairing disorder and of reconciling mutually hostile men, a way of consolidating boundaries of Islam and of frustrating what the Devil’s followers desire from the enticements and to which he incites them, which is the destruction of this religion, the division of the unity of its people, and the sowing of dissension where He has united them through His religion.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 109, 111, 115).
8. Almost all rulers of Umayyad Caliphate had tried to annul or modify the will of their predecessor.  None of them succeeded.  That is the reason Marwan bin Muhammad commented on Hisham’s wish to annul the will of his predecessor, “Hisham ‘sought to achieve something that was too difficult for him.  People of unsound opinions and beliefs responded to him in that, but they also found what he desired too difficult.”.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 101).
9. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),87.  For Walid bin Yazid’s age also see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 141.
10. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 88.
11. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),89
12. An eye witness of Walid bin Yazid’s alcohol drinking was Abu Zinād (a jurist and traditionalist).  He reports that he went to see caliph Walid bin Yazid for official things.  Both dined together and after that prayed the evening prayer together.  Then they had a lengthy conversation until it was the time of the night prayer.  Both prayed together.  After praying, Walid sat in the mosque and asked for wine.  Abu Zinad was still with him.  Three slave girls brought wine for him in a covered vessel and presented to him in a formal way.  Each time he finished the peg he called for another.  Slave girls continued to present wine to him until late night.  Abu Zinad claims that Walid bin Yazid drank seventy cups of wine that night.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 165, 166.)
13. The tastes and habits of Walid bin Yazid can be guessed from study of frescoes on Qasr Amra, which he commissioned to build.  For details of the frescoes see: Patricia Baker, “The Frescoes of Amra’ ” Saudi Aramco World 31 (4) July – August (1980): 22 – 25
14. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 88
15. Photo credit: Haupt & Binder. For the description see: Patricia Baker, “The Frescoes of Amara,” Saudi Aramco Word 31 no 4 (Jul. – Aug. 1980): 22 – 25
16. When Hisham bin Abdul Malik had to pick a new deputy governor of Khorasan after death of Asad bin Abdullah in 738 CE, he short listed six possible candidates.  Out of them he rejected the name of Uthman bin Abdullah al Khikhkhīr on basis that he was a drinker.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 188.).  Sinful behavior on part of high ranking government officers in public was not acceptable to the public either.  During Hisham bin Abdul Malik’s tenure, Yazīd bin Gharīf of Hamdan was appointed governor of Sijistan.  From the beginning of his time in the office he sinned openly.  Five Kharijis killed him in a suicide attack when he was attending a public meeting with five hundred guards present.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1037, 1038.).
17. Actually, Hisham was so pre-occupied with the fears of future of Umayyad Caliphate in the hands of Walid bin Yazid that he could not hide his anxiety.  He used to talk to every Tom and Harry around him about it.  Once he asked Nasṭās/ Anastasios Abu Zubayr, a Greek mawla, would people of Umayyad Caliphate be satisfied if Walid becomes caliph?  He answered they were simply constitutionally bound to accept him through the oath of allegiance they had given to Walid decades ago.  Rhetoric of Walid bin Yazid was that it was Allah who had destined him to be a caliph.  Nobody could prevent him from being a caliph except Allah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 96.)
18. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 88, 89
19. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 92
20. Azraq was a citadel in Wadi Sirḥān, 27 km from Quṣayr ‘Amrah.  Its ruins can still be seen.
21. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 95.
22. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 89
23. Actually Hisham remained respectful towards Walid bin Yazid until he started drinking alcohol.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 88.
24. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),89
25. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 90
26. Qaṣr ‘Amrah is a desert palace located near Azraq in modern Jordan. For the notes of original discoverer see: Alois Musil, Kusejr ‘Amara, Vienna: K. K. Hof Und Staatsdruckerei, 1907. The book is in German language. For the description and discussion of the Frescos see: Garth Fowden, Quṣayr ‘Amra: art and the Umayyad elite in late antique Syria, Berkeley, CA: University of California press, 2004.
27. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 108 – 115, 127
28. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129
29. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129.
30. see above.
31. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 130.
32. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),103, 104.
33. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 130.
34. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 131, 132, 174.
35. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 253, Year 125. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1055.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 130, 177.
36. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 136.
37. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1056. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 16
38. See for details: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1055.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 100, 127, 128, 129.
39. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),.127. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1055
40. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1055
41. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1055.
42. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 367
43. For details see: Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160
44. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 115.
45. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 115.
46. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 118, 119, 207.
47. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 253, Year 125; P 259, year 126. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 119, 120.
48. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 119, 120.
49. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1055.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129.
50. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 158.
51. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129
52. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129, 137.
53. Hakam was major.  Walid appointed him governor over Damascus.  Uthman was minor.  Walid appointed him governor over Homs under tutelage of a jurist (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1053.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 104, 129.)  This was the first example in Islam that a government official worked under tutelage.
54. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 160.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985),2
55. One of the person who believed in this rumor was Khalid bin Abdullah, ex-governor of Iraq.  One can imagine if people with political acumen could believe in rumors, what about lay masses
56. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 138.
57. Common people of the country grasped the gravity of the situation.  A jailor of Dahlak Island jail, for example, once commented to the prisoners frankly that according to his analysis the days of Walid II’ were numbered and that after him the government will slip out of Umayyad’s hands.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129.)
58. A Fresco at Qusayr Amarah. The figure is identified as Walid bin Yazid, before he became a caliph. See: Beatrice Leal, “The Symbolic Display of Water in the Qusayr Amra Bathhouse, in Holy water in the Hierotopy and iconography of the Christian world, ed Lidov Alexi (Moscow: Theoria, 2017): 233 – 254. The book is in Russian.
59. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 254, 255 year 126. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 137, 141, 142, 143, 147.
60. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 254, 255 year 126. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 144, 145, 146, 147.
61. Walid II punished his client with lashes when he broke the news that the people were plotting against him.  See: (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1056. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 148.
62. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 148.
63. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 254, 255 year 126. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1056.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 149, 150.
64. The site of Bakhra is in eastern Syria but has many suggestions, one suggestion is 25 km south of Palmyra.  le strange Palestine 530.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 149, 150.  Khalifa describes it near Tadmur (Palmyra): Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 254, year 126.
65. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 254, 255 year 126. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 149, 150, 152 – 159
66. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 256, year 126. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 153
67. When Yazid bin Walid decided to display Walid’s severed head in Damascus, Yazid’s well-wishers warned him that the gesture could be politically costly for him.  ‘This kind of show was reserved for the rebels.  Displaying the head of a caliph might generate public sympathies for the slain caliph,” they argued.  Yazid bin Walid didn’t heed the suggestion.  When the head actually passed through the bazaars of Damascus, people greeted it joyfully.  Even Walid II’s own family kept quiet.  His body did not get a burial. Nobody prayed over him. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 256, year 126. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1056. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 161.)
68. Brief details in a modern history: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 91, 92, 93
69. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 254, year 126.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1056. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 126, 164, 196.  He was about 35 years old at the time of his death:  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 254, year 126.
70. For its name and the time of start in historical sources see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 183.  For its description in modern histories see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 243.  AND G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 90
71. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 261, year 126. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1056. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 180.
72. See Hawting’s comments.  He calls the tenure of Yazid III ‘Short lived tenure of piety’: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 94 – 96
73. Actually some circles demanded Hakam bin Walid, the heir apparent of Walid II, to be installed in the office of caliph according to the constitution, which stipulated clearly the procedure of power change after the death of a caliph.  Yazid III rejected the pleas banking on popular rumors that Hakam bin Walid was still a minor.  “The orphan was not yet entitled to use his money by himself, how whole Ummah could be handed over to him”, was his argument.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 185)
74. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 256, 257, year 126.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 194.
75. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 256, 257, year 126.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 193, 194, 195.
76. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 193.
77. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 262, year 126. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 238.
78. Islamic traditions note that Yazid III had consulted his advisors on the matter.  He had appointed Abdul Aziz bin Hajjaj bin Abdul Malik, another Umayyad and his buddy, as second in line.  However, the consultations were not as extensive as his claims of public consultation suggest.  Tabari dates this event to August 744 CE.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 262, year 126. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 238.)
79. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 194.
80. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 185
81. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057.
82. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 180.
83. Born and raised in Jazira, Marwan bin Muhammad was the grandson of caliph Marwan bin Hakam.  Hisham had appointed him governor of Armenia and Azerbaijan in March of 732 CE.  His main role as governor of the border districts was to fight against Khazars and the Byzantine.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 230, Year 114;  P 259, year 126; P 305, year 131; P 210, Year 105.)
84. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 261, year 126. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 180, 244.
85. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 183.
86. For details see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057.
87. Ya’qubi reports that the disobedience to the central government by the military regiments stationed in Homs, Palestine, and Jordan were direct result of decrease in the salary of the soldiers.   (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057.)
88. Islamic sources note special units of military during campaigns of Hisham government which are known by the name of their leader rather than by the tribe they belonged to or by the geographic region they belonged to.  Most likely they were private armies of rich who were allowed to operate only under the umbrella of official military and only across the border.  The private armies were managed like a business venture.  One of them was Waḍḍāḥiyyah, which was known after its owner al-Waḍḍāḥ.  It participated in raids over Anatolia.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 190, Year 97; P 218, 209, Year 107.   AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),30).  Another such privately owned and operated army was Dhakwāniyyah.  It belonged to Sulayman bin Hisham.  When Syrian Troops dissipated, such armies played a pivotal role in the civil war.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 185, 188, 189.) Private armies were everywhere in Umayyad Caliphate.  Tabari mentions one such private army by name of Ṣahṣaḥiyyah corps in September of 748 CE at Hamedan.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 125.)
89. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 213, 215, 216
90. The Syrian Troops were reluctant to fight against the central government on behalf of Marwan bin Muhammad.  Their stance was that they were employees of central government and would follow instructions of caliph whichever he would be.  Marwan bin Muhammad convinced them to accompany him on promise that they would not go back to the borders.  They would settle in their home towns in Syria.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 218, 240).  It appears Marwan didn’t need them in Syria.  He had got twenty thousand loyal soldiers of Jazira provincial government.  His worry was that the Syrian Soldiers might rebel once he leaves his province.
91. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 239- 243
92. Harran of Arabic sources is the village of Harran in Sanliurfa province of Turkiye.  Medieval ruins are still present in the village.
93. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 183.
94. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 185, 188, 189.
95. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 186, 187, 188, 189, 190.
96. See details:   Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 185 – 193.
97. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 196.
98. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 196.
99. Mansur bin Jamhur was a commoner.  He was not the mastermind of conspiracy which ended up in murder of caliph Walid II.  He had joined the killer contingent when Yazid III had captured Damascus and had offered money to anyone who was willing to kill the caliph.  That time Yazid III appointed Mansur over a small battalion under overall command of Abdul Aziz bin Hajjaj.  Mansur was one of those ten men who killed caliph Walid II personally.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 148, 151, 154)
100. See above.
101. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 197, 198.
102. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 196, 199, 202.
103. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 262, year 126.
104. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 196, 198.
105. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 199, 201.
106. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 196, 199, 200, 201.
107. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 197.
108. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 219.
109. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 220.
110. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 263, year 126. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 199, 200, 220.
111. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 264, year 126. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 368
112. After coming to power Yazid III had not appointed anybody governor of Medina.  Yusuf bin Muhammad was governor of Medina for Walid.  Yusuf forged a document showing that Yazid III had appointed him.  That is the reason Yazid dismissed him in fall of 744 CE.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 238.
113. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 264, year 126.
114. Even the caliph was compelled to use the tribal card.  Yazid III was able to hold his position due to support from certain elements of Banu ‘Āmir of Kalb.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 186.).
115. For the term ‘aṣṣabiyah and its meaning see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 103.
116. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 208.
117. See above.
118. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 209.
119. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 210.
120. For happiness over Nasr’s leadership see the poems composed in Khorasan on the topic: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 210.
121. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 220 – 230.
122. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 227.
123. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 220 – 230.
124. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 220.
125. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 234, 235, 236, 237.
126. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 221, 227
127. See blunt refusal of Nasr bin Sayyar to step down when Mansur bin Jamhur asked him to do so in his capacity of a temporary governor of Iraq: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 207
128. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 265, 266, year 126.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 9.
129. Shaharazur is unknown location.  Marj is Marj al Safr.
130. see above
131. For his genealogy see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 58.
132. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 270, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 255.
133. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 270, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 256
134. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 255, 257
135. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 270, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 255.
136. We don’t hear of anybody sending a single dirham to the centre during Yazid III’s period
137. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 261, year 126.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 243.
138. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 243.
139. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 262, year 126.  Ya’qubi suspects that his brother Ibrahim might have poisoned him.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057)
140. For the length of his tenure see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1057.
141. Yazid III’s mother was Shāh-i- Afarīd bint Firūz bin Yazdegard III.  She had come in loot of Samarkand to Walid bin Abdul Malik.  Yazid III remained proud of his maternal ancestry.  People had heard him boasting that he was the son of Kira and Marwan.  He claimed that his one grandfather was a Qaysar, the other a Khaqan.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 261, year 126. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1056. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 243.)
142. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 236.
143. For an example of criticism of Yazid III on the hands of a religious leader of Syria see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 197.
144. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 248.
145. Ibrahim was a son of concubine by name of Su’ār.  He might have the same image problem which Yazid III supposedly had.  For the name of her mother see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1058
146. Some military officers in Armenia chanted tribal slogans to dislodge the provincial government of Marwan bin Muhammad.  Their leader was Thābit bin Nu’aim of Judham tribe.  Marwan bin Muhammad could handle him well.  Kharijis also raised their head by the same time under their leader Musāfir al Qaṣṣāb.  Khariji’s resistance to the government was low impact and continued until the end of Umayyad Caliphate.   (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),  328.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1058.)
147. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 266, year 127. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 215.
148. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 266, year 127. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 251, 152.
149. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 266, year 127. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 250.
150. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 266, year 127. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1058.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 2.
151. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 267, year 127.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1059. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 249.
152. Majority of defeated soldiers did not have even means to flee.  Marwan paid them one dinar per head as fare to go home.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 249).
153. ‘Ayn al Jarr is modern Anjar in Bekaa valley of Lebanon on the road from Damascus to Baalbek.  Significant Umayyad ruins are present on the site.
154. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 267, year 127.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1060.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 189.
155. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 268, year 127.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1060.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 152
156. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 268, year 127.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1059.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 247, 151, 152, 153.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985),1
157. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 268, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 2, 3.
158. Ibrahim bin Walid hid in Damascus when forces of Marwan II captured it.  Later he appeared in front of Marwan II and applied for pardon.  Since then Ibrahim remained with Marwan, fighting on his side, until he drowned in the Zāb River during the battle against ‘Abdullah bin Ali.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 268, year 127.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1059. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 247. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985),4.).  The anonymous chronicler of 754 CE doesn’t agree with Islamic sources.  He reports that Marwan II killed Ibrahim.  See: Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160.  Sulayman bin Hisham had escaped to Tadmur (Palmyra).  He also visited Marwan II and applied for pardon.  Marwan II granted it.  Marwan II never trusted them.  Apparently he kept both of them in his company.  According to Tabari ‘both used to sit on Marwan II’s table to dine and take supper and rode with him in his train’.  However, one can read it as ‘both had to sit on Marwan II’s table to dine and take supper and had to ride with him in his train’.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 268, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 4, 5.).  Abdul Aziz bin Hajjaj was second in line for the office of caliph according to Yazid III’s will.  Marwan considered it prudent to let him be killed at the hands of Walid II’s supporters.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 268, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 247.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 2. 
159. For Hawting’s comments on Marwan II tenure see: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 96 – 103
160. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 3.
161. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 4
162. For political ideology of Marwan II see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 214.
163. For the number of troops Marwan used to capture Damascus see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 251, 152.
164. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 12, 13
165. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 256
166. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 270, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 253, 255
167. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 255, 260, 262, 263.
168. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 270, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 253, 255. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 85.
169. Mahan is a village near modern Kerman in Iran.  See Le Strange, Lands 191
170. Current location: private collection. Stuck in Jayy mint in 746 CE. Obverse: field: ‘la ilāhah illalāh waḥdahu lā Sharīka lahū’ (no God but Allah, He is One, He has no partners). Outer margin: in the name of Allah this dirham was stuck at Jayy the year nine and twenty and one hundred. ‘Abd Allah bin Mu’awiyah. Observe inner margin: ‘Qul lā as’alakum ‘alayhi ajran illa al-mawaddata fi al-qurba’ (Say, I ask of you no reward for this other than love of kin [Q 42:23]). Revere, field: ‘Allah Aḥad, Allah al- Ṣmad lam yalid walam yū lad walam ya kulluhū kufowan aḥad’. (Allah is One, Allah is eternal. He does not beget nor is he begotten and there is none like unto him [Q112]). margin: ‘Muhammad is the messenger of Allah who sent him with guidance and the religion of truth that he might make it supreme over all other religions, even though the polytheist may detest it’ (Q9:33)
171. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 14.
172. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985)10 , 12.
173. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 11, 12.
174. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 12
175. see above.
176. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 271, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 9, 10
177. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 272, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 11. 12
178. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 272, year 127.   AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 11
179. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 272, year 127.   AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985),12, 13, 15.
180. Nukhayla was near Kufa Yaqut Mu’jam IV 771
181. Nukhayla was a military camp near Kufa, on the road towards Syria.  See: Ya’qut, Mu’jam al Buldan, Vol. 5, P 278.  Exact location is not known.
182. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 273, year 127. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 11, 15.
183. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 15.
184. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 273, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 15.
185. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 273, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 11, 13
186. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 273, year 127. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 11.
187. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 16.
188. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 273, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 18, 19, 49.
189. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 273, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 24, 49.
190. Dastmaysan was at the border of Khuzestan and Iraq.  Exact location is unknown.
191. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 263, year 126.
192. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 266, year 127.
193. See Thabit’s role above.
194. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 269, year 127. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1060, 1061, 1062.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
195. During process of subduing the resistance in Syria, Marwan II ordered reduction of height of the walls of Homs to prevent it being used by rebels in future.  The action offended many as they perceived it illegal.  Caliph Umar bin Khattab government had guaranteed against demolition of this wall in the contract with people of Homs had entered at the time of Futuhul Buldan.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 269, year 127.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 205, 206.  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1062.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 5.)
196. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 7, 8
197. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 7.
198. They included ex caliph Ibrahim and his chief of army staff, Sulayman bin Hisham.  They also included a surviving son of Abdul Malik,  all sons of ex-caliphs, and Marwan II’s own brothers.  The only exception was Abdullah bin Umar, who was at large in Iraq. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 8.)
199. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1061  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25.
200. Submission of prominent Umayyads like Sulayman bin Hisham and Abdullah bin Umar to the Kharijis appeared funny to the Arabs.  A satirical poet Shubay bin ‘Azrah al Ḍubba’ī said “See ye that Allah made His religion prevail; so Quraysh prayed behind Bakr bin Wā’il?”  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 273, year 127.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 23.)
201. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 24.
202. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 275- 280, year 128;  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1060, 1061.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 24 – 26, 49 – 57.
203. Azerbaijan and Armenia had Kharijis of their own brands.  They sometimes collaborated and other times clashed with those who held Mosul.  See details:  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 277, 278, year 128.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 328  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1060.
204. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 56, 57, 58.
205. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 284, year 129.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 52, 57, 58, 59, 60, 85 – 89, 126, 127
206. Abdullah bin Umar got arrested and died of plague in Harran jail.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 167.)
207. Obverse: in field: ‘no god except Allah, He has no associate, in the name of Allah this dirham was struck in Sijistan year one and thirty and one hundred’; in margin: ‘Say, I ask of you no reward for this other than love of kin’ (Q 42:23). Reverse, in field: ‘Allah is one Allah is eternal, He does not beget nor is He begotten and there is none like unto Him’ (Q112); in margin: ‘Muhammad is the messenger of Allah who sent him with guidance and the religion of truth that he might make it supreme over all other religions, even though the polytheists may detest it.’ (Q 9:33). Year 131 started on Sep 3, 748.
208. Obverse: in field: ‘no god except Allah, He has no associate, in the name of Allah this dirham was struck in Sijistan year one and thirty and one hundred’; in margin: ‘Say, I ask of you no reward for this other than love of kin’ (Q 42:23). Reverse, in field: ‘Allah is one Allah is eternal, He does not beget nor is He begotten and there is none like unto Him’ (Q112); in margin: ‘Muhammad is the messenger of Allah who sent him with guidance and the religion of truth that he might make it supreme over all other religions, even though the polytheists may detest it.’ (Q 9:33). Year 131 started on Sep 3, 748.
209. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 90
210. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1061.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 53, 90.
211. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 281, year 129.
212. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 283, year 129.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1061. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1061.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 53, 90, 91.
213. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 91
214. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 92.
215. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 289, 290, 291, year 130.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1062.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 112 – 118.
216. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 115 – 118.
217. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 292, year 130.  AND  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1062. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 118, 120.
218. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1062.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 120 – 121.
219. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 309, year 132.
220. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 308, year 132.
221. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 368
222. see above
223. For the date see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 287, year 129.
224. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 286, 287, year 129;  P 309, year 132.
225. Tlemcan of Arabic sources is Tlemcen in modern Algeria.
226. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 368
227. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 368
228. Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160
229. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1074.
230. See above.
231. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 264, year 126; P 279, year 128;  P 308, year 131; P 309, year 132.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1062, 1063.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 6.
232. Some people claim that it is he who changed the name of Mahfuzah to Mansurah.
233. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 28.
234. For the use of word Sirah for political program see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 29.
235. See details:   Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 280, year 128; P 285, 286, year 129; P 287, year 130.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1063.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 28 – 85
236. For the name ‘Hashimiya’ see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 96.
237. For details of the movement from the pen of a modern historian see: Hawting’s description of Hashimiya: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 104 – 118
238. See above
239. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1038.
240. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 235, Year 118.   AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1038.
241. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1038.
242. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1039.
243. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),63.
244. See the court case between Zayd bin Ali and Ja’far bin Hasan bin Hasan (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),8, 9, 10, 11.)
245. See above
246. See above
247. Ali bin Abdullah was born on 28 January 661 CE, the night Ali bin Abu Talib got assassinated.  At that time the relations between the two cousins were so genial that Abdullah bin Abbas named his son after his slain cousin, Ali. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1040.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129. )
248. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129.
249. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1001.
250. Ruins of Humaymah are present about 55 km north of Aqaba in modern Jordan.
251. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1041
252. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 10220.
253. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 235, Year 118.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1040.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129.
254. Allan Bullock and Stephen Trombley, The New Fontana Dictionary of Medern Thought, (London: Harper Colins, 1999, 754 – 46.
255. See: Jack A. Goldstone, “Theories of Revolutions: The third generation”, World Politics 32 no. 3 (Apr) (1980): 425 – 53.  AND John Foran, “Theories of Revolution Revisited: Towards a Fourth Generation”, Sociological Theory 11 no. 1 (Mar.) (1993): 1 – 20.  AND Clifton B. Kroeber, “Theory and History of Revolution, Journal of World History 7 no.1(Spring) (1996): 21 – 40.
256. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 148.
257. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 148.
258. See for example:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),83
259. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 147.
260. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 148.
261. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 96.
262. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 148.
263. See above.
264. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 147.
265. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1008 – 1010.
266. This theme is discussed in Farouk Omar, The Abbasid Caliphate, 132/750 – 170/786.  (London:  SOAS University of London, 1967): 59 – 67
267. For use of this name see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1046, 1047.
268. For use of this word for Abbasid propaganda see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1059.
269. M. Canard in Encyclopedia of Islam, S.V. Da’wa.
270. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1022, 1023.
271. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1045, 1046
272. see the details of Hajj meetings: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1046, 1047.   AND Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 66, 120. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 27.
273. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 87, 88.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1022, 1023.  Also see: Anonymous, Akhbār al-dawlah al-‘Abbāsiyyah wa-fīhī akhbār al-‘Abbās wa-waladih, (Beriut: Dār al-Talī’ah lil-Tibā’ah wa-ai-Nashr, 1997).  The book written in early tenth century is available only in Arabic.  Also see: Moshe Sharon Black Banners from the East: The Establishment of the Abbasid State: Incubation of a Revolt (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1983)
274. This Bukayr bin Mahan was a government officer in Sind district.  He was scribe to lieutenant governor Junayd bin Abdur Rahman.  When Junayd got transferred out of Sind Bukayr became jobless.  He moved to Kufa.  There he came into contact of Hashimi revolutionaries.  He got inspired by the revolutionary propaganda.  He had earned reasonable money during his government job.  He donated all of it to the cause of revolution.   He had to a guest of Kufa jail for his revolutionary activities.  He had attended a meeting of the revolutionaries.  The government spies got a tip off.  They arrested all the members of the meeting.  Later on they released most of them but Bukayr remained in jail more than anybody else.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 2, 3.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 87, 88.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),66, 67.)
275. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1045, 1046.
276. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 164.
277. ‘Ammār bin Yazid, for example, was a resident of Iraq.  He stayed in Merv propagating the revolutionary ideas under a pseudo name of Khidāsh. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 126.)
278. See how revolutionaries got varying sentences on the basis of their tribal affiliations.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),123, 124)
279. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 61
280. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1037.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),123, 124.
281. See for example: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 25, 29.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 62
282. See above
283. A lucrative trade existed between China and Khorasan.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 175, 176.
284. For this dilemma of the government after arrest of merchants on suspicion of political activism, see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1029
285. For the figure see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 27.
286. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1054. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 238.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 26, 63, 64.
287. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 26.
288. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 120.
289. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 26.
290. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 73.
291. See details:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),38, 39, 41, 171, 172.
292. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 72.
293. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 245, Year 124. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1054.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 68, 120.
294. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1054.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 66, 67, 120.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 149, 150.
295. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 238.
296. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 27.
297. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1037.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 27.
298. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 71.
299. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1054.  AND Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 120.
300. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),66.
301. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),66, 67.  See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1046, 1047.
302. As it was not an intention of Hashimiyah movement to ever disclose identity of Abu Muslim, a number of speculations persisted about him.  At one place Ya’qubi tells that he was Ibrahim bin Uthman but Muhammad bin Ali changed his name to Abdur Rahman.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1046, 1047.).  Tabari describes him to be a resident of the village of Khuṭarniyyah near Kufa (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 71.).  Abu Muslim himself never disclosed his true identity and religion.  When Abu Muslim came out of disguise later on, some young men of Merv sent religious scholars (fiqh) to interview him and find out his genealogy and fiqh.  Answering question about his genealogy Abu Muslim said, “What I have to say is better for you than my genealogy.”  In answer to the questions about his position on fiqh Abu Muslim answered, “The command to do good and reject what is reprehensible is more important for you than this.  We have work to do, and have more need of your assistance than of your questions, so excuse us.”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 76.)
303. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1054
304. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1046, 1047. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 27
305. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 71.
306. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 48, 72, 73.
307. For thriving of the movement under Abu Muslim see comments:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 73.
308. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 61, 63
309. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1064.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 288, year 130.   AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 60, 61, 65, 75.
310. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 65.
311. Exact location of Safidhanj is unknown.
312. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 66.
313. Exact location of Fanin is unknown.
314. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 64, 67, 75
315. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 82
316. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 67.
317. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 67.
318. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1065.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 83.
319. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 68.
320. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 69.
321. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 70.
322. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 70.
323. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 79.
324. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 79, 80, 98.
325. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 64, 67, 70, 77, 104, 105, 106.
326. Ruins of Abiward can be seen about 8 km outside the town of Kaakhka in modern Turkmenistan.
327. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 75, 76, 80
328. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 287, year 130. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 76, 77, 78, 81, 95.
329. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1066.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 103.
330. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107.
331. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 97.
332. This is the coin with the site claims to be that of Abu Muslim. Observe, in field: ‘no god but Allah, unique, He has no associate’; margin: ‘in the name of Allah this dirham was struck in Marw the year two and thirty and one hundred.’ Reverse, field: ‘Allah is One, Allah is eternal. He does not beget nor is he begotten and there is none like unto him’ (Q112); margin: ‘Muhammad is the messenger of Allah who sent him with guidance and the religion of truth that he might make it supreme over all other religions, even though the polytheist may detest it’ (Q9:33). Year 132 started on August 23, 749.
333. For the strength of the revolutionaries see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 108.
334. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 108.
335. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 288, year 130. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 108, 109, 120, 124, 122, 125, 126.
336. See above
337. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 288, year 130. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1067.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 110, 111, 121, 122, 125.
338. Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 294, year 131.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 127, 128.
339. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 295, 296, year 131 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1067.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 126, 129, 130, 131.
340. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 297, year 131. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 131.
341. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1067. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 131.
342. Exact location of Shahrazur is not known.  It could be the ruins of a medieval town at Bakr Awa in Shahrizor plane in modern Iraq.
343. For the number see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 304, year 131.
344. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 297, 307year 131.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1068.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 132 – 142
345. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1069.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 140, 141.
346. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 307, year 131. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1069.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 138.
347. This Abu Salma was a mawla and was so diehard supporter of the family of the Prophet that he was called ‘the Wizīr of the family of Muhammad.’(Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 138, 142.).  He was the temporary liaison official after death of Bukayr before Abu Muslim took over
348. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 141.
349. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 143.
350. Hawting comments that it is clear that the reasons why a successful revolt against the Umayyads could begin there were that there was a large Muslim civilian population with grievances against the government  in Khorasan, and that the Hashimiyya was first able to win support among these civilians and then to take advantage of the renewed factionalism in the army there following the Third Arab Civil War.  Distance from Syria and the problems of Marwan II in Iraq meant that, even if the caliph had been aware of the dangers, he would have been able to do little about them.  (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 105)
351. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 174.
352. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 138.
353. Contrary to the feelings of the revolutionaries, all Arabs of Khorasan opposed the revolutionaries and wished to fight against them.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 75.).
354. One Farsi speaking Mawla among the revolutionaries was Abu Awn, who became the governor of Egypt after success of revolution.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 174.).
355. For some examples of their trades like fruit seller, saddle maker see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 174.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),66, 67.
356. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 79, 80.
357. Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160
358. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 281, year 129. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1065.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 84, 148, 149, 150.
359. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1065.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 166, 167, 168
360. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 151, 160
361. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 158.
362. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 140, 158.
363. Here Ya’qubi gives the list of twenty-two men who came to Kufa with Abu l Abbas.  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1076.  Tabari gives his own list:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 140, 158
364. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 140, 150, 151.
365. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 151, 152, 160.
366. Some traditions note that Muhammad bin Ali had himself appointed hierarchy of possible leaders during his lifetime: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1054.  Others tell us that Ibrahim bin Muhammad appointed him at the time of his death: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 1408.
367. Tabari gives his date of birth to be November 722 CE.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 183.
368. For the date see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 312, year 132.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1070.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 145.
369. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 304, year 131.
370. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 304, year 131.
371. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1072.
372. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 305, year 131.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1070.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 167, 169, 170, 171, 172.
373. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 305, year 131; P 311, year 132.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1071.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 170, 173, 175.  AND Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160
374. Marwan II was son of a Kurdish concubine by name of Rayyā.  Marwan II’s father was her third master.  Her first master was Ibrahim al Ashtar and the second was Mus’ab bin Zubayr.  He was sixty-two at the time of his death.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 305, year 131. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1059.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 175.).  It appears that the sons of concubines were so many that Arab elite had started to accept the phenomenon.
375. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1072, 1073 .  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 170.
376. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 305, year 13; P 313, year 132.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1073.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 175, 196.
377. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 313, year 132.
378. See above.
379. Sulayman bin Abdul Malik had founded Ramallah when he was heir apparent.  He had built a beautiful palace in it known far and wide as Dar as Ṣabbāghin.  The new government confiscated it.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 221.).
380. Maslamah bin ‘Abd al Malik had given fiefs to certain men of Rabi’ah tribe.  Abbasids confiscated them and later passed to Ma’mūn.   (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 229)
381. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 456
382. Ruṣāfat Hishām was built by Hisham bin ‘Abd al Malik. He used to stop at its site of Zaitūnah before its building. He dug canal by name of Hani wa l Mari.  It converted barren crownlands of the area into tillable agricultural estates.  When Abbasids came to power they confiscated the land and it passed in the hands of umm Ja’far Zubaidah, daughter of Ja’far bin Manṣūr. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 281)
383. ‘Abd al Wāḥid was a cousin of Abdul Malik.  He owned a pasture near Suq Ahwaz. He turned it into a ḥima.  He later inhabited villages of ḥadath and Zibaṭrah on this land.  During Abbasid period some people took possession of it and of its farms unjustly. When ‘Abdallah bin Ṭāhir came to Syria he returned it to crown lands.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 282, 183)
384. Umayyad properties remained alive in public memory as something belonging to them.  Hisham bin Abdul Malik had given a fief to his daughter ‘A’ishah at Rāskīfah.  Abbasids confiscated it.  It still bore her name at the time of Baladhuri’s writing.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 282)