Political Developments III

Crisis of succession

Historical sources don’t mention clearly that Yazid had made any arrangements for his succession. ¹ He was still working to establish his rule throughout the country, and he had not factored in his sudden death in any of his political calculations. ²  Mu’awiya, Yazid’s first born, was the only one who had attained majority. ³  Yet, he was a young lad of thirteen and was reported to be sick. ⁴  He, sometimes called Mu’awiya II, assumed role of make-shift caliph.⁵

The authority of the Yazid government was already bleak during the last months of Yazid’s tenure. Ibn Zubayr was well established in Hejaz and Najada was the virtual ruler of Yamama.  Ubaydullah bin Ziyad had grown powerful in the Eastern Provinces and had started antagonism with the central government.  The Shi’a Ali, though defeated, had not died out.  Yazid I did not leave much for Mu’awiya II to inherit.

Hawting considers the start of the Second Arab Civil War from this point.  He writes, “the two fundamental facts which provided the immediate opportunity for the outbreak of the Second Arab Civil War were, firstly, the refusal of certain leading Muslims to accept Yazid as caliph and, secondly, the failure of the Sufyanids to supply sutibable candates for the caliphate after the death of Yazid. ⁶.

Sufyanids petered out

Mu’awiya II did not take an oath of the office.  He rather convened a congregational prayer in Damascus and announced his incapacity to run the country. He died soon after.⁷, ⁸  Ya’qubi notes an emotional speech coming out of his tongue on the occasion, admitting the guilt of all those accusations on his father and grandfather, which their opponents have been labeling.  ⁹ This speech is so critical of his both predecessors, that if actually delivered, it should have been written by a Shi’a Ali.¹⁰, ¹¹  He didn’t even hint at who should be the caliph if he was incapable of running the country. ¹²

Mu’awiya II’s decision appears to be sane. His father and grandfather had relied heavily on the Syrian Troops of military to rule the country. The presumed loyality of the Syrian Troops to the caliph was proverbial.  However, the hope of their unconditional loyality was smashed when Yazid put them to work.  Difficulties started from the beginning. Yazid had a hard time appointing a commander for the army because he had ordered them to attack the sacrad sites of Medina and Mecca. ¹³  Muslim bin Uqba, Yazid’s handpicked commander, had to convince his plentiful soldiers to assault and overcome the comparatively small numbers of Medinan civilians. ¹⁴  When the army marched further and its leadership changed due to the death of Muslim, the army proved to be a fiasco. We don’t hear this army assaulting the wall-less city of Mecca and arresting or killing Ibn Zubayr.  After a few low impact duels, it confined its activities to blockading the city and bombarding it by ballistics from afar. Even these activities appear to be half-hearted. There are no casualties reported inside Mecca as a result of the bombardment. Mecca had to import food to feed its inhabitants. As the town did not undergo famine despite sixty days of blockade, apparently the blockade was not effective. Paradoxically, the commander of the army raised the blockade without waiting for orders from the central government when the news of Yazid’s death came. Further, he did not write a letter to the capital to affirm his loyalty to the make-shift caliph.  Rather he invited Ibn Zubayr to accompany him to Syria so he could install Ibn Zubayr as the new ruler of the country. ¹⁵  Ibn Zubayr rejected the offer hurriedly.¹⁶  Later on, it is reported that Ibn Zubayr repented his decision. ¹⁷, ¹⁸. The rank and file of the Syrian Troops had already broke when it returned to Syria.  Mu’awiya II did not have any whip in his hands to keep the herd together. ¹⁹

The chronology of events that took place all over the Umayyad Caliphate after Yazid’s death is not well established.  One thing is sure. The news of Mu’awiya II’s incapability to act as caliph and the Syrian Troop’s incapacity to support a future caliph spread all over the country like wildfire. Everywhere, local Arab Muslim leaders received the news as an opportunity to seek power for themselves. The mushroom growth of local leaders brought the Umayyad Caliphate to the verge of breaking into pieces. Each of them took the reins of the local government in their hands with an undertaking that the arrangement was temporary until the appointment of next caliph in Damascus. Their intentions, however, were to stick to power as long as possible and to govern over as vast an area as possible, even if the country splits into fragments. ²⁰ The Second Arab Civil War entered into phase II – a phase which proved to be more grisly than phase I. Phase II of the Second Arab Civil War was not a wrangling among a few Quraysh elite for power. It was a kind of game of musical chairs in which everybody was free to participate.  The game had only one rule – the eliminated would lose his life.

The Arab Muslim elites had three major political groups: Vis Shia Ali, Ahl al Jami’ah and Kharijis. Each had a unique religio-political ideology, which had developed gradually over the decades. Out of them, Ahl al Jami’ah was the largest. Now, it was time for Ahl al Jami’ah to break into further fragments.  If it had to produce a bunch of leaders who would compete for power, it needed to produce as many ideologies as many would be the leaders.  Common people don’t fight merely to bring a personality to power or to enrich themselves.  They need an ideology to justify the fight and they see their leader as vanguard of that ideology.  Religion based ideologies don’t emerge overnight.  Ahl al Jami’ah had to look in a different direction to find an ideology that suited their ambitions.  They picked an ideology that was ancient but was dormant – tribalism. During the second phase of the Second Arab Civil War, Ahl al Jami’ah completely divided into tribe-based confederations. ²¹  The grouping inside groupings gained such momentum that it became impossible for any Arab Muslim to remain neutral in the conflict. Everybody had to pick a side for his own survival.  The neutral party effectively died.

Political scientists note that common factors at the onset or escalation of civil conflicts include political resentment among the populace and the fragmentation of society. Those who possess the skills to promote this fragmentation are technically referred to as “ethnic entrepreneurs.” Ethnic entrepreneurs can exploit various factors such as language, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, region, or tribe to further their agendas. ²² The concept of tribe became a convenient tool for ethnic entrepreneurs within the Umayyad Caliphate. Ethnic entrepreneurs do not suddenly emerge in the midst of a conflict; they exist within each society, often in latent form, and political resentment serves to activate them. Political resentment was not prevalent during Mu’awiya’s lifetime, but Yazid’s three and a half years of mismanagement contributed to the emergence of political resentment.

Provinces broke away

Ibn Ziyad was the first to take advantage of the situation.  He attempted to be an independent ruler of the Eastern Provinces of Kufa and Basrah.

²³, ²⁴, ²⁵ Basrah accepted him as a ruler, Kufa rejected him.²⁶ Kufans wanted to go their own way.  They broke up from both Basrah and Syria.²⁷

Shi’a Ali were more abundant in Kufa as compared to any other provincial capital of the Umayyad Caliphate.  The Ahl al Jami’ah majority of the town was afraid of Shi’a attaining power in the town in case Ibn Ziyad becomes independent ruler and tussle between him and the Shi’a restarts.  They elected ‘Āmir bin Mas’ūd of Jumah clan of Quraysh as their own leader from among themselves.²⁸

Syria was the worst affected.  It did not have the choice of breaking away from the center as a unit.  It ruptured into district level governments. ²⁹ Jordan, Palestine, Homs, Qinnasrin and Damascus all became independent. ³⁰ The biggest out of them was Damascus.  The Arabs of Damascus elected Ḍaḥāk bin Qays of the Fihr clan of Quraysh as their leader with an understanding that he will manage until a proper caliph is decided. ³¹, ³².

The docile province of Egypt remained an inactive spectator of the saga.  Anybody governing the center was acceptable to its Arab inhabitants.

Debacle of ‘Meccan Alliance’

The failure of Syrian army to capture Mecca had given a boost to the ‘Meccan Alliance’ of Ibn Zubayr.  He successfully appointed ‘Ubaydah bin Zubayr over Medina³³ At the same time, he expelled Marwan bin Hakam, his son Abdul Malik and other Umayyads from Medina.³⁴  Soon after Ibn Zubayr sent ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Jaḥdam of Fihr clan of Quraysh to take over Egypt.³⁵ The Egyptians had no objection to accepting Ibn Zubayr’s governor.³⁶.

Though Ibn Zubayr was the de facto ruler of Hejaz during the last months of Yazid’s tenure, he did not call himself caliph. He used to call himself the ‘fugitive at the sanctuary’ (al-‘a’idh bi’l-bayt). ³⁷  The political implications were that he was just a common citizen who had escaped the tyranny of Yazid.  His case for caliphate was not very strong. Opposing Yazid’s caliphate was one thing, claiming to be a caliph was another.  On what grounds could Ibn Zubayr claim caliphate for himself when many people belonging to the second generation of the Quraysh Companions, like Abdullah bin Umar and Abdullah bin Abbas were still around?³⁸  Throughout Yazid’s tenure, Ibn Zubayr kept calling for a council to be convened to select a caliph.³⁹.

Ibn Zubayr was observing the game patiently before throwing his trump card.⁴⁰ The opportunity came when Mu’awiya bin Yazid died in the middle of January 684 CE.  There was no official caliph and the country had dived head down into anarchy. Ibn Zubayr urgently attained the title of caliph to Prophet Muhammad on February 2, 684 CE in Mecca shelving his demand for a consultative council. ⁴¹, ⁴²

The breakdown of the country into fragments was a lottery for the ‘Meccan Alliance’ to extend its tentacles.

‘Meccan Alliance’ extends to the provinces

After governing over Kufa only for a few months, Amir bin Mas’ud realized that Ashraf won’t submit unconditionally to a person who was one of them. Each Sharif considered himself as much entitled to govern Kufa as Amir bin Mas’ud.  Each of them was promoting tribalism to prop himself up. A person with a nationwide acceptance of superiority in hierarchy was needed.  Such a figure could hail only from the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet, and the one who considered himself worthy of being a caliph to the Prophet. ⁴³ The Umayyads in Damascus had still not streamlined their house. They were out of question for the Kufans, especially for the large Shi’a Ali population.  Ibn Zubayr was their only option.  Amir bin Mas’ud asked Ibn Zubayr to send his representative to take charge of the province.⁴⁴  Ibn Zubayr sent Abdullah bin Yazid of Ansar from Khaṭm clan. ⁴⁵  He took over governorship of Kufa on May 15, 684. ⁴⁶, ⁴⁷

The district leaders of Syria pondered on the same lines as those of Amir bin Mas’ud.  Getting under the wings of a strong personality and accepting the dependent role of lieutenant governor was inevitable for them. The leaders of Damascus, Qinnasrin, and Palestine pledged allegiance to Ibn Zubayr one by one. ⁴⁸.

With Hejaz, Egypt, Syria and Kufa under his command, Ibn Ziyad emerged as the most powerful leader in the Umayyad Caliphate. Nobody in the country could ignore him. ⁴⁹

Basrah slips into mobocracy  

After the disintegration of the Syrian Troops, there was no force in the country at the disposal of any participant of the Second Arab Civil War, including Ibn Zubayr, to climb the ladder to the pinnacle of power. Each of them had to win the hearts and minds of scattered soldiers, of the Ashraf and of the general Arab masses to reach the corridors of power.  The situation was favourable for the ambitious Ashraf.

Ibn Ziyad was the first to bear the burnt.  His authority in Basrah started fading.  People were unwilling to carry out his orders.  He failed to deliver criminal justice.  His subjects went into a habit of rejecting his expressed opinion.⁵⁰

Obviously, Ibn Ziyad did not have any religious, spiritual, or tribal superiority over the other Ashraf.  Ibn Ziyad’s strategy to strengthen his grip on power was to promote regionalism and to convince people of a prosperous future by breaking away with the center. ⁵¹  As a first confidence building measure, Ibn Ziyad planned to distribute nineteen million Dirhams sitting in the provincial treasury to the common people of Basrah, which would have otherwise gone to the central treasury. ⁵²  Apparently, the people did not buy the argument. They might have thought that they could get this money in any case, even if Ziyad was not at the helm of affairs.  Ibn Ziyad’s strategy didn’t work. The first signs of rejecting Ibn Ziyad as the future amir appeared a few weeks after he assumed power in Basrah as a makeshift governor and started convincing Basrans that they would be better off without the central government.  One person, by name of Salamah bin Dhu’ayb, mounted on a horse laden with arms and standing in the Camel Market of Basrah, invited people to support Ibn Zubayr.  People attentively listened. ⁵³ Ibn Ziyad tried to arrest Salamah but failed to do so.  Salamah’s point of view received some support in the town. ⁵⁴ In the meanwhile, trouble broke out in the district of Khorasan where the Arab elite split into warring tribe-based groups to vie for power. ⁵⁵, ⁵⁶, ⁵⁷

The flames of the fire of hatred kindled in Khorasan reached Basrah in no time. A typical tribe-based civil war, involving murders and counter murders, blazed in the town. ⁵⁸, ⁵⁹ After three months, Mas’ud bin ‘Amr the leader of Azd-Rabi’ah confederation, and who had given refuge to Ibn Ziyad in his home, got killed in the tribal warfare. Ibn Ziyad took the road to Syria. ⁶⁰, ⁶¹, ⁶², ⁶³

For the next few months province of Basrah and its dependent territories passed through the worst possible violence.

Pawns of Second Arab Civil War

The second Arab Civil War was a struggle between civilian leaders. The army of the country was practically defunct except those contingents who had posting on borders. The civilian leaders extracted some fighters from their own tribesmen and lovers who hoped to get reward in the form of high government positions in case their respective leader wins. The bulk of fighting men came from two sources. One was the Mawlas. Their catalyzers pushed them into battles from their side. ⁶⁴  The others were mercenaries.  During the Second Arab Civil War agencies mushroomed in the troubled towns that recruited fighters in lieu of payment and supplied them to anybody willing to buy them. ⁶⁵ Most of the mercenaries were paid in advance. Some, however, were paid after the fight. ⁶⁶

Province of Basrah comes to senses

When Ibn Ziyad escaped from Basrah in May, 684 CE, the city was ablaze in tribal hatred.  There were rulers, but nominal. After the murder of Mas’ud bin Amr people of Basrah appointed ‘Abd al Malik bin Abdullah bin ‘Amir (son of ex-governor) of Umayyad clan. He lasted for only one month.  Then Basrans tried a personality of Hashim clan of Quraysh.  They pushed forward ‘Abd Allah bin Ḥārith al Babbah to the position of governor. He got hands up within two months. ⁶⁷, ⁶⁸

After all parties were exhausted from the tribal fighting, they started realizing that the senseless fratricide won’t lead them anywhere. No Sharif will ever become strong enough to rule over others. Their only option was to call a central personality of the Quraysh to take over the administration. The Umayyads of Syria had not streamlined their affairs yet.  Basran’s only option was to appeal to Ibn Zubayr to take over the administration of the town and the province. Ibn Zubayr was more than happy to accept the responsibility. He sent ‘Umar bin ‘Ubaydallah bin Ma’mar of Taym clan of Qurash and he took the charge of the province. ⁶⁹

The active warfare in Basrah was over by the late summer of 684 CE but the peaceful harmony among the citizens was far from perfect. Ibn Zubayr had to change his governors one after another to bring the situation under control. ⁷⁰ Umar could last for only one month and gave way to Ḥārith bin ‘Abd Allah bin Abi Rabīah of Makhzum, al Quba.⁷¹ It was only the beginning of 685 CE when Basrah came to shape and governor Harith bin Abdullah could send the Basran forces to protect Medina from the invading army of Marwan bin Hakam. ⁷²

Resurgence of Umayyads

The consecutive deaths of Yazid and his son Mu’awiya shattered the Umayyad house. Yazid’s second born Khālid was still a minor. ⁷³ Breaking away of provinces and the intertribal fight that ensued after it washed away the Ummayads altogether. Sixty-two-year-old Marwan bin Hakam had the reputation of a sage. ⁷⁴ The Umayyads used to take his advice in the face of political difficulties. By the end of Yazid’s tenure, when Yazid was committing one blunder after another, the Umayyads had already started clinging to Marwan. ⁷⁵ He was the one who supported the Umayyad families and their Mawlas in Medina in the face of the Zubayrid overtake of the town. He successfully negotiated their safe evacuation to Syria. On reaching Syria, Marwan found the sea of Zubayrid support gradually rising and drowning everything the Umayyads had considered theirs. He anticipated a barrage of revenge claims against the Umayyads. Marwan considered it wise to accept the rule of the rising star, Ibn Zubayr, in a timely fashion and apply for amnesty for Umayyads against any future prosecution. ⁷⁶

Like everywhere, Syria had plunged into a tribal split. The main tribal grouping in Syria was that of Kalb and Qays ‘Aylān. ⁷⁷, ⁷⁸ Apparently Yazid and his father Mu’awiya had leaned towards the Kalb. They had been favouring them. They also took their wives from this tribe. Ḥassān bin Mālik of the Kalb tribe was the lieutenant governor of Palestine at the time of Mu’awiya bin Yazid’s death. ⁷⁹, ⁸⁰  He was sure that the Kalb would stand nowhere if they fought in the tribal war on their own.  For him, an alliance with the Quraysh was a must for the Kalb’s survival in the war.  He also knew that the Umayyads were the most favourable to the Kalb out of all the Quraysh clans. His inclination was towards Khalid bin Yazid. But he knew whoever the Kalb will support will ultimately face a mature leader in the form of Ibn Zubayr. ⁸¹, ⁸² Marwan had already attained the status of the sole spokesperson of the Umayyads. Hassan bin Malik needed a mature person to face off against Ibn Zubayr. Marwan fit well in his need. ⁸³ He asked Marwan to take a first step towards claiming the caliphate on grounds of being senior most Umayyad. He advised Marwan to marry the mother of Khalid, the widow of Yazid, so he could become the legal guardian of Khalid. ⁸⁴ This gesture would make Marwan’s claim to caliphate more authentic in eyes of Arabs, especially the Kalbs and the Umayyads.

Marwan was still double minded until fugitives from other provinces started pouring into Syria.  They had enjoyed high ranking government positions during Yazid’s reign and were now anxious to save their necks from revenge claims. One of them was Ibn Ziyad. He could convince Marwan that begging for amnesty from Ibn Zubayr would not be the best strategy. Rather, Marwan should reorganize everything and enhance his bargaining position. ⁸⁵ Marwan was the only hope of all those who wished for the resurgence of the Umayyads.

The Umyyads had been in power for a quarter of a century. They had amassed wealth. They were in a better position to pay the mercenaries and Mawlas for fighting than anybody else in the Umayyad Caliphate. Marwan understood that attaining caliphate was not ‘mission impossible.

Marwan bin Hakam claims caliphate

Supporters of the Umayyad resurgence held a convention at Jabiya in summer of 684 CE. They included the northern tribes like the many clans of the Kalb and some clans of the Ghassan, Judham, Tanukh, Tayyi and Qays. They also included many the Yemenite tribes, including the Sakun and Sakāsik clans. In addition, the Umayyads and their ex-government officials were also participants of the convention. ⁸⁶, ⁸⁷  On 23^rd June 684 CE, after extensive debates, all of them took an oath of allegiance to Marwan bin Hakam and saluted him as Amir ul Mu’minin. ⁸⁸

It was the first time during the Second Arab Civil War that someone dared to claim caliphate in opposition to Ibn Zubayr. The Kharijis used to have their own caliph but the practice was on going since Ali’s time and did not have any impact on general politics of the country.  Many others had tried to grab power during the Second Arab Civil War, like Ibn Ziyad, but none had girt to be caliph of Allah.

It was also for the first time in the history of Islam that a person claimed caliphate who himself or his ancestors had nothing to do with advent or spread of Islam (with the exception of the Kharijis). ⁸⁹  Marwan became the caliph of a few humans. He still had to discover a piece of land to govern over. Each and every supporter of Marwan pooled his resources to build an army.  They could raise six thousand fighting men for the moment. ⁹⁰ Marwan took a big gamble. If he succeeds he wins the dice of Caliphate, if he fails he loses his head.

Marwan wins Syria

The presence of a hostile army at Jabiya, planning to seat Marwan bin Hakam on top slot of Damascus, did not provide any comfort to the leaders of the different districts of Syria. All of them had pledged allegiance to Ibn Zubayr by then. Dahhak was the most powerful of them. He hurried towards Jabiya to shove Marwan to the ground. ⁹¹  Dahhak brought a locust of sixty thousand fighters – the largest in the Second Arab Civil War. Marwan could muster only thirteen thousand supporters. ⁹². The two armies met in July of 684 CE on the rolling hills of Marj Rāhit, a village near Jabiya.⁹³ Apparently Dahhak had not prepared for the battle well and he had underestimated the stamina of Marwan’s army. ⁹⁴, ⁹⁵ After a protracted battle of twenty days, Marwan was the master of the battleground.⁹⁶ Dahhak, with at least eighty Syrian Ashraf, lay dead on the ground.⁹⁷, ⁹⁸, ⁹⁹, ¹⁰⁰, ¹⁰¹. Most of Dahhak’s army got routed, the survivors fled to their respective districts.¹⁰².

No one in Syria had the courage to challenge the army that had established its superiority at the rolling hills of Jabiya. All of the district governments fell in favour of Marwan days before he entered into Damascus triumphantly. ¹⁰³.

The whole of Syria came under the rule of Marwan. He appointed his officials and people accepted them.¹⁰⁴ As a continuation of taking control of Syria, Marwan sent his son Muhammad to Jazira before he himself marched to Egypt. ¹⁰⁵

Marwan annexes Egypt

The province of Egypt and its dependencies was a gift for anybody who could send a representative there with an appointment letter of governorship. This time it was Marwan.  When Marwan’s representative, Amr bin Sa’id, reached Fustat, the Arab elite of Egypt had no hesitation in taking off Ibn Zubayr’s coat and putting on Marwan’s coat. According to details, after sending his officials to different districts of Syria, Marwan took his men to Egypt. The Zubayrid governor of Egypt, Abdur Rahman bin Jahdam received assurance of support from only a handful of his own clan of Banu Fihr against Marwan. He still came out of Fustat to confront the intruders. Marwan camped outside Fustat and sent Amr bin Sa’id to the city to sit on the pulpit of the grand mosque and announce Marwan’s caliphate.  The people of Fustat agreed and, seeing this, Abdur Rahman bin Jahdam and his companions turned their backs. Marwan returned to Damascus without entering Fustat.   ¹⁰⁶ Marwan appointed his son ‘Abd al Azīz governor over Egypt and its dependencies.  ¹⁰⁷

Arm wrestling between Ibn Zubayr and Marwan

Who on earth could be more gloomy about the events of Syria and Egypt than Ibn Zubayr. He was just inches away from the the finish line in the race for caliphate.  Now he saw the finish line moving away from him. Checking the strength of Marwan was natural for Ibn Zubayr.  When Marwan was on his way back from Egypt to Damascus, Ibn Zubayr sent a small force under the command of his thirty-four-year-old brother Mus’ab bin Zubayr. ¹⁰⁸, ¹⁰⁹ Marwan sent Amr bin Sa’id to tackle him at Palestine.  Within few hours of encounter Mus’ab was convinced that Marwan should be left for now because he had the power to defend himself. ¹¹⁰, ¹¹¹ It was clear that the country would have two caliphs for now, a first in Islam.

If Marwan didn’t do tit for tat against Ibn Zubayr quickly, he would have been perceived weak by the Arabs. In the spring of 685 CE, Marwan sent a force of Syrians to Medina. Ibn Zubayr did not have any garrisons to support his Hejazi possessions. His governor over Medina fled in horror. Ibn Zubayr asked his governor over Basrah to send his fighters to defend Hejaz. The two forces met at Rhabadah. Marwan’s forces were completely routed, their commander being killed.  Again, both concluded that for now there would be two caliphs.¹¹², ¹¹³.

Marwan confers his achievements on his progeny

Marwan was middle aged but he was not advanced in years. ¹¹⁴ The Non-Quraysh Syrian Arab tribes accepted him as leader unconditionally after his initial victories. However, the Umayyads from the other families who fought along his side were apprehensive that Marwan would make caliphate a family affair of his own, excluding them from any future set up.  The forerunner of the league was Amr bin Sa’id, Marwan’s military commander. ¹¹⁵ Kalb wished political stability rather rifts.  Marwan took Hassan bin Malik in confidence.  One day he came to the pulpit of the grand mosque of Damascus and announced that Marwan’s first born, Abdul Malik, will take over the reins of the government after the death of Marwan and after the death of Abdul Malik, and Marwan’s second born Abdul Aziz will govern the country. Nobody dared challenge the opinion of the king maker. The noise from Amr bin Sa’id and his associates calmed down. By now, it was an accepted rule in the Arab mind that the political power would remain in the same family, until challenged successfully by somebody else. ¹¹⁶, ¹¹⁷, ¹¹⁸

Abdul Malik succeeds Marwan

Soon after designating his heir, Marwan died in Damascus on April 10, 685 CE. ¹²⁰, ¹²¹ The transfer of power to his forty-two-year-old son, Abdul Malik was eventless.¹²², ¹²³. He was not only a war veteran but was worldly wise. When the commander of Yazid’s army at the battle of Harrah needed to spy on the positions of the Medinites, all of the Umayyads who were chased away by the Zubayrids refused to co-operate with him.  They were all under oath not to divulge any information, which was a pre-condition for their safe departure from the town. Abdul Malik was the only one who didn’t bother with his oath and willingly disclosed all enemy positions to the commander.  Not only this, he gave the commander a comprehensive war plan based upon his knowledge of the positions. The commander acted on the information to win the war. ¹²⁴, ¹²⁵

The reconstruction of the Ka’ba

In the midst of the Second Arab Civil War the Zubayrid government undertook a politically risky but economically viable project.  The total demolition of Ka’ba and its reconstruction at a new site was a first in Islam.  Ka’ba was demolished and reconstructed only once in whole of its lifetime. That was in 585 CE, before advent of Islam.

Ibn Zubayr was aware of religio-political repercussions, particularly about demolition of the structure.  He relied on a Hadith of Prophet Muhammad.  “If it were not that your people had only recently been in a state of unbelief, I would restore the Ka’ba on the foundations of Ibrahim and I would add to the Ka’ba part of Ḥijr” is the saying of the Prophet, Ibn Zubayr narrated to his well-wishers.  He further explained that he had heard the saying from his mother Asmā’, who in turn had heard it from Aisha, her sister and the widow of the Prophet.¹²⁷.

Initial work started just after raising of siege of Mecca in December 683 CE, when Ibn Zubayr ordered clearing the place of stones that have been showered on it.¹²⁸  After the Hajj of July 29, 684 CE Ibn Zubayr ordered erasing the building to flat ground.  Then he excavated the original foundations of Ka’ba from pre-Quraysh-construction time.  On top of the foundations he constructed the new building exactly in the same shape as it used to be in Pre-Quraysh construction times and included Ḥijr in it.¹²⁹, ¹³⁰, ¹³¹  The pre-Islamic Quraysh had not included the Ḥijr in the Ka’ba due to lack of funds.¹³²  Ibn Zubayr spent on the new project lavishly.¹³³.  It was, anyhow, a flagship of his government.

Ibn Zubayr didn’t consult anybody, even Abdullah bin Umar or Abdullah bin Abbas, on the matter. Muslims of the Umayyad Caliphate were never unanimous in appreciating any religious endeavor up to now, especially if it was performed by their political non-favourite. They remained astonishingly quiet in regards to Ibn Zubayr’s venture.  Either the need of reconstruction was universally realized after damage to it, or everybody was too busy fighting to comment. ¹³⁴

The reconstructed Ka’ba was ready for pilgrimage for the Hajj season of July 685 CE. ¹³⁵

Ibn Zubayr had kept the broken black stone at his residence.  He had it braced in sliver.  Then he ordered a hole in the wall of the Ka’ba in which he thrust it.¹³⁶, ¹³⁷

Shi’a Ali fundamentalists – The Tuwwabun

Kufa was particularly restless among all the provinces of the Umayyad Caliphate. The reason was strong representation of the Shi’a Ali party in its citizens.  Unlike the Arab populations of the other provinces which would settle with anybody who had stick in his hand, Shi’a Ali dreamt of government of the Hashim clan of Quraysh who would bring ideal tranquility. The chaos in whole of the Umayyad Caliphate and the inability of its rulers to bring peace helped in the revival of the Shi’a Ali political ideology.

The fundamental concept of Tuwwābūn (Penitents) had born in Kufa just after murder of Husayn.¹³⁸  Its creator was an old man, a staunch Shi’a Ali, by the name of Sulayman bin Ṣurad of Khaza’ah tribe, reputed to be a Companion of the Prophet.¹³⁹ Sulayman was of the view that inviting Husayn to Kufa and letting him die haplessly was a great sin.  It could only be washed by repenting and by killing those who were responsible for the murder of Husayn, even if this action leads to one’s own death. ¹⁴⁰  The concept was in its essence not a political one – to bring its adherents to power.  Rather it was a religious one – dying to prove repentance.¹⁴¹

People with similar mindsets started frequenting Sulayman’s residence.  Almost one hundred people gathered at his dwelling on the day the group took its name and elected Sulayman as its leader.¹⁴².

Initially, the group was small and it kept a low profile to avoid being detected by the Yazid authorities.  Death of Yazid bin Mu’awiya and the resultant instability of provincial government of Kufa emboldened the group.  They started canvassing openly and their numbers increased.¹⁴³ By the time Abdullah bin Yazid was in charge of the province in name of Ibn Zubayr, Sulayman’s companions used to display their armaments and their preparations publicly in Kufa.¹⁴⁴  They financed themselves with mutual donations and alms. ¹⁴⁵  Some of them sold all of their properties to make their movement viable.

Firebrand orators belonging to Tuwwabun used to deliver eloquent speeches in front of small gatherings. They narrated the events of death of Husayn in such a way that aroused in the listeners sympathy for Husayn and an urge to revenge his death as repentance. ¹⁴⁶

The swelling support for Tuwwabun in the town startled some of the circles of the Zubayrid government of the province. They saw it as a potential threat to the government. ¹⁴⁷ Governor Abdullah bin Yazid remained confident, anyhow, that the movement would not target his government and would discharge its energies against Ibn Ziyad and his Umayyad masters. ¹⁴⁸ By July of 684 CE, when the Umayyads resurged in Syria and Egypt strongly, and Kufan Zubayrids anticipated that Umayyad’s next move would be to regain Kufa, governor Abdullah bin Yazid tried building an alliance with Tuwwabun to defend the province. ¹⁴⁹ Sulayman brushed off all such attempts because the Zubayrid government had extended immunity to all Kufan ex-government officials involved in the murder of Husayn. ¹⁵⁰, ¹⁵¹

On night of November 15, 684 CE four thousand Tuwwabun armed riders left Kufa for Syria to seek revenge to murder of Husayn.  They didn’t mind if a Shi’a Ali government establishes as a result of their effort but their goal was to kill murderers of Husayn or to die attempting it. ¹⁵² The Umayyads were aware of their arrival.  They provided Ibn Ziyad with twenty thousand armed men to save his neck. ¹⁵³, ¹⁵⁴  The two lashkars met at the plain of ‘Ayn al-Wardah on January 4, 685 CE. ¹⁵⁵, ¹⁵⁶, ¹⁵⁷ Failure was the destiny of Tuwwabun.  They preferred death to retreat. All but one hundred Tuwwabun perished in three days of battle. Sulayman bin Surad was among the dead. ¹⁵⁸

A note worthy aspect of the Shi’a Ali of Kufa was their reluctance to act. Each time a Shi’a Ali leader expected from them to fight in order to come to power, only twenty five percent of the sympathizers of that particular leader responded. Sulayman was confident that all sixteen thousand warriors, who had enrolled in his register, would leave Kufa with him to Syria. ¹⁵⁹ He expected a formidable force which would compel the Syrian Umayyads and their officials to go into hiding.  He was utterly disappointed when only four thousand joined him. ¹⁶⁰ He had made the decision to march and did not wish to look coward by revoking it. He knew the size of his force was not enough even to threaten the the Umayyads.¹⁶¹

Establishment of Shi’a Ali regime in Kufah

The defeat of Tuwwabun popped up the most colorful politician of the Second Arab Civil War – the sixty-nine years old Mukhtar bin Abu ‘Ubayd (Mukhtār bin Abū ‘Ubayd ath Thaqafi مُختار بِن ابُو عُبَيد الثَقفِى)¹⁶², ¹⁶³, ¹⁶⁴, ¹⁶⁵.

The hardcore Shi’a Ali had not ceased dreaming of coming into power and avenging the murder of Husayn after the defeat of Tuwwabun. ¹⁶⁶  They just realized that the fanatics didn’t have the competency to lead a movement to success. Mukhtar was a Shi’a Ali, who had already been warning them of grave consequences if they followed the tactics of Sulayman blindly. ¹⁶⁷ Now he emerged as the sole leader of the Shi’a Ali in Kufa. He gathered all the Shi’a Ali of the town, including those who survived the battle at Ayn al Wardah, at one platform. ¹⁶⁸, ¹⁶⁹  They were convinced that they should first get Kufa under their control before they considered revenge.

Mukhtar worked day and night and within five months transformed the baffled Shi’a Ali minority of Kufa into a bold fraternity. ¹⁷⁰ Though the Ahl al Jami’ah majority of the town and its Ashraf remained loyal to the Zubayrid authorities, Ibn Zubayr considered his governor Abdullah bin Yazid incapable of tackling the forthcoming danger. He removed Abdullah bin Yazid from the office and appointed ‘Abd Allah bin Muṭī’ on May 4, 685 CE in a hope of improvement in the situation. ¹⁷¹ Mukhtar was not yet ready for a revolt.  The new governor summoned Mukhtar to ascertain obedience.  Mukhtar asked to be excused from attending to the governor personally due to sickness.¹⁷²  Abdullah bin Muti accepted the excuse as it saved his face effectively.  By October of 685 CE Mukhtar and his militants were ready for their ‘revolution’.  Governor Abdullah bin Muti’ had received a tip about Mukhtar’s intentions and he had deployed police forces on every corner of the town. ¹⁷³ Street fighting with government forces started on the night of October 16, 685 CE when a police patrol of Zubayrid authorities intercepted a suspicious group of civilians who were carrying arms underneath their clothes. ¹⁷⁴ The leader of the civilian group killed the police officer on the spot instead of obeying his order to go to the governor for further interrogation. The following three days and three nights were jam-packed with clashes between the Shi’a Ali followers of Mukhtar and the Kufan police. ¹⁷⁵  Every neighborhood of the city, each lane and alley had a scene of violence. The Shi’a minority was resilient and apparently the police were reluctant to subdue them with due determination. ¹⁷⁶. It is hard to imagine that seven thousand policemen at the disposal of governor Abdullah bin Muti, could not subdue thirty eight hundred militants of Mukhtar. ¹⁷⁷ Governor Muti’ had not anticipated this scenario. He was surprised by the lack of resolution of his police to fight the rebellion. ¹⁷⁸ Mukhtar’s militants could also palpate it. They assessed that “Allah had instilled them with fear”.¹⁷⁹  The governor was forced to run for his life. ¹⁸⁰ He took refuge in an abandoned house of Kufa.  He did not have the money to arrange for transport to further fleeing.  Mukhtar was not bent on bloodshed.  He sent a hundred thousand Dirhams to Abdullah bin Muti so he could arrange travel to depart from the town. ¹⁸¹  Mukhtar took control of the governor house, main government buildings and the treasury. ¹⁸² Gone were the days when the oath of allegiance was a solemn pledge which could not be broken under threats to life. The Second Arab Civil War had changed the mentality of Arab elites. When the news of Governor Abdullah bin Muti’s fleeing spread in the province, all those who had given allegiance to the Zubayrid governor rushed to give allegiance to Mukhtar. ¹⁸³  All of the dependent territories of Kufa, including Mada’in, Hulwan, Armenia and Azerbaijan fell to Mukhtar’s authority passively. ¹⁸⁴, ¹⁸⁵, ¹⁸⁶

When Mukhtar had started his movement in Kufa by opposing Tuwwabun, he had claimed that he had the blessing of Muhammad bin Ali al-Ḥanifiah, for his endeavors. His political slogan was that Muhammad bin Ali al-Hanifiah was the Mahdī and he had chosen Mukhtar his wazīr. ¹⁸⁷, ¹⁸⁸, ¹⁸⁹  Muhammad bin Hanifiyah, by then a resident of Medina, had links with Mukhtar but he never announced or denounced support to Mukhtar.¹⁹⁰  Worth noting is that after coming to power Mukhtar did not invite Muhammad bin Hanifiah to come to Kufa and take the lead.

Mukhtar tries to set up a non-partisan government

Kufa became the first province of the country where the Shi’a Ali came to power after remaining in opposition for quarter of a century. Mukhtar announced his agenda to govern according to the Book and Sunnah of Prophet and to seek vengeance for the blood of the family (ahl al bayt) and to fight against those who violate Allah’s law. ¹⁹¹  In his mind, Mukhtar was very clear that he had come to power with the help of small number of determined militants.  If he had to save his fragile government he would have to build confidence with passive majority of the town.  The first decision he took after gaining provincial government was to snub his supporters for killing anybody to avenge the murder of Husayn and his companions. ¹⁹²  He, then, quickly extended a hand of friendship to the Ashraf and made them a part of his councils and discussions.¹⁹³

Mukhtar knew the two caliphs of the country, Abdul Malik and Ibn Zubayr won’t give him time to stabilize his government.  Negotiating with Abdul Malik was a total taboo for Mukhtar, since  he would lose his Shi’a Ali support. He opened talks of peaceful co-existence or even co-operation with Ibn Zubayr in a hope to protect his eastern border at least. Ibn Zubayr was furious over Syria and Egypt slipping out of his hands. Now, he felt, he would have to be content with Basrah and Hejaz only.  In despair, Ibn Zubayr rejected Mukhtar’s offers. ¹⁹⁵  Mukhtar got sure that he would have to fight on two fronts.

Mukhtar never attained the title of caliph.  He preferred to be called Amīr (commander). ¹⁹⁶. He was governing in the name of Muhammad bin Hanifiah.

Mawlas come of age

A surprising aspect of Mukhtar’s rebellion and the successful overthrow of Zubayrid government was the participation of Mawlas on Mukhtar’s side as a distinct group. ¹⁹⁷

The political activities of non-Arab Muslims, independent of their catalyzers, can be traced to the beginning of the Second Arab Civil War or even slightly earlier. ¹⁹⁸ As soon as the independent political thoughts of non-Arab Muslims came into limelight, the Muslim Arab elites were abhorrent to them. Kaysān abu ‘Amrah was a Kufan new Muslim of Persian ethnicity.  Even before Mukhtar had come to power, Kaysan didn’t shun from expressing his Shi’a Ali leaning. Once, he decried Uthman bin Affan publicly. ‘Abd Allah bin Ḥammām, a resident of Kufa and a neutral in his political thoughts by any standard, got so offended that he beat Kaysan with his whip. ¹⁹⁹, ²⁰⁰ The Muslim Arab mind was that the Mawlas were part of booty just like the lands. They must have been their permanent resource if they had not freed them. They expected remunerations, rewards, and thanks for this act of kindness. ²⁰¹ Hatred was from both sides. Mawlas were more bitter against the Muslim Arabs than non-Muslim residents of the country. And they all had the same mindset about this issue. ²⁰²

Mukhtar was the first Muslim Arab leader to incite Mawlas into a socio-political group, independent of their Arab Muslim Catalyzer. Out of thirty eight hundred militants who fought against the Zubayrid forces on the first night of Mukhtar’s ‘revolution’, five hundred were Mawlas.  All of them were Farsi speaking Persians and fought under their own leader, who was a Mawla of Persian ethnicity. ²⁰³

As the political activism of the Mawlas grew stronger, so did the hatred against them among the Muslim Arab elites. During the same uprising, mentioned above, a Muslim Arab police officer captured some rioters. He picked the Mawlas to butcher them while he spared the lives of Arab Muslims. ²⁰⁴  Apparently, Arab Shi’a Ali were more acceptable to the officer than their Mawla counterparts.

Mukhtar had to tread carefully.  He couldn’t afford annoying his Mawla supporters and at the same time, he had to be in good books of his powerful Arab Muslim subjects. Some Mawlas brought cases of bodily harm against their Arab adversaries, which dated from the time before Mukhtar came to power. Mukhtar used his ‘presidential powers’ to pardon the Arabs. ²⁰⁵ Mukhtar didn’t assign any significant post, like lieutenant governorship of a district, to any of the Mawlas. He kept them at low key positions, like captain of personal body guards. ²⁰⁶

The Mawlas felt betrayed.   They felt that Mukhtar had neglected them after coming to power and had favoured the Arabs. Mukhtar had to use his linguistic skills to soothe them.  “You are of me and I am of you,” he said. ²⁰⁷

Once the commander of Ziyad’s army encouraged his soldiers, “people of Syria, you are fighting only runaway slaves and men who have abandoned Islam and departed from it.  They have no remnant [of strength, baqiya] and do not speak Arabic.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),8.)  This was just before the first Mukhtar – Ibn Ziyad encounter near Mosul

Ripples of ‘revolution’ in Basrah

Basrah had a small group of Shi’a Ali. When they came to know about Mukhtar’s success in Kufa, they got excited. They tried to overthrow the Zubayrid government of the province in a similar fashion. The leader of the mutiny was Muthanna bin Mukharribah, a survivor of Ayn al Wardah. ²⁰⁸ Muthanna and his comrades captured the provisions depot (madīnat al rizq) of the town as a first step.  Governor Harith bin Abdullah al Quba acted swiftly. He sent his police force which dislodged the miscreants. Forty of the miscreants and one police officer died in the clashes. ²⁰⁹  The Zubayrid government wished to punish the survivors.  Fear of reigniting tribal warfare prevented the authorities from such action.  The authorities let the survivors take refuge in Kufa.²¹⁰

Mukhtar eyes Hejaz

The triangular tug-of-war between Mukhtar, Abdul Malik bin Marwan and Ibn Zubayr was fickle.  Each intended to destabilize the other. Mukhtar knew that Abdul Malik would try to dislodge him, approaching from Jazira. In that case, if Ibn Zubayr joined hands with him and attacked simultaneously from the Basrah side, Mukhtar would be crushed for sure.  Mukhtar desperately needed either an alliance with Ibn Zubayr or his elimination from the tournament. Abdul Malik had sent a small army to scare Ibn Zubayr.  The army was doing nothing but camping at Wadi l Qura. Mukhtar conceived a trick.  He wrote to Ibn Zubayr that he wanted to help him in warding off a common enemy – the Umayyads.  Ibn Zubayr allowed three thousand soldiers of Mukhtar to enter Hejaz and position against the Umayyads.  Ibn Zubayr was suspicious of the motives of Mukhtar’s troops when they did not halt at Wadi l Qura, rather kept marching straight to Medina.  Ibn Zubayr urgently dispatched two thousand soldiers to tackle with the danger.  Mukhtar had told only the top commanders of his army about the real intentions – to capture Medina.  The common soldiers were unaware of any strategy and they were under the impression that their job was to help Ibn Zubayr in defending his Hejazi possessions. Ibn Zubayr’s commander met the situation tactfully. He asked his opposite counterpart to allow the the two contingents to camp together for a while so the common soldiers could develop friendships. In a few days, he would isolate the commander of the Mukhtarid forces emotionally from the rest of their army. He then killed the commander. The rest of the army either joined hands with Ibn Zubayr, or returned to Kufa, or were killed as prisoners of war. ²¹¹

Mukhtar didn’t give up on his wish to annex Hejaz after the fiasco.  He wrote to Muhammad bin Hanifiah, proclaiming that the whole purpose of the army was to humble his enemies in Medina and to take possession of whole of the Umayyad Caliphate for him. And if Muhammad took the public posture that he had ordered Mukhtar for this kind of activities, Mukhtar would send another army, this time openly with the intention to capture Medina. The people of Medina would distance themselves from Ibn Zubayr and flock around Ibn Hanafiah, toppling Zubayrid government there. ²¹² Ibn Hanifiyah rejected the proposal gently by asking Mukhtar to obey Allah and to turn away from bloodshed. ²¹³

Apparently Ibn Zubayr was touchy about the person and activities of Ibn Hanifiah.  He arrested him with his family and some Kufan companions as well as Abdullah bin Abbas and held them in Zamzam in Mecca. ²¹⁴ Ibn Zubayr gave them a deadline bound ultimatum to give him allegiance otherwise he would kill them. Ibn Hanifiah could send a message to Mukhtar for help. Mukhtar sent about seven hundred and fifty Mawlas to help Ibn Hanifiah out. All of them were wielding clubs instead of swords. After a little argument during which, Tabari claims that Ibn Zubayr was afraid of their numbers, he released Ibn Hanifiah and his companions. Mukhtar had sent some money with the force.  Ibn Hanifiyah distributed it among them. ²¹⁵, ²¹⁶, ²¹⁷, ²¹⁸, ²¹⁹

Damascus vs Kufa

So many political units, which the Second Arab Civil War had projected so far, were striving to expand as much as possible at the expense of the other. None of them felt secure as long as the other existed. The Umayyads and the Zubayrids had tested each other’s strength and had inferred to better leave each other for now. ²²⁰. This was the time for a power struggle between Abdul Malik’s Damascus and Mukhtar’s Kufa.

When Marwan had sent Ibn Ziyad with a large army to tackle the Tuwwabun, he had commanded Ibn Ziyad to continue his eastward thrust after clearing Tuwwabun, until he reaches Kufa. Marwan had advised Ibn Ziyad to sack the rich town of Kufa for three days, if he overcomes it, to cover the cost of the war. ²²¹, ²²²

A lot of Qays Aylan, who had opposed resurgence of Umayyads during the tribal conflict of Syria, were still residing in Jazira. They gave stiff resistances to the advancing Phalanxes of Ibn Ziyad. It took Ibn Ziyad a full year to overcome the resistancse in the western parts of Jazira. ²²³ After assuring the safety of his supply line and a passage to escape, Ibn Ziyad descended on Mosul. ²²⁴ Mukhtar’s lieutenant governor there fled to Tikrīt in horror without a fight. ²²⁵.

Mukhtar quickly raised a three thousand strong cavalry in Kufa to halt Ibn Ziyad’s advance towards Kufa. Ibn Ziyad sent about six thousand soldiers to protect his gains over Mosul.  ²²⁶ On the morning of July 7, 686 CE both armies met at the village of Banāt Tala. ²²⁷, ²²⁸ After two days of fighting, Ibn Ziyad’s army was routed, the survivors fled back to Ibn Ziyad. ²²⁹, ²³⁰

Now, the road to Mosul was open for the Mukhtarid forces but they couldn’t take advantage of the situation. The death of their commander due to natural causes and the rumors that Ibn Ziyad himself was coming with a huge force of eighty thousand ‘Syrians’ faltered their confidence. ²³¹ Mukhtar’s force retreated in confusion. ²³² Mukhtar had to send another seven thousand strong cavalry from Kufa to prop up his position²³³  Before Mukhtar’s forces could advance to Mosul something so pressing happened at home that Mukhtar had to call his army back. ²³⁴

Ashraf grab Mukhtar’s throat

Ahl al Jami’ah of Kufa and their Ashraf had accepted Mukhtar their ruler as a last choice. ²³⁵  Mukhtar tried to reconcile with them but the resentment persisted. During the short period of Mukhtar’s government, the Mawlas of Kufa were on their way to get an equal social status to that of the Muslim Arabs.²³⁶  Ahl al Jami’ah and their Ashraf were afraid of the day when they would have to share the gains of Futuhul Buldan with their non-Arab Muslim counterparts. ²³⁷ They expressed their fears only in whispers, probably, because it was against the tenants of Islam. ²³⁸ What they screamed loudly were slanders against Mukhtar: “This man is not sent by Muhammad bin Haiafiah. How could his commander die on battle field of Banāt Tala and his army retreat in despair if he was Divine supported?  He and his Saba’iyah have simply disavowed their righteous predecessors.  He has usurped power without due consultation. ”, etc. etc. they vented out. ²³⁹, ²⁴⁰  Mukhtar promised them to dump the Mawlas provided the Ashraf give with recruits for his army to protect his government from the Umayyads and the Meccan alliance. ²⁴¹ They did not get convinced of Mukhtar’s intentions.

When Mukhtar sent a seven-thousand-strong cavalry to fight their way into Mosul, and three thousand were already there, Kufa was empty of supporters for Mukhtar. The Ashraf of Kufa seized the moment. They rose up to dislodge Mukhtar from power. Mukhtar haphazardly opened negotiation channels with the Ashraf as a delaying tactic and ordered the army to return without wasting a moment. ²⁴²

The uprising was totally abrupt and leaderless. ²⁴³ Mukhtar’s army would subdue the rebels as quickly as they had risen. Mukhtar was again secure on his seat on July 21, 686 CE. ²⁴⁴ His regime captured five hundred ring leaders. After killing a few of them, Mukhtar released the rest. The massacre was not in favour of the regime. Mukhtar announced general amnesty. ²⁴⁵ The death toll from both sides was seven hundred and fifty. ²⁴⁶, ²⁴⁷

Mukhtar slays the murderers of Husayn

All people involved in the army that attacked Husayn bin Ali and killed him were petty government officials and soldiers. They didn’t have any personal grudges against Husayn. They fulfilled their duty to obey the government orders. Once the Yazid government fell, there was nobody in the country to guarantee their safety. The ensuing Second Arab Civil War and the rise of tribalism made revenge-taking popular again. The Shi’a Ali of Kufa didn’t want the revenge from the government that ordered the killing, or the system that didn’t prevent the killing. They wanted revenge from the individuals as if this was their personal deed. ²⁴⁸

Since the rise of Tuwwabun in the town, Husayn’s alleged murderers were living in constant fear. They had to flatter the ruler of the day to rest assured that he would protect their lives. ²⁴⁹

Mukhtar had come to power with the promise to punish the killers of the family of Prophet Muhammad (Ahl al Bayt) at Karbala. ²⁵⁰ Immediately after gaining power, Mukhtar put the issue on the back burner. He needed the wider support of Ahl al Jami’ah. He assured the alleged murderers that they shouldn’t take his rhetoric seriously. It was simply a lip service. Actually, Ibn Hanifiah criticized Mukhtar and distanced himself from Mukhtar regime over this. ²⁵¹

The failed uprising of the Ashraf opened Mukhtar’s eyes. He was convinced that they would not support his regime wholeheartedly, whatever confidence building measures he takes. Instead, he should avoid losing the Shi’a Ali’s support by fulfilling his election promise. ²⁵², ²⁵³

The killing of Husayn’s murderers started on the eve of July 21, 686 CE, after the crushing of the Ashraf’s uprising.  Mukhtar screened some men out of the arrested ring leaders and killed them on charges of murdering Husayn.²⁵⁴ The same night Mukhtar’s police made successful raids on the houses of some alleged killers.  They ambushed and killed them on the spot.  The news spread like wildfire. The alleged killers of Husayn started fleeing in panic. ²⁵⁵ Mukthar ordered his patrol police to catch them on the roads leading towards Basrah. A lot were killed by various methods. ²⁵⁶  A few of them escaped to Basrah to join Mus’ab bin Zubayr.  Their houses were demolished as a punishment. ²⁵⁷, ²⁵⁸ Mukhtar sent the severed head of Umar bin Sa’d bin Waqqas to Muhammad bin Hanifiah to receive praise from him. ²⁵⁹, ²⁶⁰, ²⁶¹

The alleged murderers of Husayn were killed almost six years after the tragedy of Karbala.  They did not change their abode during all these years.  The threats to their lives were low level.  Mukhtar’s actions were a surprise for them.²⁶³  The decision of surviving Husayn’s slayers to run to Basrah instead of Damascus demonstrates that Ibn Zubayr was unquestioned leader of Ahl al Jami’ah by that time and Abdul Malik was a peripheral refutable. The Umayyad polity had still not come out of shock of its defeat in Jazira.

The unfinished job in Jazira

The Mukhtar regime felt an imminent threat from the presence and establishment of Ibn Ziyad as lieutenant governor of Mosul. The results of the border clashes between the Umayyad forces and Mukhtar’s army were positive from Mukhtar’s stand point. ²⁶⁴ He had to recall his army in the wake of the unrest at home. The unsuccessful uprising of Ashraf had changed the political scenario of Kufa.  Mukhtar lost even the verbal support of Ashraf. That was the time Mukhtar issued a decree freeing any slave who would enroll in the army. In this way he could raise thirteen thousand foot soldiers comprising of former prisoners of war. ²⁶⁵ Just two days after crushing the uprising, Mukhtar farewelled his army back to Jazira. ²⁶⁶

The triumph of Mukhtarid soldiery was thorough. ²⁶⁷, ²⁶⁸ Ibn Ziyad laid dead on the battleground.²⁶⁹, ²⁷⁰ Two factors appear to have worked against Ibn Ziyad. One was the presence of a disloyal element of Qays Aylan in his army. ²⁷¹ The second was the martial outwitting of Ibrahim bin Ashtar, the Mukhtarid commander. He could impose a surprise attack on the forces of Ibn Ziyad. ²⁷², ²⁷³

Mukhtar’s happiness knew no bounds.  He gained Jazira to govern over. ²⁷⁴  More importantly, he could now boast that he had achieved at a little cost what Tuwwabun had bluntly failed after a pricey attempt. He could kill all the characters around the murder of Husayn including the main accused, Ibn Ziyad. ²⁷⁵

Thorn in Ibn Zubayr’s side

Since its very birth, the ‘Mecca Alliance’ worked to solve the political puzzle presented by the Kharijis. Neither the Umayyads nor the Mukhtarids had figured it out.²⁷⁶

After a short political marriage with Ibn Zubayr to defend the Ka’ba against Yazid’s forces, the Kharijis divorced him. ²⁷⁷ The point of separation was Ibn Zubayr’s refusal to denounce Uthman bin Affan and his policies. ²⁷⁸ Ahl al Jami’ah were abundant in Basrah, Kufa, Syria and Egypt. They were in a positive financial balance sheet. The untimely death of Yazid bin Mu’awiya had left them as political orphans. Apparently, Ibn Zubayr wished to be their new political guardian. The Kharijis were not comfortable with them. Muir observes that Ibn Zubayr was not in a position to denounce Uthman because he was the one who fought in the Battle of Camel to avenge the murder of Uthman. Denouncing Uthman at this juncture would have endangered Ibn Zubayr’s whole career. ²⁷⁹

After drifting apart from Ibn Zubayr, the Kharijis formally announced their independent government in Yamama. Then they swiftly took over Bahrain and the adjacent Fars as far as Kerman and Isfahan. Oman fell under their spell as well. ²⁸⁰

The Kharijis had been increasingly assertive since their advent during the last years of the Rashidun Caliphate. They could form a government of any sort for the first time only in the early months of 684 CE. As the second phase of the Second Arab Civil War unfolded and each and every Arab soul got involved in fighting, the Khariji ideology attracted more and more proselytes.

The rise of a new wave of tribalism across the country might have helped them. Hoyland points out that East Arabian tribesmen had formed close relations with Persia, but they were mostly not given senior positions in the Umayyad Caliphate, which in part explains why so many Kharijis came from their ranks.²⁸¹

From January 684 CE onwards the Kharijis were no longer guerrilla groups who gathered in wilderness and attacked the cities when circumstances allowed.  They collected taxes, ran fiscal policy and handed down court verdicts in the state like the entity they created. ²⁸², ²⁸³   Like all other political entities of the Umayyad Caliphate, they were engaged in efforts to increase their area of influence.  Basrah was in their immediate vicinity.  The richest people of the country called it home. Their endeavors to snatch it made political sense.

They say too many cooks spoil the broth. The Kharijis had a specific problem of having ‘too many cooks’. Each of the Kharijis had an equal right to lead the group and they used to split up in fractions on petty ideological issues. Soon, after departing from Ibn Zubayr and the formation of their government in Yamama, they split into two groups.  One group elected Najdah bin Amir of Hanifa as their leader and were content governing over Yamama and its adjacent districts.  The other group, under the leadership of Nafi bin Azraq (Nāfi’ bin Azraq  نافِع بِن اَزرَق) went to Basrah to pursue its activities in the province of Basrah, which were mainly murdering and looting those Muslims who did not belong to their sect. ²⁸⁴, ²⁸⁵

There were some tribal groups of the Ahl al Jami’ah in Basrah itself who provided the Kharijis with the first opportunity to enter Basrah unhindered. During the mobocracy in Basrah, Tamim invited them to pressure their opponent, Azd. ²⁸⁶  The move brought the Kharijis dangerously closer to Basrah.  It became difficult for the later Zubayrid governors to push them away. Eliminating them was out of question for them.  The Khariji political entities survived side-by-side the government of the Meccan Alliance throughout. They proved to be a constant thorn in the side of Ibn Zubayr.²⁸⁷  The strength of the Ibn Azraq group of the Kharijis kept growing. When Ibn Zubayr made his government in Basrah after the end of the tribal warfare, his government saw the Kharijis as the main external threat to its existence. ‘Ubaydallah bin ‘Ubaydallah bin Ma’mar, the governor of Basrah, wasted no moment in sending an ill prepared force against them. The force got defeated and totally routed in Dūlāb and the commander of the force got killed. The governor, then, sent another force. This force killed Nafi bin Azraq but could not defeat the Kharijis. They knew how to retreat strategically and hide in far-off areas. The Kharijis had no difficulty in appointing Ubaydullah bin Mahuz (‘Ubaydallah bin Māḥūẓ  عُبَيدُ الّله بِن ماحُوظ ) as their caliph. They did not have to look at the tribal affiliation of a person, his wealth and generosity, or services of his ancestors to Islam before he could rise to the status of caliph of Kharijis. Anyone who could prove to be more pious in the eyes of his colleagues could get the status of leader. Next time when the Kharijis descended on Basrah, Abdullah bin Harith was governing the province in the name of Ibn Zubayr. Ibn Zubayr was so furious that he dismissed Abdullah bin Harith and appointed Harith bin Abdullah of the Makhzum clan of Quraysh in his place.  Even the new governor failed to push the Kharijis far away from Basrah. By that time Muhallab bin Abu Sufra (Muhallab bin Abu Ṣufrah  مُهَلّب بِن ابُو صَفرَه) arrived in Basrah. He was a young and energetic man of Azd Oman. His task was to proceed to Khorasan and to work there as lieutenant governor of Zubayrid government. Khorasan was still under grip of tribal warfare. Taking over the district in the name of the newly emerging Zubayrid government was not an easy task. Muhallab found it easier to motivate the Basran soldiers to fight whole heartedly to push the Kharijis away and, as a result, get ahold of Khuzestan and keep its revenues in their pocket. Ibn Zubayr endorsed the scheme. Twelve thousand military men of Muhallab started pushing the Kharijis back from the bridges of Basrah up to Silla wa-Sillabra, a village in Khuzestan. At Sillah wa-Sillabra, Muhallab’s military men gave the Kharijis a surprise attack. Out of some ten thousand Kharijis, who had concentrated on Silla wa-Sillabra, about seven thousand perished on the battle field. The remaining fled to as far-off places as Kerman and Isfahan, only to regroup, get fresh recruits from Bahrain and plot to attack Basrah in future. Muhallab and his militia neither had the heart nor the mind to pursue the Kharijis. They were content with the government and the revenue of Khuzestan. Muhallab’s administration of Khuzestan got so renowned in Basrah that Basran youth flocked to Khuzestan during the later years to get a job in the standing army Muhallab had so created. The number of its registered soldiers swelled to thirty thousand.  These events stretched from the summer of 684 CE to the fall of 685 CE. ²⁸⁸, ²⁸⁹, ²⁹⁰

Mukhtar’s regime dead and buried

Mukhtar’s minority government had always been fragile.  It failed to win the confidence of the Ashraf and the masses belonging to Ahl al Jami’ah. The failed uprising of the Ashraf and the crackdown that followed it shook Mukhtar’s government to its core. The killing of Husayn’s murderers was totally unpredictable for the Ashraf, especially in the presence of previous reassurances from Mukhtar’s regime that their life and property would be protected. Mukhtar’s freeing of slaves was completely unacceptable to the Ashraf. Now it was clear to them that Mukhtar would increasingly consort with his Shi’a Ali and Mawla/slave base and would further degrade the Ashraf. When a group of people finds life unbearable it migrates away. The Zubayrid government of Basrah opened the gates of political asylum for the Ashraf of Kufa. They took their movable assets with them. ²⁹¹, ²⁹².

By the summer of 686 CE, Ibn Zubayr had made some changes in the province of Basrah. He had dismissed Harith bin Abdullah and had appointed his own brother Muṣ’ab bin Zubayr as governor. ²⁹³ Historical sources are quiet on the reasons for the reshuffle. Probably, Ibn Zubayr was not very happy with the performance of Harith, especially his failure to convince the Ashrafs to fight against the Kharijis.  Ibn Zubayr might have doubted the very loyalty of Harith bin Abdullah. Mus’ab bin Zubayr was ruthless to the dissidents of the Zubayr government. After stabilizing the Zubayrid government in the town, Mus’ab began the preparations for overthrowing Mukhtar’s weak regime. He sent his secret operators to Kufa to raise a support for a future Basran attack. Their mandate was to persuade the Ashrafs of Kufa who sided with Mukhtar to abandon him in the midst of any Basran attack. ²⁹⁴

Any government that provides asylum to displaced persons does so for its own self-interest. The Kufan Ashraf, who had taken asylum in Basrah had their stakes in Kufa. Their immovable properties were still there. They had chosen Basrah over Damascus with the hope that one day Basrah would help them regaining their wealth and status in Kufa. They were more than willing to fight side by side the army of Mus’ab which was planning to attack Kufa. ²⁹⁵, ²⁹⁶

Mus’ab did not bank solely on the Kufan Ashraf.  He funneled all possible resources at his disposal into the war. ²⁹⁷ The clash took place at a village called Ḥammām A’yan near Jisr al Akbar. ²⁹⁸, ²⁹⁹  Subtle differences between the Arab and the non-Arab participants on Mukhtar’s side existed.  Mus’abs forces exploited them to the full possible extent. ³⁰⁰ Mukhtar’s forces were wiped out. Mus’ab’s soldiers not only killed a lot of them during the battle, but they butchered all prisoners of war on the spot without capturing them. Many prisoners of war were tortured to death. ³⁰¹, ³⁰², ³⁰³

The defeat broke the backbone of Mukhtar’s regime. Mus’ab’s troops advanced to Kufa comfortably by boats and by land on horses to finish off Mukhtar’s regime. ³⁰⁴ Mukhtar came out of Kufa at the village of Ḥarūrā’ to give a last resistance with a small army.³⁰⁵, ³⁰⁶ It was his pious hope. His miniature force was quickly smashed. He fled back to hide in the governor house of Kufa. ³⁰⁷, ³⁰⁸ Mus’ab surrounded him and his handful of companions there. ³⁰⁹ Mukhtar knew his fate. Instead of being caught alive and facing the winner’s justice, he preferred to come out of hiding and die fighting. ³¹⁰ The day was April 3, 687 CE.³¹¹, ³¹², ³¹³, ³¹⁴, ³¹⁵

Mukhtar’s killing marked the start of a horrendous bloodbath in Kufa. The massacre of seven thousand supporters of Mukhtar, including civilians, occurred over the span of a few days. ³¹⁶ Mus’ab didn’t want any comeback of Shi’a Ali or Mawlas. ³¹⁷  Mus’ab’s special target was the Mawlas. Actually, out of those who got killed only ten percent were Arabs. ³¹⁸   Mus’ab didn’t want to kill any of the Arabs. The compulsion to kill at least a few Arabs was to show the rest of the Umayyad Caliphate that the Zubayrids were not racist. ³¹⁹, ³²⁰, ³²¹

Mukhtar remains a controversial character in the eyes of later Muslims.  When it comes to the number of sustainable new concepts introduced in political and religious spheres of Islam, we don’t find any rival to Mukhtar. Still, he is memorized as a self-seeking warlord among mainstream Hal al Jema’ah. Even the Shi’a Ali don’t own him.  His suggestion to use Hasan bin Ali as a bargaining chip at the negotiation table with Mu’awiya just before Hasan’s abdication kept later generations of the Shi’a Ali suspicious of his commitment to the Shi’a Ali cause. ³²²

Final phase of the Second Arab Civil War

The elimination of Mukhtar’s regime from the political stage of the Umayyad Caliphate heralded the third and the last phase of the Second Arab Civil War. Only two titans were left in the field, Ibn Zubayr and Abdul Malik.  There was no middle ground.  One had to knock out the other.  Both quickly moved to the business of decimating each other.

Ibrahim bin Attar was governing over Jazira in the name of Mukhtar for the last eight months.  Both Mus’ab bin Zubayr and Abdul Malik bin Marwan sent their personal envoys to Ibrahim inviting him to join their respective camps. Both offered him endorsement in his office and money. Ibrahim knew it is the grass that suffers when elephants fight. He didn’t take the offers on face value. He rather toiled to preserve his neck. He suspected that Abdul Malik had a readymade death warrant against him for slaying Ibn Ziyad. Mus’ab would be a softer option.  He took the next caravan to Kufa to join Mus’ab as his adviser. Mus’ab gave the important border district of Jazira to the loyal Muhallab bin Abu Sufrah. The dependent districts of Mosul, Azerbaijan and Armenia also fell in Muhallab’s jurisdiction. ³²³

For the next four and half years, Ibn Zubayr was going to be caliph over a larger portion of the Umayyad Caliphate, right from Jazira to the far end of Yemen. Abdul Malik had to be content with smaller western portion, just Syria and Egypt.

The Khariji question

In the late 680s, Ibn Zubayr was the undisputed master of the eastern portion of the Umayyad Caliphate. The richest and the largest provinces of Kufa and Basrah were his dominions. Yet his life was far from easy. The Khariji entities operating in Yamama, Bahrain, Fars and elsewhere kept him edgy.

Ibn Zubayr didn’t have many capable men to handle the Khariji militants.  As soon as he shifted the services of Muhallab bin Sufrah to Jazira, the Kharijis started encroaching westwards under their commander Zubayr bin Mahuz. A plus point for the Kharijis was an unending line of new recruits they got from different parts of the Umayyad Caliphate. The new recruits boosted the morale and strength of the Khariji outfits whenever they were weak after a trimming at the hands of the Zubayrids.

Both Khuzestan and Fars remained grey areas between the Zubayrids and Kharijis during the late 680s. The dominant party in that point in time collected taxes from these districts. Muhallab’s replacement, Umar bin Ubayduallah bin Ma’mar, failed to contain them. Once he inflicted a defeat upon them at Sabur.  They dispersed to far off areas of Istakhar, Kerman and Isfahan only to regroup and comeback. ³²⁴

The civilian populations of wealthy urban centers like Basrah, Kufa, and Mada’in were vulnerable to their strike at anytime. ³²⁵  Ibn Zubayr’s governors and lieutenant governors tried to hide behind each other whenever the news of the Khariji’s advance near any town reached their ears. ³²⁶

They were frightened to face the Kharijis because they had a repute of barbarism. ³²⁷

In one of the fights at the urban center of Jay between the Zubayrids and the Kharijis, Zubayr bin Mahuz was killed. His replacement was ready. It was Qatari bin Fuja’a. (Qaṭari bin Fujā’ah قطرى بن فُجأَة ) ³²⁸.

At the long last, the Zubayrid officials found the name of Muhallab in the draw. His services were transferred from Jazira to Khuzestan. He started the operation against the Khariji intruders at Sūlāf. Despite a protracted low impact fighting for eight months, it was stalemate. ³³⁰,   ³³¹

The condition of the other Khariji entity in Yamama, Bahrain, and Oman was similar.  Mus’ab sent a number of military campaigns against it with utter failure. ³³²

The status quo persisted until such time that another ruler from the center started supervising the operations.

Uneasy neighbors

Though there was no war between the Umayyad and Zubayrid entities, there was no peace either.  Like professional wrestlers, both were checking on each other to grasp the opponent from an unattended limb and pin down his back to the mat instantly. None of them tried it.

Abdul Malik used to come out of Damascus with his retinue almost each year to camp near Iraq.  Mus’ab bin Zubayr, bashfully, had to move in his direction with his selected trusted army men.  As Mus’ab drew nearer, Abdul Malik packed up and strolled back to Damascus. The only exception to this routine was the year of 687 CE when there was a drought and famine in Syria. ³³³

Abdul Malik bolsters his position

If Abdul Malik didn’t pounce upon Kufa during the detente with Zubayrids, there was a reason.  He was not strong enough. Apparently, the antagonism of the Qays Aylan tribes against his rule gradually softened out as we don’t hear of any tribal clashes anymore. However, discord in the ruling house intensified as probability of the unopposed Umayyad rule in Syria and Egypt increased. Many prominent Umayyads believed that the victory of Marj Rahit was that of the Umayyad house as a whole, not a personal one of Marwan. The power they attained after the victory should be shared with the other Umayyads, in their opinion. Amr bin Sa’id was their torch bearer. Abdul Malik was definitely not convinced. Sources don’t preserve his arguments on the issue. Obviously he expressed them only inside his home. They were not cogent enough to be uttered publicly. One night, when Abdul Malik and his entourage was camping near border of Iraq, the dinner talk focused on this issue. Amr bin Sa’id left the camp in anger, went straight to Damascus and closed its gates on Abdul Malik. Abdul Malik followed his footsteps the next morning. Clashes between the loyal soldiers of the two cousins at the gate of Damascus were trivial. No soldier wished to attain ‘martyrdom’ in the Umayyad’s internal fighting. Seeing the relative neutrality of the army, Amir bin Sa’id opened the gates and expected a negotiated settlement. Once inside the town, Abdul Malik invited Amr bin Sa’id to his palace to settle the misunderstandings amicably. He cunningly isolated Amr from his bodyguards and murdered him with his own hands. The fracas, which erupted between Amr bin Sa’id’s blood relatives and Abdul Malik & sons after the severed head of Amr was thrown into the street, was short lived.  Abdul Malik could subdue the relatives of Amr who had intruded inside the palace in anger and pacified the Mawlas of Amr waiting outside by throwing bags full of money to them. ³³⁴. Tabari allots June of 689 CE for this incident. ³³⁵, ³³⁶

Abdul Malik issued a statement on the murder of Amr bin Sa’id at his hands: “When there are two stallions in herd of camels, one usually expels the other, then kills him.” ³³⁷ Nobody in the country had the power to open a murder case against Abdul Malik.

Now, Abdul Malik was the incontestable master of Syria and Egypt and ready to browbeat the Zubayrids.

Ibn Zubayr’s flail administration

Despite governing over the larger and more prosperous part of the country, the Zubayrids never had the nerve to send troops inside Syria or Egypt. They were preoccupied with a host of domestic issues. The anarchy created by the Kharijis was only one of them. Ibn Zubayr had to manage the most restive population of Muslim Arabs. Though he could pour water of law and order on the fire of tribal warfare in Basrah, hidden heat existed in the ashes.  Ibn Zubayr apprehended its flare up any time. The Ashraf of Basrah kept fanning it to blackmail the government in getting higher government jobs. Kufa didn’t slant differently.³³⁸ With the danger of the Shi’a Ali and Mawlas gone, the Ashrafs of Kufa behaved on the same pattern as those of Basrah. To make the matters worse, the central government could not clinch on taxes collected in the provinces to institute an army at the disposal of the central government. The center and even the provinces depended upon the courtesy of the Ashrafs to provide the manpower necessary to police their administrative unit. The personality of Ibn Zubayr proved to be an obstacle, rather than an advantage, in securing stability in his domain. He appeared to be stubborn and ruthless, repelling more people than attracting. His decision to remote-control his subjects from Mecca exposed his timid psyche. ³³⁹ Repeated changes of provincial governors shine ample light on the agony of the wobbly caliph. ³⁴⁰

Financial vows of Zubayrid regime

Historic sources don’t give the impression that Ibn Zubayr’s government could ever attain financial stability.  The central government didn’t get a single dirham from whole province of Kufa. This was the primary condition of people of Kufa when they joined Zubayrid entity after death of Yazid. ³⁴¹ We don’t hear of any tax share of Kufa for the central government even after its re-conquest by Mus’ab bin Zubayr.  The province of Basrah was not entirely different in this regard. The time Muhallab started fighting against the Kharijis, the Kharijis had captured all the agricultural land and tax districts of Basrah. The province of Basrah was limited to the city of Basrah only. That is the reason the Ashraf of the town convinced Muhallab that he was brave and defeating the Kharijis was more important than ruling Khorasan. ³⁴² Actually, when Ibrahim bin Muhammad reported back to Ibn Zubayr after his dismissal from governorship of Basrah, he could not deliver the full amount of tax to Ibn Zubayr. Ibrahim told that tax collection was less due to fitnah.  Ibn Zubayr did not take any action against him. ³⁴³ The only time province of Basrah could send to Mecca the dues of the central government was during the brief governorship of Hamzah bin Abdullah bin Zubayr. ^{344    345} 

Ibn Zubayr’s failure on ideological front

Historians believe that Ibn Zubayr’s insistence to stay in Mecca and the issuance of coins with deep religious overtones was part of his efforts to provide ideological umbrella to his political movement.  However, the Ashraf of Kufa and Basrah were not thoroughly impressed by this act.  Even common Muslims did not take Ibn Zubayr’s brand of Islam seriously. Ibn Zubayr had stiff competition from the Kharijis in this field.  If any, the Muslims of the eastern provinces had obsession to fight for Islam, he could fulfill his craving by joining the Kharijis.

Umayyads throw their fishing net in Zubayrid Lake

By the fall of 689 CE Abdul Malik started sending feelers into the Zubayrid territories to palpate the hearts of the Ashrafs and to coax any willing Sharif into Abdul Malik’s enrollment. ³⁴⁷, ³⁴⁸

One of the feelers was Khalid bin Abdullah who went to Basrah with handful of horsemen.  Zubayrid intelligence agencies got alert and the government strengthened the surveillance by one thousand horsemen.³⁴⁹, ³⁵⁰ Still, Khalid allured some Ashraf.  They were so excited that they openly challenged the Zubayrid authority in Basrah. After twenty-four days of hide and seek, the government authorities finally calmed them down. ³⁵¹, ³⁵²

The lieutenant governor of the city was so afraid of a bigger tribal conflict that he let Khalid evacuate the city safely to rejoin Abdul Malik. ³⁵³ Governor Mus’ab renounced the lieutenant governor on his action but what Mus’ab could do himself was just insulting the participating Ashraf. He captured them and flogged them with hundred lashes each. He shaved their heads and beards, exposed them to the sun for three days, forced them to divorce their wives, and sent their children to far off expeditions. Then he paraded them in the streets of Basrah and made them swear not to marry a free woman in future. Finally, he razed their houses and confiscated their movable property.³⁵⁴  The message was clear to Abdul Malik. Mus’ab did not have power to kill them on the charges of high treason.

Umayyads: the final victor

The Ashraf and common people of Iraq were disillusioned with the Zubayrid government in increasing numbers. The exact reasons of the widespread discontent are not known.  Any or all of financial instability, the lack of army at the disposal of the central authority, the failure of knitting the society in common ideology, or the constant Khariji threat could have contributed towards the discontent.  Abdul Malik was in constant touch with the Ashraf living in the Zubayrid areas offering them high government offices and money in case they changed loyalty. ³⁵⁵ By November of 691 CE almost all the Ashraf of Iraq had settled the matters with Abdul Malik. ³⁵⁶, ³⁵⁷ The plan was that they would abandon Mus’ab in the midst of the battlefield in case Abdul Malik advances on Iraq and engages Mus’ab in battle.    

Mus’ab was aware of the dire situation. He consulted his advisors. They put forward two suggestions. One was to arrest and kill those Ashraf who sympathesized with Abdul Malik.  Mus’ab did not find power to do that. The other suggestion was to arrest them and keep in jail, and order a loyal Mawla to kill that Sharif whose fellow tribesmen desert Mus’ab on the battle field. Mus’ab didn’t find it practical. In the absence of any other suggestions, the plight of the government was written on the wall. ³⁵⁸

The events unfolded exactly as Abdul Malik had choreographed them. Abdul Malik brought his limited number of soldiers and camped at Miskin, just north of Baghdad.  Mus’ab came forward with as much force as he could collect. Almost all of Mus’ab’s soldiers stood still. Only Mus’ab, his immediate family members and close loyalists fought briefly until they all died. All of the Ashraf of Kufa and Basrah and their tribes pledged allegiance to Abdul Malik the same day and at the same spot. ³⁵⁹, ³⁶⁰, ³⁶¹, ³⁶²

Abdul Malik appointed governors and lieutenant governors of his choosing. He did not appoint a single Sharif of Basrah or Kufa to any post, which he had promised to them before his triumph. ³⁶³, ³⁶⁴

When Abdul Malik entered Kufa triumphantly, he threw a lavish banquet party to celebrate his victory.  The magnificent Khawrnaq palace was the venue.  Each and every resident of Kufa was invited without any exceptions.  An abundance of whole roasted lambs and all varieties of delicious dishes took the central place of serving tables. People sat around to eat. Abdul Malik spoke, “How pleasant our life is! Only if anything lasted”.  A verse creped in his mind which he shared with his guests:

Everything new, O Umaymah, goes toward decay;
And every man will some day become a has-been.³⁶⁵, ³⁶⁶

After making the necessary arrangements for the governance in his newly acquired provinces, Abdul Malik returned to Damascus, his power base. ³⁶⁷

Abdul Malik spreads eastwards

The triumphant entry of Abdul Malik was not the drop scene of the Second Arab Civil War. All of the areas of the Umayyad Caliphate east of Basrah needed his attention. After the death of Yazid bin Mu’awiya, The tribal warfare had exploded in the Khorasan district before any other part of the country. ‘Abd Allah bin Khāzim of the Sulaym tribe had emerged as a dominant warlord in it. ³⁶⁸ Almost all of Khorasan came under his control. ³⁶⁹ After the province of Basrah joined Meccan alliance, he nominally took allegiance to Ibn Zubayr. However, Ibn Zubayr administration was unable to make any managerial decisions regarding Khorasan. Ibn Khazim was the semi-independent ruler of Khorasan. ³⁷⁰, ³⁷¹

The logical next step for Abdul Malik, after capturing Basrah, was to bring Ibn Khazim under his nominal obedience. He offered Ibn Khazim to accept Abdul Malik as caliph and as a result get lieutenant governorship of Khorasan for seven years, including utilization of its revenue at his wishes.  It appears Abdullah bin Khazim was dreaming of ruling Khorasan totally independently and transferring its rule to his descendants. Instead of writing any answer to Abdul Malik, Abdullah bin Khazim simply insulted his envoy to show his disgust. ³⁷² Abdul Malik was too strong to tolerate such hanky-panky. He offered the same arrangement to Bukayr bin Wishah of Tamim, Ibn Khazim’s local official in Merv.  Bukayr availed the chance with Jubilation. Ibn Khazim was still busy in subduing some of his tribal rivals outside Merv. When Bukayr, along with the soldiers of Merv cantonment turned the table on Ibn Khazim, he could not fight against so many people single handed. Bukayr sent Ibn Khazim’s severed head to Abdul Malik as a proof that the work was done. ³⁷³, ³⁷⁴

Kharijis on defensive

Whoever ruled over Basrah could not afford to underestimate the Kharijis. The Khariji presence so near densely the populated Basrah was a constant hazard to any ruler there.  Now it was Abdul Malik’s turn. Abdul Malik was a bold and determined person. He decided to take action.

Muhallab, the Zubayrid lieutenant governor of Khuzestan, was at a stalemate with Kharijis for the last eight months of Zubayrid administration. ³⁷⁵ Unlike Ibn Khazim, Muhallab defected from Ibn Zubayr to Abdul Malik instantly after Abdul Malik’s triumph at Kufa. ³⁷⁶ Still, Abdul Malik’s governor of Basrah Khalid bin Abdullah neglected Muhallab and sidelined him.  He sent his own brother ‘Abd al-Azīz to chase away the Kharijis. The Kharijis gave a thorough thrashing to Abdul Aziz.³⁷⁷ Actually, the Kharijis were scared of Muhallab. They were fearless against any other military commander. Abdul Malik was not an ideologue and he figured out that Muhallab’s name was a guarantee of success against the Kharijis. He ordered Khalid bin Abdullah to attack the Kharijis with full vigour and include Muhallab in the army as a field commander. ³⁷⁸, ³⁷⁹ Abdul Malik made sure that all the resources available to his government were used appropriately to uproot the Kharijis. A well equipped force of five thousand marched out of Basrah under command of governor Khalid bin Abdullah to drive the Kharijis out of Khuzestan and Fars. ³⁸⁰, ³⁸¹ It was joined by another well equipped force of five thousand from Kufa. ³⁸² The Kharijis did not have the means to fight against such a dreadful army. They started retreating inch-by-inch away from Khuzestan towards Fars. Abdul Malik was not used to leaving tasks half-done. He had no internal foes by this time.  He could commit all his army wholeheartedly to the Khariji front. He sent another reinforcement of four thousand soldiers from Kufa with orders to push the Kharijis to the outermost border districts of the Umayyad Caliphate. He ordered his soldiers not to come back to the comforts of Kufa and Basrah after the Khariji defeat. They were obliged to stay and police the border districts until their routine time to spend on border duty expires. ³⁸³ The Kharijis took shelter in the dry remote wilderness, not to regroup for now. ³⁸⁴, ³⁸⁵, ³⁸⁶

One wonders how a change in leadership changes the results. Abdul Malik did not send a single Syrian soldier to fight against the Kharijis.  He used the same Kufan and Basran soldiers who failed in the task many times under Zubayrid administration.

Kharijis eliminated from Arabian Peninsula

Now it was turn of the Kharijis of Yamama and Bahrain. They were different from those of Fars.  They did not believe in raiding settlements and looting innocent Muslims. They strived to govern the areas under their control in accordance with the tenants of Shari’ah. ³⁸⁷. They had become unpopular as time passed. ³⁸⁸, ³⁸⁹ Mutual differences had disunited them. ³⁹⁰ Najdah was killed somewhere in the fall of 690 CE in factional tussle. His replacement, Abu Fudayk Abdullah bin Thawr of Qays of the Tha’labah tribe had shifted the capital to Bahrain.³⁹¹ Abdul Malik did not wish for the survival of any rival of his establishment. Without taking a sigh of relief after returning to Basrah from the Khariji campaign, governor Khalid bin Abdullah dispatched an army under the command of his own brother Umayyah to subdue Abu Fudayk and his party. True to their reputation, Abu Fudayk’s companions fought bravely. They repelled the government forces and postpone the looming disaster for a few months.³⁹²

Abdul Malik was upset.  He took the matters in his own hands.  He personally organized ten thousand soldiers from Kufa and ten thousand from Basra under the command of Umar bin Ubaydullah bin Ma’mar and paid them lavishly in advance. The fighting, as expected, was fierce.  Abu Fudayk laid slain on the battle ground. Six thousand of his soldiers met the same fate.  Only eight hundred Kharijis renounced their oath and accepted captivity. ³⁹³ By late summer of 692 CE the Arabian Peninsula was free of all Khariji groups. ³⁹⁴

Hawting notes that the Khariji states were a by-product of the Second Arab Civil War. ³⁹⁵ They vanished in thin air as the Second Arab Civil War drew near its conclusion.  Rise and fall of such religio-political groups is a recurrent theme in history of Islam.  Typically, an impaired government triggers the cascade of events.  Many youth get disillusioned with the system of government itself.  They abandoned their place of abode to join groups operating in far off places to topple the government and implement a kind of Shari’ah law that was ideal in their minds.  Their undaunted fighting spirit awards them success to get administrative control of populated areas.  A short period of their governance exposes their incompetency in state affairs. The general public turns against them and their state like entity crumbles down. Powerful government institutions, emerging from a slumber, replace them. The physical group dies out but the ideology survives to reappear in the form of another physical group at another time and another place under the right circumstances.

End of epic war

After the death of Mus’ab bin Zubayr it was clear that Ibn Zubayr and his Meccan Alliance was a spent up cartridge. Ibn Zubayr did not have any strength left to face any army sent by Abdul Malik.  Ibn Zubayr knew it.  Expressing his deep sorrow and frustration in front of a gathering, he said, “People of Iraq were treacherous and hypocrites and they handed Mus’ab over and sold him for a very low price”. Mentioning Mus’ab’s bravery Abdullah bin Zubayr said, “We don’t die in beds. We die a sudden death by spears or under the shadow of swords”. He further blamed that “None of Abu al ‘Āṣ’s sons has died in war neither in pre-Islam nor in Islam”. ³⁹⁶, ³⁹⁷

The planning for the scaling the of the last fort of the Zubayrid administration had started when Abdul Malik had not left Kufa for Damascus. ³⁹⁸ Abdul Malik knew Ibn Zubayr was innocuous for him. However, he smelled the danger in the existence of a person in the country with caliphal claims. ³⁹⁹ Financing a small contingent to dislodge Ibn Zubayr from Mecca was not a problem. The problem was finding those that would join this force. None of the Ashraf of Kufa, the Basrah, or even Syria was willing to lead a force that would attack the holiest site of Islam.⁴⁰⁰ Thirty-one-year-old Ḥajjāj bin Yusuf volunteered his services. ⁴⁰¹, ⁴⁰² He was not a Sharif. He was an ordinary foot soldier in the Syrian contingent. ⁴⁰³ Abdul Malik didn’t think for a moment before accepting Hajjaj’s help. All two thousand men who joined happily Hajjaj’s contingent were Syrians. ⁴⁰⁴

The army left Kufa by end of November 691 CE. ⁴⁰⁵, ⁴⁰⁶ It bypassed Medina and strolled to Taif leisurely in two months to camp there in January of 692 CE. ⁴⁰⁷ Abdul Malik was not bent on bloodshed. He declared a guarantee of general amnesty for Meccans if they don’t resist Hajjaj. ⁴⁰⁸ His aim was to give as much time to the Meccans as possible to abandon Ibn Zubayr under the threat of the army.  Hajjaj used to send sorties to Arafah, outside Haram territory. Ibn Zubayr would send a fighter or two to combat with them.  Hajjaj could guess that vehemence of Ibn Zubayr’s strength had abated and that most of his supporters had dispersed, leaving him. By the end of March 692 CE, Hajjaj sent an appraisal report to Abdul Malik and asked his permission to march closer to Mecca and blockaded the town. This move would bring the army in Haram territory at Bi’r Maymūn.⁴⁰⁹

By that time the Zubayrid administration of Medina had already crumbled and Abdul Malik had appointed his man, Ṭāriq bin ‘Amr, a Mawla of Uthman bin Affan, governor over Medina.  ⁴¹⁰, ⁴¹¹

Abdul Malik sent a reinforcement of five thousand soldiers under the command of Tariq bin Amr before Hajjaj came closer to Mecca. ⁴¹² The purpose was to overwhelm the Meccans with fear and defeat Ibn Zubayr without fighting. The reinforcement reached there on April 24, 692 CE. The same night a blockade of Mecca started. ⁴¹³ The blockade served its purpose. The Meccans didn’t want to sink with Ibn Zubayr. A total of ten thousand left the ‘ship’ to start camping with Hajjaj for their safety, including two sons of Ibn Zubayr. ⁴¹⁴ Abdul Malik made special arrangements to supply ample food to the camping civilians and soldiers so their morale wouldn’t sink. ⁴¹⁵ Ibn Zubayr remained defiant and rejected all amnesty offers. ⁴¹⁶, ⁴¹⁷ Hajjaj’s soldiers were reluctant to enter the deserted town to kill Ibn Zubayr. They hurled stones towards the town with the help of mangonels maintaining a distance from the Ka’ba.⁴¹⁸  After months of patience, Hajjaj calculated that breaking the pride of the septuagenarian with the mere shooting of stones was impossible. Someone would have to enter into the town to finish the job. He could convince a handful of his soldiers to do the job. Ibn Zubayr came out of his house in military gear to die fighting instead of being captured alive. ⁴¹⁹, ⁴²⁰, ⁴²¹, ⁴²², ^{423 424}, ⁴²⁵

Abdul Malik thanked Hajjaj by gifting him governorship of Mecca, Yemen and Yamama, and later of Medina.⁴²⁶, ⁴²⁷

The religio-political concepts prevelant during the Second Arab Civil War, like those of Shi’a Ali, Ahl al Jami’ah, or the Kharijis, lingered on in future generations of Muslims.  Ibn Zubayr had not devised any specific doctrine of the ‘Meccan Alliance.’ The alliance ceased to exist, both physically and politically after death of Ibn Zubayr. The only thing that survived in political memory of Muslims was the bravery of Ibn Zubayr. ⁴²⁸

The D day

October 4, 692, the day on which Abdullah bin Zubayr got killed at the hands of Abdul Malik’s soldiers, is the last day of the Second Arab Civil War. ⁴²⁹.

The bloodiest war that the Muslims had ever fought with each other started in Hejaz and finished in Hejaz. The war started with an Umayyad caliph moving control strings from Damascus and it ended with another Umayyad caliph moving control strings from Damascus. Arguably, the Umayyad Caliphate was back to square one.

Caliph Abdul Malik was as powerful as Caliph Mu’awiya was at the time of his death. From the cold torrents of Oxus River in the east to the low mountains of Kairouan in the west, and from the snow clad peaks of Azerbaijan in the north to the sandy beaches of Yemen in the south, Abdul Malik’s words were law. Such was the magnificence of Umayyad Caliphate and such was the grandiosity of the caliph.

Why did Abdul Malik Succeed?

Husayn bin Ali, Ubaydullah bin Ziyad, Mukhtar bin Abu Ubayd, Abdullah bin Zubayr, Dahhak bin Qays, Nafi’ bin Azraq, Najdah bin Amir, Qatari bin Fuja’ah, Abdullah bin Khazim and so many others aspired to reach the summit. What was so special in Marwan bin Hakam and his son Abdul Malik bin Marwan?  It is a difficult question to answer.

Did they have any spiritual claim? The straight answer is no!  They and their direct ancestors were nowhere propagating Islam during the Meccan phase, fighting in the prophetic battles or even in Futuhul Buldan.  Rather their ancestors are more known for opposing Islam.⁴³⁰ Mu’awiyah bin Mughīrah bin Abi’ l ‘Āṣ, the grandfather of ‘Abd al Malik bin Marwan was a prisoner form the raid of Zayd bin Haritha on the caravan of Iraq.  ⁴³¹ Had they rose to prominence by rendering excellent services to the state? No! Marwan bin Hakam served only as governor of the backyard town of Medina and even that for brief periods. ⁴³² Did they have a large military at their disposal ready to fight at their single yell? No! Neither of them was a military general. Actually, just before being elected to power they had fled from Medina on camels, leaving their womenfolk with Ali bin Husayn. ⁴³³ Were they richer than others to buy loyalty? Probably not! The only wealth of Marwan we know of came from inheritance of his wife from Uthman. Others had been governors of rich provinces for years and had the chance to embezzle taxes. Abdullah bin Zubayr’s ancestors had got preferential treatment in the estate allotments during the Rashidun Caliphate. ⁴³⁴

The only explanation left is their leadership qualities. The menace of tribal warfare and revenge and counter revenge spread almost everywhere after death of Yazid bin Mu’awiya. The hearts of the Umayyads and their supporters filled with horror because they were powerless and could be an easy victim of revenge from any corner. The reputed sagacity of Marwan made him a perfect fit for the need. That was the lucky opening. After that whatever Marwan and his son did was timely decisions in correct direction.  During second phase of the Second Arab Civil War, when everybody else was trying to grab as much area as possible, they strenghthened their rule in one area by building a loyal army and eliminating the home grown opposition.  During the last phase of the Second Arab Civil War, when the Zubayrid administration was struggling to control the unruly Ashraf of Iraq, Abdul Malik waited patiently until everybody there gets exhausted. Last, he struck the iron when it was hot.

Let’s look at one facet of Second Arab Civil War to check on leadership capabilities of the father and son team. Once somebody asked Ubaydullah bin Ziyad if he felt remorse on killing of Husayn bin Ali. His answer was in negation. “He had come to kill me, so I killed him first”, explained Ziyad.⁴³⁵ This demonstrates the mindset of Arab Muslims during the war.  If you don’t eliminate your opponent physically, don’t expect your opponent will pay you in the same coin if he gets a chance. The physical elimination of opponents was a norm rather than exception.  It had started from the very first casualty of the Second Arab Civil War.  Abdullah bin Zubayr did not spare the life of his brother Amr bin Zubayr. ⁴³⁶ To add insult to injury, the victims were tortured before killing and their dead bodies were regularly molested. Such policy generated hatred and the wish to avenge among the well-wishers of the dead. Marwan and Abdul Malik didn’t revert the policy. They modified it in such a way that it didn’t look like personal vendetta. When the severed head of Dahhak bin Qays was brought in front of Marwan bin Hakam, he expressed his disgust for the act. ⁴³⁷ If Marwan really meant it, he would have forbade his soldiers from such an act at the beginning of the war.  His small gesture of softness, anyhow, did not trigger emotions of revenge in family of Dahhak bin Qays. No wonder, we later see Dahhak’s family members in Marwan’s camp.⁴³⁸ When Abdul Malik was in power to kill Mus’ab bin Zubayr on the battlefield he sent him a message of unconditional forgiveness. He could demonstrate to all and sundry that a violent death was Mus’ab’s choice.  Here again, one can see that if Abdul Malik really meant it, he could have arrested Mus’ab. To make his victory appear humane, he allowed for the ceremonial burial of his opponents, a first in the Second Arab Civil War. ⁴³⁹ Abdul Malik urged Ibn Zubayr for months to surrender with promise of indemnity.⁴⁴⁰ When he chose a violent death, Abdul Malik praised his bravery to console Ibn Zubayr’s surviving supporters. ⁴⁴¹, ⁴⁴²

All participants of the Second Arab Civil War had the cunning to conquer heads while breaking hearts. Marwan and Abdul Malik had art to win hearts while conquering heads.

It could not be mere chance that at the death of Ibn Zubayr, Umar bin Abdullah commented, “He [Abdul Malik] was better manager of his worldly affairs than you [Ibn Zubayr]”. ⁴⁴³

Why did ideologues fail?

Generally speaking, the Second Arab Civil War was a contest for the dice of caliphate.  However, there were two specific groups for whom caliphate was secondary. Their primary aim was to make their ideology triumphant. Obtaining caliphate was merely a means to impose their ideology. Both Shi’a Ali and Kharijis fought more valiantly than any other.  Why did they fail?

The ideologues had one basic problem. They seek truth from ideology and not from the facts.  Ideology becomes a feeter for their leaders and supporters. It deprives them of any flexibility, which is essential for successful political maneuvering. Sulayman bin Surad should have postponed his march to Syria when he came to know that many of his supporters were passively resisting his decisions. ⁴⁴⁵ Instead of changing his course of action in light of facts, he took guidance from his ideology. As a result he wasted four thousand bravest men who would have changed the course of events if they survived. This is a typical example of a leader in fetters of ideology.

Najda could establish a government in Yamama. His polity was under constant threat from the Zubayrids. Any foe of the Zubayrids was his natural friend.  By chance, Najda’s forces captured a daughter of Amr bin Uthman bin Affan during a raid on Taif. Instead of granting her to one of his soldiers, like any ordinary woman, he bought her freedom out of his own pocket. Then he sent her respectfully to Abdul Malik as a gesture of friendship. ⁴⁴⁶ This was a course of action in light of facts.  His supporters were so offended by this action of his that they rebelled against him and killed him.⁴⁴⁷  As a result, the Khariji government weakened and soon became part of history. This is a typical example of supporters in fetters of ideology.

Ideologues rarely succeed. And when they succeed, their success is usually short lived.

Dominion or death

When Abul Malik could capture Yahya bin Sa’id alive, who had jumped into Abdul Malik’s house to protect his brother Amr bin Sa’id from murder, Abdul malik didn’t know what to do with Yahya.  He took him in front of a crowd of supporters and asked them how to treat Yahya.  A person from the crowd shouted, “Do snakes bear anything but snakes?” kill him because he is hypocrate and enemy. ⁴⁴⁸ The event highlights an inculcation of Second Arab Civil War, ‘forgiving an opponent is not an option’. From the Killing of Husayn to the heroic death of Ibn Zubayr, it was a norm of those turbulent times that the looser would loose his head too.

Each leader of the war knew that his end would be a termination if he is not triumphant. Each of them met his last moments bravely. Look at the way Abdullah bin Khazim died. The tradition is narrated by Wakī, the killer of Abdullah bin Khazim. Abdullah bin Khazim was already exhausted and wounded by fighting simultaneously with three people in the battle.  “I subdued him with the end of the spear shaft.  After he was thrown down, I sat on his chest.  He tried to get up but could not. I said, “Vengeance for Dawilah!” He spat out phlegm in my face, and said, “Allah curse your father! Will you kill the ram [used in the meaning of a leader of the flock] of Muḍar to avenge your brother, a peasant not worth of a handful of date pits?”⁴⁴⁹, ⁴⁵⁰.

None of the defeated leaders chose to live, even if he was given an opportunity.  The reasons were clear. How could he justify deaths of his companions, whom he had encouraged to die on his side, if he himself avoided it?  His surrender on promise of amnesty could have provided ample proof to the society at large that he was fighting for his own sake, and not for any cause.⁴⁵¹, ⁴⁵²,  ⁴⁵³

The matter of ordinary soldiers was different. Many a times they begged for pardons. ⁴⁵⁴

Occasionally, however, ordinary soldiers did chose to die with their colleagues. ⁴⁵⁵

Coping with death

The belief in attaining martyrdom by fighting against non-Muslims was widely accepted during Mu’awiya’s reign. ⁴⁵⁶  This kind of passion is understandable while fighting against non-Muslim.  Still, fighters of all sorts, during the Second Arab Civil War, were convinced that they were dying for the cause of Islam.  Religion provided them the required psychological anaesthesia, which each soldier needs to mustur courage to fight. ⁴⁵⁷.

However, religion was not the only passion which provided a reason to die during Second Arab Civil War.  Pre-Islamic tribal prejudices had raised their head.  For many, who died, tribal pride was enough.  Abdullah bin Khazim, for example, died being proud of a leader of Muḍar.⁴⁵⁸

Religious motifs of Second Arab Civil War

“Allah has killed the liar al-Mukhtar and his partisans who adopted unbelief as their religion and beguiled with enchantment.  We summon you to the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of His Prophet, and allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful.  If you respond favourably to this, come to me.  You shall have the territory of al-Jazirah and all the territory of the west, as long as you live and as long as the dominion of the family of al-Zubayr remains.”  This is the content of the letter which Ibrahim bin Ashtar received from Mus’ab after fall of Kufa to Mus’ab’s forces.  Ironically he received a letter from Abdul Malik the same time. “The family of al-Zubayr have revolted against the Imāms of guidance, have tried to wrest command from those entitled to it, and have blasphemed in the Sacred House. Allah will give power over them, and will bring an evil turn upon them. I summon you to Allah and the Sunnah of His Prophet.  If you accept and respond favourable, you shall have authority over Iraq, as long as you live and I live,” the letter read. ⁴⁵⁹ What a similarity between the two letters!

The main ideological front of the Second Arab Civil War was religion, not tribalism, not regionalism, and not economy. All warring parties claimed to be on right path of the religion and blamed their opponents to be on wrong path of religion. All appealed to people for support in the name of Islam and justified their actions on the same basis.

The Umayyads vs. the Kharijis: Khalid bin Abdullah writes to Abdul Malik that he went against Azriqah who had turned away from the faith and withdrawn from the governance of the Muslims.⁴⁶⁰

The Umayyads vs the Shi’a Ali: Abdul Malik bin Marwan calls Tuwwabun the spreader of disorder and commotion (fitnah) and calls Sulayman bin Surad the head of error.⁴⁶¹

The Zubayrids vs the Kharijis:  During the war of Silla wa-Sillabra, ‘Ubaydallah bin ziyād bin Ẓabyān the commander of Ibn Zubayr’s Basran forces,  called out, “Oh people of Hell, indeed, hurry to it soon, for it is your resting place and your abode!”  They [Khariji] answered, “Oh wicked one, is Hell kept for anyone but you and your kind? It was prepared for the unbelievers and you are one of them!”. ⁴⁶²

Mukhtar vs Tuwwabun: Mukhtar, writing to Tuwwabun who returned Kufa alive, said, that they had separated from unrighteous (al-qāsiṭīn) and fought against profaners of His law (muḥillīn).⁴⁶³

Mukhtar vs the Zubayrids: Before the war for Kufa started, Mukhtar’s companions claimed to the Zubayrids that they summon them to Book, Sunnah and command of Mukhtar and that if somebody says the family of Prophet ought to be ruled by him, he is wrong. The companions of Mus’ab said they summon them to Book, Sunnah and to command of Ibn Zubayr. ⁴⁶⁴

Even outlaws used religious motifs to justify their actions: When Ibn Hurr, the dacoit, came out of jail he refused to give allegiance to Mus’ab saying “This matter is meant only for such men as were your former caliphs.  We see no one equal to them or like them among us, that we should allow him to conduct our affairs and grant him our sincere advice. If it is only ‘he who overcomes takes the spoil’, why not Hubayrah al Shaybani, [the Khariji]?”⁴⁶⁵  The same Ibn Hurr, comments while looting estates of Mukhtar’s partisans, “Do we bind ourselves with allegiance (bay’ah) to them, when they are no braver than we in battle or wealthier than we?  The Messenger of God charged us, ‘no obedience to a creature that involves disobeying the Creator!’  After the four who have passed away [first four caliphs] we have seen no righteous imām or pious helper (wazīr)’ all of them have disobeyed and opposed [Allah]”.⁴⁶⁶

The religious slogans and blames of opposing sides during the Second Arab Civil War are almost mirror image of each other.  It is difficult to imagine where exactly the waring parties differed.  Hawtings points out that such religion based blames to Muslim opponents are not specific to the Second Arab Civil War.  They can be found in political disputes of later periods, in very differing scenarios, and in very different contexts.  Abusive words of religious meaning became generic after the Second Arab Civil War. The future Muslim generations used them generously to give their political strives a religious flavor, even without defining exact meaning of such words.

Some participants of the Second Arab Civil War clearly understood the hollowness of prevailing political slogans with intrinsic religious connotations. When Muhallab and his companions gave allegiance to Abdul Malik, the Kharijis taunted them saying, “Morrow you used to call Mus’ab a companion in life and death and used to call Abdul Malik son of the Accursed One  Now you call Abdul Malik your Imam and caliph.  You are friends of Devil and slaves of this world.” ⁴⁶⁷

The war was between Muslims only. The leaders of the war were trying their best to convince their fellows that they were better Muslims than the other warring fraction. A study of coins issued during the Second Arab Civil War demonstrates that this was the time when pure Islamic slogans started appearing on coins.

Other motifs

By the way, religion was not the only ideological expression of political ambitions during Second Arab Civil War.  There were rare exceptions to use of religion for politics.  A vivid example is Amr bin Sa’id.  When trying to convince people of Damascus to accept him as a leader he said, “No one from Quraysh ever stood on this pulpit before me without asserting that his were a heaven and a hell, and that he would cause whoever obeyed him to enter the heaven, and whoever disobeyed him to enter the hell.  But I tell you that heaven and hell are in the hand of Allah; nothing of that belongs to me, save that you have a claim to equal treatment (mu’asāh) and a good stipend (‘aṭiyyah) from me”. ⁴⁶⁸

Not only rejection of religious slogans and promises of material benefits can be traced, references to tribalism, especially its pre-Islamic form, can easily be found in narrations of Second Arab Civil War.  At the time of taking oath of allegiance from citizens of Kufa Abdul Malik was in a mood to eulogize the local tribes to win their hearts.  He sang the praises of horsemanship of Ju’fi tribe both during Islamic period as well as in pre-Islamic times.⁴⁶⁹  Examples are scattered where people took refuge with another people on the basis of pre-Islamic tribal alliances. ⁴⁷⁰

Was the war about redistribution of wealth?

Basically no!  The war started after the death of Mu’awiya only because more than one men of Quraysh aspired to be ruler.  It flared up after the death of Yazid because one ruling house failed to produce a leader and all and sundry jumped into the race to be ruler. ⁴⁷¹  Second Arab Civil War was fundamentally a war of succession.

If it were about redistribution of wealth, the sources would have mentioned at least one instance where common people agitated against existing distribution system of wealth, and one person from them became their voice by attaining leadership role.

Islamic sources note references to economy during the war only as fleeting ideas.  Husayn bin Ali, for example, blames the Umayyads ‘have appropriated the fay’ exclusively to themselves and claims that he has more right to correct the things than anybody else because he is ‘Husayn bin Ali, the son of Fatima the daughter of the Prophet’. ⁴⁷² Anyhow, he doesn’t reveal what exactly he would do to correct the things if he comes to power. All participants talked about redistribution of money on one occasion or other.  All mentioned it superficially.  None gave a clear manifesto about redistribution of wealth.

Open comments about the Companions

Public awareness that top administrative posts should be filled on merit rather than on a person’s grouping had gradually increased in Islamic society. People and rulers both understood that simply being a Companion of the Prophet was not an ample qualification for an administrative job. However, due to their reverence in the society, nobody voiced it clearly. The Second Arab Civil War broke this taboo. For the first time in history of Islam, people raised the public voice that nobody should be considered for an administrative job just on the basis of his closeness to the Prophet. “Abdullah bin Umar bin Khattab has Companionship of the Prophet, he has precedence in Islam but he is a weak man.  He can’t be master of the community of Muḥammad”, heard the convention of supporters of the Umayyad resurgence before election of Marwan from Rawḥ Bin Zinbā of Judham when somebody suggested that Marwan can’t be given a chance to be caliph of Prophet Muhammad while a Companion of the Prophet was alive in the community.⁴⁷³

Regard for the Companions of Prophet, however, persisted in the society as a whole during the Second Arab Civil War. A Syrian soldier spared life of Abu Sa’id al Khudri during the massacre after the battle of Harrah only because he introduced himself and the Syrian could recognize that he was a Companion. ⁴⁷⁴

Non-Muslim majority remains docile

Unlike the First Arab Civil War, which was fought mainly in Iraq, the Second Arab Civil War was fought over larger geographical area.  All the lands belonging to ex-Sasanian Iran came under its sway.  It also lasted double the time of First Arab Civil War. Obviously, the non-Muslim majority of the Umayyad Caliphate was fully aware of the Muslim Arab’s weakness.  Surprisingly, there is very little in historical literature which could elaborate insubordination on their part.  They continued to pay jiziya loyally to anybody who governed over them for the time being.

Why was it so?  Most probably they had accepted the new rulers by then and were no longer seeking independence.  Our supposition gets strength from the fact that those who wished to defy Arab Muslim rule during Second Arab Civil War could do it easily.

‘During the insurrection of ibn az Zubayr, Armenia rose and its nobles (Aḥrār) with their followers threw off their allegiance’, informs Baladhuri. ⁴⁷⁵

Some incidences involving the dependent territories of provinces, where ex-Sasanian nobles still governed in the name of the Umayyad Caliphate, have survived. After the death of Yazid bin Mu’awiyah, for instance, the people of Rayy revolted.  ‘Āmir bin Mas’ūd, governor of Kufa (he was the one elected by the people of Kufa rejecting Ziyad) sent a force. It was routed. Then he sent another force. It could “kill al-Furrukhan and infidels were routed”. ⁴⁷⁶ Anyhow, the frequency and intensity of such events is not more than periods before and after the Second Arab Civil War.

Just like the First Arab Civil War, Arab Muslims were cautious of losing their ongoing source of easy income, if the non-Muslim subjects come in open revolt.  The warring parties were totally united against non-Muslims even on a hint of such scenario.  In the midst of most ferocious infighing between Azd and Tamim in Khorasan a band of Turks tried to dislodge Arabs of Azd tribe from a castle named Qaṣr Asfād. In no time Tamim came to the help of Azd and their combined levy defeated the Turks. ⁴⁷⁷, ⁴⁷⁸

An outlaw during Second Arab Civil War

There is no way that a country rives in a civil war and law and order remains undamaged.   One example would be sufficient to understand the general situation of law and order in Umayyad Caliphate during Second Arab Civil War.

Ubaydullah bin Ḥurr, a resident of Kufa, a well-known gangster of Iraq, belongs to this period. ⁴⁷⁹

Just after the death of Yazid bin Mu’awiya, Ubaydullah bin Hurr created his gang of seven hundred horsemen. All were outlaws (Khalī’) from many different tribes. They raided on Mada’in and captured the money that was on its way from Jabal to the public exchequer in Kufa.  The law and order situation had not deteriorated greatly in the earlier days of the Second Arab Civil War. There was someone to question Hurr about his dacoity. He simply explained to the in charge of the treasury that he and his companions had actually taken their share of fay’ in advance.  He wrote a ‘no dues letter’ (barā’ah) for the treasury as a receipt of payments. When he and his companions found that nobody reprimanded them they got daring.  Raiding a range of rural districts (Kuwar) became their way of life. As the government in Kufa became weak, they didn’t even bother to explain anybody why did they snatch money. Traditionalists, who have transmitted the story, are not sure if he was content with government money only or if he looted the merchants as well. ⁴⁸⁰.

Any government is under public pressure to curb bandits.  Mukhtar’s regime, though weak, made the first attempt on Ubaydullah bin Hurr. Mukhtar arrested ibn Hurr’s wife whom he had left at home in Kufa.  Ubaydullah bin Hurr broke into the jail with help of his companions, took her away and fought his way out of Kufa. In doing so Ibn Hurr let each and every prisoner, man and woman escape. Now, Ibn Hurr felt special pleasure in harassing Mukhtar’s tax officers and his partisans. He didn’t shun from looting the owners of estate in Swad who had sided with Mukhtar.  In retaliation, the Mukhtar regime demolished Ibn Hurr’s house in Kufa and plundered his estates in Jubbah and Budāt   Ibn Hurr had taken the insult of his wife’s arrest so seriously that he joined Mus’ab’s forced that attacked Kufa and dislodged the Mukhtar regime. ⁴⁸¹

Mus’ab assumed that Ibn Hurr was against Mukhtar politically, and when Mukhtar was no longer at the helm of the government, he would return to normal life. Goons don’t have political affiliations. Ibn Hurr flatly refused to submit himself to state laws.  Mus’ab jailed him.  He got out of jail by exerting the pressure from his tribesmen of Madhhij on Mus’ab.  Once out of the Kufa jail, Ibn Hurr reverted to his previous activities. Now the pressure was on Mus’ab’s government to curb him.  Again the government sent the police numerous times to arrest or kill Ibn Hurr. He survived each attempt.  A resigned Mus’ab offered money to Ibn Hurr to abandon his activities. He sent an envoy with a message that if Hurr became a law abiding citizen, the government would grant him the revenue of the whole district of Bādūrayā. “Am I not already collecting the revenue of Bādūrayā?” was his reply. He rather offered the envoy to join his gang to make more than what he was earning from his job. ⁴⁸², ⁴⁸³

Over time the gang of Ibn Hurr weakened.  He knew Abdul Malik was looking for teasers for Mus’ab.  He tried to seduce Abdul Malik.  Abdul Malik was clever.  He gave Hurr only ten horsemen just enough for his survival.⁴⁸⁴  Gangsters don’t have a long life.  They know it.  In one raid on his den by Kufa police in 687 CE, he got killed.⁴⁸⁵, ⁴⁸⁶

All outlaws were not that successful.  Others, who could not give a political hue to their activities, were caught.  Nābi bin Ziyād, for example, had committed highway robbery during the reign of Mus’ab. Mus’ab’s police captured him and sentenced him to death.⁴⁸⁷

Foreign policy during Second Arab Civil War

Whenever a country entangles into civil strife, it cannot formulate any foreign policy. All its efforts are for not involving into anything else except domestic problems. Weak neighbors take a sigh of relief but strong neighbors try to take advantage.

The Umayyad Caliphate could not send any summer or winter campaigns against Byzantine Rome during first few years of the Second Arab Civil War. It could partially be result of the truce agreement which the Mu’awiya government had entered with Byzantine Rome. ⁴⁸⁸  When Abdul Malik came to power in Syria, and he still did not have any hold on the remainder of the country, the revolt of Mardaites in Lebanon had still not settled down fully.   Abdul Malik renewed the truce treaty with the Byzantine Rome on exactly the same conditions which Mu’awiya had agreed.⁴⁸⁹ When Abdul Malik got a bit stable in Syria he planned to restart border raids. His soldiers failed his first attempt in 688 CE by making excuses like “heavy rains have caused muddy roads”. ⁴⁹⁰

Byzantine Rome was keeping a keen eye on the events across its border. It flexed its muscles against theUmayyad Caliphate in 689 CE.  It massed its troops at the Anatolia – Syria border near the the town of Maṣṣiṣa just to see the response.⁴⁹¹. ⁴⁹²  When nobody took notice, the Byzantine navy sailed to the border port of ‘Asqalān and expelled its Arab inhabitants. ⁴⁹³ The defences of the port of Tripoli in Syria were the weakest.  Its Christian population rose in rebellion,  killed the local administrator appointed by the Umayyad Caliphate and occupied the city, then took a number of Muslim soldiers and Jews captive. ⁴⁹⁴

The Umayyad Caliphate was too weak to reply by tit for tat. Byzantine Rome on their part were not strong enough to start a full scale invasion.  It flared up the sabotage activies inside the Umayyad Caliphate, taking advantage of the disenfrenchized population groups. A small cavalry of Byzantine Rome snuck into the territory of the Umayyad Caliphate from the border region of Mount Lukān and descended upon Labanon. Again a large body of people of Jarājimah, Nabateans (probably settled Arabs) and the runaway slaves of Muslims joined them. ⁴⁹⁵, ⁴⁹⁶   Abdul Malik was bogged with domestic affair of Amr bin Sa’id that time. ⁴⁹⁷ Still, he could not neglect the developments on his border.  He sent his commando by the name of Suḥaim bin Muhājir to the Roman general.  Suhaim gained the confidence of the Roman general in disguise of a turncoat who was disillusioned with Abdul Malik.  One day, on getting opportunity, he fell upon the general with the help of troops and Mawlas of Abdul Malik, who were specially trained for this kind of assault.  Hence Suhaim killed the general and immediately announced pardon to his army.⁴⁹⁸  The minute success of the Arab commando action compelled the Byzantine side to come to the negotiation table.  The frightened Abul Malik aptly seized the moment to buy an expensive truce on Byzantine terms. This time Byzantine Rome would compel the Umayyad Caliphate to recognize the Byzantine Rome claims on Cyprus and Armenia in the truce accord. ⁴⁹⁹   Byzantine agents seized twelve thousand Mardaites.⁵⁰⁰  People of Jurūmah returned to their city, some settled in villages near Damascus and Homs. Nabateans returned to their villages, slaves returned to their masters.⁵⁰¹  Abdul Malik reestablished the claim of Umayyad Caliphate over Tripoli, Qaysiriyah and Asqalan the next year (690 CE).  He rebuilt and refortified both towns.⁵⁰², ⁵⁰³

Other borders of the Umayyad Caliphate, like Ifriqiya, Khorasan, and Kerman remained quiet during the Second Arab Civil War. The weak status of the people living across these borders explains it.

Aftermath of Second Arab Civil War

The Second Arab Civil War had a great impact on Muslim political thought.

A competency based heirarchy succeeded in Muslim society.  Marwan bin Hakam had started his carrier as a clerk in Uthman bin Affan’s central secretariat. ⁵⁰⁴  Abdul Malik bin Marwan had also started as a town clerk for Medina during Uthman’s caliphate.⁵⁰⁵ A sprituality based hierarchy, formalized by Umar bin Khattab, was defeated in real life.  It only survived in theory in Muslim minds as a fantasy.

New social groups emerged during the war and persisted after it.  One of them is the tribal grouping among Arabs themselves. We don’t hear of any tribal alliances based upon north and south devide in pre-Islamic times.  Now the tribes in eastern part of country, and probably in western part as well, aligned themselves in a northern tribal confederation and a southern tribal confederation. This tribal grouping thrived during the rest of life of the Umayyad Caliphate.

The other group, Mawlas, increased in strength and played a significant role in future politics of the country.

The basic religio-political grouping of Muslims, Ahl al Jami’ah, Shi’a Ali and the Khariji, which had first emerged during First Arab Civil War drifted apart further.  They were on the way to formation of formal religious sects.

Overall the winner of the Second Arab Civil War was the Islamic state, as the religion of Islam was the overall winner of the the First Arab Civil War. The Umayyad Caliphate emerged stronger after the civil war. It was actually stronger than it was at the time of Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan’s death. The country was at the brink of breaking into many independent regions during the Second Arab Civil War.  The centrifugal forces didn’t get ground.  The concept of a unified ummah worked throughout the war.  People were fighting to install a caliph of their own choice who would be a single caliph for whole ummah on earth.

Further degradation of Arabian Peninsula

If we imagine the Second Arab Civil War as a clash between different geographical regions of the Umayyad Caliphate, the Arabian Peninsula was a clear cut loser.

The region was already on a political decline.  We don’t hear about Yemen anymore after the 662 CE campaign of Busr bin Artat against it.  Mu’awiya appointed Fayrūz al Daylami as Yemen’s governor.⁵⁰⁶  He appears to be a non-Muslim of Iranian ethnicity from his name. He must be the first non-Muslim to be a governor of whole province in Islamic state.  It indicates decline of Yemen in political significance. Later, Mu’awiya appointed ‘Uthman bin ‘Affan al Thaqafi and Nu’man bin Bashir one after another replacing Fayruz. ⁵⁰⁷ Yemen might have been sending some tax revenue to the central government. We hear that on his way to Kufa from Mecca, Husayn captured a government caravan carrying money from Yemen to Yazid.  At that time the governor of Yemen was Baḥīr bin Raysān, a local Himyar.⁵⁰⁸  Yemen gradually slipped into ambit of the Kharijis.  We hear of a raid of certain ar-Rayyan and his mawlas around 688 CE in Yemen⁵⁰⁹, ⁵¹⁰

Hejaz was already an impregnable asylum due to its remoteness. ⁵¹¹  Probably one reason for the attraction of asylum seekers was the presence of two harams.  When the powerful governor of Iraq, Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan, turned against poet Farazdaq in 670 CE, the only place on eath for him to hide was Medina.⁵¹²  By the end of the Second Arab Civil War it lost all its significance except that it was destination of pilgrimage.

Najran was the most ancient urban center on the peninsula. ⁵¹³ It lost its importance as a trade center and an an oasis. ⁵¹⁴

End notes

1. Ya’qubi doesn’t mention any will of Yazid.  Tabari and Khalifa do mention that Yazid had willed his son, Mu’awiya, to succeed him.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 111, Year 64). Though, both shun from giving exact details about when did he disclose it to the dignitaries of the state and what arrangements did he do to get the consent of the provincial governors. This was a standard procedure and was adopted by Mu’awiya when he appointed Yazid (see above). The same procedure continued later on. For example, Abdul Malik bin Marwan sent a decree to all provinces and territories ordering them to take the oath of allegiance to the heir apparent he had selected.People declared unambiguously that they agreed with the decree. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 114.) The circumstantial evidence points out that Yazid had not appointed any heir. His death was unexpected and the death plunged the house of Sufyanids and the central government into acute crisis. They kept Yazid’s death a secret. No official letter was sent to the provinces and to the military commanders announcing the death of Yazid and ascension of anybody in his place. All of the provinces and the forces fighting at borders came to know about Yazid’s death by sources others than those of the government.
2. Yazid’s first and main wife was Umm Hāshim bint Abi Hāshim bint ‘Utba bin Rabī’a, a Qureshi lady (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 949. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5).  She had given birth to Mu’awiya, Yazid’s first born. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 949.) His second wife was the daughter of Ḥuraith of Kalb, brother of Ukaider bin ‘Abd al Malik, ex ruler of Dumat al Jandal (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 96.  She had given birth to two sons for Yazid. The elder of the two was Khalid, Yazid’s second born. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 949.)   The rest of Yazid’s eight sons were from concubines.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 947.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),226, 227).
3. He had a kuniya of Abu Layla and Abu Abdur Rahman, which means he was married. He is the one who prayed over the funeral of Yazid. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 111, Year 64. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359, 360. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359, 360.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 225, 226.
4. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5.  Ya’qubi states his age at the time of his death as twenty three years.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 950)
5. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 1
6. G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 46
7. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359, 360.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 49
8. Sources differ widely about the timings of Mu’awiya bin Yazid’s death. Baladhuri tells he died two months after the death of his father.  Tabari gives forty days as well as three months. Ya’qubi thinks it was either forty days or four months.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359, 360. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 949)
9. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 950.
10. The anonymous chronicler of “The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741” says that Mu’awiya II reigned for six months and his rule finished only due to his death.  He further informs that Mu’awiya II remitted a third of the tribute in money to all the provinces he ruled.  See: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 620
11. Sources fail to give the cause of death of Mu’awiya bin Yazid.  Tabari speculates that either he was poinsoned secretly or was stabbed. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 49)
12. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 160
13. Yazid’s difficulties to convince someone to command the army is evident from the choice of the commander. Husayn bin Numayr was his usual commander whom he used to send to Byzantine expeditions. He flatly refused to lead this army. Yazid appointed a sick and nearly dead, relatively unknown person by name of Muslim bin Uqba as the commander of the army with instructions that if he dies, Husayn bin Numayr should take the command.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 108, Year 64.
14. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 101, Year 63
15. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),1, 2, 3.  AND (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 948
16. Either Ibn Zubayr was reluctant to leave the city of Ka’ba, which he had used as a shield against the invaders or he was under pressure to take revenge for the deaths of the people at the Battle of Harrah and Mecca. Ya’qubi reports that Ibn Zubayr demanded vengeance of the dead of the battle of Harra from the commander. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 948)
17. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 3, 4
18. Most of the historians dub Ibn Zubayr’s decision as a mistake on his part.  See, for example: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 318.
19. See comments of Hawting on Mu’awiya II’s rule: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 47
20. Almost all of them took to power with a promise that they had done so with the wider public interest in mind and would submit to the new caliph as soon as the matters clear at Damascus. For this kind of understanding in Kufa, for example, see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 47. Anyhow, an analysis of their actions after assuming power creates an impression that each of them strived to consolidate his power.  Evidence of such a mood comes from the statement of Dahhak bin Qays’ son after his death that the people of Damascus had given an oath to Dahhak as caliph. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 55)
21. Von Grunebaum points out that the persistence of Bedouin attitudes, which were obsolete and un-functional from the Islamic empire’s point of view, was the main reason that the empire slipped away so soon from its Arab founders (eve of Islam, G. E. Von Grunebaum, in the nature of Arab Unity, p 15)
22. Berber F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start and How to Stop them, New York: Crown, 2022.
23. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5
24. Ibn Ziyad knew that the people would not accept him as the caliph to Prophet Muhammad.  He promised to be a ruler only until the people of Syria decided amongst themselves who would be the next caliph. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),5, 7).  One can assume that Ibn Ziyad was sure that such time would never come.
25. While trying to canvass his fellow citizens in Basrah to accept him as an independent ruler, Ibn Ziyad argued that the Arab elite of Basrah were more in number as compared to any other provincial capital and their province Basrah was the largest in terms of territory.  He analyzed in front of them that others needed them, they didn’t need anybody else.   Presenting his own credentials, Ibn Ziyad claimed that he was born in Basrah so he was one of them.  He cited his track record of governing Basrah towards prosperity as a reason for Basrans to choose him as the next leader for them. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),7)
26. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5, 6, 38, 39
27. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),39, 40
28. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 39, 92
29. The absence of a provincial governor and the province being directly administered by the central government explains the break up into districts.
30. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 49, 50, 59.
31. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),48
32. Ḍaḥāk was Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan’s right hand man in Damascus during his tenure. (See above).  He had influence over Mu’awiya and he had appointed him as his police chief in Damascus.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 921).  He was from the Fihr clan of Quraysh. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 65.
33. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 47, 48.
34. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 951.  The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 621.  It appears that Marwan and his family had retaken their properties in Medina after battle of Harra and had taken abode there.
35. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 47, 48. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 951.
36. Tabari fits these events in the fall of 683 CE,  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 47, 48.) meaning they took place while the Syrian Troops were retreating and were the logical result of the retreat.
37. For the title see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 109. See the comments of Hawting: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 47
38. Both Abdullah bin Umar and Abdullah bin Abbas did not acknowledge Ibn Zubayr as caliph: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 938
39. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 114, Year 64
40. Khalifa asserts that Ibn Zubayr waited for the death of Yazid before taking the title of caliph.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 109, Year 64; P 113 Year 64
41. For the date see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 113 Year 64; P 114, Year 64
42. Probably he justified morality of his action as taken in wider public interest in the face of chaos.
43. Amir bin Mas’ud was from the Jumah clan of Quraysh – a weak one. The people of Kufa didn’t give him the respect that is usually reserved for a ruler. They used to call him ‘a ball made by dung beetles’.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 47, 92.)
44. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 39, 92, 116
45. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 47
46. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 92, 93.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 116, Year 64.
47. At the same time Ibn Zubayr gave department of finance of Kufa to Ibrahim bin Muhammad bin Talha bin Ubaydullah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 92, 93. )
48. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 49, 50, 56, 59.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 951
49. In Tabari’s words, “That time people of Basrah, Kufa, Arabs of Qiblah, the Syrians and people of Mesopotamia all accepted Ibn Zubayr, except the people of Jordan”.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 47.)
50. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 11, 12
51. The people of Iraq were comparatively rich as compared to those of Syria.  ‘Abd al Qāhir bin Sarī, a resident of Basrah and a participating soldier in the campaigns against Anatolia states, “I have seen us on summer expeditions, one of us in charge of a thousand camels, while each of their [Syrian] chieftains went raiding on his horse, with his provisions behind him.”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 181). Abdul Qahir was comparing the wealth of Syrian Arabs with that of Iraqi Arabs. His narrative might be exaggerated but what he wants to emphasize was that Iraqi Arabs could afford taking large provisions to the campaigns, while Syrians couldn’t.  The separation of Basrah from the center should have been beneficial to Basrah in economic terms.  Basrah was not surrounded by powerful hostile neighboring countries either.  It could afford to be small.
52. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 14
53. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 214, Year 64.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 12
54. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 13).
55. Salm bin Ziyad was the lieutenant governor of Khorasan when Yazid died.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 70.)  He took an oath of allegiance with a general consent that he would rule until the new caliph was chosen.  They broke the oath after two months.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),71).  The people of Khorasan rose against their officials and drove them out.  Each tribal group seized control over a sub-district and civil commotion broke out.  ‘Abd Allah bin Khāzim of Sulaym seized a major portion of Khorasan but failed to eliminate resistance from the opposite tribes.  A proper intertribal war broke out in Khorasan.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 72).  For details of tribal warfare in Khorasan see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 70 – 79.  AND (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 947.
56. Abdullah bin Khazim was from Sulaym.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 153). Abdullah bin Khazim had gone to Khorasan as part of the army that raided Balkh around 662 CE under the command of Abdur Rahman bin Samura.  He settled in Khorasan as a low level government official.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 886.)  After Yazid’s death unrest started in Khorasan before other parts of the country.  Salm bin Ziyad, Yazid’s lieutenant governor over Khorasan had to flee for his life, giving charge of the government to Abdullah bin Khazim.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 946)
57. The tribal war in Khorasan was not benign. In one skirmish, for instance, eight thousand men of Bakr bin Wai’l perished. Some on the battle field, others as prisoners of war.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),78, 79)
58. When Basrah was founded, only those tribesmen that made it their abode had taken part in Futuhul Buldan.  Out of them the tribes who used to live previously in the northern parts of the Arabian Peninsula used to call themselves Muḍar. Rabi’ah (the tribal group of northeastern Arabia, including Bakr bin Wa’il and Abdul Qays were less in number than other Mudar).  later, Azd Oman reached Basrah as Radif.   Initially, they didn’t get houses inside the town and had to be content by living on the outskirts of the town.  To get support inside the town with an aim to ultimately move in, Azd Oman developed an alliance with Rabi’ah. Somewhere by the end of Mu’awiya’s government or the beginning of Yazid’s government, Azd Oman managed to move inside the town. When Ibn Ziyad was weakened and the town started crumbling on the tribal lines, Ibn Ziyad put his weight in the scale of Mas’ūd bin ‘Amr of Azd Oman, the combined leader of the Azd Oman-Rabi’ah alliance. The Mudar, including Tamim, perceived this alliance as a threat to their financial security. The Kharijis were active in nearby Khuzestan. Mudar invited them to help them in getting rid of the ‘impious’ Mas’ud bin Amr.  They, in collaboration with Tamim, killed Mas’ud bin Amr in the grand mosque of Basrah.  This was the first blow of tribal warfare in Basrah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 13, 14, 24, 25,26, 27, 28, 33.) Ibn Ziyad could not manipulate the warring groups in his advantage and had to flee to Syria to save his life by end of May 684 CE.
59. Ibn Ziyad tried to manipulate the tribal groupings in his favour by offering them money.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 27) He also called troops from Khorasan to support his government.  They flatly refused.  Even his brothers asked him why they should fight for him when he was not a caliph.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 214, Year 64.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 15). Foreseeing his weak position, Ibn Ziyad left the governor house and took refuge in the house of Mas’ud bin Amr in hopes of staging a comeback, even when no practice arrow was shot. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 13, 14). Khalifa dates the event as February 684 CE (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 215, Year 64.
60. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),14, 40
61. Ibn Ziyad took the nineteen million of public exchequer that he was going to distribute among people with him. It remained in his family after his death. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 14, 18)
62. For tribal affiliations of Mas’ud bin Amr see: (bū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),40.
63. For the date of the murder of Mas’ud bin Amr and escape of Ibn Ziyad see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 33, 34.  Khalifa dates this incident as April 684 CE ( Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 215, Year 64.).
64. For example, Māh Afrīdhūn brought his five hundred Asāwirah to fight in tribal clashes in Basrah from Tamim’s side. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 115, Year 64.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 30, 32).
65. One such agency was Qays bin Haytham of Sulaym. He provided hired soldiers to fight on Ibn Zubayr’s side in Basrah. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 173. ‘Amr bin Wabarah al Quḥayfi was another fighter provider in Basrah. He used to rent slaves. He charged 30 dirham per day for each slave. He in turn paid each slave 10 dirham a day. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 174). Mukhtar al Thaqfi tried to recruit some of the Ashraf of Basrah in the beginning of 686 CE. He promised money as well as future rewards. One of them replied jestingly, I do not fight on credit; if someone gives me cash, I fight for him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 49)
66. Once a mercenary by name of Ghaṭafān bin Unayf of Banu Ka’b bin Amr demanded his remuneration from his recruiting agency, Qays bin Haytham.  Qays promised to give it by tomorrow.  The mercenary angrily rejected saying, ‘cash was a debt but the fight was right now’.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),173)
67. For details of governors of Basrah during period of tribal warfare see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 214, 215, 216, Year 64. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 20, 22, 23, 24, 43.
68. For failure of Bubbah and continuation of tribal warfare in Basrah during his two months see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 24, 25,26, 27, 28.
69. For details of governors of Basrah during period of tribal warfare see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),43.
70. Ibn Zubayr asked Anas bin Malik, a renowned Companion of the Prophet, to lead the prayers in the grand mosque of the town initially when he received the request for intervention.  It must have happened during the tenure of Bubba. He did so for forty days until ‘Umar bin ‘Ubaydallah bin Ma’mar arrived.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),45).
71. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 82 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),43.
72. See below.
73. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 52, 161
74. Marwan was 63 years old at the time of his death: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 121, Year 65.
75. Marwan was a man of opinion. When mismanagement started in the hands of Yazid, Marwan became a salient in-house critic of him. Yazid’s own governors didn’t hesitate to ask Marwan for his opinion on the orders given by Yazid. Yazid sent news of death of Mu’awiya to his governor in Medina, Walid bin Uqba, through a confidant Mawla so it should not be known widely. Through this confidant he also ordered Walid to arrest Husayn and Ibn Zubayr before they come to know about Mu’awiya’s death.  Walid was reluctant.  He asked no one else but Marwan to guide him on the matter.  Marwan told him categorically to arrest them otherwise they would pose a physical danger to the person of Walid himself one day. Walid didn’t act and lost his job. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 93, year 60. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 3.) Marwan later advised governor Amr of Medina to neglect Yazid’s orders and refrain from attacking Ibn Zubayr in Mecca. Marwan was of opinion that Ibn Zubayr’s uprising in a town which was politically insignificant, economically dependent on others and deserted population-wise, should be neglected. Ibn Zubayr would die of old age without extending his influence further. On the other hand, if he were attacked, the news of the violation of Haram would hound the Yazid government. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),12.). It was also Marwan who publicly criticized Yazid’s order to his governor in Medina to bring Ibn Zubayr to him tied in a golden chain. Marwan warned that his arrogant attitude will do nothing but to strengthen the resolve of Ibn Zubayr.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 191.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 106, Year 63)   At last, when Yazid’s administration collapsed in Hejaz altogether, the Umayyad residents, including Yazid’s governor Uthman, relinquished to Marwan’s leadership.  Yazid was hesitant to give a bailout to the stranded one thousand families under Marwan’s wings. Marwan negotiated his way out giving a promise that these people would not assist the incoming army of the central government.
76. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),48
77. The Kalbs were widely scattered in the province including the districts of Jordan and Damascus. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 52, 53)
78. The Qays of Damascus supported Dahhak.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 53
79. Ḥassān bin Mālik was maternal uncle of Yazid bin Mu’awiya. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 161).  He had served as the Lieutenant governor of Palestine under Mu’awiya and then Yazid.  He was a staunch supporter of the Umayyads.  He became active immediately after the death of Mu’awiya bin Yazid to prop up the Umayyads. For details and his tribal affiliation see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),59.
80. Tribal confederation formations throughout the Umayyad Caliphate were not based upon any genealogical classification of the groups. Tribes and their clans concentrated on their self-interests in picking a leader. The Sakun clan of Kindah, for example, belonged to the Qays division of genealogical classification.  However, they felt that they had a better status due to Yazid and if Khalid was selected he would give them the same status.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),57.
81. Tabari notes that the common people of the Kalb had told Hassan bin Malik that Yazid was on right path (dīn) and they thought that their soldiers who died in the battle of Harrah were in Heaven and those of th Medinites who died in Harrah were in Hell. They considered Ibn Zubayr a munāfiq (hypocrite).  They also told Hassan that they won’t accept either of the two lads of Yazid as leader because they were short in years while they had a clash with a sheikh (Ibn Zubayr).  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 50, 54, 55).
82. The Syrian people opposed to the ‘Meccan Alliance’ were under pressure to quickly streamline the Umayyad house lest Ibn Zubayr takes over Syria.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 48).
83. Marwan bin Hakam was a talented man. He had not allowed his humble origin from an ignoble family, which had opposed the Prophet of Islam sternly, to be a hurdle in his way. Born and raised in Mecca, Marwan was only a lad of ten years when the forces of Prophet Muhammad captured Mecca. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 120, Year 65).  He did not participate in Futuhul Buldan. Yet he managed to be the main advisor and confidant of the most powerful man in the country – caliph Uthman.   Caliph Uthman was so kind to him that he not only gave his daughter Aisha into marriage to him but also made him a receiver of his inheritance.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 205, 206).  When the rebels turned the tables on Uthman, Marwan was the only man in whole country to side with him. (Mu’awiya gave only symbolical support to him at that time).  Marwan had the audacity to lay the foundation of the Shi’a Uthman party to demand justice for Uthman in a horror-stricken atmosphere when even the sons of Uthman acted dumb. Mu’awiya had to accept him after the battle of Camel in his camp because he was the most vocal proponent for justice to Uthman and Mu’awiya had based all his politics on this issue.  Mu’awiya remained apprehensive of his potentials. He sidelined him as governor of the insignificant province of Hejaz after coming to power. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 84.)  Mu’awiya used to dismiss him regularly, but had to bring him back to his post when his substitutes didn’t do well.  (See for his dismissals: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 61, Year 48.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 94).  Marwan was the governor of Medina when Mu’awiya visited the town in 676 CE as part of his pilgrimage journey with an aim to promote Yazid’s nomination.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 187).  The last time Mu’awiya dismissed him was in September of 677 CE after which Marwan decided to live his life in Medina in comfort of his family and aloof from politics.
84. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 65, 161
85. Tabari notes that Marwan didn’t want to be a caliph. For Marwan’s double mindedness and how Ibn Ziyad convinced him see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 48, 54, 64
86. For the date see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 108, Year 64. For the tribal affiliations of supporters of Marwan see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 48, 52, 57, 59, 61 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 952.
87. All the Kalb clans were not in favour of the Umayyads. Zufar bin Ḥārith, leader of the district government of Qinnasrin was from the Kalb. He supported Ibn Zubayr. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),49). For Kalb tribesmen being killed fighting opposite to Marwan see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 60.
88. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359, 360.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 54, 55.  Khalifa gives this incident date of July 684 CE.  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 116, Year 64.  See also brief comments of anonymous chronicler of 741 CE:  The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 620.
89. Though Marwan had a weaker moral case, he based himself in Damascus and drew upon formidable power base that Mu’awiya had built up in Syria over previous decades.  As the anonymous chronicler of “The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741” says “with the consent of a good many from the army, he [Marwan] was carried forward to power, with God turning a blind eye. (The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 621).  The comments should be applied to Marwan cautiously. The Christian writers believed that whatever achievements the Muslim rulers attained was not because God was favouring them but because God was punishing the Christians for their sins. For clear application of this explanation on Walid see: Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 622
90. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 62
91. Dahak’s army had many Yemeni tribes, Qays and Sulaym. They were residents of almost all districts of Syria including Damascus and Homs.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 116, Year 64. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 53, 54, 56, 63. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 952). Dahhak had paid two thousand Dirhams each to all his soldiers in advance.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 60.).
92. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2016), P 115, Year 64
93. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 54.  Khalifa gives the date as July 31, 684 CE.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 108, Year 64. For location of Marj Rahit see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 59
94. Neither Dahhak nor Marwan had any experience commanding an army. Marwan had participated in the battle of Camel decades ago. His most recent encounter was at the battle of Harrah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 213). In none of them he was of any commanding position. Dahhak, on the other hand, had actually not participated in any war.
95. Both armies contained veterans of now defunct Syrian Troops.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 53).
96. For length of the war see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 116, Year 64. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 60.
97. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 54, 60.
98. Khalifa asserts that Marwan could only win due to better war strategy, which Ibn Ziyad had advised to him.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 116, Year 64)
99. When Dahhak became hundred percent sure that he would have to fight against Marwan, he pledged allegiance with Ibn Zubayr. Before that he just showed that he was leaning towards him. He then imprisoned all the Umayyads present in the town. When Dahhak left Damascus for the fight, the only people left behind were supporters of the Umayyad resurgence. They raised a rebellion, expelled Dahhak’s officials from the town, took possession of the arms depot and the treasury, broke into the jail and released the imprisoned Umayyads. Then they sent Marwan help through money, men and arms.  Those of the Umayyads who wished to fight from Marwan’s side, travelled all the way to Marj Rahit.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 52, 56, 60.)
100. One important personality who fought the battle from the side of Marwan was Ubaydullah bin Ziyad.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 59
101. Not every single Umayyad had supported Marwan. Abdullah bin Yazid bin Mu’awiya is reported to have participated in the battle of Marj Rahit from the side of Dahhak, against Marwan.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 165)
102. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 63, 65
103. Nu’man bin Bashir had acquired the district government of Homs after Yazid’s death and had pledged allegiance to Ibn Zubayr.  When he heard the news of Marwan’s triumph at Marj Rahit, he fled.  People tracked and killed him (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 63.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 952).  He was the last Companion in any position of authority.  Zufar bin Harith, the district manager of Qinnasrin fled to Qadisiyyah and established himself in the town with the help of Qays.  He expelled the pro-Umayyad prefect from there. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 63. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 953.  Nātil bin Qays of Palestine district government escaped and joined Ibn Zubayr in Mecca.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 63.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 953
104. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 63.
105. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 175
106. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 64. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),  953) Khalifa dates the entry of Marwan into Egypt to 15 November 684 CE Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 119, Year 65.
107. Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 621 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 953
108. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 64
109. Mus’ab was forty years old at the time of his death. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 128, Year 72).
110. For details of the encounter see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 64
111. Marwan didn’t even bother to wait for the results of the encounter. He continued his travel to Damascus to take abode there. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 64.)
112. For details of this encounter see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)162, 163. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 953)
113. By this time Basrah was under Ibn Zubayr’s control. (see above)
114. Tabari shows him dying at sixty three. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 161). Other traditions put his age at 61, 71 or 81 or simply an old man. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 60, 161). Ya’qubi describes his age to be 61 at the time of his death. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 954)
115. Actually, the names of Khalid bin Yazid and Amr bin Sa’id had been reserved as future caliphs by the supporters of the Umayyad resurgence at the time they elected Marwan as caliph.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 58). The original plan was to keep the Umayyads in power, not Marwan and his family.
116. For details of Marwan’s will see: Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997),  621. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 160.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 954.  See also: s: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 58, 160. 
117. Khalifa gives this incident the date of August 684 CE.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 119, Year 64.
118. Marwan governed only two provinces of Umayyad Caliphate, Egypt and Syria.  These two provinces might be in his mind when he appointed Abdul Malik his heir apparent.
119. Current location: private collection. Obverse: a double bust of Byzantine Emperor Heraclius and his son Heraclius Constantine. The reverse ‘there is no God except Allah, He is alone with no partner’
120. for the date see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 119, Year 65; P 121, Year 65. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 160, 161. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 954, 969
121. It appears whenever a politician died naturally without a protracted disease, conspiracy theories were in air. According to Tabari, Marwan used to diminIn the midst of the Second Arab Civil War the ish Khalid bin Yazid in eyes of Syrians. Khalid told it to his mother, who was now the wife of Marwan.  One day, when Marwan was sleeping with her, she suffocated Marwan with a pillow and killed him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)161.  See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 954)
122. ‘Abd al Malik bin Marwan was born in 643 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),42.
123. Abdul Malik was raised in Medina where his father used to be a government servant for the Rashidun Caliphate. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 160, year 86. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),117).  Like his father, he was interested in politics from the a young age. He took a job in military of the Umayyad Caliphate and in this capacity, he participated in a border raid in Ifriqiya in 670 CE under the command of Mu’awiya bin Hudayj. During this raid he commanded the Medinan corps. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 64, Year 50).  He was among those Umayyads who were chased away from Medina after Zubayrid’s takeover.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),48). He later participated in the battle of Harrah from Yazid’s side.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),216). Abdul Malik’s political opinions were similar to Marwan.  He never differed from his father.  When Amr bin Sa’id, Yazid’s governor over Medina decided to attack Mecca to humiliate Ibn Zubayr, Abdul Malik was one of those who opposed the plans on grounds that invading the sacred place would be a political blunder. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 95, 96, Year 60.).
124. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),207
125. Abdul Malik is described as brownish-reddish man with large black eyes, and not much flesh in his cheeks, good looking and fashionably dressed:  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 120, Year 65
126. Discovered by Fariq al-Sahra team in October 2013. The inscription reads “I am ‘Abd al Malik bin Marwan.” See: F. Imbert, “Califes, Princes et Poetes Dans Les Graffiti du Debut de l’Islam”, Romano-Arabica 15 (2015): 67 and 76. Fig. 4.
127. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 176. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 74, 75
128. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 74, 75.
129. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 118, Year 64. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 74, 75 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 122, 123.  AND G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 49
130. According to Tabari, the location of old foundations was a well-known folk lore and the pilgrims used to circumambulate the site of the foundations.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 122, 123)
131. Ya’qubi gives date of erasing Ka’ba Feb 684 CE.  See:  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 957.
132. See above.
133. See details:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 74, 75
134. Ya’qubi asserts that Abdullah bin Abbas could not tolerate the sight of the erased Ka’ba.  He left Mecca. While leaving, he advised Ibn Zubayr to heap up the wood around the site of the Ka’ba so people shouldn’t be without qibla.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 957)
135. Abū Jā’far Muḥwammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 176.
136. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 958
137. The new building of the Ka’ba was made up of stones. It had two doors on the ground level, one to the east and one to the west; one for the entrance and one for the exit.  The doors were gold plated and had a key made up of gold. The black stone was wrapped in a strip of silk before being put in the hole (tābūt). Ibn Zubayr put the ornaments, the clothes, and the perfumes which he found inside it in the treasure of the sanctuary (khazīnah), in the care of the keepers and replaced them at their previous place after the building was complete (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 74, 75. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 122, 123, 176. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 1). The construction workers had found rocks as big as camels when they excavated the Ka’ba. They could move only one boulder out and a bright light flashed out. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 176).
138. For the first appearance of the concept see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 89
139. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),80, 120. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 953
140. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 80.
141. Tuwwabun cried out before their departure to Syria, “we do not seek this world, and it is not for it that we have come out.’  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 127.) Abdullah bin Yazid, governor of Ibn Zubayr over Kufa, said about Tuwwabun when they left Kufa, by Allah they are seeking death.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 137. )
142. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 81, 83
143. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 23, 90
144. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 97
145. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 84
146. For an example of such oration see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),90, 91, 92
147. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 94
148. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 94, 95.
149. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)130.
150. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)129, 13, 135, 136.
151. Moreover, the Tuwwabun had a faint wish that successful revenge of Husayn’s murder would lead to establishment of a government of Shi’a Ali and Zubayrids were as much hindrance to it as were the Umayyads. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)135, 136, 144.)
152. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),86, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131
153. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)143, 161, 162
154. The force at the disposal of Ibn Ziyad could be huge.  Khalifa numbers them as sixty thousand.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 120, Year 65)
155. For the date of the battle see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)144, 159. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 120, Year 65
156. For details for the war see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)143 – 153. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 953, 954.)
157. ‘Ayn al-Wardah has been identified as Ra’s al-‘Ayn.  See Le strange, Easter Caliphate, map III, and index. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 140).  It was near Sā’ on River Khabur.
158. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 145
159. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 126.
160. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 124, 126, 127, 132
161. Shi’a Ali of Basrah played delay tactics and did not join Tuwwabun until war was over.  (See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 147, 153.)
162. Mukhtar was 73 years old at the time of his death. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),117.
163. Mukhtar is a unique character of the Second Arab Civil War. He was not a Sharif, he was commoner.  He hailed from a prominent Shi’a Ali family of Thaqif, resident of Mada’in. His father Abu ‘Ubayd bin Mas’ud, had got slain while leading the army of the Rashidun Caliphate in the battle of Jisr against Sasanian Iran. His paternal uncle Sa’d bin Mas’ūd was a commander from ‘Ali’s side in the battle of Siffin.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 122, foot note, 655; Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 5.).  Mukhtar took an interest in politics from the beginning and joined the Shi’a Ali party during the First Arab Civil War.  He remained attached to it throughout his career.  He joined the underground support for Muslim bin Aqil in Kufa.  He even opened his house for Muslim bin Aqil for a few days to facilitate his hiding.  Like many other astute calculators, Mukhtar abandoned Muslim on the day of rebellion and Ibn Ziyad graciously spared his life.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 105; Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 28, 65.).  Ibn Ziyad had imprisoned Mukhtar on charges of siding with Muslim.  He released him from the prison and exiled him to Hejaz after an intervention from Abdullah bin Umar who happened to be Mukhtar’s brother-in-law and who had pledged allegiance to Yazid by that time.(Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)106, 107, 108, 109.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 955).  Once in Hejaz, Mukhtar roamed around town to town seeking support.  Failing in his endeavors, he joined Ibn Zubayr in Mecca, which was the epicenter of the anti-government resistance by that time.  He even fought in Yazid’s siege of Mecca from Ibn Zubayr’s side. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)111, 114). The two men ultimately parted as they could not agree on a post-war political set up. Mukhtar, probably, expected Ibn Zubayr to endorse him as governor of Kufa while accepting his Shi’a Ali flavor.  Ibn Zubayr, on the other hand, could not risk annoying the Ahl al Jami’ah majority of Kufa by appointing a Shi’a Ali. (For differences between the two men see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 113, 114, 117.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 955).  By the time Yazid died, Mukhtar was no longer bound by the exile imposed on him by Yazid’s authorities.  He departed from Ibn Zubayr and reached Kufa to try his luck. Mukhtar found the Ahl al Jami’ah of Kufa in favour of Ibn Zubayr and the Shi’a Ali of the town under the spell of Sulayman bin Surad. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 92, 93, 116. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 955).  Mukhtar was never convinced by the philosophy and tactics of Tuwwabun.  He started convincing Shi’a Ali to avoid joining Tuwwabun and to come under his banner to avenge the blood of Husayn.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 120). Sulayman bin Surad saw a dangerous rift creator for his movement in the form of Mukhtar.  He bitterly opposed his activities. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 121).  The Zubayrid authorities of Kufa, on their part, smelled the danger because Mukhtar opposed Shi’a Ali leaving Kufa to seek revenge.  They arrested Mukhtar and locked him up in the jail. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 122). Jail proved to be an effective barrier against the growth of Mukhtar’s popularity in the town.  He could win only five supporters during his stay in the jail.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 126, 185).  After the defeat of Tuwwabun, Mukhtar devised a plan to get out of jail.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 94, 154).  Abdullah bin Umar, a resident of Mecca and politically inert, had earned prestige for being the Companion of the Prophet and the son of ex-caliph.  Mukhtar asked Abdullah to intercede with Zubayrid authorities on his behalf.  Unwillingly, the Zubayrids had to release Mukhtar from the jail after his supporters gave an undertaking of good conduct and he himself produced an affidavit that he won’t plan an uprising against governor Abdullah bin Yazid.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 184).
164. See also: Khurshid Ahmad Fariq, The Story of an Arab diplomat, (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, 1967).
165. Helping Mukhtar out of jail was the last political action of Abdullah bin Umar.  He was a resident of Mecca and uttered comments on the death of Ibn Zubayr.  (see later).  He died in 693 CE.  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 131, Year 74
166. Political observers were long convinced that the Shi’a Ali of Kufa wished to use the political chaos produced by the death of Yazid in their favour. Their problem was lack of appropriate leadership. Even when Ahl al Jami’ah of Kufa had not pledged allegiance to Ibn Zubayr and Mukhtar had not started his campaign, a Kufan man mentioned ‘however there were plenty in the garrison town who, if get a leader will devour the earth’.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 117).
167. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 93.
168. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 185
169. For the surviving Tuwwabun joining Mukhtar see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 183
170. About twelve thousand men of Kufa pledged to fight under the command of Mukhtar.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 205
171. For the support of majority for the Zubayrid governor see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 211, 214.  For the change of governor, its date and the reasons see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 175, 185, 186).
172. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 188
173. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 202
174. For the date and the event see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 197, 199
175. The mob of Mukhtar was chanting two slogans.  “Oh Manṣūr! Deal Death!” and “Vengeance for al- Ḥusayn” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),201)
176. For an example of police’s reluctance to tackle the Shi’a uprising with determined force see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),205
177. For the numbers see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 205.
178. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 212.
179. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),212)
180. Governor Abdullah bin Muti escaped from governor’s house after three days of siege.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),215, 216.)
181. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),218. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 956). Abdullah bin Muti did not have courage to face Ibn Zubayr in this condition.  He fled to Basrah and took residence there.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),54
182. Mukhtar found nine hundred thousand Dirhams in the treasury.  He paid five hundred dirhams each to those thirty-five hundred who fought from his side on the first night of uprising. He paid two hundred dirhams each to those who besieged the governor’s house with him.  They were six thousand in total. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 218).  Obviously when rest of the Shi’a Ali of Kufa saw Mukhtar winning they rushed to join him.  Still, only half of those who had promised to participate from Mukhtar’s side joined in on the action.
183. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 217
184. Mukhtar appointed lieutenant governors over Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mosul, Mada’in, Baihqudah and Hulwan.  Jabal was part of Hulwan.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 219, 220)
185. For details of events see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 197 – 220.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 122, Year 66. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 956
186. Here we again see the phenomenon typical of Shi’a Ali of Kufa.  Twelve thousand men had pledged to Mukhtar to fight for him but when actual hour came only thirty eight hundred showed up.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 205)
187. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),40
188. Muhammad bin Ali al-Hanifiyah was Ali’s son from a woman of Hanifa. He is mostly named Muhammad bin Hanifiah for convenience because Ali had other sons by name of Muhammad as well from other women.
189. This is first use of term Mahdi in history of Islam.  It could have emerged in competition of the propaganda between Tuwwabun and Mukhtar (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),40, footnote 160
190. When a delegate of Shi’a Ali of Kufa went to Muhammad bin Hanifiah to confirm if he really had shown green light to Mukhtar, Muhammad answered them symbolically.  “I just want Allah to aid ‘us against our enemies by means of any of His creatures He wishes’ ”.  Shi’a Ali of Kufa took the words as Muhammad bin Hanifiah’s occult support to Mukhtar’s actions.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 191).
191. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 217
192. Just after Mukhtar took oath, a mob killed two men (a father and a son) accusing them to be the leaders of tyrants (al-jabbārīn).  Mukhtar expressed his anger about the event but did not arrest or punish anybody.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 218)
193. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 219
195. During the first week of his power, Mukhtar wrote to Ibn Zubayr that he was interested in working in alliance with Ibn Zubayr. It appears that Ibn Zubayr didn’t analyses the situation in Kufa objectively. He asked Mukhtar to step down and sent a person by name of Umar bin Abdur Rahman with forty thousand Dirhams but without any troops to enter Kufa and take the place of Abdullah bin Muti’ as governor.  Probably, the Dirhams were meant to buy the loyalty of the Ashraf. When Umar reached in the vicinity of Kufa he found a well-armed cavalry of five hundred.  He didn’t have means to fight against them.  To make the things complicated the cavalry handed him seventy thousand Dirhams, sent by Mukhtar, to return back.  Umar bin Abdur Rahman pocketed the money and retired to Basrah, one hundred and ten thousand Dirham richer than he was when he left Mecca. Tabari reports that Ibn Zubayr had not briefed Umar bin Abdur Rahman properly before his departure.  Umar bin Abdur Rahman was under impression that Mukhtar was obedient to Ibn Zubayr and he simply had to show Mukhtar his appointment letter.¹⁹⁴Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 53, 54.)
196. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 28
197. See Hawting’s comments: (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 51, 52, 53).
198. A tiny group of Mawla residents of Kufa revolted under their leader Ibn ‘Ali, when Mughira bin Shu’ba was the governor of Kufa for Mu’awiya. We don’t know the reason of their revolt. However, the dialogue between them and the commander of the police force of Mughira who went to deal with them is interesting. The commander yelled, “You non-Arabs! Here are the Arabs fighting us over religion; so what is the matter to you?”  They replied back, “Jābir, we have indeed heard a wondrous Qur’ān that guides to righteousness; we have believed in it and we will not associate anyone with our lord. (Q 72:1 – 2).  God sent our Prophet to all people; He did not withhold him from anyone.” The government police killed all of them easily. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 892, 893).  The khariji who killed Mas’ud bin ‘Amr, the tribal leader of Basrah, in his mosque in April of 684 CE was a Mawla. He was a newly convert of Persian ethnicity. After converting to Islam he had changed his name to Muslim and had adopted the Khariji ideology.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 41).
199. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 221
200. For the neutral stance of Abdullah bin Hammam see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),223, 224
201. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 12
202. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 13
203. For Mawlas participating from Mukhtar’s side see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 206, 207. For the numbers of Mawlas involved in the conflict and their commander see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 212.  For the ethnicity of Mawlas supporting Mukhtar see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),13, 91
204. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),207, 208.  The name of the officer involved was  Sabath bin Rib’ī
205. For one example of such a case see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 221
206. Mukhtar appointed Kaysan abu ‘Amrah, a mawla of ‘Uraynah as leader of his personal guards. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 219).
207. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 219
208. Muthanna bin Mukharribah was from Abdul Qays and was a resident of Basrah.  He had participated in Ayn al Wardah under Sulayman bin Surad.  He returned to Kufa with the survivors. Mukhtar was in prison by that time. When he came out of prison, Muthanna took allegiance to Mukhtar secretly. Mukhtar sent him back to Basrah to propagate his movement in Basrah secretly. He waited for the uprising until Mukhtar came to power in Kufa. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 45).
209. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 46, 47
210. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 48
211. See details:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 55, 56, 57, 58
212. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 58
213. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 59.
214. It appears there was a wooden structure around Zamzam that was used to constrain humans, if needed. Khalifa begs to differ. He states that Ibn Hanifiyah was kept in Shi’b of the Banu Hahsim. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 120, Year 65
215. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 59, 60, 61, 62.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 959, 960, 961.  These events took place in 66 AH: from August 8, 685 CE to July 28, 686 CE.
216. Ya’qubi tells that generally the Ibn Zubayr government was hostile to the banu Hashim.  Hatred could be from both sides because none of the banu Hashim had pledged the oath of allegiance to Ibn Zubayr.  (See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 959
217. After releasing Muhammad bin Hanifiah, Ibn Zubayr exiled him to Radwā (an escarpment west of Mecca: Yaqut Mu’jam) (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 961
218. Ibn Zubayr exiled Abdullah bin Abbas to Taif.  He died there in 688 CE at the age of 71.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 961. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 124, Year 68.)  Muhammad bin Hanifiyah prayed during his funeral. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 125, Year 69.)
219. The Mawlas, who came to release the hostages, were club wielding. Probably they were not instructed to fight in the Haram and they conveyed the same message to Ibn Zubayr with their body language.  Some of the Mawlas and runaway slaves on Mukhtar’s side, anyhow, did not have means of buying arms.  They fought with clubs even in pitched battles.
220. See above
221. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 2,3
222. Abdul Malik had taken over the caliphate the time Tuwwabun got defeated.
223. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 3
224. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 3
225. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 3
226. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 4, 6
227. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 6, 7
228. Banat Tala is unidentified location. There is a village by name of Tal Banat south of Tikrik near the left bank of Tigris. However, archaologists have not found any mediaeval era occupation in it.
229. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 9
230. Mukhtarids killed three hundred prisoners of war.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 9).
231. The Mukhtarid commander, Yazid bin Anas, died of sickness during the war. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 7, 10).  For details of eighty thousand strong force see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 10).
232. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 10
233. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 11
234. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),14.
235. They did not fight from Mukhtar’s side against the Umayyads or the ‘Meccan Alliance’. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 12))
236. For details see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 11
237. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 11
238. For their arguments that they never expressed in political gatherings see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 11.
239. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),11, 13
240. Mukhtarid’s commander Yazid bin Anas had died of natural causes but the Ashraf of Kufa spread a rumor that he had died on the battlefield. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),7, 10, 11, 13)
241. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 12
242. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),15,16
243. The inability of Ahl al Jami’ah to fight against the Shi’a Ali and the Mawla’s as a unified body had brought Mukhtar to power.  Now, again they were so disorganized and mutually jealous that one sympathizer advised them to rather wait until either the Zubayrids or the Umayyads threw Mukhtar down. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 13).
244. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 31.
245. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 22, 23
246. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 30
247. An important personality killed from the Ashraf side was Muhammad bin ‘Ammār bin Yāsir. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 31
248. The concept of taking revenge individually for the murder of Husayn did not exist when news of the Karbala tragedy spread.  It developed gradually. Some people advised Sulayman bin Surad to take revenge against Umar bin Sa’d bin Waqqas and the other Ashraf of Kufa instead of going out to Syria. Surad stated that he considered Ibn Ziyad as the main accomplice of the murder and would take revenge against him. The killing of Ibn Ziyad would weaken the governing class of the country. In that case the people of Kufa would definitely seek their pardon. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 128).  At that moment Tuwwabun could screen and kill all the residents of Kufa who participated in Husayn’s murder, but they didn’t.
249. Name of Umar bin Sa’d bin Waqqas was part of any list of people who participated in killing of Husayn. He, for example, had to befriend with Ibrahim bin Muhammad bin Talha, the finance minister under the Zubayrid governor Abdallah bin Yazid. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 121). After Mukhtar came to power, Umar bin Sa’d entered into a written agreement with him that Mukhtar won’t order the killing of Umar. In turn Umar was bound to stay in Kufa. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),36).
250. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 39
251. Ibn Hanafiah had commented that Mukhtar was a Shi’a yet murderers of Husayn were his table companions. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 39.)
252. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),31
253. The general amnesty Mukhtar declared for the participants of failed uprising did not apply to the alleged killers of Husayn. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 23).
254. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 22, 23
255. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 23
256. For the names of some of the murderers of Husayn who were killed by Mukhtar: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),31, 32, 33, 35). One murderer of Husayn had his hands and feet cut and he bled to death.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 32)  Two men who had killed Abdur Rahman bin Aqil bin Abu Talib were killed by beheading, then their bodies were not buried but burned. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 34. A mob of Shi’a Ali suspected that one of the accused murderers of Husayn would be acquitted by Mukhtar due to intercession of Adi bin Hatim, a well-known Shi’a partisan of Kufa. They snatched him from the police, stripped him of his clothes, bound his arms, then killed him with a volley of arrows.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 40, 41). One of the killers resisted arrest. The police pelted him with stones and arrows. When he was half dead they burned him alive. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 43
257. Total three men fleed to Basrah to join Mus’ab bin Zubayr and had their houses demolished.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),42, 43). One of them who dodged the police to escape and seeked refuge in Basrah was Muhammad bin Ash’ath bin Qays. Mukhtar tore down his house.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 44, 85, 86)
258. Trying to rescue one of the alleged murderers of Husayn is the last entry of Adi bin Hatim in the history of Islam.  Soon after he died when Mukhtar was still governing Kufa.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 122, Year 66.)
259. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 38
260. Mukhtar’s police tried to arrest Shamir, the killer of Husayn. He escaped after killing the lad (Ghulām) that Mukhtar had sent to arrest him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),24). Mukhtar’s guards on the road to Basrah detected and killed Shamir. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 26.
261. Mukhtar had given Umar bin Sa’d a guarantee of life and had bound him not to leave Kufa as part of the guarantee. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 36). When Umar bin Sa’d heard that Mukhtar intended to kill all of the murderers of Husayn, he ran away from Kufa in panic. He, later, returned on the advice of a sympathizer who said that leaving Kufa was an offence by itself for him. Mukhtar sent his bodyguard police to kill Umar in his home. They took the severed head of Umar bin Sa’d to Mukhtar. Mukhtar showed the head to Umar’s son Ḥafṣ bin Umar. After that Mukhtar killed Hafs bin Umar as well in retaliation for Ali bin Husayn.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),37, 38.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 122, Year 66.)
262. A tile decoration depicting Mukhtar’s massacre of Husayn’s killers. Takieh Moaven ol Molk, Karmanshah, Iran.
263. Mukhtar rebuilt the house of Hujr bin Adi of Kindah whose house had been tore down by Ibn Ziyad.  He built it with bricks and clay. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),45
264. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 11
265. Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75.
266. A young man by the name of Ibrahīm bin Ashtar was the commander of the army. He remained in Kufa for only two days to crush the revolt of Ashraf. Then he left for Ibn Ziyad on July 20, 686. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 67). Ibrahim bin Ashtar was son of Malik bin Harith al Ashtar, the Ali’s slain governor of Egypt.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 83, foot note AND  193, 199
267. The encounter took place around July 28, 686 CE on the bank of River Khāzir near the village of Bār’itā. For details of the fight see: Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 70, 74, 81.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 121, Year 66. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 62, annus mundi 6178.
268. River Khāzir is a tributary of Great Zāb which flows into the Tigris south of Mosul. Yaqut Muj’am. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),74, footnote 284
269. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 80. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 956
270. Mukhtar sent Ibn Ziyad’s severed head to Ali bin Husayn in Medina as a trophy. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 957)
271. For the details see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75, 79, 80.
272. Tabari gives the impression that the attack of Ibrahim was unexpected and the forces of Ibn Ziyad were in confusion. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76
273. An important person met his death while fighting from Ibn Ziyad’s side.  He was Husayn bin Numayr of the Sakūn clan. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 122, Year 66. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 80. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 956). After offering Ibn Zubayr to proceed to Syria and take his oath as a caliph, Husayn had put all his weight towards Marwan bin Hakam.  He fought for him at Marj Rahit.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 56.).  He was instrumental in the defeat of Tuwwabun.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 143.)
274. Mukhtar’s forces occupied Jazira including Mosul, Naṣībīn, Sinjār, and Dara.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 83. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 956)
275. Encouraging his soldiers to fight whole heartedly, Ibrahim bin Ashtar made a speech in front of his soldiers before the war. He proclaimed that this war was about taking revenge of Husayn.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 77).
276. For the study of Kharjism in early Islam see: Jeffrey T. Kenney, “The Emergence of the Khawārij: Religion and the Social Order in Early Islam,” Jusūr: the UCLA Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 5 (1989): 1 – 29.   AND W. Montgomery Watt, “Khārijite thought in the Umayyad Period,” Der Islam 36 no. 3 (1961): 215 – 231.
277. See above.
278. The Kharijies had come to Mecca to defend the Ka’ba as their religious duty, irrespective of the political desires of Ibn Zubayr. Ibn Zubayr was hard pressed by the blockade by that time and any help from any quarter was welcome. Tabari gives the impression that both had talked about political ideologies superficially and the Kharijis were convinced that Ibn Zubayr held their views. After the embargo was over, Ibn Zubayr and the Kharijis sat together to discuss the future political set up of the country. It was then that the differences surfaced and Kharijis dissociated from Ibn Zubayr with immediate effect. (See details: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 97, 98, 100, 101, 115 AND Abdullah al-Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 69)
279. William Muir, The Caliphate; Its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 320.
280. For the Khariji control over Yamama, Bahrain, Oman, Khuzestan, Fars and Kerman see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 113, Year 64. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 974.  See also: Abdullah al-Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 71 AND Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 267.
281. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 265
282. For taxes as their income instead of looting see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 112, Year 64.
283. All Kharijis didn’t believe in looting Muslims.
284. For details see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 109, Year 64; P 112, Year 65.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 98, 102.
285. The ideological difference between the Najada and Ibn Azraq groups was that Ibn Azraq group believed in isti’rāḍ. They believed that non-Khariji Muslims had apostatized and should be killed for it. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 1112, Year 64.)
286. The leader of the Khariji group that came to Basrah to help Tamim was Nafi bin Azraq.  He lends his name to the whole Khariji movement of Fars during the Second Arab Civil War, which is called Azraqiyah. His militants were instrumental in the killing of Mas’ud bin Amr of Azd.  The time they entered Basrah, the Kharijis imprisoned in the central prison of Basrah took advantage of the situation. Some three hundred of them broke the prison and joined their comrades. Ibn Azraq and his companions were not in a position to capture Basrah.  They grabbed the nearby Khuzestan, in any case.  For details see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 46, 102
287. Ibn Zubayr had experienced their unreliability as a coalition partner.  He never tried to forge an alliance with them against his adversaries.  Rather he devoted all his efforts and energies to exterminate them.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 97)
288. See details: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 104, 105, 185.
289. Muhallab bin Abu Sufra first surfaced in history when he participated in a border raid in Khorasan in 664 CE as a soldier. He convinced his colleagues and commanders of his bravery and fortitude during this raid.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 895). Later on he used to serve Salm bin Ziyad, Yazid’s lieutenant governor over Khorasan, as his personal messenger to Yazid.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 119, 120, Year 65)
290. Dūlāb is a small village of Dulab-e Shirin, near Qalehreesi in Khuzestan Province in modern Iran. See: Yaqut Buldan II 622.  Silla wa-Sillabra is unknown locality
291. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 28
292. Some names out of them are Shabath bin Rib’i and Muhammad bin Ash’ath bin ‘Qays, the alleged looter of Husayn’s belongings. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 85, 86).  Muhammad bin Ash’ath’s brother, Qays bin Ash’ath bin Qays was also in the army that attacked Husayn.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 120.  He is also reputed to have plundered Husayn’s silken cloak. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161). Muhammad bin Ash’ath was the main Sharif of Kufa who had opposed accepting Ubaydullah bin Ziyad as the independent ruler of Kufa after the death of Yazid bin Mu’awiya. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 38.
293. The change came in 686 CE after the defeat of Azriqah Kharijis at the hands of Muhallab bin Sufrah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 172. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 84.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 963.  Mus’ab had served as governor of Medina for Ibn Zubayr for time being before his appointment at Basrah (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 176)
294. One of the secret operators was Abdur Rahman bin Mikhnaf.  He reported to Mus’ab that no Sharif of the town wished to abandon Mukhtar. Those who hated his regime had already left the town for Basrah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 87, 100)
295. For presence of the Kufan Ashraf in Mus’ab’s forces see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 90).
296. Many of them openly advocated such attack.  Their reason against Mukhtar was that “our own Mawlas had risen against us” and that “Mawlas have taken our wives, children and families from us by force”. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 85, 86)
297. Mus’ab, for example, ordered Muhallab bin abi Sufrah, the lieutenant governor of Khuzestan, to join the attack along with his troops and funds. Muhallab was reluctant but he had to comply. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 86, 87).
298. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 87, 88
299. The commander of Mukhtar’s forces was Aḥmar bin Shumayt.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 88).
300. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 88, 89
301. For the details of the clash and the subsequent killing of prisoners of war see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 89, 90, 115).
302. The total number of soldiers Mukhtar raised to fight was twenty thousand.  Out of them eight thousand left the battlefield before the battle due to differences and due to the fact that Mukhtar himself was not present at the battle field. Only twelve thousand fought the battle. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),115, 116.
303. Hammam A’yan and Jisr al Akbar are unknown locations.
304. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 91, 92
305. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),92
306. Hurura is two miles out of Kufa, Yaqut muj’am
307. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 94, 101).
308. Muhammad bin Ash’ath bin Qays was killed in Harura fighting from Mus’ab’s side. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 95
309. They were two hundred in total. The general population was so hostile to Mukhtar that they used to throw filthy water and stones on his companions if they came out of their hiding to fight or to get food.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 101, 103).
310. Nineteen of Mukhtar’s companions chose to die this way. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 104, 105.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 123, Year 67. AND Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75.
311. For the date see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),117
312. Tabari notes that Mukhtar and his die hard supporters remained confined to the government building complexes of Kufa for a total of four months. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 116). Ya’qubi asserts that the total affair from the first battle between the Zubayrid and Mukhtarid entities to the death of Mukhtar took four months.  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 963
313. Mus’ab ordered to cut one of Mukhtar’s hands off and nailed it to the wall of grand mosque.  It remained there until Hajjaj bin Yusuf came to power.  He ordered it to be taken down. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 109)
314. The dependencies of Kufa, like Swad and Jabal automatically fell in the lap of Mus’ab. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),109
315. At least one son of Ali bin Abu Talib participated in the war from the side of Ibn Zubayr.  Khalifa gives his name as Umar bin Ali bin abu Talib (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 123, Year 67.) Ya’qubi calls him by name of Ubaydullah bin Ali bin Abu Talib.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 963)
316. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 112, 117. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 963
317. Some of the Ashraf of Kufa had supported Mukhtar. They were killed in the massacre. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 106)
318. Out of seven thousand dead, only seven hundred were Arabs.  See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 116).
319. Mus’ab’s advisors warned him that if he spares life of all Arabs and kills only Mawlas, it would give his political opponents a propaganda point that Mus’ab spared some Muslims because they were Arabs and killed some other Muslims because they were non-Arabs. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 116). It would be an obvious inference that Mus’ab didn’t fight to subdue those who were on wrong path of religion rather he fought to restore the lost honour of his fellow Arab race – a typical racist reason.
320. The massacre shocked everybody. The killing of innocent civilians was not expected. One prisoner warned Mus’ab that he had killed some of the prisoners who were not soldiers and had not killed any of his men.  They were civil servants. Killing a Muslim is not permissible in Islam except if the Muslim has taken life of another Muslim.  Mus’ab did not listen to the advice.  The same advisor said to Mus’ab that he should kill as many people of Mukhtar as many his own men were killed and spare the lives of the rest. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),108
321. Apparently, Mus’ab did not manage to massacre all the freed slaves. According to John bar Penkay, the rest of them fled to Nisibis where they occupied the city and the population of city also rose against the Arabs. They appointed one of them, Abu Karib, as their leader.  They could capture much territory of Jazira.  (Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75.)
322. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)105
323. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 109, 118
324. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 123, 124
325. For their threat on Basrah and Kufa see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 124, 128, 130).
326. For the fear on the part of the Zubayrid officials see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 124, 125, 128.
327. For examples of barbarism committed by the Kharijis during their raid on Mada’in see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 124, 125
328. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 130 – 133
329. Obverse: Typical late Arab-Sasanian bust in the field. Lā ḥukma illallāh (Judgement belongs to Allah alone) on the margin. Reserve: Typical Arab-Sasanian fire alter with attendants. Mint is Ardashir Khurra. Year is 75 AH. See: J. Walker, A Catalogue of the Muhammadan Coins in the British Museum, 1941jk, Volume I – Arab Sasanian coins, British Museum: London pp 112 – 113. Walter has examined other similar coins. The name of Abdullah, Amir ul Mu’minin, Qatari bin Fuja’a is written on a coin that comes from 69 AH. For further discussion of this coins see: J. Treadwell, “Qur’anic inscriptions on the coins of the Ahl al-Bayt from the Second to fourth Century AH”, Journal of Qur’anic studies, 14 (2012): 49.
330. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 133, 134
331. Sūlāf was a village about 20 miles north of Suq Ahwaz, west of Dujayl River and near the town of Manādhir al Kubra.  See Yaqut and Le strange, P 239
332. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 127, Year 71. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 974.
333. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 124, Year 68. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 172.
334. See details:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 69, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 125, Year 70. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 970). AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 62, annus mundi 6178
335. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 155, 167. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 971
336. Abdul Malik let Amr’s relatives go to Kufa and live there under the rule of Ibn Zubayr after imprisoning them for a short while. Among them were four sons of Amr bin Sa’id and Abdullah bin Yazid bin Mu’awiya and Khalid bin Yazid bin Mu’awiya. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 164, 165).
337. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 126, Year 70. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 970, 971
338. This attitude of the Ashrafs continued up to the end of the Zubayrid government. See an anecdote of two Ashrafs of Basrah just after end of the Zubayrid government. One of them wanted to become governor because he was wealthy and had used his wealth to help pro-Abdul Malik forces in Basrah.  The other brought support of another Sharif.  He then became governor. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 193)
339. Hawting comments that Ibn Zubayr’s failure was partly result from military defeat but partly due to his inability to manage Iraq properly. (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 48, 49). See also for analysis of the Zubayr administration: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 138
340. Changes in the governorship of Basrah continued throughout the Zubayrid time. Most of them don’t get any valid reasons in historical texts.  When Mus’ab achieved success in Kufa, Ibn Zubayr dismissed him arbitrarily and appointed his own son Ḥamzah instead.  Ḥamzah proved to be incapable and Abdullah bin Zubayr had to reinstate Mus’ab. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 118 – 120). Ya’qubi suspects that Ibn Zubayr was afraid of growing power of Mus’ab. He divided the province between Kufa and Basrah and appointed his son, Hamzah on Basrah. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 965).
341. The Shi’a Ali said to Abdullah bin Muti that they don’t consent to giving their surplus of Fay to others, Abdullah agreed to it. They were glad. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 188)
342. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 964.
343. Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 186
344. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 964
345. This is the last entry of any of the descendants of Talha bin Ubaydullah in the history of Islam. Ibrahim bin Muhammad retired in Mecca.  He lived a long life. The caliphs of the Banu Umayyah were particularly harsh on him.
346. Observe: typical late Arab-Sasanian bust in the field with name of ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh (Zubayrid governor of Bishapur) in Middle Persian. Bism Allāh / Muḥammad rasu.l / Alāh (in the name of Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah) on the margin. Reverse: Typical Arab-Sasanian fire-alter with attendants with name of the mint (in abbreviation) and 65 AH in the field. Pellet at 7h30 on the margin. See: J. Walker, A Catalogue of the Muhammadan Coins In the British Museum, 1941, volume I – Arab-Sassanian Coins, British Museum: London, p 97. This is the first mention of Muhammad on a dated Muslim document.
347. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),172, 188
348. The anonymous chronicler of 741 CE appraises that Abdul Malik used all his experience and courage against the Zubayrids: Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 622
349. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),172, 174
350. Khalid bin Abdullah bin Khalid bin Asīd bin Abi’l ‘Āṣ bin Umayya.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 128, Year 72.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),172)
351. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 174
352. Abdul Malik wished to reinforce his loyalists in the town.  He ordered a small cavalry to reach Basrah but the men were not enthusiastic. They just dispersed on their way and returned to Syria individually (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 174).
353. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 174
354. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 175, 176, 177.
355. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 178
356. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 178
357. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),186. Ya’qubi gives a later date of April 692 CE: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 966
358. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 180
359. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 178, 179, 181, 182, 188, 189, 190.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 127, Year 71. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 965, 966
360. Abdullah bin Yazid bin Mu’awiya and Khalid bin Yazid bin Mu’awiya were residing in Kufa. They joined hands with Abdul Malik in his army as he approached Kufa. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 179)
361. On the way to Kufa, Abdul Malik kept encouraging his soldiers with exemplary courage of Husayn bin Ali in the face of death. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 179). The Shi’a minority of Kufa was getting on his nerves. He wished to give them an impression that he or his direct ancestor were not involved in murder of Husayn.
362. an important person who decided to die honourably fighting from Mus’ab’s side was Ibrahim bin Ashtar.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),181).
363. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 192
364. Abdul Malik gave the governorship of Kufa to his brother Bishr bin Marwan and the governorship of Basrah to his trusted friend Khalid bin Abdullah. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 128, Year 72;.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 193, 199)
365. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 196
366. Khawarnaq was located in Baghdad about 170 km north of Kufa.  It was built by Nu’mān bin Amru’ l Qays, a Lakhmid king.  The purpose of the palace was to provide dwelling to prince Bahram Jūr of the Sasanian dynasty, the future king.  Nu’man had a unique distinction of raising the Sasanian king during his childhood.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 4460
367. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 193
368. For details of the tribal warfare in Khorasan see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 177 – 181. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),64, 65, 66
369. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 67
370. For example, Tabari mentions Khorasan as a separate province for the year 65 AH.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 176
371. Abdullah bin Khazim’s nominal allegiance to Ibn Zubayr is evident from the event that after Ibn Zubayr’s killing, Abdul Malik sent his severed head to Abdullah bin Khazim to convince him that Ibn Zubayr was actually dead.  Ibn Khazim washed it, anointed it with spices, shrouded it, and sent it to the family of Abdullah bin Zubayr in Medina for proper burial.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 21 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 972). His allegiance was nominal is evident from the fact that he did not participate in any of the battle on the side of Ibn Zubayr, including the attack on Kufa and attack on Kharijis.  He was not present to defend Mus’ab against Abdul Malik, though he was not in communication with Abdul Malik.
372. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 209, 210. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 972
373. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 211, 212.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 972
374. The actual death of Ibn Khazim took place after Abdullah bin Zubayr was killed. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 212.)
375. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 198
376. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 199
377. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 200
378. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 203
379. Muhallab was still Lieutenant governor over Khuzestan, now in the name of Abdul Malik. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 202 AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 128, Year 72.
380. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 203
381. The Zubayrid forces against the Kharijis were underequipped. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 170
382. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 203
383. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 203, 205
384. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 204, 205
385. The leader of this group of Kharijis was Qatari bin Fuja’ah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 206).
386. Nobody doubts that the Kharijis were more courageous fighters than the government forces.  All of them had taken oath to fight until death. When the government forces of Khalid bin Abdullah camped at Khuzestan for twenty days in preparation of all-out attack at the Kharijis, Khalid saw numerous boats in the sea on which Kharijis had come from across the gulf. Khalid’s advisors asked him to capture the boats. Otherwise the Kharijis would burn them to block their means of fleeing from the battle field.  Before Khalid could capture them, Kharijis bunt them in a moment.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 203, 204).
387. Actually the word Shari’ah surfaces for the first time in the history of Islam in connection with this Khariji group.  Before it, we only hear of the Book and the Sunnah
388. For certain grievances common people held against the Khariji government see: Abdullah al-Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 72 – 74
389. They did not have constantly flowing taxes from non-Muslim population in the form of Jiziya. Yamama had thoroughly converted to Islam and the Zoroastrian and Christian population of Bahrain was insignificant.
390. For their mutual differences see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 974.  See also: Abdullah al-Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 72 – 74
391. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 126, Year 70; P 127, Year 71. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 206.
392. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 974.  AND Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 206
393. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 974.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),232, 233
394. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 232, 233
395. G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 66, 67
396. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 195
397. Muir speculates that Ibn Zubayr did not take any measures to protect his remaining domain because he had a whim that Abdul Malik would never gamble his political career by attacking the Ka’ba.  See: William Muir, The Caliphate; Its Rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 329.
398. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),206
399. William Muir, The Caliphate; Its Rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 330
400. As a young opposition politician, Abdul Malik had himself criticized Yazid bin Mu’awiya for invading Mecca and hence violating the Haram. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 95, 96, Year 60.)  His decision to repeat the infraction must have shocked many.
401. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),206. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 966
402. For the age of Hajjaj see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 54, Year 41
403. Hajjaj bin Yusuf was from the Thaqif tribe. He took part in the Battle of Rhabadah fought between Ibn Zubayr and Marwan bin Hakam in 684 CE from Marwan’s side.  As a foot soldier, Hajjaj did not have a horse. He escaped from the battlefield on a camel. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 163. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 953). Like Abdul Malik, Hajjaj was worldly wise. Fleeing as a ‘Ghāzi’ from a battle where everybody was attaining ‘Shahādah’ for the sake of their respective masters was real smart. Now, he saw an opportunity where everybody saw a risk.
404. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 206, 207
405. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 207). AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 72.
406. Ya’qubi gives the number of men in the army as twenty thousand. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 966)
407. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 207, 208
408. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 207
409. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 207, 208
410. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 212.
411. Abdul Malik sent Tariq bin Amr to Medina when he was appointing governors during his stay in Kufa in last months of 691 CE. Tariq conquered Medina, expelled Talha bin Abdullah bin ‘Awf, Ibn Zubayr’s governor over Medina and pledged allegiance to Abdul Malik.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 72.)
412. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 208
413. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 208, 209, 224. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 72.
414. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 225, 226
415. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 209
416. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 226
417. Ibn Zubayr had to ration each family of the town with half a measure of dates: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 967
418. Yūsuf bin Māhak, an ordinary Muslim who had gone for pilgrimage which fell on May 4, 692 CE, witnessed the blockade.  He recorded, “I saw the trebuchet (manjanīq) with which [stones] were being hurled. The sky was thundering and lightening, and the sound of thunder and lightening rose above that of the stones, so that it masked it. The Syrians considered this ominous and withheld their hands. But al-Hajjaj having lifted the skirt of his tunic and tucked it into his belt, picked up the trebuchet stone and loaded it. “Shoot” he said; and he himself shot with them. During the morning, a thunderbolt struck and was followed by a second, killing twelve of his men. The Syrians became discouraged, but Hajjaj said, “Men of Syria do not consider this extraordinary.  I am a native of Tihamah.  These are the thunderbolts of Tihamah. Behold, victory has come! Rejoice; the enemy will be afflicted even as you have been.” The next day, there was lightening, and a number of Ibn Zubayr’s men were struck. Hajjaj said, “Don’t you see that they are being hit?  You are in a state of obedience; they are in a state of disobedience.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 225.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 966.  See also: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 72.
419. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 231. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 968
420. Ibn Zubayr was a proud person.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 938
421. Hajjaj sent the severed head of Ibn Zubayr to Medina where it was put on public display for a while, then it was sent to Damascus to Abdul Malik.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 232). Ya’qubi insists that Hajjaj also crucified the dead body of Abdullah bin Zubayr.  He only removed it after three days at the request of Asma bint Abu Bakr, the mother of Ibn Zubayr. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 968). See also: Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 622
422. All surviving Quraysh supporters of Ibn Zubayr pledged allegiance to Hajjaj when he entered the town. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 232)
423. Ibn Zubayr was seventy years old.  He is reputed to be the first child born to those who had made the Immigration to Medina with Prophet Muhammad in 622 CE. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 73. His date of birth was October 623 CE. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 130, Year 73.See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 48, 49).
424. One important person who died by being hit by a stone from a mangonel during the siege was Abdullah bin Muti’. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 73.)
425. Abdullah bin Safwan bin Umayya bin Khalaf remained loyal to Ibn Zubayr to his last moments. He was killed while clinging to curtains of Ka’ba on the day soldiers entered into Mecca to kill Ibn Zubayr. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 73.)  He was chief of staff (a’lā amri-hi kulli-hi) of Abdullah bin Zubayr. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 130, Year 73.)
426. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 234
427. Tariq bin Amr was a temporary governor over Medina.  In 74 Abdul Malik dismissed Tariq bin Amr from governorship of Medina and appointed Hajjaj in his stead.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Everett K. Rowson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 1.).
428. “Ibn Zubayr had no defensive trench, no fortress, no stronghold; yet he held against the army as equal for seven months”, records Tabari. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 232).  His opponents were compelled to raise a white flag to salute his bravery at the time of his death.  All Hajjaj’s soldiers marveled on bravery of Ibn Zubayr and, when Abdul Malik heard it, he frankly agreed with them. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 231, 232).
429. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 224. Khalifa’s date is November 2, 692 CE.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 73.
430. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 969
431. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),674.
432. See above.
433. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 218, 219
434. See above.
435. See above.
436. See above.
437. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),60.
438. later on Dahhak bin Qays’ son Abdur Rahman got appointment of governorship of Medina on April 10, 720.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),105
439. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 186.
440. see above.
441. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 231, 232
442. Abdul Malik had a skill of taking calculated risks. Neither of his adversaries, like Mukhtar or Ibn Zubayr, led armies in the battle field.  Only Abdul Malik did. When he was planning an attack on Kufa, his advisors suggested to him to stay in Damascus and send a general from his own family against Iraq. Abdul Malik said, “This affair can be handled only by a man from Quraysh who has good judgement.  I might perchance send someone who has bravery, but not good judgment. But I find in my soul that I am discerning in war, and brave with the sword, if I am forced to use it.  Mus’ab is from a family of bravery.  His father was the bravest of Quraysh.  He, too is brave, but he has no knowledge of war and likes ease.  With him there are men who will oppose him; with me there men who will give me sincere advice.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 180).
443. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 968
445. On realizing that every supporter had not accompanied him, he camped outside Kufa for two nights. Despite his passionate pleas for joining the march, he could attract only one thousand more participants. He simply rejected those who did not join him blaming that they were seeking wordly wealth. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 126, 127)
446. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 974
447. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 974
448. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 164
449. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 211
450. Dawilah was Waki’s full brother who had died in a previous tribal feud.
451. On assurances of safe conduct, for example, Ibn Zubayr asked his mother Asmā’ If he should surrender under amnesty offered by Hajjaj?  Asma anwered that he had been advocating of being on right path (ḥaqq). His companions got killed for his right path. Now, if he accepts amnesty he would enable the young men (ghilmān) of Banu Umayyah to make sport of him. Death was better in Asma’s opinion. “How long more will you stay in world?” Asked Asma.  Ibn Zubayr told his old mother that he thought on the same lines but wished to know her views.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 226, 227.)
452. Asmā’ Bint Abū Bakr survived Ibn Zubayr only five to ten days. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 227. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 129, Year 73. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 967.
453. Marwan sent a message to Mus’ab to get a guarantee of safety from him.  Mus’ab rejected it saying men like him either get victorious or vanquish.  Mus’ab advised his son Isa to flee to Mecca and let Mus’ab die in the war.  Isa refused and got killed.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 183.)
454. When Mus’ab ordered killing of a group of Mawla soldiers who had fought from Mukhtar’s side, they argued that they were Muslims just like Mus’ab. So Mus’ab should consider them on err rather than on disbelief and should pardon them. Mus’ab refused. Then they brought in another point. They argued that if someone forgives men, Allah forgives him.  Mus’ab still refused.  Then they brought another point. They offered to fight for Mus’ab against the Syrians if their life was spared.  They said that by killing them, Mus’ab would reduce the number of his potential army.  This was the last argument which needed to be rejected before their killings.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 107, 108.)
455. When prisoners of war were being killed after Mukhtar’s defeat, Mus’ab granted bail to one of the prisoners by name of Qays. His real brother, Aswad bin Sa’īd was in Mus’ab’s forces and he had begged for his brother. Qays rejected the bail and wished to ‘die with his comrades than living with his brother’ and he was killed. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 107)
456. Sinan, the commander of forces of the Umayyad Caliphate that raided Qiqan in 670 CE, encouraged his soldiers who were demoralized by the enemy’s great numbers, “Rejoice! You will attain one of the two things; Paradise or booty.”  He, then, ordered his soldiers to attack on the enemy in afternoon exactly as ‘the Prophet used to do’.   (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 66, Year 50).
457. Islamic sources are saturated with examples. Yazid bin Anas, a soldier fighting from Mukhtar’s side, asked Mukhtar to pray for his martyrdom. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 5). A soldier fighting from the Umayyad side was agitated when he heard a commander of Tuwwabun saying that those who die from their side were martyrs. The Umayyad soldier concluded that it indirectly meant that the Tuwwabun considered his side polytheist (while the situation was exactly the opposite in his eyes). (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)149). During the battle with Dahhak, a soldier of Marwan bin Hakam claimed that the angels were with them. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),62).
458. See above.
459. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 109, 110
460. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 205
461. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 154.
462. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)169, 170.
463. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 182.
464. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 89
465. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),142
466. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),141
467. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 199.
468. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 156
469. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 189
470. For one example see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 192
471. Look at Hawting’s comments: “If Zubayr would have been victorious, it is not clear, what changes would have resulted apart from the end of Umayyad rule and its replacement by that of another member of Quraysh”.  (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 55
472. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 96
473. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 57
474. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 103, Year 63.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 214
475. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 322.
476. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 118, Year 64.
477. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 76
478. Qasr Asfad is an unidentified location in Khorasan.
479. Initially Ibn Hurr was a political worker of Shi’a Uthman party in Kufa. After the murder of Uthman he crossed over to Mu’awiya to take revenge against the murder. He participated in Siffin from Mu’awiya’s side. After the assassination of Ali he returned to his home town Kufa.  He remained Shi’a Uthman and in this capacity he was a witness in the treason case of Hujr bin Adi.  His political affiliation staggered during the governorship of Ibn Ziyad.  He did not join the Shi’a Ali party openly but flirted with them.  When Ibn Ziyad arrested Muslim bin Aqil, he left Kufa to camp at  Qaṣr bani Muqātil.  Husayn bin Ali contacted him to join his camp when he passed by on his way to Kufa.  He refused but offered Husayn a swift horse to escape.  Later he wrote a grief poem over events of Karbala.  Somewhere after death of Yazid bin Mu’awiya, he figured out that political work won’t take him anyway.  Gang life was a better option for him.  See details: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),134, 135.
480. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 136
481. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 136, 138
482. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),139, 140, 141, 145, 146
483. Baduraya was an agricultural district to the south-west of Baghdad.
484. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 143, 144, 146
485. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 134
486. Actually Ubaydullah bin Hurr would manage to escape alive from the raid after his horse drowned in River Euphrates. He took a ferryboat to run across the river. A peasant on board of the boat recognized him. He grabbed him by arm to take him to the Commander of Faithful  (Probably, there was a bounty on his head). In the struggle Ibn Hurr fell out of the boat and drowned.  The peasants severed his head which was then displayed in Kufa and then in Basrah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 146, 147 )
487. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 184.
488. See above.
489. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982),  P 59, annus mundi 6176.
490. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 125, Year 69; P 125, Year 70.
491. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 169.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 970).
492. Massisa is ancient Mospuestia in Cilicia region on the right bank of Jayḥān, about 27 km east of Adana in modern Turkiye.
493. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 169. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 970
494. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 195
495. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 248
496. Mount Lukan is near Jurūmah
497. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 247, 248
498. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 248
499. According to the terms of the truce the Abdul Malik government would pay the Byzantine Rome one thousand dinars, one horse and one slave girl daily. In addition, the Abdul Malik government will share the revenues of Cyprus and Armenia with the Byzantine Rome.  Furthermore, Abdul Malik would return all prisoners of war and the deserters of the Byzantine army unharmed. The Byzantine, on its part, would take its commandos out of Lebanon, and will halt the attacks of Mardaites  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219, 247 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 169. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 970.  AND  Chronicle of 741 CE in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 621.   AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 61, annus mundi 6178.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 128.
500. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 61, annus mundi 6178
501. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 248
502. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 195, 197.
503. This must be the time when Abdul Malik removed naval headquarter from Acre to Tyre.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 181)
504. Marwan bin Hakam was secretery (kātib) to Uthman bin Affan.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 214
505. Abdul Malik bin Marwan was Uthman’s secretery for Diwan of Medinah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 214)
506. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 914
507. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 914
508. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 70)
509. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 124, Year 68.
510. A dated inscription notes the name of ar-Rayyan.  See below.
511. Julien Loiseau, in Arabia and the Holy Cities in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibra.hi.m Ghabba.n, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 409.
512. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 103 – 119
513. Saleh Al-Marih, “Najran” in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhīm Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 365.
514. Christian Julien Robin, in Antiquity in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhīm Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 94.