Political Developments V

Sulayman becomes caliph

Walid didn’t get enough time to officially amend the will of his father regarding Sulayman. Sulayman bin Abdul Malik proclaimed himself caliph the same day Walid died.¹, ² He did not even bother to travel to Damascus for a formal ceremony. He proclaimed himself caliph in Ramallah where he resided.  He was visibly in a hurry. ³  If few prominent figures of the country would have pledged allegiance to Abdul Aziz bin Walid as caliph, Sulayman would have been in trouble. Generally, people hated renouncing their oath because it was a religious misconduct in their belief system. ⁴

Sulayman’s retribution against Walid’s governors

The first administrative action Sulayman took after gaining power was to torment all those who had served as a governor during Walid’s government.  Yazid bin Abu Muslim was ad hoc governor of Iraq designated by Hajjaj at his death.  Sulayman didn’t confirm him in the office.  Rather he brought in Yazid bin Muhallab, the sacked lieutenant governor of Khorasan, as governor of Iraq.  At the same time, he appointed Ṣāliḥ bin Abdur Rahman, a person afflicted by Hajjaj, as financial secretary of the province. Sulayman ordered Salih, to arrest and torture the family of Hajjaj. ⁶     Musa bin Nusayr was visiting the capital to deliver the prized booty of Spain and to amass praises at the time of Walid’s death.  Sulayman dismissed him and accused him of pilferage and demanded hundred thousand Dirhams from him.  Musa could get rid of the trap only on interference of Yazid bin Muhallab.⁷, ⁸

Walid not only dismissed the governors of Medina and Mecca but also flogged them and shaved their heads and beards, apparently under a number of hudd punishments, but actually to insult them.⁹

The only governor of Walid who did not face the vindication was Qurrah bin Sharik, the governor of Egypt.  He was lucky to die a few months before Walid. ¹⁰

The case of Qutaybah bin Muslim needs special mention. Qutayba was one hundred percent sure that Sulayman would dismiss him and would bring in Yazid bin Muhallab to decide his fate.  He reminded Sulayman that he was the most capable officer of the Umayyad Caliphate in the border region of Khorasan and that his name was a guarantee of security in Central Asia.  He also requested Sulayman to give him a chance to serve Sulayman’s government loyally as he had done to Walid and Abdul Malik.  Qutayba’s letter to Sulayman contained an occult threat that he was in a position to defy the orders of the central government in case of dismissal.  Sulayman was, it appears, in limbo.  The impatient Qutayba decided to flout preemptively before he received a dismissal letter.  He shifted the military under his command to Bukhara under the pretext of a campaign.  There he announced his real intentions.  He had only regiments belonging to Kufa and Basrah divisions under his command. The ‘Syrian troops’ were not under his command.  Common soldiers foresaw a fight against the ‘Syrian troops’ in case the matter lingers on.  They were not in a mood to lose their lives for the sake of Qutayba. They simply refused to obey Qutayba. When Qutayba pushed them to obey his commands showing them anger and threats, they turned against him. They not only murdered Qutayba but his whole family. ¹¹, ¹²

Sources don’t articulate clearly Sulayman’s reasons for sacking the governors. The actions speak for themselves. Sulayman was avenging their opposition to his candidacy. Being governor in the Umayyad Caliphate became a dangerous job.  Not only this, each and every governor was, from now onwards, very clear in his mind that his governorship would end with the death of the caliph.  The same applied to all subordinates to the lowest level.  Each one’s job became subject to the life of his superior.  On the flip side, the events of Khorasan proved beyond doubt that fear of the central government of a governor growing powerful enough to challenge the authority was real.

Developments in Khorasan

The murder of Qutayba had left Khorasan without any lieutenant governor.  Wakī’ bin Ḥassān, the killer of Qutayba had become self-appointed administrator of the district.  In his earliest convenience, Sulayman added Khorasan to the domain of his governor of Iraq, Yazid bin Muhallab, in late summer of 715 CE. ¹³ Yazid bin Muhallab was under pressure to outperform Qutayba to prove himself.

Gorgan was the most difficult to reach region in Khorasan.  This, and its neighboring Tabaristan, had never come under permanent yoke of the Umayyad Caliphate. After their surrender during the first phase of Futuhul Buldan, they were non-compliant in payment of their taxes dues to the central government. They used to pay whatever they deemed reasonable, and many a times didn’t pay a dime. After the final subjugation of many principalities in the region, like Kabul, Tukharistan and Balkh, it was imperative for the Umayyad Caliphate to tame Gorgan and Tabaristan. Yazid bin Muhallab accomplished it in the summer campaigns of 716 and 717 CE.  Yazid penetrated the impassable mountains with thirty thousand soldiers. Sul, the Turkish prince of Gorgan fled to an island in Caspian Sea and could not be defeated to the extent of being ousted from power.  He, however, saved his life and domain by signing a long lasting treaty to pay taxes in time and in amount assessed by the Umayyad Caliphate. ¹⁴, ¹⁵

Now it was turn of Ispahbadh of Tabaristan, a Turk by ethnicity. Yazid turned his forces against him in a decisive way. The Ispabadh called help from the neighboring principalities of Daylam and Jīlān.  The combined forces got defeated on rolling hills of Tabaristan. Ispabadh agreed to pay taxes in time and whatever Umayyad Caliphate assessed. ¹⁶

Last attempt on Constantinople

During previous decade the Umayyad Caliphate had expanded in all directions except sub Saharan Africa and Byzantine Rome.  By the time Sulayman took office, first Islamic century was drawing towards its end.  Rumors were circulating that Islam shall get dominance all over the world before end of first century. ¹⁷ Each ruler of the Umayyad Caliphate wished to be remembered as the one who accomplished final dominance of Islam by annihilating Byzantine Rome from the face of earth.  Preparations for the full scale assault on Constantinople with all the might of a big empire had started in summer of 714 CE, when Maslamah bin Abdul Malik had led the summer campaign of Umayyad Caliphate against Byzantine Rome. ¹⁸  Maslamah had penetrated only up to Galatia, which was a routine, but somehow Emperor Anastasios had got intelligence that the Umayyad Caliphate was preparing for a bigger invasion by land and by sea. ¹⁹, ²⁰, ²¹ Anastasios remained confident and appointed Leo, the most competent man with political skills available in the empire, as a general to tackle the anticipated attack. ²²  The Emperor then, sent his envoy Daniel of Sinope to Walid bin Abdul Malik’s office to negotiate any possible de-escalation. Part of Daniel’s responsibility was to assess the military preparations of the Umayyad Caliphate while he was in Damascus.  Daniel reported back to Emperor Anastasios that a great expedition by land and sea was looming against the imperial city.  The emperor ordered that everybody in the city would stock provisions for at least three years.  Those who cannot afford doing this should evacuate the city.  At the same time Emperor Anastasios started large scale defensive preparations.  He ordered the building of warships, sails, and Greek fire carrying biremes. The land and sea walls of the city got renovated. All gates of the city got installed with arrow shooting engines, stone throwing engines, and catapults. The city stockpiled as much produce in the imperial granaries as they could. ²³ The Umayyad Caliphate was yet fine tuning its offensive preparations when Walid died and the golden chance to be immortal in the history of Islam came into Sulayman’s lap. Sulayman himself moved out of comforts of his palace in Damascus to Dābiq, a military depot in vicinity of Qinnasrin, to supervise the preparations personally. ²⁴, ²⁵.

Sulayman knew that the walls of Constantinople had been indestructible since their building by Emperor Theodore.  He also knew that Byzantine Romans were masters of the sea due to the Greek Fire in their armory. His strategy was to besiege the city from the land side for as long as possible, try to besiege it from the sea side only if possible, and to do one thing more.  The Umayyad Caliphate was not looking forward to classic military success.  It was aware of the religio-political divides in Byzantine Roman society.  It wanted to utilize the divides in its favour.  It hoped that at least one Roman faction would co-operate with the invading army.  The capture of Constantinople by a combination of violent and non-violent methods was the target.

Emperor Anastasios was optimistic that he would be able to defeat the Umayyad Caliphate militarily. Contrary to his optimism, his country was far from being politically stable.  When news reached the ears of Anastasios that numerous warships had left naval bases of Umayyad Caliphate from Alexandria to the ports of Lebanon, and that they would first sojourn in Cyprus to collect wood, Anastasios came into action.  He sent his warships to Rhodes to make it a naval base and ordered his army division stationed in the province of Opsikion to join the navy at Rhodes.  The plan was that the combined army and navy, would sail to Lebanon and burn its timber, which was the raw material of warships, and would capture whatever military equipment it finds. The soldiers of Byzantine Rome were not eager to carry out the orders.  On their way to Lebanon, they mutinied, killed their commander, elected a certain Theodosius as their leader. This Theodosius was an obscure tax collector. The rebels turned their ships back to Constantinople.  Emperor Anastasios did not have power to withstand the rebels. After a ‘peak-a-boo’ type of battle between the supporters of Theodosius and Emperor Anastasios for six months, the rebel forces entered into Constantinople.  They proclaimed Theodosius emperor and Anastasios resigned. ²⁷, ²⁸

The Umayyad Caliphate attacked Byzantine Rome with its full vigour in late summer of 716 CE, utilizing hundred thousand Syrian Troops. ²⁹ Maslamah bin Abdul Malik, the overall general of the campaign, marched slowly with heavy equipment. ³⁰ He had sent his navy under the command of Umar bin Hubayra and his lightly armed cavalry under the command of Sulayman bin Mu’adh in advance.  Sulayman, on reaching Ammuriya, entered into negotiations with General Leo, the commander of the Anatolian division of Byzantine Rome. ³¹,  ³² Leo had royal ambitions and decided to play a double game.³³ Representatives of the Umayyad Caliphate offered him a nominal emperorship of Byzantine Rome, provided he chased Emperor Theodosius out of Constantinople.  Leo accepted the offer.  Simultaneously, General Leo reassured the nervous subjects of Byzantine Rome that the Saracens won’t be able to destroy the Christians through him.  Probably Maslamah expected to tear the political fabric of Byzantine Rome by this move before his forces lay a siege against Constantinople. Maslama ordered his military to refrain from harming anyone in the province of Leo to build confidence. The naval ships of Umayyad Caliphate docked at Cilicia and the army camped at Pergamon to winter and to give Leo enough time for action. Leo secured support of General Artavasdos, the commander of Armenian division of Byzantine army. He declared that Emperor Theodosius was unconstitutional and generals Leo and Artavasdos won’t recognize him. ³⁴, ³⁵

In the fall of 716 CE Leo marched on Constantinople, and expelled Emperor Thoedosius out of office with the help of his men.  Leo declared himself Emperor and accommodated General Artavasdos by making him his son in law.  Immediately after gaining power in Constantinople, Leo showed indifference to Maslamah.  Only then Maslamah could figure out that Leo had dodged him. ³⁶, ³⁷ In his fury, Maslamah set his military in motion. At the same time he wrote to caliph Sulayman for reinforcements. The army of the Umayyad Caliphate crossed the Dardanelles Strait from Abydos, and rode through Thrace to Constantinople.  On August 15, 717 CE, Maslamah’s army blocked access to Constantinople from land. It dug a ditch along all the land wall of the town and built a wall of mortar by the side of the ditch.  Further, it devastated many towns of Thrace to cut off any possible supply to town.³⁸, ³⁹. As planned, the army built wooden houses to live in, and started cultivation around Constantinople to grow food. ⁴⁰  On September 1, 717 CE the naval fleet of the Umayyad Caliphate was in the area. After the initial failure to anchor on the shores of Constantinople, the fleet could anchor at four different harbors on the European and Asian sides of the Bosporus. They were a total of eighteen hundred vessels including front-line ships, armed merchantmen, and warships.  Some of the ships were so heavy with their load that they could not reach the coast and remained in the deep sea.  Each of them needed about twenty armed merchantmen for protection with each merchantman staffed with one thousand warriors. Maslama had a plan to bring the warships to forward positions on a windless day so they could be anchored besides seawalls of the city to complete the blockade.  This move would have limited Byzantine capacity to use Greek Fire. Emperor Leo’s only hope was an opening from the sea.  He swiftly sent the ships equipped to deliver Greek Fire from the citadel, before Maslama could bring his ships near the city walls.  They set ablaze the fleet of the Umayyad Caliphate within moments.  Wrecks of some of them, still burning, smashed into the sea wall, while others sank in the deep with all men, and still others, flaming furiously went as far off as islands about twenty-five kilometers away.  All plans of the Umayyad Caliphate shattered.  The wonders of the Greek Fire boosted moral of nervous city dwellers. The Umayyad Caliphate’s navy still had an option to come near the city’s sea wall by entering into Golden Horn. Emperor Leo stretched a chain on the mouth of Golden Horn the same night.  Frustrated, the surviving ships of the navy took shelter in bay of Sosthenios. The sea was now open for the residents of Constantinople for fishing. ⁴¹, ⁴²  The war was practically over.  Now it was only stubbornness on the part of the Umayyad Caliphate to linger on.  The caliph had taken a wow that he won’t leave the hardships of Dabiq until the army enters Constantinople.⁴³

Winter in Thrace was particularly harsh in 717 CE.  Crystalline white snow covered the land for a hundred days continuously. Camels, horses and other beasts of the besieging army started dying. When snow melted in the spring of 718 CE, the Umayyad Caliphate sent numerous cargo ships from its ports in Egypt and Ifriqiya to supply food, clothes and armaments to its army.  Each of them had to anchor far away from Constantinople for safety from the Greek Fire.  Incidentally, most of the crew of these ships were Christians.  They used to leave the ship, take political refuge with Emperor Leo, and tell him exact location of their landing.  Emperor Leo used to send Greek Fire immediately.  Not a single ship could provide the direly needed logistics to the army.  Misfortunes never come alone.  The Bulgar tribesmen of hinterland started stealth attacks.  At least twenty-two thousand soldiers of the Umayyad Caliphate were killed at their hands. ⁴⁵

Some battalions of the Umayyad Caliphate were still stationed on the Asian land opposite Constantinople. The Umayyad Caliphate had organized a fifteen hundred kilometer long supply chain from Syria for logistic needs of this force. To their surprise, the chain didn’t work well and heaps of grains gathered for the army got rotten in the deserts. ⁴⁶ The Umayyad Caliphate strived hard to restore this supply route with failure. ⁴⁷ The conditions of soldiers in Asia were not entirely different from those in Europe. Emperor Leo sent ambush parties to harass them.  Their retreat from the shores of Bosporus made fishing for people of Constantinople safer.  Constantinople got everything, food and water.  On the other hand, the famine stricken army of the Umayyad Caliphate got compelled to eat its dead animals, horses, camels, and asses.  The rumors were ripe in the town that they were even eating their own dead men and their own dung.  Infectious epidemics spread in their camp killing many more. ⁴⁸

Umayyad Caliphate had learned its lesson.  Co-operation from individual traitors is not a guarantee of defeating a country.  No army can defeat a country unless a portion of population supports the invasion, or at least is neutral towards it.  And that the Christian power cannot be annihilated only by military means. ⁴⁹

Sulayman’s place in history

Before we proceed further, let’s be familiar with Sulayman’s impact on Muslim society. Ya’qubi claims that behavior of the subjects in an Islamic country is always a mirror image of the behavior of the caliph. ⁵⁰ Tabari presents similar concepts and further elaborates his point by telling us, “Then there took charge Sulayman, who was an enthusiast for sexual intercourse and food, and people took to asking one another about coupling and slave girls”⁵¹  We don’t hear of widespread undocumented sexual promiscuity during the Umayyad Caliphate.  Probably what Tabari is reporting is frequent buying and selling of slave-girls just for the sake of sexual intercourse, rather than for procurement.  If we believe in Tabari’s report, the caliph himself suffered from the ailment.

Power changes hands

Sulayman died unexpectedly on October 8, 717 CE at a young age of forty three.⁵², ⁵³, ⁵⁴ The cause of his death is not known. Islamic sources report him being over eater and never satisfied with eating. ⁵⁵ He might not be in good shape of health.  The shock of failure at Constantinople might have depressed him. He had nominated his son Ayyub as heir apparent after coming to power.  By chance Ayyub died before Sulayman.⁵⁶  Sulayman’s other sons were either minor or away at Constantinople.  His paternal cousin Umar bin Abdul Aziz was present in the camp.  He had good relations with pious Muslims.  One of them Rajā’ bin Ḥaywa, who attended Sulayman during the death process. He convinced Sulayman to appoint his cousin Umar bin Abdul Aziz as the next caliph.  Sulayman willed for his brother, Yazid, after Umar just to bring the power back to Abdul Malik’s house. ⁵⁷, ⁵⁸, ⁵⁹, ⁶⁰, ⁶¹, ⁶²

Disgraced withdrawal of the military from Constantinople

The most crucial issue for Umar bin Abdul Aziz was the siege of Constantinople.  Sulayman had died just before the first winter of the siege.  He was aware of the impasse but was unable to send any reinforcements due to harsh winter.⁶³  All attempted reinforcements went under the supervision of Umar bin Abdul Aziz. ⁶⁴  Probably Umar bin Abdul Aziz was still under illusion that he could be the lucky immortal in the history of Islam.  He kept sending reinforcements of clothes, food and money throughout summer of 718 CE. ⁶⁵  Nothing worked.  Another risky winter was approaching. A reluctant Umar bin Abdul Aziz ordered pull out on August 15, 718 CE.  Only five hundred horses were enough to bring the surviving army back.  Those who were returning by sea met another disaster. A furious storm fell on them when they were in Aegean Sea.  Most of them drowned.  Those who managed to reach the shore got seized into slavery by elated people of Constantinople.  Those who reached back to tell the tale could be counted on fingers.⁶⁶, ⁶⁷

Fiscal and administrative reforms of Umar bin Abdul Aziz

The Umar bin Abdul Aziz government had inherited the siege of Constantinople.  It had to do something for it.  Its undivided attention, however, was on internal affairs.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz government survived only two and a half year.  During its short tenure it initiated tremendous economic and administrative reforms.  Possibly Umar bin Abdul Aziz had realized before coming to power that the country had accumulated numerous domestic problems and that it could not be run indefinitely the way it was being run. Umar bin Abdul Aziz staunchly believed in strength of political institutions. ⁶⁸  His concept of a successful government was that of flawless economy and inclusivity.  It was opposite to that of Mu’awiya I and Abdul Malik which was centralization of power and exclusivity.  Most of the surviving evidence of Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s reforms is from Khorasan background.  Still, it is justifiable to suppose that such reforms had a wider canvas.

Since Abdul Malik’s administrative and fiscal reforms the provincial governors were expected to collect a certain amount of tax and deliver it to the central government.  The central government definitely guided them with tax law. Still, the focus of the central government was on prescribing them the tax amount and not on supervising their adherence to tax law.  The central government was happy to overlook any deviation from the prescribed tax collection guidelines on the part of provincial governors provided they submitted the desired tax amount.  Furthermore, all administrative levels worked on commission style remuneration.  Each administrative level had a right to keep the surplus of what was deemed to be sent to the central government.  Resultantly the provinces gradually started raising taxes by hook or by crook.  The centralized power in caliph’s hands shaped the government spending policy.  Islamic historical sources continue to term all kind of government spending as ‘ata’ (stipends).⁶⁹ However, the meaning of ‘ata’ was quiet different in the second decade of the eighth century from what it used to be by end of the seventh century. Spending the tax funds in the form of ‘ata’ was at the caliph’s discretion. He obliged his family members, relatives and well-wishers and those he wished to impress upon more than anybody else. A similar government spending pattern existed at the province and district levels. ⁷⁰  A quarter of a century of such taxation and spending policy created side effects. The total tax burden on general population increased. The formula of tax calculation became unpredictable for a common man.  The net flow of money became uni-directional, from the districts to the central government, and from common man to the high ranking government officials, including the caliph.  Widespread discontent was inevitable.  After a long while, we hear that the Kharijis raised their head again during Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s reign.  He had to crush them militarily.⁷¹, ⁷² The people of Khorasan were so disappointed with the government performance that an open rebellion was imminent. ⁷³ 

The central government had no choice but to attend the matters at home before they get out of hand and to halt the border expansion for now. The Umar bin Abdul Aziz government strived to make the governors abide by the taxation rules. ⁷⁴  It forbade all officials from receiving the pricy gifts which they used to receive at Nawroz and Mirjan.⁷⁵  It hit at the knuckles of those governors who were still taxing jiziya from newly converted Muslims.⁷⁶

The bottom level lieutenant governors had judicial powers.  They used them to collect taxes.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz government ordered them to demand tax from the peasants gently and not to ruffle them.   Furthermore, the Umar bin Abdul Aziz government forbade carrying out punishments awarded by local courts, like cutting off hand of a thief or crucifying anybody, without judicial review from the court of caliph. ⁷⁷

The central government halted the endless flow of tax money from the provinces towards the central government. The Umar bin Abdul Aziz government ordered the provincial governors to spend most of the tax money in the same district which had contributed towards it. ⁷⁸

The Umar bin Abdul Aziz government made some changes in the spending policy of the central government as well. It allocated funds for spending on public welfare independent of the caliph’s discretionary powers. The aim was to recycle the collected tax. The government promised to pay one hundred Dirhams to women with children towards their expense for Hajj if any intended to perform it. ⁷⁹ It started some kind of child support subsidy after weaning. (When parents had to provide the child food). ⁸⁰ The government devised a disability grant of fifty dirhams for all chronically sick people in the province of Basrah.  In addition, abject poor of Basrah got government assistance of three dirhams each. ⁸¹

No government can afford annoying the military, especially at the time of distasteful reforms in the country. The Umar bin Abdul Aziz government was under pressure to raise the salary of soldiers. It gave a raise of ten dirhams per person to the Syrian troops only.  It did not raise anything for the other military divisions. ⁸²  The Syrian troops might have considered this ‘peanuts’.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz is on record telling them that they should not expect more.⁸³ However, the government introduced some kind of lottery scheme in all divisions of military by which the winners of the lottery got a family allowance on top of their salary.  It had two tiers, one of hundred dirhams and the other of forty dirhams.⁸⁴

After enduring extreme tyranny, the opposition got some relief during the Umar bin Abdul Aziz government.  As a first confidence building measure, Umar bin Abdul Aziz repudiated the deeds committed by members of his family, which he branded as acts of injustice.⁸⁵  He banned the cursing of Ali bin Abu Talib from the pulpits. ⁸⁶, ⁸⁷  He gave some financial support to Banu Hashim. Ya’qubi reports that Umar bin Abdul Aziz granted fifth (khums) to Banu Hashim. ⁸⁸  It could be a token money got as booty from the raids.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz restored Fadak to descendants of Fatima. He had inherited it from his father Abdul Aziz, who had inherited it from Marwan.  Mu’awiya had granted it to Marwan. ⁸⁹

Banu Hashim were not the only one to get exclusive treatment at the hands of Umar bin Abdul Aziz. Other political groups received a softened stand. Ibrahim bin Muhammad bin Talha bin Ubaydullah, for example, got his confiscated property back. ⁹⁰  He was a prominent member of the ‘Meccan Alliance.’

Khorasan – a trouble child

The clamorous setting of the country in which Umar bin Abdul Aziz was operating, and which compelled him to introduce reforms, is obvious from the news of Khorasan.  Immediately after taking office, Umar bin Abdul Aziz appointed Jarrāḥ bin Abdullah, a man of his own liking, over Khorasan as lieutenant governor. The newly appointed lieutenant governor sent back his first report of situational analysis.  The report was gloomy from the Umayyad Caliphate’s perspective. The essence of the report was that ‘the people at Khorasan were at the verge of rebellion. They wanted to withhold what they owe to Allah (meaning tax).  Only a sword and whip would control them.’  Umar got upset.  He wrote back to use only whips and not swords, and even use whips after due judicial process. ⁹¹

The question is why was Khorasan so troublesome?  And the answer is that Khorasan was special. It was different from others.

The Arab’s internal economic migration started again after a lull during the Second Arab Civil War. ⁹² The general direction of the flow of immigrants was from Iraq towards the eastern districts of the Umayyad Caliphate. ⁹³ Khorasan proved to be particularly attractive to economic immigrants. Tabari mentions the presence of two small towns in Khorasan as early as 696 CE, whose whole population consisted of Arabs. One was near Merv by the name of Bāsān. Only the Arabs of Banu Nasr inhabited it. The other was also nearby, by the name of Būyanah. Solely the Tai Arabs inhabited it. ⁹⁴, ⁹⁵⁹⁶ The Arab population in Khorasan was disproportionately bigger than any other eastern district of the Umayyad Caliphate. ⁹⁷  We don’t know exact reasons for Khorasan being the first choice of the Arab economic immigrants.  It could be the remoteness of the district.  People might be running away from the oversight of authorities. It could be a higher chance of getting seasonal work in the army and getting rich with booty. Khorasan was the most active region of cross border raids since end of the First Arab Civil War. It could be easy availability of virgin lands. Whatever the reason, the Arab settlers of Khorasan were subject to local Dihqan tax collectors. Khorasan did not get fully assimilated in the Umayyad Caliphate until Qutayba’s campaigns of the 710s. Sulh agreements between different agents of the Umayyad Caliphate and the local lords were about payment of lump sums.  Role of agents of Umayyad Caliphate was to make sure local lords make timely payments and in full.  What formula the local lords used to collect tax in their respective jurisdictions was not a headache of the agents of the Umayyad Caliphate. The Arab dwellers of Khorasan did not get lower tax rates, like the Arab Muslims dwelling in other parts of the country. This was the first clash of interests that made Khorasan special. ⁹⁸

Khorasan was ‘the hen that laid golden egg’ in the eyes of the rulers of the Umayyad Caliphate.  This impression could have been created by easy success of raiding expeditions and their favourable returns since the time of Mu’awiya.  Each succeeding caliph expected the lieutenant governor of Khorasan to send back huge treasures.  If any lieutenant governor failed to yield results he was dismissed in one or two seasons. ⁹⁹ Decades of plundering and looting would have brought economic recession in the region. Further, the transfer of much of the looted goods to Iraq and Syria would have depleted the region of investable capital. All reasons of economic downturn were present in Khorasan.

Economic downturn gives birth to all sorts of chauvinisms.  “Humph! My son did not get job due to color of his skin,” the argument goes.  No wonder Arabs of Khorasan harbored worst tribal chauvinism.  Conflicting tribal groups among the Arabs in Khorasan were those of Mudar and Yamen.  There was no political division on regional lines among Arab tribes during pre-Islamic times.  Neither there was any during first phase of Futuhul Buldan. The stressful events of the First Arab Civil War gave birth to the new geography based classification of the Arabs. ¹⁰⁰ The tribal people of Hijaz used to call themselves Mudar in pre-Islamic times.  The tribal groups living in the south used to call themselves Yamen. The tribes of northeastern part of the Arabian Peninsula were Rabi’ah. The Rabi’ah tribes had joined hands with Mudar to invade Iraq and Iran during the first phase of Futuhul Buldan. It was they who got houses in Basrah at the time of its founding. Tabari informs that the Azd Oman tribe of the south immigrated to Basrah later on for economic reasons. They did not get houses inside Basrah and had to be content with camping on the outskirts of the town.  When the Second Arab Civil War was in its credible, tribalism raised its head everywhere.  Rabi’ah were numerically small in Basrah. They felt threatened from Mudar.  They made an alliance with the campers of Azd.  The Rabi’a-Azad alliance was conveniently called Yamen. Mudar and Yamen fought against each other in Basrah and Khorasan in the Second Arab Civil War until both were satisfied.  Generally speaking, tribalism got defeated in the  Second Arab Civil War all over the country.  Khorasan was special.  Tribalism survived in the backdrop of political theatre.  It was tribalism which compelled the conscious citizens of Khorasan to appeal to Abdul Malik to send a man of Quraysh as governor.¹⁰¹  Since then, all lieutenant governors of Khorasan, including Muhallab bin Abu Safrah and Qutayba bin Muslim had treaded a cautious path to deal with tribal tendencies in Khorasan.

Khorasan had one more special feature.  From its very beginning Islam was more attractive to certain cultures.¹⁰²  Turks of Khorasan were one of them.  Islam had started spreading among them even before Qubayba bin Muslim had assimilated Transoxiana into Umayyad Caliphate.¹⁰³  Khorasan had a larger proportion of Mawlas as compared to many other ex-Sasanian districts.  Increase in numbers of Mawlas was inversely proportional to decrease in numbers of non-Muslim Ahl al Dhimma.  The development resulted in contraction of tax base. Now, Khorasan had got a reputation of ‘land of opportunities’.  Candidates of Lieutenant governorship preferred it over others.  Each succeeding lieutenant governor reached Khorasan to fill his own pockets and at the same time to send lavishly to the central government via provincial government to keep his job.¹⁰⁴   Though raids generated main income of district, provincial and central governments, locally collected taxes made a significant portion thereof.  In face of increasing population of Mawlas, the lieutenant governors were not inclined towards applying same lower tax rate to them which Arab Muslims enjoyed after full assimilation of Khorasan in Umayyad Caliphate.  Arab Muslims had no objection to such taxation policies.  The last clash of interests which developed in Khorasan was between Arab settlers and the Mawlas.

Murder of Qutayba bin Muslim broke the dam which had a capability of containing all opposing torrents.  Group based hatred became pervasive and endemic in Khorasan after Qutayba’s death.  Three groupings were more oppugnant than any other – non-Muslims vs Muslims, Arab Muslims vs Mawla Muslims, and Mudar Arabs vs Yamen Arabs. 

Qutayba’s successor, Yazid bin Muhallab, was artless in tackling the tribal sentiments of Arabs.  He filled all available lucrative government posts with the people of Mudar at the expense of Yamen.¹⁰⁵  This action of his accelerated the pre-existing tribal hatred to the top notch.  The situation could still have been handled.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz was apt in dismissing Yazid bin Muhallab after coming to power due to his personal disliking for him.¹⁰⁶  Jarrah bin Abdullah, Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s pick to govern the troubled district, was even worse than Yazid bin Muhallab.  To bring all Arab tribes on one platform, he raised the slogan of Arab nationalism, irking the Mawlas.¹⁰⁷  Jarrah bitterly failed to mend the cracks between Yamen and Mudar but he successfully widened the gap between Arabs and the Mawlas.¹⁰⁸, ¹⁰⁹

Winding up of Futuhul Buldan program

Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s short lived government was too busy on domestic front.  It neither had appetite nor energy to seek territorial expansion, which had been a flagship policy of Abdul Malik, Walid and Sulayman’s governments.  Winding up of Futuhul Buldan program was not a conscious decision of Umayyad Caliphate.  The circumstances dictated it to do so.¹¹⁰

Khorasan gave the first shock to the long cherished concept of territorial expansion in the name of Islam.¹¹¹  Forces of Umayyad Caliphate operated in Transoxiana to subjugate the non-compliant non-Muslim Turks in first year of Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s reign.  Umayyads got a crushing defeat.  A disheartened Umar ordered halting any further raids.  “Let them be satisfied with the victories that Allah had already granted to them.” Umar declared while halting the Futuhul Buldan program.¹¹²  A number of Arab families had settled in Transoxiana.  Withdrawal of Umayyad Caliphate forces to the western bank of River Oxus made their safety precarious.  Umar advised all of them to evacuate the land because his government was no longer in a position to protect them.  They chose to stay on at their own risk.¹¹³

Then came the ignominious retreat from Constantinople.   Byzantine Rome got so bold that the very next summer in 719 CE it sent its navy ships to Ladhiqiyah, the very heart of Umayyad Caliphate.  They took many Muslims in captivity.  The weak government of Umar bin Abdul Aziz had to pay ransom for their safe return.¹¹⁴  The development was troublesome for Umar.  He ordered strengthening of fortification of Ladhiqiyah.¹¹⁵  Soon after, Umar bin Abdul Aziz personally inspected the fortifications at the border of Syria and Armenia.  He ordered abandoning many of them to hinder the potential Byzantine Raids to Umayyad Caliphate.¹¹⁶  Umar bin Abdul Aziz government also reversed the decision of Abdul Malik to raise the tax on people of Cyprus.¹¹⁷  It could be another gesture of détente for Byzantine Rome.

Umayyad Caliphate had been launching regular summer and winter assaults on Anatolia throughout its life.  Halting them would have given a wrong signal to the opposite side.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz government organized them albeit on lower scale.¹¹⁸ 

Umayyad Caliphate had teased Khazar Khanate by destroying Bab.¹¹⁹  The Khanate had grown powerful and won’t take it lightly.  Counterattack from their side was expected.  In 718 CE, when Umar bin Abdul Aziz ruled the Umayyad Caliphate, we hear from Khalifa that Khazars (Turks of Khalifa) attacked Armenia and Azerbaijan.  The local border guards easily repulsed the attack.  Umayyad Caliphate dug a defensive canal along whole border to prevent future attacks.¹²⁰  Tabari verifies it.  “Turks attacked Azerbaijan killing a group of Muslims and causing serious damage.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz sent his general who killed the Turks and only a small number could escape.  The general captured fifty of them as prisoners of war” reports Tabari.¹²¹  This was the first intrusion of Khazars into Armenia and Azerbaijan since the times of Sasanian Iran.

Umar bin Abdul Aziz government adopted the same policy of nonviolence at the borders of Ifriqiya.  We don’t hear of a single raid in that border region during Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s tenure.

Did Umar bin Abdul Aziz flip the official policy?

Umar bin Abdul Aziz is an atypical ruler of the Umayyad Caliphate.  Islamic sources join in a chorus to sing his praises.  They label him as a torch bearer of justice and reviver of original Islamic practices. Reference to the Book of Allah and Sunnah of the Prophet definitely increased in frequency during his tenure.  Official instructions to the governors and generals attained more religious tone.¹²²    The religious leaders softened their antagonistic stand against the central government.  A common vision between the caliph and the religious leaders started developing.  However, all these changes were in supra structure.  We don’t find any change in the foundations.  The caliph continued to govern single handed without establishing any consultative institution.  The caliph held the same draconian powers which his predecessors had attained.  Excellence in religion did not become criteria in appointments of governors or generals.  The policy of arrest, extortion and insult of a dismissed governor continued.¹²³   The central government re-confirmed the land grants to members of Umayyad clan, approved by previous governments and kept paying them government handouts, recognizing their higher status in the society.¹²⁴  The caliph continued to inscribe his name on commemorative plaques of the buildings funded by the central government as a show off.¹²⁵  So on and so forth.

Then a natural question arises why Umar bin Abdul Aziz government tried to look different?  It appears that the descendants of Abdul Malik had attained massive power.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz aspired to reduce their influence.  One way to achieve the target was to find friends in non-conventional circles – the religious leaders.¹²⁶  Umar bin Abdul Aziz government’s parleys were only with those religious leaders who were incubated by previous Umayyad governments.  Examples are Zuhri and Raja’.

Young death of Umar bin Abdul Aziz

Umar bin Abdul Aziz was only thirty nine years old when he died.  A short illness took his life on February 10, 720 CE.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s fiscal policy was not compatible with further accumulation of wealth in hands of Umayyad house.  They were afraid that if things continued in the same direction, one day Umar might confiscate their properties.  They were also nervous that if Umar’s parleys with religious leaders cross a limit, power might get out of Umayyad house forever.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz himself didn’t shun from expressing that if it was up to him he would nominate a religious leader as his successor.  Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that rumors circulated that Umayyads had poisoned Umar bin Abdul Aziz.¹²⁷, ¹²⁸

Place of Umar bin Abdul Aziz in history

Later Muslim generations had a great regard for Umar bin Abdul Aziz.  They considered him a replica of Umar bin Khattab and took pride in the fact that he was a maternal grandson of Umar I.¹³⁰, ¹³¹   Unlike his predecessors in Umayyad Caliphate, Umar bin Abdul Aziz presented himself as a down to earth ruler who wished to look like common citizens.  Soon after assuming power he abandoned the grand governmental palaces of Damascus and took residence in an ordinary house.¹³²  He revived the idea that being a caliph over Muslims is a burdensome responsibility rather than a prestigious carrier option.¹³³

Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s attire of a devout Muslim could be, anyhow, a political farce.  Ya’qubi reports that Umar bin Abdul Aziz adopted the religious propensity later in his life.¹³⁴  The only surviving statement from opponents of Umar bin Abdul Aziz is that of Yazid bin Muhallab.  He labels Umar bin Abdul Aziz as ‘hypocrite’.¹³⁵  We don’t find anything atypical of Umayyad governors during his work as governor of Medina.  His baggage and pomp and show with which he landed in Medina to take a charge were splendid.  Thirty camels delivered his luggage to Medina.¹³⁶  He did have a meeting with prominent Jurists of the town, including ‘Urwah bin Zubayr, Sālim bin Abdullah bin Umar and Abdullah bin Abdullah bin Umar, and reassured them that he would take their inputs in decision making process.  He also invited them to inform him about any transgression or injustice on the part of his government.¹³⁷  However, this could be a routine meeting, a usual for a new governor.  None of these Jurists was in opposition to the caliph or the governor.¹³⁸

A caliph born with silver spoon

Worst negativity of dynastic aristocracy is scarcity of competition for the highest ruling post of the country.  People with high mental caliber lay foundation of a dynasty.  They usually arise from general cadre and are in touch with reality.  They are generally flexible, diplomatic, and cunning.  As time passes the forthcoming generations of the ruling family are born with a silver spoon in mouth.  The possible heirs are raised in an isolated environment of a palace under the tutelage of a personal trainer.  They never have a chance to learn from ‘open university of people.’ They are usually of average mental caliber, not capable of tackling the political, social and economic issues of their time.  They get a chance to govern the country only because nobody competed with them for the top slot.  Yazid bin Abdul Malik is a typical example of ‘a heir born with silver spoon.’  Yazid bin Abdul Malik (Yazid II) took over the caliphate after death of Umar bin Abdul Aziz according to the will of Sulayman.¹³⁹  He did not have any clue of the troubles the country was facing and the reasons behind the reforms of his predecessor.   His sole perception about his country was that it was created to serve the interests of caliph and his family.  Single aim of the young and inexperienced caliph was to provide as much luxury to the caliph and his Umayyad friends as possible.¹⁴⁰ 

Reversal of Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s reforms

Umar bin Abdul Aziz had died prematurely without institutionalizing his reforms.  It was simple for anybody to annul them by decree.  Yazid bin Abdul Malik government worked sincerely on it for the next four years.

Yazid II government restored the previous taxation and government spending policy.  Taxation on vacant lands re-started.  The custom of payment of cash or expansive gifts at the time of Nauruz and Mihrajan reinstated. ¹⁴¹ There was nothing which Umar bin Abdul Aziz had introduced and Yazid II didn’t change. ¹⁴²

Yazid II government took off the olive branch Umar bin Abdul Aziz had offered to the opposition.  Instead it presented a bouquet of thorns.  Confiscation of their properties restarted.¹⁴³  Most pronounced was confiscation of Fadak by the government.¹⁴⁴

Empty government coffers

The speedy taxation and spending reforms of Umar bin Abdul Aziz must have reduced the government exchequer to a dangerous level.  Yazid II government had to face the consequences.  Previous governments of Umayyad Caliphate are known to have faced financial constraints.  This time it was different.  Yazid II government did not have money to spend at time of dire need.  His governor of Basrah could pay the soldiers only two dirhams each in the midst of the fighting with an empty promise that they could be paid more only if the central government sends an authorization to do so.¹⁴⁵  Even the central government had to quieten the fighting soldiers by mere promise that their stipends would be raised.¹⁴⁶

One of the reasons for Yazid II government to revert the fiscal policy of its predecessor could be the urgent need for money.  Yazid II government also looked for new sources of tax revenue.  In 723 CE it carried out a fresh land survey in Swad.  It brought those palm trees and other trees into tax bracket which had been omitted by the previous survey conducted by Umar bin Khattab government.¹⁴⁷  Umar bin Abdul Aziz government had barred the torture of outgoing governors, though insulting them had continued.  Yazid II government resorted the practice of torture to the extent of killing to extort money from outgoing governors and their officials.¹⁴⁸

Rebellion of common people

When Yazid bin Muhallab escaped the Damascus prison after hearing the news of Yazid bin Abdul Malik’s ascension, the former didn’t know that he would be a leader of revolt against the central government.  His only moto was to avoid wrath of the new ruler.¹⁴⁹  Yazid II ordered his officials in Iraq to hunt down Yazid bin Muhallab.  To the surprise of Yazid II, the divisions of both Kufa and Basrah did only halfhearted attempts to grip Yazid bin Muhallab.  Yazid bin Muhallab reached Kufa and then Basrah unhindered where the local deputy governor had jailed Yazid bin Muhallab’s brothers to pressurize him.  Yazid bin Muhallab demanded release of his brothers, which the deputy governor rejected scornfully.  Yazid bin Muhallab hired paid mercenaries to assault the prison where his brothers were imprisoned.  After a superficial fight the soldiers loyal to the government conceded defeat and Yazid bin Muhallab could capture Basrah, arrest deputy governor of Basrah and release his brothers from the prison on 31 March 720.  Yazid II hastily declared amnesty for Yazid bin Muhallab.  Yazid bin Muhallab would have accepted the offer, but to his surprise, people from all walks of life and of different political opinions started gathering around Yazid bin Muhallab.  Soldiers of Basran regiment, Kharijis, Qurra, tribal leaders, even some soldiers of Syrian Troops stationed in Basrah were in Yazid bin Muhallab’s camp.  The town was in ferment.   Encouraged by the scenario, Yazid bin Muhallab formally declared revolt against the central government, promising to enforce the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet if he becomes ruler of the country.  Very few people, like Hassan al Basri the judge of the town, opposed Yazid bin Muhallab, doubting his intentions to enforce the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet, given his well known secular past.  Anyhow, Yazid bin Muhallab was swinging high.  He appointed his own lieutenant governors over Khuzestan, Fars, Kerman, Bahrain and Sind.  The central government could maintain its control over Khorasan.  Wasit fell into Yazid bin Muhallab’s hands without any fight.  Unrest had spread to kufa, Jazira, Oman, and Khorasan.  Yazid bin Muhallab had gathered one twenty thousand supporters.  They included soldiers from Jabal and from far off frontiers, volunteers from Medina, as well as those of Kufan regiment who had sneaked out of the town.  They all advanced towards Kufa to join hands with kufan division there and to bring whole eastern part of the country under their rule.  Yazid II countered their move by promising a raise in the salary of the Kufan division to keep them loyal.  The soldiers of Kufan divisions were not kids to be pacified by empty promises.  Yazid II had to dispatch two separate regiments of his Syrian Troops.  One regiment of four thousand men pacified Jazira and Kufa, restoring grip of the central government over there.  Another division of four thousand men proceeded to al ‘Aqr, near Karbala, to halt the rebel forces from entering Kufa, to engage them in war, and to eliminate them.  This regiment could accomplish its target in the month of August of 720 CE.  As it happens in all situations where a number of people from different political shades crowd together on a short notice, Yazid bin Muhallab’s undisciplined locust sized mob had differences on war strategy. They dispersed in all directions after initial light fighting.  The rebels were aware of striking similarities between this rebellion and that led by Abdur Rahman bin Ash’ath two decades ago.  The only contrast was the behavior of the leader.  Yazid bin Muhallab decided to die a hero’s death fighting on the battlefield on August 22, 720.    The Syrian Troops restored order of the central government all over the eastern parts of the country in forthcoming weeks.¹⁵⁰, ¹⁵¹,   ¹⁵², ¹⁵³  Yazid II government survived due to disorganized condition of the rebellious mob.  The rebellion, anyhow, documented the wide spread discontent against the central government.  The rebellion also demonstrated the weakening iron grip of the central government.  Ordinary rebels could not be prosecuted as had happened after the Rebellion of discontent.

Kharijis raise their head again

Despite Kharijis military defeat, Umar bin Abdul Aziz government was interested in political solution of the issue.  It had engaged Shawdhab group of the Kharijis.¹⁵⁴  Yazid II government was supposed to do everything opposite to the previous government.  It called off the negotiations claiming that the new government would not honour even the memorandum of understanding both parties had produced.  Yazid II government sent small battalions of up to two thousand men many a times to contain the Khariji group with failure.  It was only after crushing the ‘rebellion of common people’ that Yazid II government could muster ten thousand soldiers to defeat the Kharijis.¹⁵⁵  In any case, the Kharijis were going to be a regular feature of political landscape of Umayyad Caliphate from now onwards.  The very next year, in July of 721, a small band of Kharijis raised banner of rebellion in Bahrain and instantly took control of Yamama in their hands.  They had to be defeated militarily.¹⁵⁶

Anarchism in Khorasan

Jarrah bin Abdullah was the last effective lieutenant governor of Khorasan for Umayyad Caliphate.¹⁵⁷  When Umar bin Abdul Aziz fired him in April of 719 CE for deviating from taxation policy of government, Umar knew that Khorasan was out of hand.  He appointed two relatively unknown men in Jarrah’s stead.  One was over military and the other was over finances.  Separating the two interdependent bureau of government was the last option available to Umar to pacify the widespread unrest.  He wrote an open letter to people of Khorasan that if they get displeased with these two men then ‘seek help from Allah.’¹⁵⁸  Yazid II government, on the other hand, didn’t see the things through the lens of Umar bin Abdul Aziz.  It was confident that Khorasan could be tamed by a dynamic personality without fixing its social, economic, and political mess.

The next political period in Khorasan is that of frequent hiring and firing of its governors in a hope of finding a ‘Qutayba bin Muslim’, no practical support, either militarily or financially, from the provincial or central government to stabilize the district, high expectations of provincial and central governments to gain net revenue from the district, inability of government to make necessary amendments in the laws governing the district to improve scenario, and failure on the part of government to extend its justice system, financial system, and police protection to all citizens of the district.

Changing whole government apparatus from bottom to top after change of caliph had become a fashion in Umayyad Caliphate.  Yazid II government appointed its own governor in Iraq, and that governor had a compulsion to dismiss the two men appointed in Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s time.  When the new lieutenant governor of Khorasan, Sa’īd Khudhaynah reached Merv in summer of 720 CE, he found the district unmanageable.  Numerous small and large non-Muslim Turk lords had become semi-independent.  A wave of apostasy had swept a large population of newly converted Turk Muslims of Soghdia to their previous religions during the last eighteen months.¹⁵⁹  The apostatized Turks had abandoned their lands to avoid paying tax.  They had joined hands with non-Muslim Turks to form small militias.¹⁶⁰  The militias were making harassing raids on Arab settlers and their Iranian mawlas.¹⁶¹  The Arab settlers were totally fractured on tribal lines.  If Mudar battalions would co-operate with government to re-establish administration, Yamen battalions would flatly refuse and vice versa.  Rather they would hinder the process.¹⁶²  On top of it, all groups, whether they were Arabs, Iranians, Turks, Muslims, or non-Muslims, would laugh at the governor and ridicule him.

Sa’id Khudhaynah decided to appoint lower level government officials only by consultations of tax payers.  Nobody could agree on a single name.¹⁶³  He re-started raiding to subjugate the disobedient.¹⁶⁴  It ended in a stalemate.¹⁶⁵

Umayyad Caliphate got compelled to change Sa’id Khudhaynah with two men, one after other.  Both proved to be similar to Sa’id Khudhaynah.  The maximum they could do was to prevent further disarray in Khorasan.¹⁶⁶

Border with Khazar Khanate

Constant scrimmage at the border between Khazar Khanate and Umayyad Caliphate was a normal feature during previous two governments.  It was not unilateral and hence, was not in hands of Umayyad Caliphate alone.  Sources describe yearly clashes between the two rivals during Yazid II government.  None was decisive.   Both sides suffered from loss of property and life.  Both did not feel need to sit down and settle the differences.¹⁶⁷

Byzantine policy under Yazid

Byzantine Rome – Umayyad Caliphate border had the same conditions which prevailed for years.  Forces of Umayyad Caliphate crossed the border yearly to protrude into Anatolia, and returned to their base camps.  However, the size and ferocity of the campaigns had decreased during the years of Yazid II as compared to those of his predecessors.¹⁶⁸

Armenian policy under Yazid

The border between Byzantine Rome and Umayyad Caliphate in Armenia used to be the hottest at one stage.  Lately, that part of Armenia which was under control of Umayyad Caliphate had become passive.  Border clashes in Armenia, during the tenure of Yazid II, were of similar intensity as were elsewhere between Byzantine Rome and Umayyad Caliphate.¹⁶⁹

Ifriqiya under Yazid

Worst setback for Umayyad Caliphate came from Ifriqiya.  Like Turks of Khorasan, Islam was popular with Berbers of Ifriqiya from the time of first phase of Futuhul Buldan.  The numbers of Mawlas grew exponentially.  Somewhere during Caliphate of Sulayman it became practically difficult for Umayyad Caliphate to honor its tax rates for Muslims and non-Muslims.  They charged the newly converting Mawlas at the same rate they used to pay when they were Ahl al Dhimma.  Complains and discomfort was rife in the region.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s tax reforms provided Mawlas with a great relief.  Cash strapped government of Yazid II tried to revert Umar bin Abdul Aziz reforms.  For this purpose, It sent Yazid bin Abu Muslim, who himself was a Mawla but of old generation, as a new lieutenant governor to the district in May of 720 CE.  Soon a revolt flared up in general population and in the army.  Local politics must have played a part because the dismissed ex-lieutenant governor Muhammad bin Yazid and the jailed ex-lieutenant governor Abdullah bin Musa bin Nusayr were the leaders of the rebels.  A Mawla soldier by name of Jarīr assaulted Yazid bin Abu Muslim fatally when he was praying in the grand mosque of Kairouan.  The rebels elected Muhammad bin Yazid as their new lieutenant governor.  The same time the rebels wrote to caliph Yazid II that their intention was not high treason against the caliph, they simply didn’t want to pay the tax rate imposed upon them.  Poor caliph wrote back that he was already concerned with the tax policies in Ifriqiya and whatever the rebels had done was worth accepting.  Then he ordered Bishr bin Safwan, his governor over Egypt, to take administration of Ifriqya district in his own hands.  Bishr did not touch Muhammad bin Yazid but he sentenced Abdullah bin Musa bin Nusayr to death in murder case of Yazid bin Abu Muslim.¹⁷⁰  Umayyad Caliphate could restore its writ over Ifriqyia.  Ifriqiya did not behave like Khorasan because center did not have high expectation of revenue from Ifriqiya and hastily took the unpopular policy back.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz government had halted the cross border raids in Ifriqiya.  Now Forces of Umayyad Caliphate in Ifriqiya started raiding far off islands again.¹⁷¹  Probably they were safer than at other borders and the region needed income.

Defeat in France

Umayyad Caliphate tasted its first defeat in France in 721 CE.  After consolidating its rule in Spain, the forces of Umayyad Caliphate were, now, advancing towards France.  They had raided border areas of France and, lately, had stationed a permanent garrison at Galia Narbonensis.  The people of France felt threatened.  Odo of Aquitaine confronted forces of Umayyad Caliphate at Tolosa.  Forces of Umayyad Caliphate got routed and its commander Samh., got killed on the battle field.¹⁷², ¹⁷³.

Sudden end of Yazid bin Abdul Malik government

Yazid bin Abdul Malik died of natural causes on January 29, 724 at the age of 37 after ruling for four years.¹⁷⁴, ¹⁷⁵

Yazid II’s place in history

Each upcoming caliph of Umayyad Caliphate did something which his predecessor had shunned to do.  Yazid gave more attention to his sexual partners than to the affairs of government.  Ya’qubi blames, “Then came Yazīd bin ‘Abdu al-Malik.  He was the first caliph to acquire a singing slave-girl and the first over whose affairs a woman gained control.  Ḥabābah, his singing slave-girl, used to appoint and dismiss, set free and imprison, command and forbid.”¹⁷⁶

Yazid II holds another record to be the first in history of Islam. Since times of Umayyad Caliphate it was customary for the sitting caliph to lead Hajj.  It was a symbol of their authority over religious matters.  As the seat of governance moved out of Hijaz, it became practically difficult for the caliphs to go for pilgrimage every year.  They used anybody who was governing Hijaz as their proxy.  Still each caliph led the Hajj personally at least once as his religious duty.  There were exceptions but each had explanation.  Abu Bakr did not lead any Hajj during his tenure. Only one Hajj fell during his tenure and he was pre-occupied with Ridda wars.  Ali bin Abu Talib did not lead Hajj personally because he remained busy with First Arab Civil War throughout.  Yazid bin Mu’awiya did not lead any Hajj because Ka’ba was under control of his rival Abdullah bin Zubayr.  The first caliph who did not perform Hajj during his caliphate out of choice was Yazid II.  He had led Hajj once in his capacity as heir apparent.  Probably he considered that event enough.

Due to his lusty habits, low political IQ, failure to handle internal turmoil, and weak foreign policy, Yazid bin Abdul Malik is an obscure figure in history of early Islam.  Today very few Muslims even know his name.

Long stagnant decades

34 years old Hisham bin Abdul Malik was on holiday at his estates of Zaytūniah in Ruṣāfah when news of Yazid II’s death broke out.  Within a day he was in capital Damascus to take reign of the vast country into his hands.  After taking oath he returned to Rusafah to make it the official residence of caliph.¹⁷⁷, ¹⁷⁸, ¹⁷⁹  Unlike his predecessor, Yazid II, he had some practical experience.  He had conducted campaigns against Anatolia.¹⁸⁰  He should have better understanding of things as compared to Yazid II.  Yet, most characteristic feature of Hisham government is maintenance of status quo.  He did not make any effort to reform the political, economic or social system of the country, though it was direly needed.  Hisham government was simply continuation of Yazid II government, as far as policies were concerned.  On the surface everything appeared to be in control during his long two decades.  Under the surface there were torrents of unrest.  They say, still air is predictive of a storm.  Hisham’s era was still air and the storm came at the end of his era.

Intrusion in India

The Umar bin Abdul Aziz government had terminated the border expansion and cross border raids.¹⁸²  Yazid II government was irresolute over the issue.¹⁸³.  Hisham government allowed both of them, provided the risk and expenses were those of the lieutenant governor of the border district and at least some benefits were transferred to the central government.  Need for money at the central government appears to be the main stimulus.  Probably Hisham had calculated that it won’t cost much to his internally weak country.  Umayyad Caliphate had grown so big that the neighboring countries had no chance to get irked and invade it in retaliation.

Umayyad Caliphate had assimilated Sind about a decade ago.  Its lieutenant governor Junayd bin Abdur Rahman was a speculator.  He picked the cue intelligently how Hisham wanted his borders to be.  He took his forces all the way to Kannauj.  Results of this campaign are not known to Islamic sources.  Then Junayd invaded the land of China and captured one fortress.    Still not satisfied, Junayd attacked Kīraj with the help of king Ashandarābīd and compelled its king Rāh to flee.  Ultimately he could appoint his tax agents at Marmadh, Mandal, Dahnaj, Burūṣ, Surast, Bīlamān and Māliba.¹⁸⁴, ¹⁸⁵, ¹⁸⁶  Blankinship considers this campaign as a full scale invasion with intention to add land to Umayyad Caliphate.¹⁸⁷  However, circumstantial evidence defies this opinion.  Umayyad Caliphate was not in a position to occupy foreign lands, even if it wished to do so.  Junayd boasted to Hisham of capturing three fifty thousand captives and collecting eighty million dirhams in booty.¹⁸⁸  Nonetheless, he did not send even a cent to the center.

Raids on Anatolia

Umar bin Abdul Aziz government had not halted summer and winter raids on Anatolia after retreat from Constantinople in 718 CE.  The failure of siege of Constantinople was a purely defensive action of Byzantine Rome.  It was still not in any position to effectively keep the raids of Umayyad Caliphate out of its borders.  There is not a single year during Hisham’s tenure in which the raids did not take place.¹⁸⁹  The reporting of these raids is as brief as those of previous years and as typical as it used to be.  Look at reports of Theophanes the Confessor about two separate raids.  In one raid he reports, “In this year [1/9/726 – 31/8/727] Hisham’s son Muawiyah attacked Romania, went here and there, and withdrew”.¹⁹⁰  In another raid he reports, “At about summer solstice [21 June 727] a body of Saracens attacked Bithynian Nikaia.  It had two emirs.  Amr went ahead with 15,000 light-armed men to surround the unprepared city, while Muawiyah followed with another 85,000.  Even after a long siege and the partial destruction of the walls, they could not enter Nakia’s sacred precinct ………  after the Arabs accumulated a large body of prisoners and booty, they withdrew.  [Emperor] Leo boasted that he prevailed over his fellow citizens due to his piety”.¹⁹¹, ¹⁹²  It appears that Umayyad Caliphate chose different city each time to avoid timely detection.  The purpose was, as usual, to loot human and material resources and return. ¹⁹³ Things were going smoothly from Umayyad Caliphate’s point of view at this border when something unusual happened near the end of Hisham’s tenure.  The summer raid of 740 CE was particularly large.  Four field commanders of Umayyad Caliphate penetrated into Anatolia in the month of May from four different directions keeping their target secret.  Sulayman bin Hisham was the vanguard with ninety thousand men.  His aim was to create general fear.  Ghamr led ten thousand lightly armed cavalry behind him to swiftly give surprise attack to any target in Anatolia.  Behind both of them were Malik and Abdullah bin Husayn Al Baṭṭal with their combined force of twenty thousand lightly armed riders to target Akroinos.  In the last was Sulayman with sixty thousand men to attack Tyana.  Both Sulaymans withdrew from the territory of Byzantine Rome unharmed after achieving their targets.  Malik and Battal got trapped.  Emperor Leo and his son Constantine were waiting to trounce them.  Both of them died fighting on the battle field.  Out of their twenty thousand men only sixty-eight hundred could flee to safety in Synnada.  From there they joined Sulayman’s withdrawing army to return to Syria.¹⁹⁴, ¹⁹⁵  The event did not compel Umayyad Caliphate to change its policy towards Byzantine Rome.  It continued to send summer and winter expeditions.  By that time Umayyad Caliphate was militarily engaged at all its borders.  Such events were expected and were considered a by-product of raids.  On the other hand, it was a marvellous achievement for Byzantine Rome.  It had defeated an Arab force in open field after almost a century of military abuses at their hands.   Same emperor Leo carried out the credit, who had successfully defenced Constantinople.

The Northern borders

Khazar Khanate and Umayyad Caliphate were two giants one-on-one.  None was afraid of the other.  Whole Caucasus region between Caspian and Black seas became their non-ending battle ground.  Each year both armies came out of their camps devastated each other’s populations and cities and returned without gaining anything substantial. ¹⁹⁶  Look at a passage of Khalifa:   In 730 CE “al-Jarrāḥ [bin Abdullah al Ḥakami] marched from Bardha’a to Azerbaijan.  He encamped with his army at Marj Sabalan.  There was a river over which he built a bridge.  To this day it is called al-Jarrah’s bridge (Jisr al Jarrāḥ).  Al-Jarrāḥ marched against the son of Khaqān, who was besieging the inhabitants of Arbadil.  They fought bitterly.  Al-Jarrāḥ was killed – my Allah have mercy on him – on 22 Ramaḍān 112 [8 December 730], and the Khazars took control of Azerbaijan.  Their cavalry roamed about unopposed, getting close to Mosul.  They set up mangonels against Arbadil while the inhabitants of Ardabil were battling them.  When the siege against them lasted too long, they surrendered the city, and the Khazars entered it.  They killed the warriors and took the women and children captive.  Al-Jarrāḥ was killed in Arshaq.  When al-Jarrāḥ was killed, Hishām bin ‘Abd  al-Malik sent Sa’īd bin Amr al-Ḥarashi with Arab knights riding post-horses.  Sa’īd bin Amr went to Bardha’a.  Al-Ḥarashi came to ….. to Baylaqan, and they went twards Adherbaijan.  A khazar army was advancing.  They had many carts on which they were carrying the Muslim prisoners and the booty taken from the inhabitants of Ardabil.  Al-Harashi sent …. a scouting mission.  [It] came upon the Khazar camp while they were sleeping, then …. [it] departed and informed him.  He roused his men and marched against the Khazars, and rescued the carts and their contents.  ….. He brought the carts into the city of Warthan, and wrote to Hishām about the victory……  Then he marched and confronted the tyrant (ṭāghiya) of the Khazars.  Allah put them to rout, the tyrant fled and al-Ḥarashi rescued the Muslim prisoners and their booty.    In Shawwāl 112 [December 760 – January 731], Maslamah bin ‘Abd al-Malik went out in pursuit of the Turks, in driving rain and snow, until he passed al-Bāb.  He left aṭ- Ṭā’i to rebuild and fortify al-Bāb.  He assigned a detachment for that .  Then he sent the armies, and conquered cities and fortresses.  The enemies of Allah burned themselves in their cities.¹⁹⁷, ¹⁹⁸, ¹⁹⁹  The borders of Umayyad Caliphate and Khazar Khanate did not touch each other.  There were buffer states between the two.  These tiny princely states had to get ground between the fight of two genies.²⁰⁰

Armenia had been a trouble spot of Umayyad Caliphate in the past.  It could create very little trouble for Umayyad Caliphate, if any, during Hisham’s tenure.  The districts of Armenia and Azerbaijan were under administration of province of Jazira.  The governors of Jazira continued to attend the Khazar threat without any fear of disruption from the hostile population of Armenia.

Revolts in Ifriqiya

The border policy in Ifriqya remained the same.  Now and then the forces of the Umayyad Caliphate organized a raid targeting either the Mediterranean islands or the sub Saharan communities of Western Africa. The raids brought wealth and income for the participants.  Some of it was definitely transferred to the central government.²⁰¹  Things were as usual until later years of Hisham’s tenure.  According to Tabari, a delegate of Berber Muslims, all of whom fell under the Mawla class, reached Damascus to see the caliph in person.  This was too much of an expectation from them.  They stayed in the capital for days but in the end realized that seeing the caliph was like spotting a unicorn in the wild.  They handed a list of grievances to the master of ceremonies (ḥājib) and returned home. Among other they enumerated that the governors of the region used Berber Mawlas in raiding campaigns.  They assigned the most dangerous positions in the war to the Berbers, keeping the Arab fellows at safer points.  At the time of payment from the booty, the Arab governors paid little to the Mawlas as compared to their Arab counterparts.  Moreover, the governors slaughtered thousands of Berber’s sheep yearly to find a purely white skinned lamb’s wool for the caliph without compensation.  The practice was extremely taxing on Berbers because chance of getting such lamb was one in one thousand.  Furthermore the governors took each and every beautiful daughter from the Berbers.  The delegate had wanted to hear from the caliph that such practices were against the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, which was the supreme law of the country.  They had expected that the caliph would issue a statement that Islam doesn’t discriminate between Arab and non-Arab Muslims.  They had hoped that the caliph would categorically deny his involvement in such a tyranny. ²⁰²  Tabari accuses the Iraqi Kharijis for blossoming of such ideas in Ifriqiya.  He says they had gone all their way to Ifriqiya to propagate the concept of equality of every Muslim in the eyes of law.  The only dilemma among the ever growing Khariji sect in the Berber Muslims was if they should blame the caliph or the governor for ongoing discrimination.²⁰³  In any case, the delegate returned empty handed.  On their return, all the members of the delegate organized a coordinated uprising.²⁰⁴  In August of 740 CE the Berber soldiers took power in their hands everywhere in Ifriqiya from Tanjah to Kairouan.  The uprising had spread to the forces of Umayyad Caliphate stationed in Spain, which were predominantly Berber.  The Khariji Berber rebels either killed or expelled governors of Umayyad Caliphate.  For the next two years Umayyad Caliphate sent army after army from Egypt to subjugate them.  Ultimately, as it usually happens with the Kharijis, they split into groups.  Syrian Troops sent from Damascus could control the situation in December of 742 CE.²⁰⁵  Interestingly, one of the leaders of rebels was al-Ḥaqīr, which means ‘the downtrodden’.  He was a water-seller by trade.²⁰⁶

Final defeat in France

Despite defeat at Toledo, local governors of Umayyad Caliphate in Spain had not stopped dreaming of capturing France.  In October of 732 CE, the forces of Umayyad Caliphate, under the command of lieutenant governor of Spain by name of Abdur Rahman al Ghafiqi, crossed the Pyrenees Mountains to descend into the fertile plains of Aquitaine Basin.  Odo of Aquitaine fled after a brief encounter at the northern bank of River Dordogne.  Forces of Umayyad Caliphate were in hot pursuit of Odo when, to their surprise, Charles Martel the Mayor of the palace of Austrasia marched all his way down to Tours.  Both sides tried to harass  each other out of the conflict zone for seven days.  Finally they drew themselves up into battle lines.  “The ‘Europeans’ stood immobile as a wall and held together like a glacier in region of cold and slaughtered the Arabs by sword in a blink of an eye.”  Abdur Rahman al Ghafiqi got killed on the battle field.  The survivors fled to Spain for safety, with their tails touching belly buttons, taking advantage of the darkness of night.  Charles Martel did not believe in sincerity of Arab’s flight.  His army kept patrolling the area for days under suspicion that the Arabs had hidden somewhere.  ²⁰⁷, ²⁰⁸

Some modern historians dub the battle of Tours as the final recuperation of Western Civilization from the gash it received at the hands of Arabs at Yarmouk about a century ago.²⁰⁹

Rebellions in Sind

Conditions on the eastern border of Umayyad Caliphate were not entirely different from its western border during later years of Hisham.  Tamīm bin Zayd was Junayd’s replacement in Sind.  The district became volatile.  Local population rose in resistance to the government.  Arabs started quarrelling with each other.  Daily killings became a routine.  Tamim had to cede the control and run to Iraq.  When his replacement, Hakam bin ‘Awāan arrived, he found that Sind had been overrun by the people of Kutch.  He was compelled to build a stronghold (madīna) for the Muslims to take refuge in it.  He named it Maḥfūẓah (protected).  After fierce fighting, he drove out those who had overrun the land, and the country became calm and quiet.²¹⁰²¹¹

The calm did not last long.  The administrative structure of Umayyad Caliphate had changed in a way that when a superior retired or got dismissed, the juniors got automatically a termination letter.  Not only this, they had to face jail and torture for no crime of theirs.  When Hisham dismissed governor of Iraq Khalid bin Abdullah in 738 CE, Hakam bin ‘Awaan knew his fate.  He slipped off across the border to die as a martyr at the hands of foreigners rather than to die of torture in a jail of Iraq.  Mayth people of India took the credit of killing him.²¹², ²¹³ The new lieutenant governor, ‘Amr bin Muhammad bin Qasim had to shift his capital.  He built a town this side of the lake, which he named Manṣūrah and took up residence in governor’s palace.  The locals proved tenacious.  They crowned a king, and marched on Mansura to besiege it.  ‘Amr asked reinforcements from Yusuf bin Umar, the new governor of Iraq.  He dispatched four thousand men.  Hearing the news, the king lifted the siege and retreated.  Amr’s vanguard made a surprise attack on the king’s army by night.  Great many of king’s army was killed.  The person of the king was vulnerable but Arabs could not recognize him, even when passerby people used to call him “al Rāh!” (Rao).  The king and his men took to their heels and Amr took firm control of the land.  ‘Amr had just pacified the local rebellion when his own people started fighting.  An army commander of Sind by name of Marwan bin Yazid bin Muhallab rebelled along with likeminded commanders and made off with Amr’s provisions and riding animals.  Amr defeated him with help of the remainder of the army and scattered his men.  Marwan fled.  Amr proclaimed clemency to everybody except Marwan, who was turned in and executed.²¹⁴, ²¹⁵

Insurgency in Khorasan

Out of all newly engulfed areas during Walid’s government, Transoxiana proved to be particularly hard on Umayyad Caliphate’s stomach.  Still, Umayyad Caliphate did not wish to regurgitate it.  At the beginning of Hisham’s tenure whole of Khorasan, from Herat in the west to Fergana in the east and from Ghur in the south to Bukhara in the north slipped out of proper control of Umayyad Caliphate.   The insurrection was the worst in Transoxiana. ²¹⁶

As Hisham government started its long tenure, the yaman and Mudar brigades of the military came to blows.  About thirty soldiers died in one such conflict fought in Balkh in Spring of 724 CE.²¹⁷  Since then they never sat on one table in Khorasan.

Muslim missionaries were highly active in Khorasan.  They were speedily converting local Turks to Islam.  One of their teachings was that Islam grants equal rights to all Muslims whether they were Arab or non-Arab and whether their current generation converted to Islam or forefathers had converted.  Tax collection dropped to a drastic level due to non-cooperation of these new converts.  Local Turk tax collectors had already warned the government of missing the tax targets in case people continue to convert to Islam with that speed.  The lieutenant governor Ashras bin Abdullah dismissed the conversion of many new Muslims as ungenuine and merely a tax evading strategy.  He challenged them to either produce a certificate that they were circumcised, or demonstrate their ability to read a portion of the Qur’an to prove probity of their conversion.²¹⁸  No nation changes its religion abruptly.  Initially it accepts the core concepts of a new religion while maintaining many traditions of its previous religion and culture. Slowly, over many generations, it adopts further principles of the new religion.  Sometimes it maintains few of its old religious traditions forever.  The newly converted Turks were practicing hybrid Islam.  Their viewpoint was that they had established mosques and prayed in them routinely.  The government must accept it as ample proof of their change of religion.  Muslim missionaries agreed with them in toto.  Under public pressure, the district government got compelled to change its stance.  This time they announced that the government doesn’t need to go into any detail if anybody has converted or not.  All new converts would pay according to the formula by which they had been paying in the past.  Conversion to Islam won’t change tax liability of anybody.  About seven thousand embittered Turk mawlas, Iranian Dihqan Mawlas, and Muslim missionaries staged a sit-in outside the city of Samarkand in 728 CE.  The police arrested prominent missionary members and dispersed the crowd forcibly.  Disappointed from all venues, the Turk Mawlas and their converting missionaries joined hands with non-Muslim Turk lords.²¹⁹  Their aim was to chase away forces of Umayyad Caliphate from their land and probably establish self-rule.  (Gone were the days of early Futuhul Buldan when the new converts had to participate in jihad to prove their wholehearted acceptance of Islam.  Now they had to show their circumcisions.).  The number of people who took arms against the rule of Umayyad Caliphate under their leader, the Khaqan, whom Islamic sources give a nick name of Abu Muzāhim and who is known to be Suluk Khagan from other sources, is estimated to be hundred thousand.  They resorted to guerilla type warfare.  Forces of Umayyad Caliphate faced their surprise attacks and destruction which such attacks can bring, followed by their disappearance from the scene.  Soldiers of Umayyad Caliphate were used to pitched battles and didn’t know what to do with the elusive enemy.  Fear spread in rank and file of the government officials.  Grip of the Umayyad Caliphate got limited to urban areas.²²⁰

Caliph Hisham had a false fixed idea that the issue of Khorasan had a military solution.  He transferred the services of his most agile lieutenant governor, Junayd bin Abdullah from Sind to Khorasan by spring of 729 CE.  Tribal rivalry among forces of Umayyad Caliphate stationed in Khorasan had severely deterred capacity of any lieutenant governor to restrain the insurgency.  Junayd demanded military reinforcements to start afresh.  Caliph Hisham sent thirty thousand war ready soldiers of Kufan and Basran divisions to support Junayd.  Junayd tried to bring the insurgents to open field combat in the Battle of Defile fought in the environs of Samarkand.  Still, Junayd could get only limited success.  Probably Turk insurgents changed their strategy and became more deceitful.  Safety climate in Transoxiana changed to such a dangerous level that Junayd had to evacuate Arab women, children and civilian families to the eastern bank of Oxus.²²¹

Political grounds of Khorasan got more complicated when many Arab ethnic entrepreneurs jumped into the arena after death of Junayd.  One of those dubious characters was Harith bin Surayj who, in 733 CE, temporarily captured Merv and Juzjan with the help of his mainly Mudar militia.²²²  He was a typical warlord in political and ideological grab.  He could swiftly shift his alliance between non-Muslim Turks, Mawlas or whoever suited him.  He effectively brought the insurgency to the western border of Oxus and to Merv itself.  His activities in Khorasan created a fierce collision between Mudar and Yaman tribal groups in the eastern part of Khorasan, which never ended during lifetime of Umayyad Caliphate.

Caliph Hisham never realized that the issue needed a political solution.  He did not take a bold decision of opening negotiations with the insurgents and moving his troops back to the western border of Oxus River, where they used to be before assimilation of Transoxiana.  Instead, he kept changing the deputy governors of Transoxiana under assumption that the issue was merely administrative.  Umayyad Caliphate even changed the capital of Khorasan from Merv to Balkh so the lieutenant governor could be nearer to the troubled area.  Umayyad Caliphate changed the administration of Khorasan from a district under supervision of the provincial governor of Iraq to a full province under direct supervision of the center and vice versa to find the best administrative model.²²³  Nothing worked.  For the good fortune of the Caliph, as it eventually happens in a collective insurgency of varied political forces, the enemy split into disputing groups.  The Khaqan got killed in those disputes in the beginning of 738 CE.  Since Khaqan had fought a battle against government forces near Balkh a few weeks ago, Umayyad Caliphate celebrated Khaqan’s murder as its triumph, though its forces had nothing to do with it.²²⁴

Death of the Khaqan did not bring any relief to the beleaguered administration of Umayyad Caliphate in Khorasan.  In June of 739 CE Khorasan received its last lieutenant governor from Umayyad Caliphate – Naṣr bin Sayyār.²²⁵  Though belonging to Layth tribe in official terminology, Nasr bin Sayyar was a local guy.  He had served as administrator of Balkh for years and had military experience.  Hisham had chosen him after thorough search. Nasr clearly understood that the issue of Khorasan had only political solution.  He introduced much awaited reforms.  He announced unequivocally that tax rate for all Muslims in his jurisdiction would be the same irrespective of their ethnicity or timing of conversion.  At the same time he announced that non-Muslims would pay jiziya without any exception.  He appointed an ombudsman to whom the tax matters could be referred to in case a tax payee perceived his tax to be over assessed.  Nasr opened negotiations with the insurgents.  He finalized an agreement with Turk Mawlas that they would return to their lands and would pay tax according to Muslim tax rate.  Further, the government would not prosecute any of them for apostasy.  (Defying a lawful caliph was apostasy.)  The government would not demand any tax arrears from them.  They would free all Muslim prisoners without demanding ransom for them.   Local courts would issue an order in each individual case after proper establishment of facts in this regard.  Nasr also entered into negotiations with those Arab Muslims who had sided with Turk insurgency.  He offered amnesty to Harith bin Surayj and Harith returned to live at Merv.  The non-Muslim Turks had disseminated into different directions after murder of their leader, the Khaqan.  Nasr carried out a number of military campaigns to root out the vestigial resistance of the Turks.  Many people in government circles in Khorasan were shocked at the way Nasr had broken the political taboos.  “Everybody has seen with his own eyes the military prowess of the Soghdians against Muslims and the devastation they have wrought amongst them, still you would not approve the agreement?” Nasr asked them in a public gathering.  Finally, he sent a delegation to Hisham for approval of his dynamic policies.  Hisham could not believe his ears that his lieutenant governor would negotiate with ‘terrorists’ and would abjure the tax policy for which his government was fighting for years.  His advisors in the capital convinced him that this was the best strategy in given circumstances.²²⁶, ²²⁷, ²²⁸.

The arguments of warfare

A common soldier of Umayyad Caliphate still fought for Islam.  During 731 CE summer campaign against Anatolia the forces of Umayyad Caliphate were overpowered by Byzantine soldiers.²²⁹  Commander Abdullah al Battal ordered withdrawal.  One soldier questioned the army, “Was it paradise from which they were fleeing?”  He turned his horse towards enemy battle lines and died fighting alone.²³⁰  Fighting to attain martyrdom was the official line of military of Umayyad Caliphate.  Sometimes a mother prayed to Allah that her son should attain martyrdom.  That was the case of Yazīd bin Mufaḍḍal al Ḥuddāni who died fighting in Khorasan in 730 CE.²³¹

A theoretical problem for Umayyad Caliphate and the commanders of the army was that the number of non-Muslim combatants was increasing in their military.  Non-Muslim combatants also received the rank of a ‘martyr’ in case they died fighting for Umayyad Caliphate.²³²

A challenge to the notion of dying for Islam was, however, in air.  Once an Arab leader of Khorasan commented to a non-Arab about infighting, “Those [Arabs] are fighting over something other than religion, so let them kill one another.²³³  General Leo was more blunt in his expression at the time of negotiations with the invaders of Anatolia in 718 CE.²³⁴  The envy of military of Umayyad Caliphate stated his position to start the negotiations that they had come to fight for Islam.  Leo answered his position calmly that both of them had been fighting for religion in the past.  Currently they fought just for sovereignty.  The envy of opponent military should simply tell how much per head does he need as a price to return without fighting.²³⁵  

Domestic scene

Internal conditions of the country were far from ideal.  Though Hisham bin Abdul Malik government never faced a real threat to its rule, general public was unsatisfied.  Main reason of general public’s discontent was one way flow of wealth from the periphery to the center, with many sinks on the way. ²³⁶  In addition to the taxes, exchange of gifts became a primary vehicle of money transfer.  Tabari gives a vivid description of gift transfers from common people to the lieutenant governor in Khorasan.²³⁷  Same scene was from the deputy governors to governors to the caliph.²³⁸

All government officials, including the caliph had their side businesses, which they had established from the money they had earned while in government position.²³⁹  They never shunned from using their government position to increase their business profits.²⁴⁰ When Hisham came to know that his governor of Iraq, Khalid bin Abdullah, had an income of twenty million Dirhams per year, he suspected that the governor had not been forwarding appropriate share of income he received from his subordinates to the caliph.  That was the main reason Hisham dismissed his long serving governor.²⁴¹  Stories of miseries and greed of Hisham bin Abdul Malik are ripe in historical sources.²⁴²  Such stories do not necessarily denote fiscal discipline or austerity measures during his reign.  The stories can’t either exclude the rest of the country from accumulation of wealth in certain hands.  Misery and greed were Hisham’s personal habits.²⁴³  Probably he was fond of hoarding money and counting it gave him psychological comfort. ²⁴⁴  No doubt, book keeping was meticulously observed during Hisham’s government but the government didn’t change the spending policies or taxing policies of the government.²⁴⁵

Government expenditure

One way of recycling the tax money was to spend them on public structures.  Hisham government halted all such projects like construction of iconic buildings, grandiose mosques, safe roads etc.  Once Khalid bin ‘Abdallah al Qasri, governor of Iraq, suggested to build an arch over Tigris in public interest.  Hisham concocted an excuse that if it were that damn easy, the Sasanids would have done it long ago.  Khalid kept insisting on building it.   Hisham wrote back that Khalid was free to build it if he was sure that the project was feasible and only at the expense of the provincial government.  Any construction done halfheartedly is doomed.  The arch did not survive flood season.  The central government didn’t pay anything towards footing the lost expenses.²⁴⁶

Bribery a legal norm

Bribery – paying money to a government functionary to get favours – became a common practice during Hisham’s tenure.  Hisham himself inaugurated the practice and popularized it.  When Hisham came to power he was poised to dismiss all sitting governors, according to the precedent set by his predecessors.  Lieutenant governor of Ifriqiya, Bishr bin Ṣafwān, conceived a bright idea.  Instead of waiting for a termination letter followed by a jail term, he sent a big sum of money along with some precious gifts to Hisham.  Hisham kindly confirmed him in his post.   ²⁴⁷

The menace percolated through all governmental levels.  Once Khalid bin Abdullah al Qasri, governor of Iraq, appointed Ziyād bin ‘Ubaydallh lieutenant governor over Rayy.  On taking charge of his office, Ziyad dismissed the finance secretary of the district.  The finance secretary offered Ziyad three hundred thousand dirhams if he reversed his decision.  Ziyad did so.²⁴⁸  Such acts were performed in broad day light and in knowledge of all and sundry.

Once well established, everybody paid the bribe before being demanded.  In 729 CE when Hisham transferred the services of lieutenant governor of Sind, Junayd bin Abdur Rahman, to Khorasan, Junayd presented a jeweled necklace to Umm Ḥakīm bint Yaḥyā bin al Ḥakam, the wife of Hisham.²⁴⁹  Junayd paid bribe before the body language of the caliph demanded it.

In a similar fashion, jailing and torturing an outgoing government official became a norm rather than an exception.  People of the country generally knew that termination letter of any official would be followed by a charge sheet of false criminal allegations just to squeeze money out of him.²⁵⁰    Many a times sources don’t bother to give details.  “In 113 Hisham bin Abul Malik appointed his brother, Maslama governor over Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Sa’id  bin ‘Amr al Harashi was dismissed.  …..  he apprehended Sa’id bin ‘Amr, put him in fetters, and threw him in prison.” ²⁵¹  When Khalid bin Abdullah had grown very wealthy, people used to tell him in confidence that he should inform Hisham about his wealth and offer him to get what ever he would like to take from it.²⁵²

The serving government officials started finding a way out.  At least in one instance, we know that Nasr bin Sayyar sent four thousand dinars through a messenger to Walid bin Yazid, the heir apparent.²⁵³  Obviously it was an attempt to be in good books of the next caliph so he should be reluctant to terminate that particular official.

Gift culture

Receiving valuable gifts from sub-ordinates had embedded into culture.  Ṭāriq bin Abu Ziyād was an undersecretary of finance in Iraq.  His son got circumcised in 738 CE.  Tariq paid a present of one thousand excellent horses, a thousand salve youths, a thousand slave girls, besides money, clothes and other things to governor Khalid bin Abdullah.²⁵⁴

Government officials super rich

If Forbes magazine were there and made a list of rich people, the first hundred richest people of the country would have been the government officials.  Caliph would have topped the list followed by governors and lieutenant governors.  Successful business people, innovators, entrepreneurs, entertainers, professionals, all would not have been anywhere in the list.  Caliph Hisham owned big estates.  One of the estates was called Rustāq al Rummān.  He had assigned it to Farrukh Abu Mathanna., who used to pay a fixed amount to Hisham for its use.  Once Hisahm unilaterally increased the amount by one million Dirhams.  After a while Hisham simply took the land away from him and gave it to ‘two honest inhabitants’ of Syria.  Hisham had given another estate to Ḥassān al Nabaṭi on similar conditions.  This land had dikes to prevent flooding (probably from Tigris).²⁵⁵  The annual income of Khalid bin Abdullah’s son was ten million dirhams.²⁵⁶  His father, governor Khalid bin Abdullah had grown so rich that he used to boast, “By Allah I am unjustly treated.  There is nothing under my feet except that it belongs to me.”²⁵⁷

Families of ex-caliphs and ex-governors also held large properties.  The family of Sulayman bin Abdul Malik, for example, still held and managed a property near ‘Adhrā’.  It was such a big estate that it had got a name – Sulaymaniyah.²⁵⁸

Syrian Troops loose charisma

Somewhere during caliphate of Hisham bin Abdul Malik the Syrian troops started losing their charisma.  When Hisham bin Abdul Malik dismissed Khalid bin Abdullah in June of 738 CE he could not order any of the Syrian Troops to bring the governor to book.  Rather he had to use the loyalty of the deputy governor of Yemen.  He asked Yusuf bin Umar to tiptoe to Wasit secretly along with a handful of soldiers and pounce at Khalid unattended.²⁶⁰

Khariji intimidation

Generally speaking, if corrupt rulers keep managing the economy well, the masses accept them with contempt.  Problem with corrupt rulers is that they cannot deliver on economic side indefinitely because corruption disrupts the very foundation of sound economy.  By that time masses start rejecting them.²⁶¹

Hisham government never faced any serious challenge to its authority throughout its life.  It doesn’t mean that the masses were extremely happy. Tell-tale story of discontent of masses is periodic rebellions organized by the Khariji groups.  Wide spread uprising in Ifriqiya was one such episode. ²⁶²  Classic plot of Khariji drama in Iraq was that about hundred or less people denounce their loyalty to the government.  They start looting, burning and killing.  The government sends numerous forces, up to four thousand, to get rid of them.  They defeat each of them before dying in battle field at the hands of the last such force.²⁶³.  Many such revolts took place in Iraq and Arabian Peninsula during later years of Hisham.²⁶⁴.

Shi’a Ali return

Whenever Kharijis became active in the country, Shi’a Ali were also there to complete the scene of chaos.  We can appreciate revival of Shi’a Ali in the country’s politics by 737 CE.  Mughīrah bin Sa’īd was a Shi’a activist in Basrah whom the provincial government burnt alive on false charges of sorcery.²⁶⁵

The Shi’a discontent culminated in a relatively big disruption in Kufa. Descendants of Ali were residents of Medina.  Central governments of Umayyad Caliphate strived to limit their presence to Medina and kept an eye that none of them takes abode in any city of Iraq.  To bad luck of Hisham, he summoned Zayd bin Ali, Husayn bin Ali’s grandson as a witness in a court case of misappropriation of funds against Yazid bin Khalid, the son of ex-governor of Iraq.  In first leg of his journey, Zayd attended Hisham’s court in Syria to face a cross examination.  Then Hisham sent him to Basrah after recording his initial statements.  After Zayd refuted the defense claims of Yazid bin Khalid, the Basran court excused him of attendance.  Instead of going back, Zayd decided to proceed to Kufa.  The government authorities got startled.  Governor Yusuf bin Umar ordered Zayd to leave for Medina.  Zayd communicated to the governor that he was overstaying in the town only in regards to litigation in a property dispute with the descendants of Talha bin Ubaydullah. Yusuf advised him to appoint a power of attorney and leave the town immediately.  Zayd went underground.  Now, this Zayd was the most eloquent, smart and learned young man out of all Banu Ali bin Abu Talib.  Government intelligence gathered reports that Zayd had instigated the people of Kufa to topple the government.  Forty thousand Kufans had given assurance to Zayd of their support in case of armed rebellion.  He had travelled to Basrah and other towns of Iraq to build support.  The central government was not in a position to curb the upcoming unrest by mere state violence.  Hisham wrote to Yusuf bin Umar to handle the situation tactfully with as little bloodshed as possible.  Yusuf sent a circular to the town that the government would not be responsible for any citizen’s miserable state of affairs in case he supports Zayd.  Yusuf’s strategy was to isolate Zayd from the masses, arrest him and deport him to Medina.  Zayd was active underground in Kufa for the last ten months.  He kept changing his abode to avoid arrest.  Yusuf government erected barricades on main roads of the town to block the free movement of people, especially towards government buildings.  Finally, Yusuf government could tighten its noose around the house in which Zayd stayed.  Zayd was confident of his supporters and didn’t give any consideration to government announced amnesty.  He simply wanted more time to organize his uprising, which was cut short by Yusuf’s measures.  Compelled by impelling government snare Zayd decided to come out of his hiding on a chilly night of January 740 CE.  He called his supporters to rise in rebellion and oust the government.  To his surprise, and as usually happens in Shi’a Ali rebellions in Kufa, only two hundred and eighteen men responded to his call on that wintry night.  They all knew that death was imminent.  They marched on empty streets of Kufa chanting slogan Yā Mansūr amit amit! (O Mansur! Kill, kill).  Still nobody joined them.  Governor Yusuf had shifted to Hira to keep a close eye on the situation.  In despair, the handful of rebels decided to go to the neighborhood of Hira to reorganize and to probably cut throat of Yusuf bin Umar.  Yusuf was not going to give them another chance.  He unleashed his Syrian Troops and local police force on them the next day.  By the night almost all of them had died fighting, including Zayd bin Ali.  Zayd’s son, Yahya escaped to Khorasan.²⁶⁶, ²⁶⁷, ²⁶⁸

Death of Hisham

Hisham bin Abdul Malik bin Marwan died on the 3^rd of February 743 CE in Rusafah.²⁶⁹  He was in his early fifties.²⁷⁰, ²⁷¹  Hisham’s death proved to be a Gordian knot for Umayyad Caliphate.

End notes

1. Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 624
2. Sulayman was born in Medina in the same house where Walid was born, to the same mother who had given birth to Walid.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 183, Year 96; P 192, Year 99.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 989, 1004
3. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1004.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 3.
4. A piece of evidence that Muslims considered throwing off allegiance once given a serious sin comes from the arguments between Qutayba and his soldiers.  Qutayba’s troops declined to throw off allegiance to Sulayman as a nominated heir apparent by Abdul Malik on instigation of Qutayba citing “that throwing off the allegiance to a caliph will corrupt the matter of both religion and the temporal word”.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 12.)
5. The inscription reads ‘Sulayman bin Abdul Malik year 96’. See: Adolf Grohmann, Arabische Palaographie II Teil, (Graz: Bohlau in Kommission, 1971), 73b, 85 fig. 54 and pl 14.2.
6. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 188, Year 96; P 193, Year 99.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1006.  AND  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 4.
7. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 366. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1006.
8. Musa’s mawla, Tariq bin Ziyad was a star witness in this case.  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1006.  The anonymous chronicler of 754 CE states that Musa was paraded in the bazars of Damascus with a rope around his neck as a show of his insult.  (Chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160)
9. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 193, Year 99.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1006.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 28.
10. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 28, 29
11. For details see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 194, Year 99.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1006.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5 – 28
12. Islamic sources do not mention Qutayba’s murder as a usual elimination of a rebellious governor by the central ruler.  Khalifa expresses his opinion, “if the whole military is sent in different directions to find another man like Qutaybah they will fail”.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 188, Year 96).  Actually, Qutayba’s death proved to be a big setback to the Umayyad Caliphate in the district of Khorasan.  Khorasan never became a stable administrative unit thereafter.  (See below)
13. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),30
14. For details of the development see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 189, Year 97.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1008.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),42
15. As soon as the forces of the Umayyad Caliphate left Gorgan, the people of Gorgan murdered the tax collector of the Umayyad Caliphate and announced their intention to denounce the treaty. After beating Tabaristan a bit, when Yazid bin Muhallab got free hand, he raided Gorgan again.  This time he not only subjugated them but also killed all warriors and took away their women and children in captivity. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 191, Year 98 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),52, 53,54, 55)
16. For details see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 190, Year 98 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1008
17. Ya’qubi reports people believing that ‘hundred years have never passed after a prophethood without its affairs being accomplished’. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1010.).  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 172
18. For the date of Maslamah’s raid see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 188, Year 96.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 28.
19. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 79 – 80, annus mundi 6206.
20. Galatia is the region of Anatolia where Ankara is currently located
21. Anastasios is also known as Artemios. See:  Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 79 – 80, annus mundi 6206.
22. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 79 – 80, annus mundi 6206; P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209.
23. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 79 – 80, annus mundi 6206.
24. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1011, 1012. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),41.
25. Dabiq was a village near Qinnasarin: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 192, Year 99 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 61
27. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 80 – 81, annus mundi 6207.
28. Some ships sent by Anastasios had actually reached the shores of Lebanon.  Ya’qubi reports that they set the city of Ladhiqiyyah in the district (jund) of Homs on fire and carried off spoils.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1011, 1012)
29. Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 624. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 82 –  85, annus mundi 6208.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 191, Year 98; P 190, Year 97.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1013.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),30, 39, 40
30. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 82 –  85, annus mundi 6208.  The army moved slowly because it carried at least two muds of food on the back of each horse.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),39, 40
31. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 82 –  85, annus mundi 6208. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),40.
32. Amorium in Greek sources is Ammuriya in Arabic sources.  Ruins of Amorium are present at the village of Hisarkoy, about 13 km to the east of Emirdag in modern Turkey.
33. Leo had faced a judicial enquiry during his early years.  He was accused of conspiring to attain Emperorship.  The enquiry cleared him of the accusations. (Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209.) It is possible that Leo was in contact with Sulayman before Maslama’s invasion started.  At least Tabari maintains this position.  Tabari insists that during his meetings with Sulayman, before departure of Maslamah, Leo had assured that he would deliver Byzantine Rome to Umayyad Caliphate. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 41)
34. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209.
35. Pergamon is the viallage of Bakircay in modern western Turkey.
36. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209. Tabari believes that inhabitants of the city had chosen Leo over Theodosius because Leo had convinced them that only he was capable of getting rid of Maslamah for them. ( Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),41.)
37. Befooling of Maslama became folklore in Muslim traditions. Tabari presents it in a funny way. He tells that when Maslamah had camped at Constantinople to lay the siege, people of Constantinople had elected Leo their Emperor. The soldiers of the Umayyad Caliphate were desperate to capture the city after an open fight and go back.  That time Leo sent a message to Maslamah feigning as his agent inside the town.  Leo told Maslamah that if he burns all the food he had, the residents of Constantinople will take it as a sign that he was preparing to lift the siege.  They will come out of the city wall jubilantly. That time he can attack them and finish them off.  Maslamah burnt all his food but nobody came out of the town.  Only a lone messenger appeared with a notice that the inhabitants of the town had elected Leo their king.  The starvation of the Muslim army started from that time, according to Tabari.  Similarly Tabari reports another anecdote that at the beginning of the siege, Leo sent a message to Maslama that if he allows food to enter into the city, the inhabitants will believe that Leo was in good books of Maslama.  Maslama heaped a lot of food, inhabitants came at night and took it inside the besieged city.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 41)
38. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 191, Year 98.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1011, 1012.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),42, 60.  Islamic sources name this action the ‘conquest of the city of Slavs’ (Medinat as-Saqaliba).
39. The ruins of Abydos can be seen near Qanakkale in modern Turkey.
40. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1011, 1012.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 39, 40
41. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209.
42. Bay of Sosthenios is Istinye, on the European side of Bosporus in modern Turkey.
43. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),41
44. Current location: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Bulgaria. Miniature 47 of the Bulgarian translation of Constantine Manasses Chronicle. (Manuscript BAV Cod. Vaticanus Slav. II Manasses Chronicle). The work belongs to somewhere from 1335 to 1340. See: Ivan Duichev, “Miniatures from the Manasses Chronicle”, Sofia: Bulgarski hudojnik Publishing house, 1962
45. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209. Islamic sources call the Bulgars Burjān:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 42. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 191, Year 98
46. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),39, 40
47. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 196, Year 99.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1013. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 60. One important person who tried to accomplish this mission was Caliph Sulayman’s own son by name of Dāwūd.
48. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1011, 1012.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 41
49. For details of the last attempt on Constantinople from perspectives of modern historians see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 243.  Also see:  Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 172 – 178.  AND E. W. Brooks, “The Arabs in Asia Minor (641 – 750) from Arabic Sources”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 18 Nov (1898): 182 – 208.  AND Hawting’s comments on this siege: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 72, 73
50. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 37
51. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 221
52. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 192, Year 99.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),62.  Others say he died at 33 or 45. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 192, Year 99.  Theophanes puts his death on October 8, 717 CE.  See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209.
53. He didn’t move out of Dabiq and died there.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz prayed over his funeral.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 192, Year 99 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),61, 62).
54. The death was quite unexpected.  Ya’qubi reports that Sulayman was a tall white man, attractive and eloquent.  He never went grey.  He looked in the mirror and said, “I’m a youthful king”. Within a week he died. Umar bin Abdul Aziz went into the grave of Sulayman along with the three sons of Sulayman to lay him down, but when they grasped his body, it moved in their hands.  Sulayman’s sons then said “By the Lord of Ka’ba, our father is alive!” but Umar said by the lord of the Ka’ba, no; rather your father has been hastened away [to death].”  Some, who wished to impugn Umar, would say about him that he had buried Sulayman alive.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1012, 1013)
55. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 33. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1012
56. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),41, 42, 60
57. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 192, Year 99.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 70 -74
58. Raja’ bin Haywa had been close to the hearts of ruling Umayyads since time of Walid bin Abdul Malik.  He maintained his status as the most influential person on caliph Sulayman and later, on Umar bin Abdul Aziz.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1004, 1012, 1023. Also see: C. E. Bosworth, ‘Raja’ bin Haywa”, Islamic Quarterly, 16 (1972).
59. Raja’ had taken the signatures of caliph Sulayman for the appointment of Umar bin Abdul Aziz at his deathbed.  He then took the sealed appointment letter to the mosque of Dabiq where he advised to take an oath to an undisclosed name written in the letter. Only after that Raja’ disclosed the name.  Some of the Umayyads got seriously disappointed.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1013, 1014)
60. Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s father was the brother of Caliph Abdul Malik and was the governor of Egypt. Abdul Aziz bin Marwan was tipped to be the next caliph after death of Abdul Malik. Abdul Aziz died before Abdul Malik’s death. It paved the way for the ascension of Walid.  Walid might be indebted to the Abdul Aziz family. Walid is the one who brought Umar bin Abdul Aziz to limelight when he appointed him governor of Medina on December 26, 705 CE. Umar was a young man of 25 that time. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 990.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 131).  Umar bin Abdul Aziz had been active in the politics of the country after his dismissal as governor of Medina.  It was he who quickly organized an oath for Sulayman in the capital of Damascus at the death of Walid, while Sulayman himself was in Ramallah.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1005). The reasons other than Raja’s convincing tone might be operating in Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s appointment
61. Many modern historians cover the event.  See: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 72, 73.  C. H. Becker, “Omar II”, Zeitschrift fu. Assyriologie 15 (1900).  AND W. Barthold, “The Caliph ‘Umar II and the Contraditory information about His Personality”, Islamic Quarterly, 15 (1971): 69 – 95.  AND H. A. R. Gibb, “Fiscal Rescript”. Arabica 2 (1955).
62. For the age of Umar bin Abdul Aziz see: Umar bin Abdul Aziz was born in 61 AH.  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 97, Year 61.
63. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 41
64. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1016, 1024.
65. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 196, Year 99. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1016
66. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 85 – 90, annus mundi 6209. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 196, Year 99.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 74
67. The Umayyad Caliphate did not discharge Maslamah bin Abdul Malik from his duties after the failed attempt on Constantinople.  It might be a politically damaging act for any caliph.  He continued to govern Jazira and its districts up to March of 732 CE when caliph Hisham discharged him of his duties.  Maslama had a lengthy retirement of six years and died in 738 CE.  He also held governorship of Iraq for caliph Yazid II for a few months.  Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 230, Year 114; P 237, Year 120.   AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),163.
68. Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s statement is on record that the sovereignty has four pillars, the caliph, the governor, the judge and the head of public treasury.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),95.)
69. For example Tabari uses word ‘ata’ for the child care subsidy given by the government.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),97.)
70. For example, many a times junior government officials hired people without paying them ‘ata’ in one such incident, which took place during the first year of Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s office, his lieutenant governor of Khorasan raided Khuttal.  Twenty thousand mawlas were part of his army. He didn’t pay any of them.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 83).  Khuttal was a region on the north bank of River Oxus stretching between its tributaries Vakhsh and Panj.  It corresponds roughly to the Khatlon province of modern Tajikistan.
71. Kharijis rebelled against Umar bin Abdul Aziz government in Iraq in 718 CE.  Initially the rebels defeated an army sent by the governor of Iraq. Then Umar sent the Syrian troops under Maslamah bin Abdul Malik.  He defeated the Kharijis. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1021, 1022.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 76, 77)
72. The Umayyad Caliphate had seen one small rising of the Kharijis in the insignificant district of Bahrain in 715 CE during the reign of Sulayman.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 188, Year 96
73. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 84
74. It reminded the tax inspectors that the taxation laws of the country did not allow assessing an uncultivated piece of land at the same rate as cultivated land.  It also reprimanded them that levying any kind of toll (āyīn), wages of mint officials, any fees for official papers, for couriers, for housing, or for weddings was prohibited in the tax laws of the country. The reprimand mentioned that deliberately overassessing the tax amount was a crime in the law.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),96.).  For Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s harsh rebuttal to Muḥammad bin Yūsuf, governor of Yemen, for wresting the lands of people without paying them and levying upon people Kharaj land tax over and above tithe see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 112
75. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1020. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),96.
76. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 96. Twenty thousand new converts were only in the district of Khorasan during the first year of Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s reign who were forced to pay Jiziya.  All of them were relieved on the orders of Umar bin Abdul Aziz.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 83).  One of the reasons for the dismissal of Jarrah bin Abdullah from the post of lieutenant governor of Khorasan was that he failed to toe the government policy and continued to charge jiziya tax to mawlas and kept them using in army without paying them.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1015)
77. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1019.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 96.
78. The surplus of tax money of Khorasan after the usual government expenditures was sent to the central government.  Umar asked it to be distributed locally to the needy. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 95.  For such orders given to the governor of Yemen see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1020.  For Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s such orders for governor of Oman see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 119.
79. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),96.
80. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),97.
81. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 97.
82. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1020.
83. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 97
84. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 97.
85. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1019.
86. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1019.
87. The cursing of Ali from the pulpits did not get momentum again.  When Caliph Hisham bin Abdul Malik reached Medina on his way to pilgrimage in 725 CE, he came across Sa’id bin Abdullah bin Walid bin Uthman bin Affan.  Sa’id said that Allah has not ceased blessing the people of the house of the Commander of Faithful and is thus helping the wronged caliph (Uthman). Nor had people have stopped cursing Abu Turab in those good lands. Likewise the Commander of Faithful ought to curse him in these good lands. Sa’id’s talk was hard on Hisham.  He simply commented that ‘We did not come to revile anyone or to curse him; we have come as pilgrims.”. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),19.
88. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1019.
89. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1019, 1020
90. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),20
91. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 84
92. The scale of migration was such that the government authorities were afraid of its consequences. Once, Hajjaj’s lieutenant governor over Hamadan offered Hajjaj to use his local men to fight against a Khariji rebel instead of getting Hajjaj’s troops.  Hajjaj exclaimed in disgust, ‘How I hate to see the Arabs increasing in number in the Kharaj lands.”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Everett K. Rowson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 143).
93. For example, the whole clan of Arabs moved out of Iraq and settled in Jabal District during the reign of Marwan bin Hakam see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916, 488
94. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Everett K. Rowson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 169.
95. For the location of Basan see: Yaqut Mujam I, 468, 766f.  Le Strange, lands 399;  For location of Buyanah at two farsakhs from Merv see: Yaqut Mujam I 766f
96. For some other exclusively Arab townships see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),117.
97. The Arabs had taken possession of at least some agricultural land in Khorasan by illegally evicting their ahl al Dhimma owners with the help of the district government.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 94, 95.
98. Abdul Malik’s first governor in Khorasan, Umayyah bin Abdullah, had to face resistance from Arab dwellers. One of their objection on the management of Umayyah bin Abdullah was that Umayyah had made the dihqan masters over Arabs in collecting taxes.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Everett K. Rowson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),172)
99. Mu’awiya appointed Abdur Rahman bin Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan lieutenant governor over Khorasan.  It is mentioned as a bad credit for him that he remained at the helm of affairs for two years but did not make a single raid. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 200).  This was the reason of his dismissal
100. Actually the division on geographical lines can be traced in the cities of Iraq during the tenure of Mu’awiya.  (See, for example: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 132.) Still they had good neighborly relations.
101. See above.
102. See above.
103. See above.
104. Abdur Rahman bin Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan had earned twenty million dirhams during his two years tenure as lieutenant governor of Khorasan.  Yazid bin Mu’awiya summoned him back.  He gave him option of giving an account of his finances and keeping the job or contribute five hundred thousand dirham towards central government spending and keep the rest and take retirement.  Abdur Rahman accepted the later terms.   (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 200)
105. Yazid bin Muhallab drew near to army of Syria and a group from army of Khorasan when he became governor of Khorasan.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 37.
106. Umar bin Abdul Aziz was not a government official during Sulayman’s tenure.  He was simply a prominent member of the ruling house. That time he went for pilgrimage in his private capacity.  There, in Arafat, he had a chat with Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Khalid bin Asid, who was tipped to be the next governor of Mecca.  “How come the caliph had appointed a man (Yazid bin Muhallab) governor of the best frontier province of the country.  He pays one of his concubines, a Juhani woman, stipend equal to that of one thousand soldiers.  By Allah, the caliph has not appointed him for the sake of Allah,”  Umar exclaimed.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),37).  See also: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 197, Year 99
107. Mawlas had complained to Umar bin Abdul Aziz about Jarrah’s leaning towards Arabs at the cost of Mawlas.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 83).   Jarrah used to say that he liked traveling in Ramadan because it promoted the tradition of pre-Islamic Arabs: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),84.  By that time travelling in Ramadan without any valid reason was shunned.
108. Umar bin Abdul Aziz acknowledged his failures at the time of his dismissal.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1015).
109. Umar bin Abdul Aziz was seriously concerned about the direction Khorasan had taken.  Once he admitted to the finance secretary of Khorasan, “there is no Muslim frontier that is of greater concern to me or that I consider to be as important as the Khorasan frontier”.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 95.)
110. The anonymous chronicler of 714 CE notices this change.  He tells, “In military matters Umar achieved no great success nor anything adverse.”  (Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 625).  The anonymous chronicler of 754 CE is more clear.  He describes, “[with] this Umar …  all battles ended.” (Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160).
111. Any government, central, provincial or district in Umayyad Caliphate, never declared that the territorial expansion was for the benefit of the country or for enriching its people.  People living inside Umayyad Caliphate, however, had started realizing that all fighting was for money.  People living in the neighborhood of the country were also clear conscious about it.
112. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 197, Year 99.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1015.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 95.
113. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 197, Year 99.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1015. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 95.
114. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 204
115. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 204
116. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 256, 290
117. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 238
118. For the summer campaign of 719 CE, for example, see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),79.
119. See above.
120. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 192, Year 99; P 197, Year 99
121. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),74, 75
122. Umar bin Abdul Aziz wrote to his lieutenant governor over Khorasan by name of Abdur Rahman bin Mu’aym around April of 719 CE, “now then, if you are a sincere servant of Allah with regard to His servants, no reproach that anyone might utter will have any effect on you in the cause of Allah, for Allah is closer to you than the people are, and what you owe Him is greater than what you owe them.  Do not commission anything in the affairs of the Muslims except that which is known to be good for them and that which promotes their welfare, and be faithful to what is entrusted to you.  Beware lest you incline toward anything but what is right, for the unseen is not concealed from Allah.  And do not walk along a path that leads away from Allah, for there is no refuge from Allah, expect with Him.”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 86.)
123. Umar dismissed Yazid bin Muhallab from governorship of Iraq immediately after coming to power, for example.   He was transported to Umar from Iraq under arrest.  When Yazid bin Muhallab reached Umar, the later demanded the money he had mentioned in the letter to Sulayman after the triumph of Gurgan.  Yazid replied that he had done to augment prestige of Sulayman, knowing that Sulayman will not demand the money.  Yazid refused to pay anything.  Umar paraded him dressed in wool garments and on a camel in front of soldiers and ordered his exile to Dahlak (an island in red sea).  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1015.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 75, 79).  Later on Umar cancelled the exile orders.  Yazid bin Muhallab remained in Damascus Jail until death of Umar bin Abdul Aziz.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 197, Year 99.)
124. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1020.
125. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 256
126. Interestingly, the Kharijis got delighted by the initial reform policies of Umar bin Abdul Aziz government.  Despite their war against his government, they opened negotiation channels to find out actual intentions of his government.  They advised Umar to dissociate himself from the rest of Umayyads and curse them.  Umar did not show any intention to do that.  He rather criticized the Kharijis that whatever they stood for could be compelling but it had failed to attract mass support. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1021, 1022.).
127. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1023.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),78, 9, 92
128. It was customary that the person taking the office of caliph used to pray over the dead caliph.  In case of Umar bin Abdul Aziz it was his son Maslamah who prayed over his dead body.  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1023.
129. The medieval building located in Deir as-Sharqi in Syria has got a reputation to contain grave of Umar bin Abdul Aziz. Islamic traditions assert that the Abbasids razed graves of all Umayyad caliphs except that of Umar bin Abdul Aziz. No archaeological research has ever been done on this structure.
130. Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s mother, Umm ‘Asim was granddaughter of Umar bin Khattab: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 192, Year 99.  AND Umar’s mother, Umm ‘A.s.im was daughter of ‘A.s.im bin ‘Umar bin al Khattab.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),92
131. Paying homage to Umar bin Abdul Aziz, the anonymous chronicler of 741CE in Spain writes:  He was of such great kindness and compassion that to this day as much honour and praise is bestowed on him by all, even foreigners, as ever has been offered to anyone in his lifetime holding the reins of power. (Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 625)
132. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1021.
133. Writing to Yazid bin Muhallab for an oath of allegiance after ascending to power Umar bin Abdul Aziz says, “Now then, Sulayman was one of Allah’s servants upon whom Allah bestowed His blessing and then took him away.  He designated me as his successor and he designated Yazid bin Abdul Malik – if he is still live – to succeed me.  The office that Allah has entrusted and allocated to me is not easily borne.  Were it my desire to take many wives and acquire wealth, then the sums that He has already given me are greater than that attained by any of his creatures.  But I fear, in connection with the office for which I have been chosen, a difficult reckoning and a painful questioning, except for whatever defense from trial Allah may grant me, in His mercy.  Those at our end have sworn the oath of allegiance, so now let those at your end do the same.”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),93. )
134. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 991
135. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 79
136. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 990.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 131.
137. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),132.
138. Welhausen considers Abdul Aziz a pious individual who attempted to solve the problems of his day in a way which would reconcile the needs of his dynasty and state with the demands of Islam.  (J. Wellhausen, Arab Kingdgom, 304 – 11).
139. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 199, Year 101.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1026.
140. Yazid bin Abdul Malik was twenty-nine years old when he came to power.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 105).  He had not served in military service or on any administrative position.
141. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1030.
142. For reversal of all of Umar’s policies in Yemen see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 112
143. Yazid II re-confiscated the property of Ibrahim bin Muhammad bin Talhah bin Ubaydullah in Mecca which Umar Abdul Aziz had restored to him.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),20
144. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1019, 1020
145. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),115
146. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),120.
147. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1030.
148. See for example, an incident of 720 CE:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),150, 151
149. Yazid bin Muhallab had tortured the family of Hajjaj bin Yusuf and Yazid bin Abdul Malik was married to the sister of Hajjaj.  Yazid bin Muhallab anticipated revenge.
150. For details of Yazid bin Muhallab’s rebellion see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 193, Year 99; P 199, Year 101; P 203, Year 101; P 204, Year 102; P 204, Year 102; P 212, Year 105; P 213, Year 105.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1023,1026, 10271028. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 21, 89, 90, 127  – 146.  See also: Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 624.  AND Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160.  See as well: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 73, 74, 75, 76
151. The wordings of oath of allegiance to Yazid bin Muhallab were, “I swear allegiance to the Book of Allah and to the Sunnah of His Prophet that no army will pillage our country or our headquarters and that we will never again be subject to the behavior of that sinner al- Ḥajjāj.  We accept the allegiance of anyone who will swear on these terms and we will engage in holy war against anyone who refuses, putting Allah between him and us.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),131).
152. The rebellion was equivalent to modern violent protest.  Many of the rebels were unarmed or lightly armed.  The Syrian Troops let the ordinary rebels run for their lives.  They arrested only three hundred prominent rebels.  Some of them were executed in Damascus on orders of Yazid bin Abdul Malik.  The rest were pardoned by the caliph.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 140).  The surviving members of Yazid bin Muhallab’s family gathered at Basrah before the advancing Syrian Troops reached the town.  They grabbed the public treasury and boarded a passenger ship to disembark at Kerman and reach Qandabil in the district of Sind by road.  The deputy governor of Qandabil, who was a Yazid bin Muhallab appointee, denied them entrance into the town.  The chasing Syrian Troops overcame them on the road, outside the town.  They killed some of them and took others in custody.  Two of them escaped to the Turks (Khaqan or Rutbil).  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 204 – 206, Year 102.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),144, 145)
153. Al ‘Aqr was near Karbala.  See: Yaqut Mu’jam IV 136
154. See above.
155. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),108, 109, 110.
156. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 216, Year 105.
157. He was the last representative of Umayyad Caliphate in the district whom neighboring powers considered worth something.  Ruler of Tibet sent him envoy to open diplomatic relations.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1015)
158. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 86.
159. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),150.
160. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1027, 1028.
161. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),152 – 158.
162. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1029.
163. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),152.
164. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),158.
165. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),160, 161.
166. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 206, Year 102; P 207, Year 103.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1027, 1028, 1029.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 164, 168, 169, 170, 172, 174, 175, 176, 178,179, 192.
167. See details: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 207, Year 103; P 208, Year 104; P 210, Year 105.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1030, 1032.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 167,182, 183, 192.
168. See details:  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 206, Year 102; P 207, Year 103; P 209, Year 103; P 210, Year 105.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1030, 1032.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 167, 192.
169. See details: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 207, Year 103.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 164
170. See details: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 205, Year 102; P 204, Year 102; P 214, Year 105.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 366.  AND  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1030.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 164, 165
171. See details: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 204, 205, Year 102; P 207, 209, Year 103
172. Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 626.  AND Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160
173. Galia Narbonensis was region of Roman times centered on modern day Narbonne in Southern Farce; Tolosa is Toulouse in France
174. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 210, Year 105. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1031.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),193, 194.
175. Hisham bin Abdul Malik led his funeral prayer.  He got buried in Balqa’ in the district of Damascus.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 211, Year 105.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),1031.
176. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 37
177. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 211, Year 105. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1033. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 1, 2.
178. Hisham was born in 72 AH.  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 128, Year 72.
179. Exact location of Rusafah is not known.  Most historians believe that it could be Qaṣr Ḥayr al Gharbi.  Tabari informs that it was a Byzantine built city.  This place was known to Yaqut and he mentions it in Mujam III 163. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 80.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 2. Editor’s notes).  Some historians believe that, if Tabari is correct, Rusafah was actually Sergiopolis whose Byzantine ruins are present in present day Resafah to the southwest of Al-Raqqa in Syria.  Hisham and his immediate family members chose to reside in Rusafah to avoid exposure to plague in Damascus.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 80, 81.).
180. For one of his campaigns during his father’s government see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),134.
181. Ink inscription on marble ostracon. Found at Khrbat al-Mafjar, Palestine. Current location: Rockefeller Archaeological Museum, Jerusalem.
182. See above.
183. See above.
184. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1033 – 1035.
185. Ashandarabid of Ya’qubi is identified as Chandrapīda, the King of Kashmir.
186. ‘Land of Kurz’ of Arabic sources is identified as the territory governed by Gurjara-Pratihara dynasty.  Its capital city was Qanawj.  This is town of Kannauj located about 100 km northwest of Kanpur in modern Northern India near the bank of Ganges.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1033 – 1035.  Foot note 2419.); Islamic sources mention foothills of Himalaya in the Punjab as ‘China’; Kiraj is considered to be Kangra Valley in Himachal Pradesh; Marmadh is identified as Maru-Mada in Jaisalmer near jodhpur; Barus or Barwas is identified as Bharuch; Surast is identified as Saurashtra; Bilaman is identified as Bhillamala or Bhinmal; Malibah is identified as Malwa. All these locations are in Gujarat and Rajasthan. Mandal and Dahnaj are unidentified (Blankinship 1994, P 133 – 134)
187. (Blankinship 1994, P 133 – 134)
188. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1033 – 1035
189. First action of Hisham government against Byzantine Rome was to annul the tax concession to people of Cyprus, which Umar bin Abdul Aziz government had granted: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 238
190. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 96, annus mundi 6218.
191. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 97, 98, annus mundi 6218.
192. Nikaia is modern Iznik in Western Turkiye.
193. For details see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 95, annus mundi 6216; P 96, annus mundi 6218; P 96, annus mundi 6218; P 97, 98, annus mundi 6218; P 98, annus mundi 6219; P 101, annus mundi 6222; P 101, annus mundi 6224;  P 102, annus mundi 6226; P 102, annus mundi 6227; P 102, annus mundi 6228; P 102, annus mundi 6229; P 103, annus mundi 6230.   AND Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 218, Year 106; P 218, Year 107; P 218, 209, Year 107; P 219, Year 107; P 220, Year 108; P 221, Year 108; P 222, Year 109; P 223, Year 110; P 225, Year 111; P 228, Year 112; P 231, Year 114; P 232, Year 115; P 234, Year 117; P 235, Year 118; P 236, Year 119; P 236, Year 120; P 240, Year 121; P 242, Year 122; P 242, Year 123.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 257, 258, 263.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1050, 1051.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 8, 24, 29, 34, 45, 64, 69, 95, 96, 97, 100, 102, 111, 125, 131, 167.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. John Alden Williams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 121.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 3, 55, 68, 70.  See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 83.
194. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 103, annus mundi 6231.  AND Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 240, Year 121.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),55
195. Akroinos is modern Afyonkarahisar in western Turkey ; Tyana is modern Kemerhisar near Nigde in Turkey; Synnada is modern suhut in western Turkey.
196. For details see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 217, Year 106; P 218, Year 107; P 220, Year 108; P 222, Year 109; P 222, 223, Year 110; P 224, 225, Year 111; P 226, 227, 228, Year 112; P 229, Year 113; P 230, Year 114; P 233, 234, Year 117; P 234, 235 Year 118; P 235, Year 119; P 236, Year 119 AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 323, 325, 326, 327.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1035 – 1036, 1050 – 1051AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 8, 45, 65, 69, 95, 98, 111, 167.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 3.  See also:  See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 83.  AND D. M. Dunlop, Jewish Khazars, 58 – 87.
197. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 226, 227, 228 Year 112.
198. The story has survived in Tabari’s accounts as well:  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 69
199. Bardha’a is Barda in modern Azerbaijan; Marj Sabalan is the meadows at the foot of Mount Sabalan in modern northwestern Iran; Arbadil is still known by the same name and is located in modern north western Iran; Arshaq is Meshginshahr in modern Iran; Baylaqan is Beylagan in modern Azerbaijan;  Warthan is unknown place
200. For existence of such states and their suffering see: Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 239, 240.  Year 121.
201. For details see: Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 217, Year 106; P 220, Year 108; P 221, Year 109; P 223, Year 110; P 225, Year 111; P 228, Year 112; P 229, 230, Year 113; P 230, 231, Year 114; P 232, Year 115; P 232, 233, Year 116; P 234, Year 117; P 235, Year 118; P 236, Year 119; P 237, Year 120; P 240, Year 121.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 367.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1036, 1037.
202. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),21, 22
203. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 22
204. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 22.
205. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 232, Year 116; P 240, 241, Year 122; P 243, 244, 245 Year 124.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 360. 367  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),54.  See also comments of Hawting: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 83. AND Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160
206. For the name and his trade see: Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 241, Year 122
207. Chronicle of 754 CE in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160
208. Austrasia mentioned in this passage is not the modern day territory of Austria.  It is the Frankish domain of Austrasia.  Originally corresponding to the northeastern France and parts of Belgium and western Germany
209. G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 83.
210. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1033 – 1035.
211. Qaṣṣa of Arabic sources is recognized to be Kaccha, modern Kutch in Maharashtra state of India.
212. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 248, Year 125. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1043
213. Mayd, Mand, people of India
214. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 242, Year 122.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1043, 1044.
215. Ruins of Mansura are located 47 km northeast of Hyderabad, Pakistan
216. G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 83.
217. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 9 – 13.
218. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 46 – 48
219. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 46 – 48.  See also comments of Hawting on the issue: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 85, 86
220. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 25 – 62, 132.
221. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),65 – 67, 70 – 89
222. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 231, 232.  Year 115. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),105 – 122.
223. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 111, 128
224. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 148 – 150
225. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 171.
226. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),23 – 33, 56 – 59
227. For a full list of lieutenant governors of Khorasan during Hisham’s tenure see: Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 248, Year 125.
228. For full details of conditions of Khorasan during Hisham’s tenure see:  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 216, Year 106; P 219, Year 107; P 220, Year 108; P 224, Year 110; P 225, Year 112; P 228, Year 113; P 231, Year 114; P 233, Year 117. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 9 – 13, 14 – 18, 25 – 27, 30, 31, 35 – 38, 42, 46 – 48, 50 – 62, 65 – 89, 103, 111, 112 – 129, 133 – 152, 162 – 164.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 23 – 33, 56 – 59
229. See above.
230. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),95
231. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 75
232. Two slaves died in a fight against Turks in Khorasan around 730 CE.  Tabari claims that both of them achieved martyrdom.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 75.).  No Muslim could be enslaved according to the law of the country.
233. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 15.
234. see above
235. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 40
236. The anonymous chronicler of 754 CE notes that “Hisham was seized by greed, such a great collection of money through commanders in East and West was made by him, as had never been gathered among the kings who had come before him.  As considerable groups of people saw that there was dishonest greed within him, they disobeyed his diction.  Then, with considerable civil havoc occurring over almost three and four years, he was barely able to restore to his power the provinces that had been lost.  (Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160)
237. Asad bin Abdullah, the deputy governor of Khorasan, attended the feast of Mihrijān while he was at Balkh [his capital], when the amīrs and dihqāns brought him presents.  Among those who came to him was Ibrahīm bin ‘Abd ar Raḥmān al Ḥanafi, his governor of Herāt and Khorasān, the dihqān of Herāt.  [Khorasan was the dihqan’s name. i.e. the lord and the amir of the same town].  The two of them brought him a gift valued at a million [dirhams].  Among that which they brought were a fortress of silver, a fortress of gold [they must be models], pitchers of gold, pitchers of silver, and large dishes of gold and silver.  The two of them came forward as Asad was sitting on the raised seat and the nobles of Khorasan on their chairs.  They sat down the two fortresses, then put behind them the pitchers, large dishes and silk garments of Merv, Qūhistān, and Herat, until the cloth spread out (for the feast) was filled.  Among what the dihqān brought Asad was a ball of gold. [The dihqan had brought separately].  Then the dihqan stood to deliver a speech and said:  “May Allah make the amīr prosper! We Iranian people ruled the world for four hundred years.  We ruled it with forbearance, reason, and dignity. Though there was not among us a clear book nor an Allah-sent prophet.  (Great) men with us were three.  (First) is one fortunate in nature; wherever he goes, Allah conquers through him.  (Second) is a man whose manly qualities have been completed in his house; if he is like that, he will be welcomed, greeted, exalted, given command, and advanced.  (Third) is a man whose heart is big and whose hand is open (with generosity), so that he is wished for; if he is like that, he will be given command and advanced.  Allah has put in you the characteristics of these three by whom we ruled for four hundred years, O Amīr.  We do not know of anyone who is more perfect in leadership than you.  You have kept your household, entourage, and mawali in line so that there is not one of them who can transgress against either a little man or a great one, a rich man or a poor one.  This is perfection of leadership.  Then, you have built arched halls in the deserts to which one visitor comes from the east, another from the west.  Neither of them finds a fault, but rather they say, ‘Glory be to Allah! How excellent is that which has been built!” included in your natural good fortune is that you met the Khāqān when he was leading a hundred thousand men and accompanied by Ḥārith bin Surayj.  You defeated him, made him flee, killed his men, and plundered his camp.  As for your big heartedness and open handedness, we do not know which of two kinds of wealth is more delightful to you: wealth that has come to you or wealth which has gone forth from you.  Indeed, you are more delighted by that which has gone forth!”  Asad laughed and said, “You are the best of Khorasān’s diqhāns and the most excellent in giving.”  Asad gave him an apple which was in his hand. The dihqān of Herāt prostrated himself before Asad.  Asad felt silent looking at those gifts.  He looked to his right saying, “O ‘Udhāfir bin Yazīd! Command someone to bear away this gold fortress.  Then he said, “O Mughirah bin Aḥmar, head of the Qays! Command someone to bear this fortress away.  Then he said, O so and so take and pitcher and so on.  He gave away the large dishes until two large remained.  He said, “Stand up, O ibn al Ṣaydā’, and take a little dish.” Ibn Ṣaydā’ took one, lifted it to test its weight, then put it down.  Then he took the other one and lifted it, testing its weight.  Asad asked him, “What is the matter?” Ibn Ṣaydā’ answered, “I will take the heavier one.”  Asad said “take both of them together,” He gave also to the lesser officers and to those who had performed outstandingly in war.  Abu Ya’fūr, who used to go before the ruler of Khorasān in military campaigns, rose and called out, “On war, to the road!” Asad said, “How excellent is that which you have called attention to regarding yourself! Take two silken garments.”  Maymūn al ‘Adhdhāb stood up saying, “to me, to your left, to the thoroughfare!”  Asad said, “How excellent is that which you have called attention to regarding yourself!  Take a silken garment.” Asad gave away all that was on the cloth spread on the ground.  Nahār bin Tawsi’ah sad a couplet:  You (people) are few when one who rewards summons to war; But on the morning of al-Mihrijān you are many.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),167, 168, 169.).  One can note that the amil and Dihqan of Herat probably brought all they could afford for that year.  On top of that the Dihqan had to praise the lieutenant governor for his personal charisma and the superiority of his ethnic group.  At the same time the Dihqan had to express his personal humbleness and the inferiority of his ethnic group.  The lieutenant governor had to give the Dihqan a return gift, as the custom goes.  He gave the dihqan a worthless apple.  The passage records vividly what happened to the gifts.  A small portion of them got distributed to the entourage of the lieutenant governor and a large portion went into the Lieutenant governor’s house.  He utilized the wealth he amassed in this way on building a palace in the desert whose only function was to get praise from the people.  Probably it was lieutenant governor’s personal holiday home which remained empty most of the year.
238. Once Yusuf bin Umar, governor of Iraq, sent to Hisham a red ruby which was the size of a hand’s palm and a pearl as bright as it could be, as gifts.  Yusuf had confiscated it from ex-governor Khalid bin Abdullah. Hisham asked the bearer if he had brought the papers (gemologist’s certificates) documenting their weights?  The bearer told that they were too big to be weighed.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),82.).
239. For extensive business of governor Khalid bin Abdullah in Iraq see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 184, 185.
240. Once Hisham raised the price of grain in the market of Iraq by secretly ordering his governor of Iraq, Khalid bin Abdullah al Qasri, not to allow any sale of local produce until caliph’s product is fully sold out.  Market inflamed so tremendously, and the people got so offended, that the the governor had to give them a hint, “You have claimed that I have made prices expensive for you.  May Allah’s curse be upon he who makes them dear!”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),186, 187.).
241. In 738 CE Hisham bin Abdul Malik dismissed Khalid bin Abdullah from Iraq and appointed Yusuf bin Umar.  Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 236, Year 120.  See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 81, 82.  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1042, 1043.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī , The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 172 – 186.  Partial reason for dismissal could be that Khalid bin Abdullah al-Qasri had grown strong and Hisham felt threatened.
242. Among many ill things of Hisham, Ya’qubi blames he was a miser.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 48).  Hisham bin Abdul Malik forbade his officials and family members to go around with a retinue.  Only Maslamah bin Abdul Malik was allowed to do so.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),73.)  Hisham was so miser that he used to wear the same attire at many different occasions.  Once a government officer saw him in a tunic (Qabā’) made up of green fur, which he had seen him wearing previously. The officer asked him if this was the same tunic he saw him wearing previously.  Hisham answered yes, then added I do not possess any other tunics.  ( Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 73).  None of Marwanids was more avaricious in dealing with his associates and registers than Hisham bin Abdul Malik.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),75.  One of the banu Marwan once asked Hisham, “How can you, who are miserly and cowardly, want the caliphate?”  Hisham answered “Why should I not want it, seeing that I am forbearing and decent? (anā Ḥalimun ‘afīfun).  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),78).  See also Hawting’s comments on the issue: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 81
243. Explaining himself to his immediate family members, once Hisham exclaimed, “This money that you see me collecting and hoarding is for you all.”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),73)
244. Hisham’s past time hobbies manifest his spending habits.  Unlike other rich people of his time, Hisham’s took pleasure in picnicking with his friends where he showed them boastfully how to milk a goat or bake a bread.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 79.)
245. None of the Marwanids maintained the diwans more sound than Hisham.  It was beneficial to both the common people and the government. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 75)
246. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 451.
247. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1036.
248. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5, 6, 7
249. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),65.
250. For public knowledge of this issue see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 185.
251. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 229, Year 113.
252. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),184.
253. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 118.
254. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 178.
255. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),172.
256. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),177, 178.
257. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 184.
258. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 186.
259. Khirbet al Mafjir, Palestine. Photographer not known. See: R. W. Hamilton, An Arabian mansion in the Jordan Valley, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.
260. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),  178, 179, 180, 181.
261. The anonymous chronicler of 754 CE observes, “As considerable groups of people saw that there was dishonest greed within him [Hisham], they disobeyed his diction.  Then, with considerable civil havoc occurring over almost three and four years, he was barely able to restore to his power the provinces that had been lost.”  (Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”.  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160)
262. See above.
263. Bahlūl bin Bishr, for example, denounced his loyalty to the caliph with forty of his companions.  Initially the group killed a petty city administrator and ganged to kill Khalid bin Abdullah, the governor of Iraq.  Governor Khalid sent a number of armies against him, sometimes up to four thousand in number.  Each time government forces came back licking their wounds.  In the long last, Bahlul decided to leave governor of Iraq aside and cut throat of caliph Hisham, who was the root cause of problems in the country in his view.  He was on his way to Syria when governors of Iraq and Jazira sent a joint force to halt him.  Hisham, in his capacity as governor of province of Syria, sent the Syrian Troops.  A total of twenty thousand strong fully equipped fighters killed Bahlul and his seventy companions in 737 CE.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1041.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 155 – 160.)
264. See details: Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 220, Year 108; P 249, Year 125.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 24, 161, 164, 165, 166)
265. For the event see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 152, 153. 154.  For the Shi’a Ali affiliation of Mughirah see: Ibn Qubaybah, ‘Uyūn, II 146 – 9.  And Mubarrad, Kāmil I 31. AND tabari III/2 1700
266. See details:  Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 241, Year 122.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 4 – 54.
267. The oath of allegiance Zayd used to take from people was:  We summon you to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Prophet, and to wage war against those who act tyrannically, to defend those who have been oppressed (Qur’an 28:4 – 5), to give pensions to those who have been deprived of them, to distribute this booty (fay’) equally amongst those who are entitled to it, to make restitution to those who have been wronged, to bring home those who have been detained on the frontiers, and to help the Ahl al Bayt against those who have opposed us and disregard our just cause.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),21.)
268. Some Shi’a Ali sympathizers carried Yahya bin Zayd from the death scene of Zayd to a safe place.  From there they smuggled him into Khorasan.  Nasr bin Sayyar, the lieutenant governor of Khorasan, quickly traced him and locked him up in Merv jail.  Either Yahya got released from the jail or escaped.  In any case, he gathered about hundred Shi’a Ali dissidents.  They fought against the government forces near Juzjan and got killed.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1053, 1054.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 120 – 125.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 120 – 125. )
269. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 245, Year 125.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1048.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),70
270. Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 245, Year 125.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),71
271. Hisham died of diphtheria.  Palatial conspiracies were at their peak at the time of his death.  His opponent’s agents locked the state storeroom.  His loyalists had difficulty in getting a shroud for his burial.  For the same reason, there is confusion in historical sources about who prayed over him.  However, nobody vandalized his grave later on and it was still in Rusafah at the time of Tabari’s writing.  (Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 245, Year 125.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1048.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),71, 72.)