Political Developments II

Yazid assumes power

The transfer of power from Mu’awiya to Yazid (Yazid I) was as smooth as that between Abu Bakr and Umar. The military, the judiciary, the Ashrafs and the dignitaries, all supported him.  At least a part of public opinion was in his favour as well.  He did not change any governor or military commander. ^{1 2}

He was the first caliph in Islam who had not seen Prophet Muhammad with his own eyes. ³ He was also the first caliph whose parents were not both Quraysh. ⁴  There might have been an annoyance among certain circles of the country regarding this fact.  Mu’awiya is quoted to have said ‘a woman from Quraysh is better than a woman from Kalb’ about Yazid’s mother. ⁵, ⁶

Yazid did not organize an oath-taking ceremony, in which usually a caliph vowed to act according to the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet.  Perhaps he wanted to take the country in a different direction. ⁷ Archaeologists have discovered a coin of his, which he minted immediately after coming to power.  This coin has no mention of Hijri year, which was official calendar of the country. Instead, it gives first year of Yazid’s ascension to power as a date of coinage, in imitation to the Sasanian kings. ⁸  The discovery hints that Yazid wanted to organize the country on a Sassanian pattern. Another clue that Yazid wished to take the country in a different direction comes from his special relations with his Christian subjects. Yazid further strengthened the bridge of friendship between the caliph and the Christian subjects of Syria. The Christians liked the previous caliphs but they loved Yazid. ⁹.

Yazid faces political challenges

Yazid’s strongest weak-point was that he lacked his father’s social intelligence. Perhaps, he even didn’t know how to palpate the political pulse of Arab Muslims. He inherited a stable government and in a brief period of time, led it to instability. ¹¹

Contrary to his father, Yazid could not tolerate the fact that a few renowned individuals in the country had not recognized him a caliph. Further, contrary to his father, he had the mindset to settle the matters by use of mere force rather than by gentle persuasion. The very first decision Yazid took after assuming power was to order Walid bin Utba (Walīd bin ‘Utbah وَلِىد بِن عُتبَه ), his governor over Medina, to arrest Abdullah bin Umar, Abdullah bin Zubayr (‘Abdallāh bin Zubayr عَبدُاللَه بِن زُبَير) and Husayn bin Ali (Ḥusayn bin ‘Ali حُسَين بِن عَلِي ) and to force them to give oath of allegiance to him. ¹², ¹³  Abdullah bin Umar succumbed to the pressure. ¹⁴ Abdullah bin Zubayr and Husayn bin Ali were not in a mood to compromise under threats.  They decided to test the popularity of Yazid. ¹⁵  Both Abdullah bin Zubayr and Husayn bin Ali were unarmed in Medina but they commanded respect among the residents due to their fathers. ¹⁶, ¹⁷ Governor Walid was reluctant to arrest them.  He just suggested to them to take oath of allegiance to Yazid. ¹⁸ Without answering Walid’s request, both absconded from Medina to Mecca separately, each with a handful of supporters, in the darkness of the night in May 4, 680 CE. ¹⁹, ²⁰ When Yazid received the news, he boiled in rage and dismissed the governor to replace him with ‘Amr bin Sa’īd, who had a reputation of being harsh with political opponents. ²¹  Yazid knew that the bird had flown the coop.

Debut of the Second Arab Civil War

Historians are unanimous on the date of end of the Second Arab Civil War.  However, they disagree on its start date. Kaegi believes that the civil war started after the death of Mu’awiya. ²² Hawting thinks it started gradually during the caliphate of Yazid. ²³  For all practical purposes it started on May 4, 680 CE when both Husayn bin Ali and Abdullah bin Zubayr left Medina in defiance to the government orders. ²⁴

The posturing for the Second Arab Civil War took its final shape in the next few weeks after Husayn and Ibn Zubayr reached Mecca. The Second Arab Civil War was going to be as horrible as the first one. And again the winner of this gory war, that would be fought in the field of battle, in the domain of propaganda, and in the arena of religious proselytism, won’t be the one who was more pious or whose ancestors had been closer to the Prophet of Islam, but the one who was more pragmatic and closer to resources.

We don’t know exact reasons why Husayn and Ibn Zubayr chose Mecca. Probably, taking refuge in the sanctuary to avoid the pressure from governor Walid bin Utba was their initial intention.  Once in Mecca, both of them picked up their future plans. Not only that they declared Yazid’s nomination to the office of Caliph unconstitutional, they presented themselves as suitable claimants for the job.

As Mu’awiya had not convinced his Arab Muslim subjects, rather he had imposed his son on them, many did not feel bound to that decision.  Gradually, the Muslim Arab elite throughout the Umayyad Caliphate was divided into the same three parties which had fought the First Arab Civil War.  Ahl al Jama’ah, whose leader was Yazid.  Shi’a Ali, whose leader was Husayn.  ‘Meccan Alliance’ whose leader was ibn Zubayr.  ‘Neutral party’ emerged too. They again did not support any faction whole heartedly. They were willing to support anybody with whom the wind flies high. ²⁵ The division of country on the same political stands suggests that twenty years of Mu’awiya’s reign had brought political stability, not political unification.

Yazid took the stand that he was the only hope of unity for Muslim Ummahs and his rivals were harbingers of division.²⁶  Husayn took the stand that ruling over Muslim Ummah was the birthright of the Banu Hashim clan of Quraysh as they were the clan of the Prophet. ²⁷  Abdullah bin Zubayr took a stand that the caliphate should belong to the descendants of one of those early immigrants from Mecca who participated in early wars along with the Prophet. ²⁸  However, his dilemma was how to take Husayn out of the list of the sons of the early Muhajirun.

The Second Arab Civil War was about who should govern the country.  It was not about how it should be governed. ²⁹

Ibn Zubayr verses Husayn in Mecca

Apparently, Husayn did not have many supporters in Mecca. He kept a low profile there. The only people who gathered around him were those of his own family and clan who had accompanied him from Medina. ³⁰ On the other hand, Abdullah bin Zubayr had supporters among the Quraysh of Mecca. He quickly dislodged the central government’s setup in the town and established himself in its place. ³¹  It appears there was no shurta force in Mecca to support the government representative, Harith bin Khalid.  Ibn Zubayr did not declare himself ruler formally. His gesture of relieving Harith bin Khalid of his official duties was enough to an ring alarm in Damascus. It was only this gesture of Ibn Zubayr after which Yazid ordered governor ‘Amr bin Sa’id to send a force against Ibn Zubayr. ³², ³³

Ibn Zubayr did not find any comfort in Husayn’s presence in the town. He perceived the latter as a political adversary. Both had a kind of cold war. ³⁴  When Ibn Zubayr met Husayn in Mecca, according to Khalifa, he aptly asked Husayn what was keeping him from his Shi’a and the Shi’a of his father.  If, Ibn Zubayr reiterated, he were in Husayn’s situation, he would have certainly gone to them.³⁵ This was a gentle way to ask Husayn to leave Mecca and Husayn understood it. He knew Ibn Zubayr wanted a free hand in Mecca. ³⁶ The cold war between the two must have contributed towards Husayn’s decision to leave for Kufa.³⁷

First shot of the Second Arab Civil War

The new governor of Medina, Amr bin Sa’id, faced significant challenges in his role. Though he had the police force of Medina at his disposal, it was not strong enough to dislodge Ibn Zubayr from Mecca. Another issue was how to convince the policemen to attack and kill Ibn Zubayr in Mecca, who was declared a haram by the Prophet. The governor urgently raised forces from the Bedouin tribe of Aslam. Presumably, this force was underequipped but could supplement the Medinan police force in the attack and was willing to raid on the sacred site. The total number of soldiers was two thousand. ³⁸, ³⁹.

Ibn Zubayr organized his Quraysh supporters in Mecca in forces and supplemented them with members from the surrounding tribes. ⁴⁰ This force easily defeated the forces of the provincial government that had marched on the vicinity of the city and chased them away. ⁴¹, ⁴², ⁴³ Ibn Zubayr became the de fecto ruler of Mecca from where he was in a position to extend himself further. He didn’t proclaim himself as the caliph at this stage. He wanted to wait and see how the events unfold, particularly what decisions Husayn made.  Husayn was in the town but didn’t participate in the fight.  Defending the ‘Meccan Alliance’ was not on his agenda.

Husayn’s Maneuvers

Unlike Ibn Zubayr, fifty-five-year-old Husayn had no significant support in Mecca. ⁴⁴  However, there was a strong presence of Shi’a Ali in Kufa and Yemen. ⁴⁵  A group of Shi’a Ali was present in Basrah, though it was weak.⁴⁶, ⁴⁷

Husayn was weighing his options when a messenger of Shi’a Ali of Kufa met him in Mecca on June 14, 680 CE.  He informed Husayn that Kufans were aching to be governed by him and invited Husayn to come and take over the city.⁴⁸  Husayn did not take the offer of the messenger at face value and sent his young paternal cousin Muslim bin ‘Aqīl to Kufa on a fact finding mission. ⁴⁹, ⁵⁰, ⁵¹  In the meantime Husayn had consultations with his sympathizers in Mecca about his future strategy. Muhammad bin Hanifa was opposed to Husayn’s plans from the beginning.  He had not accompanied Husayn from Medina. ⁵² Abdullah bin Abbas doubted the loyalty of Kufan Ashraf.  He advised Husayn not to hurry towards Kufa until Kufans chased away Yazid’s governor on their own.  The other option he tabled to Husayn was to go to Yemen, build guerrilla warfare and bit by bit dislodge the central government from the whole country. ⁵³, ⁵⁴, ⁵⁵

Husayn took his own decision to bank upon Kufan support and his Meccan sympathizers parted their ways from him. ⁵⁶ The only people who accompanied Husayn to Kufa on September 9 680 CE were those who had accompanied him from Medina. ⁵⁷, ⁵⁸, ⁵⁹

Unrest in Kufa

On reaching Kufa, Muslim bin Aqil had found the conditions favourable. ⁶⁰ While remaining underground, he claimed the allegiance of eighteen thousand men for Husayn in a few weeks. ⁶¹ They contributed towards a fund to buy arms for the final uprising. ⁶² Muslim bin Aqil gave a signal to Husayn to come to Kufa immediately and to lead the revolt in person. Yazid’s governor of the province, Nu’man bin Bashīr, turned a blind eye towards the development. ⁶³, ⁶⁴  All Kufans were not Shi’a Ali.  Actually, the majority was ahl al Jam’ah. ⁶⁵ They panicked and informed Yazid of the weakness of his governor. ⁶⁶  When Yazid saw the province of Kufa slipping out of his hands, he dismissed governor Nu’man and replaced him with Ubaydullah bin Ziyad, his hawkish governor over Basrah. ⁶⁷  In doing so Yazid once again combined two provinces of Kufa and Basrah. ⁶⁸, ⁶⁹.

On reaching Kufa, Ibn Ziyad found the city alien to the central government. The guards of the city and the common people in streets mistook him for Husayn and greeted him joyously as if Husayn had reached there from Mecca. ⁷⁰ He lodged in the governor house without delaying a single moment and prepared a scheme to crack down on the opposition. He used the police force, the Ashraf of the town, and the loyal Ahl Jama’ah to re-establish the government’s writ.  His spies quickly unveiled that Hani’ bin ‘Urwah of Murad tribe had hidden Muslim bin Aqil in his house. They arrested Hani to pressure him to produce his guest. Muslim bin Aqil was in a situation of now or never. He come out of his hiding and ordered Husayn’s sympathizers to assault the governor house without waiting for arrival of Husayn. ^{71 72} A big procession of four thousand leapt at the governor house where Ibn Ziyad was holed with a handful of supporters, most of them police officers and Ashraf. Ibn Ziyad sent the Ashraf to speak to the crowd and to threaten them by calling the Syrian Troops if they didn’t disperse. The Ashraf also communicated clearly that no participant of the procession would ever receive stipends. The trick worked and crowd started thinning out, ultimately leaving Muslim bin Aqil alone.⁷³, ⁷⁴, ⁷⁵, ⁷⁶

Political scientists tell us that there are three levels of political support. The weakest level is that of sympathy and vote. The next level is that of support with time and money. The strongest level is taking up arms and risking life.  Muslim bin Aqil had overestimated Husayn’s support in Kufa.  It was at the weakest political level.⁷⁷, ⁷⁸ Ibn Ziyad arrested Muslim bin Aqil and ordered him and Hani to be executed. ⁷⁹ Ibn Ziayd did not bother to try them in a court of law, not even a sham one.  This was a first instance in Islam where the government eliminated its political opponent by simply murdering them. Later, it set a precedent. ⁸⁰

Tragedy of Karbala

Husayn had left for Kufa along with his family members including the women and children on the day of Muslim bin Aqil’s uprising, unaware of the situation in Kufa.  He received the news of Muslim bin Aqil’s execution in the vicinity of Kufa. ⁸¹, ⁸²  Husayn wished to return but he had to change his mind when the brothers of Muslim bin Aqil disagreed on the ground that they should at least try avenging his death.⁸³ Probably, Husayn still had a glimmer of hope that the Kufans would support him militarily if they find him among them.⁸⁴

Ibn Ziyad had settled the potential uprising in Kufa within two weeks. ⁸⁵  Now, he put armed guards on all of the roads leading to Kufa to halt Husayn from entering the city. ⁸⁶  The guards stopped Husayn at Mecca-Kufa road just few kilometers outside the town of Kufa.  Husayn didn’t confront them, rather he deviated towards Kufa-Damascus road with an aim to see Yazid in person.⁸⁷, ⁸⁸  Ibn Ziyad had not anticipated it. He ordered his guards to halt Husayn again and sent a force of four thousand men under command of ‘Umar bin Sa’d bin Abu Waqqāṣ to confront Husayn.⁸⁹, ⁹⁰

Husayn was a big religious figure among Muslims. He was the closest surviving descendent of Prophet Muhammad. ⁹¹, ⁹², ⁹³ Ibn Ziyad had difficulty in finding a man to command this army. Umar bin Sa’d bin Waqqas agreed to command this army after a promise that he would be granted lieutenant governorship of Rayy. ⁹⁴, ⁹⁵, ⁹⁶, ⁹⁷

During customary negotiations with Umar bin Sa’d bin Waqqas, Husayn proposed to Umar to either allow him to go to Yazid for negotiations, allow him to return to Mecca or to allow him to go to any border town to live an anonymous life. ⁹⁸  The conditions sounded reasonable to Umar and his army.⁹⁹  They held the view that Husayn had not committed any offence against the government. He had not revolted personally. He was on his way to Kufa on invitation from its citizens and now no longer wished to continue. ¹⁰⁰  Why should he not be allowed to leave the venue? The conditions were, anyhow, not acceptable to Ibn Ziyad.¹⁰¹  He asked for Husayn’s unconditional submission to his person. ¹⁰²  Husayn was a proud man.¹⁰³  He made clear that such humiliation was unacceptable to him. ¹⁰⁴

Ibn Ziyad ordered his army to kill Husayn if he didn’t submit to Ibn Ziyad. ¹⁰⁵, ¹⁰⁶ Such was the reluctance of the army to carry out the orders that one commander by name of Ḥurr bin Yazīd switched sides to Husayn and was killed defending him. ¹⁰⁷, ¹⁰⁸.

Umar threw a lance himself to encourage his soldiers to start the battle. ¹⁰⁹  The day was the  b10^th of October, 680 CE and it was Ashura.¹¹⁰  It took about half a day for four thousand soldiers to kill the thirty horsemen and forty two foot soldiers of Husayn.  Husayn was the last to die on the battlefield. It was the five men battalion under the command of Shamir bin Dhi al Jawshan of Hawazin who killed him. They severed his head from his body and Shimar took it to Ibn Ziyad as a trophy.  Ibn Ziyad sent it to Yazid. ¹¹¹, ¹¹², ¹¹³, ¹¹⁴, ¹¹⁵. This was one of the earliest examples of mutilation of a dead body in Islam, which was otherwise considered a war crime. ¹¹⁶, ¹¹⁷, ¹¹⁸, ¹¹⁹.

The death toll of the forces of the provincial government was eighty eight. The wounded were extra. Umar bin Sa’d prayed over them and buried them. ¹²⁰ The death toll on Husayn’s side was seventy two. Sources don’t mention anybody praying over them. The next day, residents of the nearby Ghādiriyyah village, who belonged to Asad, came to the venue and buried the bodies of Husayn and his companions. ¹²¹, ¹²², ¹²³ The Tragedy of Karbala attracts detailed attention from all Islamic sources. However, non-Islamic sources are totally mute about it. It appears that the incident was too insignificant to catch the attention of contemporary Christian writers but it had such far reaching political implications that Islamic sources writing during the Abbasid Caliphate had to deal it like a milestone in the history of Islam.

Phenomenon of martyrdom

Those who die knowingly for the sake of a great cause remain alive in the memories of people. It is not the death itself which makes a person a martyr, it is the undauntedness with which a person faced the death. Husayn immediately attained martyr status in the eyes of all Muslims, both Shi’a Ali and Ahl al Jama’ah. Here is a piece of poetry composed by ‘Ubaydullah bin Ḥurr, the son of the slain warrior Hurr bin Yazid, a few years after Husayn’s death:

A treacherous governor, the very reality of a treacherous man, says:
Should you not have fought against the martyr son of Fāṭima?

O how much I regret that I did not help him!
Indeed, every soul that does not set upon the right course regrets.¹²⁵

By the time Tabari was writing his history, the mode of the death of Husayn was straightforward murder (maqtal) in the eyes of his contemporaries.¹²⁶, ¹²⁷, ¹²⁸, ¹²⁹

“Karbala was such a big tragedy for Ali’s and Fatima’s descendants,” points out Hawting, “that when Yazid died after a while, they were unable to take advantage of the situation.  And that is the reason Mukhtar Thaqafi had to take another line of Ali’s descendants.”¹³⁰.

Who decided to murder Husayn?

Yazid was pleased when hearing the news of death of Husayn. ¹³¹ However, he soon realized that he had committed a political blunder. ¹³² There was not a single political dignitary in the country who praised this action of Yazid.  Even members of his inner circle, like Yaḥyā bin Ḥakam, publicly criticized him on this matter. ¹³³, ¹³⁴ He quickly distanced himself from the murder. Yazid told the messenger who had brought the heads of Husayn and his companions that the killing of Husayn was not a required thing for Ibn Sumayyah to prove his loyalty.  He wept on this incident in front of everybody present and publicly blamed Ibn Ziyad for the mishap. ¹³⁵  A few days later, when Ibn Ziyad asked Yazid what to do with the imprisoned women and children of Husayn, he ordered him to send them over to him. ¹³⁶  Yazid dealt with them kindly and generously. ¹³⁷ That time he declared in front of everybody present that if he were to decide the fate of Husayn, he would have decided differently from Ibn Ziyad. He then sent the women and children to Medina respectfully. One special person among them was ‘Ali al-Aṣghar bin Husayn bin Ali.¹³⁸, ¹³⁹, ¹⁴⁰, ¹⁴¹

Ibn Ziyad was not very happy for being made a scapegoat. ¹⁴²  He tried to pass the buck on Umar bin Sa’d but the latter flatly refused to accept responsibility for the murder. He stood firm that Ibn Ziyad had ordered him to do so in writing. ¹⁴³ Ibn Ziyad himself did not have any written instructions from Yazid to prove his innocence. According to Tabari, when Yazid received the news of the execution of Muslim bin Aqil and suppression of unrest in Kufa, he simply ordered Ubaydullah to arrest anybody on the suspicion but kill only those who fight. He also ordered him to set lookouts and a watch against Husayn and to keep an eye on suspicious characters passing on the roads. ¹⁴⁴

Yazid’s fending off measures didn’t earn him any dividends. He was overall responsible for the heinous crime in the public eye.

Abdullah bin Zubayr harvests what Husayn sowed

The only person in the country who reaped the reward from the situation arising from death of Husayn and curbing of Shi’a Ali’s revolt was Abdullah bin Zubayr.¹⁴⁵  His ‘Mecca Alliance’ emerged as a single possible political alternative in case the people got fed up with the governance of sitting caliph. Hejaz had never been a staunch supporter of Ahl al Jama’ah. ¹⁴⁶ They were governing over Hejaz by force.  In the absence of any political rival, the people of Hejaz were apt to accept leadership of Abdullah bin Zubayr. ¹⁴⁷ He took advantage of the situation without wasting any time and declared himself as the ruler of Hejaz, independent of the central government in the beginning of 681 CE. The people of Hejaz took oath of allegiance with him. ¹⁴⁸, ¹⁴⁹, ¹⁵⁰   Ibn Zubayr preferred to be called by title “One who seeks refuge”. ¹⁵¹

Battle of Harrah

Medina had supported Ali during the First Arab Civil War. The people of Medina were ambivalent at the start of the Second Arab Civil War. After Husayn’s death, all the people of the town, including Ansar and Quraysh, leaned towards Abdullah bin Zubayr. ¹⁵² Yazid tried to maintain his grip on the town by changing governors. ¹⁵³ He was receiving reports that the majority of Hejaz stood behind the leadership of Ibn Zubayr. ¹⁵⁴ Yazid expected Walid bin Utbah, who had replaced Amr, to crush the opponents with an iron fist as Ibn Ziyad had done in Kufa few months ago.  Walid, anyhow, did not have a dedicated group of ahl al Jam’ah in the town as Ziyad had in Kufa. He found himself weak and found Ibn Zubayr strong and cautious. ¹⁵⁵ Just to increase the hurdles of Walid, by this time the people of Yamama accepted Khariji doctrine en masse and came into open revolt against the Yazid government under their leader Najdah bin ‘Āmir of Hanifa. Their inclination was towards political alliance with Ibn Zubayr. ¹⁵⁶ Under distress, Yazid replaced Walid bin Utbah with ‘Uthmān bin Muḥammad bin Abu Sufyān on the suggestion of Ibn Zubayr, in a hope that the change might produce a soft corner in heart of Ibn Zubayr for Yazid government.¹⁵⁷, ¹⁵⁸ The young and inexperienced Uthman couldn’t handle the situation. ¹⁵⁹ Disappointed from all venues, Yazid organized a meeting with the dignitaries of Medina at Damascus with the mediation of governor Uthman. Yazid bestowed upon them the gift of hundreds of thousands of Dirhams. ¹⁶⁰, Bribing didn’t work. All of them kept the gifts but didn’t change their mind.  They returned to Medina publicly vilifying Yazid’s character. ¹⁶¹  Nothing worked out and ultimately people of Medina raised banner of revolt under their leader ‘Abdallāh bin Ḥanzalah al-Ghasīl of Ansar. ¹⁶², ¹⁶³  They herded the handful government officials and government supporters to one place and let them leave the town with the promise that none of them would inform the forthcoming forces of central government about strategic deployments in Medina. ¹⁶⁴, ¹⁶⁵

The events in Hejaz alarmed Yazid. Hejaz was not a significant province as far as revenue generation or military strategy was concerned. It must be the immense popularity of Abdullah bin Zubayr that abashed him.  He apprehended the spread of his cult to other parts of the country.  He decided to unleash the Syrian Troops, which had been being portrayed as a dreaded force, to impose central authority over provinces for the last quarter century but had never been used.  The people of Hejaz, on their end, had resolved not to take the threat of use of the Syrian Troops on face value.  They wished to test the waters.¹⁶⁶

Within days, Yazid raised an army of twelve thousand men, all well paid.¹⁶⁷  The army descended on Medina on August 27, 683 CE. ¹⁶⁸  The citizens of the town came out for an open battle at the Harrah located to the east of the town. Hence the name ‘Battle of Ḥarrah’.¹⁶⁹  Medinans were defeated within the hour. ¹⁷⁰, ¹⁷¹, ¹⁷²  The army of the central government treated the defeated citizens of Medina as combatant enemy.  They not only killed some prisoners of war, whole city was given to the license and rapine of the army for full three days.¹⁷³ This was the first example in a Muslim state of killing and plundering a Muslim town. After that it set a precedent. The survivors either pledged allegiance to Yazid or escaped to Mecca to join hands with Abdullah bin Zubayr. ¹⁷⁴. Ali bin Husayn had taken residence at Yanbu near Medina. When the people of Medina came in open disobedience to the central government, he assured Yazid that he was not involved in the matter. Obviously, the Shi’a Ali were too weak at this stage to take any risk. Yazid had ordered the invading army to protect Ali bin Husayn and the army did. ¹⁷⁵, ¹⁷⁶.

The Battle of Harrah is the last episode in the history of Islam in which the Ansar of Medina participated as a group. ¹⁷⁸ The battle was a fatal blow to them. They lost political significance for ever.  The group’s name ‘Ansar’ scaled down to merely a surname among the future generations of Muslims.

Medina itself underwent further political downgrading. After the Battle of Harrah the only political significate Medina retained was that it became a refuge for the important families excluded from power.  From here onwards, Medina distinguished itself as a scholarly city playing the role of a crucible for the study of the holy text and the first Muslim historiographical tradition.¹⁷⁹

First Siege of Mecca

After imposing ‘peace’ on Medina, the army of the central government marched into Mecca. ¹⁸⁰, ¹⁸¹ Abdullah bin Zubayr was not an easy target. He had gathered his supporters from all over Hejaz including Medina. The Kharijis of Yamama had also snuck in to help him under their leader Najada bin ‘Āmir because they considered protecting the Ka’ba from the invaders a religious duty. ¹⁸², ¹⁸³ The army had to besiege the city. This city had no walls.  The term ‘besiege’ means they blockaded the city. ¹⁸⁴ Yazid’s management outside Hejaz had already blockaded the city and they were routinely checking traffic and returning those to their origin who intended to support the efforts of Abdullah bin Zubayr.¹⁸⁵, ¹⁸⁶, ¹⁸⁷. When the siege was prolonged for a month, the army of the central government started bombarding the city, including Ka’ba, with stones with the help of ballistics. ¹⁸⁸.

A rare incident happened on the very first day when the army started bombarding the city.  The Ka’ba caught ablaze due to negligent handling of a fire lit by one of Abdullah bin Zubayr’s soldiers.  The curtains of Ka’ba, and its wooden structures burned down. Its stones cracked.¹⁹⁰, ¹⁹¹, ¹⁹², ¹⁹³  Due to the confusion of the ongoing bombardment, it was very easy for the opponents of Ahl al Jama’ah to shift the blame for the fire onto Yazid and his soldiers.  Hence, Yazid became the first in Islam to damage the Ka’ba intentionally. ¹⁹⁴

Why only Hejaz?

Just like the reporting of the First Arab Civil War, Islamic sources of the Second Arab Civil War are obsessed with events and personalities. They employ all of their eloquence to establish the innocence and righteousness of their favourites and meanness and indecency of the unfavoured.  They leave it to the future historians to dig out the root cause of the trouble.

Noticeably, only people of Hejaz raised arms against the central government in the first phase of the Second Arab Civil War, more precisely Mecca and Medina. Taif remained neutral to some extent. The dissatisfaction of the people of Mecca and Medina toward the central government was only for one reason, according to Islamic sources. That was the immoral character of Yazid.  The question is why only Hejazis were enraged. Were the Arabs of Basrah, Damascus or Fustat not Muslims? Arguably, there was something which hurt mainly the people of Mecca and Medina.

Let’s guess! When the rebels attacked Medina to dislodge Uthman in 656 CE, the caliph entered into an agreement with them. The central government gave a pledge that it will not pay stipends to anybody who did not participate in Futuhul Buldan except the bona fide Companions of the Prophet.  We don’t find any sources for streaming money from the provinces to Mecca and Medina after it. Probably, the succeeding governments of Ali, Hasan and Mu’awiya honored the agreement. ¹⁹⁵  Only a handful of the Prophet’s Companions kept receiving stipends. Most of them were residents of provincial capitals. Residents of the twin towns of Mecca and Medina were disgruntled with the situation.

The first phase of the Second Arab Civil War was a brawl between the factions of Quraysh for the highest chair. ¹⁹⁶ Initially the unsatisfied population of Hejaz had a choice between Husayn and Ibn Zubayr.  They were unsure of Husayn’s success, though. After his death, they embraced Ibn Zubayr wholeheartedly.

Slogans of the Second Arab Civil War

Each participating leader of the Second Arab Civil War knew that both possession of wealth and high number of supporters was key to final success.  Tapping into the religious sentiments of the masses could indeed be a straightforward method to garner support. None of the participants in the Second Arab Civil War presented a clear political, social, or economic manifesto. Similar to the First Arab Civil War, all sides resorted to vilifying their opponents, questioning their adherence to the correct path of religion, in order to incite hatred against them. Yazid labels Ibn Zubayr mulhid, a man of deceit in religion, who slanders noble people. ¹⁹⁷  Ibn Zubayr labels Yazid as “ a man who drinks wine, neglects his prayers, and goes hunting,” ¹⁹⁸  Husayn states, ‘The [Yazid] government has make permissible what Allah had forbidden, violated Allah’s covenants, Opposed Sunnah of the Prophet by acting against servants of Allah sinfully and with hostility. They have neglected the punishments (ḥudūd) laid down by Allah’. ¹⁹⁹

Defaming political opponents in religious terminology became a precedent in Muslim politics later on. There is not a single political movement after the Second Arab Civil War where opponents on both sides don’t blame each other for deviating from Islam. Such blames are usually vague, which means, religion remained the main ideological umbrella for political thoughts, and everybody tried to exploit it without being precise what he meant by his phrases. ²⁰⁰

Passions have played a significant role in shaping the political movements throughout history.  The collective emotions of fear, hate, love, greed, and jealousy can be seen behind many historical changes. Most influential political books, like Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Gorky’s Mother were, anyhow, fictions not facts.

Kharijis during Yazid’s tenure

Mirdās bin ‘Amr had rebelled in Tawwaj during Mu’awiya’s reign. Ibn Ziyad, governor of Basrah, had sent two thousand men to punish him. He easily defeated the government forces.  The matter was pending when Yazid came to power. Ibn Ziyad sent another force of three thousand men in 681 CE.  Mirdas’s companions were inferior in number.  They preferred death on the battle field to surrender. ²⁰¹, ²⁰².

The Khariji ideology smoldered throughout Mu’awiya’s tenure.  Actually, according to statistics, thirteen thousand Kharijis were killed during combined tenures of Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan and his son Ubaydullah bin Ziyad as governors of the Eastern Provinces. Four thousand Kharijis were thrown into prison by Ubaydullah alone.²⁰³  As Yazid took over and politics of the country took a violent turn, the Khariji ideology blazed.

In the fall of 681 CE, a few months after Ibn Zubayr proclaimed independence in Mecca, and when the revolt in Medina was simmering, the people of Yamama accepted Khariji doctrine en masse and raised a banner of revolt under their leader Najadah bin Amir of Hanifa.²⁰⁴  This was for the first time in history of Islam that whole population of a region accepted religious fundamentalism and managed a piece of land. The beleaguered Yazid government did not find any means to contain them.

Mawlas increase political activities

During Mu’awiya’s time, the political role of Mawlas was still that of subservient to the Arab catalyst who had symbolically freed them. ²⁰⁵ Mawlas were trustworthy in the eyes of the symbolic masters. They utilized them at times when they needed strict obedience. ²⁰⁶ As the Second Arab Civil War unfolded, the dynamics between Mawlas and their symbolic masters started changing. Apparently, hostilities among the ruling Arab Muslim elite had compelled them to depend upon Mawlas. By the time of Yazid, we can trace the latent political activism of individual Mawlas, independent of their symbolic masters. ²⁰⁷

Not only this, there is a shred of evidence that Christian subjects of the country had started taking interest in Arab Muslim politics as well. ²⁰⁸

Foreign policy of Yazid

Yazid’s brief tenure was full of internal strife. However, all internal events were of low intensity.  Yazid never needed to withdraw troops from the borders to deploy them against his adversaries.  Raids across the border continued in the Central Asian front.²⁰⁹ The situation was similar on the African front. ²¹⁰.

The dependent territories of the Basrah province had been showing periodic hostilities against Umayyad Caliphate during Mu’awiya’s tenure. The trend continued. Khalifa mentions a revolt in Kabul in 682 CE in which they imprisoned Abu Ubaydah bin Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan, the lieutenant governor of Sistan. Yazid bin Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan went to fight against Kabul but was killed .²¹¹  In the fall of 682 CE Salm bin Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan, the lieutenant governor of Khorasan, sent Talha bin Abdullah bin Khalaf of Khuza’ah to ransom his brother Abu Ubaydah bin Ziyad.  He ransomed him for five hundred thousand dirhams. ²¹²

The only eye-catching change in the foreign policy of the Umayyad Caliphate during Yazid’s tenure was regarding its relations with Byzantine Rome. Immediately after coming to power, Yezid deescalated the military buildup on the naval front. He ordered the destruction of the military installation and the withdrawal of troops from all Mediterranean islands including Cyprus. ²¹³, ²¹⁴  Yazid’s attempt to befriend his Christian subjects more than his predessors explains his attitude towards Byzantine Rome.  Apparently, Byzantine Rome reciprocated the gesture. We don’t hear of any new infiltration of Byzantine Rome in the Rashidun Caliphate during Yazid’s tenure as it was customary during internal stife of the country before Yazid.

In general, border raids were not aimed at occupying territory; they served as a core strategy for the military of the Umayyad Caliphate. These raids persisted against Byzantine Rome at a consistent pace, much like they did during the rule of Mu’awiya. ²¹⁵

Failure against ‘Meccan Alliance’

The last event of Yazid’s tenure, which heralded the downfall of Sufyanids, actually happened after Yazid’s death. The well-paid and well-armed huge army of Syrian Troops, despite its ferocity, failed to dislodge Abdullah bin Zubayr from Mecca. The siege was in its 60^th day when the news of Yazid’s death reached Mecca. ²¹⁶ The army was perhaps already fed up of hearing the chiding for attacking the sacred haram. ²¹⁷  They halted the war, requested permission from Abdullah bin Zubayr to perform Umrah, and once the Umrah was completed, they promptly returned to Syria. ²¹⁸  The illusion of the invincibility of the Syrian Troops, that kept provinces terrified for decades, fizzled out in two months. On their way back, the soldiers of Syrian Troops were so afraid of being looted by the emboldened residents of Hejaz that they had to stick together in groups.²¹⁹, ²²⁰

Death of Yazid

Yazid was in the midst of his youth when he died. ²²¹ His death was so sudden and unexpected that even his own soldiers disbelieved the news. ²²² He was definitely not in a good shape of health. His opponents never got tired of accusing him of drinking alcohol, a charge which he always denied. ²²³  Tabari notes that he had gout and used to soak his feet in water to get cold/hot compression. ²²⁴ No source gives the cause of Yazid’s death. One can guess it could be a sudden metabolic event like cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction.

Yazid’s unanticipated death on the night of November 11, 683 CE, was a surprising twist in the drama of the Second Arab Civil War. ²²⁵ Yazid’s government was a house of cards which Yazid had been protecting against blows. Like some of his predecessors, Ali and Hasan, he never was recognized as a caliph by everybody in the country. Hejaz never came under his ambit properly. After the murder of Husayn, he developed an antagonism with the powerful governor of Eastern Provinces, Ubaydullah bin Ziyad. Ibn Ziyad anticipated that Yazid would dismiss him but Yazid never got in that position. ²²⁶ The Umayyad Caliphate was yet trying to establish a constitutional principle that the sitting caliph would have the sole right to nominate the next caliph. It was not widely accepted among Muslim Arab elite. They still expected that they had a right to give inputs in selection of a new caliph after the death of previous one. Yazid was grappling with the issue. The untimely death of Yazid collapsed the house of cards. ²²⁷  It opened crisis of replacement.  The trouble hotbeds of the country, Hejaz, Kufa and Basrah plunged into disarray. And within a few days after Yazid’s death, the authority of central government shrank to environs of the Sufyanid palace in Damascus.

Ibn ‘Arādah said on Yazid’s death:

Oh Banū Umayyah, the end of your rule
Is a corpse at Huwwārīn, there remaining.

His fate came upon him while by his pillow
Was a cup and a wineskin filled to the brim and overflowing.

Many a plaintive singing girl weeps by his drunken companions,
With a cymbal, now sitting and now standing.  ²²⁸, ²²⁹.

Yazid’s position in history

Out of all rulers of the Umayyad Caliphate the most notorious in political memory of later Muslim generations is Yazid. The murder of Husayn and assault on Ka’ba became his unforgivable crimes.²³⁰ He was only thirteen when Mu’awiya came to power.  He might have been raised in a rich, worry-free environment. He had hobbies. His passion for music and pet dogs was obviously not palatable for pious Muslims. His political opponents took the full advantage to demonize his personality. ²³¹

Anyhow, there is one aspect of his personality which becomes evident from an anecdote.  Being well-versed in the Qur’an was customary among the early Muslim elites. People used to teach the Qur’an to their children at an early age. It does not astonish that young Ali bin Husayn was deft in knowledge of the Quran and could produce quotations from the sacred text in arguments with Yazid, when Ali faced the later in his court. Astonishing is that Yazid asked his second born, Khalid, to respond to him in terms of the Qur’an. It simply means that Yazid had taken pains to teach his children Quran and had expected from them to express it.  When Khalid could not aptly bring any arguments, Yazid himself quoted from the Quran to snub Ali bin Husayn.  It means Yazid himself was well versed in the Quran. ²³²

By the time Yazid came to power decorating Ka’ba, at least once, had become a symbol of sovereign’s attachment with Islam. ²³³  Yazid did his part.  Accroding to Baladhuri, he covered the Ka’ba with Khusruwāni cloth.²³⁴  As Yazid’s government never had full authority over Ka’ba, it can be assumed that Yazid aquired the consent of Ibn Zubayr to do it.

Yazid adopted the same title of the ruler, which his predecessors had – Commander of the Faithful.  He introduced himself by this title in his first official letter which he wrote to his governor of Medina to arrest opposition figures.  Not only this, his letter had full Islamic format as the letters of his predessors had.²³⁵

Lastly, the comments of the anonymous chronicler of Spain writing in Latin in 741 CE:  ‘a most pleasant man and deemed highly agreeable by all the people of his rule. He never, as is the wont of men, sought glory for himself because of his royal rank, but lived as a citizen along with all the common people.’²³⁶

History, as a modern science, seeks explanation of the events. Events are already known to everybody. Modern historians tend to look for the causes in fields like economics, geography, environment or technological changes. All of them do influence the events but they cannot explain each and every facet of an even. Yazid took over a popular, smoothly running and economically stable government.  He left it in an impending chaos. Why and how? Were there any sudden economic, geographic, environmental or technological changes? We don’t find any.  The only reasons we find, objectively, from the sources of the history of Yazid’s failures, are the perceived personal habbits of Yazid and religiosity of common people. Sentiments do play role in historical events.  They are an independent factor, in addition to economics, geography, environment or technological changes.

End notes

1. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 2.
2. Yazid started his reign on April 21, 680 CE. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 109, Year 64. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 930.  See also: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 306.
3. Yazid was born in 646 CE, fourteen years after the death of Prophet Muhammad. For the date, see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 13.
4. Yazid’s mother was Maysūn bint Haḥdal of Kalb tribe.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 111, Year 64 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 226. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 930).
5. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 188.
6. Islam doesn’t discriminate between the children of different wives. The debate was influenced by an Arab mindset rooted in tribal traditions.  (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 304.)
7. The assertion is confirmed by John bar Penkaye: “When Mu’awiya ended his days and left the word, Yazid his son reigned in his stead.  He did not follow in the footsteps of his father”.  (Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75)
8. This coin is guessed to be from 61 AH (681 CE).  Obverse has typical late Sassanian bust, i.e. profile portrait of Khosrow II, enclosed by double circle.  On the left is written in Pahlavi script “GDH ‘FZWT (“Increase of Glory”).  On the right, in front of the head a legend in Pahlavi “Ḥwslwy” (“Khosrow”) is written.  On the obverse margin is the usual star-and-crescent ornament with a legend in Pahlavi ‘PD (“excellent”).  The reverse has typical Sassanian fire-altar with attendants.  The Pahlavi legend on the far left says: S.NT ‘YWK (“Year one”).  On the far right it reads: Y YZYT (“Of Yazīd).  No mint is mentioned on this coin. Worth noting is that the name Khosrow is not substituted with Yazid. It is also worth noting that there are no indications of Islamic characters on the coin. The Pahlavi “excellent” is not replaced with “Bism Allah”.  (M. I. Mochiri, “A Sasanian-style Coin from Yazīd bin Mu’āwiya”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, (1982): 137 – 141.  Plate I.) The current location of the coin is unknown.  For Hoyland’s comments on the issue see:  Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 130.
9. Archaeologists have discovered an inscription at Samrūnīyyāt about 12 km south-west of Qaṣr Burqu’ in modern Jordan. It is probably written by a Christen soldier of Yazid.  The inscription reads, ‘Yazid the king’.  (Younis al-Shdaifat, Ahmad Al-Jallad, Zeyad al-Salameen, Rafe Harahsheh, “An early Christian Arabic graffito mentioning ‘Yazīd the King’ ”, Arabian Archaeology and Epigraphy, Vol 28, Issue 2 (November 2017): 315 – 324.  Fig. 1.) As a graffiti sheds light on what transpired in the mind of a person at the time of writing, it is apparent that the soldier was proud of his king.
10. Younis al-Shdaifat, Ahmad al-Jallad, Zeyad al-Salameen, and Rafe Harahsheh, “An Early Christian Arabic Graffito Mentioning ‘Yazīd the King’,” Arabian Archaeology and Epigraphy 28 no. 2 (2017): 315 – 324.
11. “The strength of [Arab] men declined under his[Yazid’s] weak government,” analyzes John bar Penkaye. (Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75)
12. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 93, year 60  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 2. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 930
13. Abdur Rahman bin Abu Bakr had died by that time.  He died in 673 CE.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 76, year 53).
14. Initially, Abdullah bin Umar responded to Walid’s messenger that when everybody else gives oath he would give it as well.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 9). Later on, when the provinces had pledged allegiance to Yazid he also gave allegiance.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),10.)  Abdullah bin Umar was a soldier by trade  In this capacity, he participated in the campaign of Tabaristan in 651 CE under the command of Sa’id bin As. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42.  During the later years of his life, Abdullah bin Umar turned more towards religion and Tabari describes him as a pious person who did not have any interest in worldly matters. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 208).
15. Only those participate in the race to the ‘White House’ who have a glimmer of hope of reaching the finish line. Abdullah bin Umar had no political supporters in the country – thanks to selfless service of his father to the country.
16. Abdallah bin Zubayr had always been a person with political bend. He attended the proceedings of the arbitration between Ali and Mu’awiya enthusiastically. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 107).  His trade was soldiers. He had participated in the campaign of Tabaristan under the leadership of Sa’id bin As during Uthman’s tenure in 651 (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42).  He was active in the military of the Umayyad Caliphate as well and in this capacity he fought on the Byzantine Rome front under the command of Yazid in 669 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 94).
17. Husayn bin Ali was the secondborn of Ali bin Abu Talib.  When Husayn came of age, he joined the military of the Rashidun Caliphate as a soldier.  In this capacity, he participated in the campaign of Tabaristan under the leadership of Sa’id bin As in 651 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42.). He got involved in the politics of the country later on and participated in the Battle of Siffin from Ali’s side.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 41).  He was an advisor to his brother Hasan after the death of his father, Ali.  He was totally opposed to Hasan’s policy of reconciliation with Mu’awiya.  He implored his brother and warned him not to believe Mu’awiya’s story and advised him to believe the story of Ali at a time when Hasan was at the verge of surrendering his claim to the caliphate. Hasan had to snub him, saying he didn’t know as much as Hasan did.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 5).  Husayn had pledged allegiance to Mu’awiya as part of the peace deal signed with Hasan. Since then, he had taken residence in Medina.
18. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 3, 4, 5.
19. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 94, 95.  Year 60 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 6, 7.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 931.  See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 47).
20. Husayn reached Mecca on May 9, 680 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 64, 84). It took five nights to complete a journey that should have taken only two. Clearly, he was trying to avoid arrest by staying off the radar of government spies.
21. For dismissal of Walid bin Utba see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 90, year 60. ‘Amr bin Sa’id bin As was governor over Mecca at the time of Mu’awiya’s death.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 2.  One source of Tabari gives the date of dismissal to be June 680 CE, other sources give it July 680.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 10, 15, 90.
22. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 243
23. G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 46
24. For a detailed description of the Second Arab Civil War see:  Gernot Rotter, Die Umayyaden und der zweite Burgerkreig (680 – 692) (Wiesbaden, 1982).  AND   R. Sellheim, Der zweite Burgrerkrieg im Islam (680-962), Extrait des Sitzungsberichte der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft an der J. W. Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt/Main, VIII/4, 1969, pp. 87 – 111, Weibaden 1970.  Another work that deals with it is: ‘Abd al-Ameer ‘Abd Dixon, The Umayyad Caliphate, 65 – 86/684 – 705: (a political study), (London: Luzac, 1971).
25. Unlike the First Arab Civil War, the descendants of Talha bin Ubaydullah were junior partners in the ‘Mecca Alliance’.  Ishaq bin Talha bin Ubaydullah had died in 676 CE.  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 83, Year 56. Ibrahim bin Talha became a member of the ‘Mecca Alliance’ under the leadership of Ibn Zubayr. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 92, 93. )
26. When Husayn left Mecca for Kufa, governor ‘Amr bin Sa’id sent messengers to him as a last ditch attempt to prevent Husayn from his designs.  The messengers reiterated Yazid’s stand and warned Husayn to fear Allah and leave the people unified (jamā’ah) and don’t split this community (Ummah).  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 70).  Similarly, ‘Amr bin Ḥajjāj was a supporter of Yazid, fighting against Husayn and his companions.  Before the battle started he expressed the political stand of ahl al Jami’ah in the presence of the followers of Husyan. He said, “People of Kufa! Stay steadfast in your obedience and unity (Jamā’ah). Do not have any doubts about fighting against those who have strayed from the true religion and have opposed the imām.”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 137).  The godfather of Ahl al Jami’ah was Uthman bin Affan.  When the news of Husayn’s death reached Medina through a messenger sent by Ubaydullah bin Ziyad to ‘Amr bin Sa’īd bin ‘Ās, governor of Medina, the women of Banu Hashim lamented bitterly. ‘Amr bin Sa’id laughed and said this lamentation is in return for the lamentation for ‘Uthman bin ‘Affan.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 177)
27. See the contents of the letter Husayn wrote to his supporters in Basrah.  He outlined his political philosophy in this letter.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 31, 32).  When the forces of Ibn Ziyad halted Husayn on the fringes of Kufa and negotiations started, Husayn claimed that he had more right to correct things because he was Husayn bin Ali, the son of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 96.
28. While talking to Husayn in Mecca, Ibn Zubayr claimed that only the sons of the early Muhajirun had the right to govern the country.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 67.).
29. Hawting comments, “Ibn Zubayr does not seem to have espoused any distinctive religious or political program in the manner of the Shi’ites and the Kharijites (we are told that his alliance with the kharijites foundered when he refused to accept their religious and political program), and it seems that he won support mainly because of his status as one of the first generation of Muslims and a member of Quraysh at a time when the Umayyads were weak and opposition to them strong in different quarters.  One thing that is notable, however, is the strong association between him and the Muslim sanctuary at Mecca. (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 49).
30. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 89.
31. On reaching Mecca, Ibn Zubayr simply requested Ḥārith bin Khālid of the Makhzūm clan to stop leading the prayers. He complied. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 11.).
32. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),11
33. Amr bin Sa’id had already put Amr bin Zubayr in charge of his police in Medina because Amr bin Sa’id was aware of enmity between the two brothers. Amr bin Zubayr flogged a group of people in Medina who were supporters of Ibn Zubayr. Those who got flogged included Mundhir bin Zubayr, (Abdullah bin Zubayr’s brother), Mundhir’s son Muhammad bin Mundhir, Khubayb bin Abdullah bin Zubayr, and Muhammad bin ‘Ammar bin Yāsir (see how party changed). Each of them got forty to sixty lashes. The few supporters of Ibn Zubayr could escape to Mecca unharmed (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 11, 12).
34. Both Husayn and Ibn Zubayr entered into negotiations about who would rule Mecca and later the country in future political set up.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 69.)
35. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 94, 95.  Year 60. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 23
36. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 67.
37. The political case of the ‘Meccan Alliance’ was the weakest.  The stance of Ahl al Jami’ah, that the unity of Ummah was of utmost importance and whoever governs the country is of secondary significance, appealed to many. Similarly, the stance of Shi’a Ali that the family of the founder of religion has the first right to govern over a country that had come into existence as a result of founding of religion, was valid in eyes of many. Ibn Zubayr’s only option was to play the ‘religious card’ to attract support. John bar Penkaye notes, “Zubayr made his voice heard from afar.  He said of himself that he had come out of zeal for the house of God. He threatened the west [Umayyads], as transgressors of the Law.  So he went south, into the place where was their place of worship, and settled there.” (Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75).  It appears that Husayn did not consider the idea of using the sanctuary as a shield and get killed there in case of defeat as morally justifiable. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 69.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 941.)
38. According to Tabari, the force that went to Mecca against Ibn Zubayr consisted of a few dozen men on the dīwān, many mawlas of people of Medina and seven hundred men of Aslam. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 12).  For the total number of soldiers see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 16.
39. For the government’s debate on whether or not to raid the sanctuary see: al-Waqidi’s Kitab al-Maghazi.; The life of Muhammad, edited by Rizwi Faizer, translated by Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail, Abdulkader Tayob.  Routledge New York 2011; 415.  See also: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 95, Year 60 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),12, 13, 16
40. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 13, 14.
41. The force that came to dislodge Ibn Zubayr had no coherence. The official police and tribal lashkar of Aslam fought separately.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 13. The reluctance to raid the sanctuary was at the minds of official policemen. Their commander, Amr bin Zubayr, sent a message to Abdullah bin Zubayr just before the start of war to surrender and avoid fighting in the sacred city. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 13). The secondary audience for this message might include his own men, whom he wished to persuade that it was Ibn Zubayr who had created a situation where a raid on the sanctuary was unavoidable.
42. One of the commanders of Ibn Zubayr’s forces was Muṣ’ab bin Abdur Rahman bin Awf) (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),14).  Mus’ab’s appearance here gives a clue how alignment of the Second Arab Civil War was.  Mus’ab bin Abdur Rahman died during the siege of Mecca by end of 683 CE. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 111, Year 64
43. Unays bin Amr, the leader of Aslam portion of the forces of the provincial government, was killed in the campaign.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 16). Amr bin Zubayr, the overall commander of the forces of the provincial government, was arrested alive. Abdullah bin Zubayr initially imprisoned him, and then asked his Medinite supporters to flog him as many times as they were flogged in retaliation.  Amr bin Zubayr could not endure the extensive flogging and died. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 16.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 964). Apparently, Zubayrid’s supporters had reached Medina from Mecca and they took vengeance physically.
44. Husayn was born in 625 CE.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 936.  Tabari states his age as fifty-five. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 82.  Ya’qubi gives his age at death as fifty-six. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 936
45. For the presence of a strong group of Shi’a Ali in Yemen see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 67
46. For activities of Shi’a Ali in Basrah see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 26, 27, 36.
47. Husayn did not limit his appeal to Shi’a Ali.  He also tried to win over prominent members of the neutral party. See, for example, his letter written to Ahnaf bin Qays in Basrah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),32.
48. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 25
49. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),16, 17. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 931
50. It seems that Husayn lacked confidence in the strength of his support in Kufa, as he requested Muslim to go there and verify the accuracy of the reports. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),17, 26, 27). There are reports that many of Husayn’s sympathizers did not trust in loyalty of Kufans. They were of the view that Shi’a Ali of Kufa loved the glitter of Dirhams and Dinars more than they loved Husayn. They were government employees and their support to Husayn was just lip service. Those who were promising to fight with Husayn might fight against him when the time comes.  For such comments from Husyan’s sympathizers in Mecca see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 66).
51. Muslim bin Aqil was a young man.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 55
52. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 8, 83.
53. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 67
54. The shakiness of Shi’a Ali of Kufa was apparent to many political observers. Some of those political observers were sympathizers of Husayn. Farazdaq, for example, commented that the hearts of the people were with Husayn but their swords were with Banu Umayya. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 93, year 60. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 71).
55. Suggestions to Husayn for his future line of action were numerous. Someone advised Husayn to go to the territory of Tayy and organize a rebellion with their help. Their mountains had defended them against Ghassan, Himyar and Nu’man bin Mundhir, he said. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 99, 100)
56. Soon after, Abdullah bin Abbas pledged allegiance to Yazid.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 10).  He took retirement from active politics and took up residence in Taif. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 124, Year 68.). Probably he chose Taif because he might have inherited the vineyard from his father.
57. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 89.
58. For the date of the departure of Husayn to Kufa see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 64.
59. Abdullah bin Amr bin As was in Mecca by the time Husayn left Mecca. He sympathized with Husayn but he didn’t accompany Husayn. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 71, 72.).  Abdullah bin Amr’s tug-of war had continued with Mu’awiya after former’s dismissal as governor of Egypt.  Abdullah  bin Amr had an estate in Taif. Mu’awiya had offered to buy it above market price but Abdullah refused. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 71, 72.). This is the last entry of Abdullah bin Amr in the history of Islam. After him, the family of Amr bin As disappeared in anonymity.
60. According to Muslim’s assessment, a majority (jam’) of Kufa was with Husayn. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 84.
61. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 92, Year 60.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),17, 30, 47.  AND (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 931.
62. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42
63. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),17, 29.
64. Governor Nu’man bin Bashir was not a sympathizer of Husayn. He was reluctant to crack down on the potential rebellion on the grounds that nobody had yet defied government authority. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),29).  He remained loyal to the Yazid government (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 36) and acted as Yazid’s ambassador to the revolting Medinites later (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 199,200)
65. Kufa had a population of forty thousand (see above).  Out of them, only eighteen thousand had assured Muslim bin Aqil of their support to Husayn.
66. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),17, 30.
67. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 18, 31.
68. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 92, Year 60.
69. Ubaydullah bin Ziyad was the son of late governor Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan. He was born and raised in Basrah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 7). He was a young man, just twenty-five, when Mu’awiya appointed him as lieutenant governor of Khorasan in 674 CE after death of his father. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 76, 77, Year 7.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 175. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 917).  He served as the lieutenant governor of Khorasan for two years.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 179). He was a successful lieutenant governor and is reputed to have raided Bukhara, Ramithan and Baykand successfully.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 80, 81.  Year 54.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 178, 179. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 918).  Mu’awiya was so happy with the efficiency of Ibn Ziyad that he gave him governorship of the largest province of the country – Basrah, in 675 CE.   (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 180. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 918). He served as governor of Basra until Mu’awiya died and Yazid took over.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), P 82, Year 55.  See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000) 40.). Name of Ubaydullah’s mother was Marjānah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 36.
70. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 18, 36
71. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 20, 20. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 932
72. It was the same day, September 9, 680 CE, on which Husayn left Mecca for Kufa.  See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 64, 84.
73. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 20, 20.
74. For the tribal affiliation of Hani’ and how Muslim ended up in his house see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 18).
75. Ubaydullah was with only thirty policemen and ten Ashraf and his own family when he barricaded himself in the mosque. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 48)
76. The Ashraf who spoke to the crowd emphasized on three points. One, that those who obey the government could expect additional monetary grants and kind treatment. Two, those who remain disloyal would be punished monetarily and physically. Three, that Syrian Troops were on their way to enforce order in the city.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),50).
77. Eighteen thousand Kufans had promised Muslim bin Aqil their support and some of them had contributed to the movement financially. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 17, 30, 47).  When Muslim appealed them to come to streets only four thousand gathered.  Even they dispersed after hearing hollow threats in the speeches of Ashraf, whom Ibn Ziyad had sent to convince them to disperse. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 20, 21.) It appears that the majority of people who participated in the street procession were youth because elderly men and women (either their own parents or their other elderly relatives) coerced them out of the procession.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 20, 21, 49, 51.)
78. One speech made by Kathīr bin Shihāb, a Sharif of Azd tribe has survived, “O people, go back to your families.  Do not hurry into evil actions.  Do not expose yourselves to death.  These are soldiers of the Commander of the Faithful, Yazīd, who were approaching.  The governor has given Allah a promise that, if you persist in fighting him and do not go away by nightfall, he will deprive your children of their ‘aṭā’. Also he will scatter your soldiers in Syrian campaigns without rations (ṭama’), holding the healthy responsible for the sick and those present for those who are absent until none of the rebellious people remain who have not tasted the evil consequences of what their hands have earned.”  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 50
79. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 92, Year 60.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 21, 61, 62). AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 932
80. Ubaydullah continued to kill the supporters of Husayn in Kufa after the execution of Muslim up to the time Husayn reached in vicinity of Kufa.  He continued to grease the Ashraf with gratuity. All of the Ashraf turned their coats within days. Political sympathy for Husayn was limited to commoners. Even they did not have courage to refuse fighting for Ibn Ziyad. When he ordered to serve in the contingent to halt Husayn, a big crowd gathered to be inspected by the government officials for the job. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 98
81. Husayn received the report of killing of Muslim three miles away from Qadisiyyah. The report was brought by Ḥurr bin Yazīd of Tamim. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),74. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 932
82. After his arrest, Muslim had sent a message to Husayn through a sympathizer who was actually a government officer. Muslim briefed Husayn not to come to Kufa, as Kufans had betrayed their cause. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 56, 59).
83. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),74, 75, 87, 88
84. William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 307.
85. Ubaydullah’s crack down on opposition in Kufa was swift. Muslim bin Aqil had written a positive report to Husayn just seventeen days before his execution. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 84).
86. Actually Ubaydullah had sealed all the roads leading from Kufa to Mecca, Syria and Basrah so nobody could enter or leave Kufa.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 79. For the locations of the barricades on the roads see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 83.
87. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),75.
88. Tabari alleges that when Husayn came to know that the guards were ordered to halt him and not to confront him, he declared that he would see Yazid in person and would argue with him, and he kept option of pledging allegiance to Yazid open.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 79).  Tabari maintains this position throughout his narration of the event, though at one point he discloses that there were people during Tabari’s time who did not believe that Husayn kept the option of giving allegiance to Yazid open. Instead, his only aim was to start a dialogue with Yazid himself.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 109.)
89. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 97, Year 61. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 933.
90. For the strength of the army see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),103. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 933.
91. For him being the closest descendent the Prophet alive at that time see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 124. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 935.
92. People used to call Husayn ‘son of the Prophet’ instead of ‘son of Ali’.  See for this attribute: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 93, year 60.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 96
93. Actually, one of the suggestions Husayn got on his way to Kufa was that Husayn shouldn’t attempt to snatch the government from the Umayyads because if they kill him during the attempt, the sacredness of Islam, the veneration of Quraysh, and the esteem of Arabs will decrease in the eyes of the common people.  And Banu Umayyah will be left without any body to fear about.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 85)
94. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75.
95. ‘Umar bin Sa’d bin Waqqas was a member of Ahl al Jama’ah in Kufa and a strong ally of Yazid (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 30).  He was sitting beside Ibn Ziyad as a gesture of loyalty at the time of the arrest of Muslim bin Aqil.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 58.
96. Many people advised Umar to refuse Ubaydullah.  Hamza bin Mughira bin Shu’ba, who was the son of Umar’s sister, advised Umar bin Sa’d bin Waqqas not to go against Husyan, otherwise he will have to meet Allah with Husyan’s blood on his hands.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),104)
97. Jabir bin Abdullah of Ansar, Abu Sa’id al Khudri, Sahl bin Sa’d al Sā’idi, Zayd bin Arqam and Anas bin Malik were the Companions of the Prophet who participated in the army that killed Husayn.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 124)
98. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75, 109. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 934
99. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 110
100. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 124
101. In Ubaydullah bin Ziyad’s words: “Now when our claws cling on him, he hopes for escape but now is not the time for escape.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 106)
102. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 933
103. Umar bin Sa’d remarked that Husayn will not surrender as he was a proud man.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 111
104. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75.  Husayn had an established descent from a respectable clan of the Quraysh. Descent of Ubaydullah bin Ziyad was doubtful.
105. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 110
106. The forces of the provincial government had surrounded Husayn and his companions in the middle of nowhere.  They wanted to make sure that Husayn’s party received neither shelter nor provisions.  The area was generally called Ṭaff.  It was actually a semi-arid plateau. For the name of the area, its location and its characteristics see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 109. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 142. AND Yaqut III 539.  The exact location, where Husayn got halted on the road from Kufa to Damascus, was called Karbala.  It was just near the bank of Euphrates. For the name and its location see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 79.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 933.  Just to make sure that Husayn’s people don’t use the river to get water, a contingent of the provincial forces was deployed between Husayn’s camp and the river. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),107)
107. For general reluctance on the part of soldiers of central government to kill Husayn see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 126, 139, 153).  For joining of Ḥurr Husayn’s side on this ground see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 79, 80, 121, 127
108. There were a few Kufans who reached Husayn to join his camp and were killed.  See, for example, a couple of Kufa who joined Husayn: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 129.).
109. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 129
110. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 92, Year 60.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 82.  AND (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 935.  See also: (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 50).
111. Husayn died of multiple wounds. He received his first wound from Mālik bin Nusayr of Kindah. He struck Husayn with a sword on his head injuring his scalp. Husayn tied his turban around the wound. He got exhausted due to this wound and became less active.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 97, Year 61 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 153. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 935). Husayn’s second wound was an arrow thrown by Ḥusayn bin Tamīm which landed in Husayn’s mouth. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 156).  Then Abānī lodged another arrow in Husayn’s throat.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 156).  Sinān bin Anas of Nakha’i tribe stabbed him and he fell down. Sinān killed him and cut off his head.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160, 161). Husayn had a total of thirty three stab wounds [lacerations] and thirty four blows [bruises] on his dead body.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161).
112. According to Tabari, Shimar did not kill Husayn himself.  But all the five foot soldiers who attacked Husayn to kill him were under his personal command and he supervised them. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 157).
113. For biographical details of Shamir see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 79, 121, 179.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),26
114. For Ibn Ziyad sending the head to Yazid see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 935
115. Umar bin Sa’d ordered Husayn’s headless body to be trampled under the horses and it was done. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 163)
116. Mu’awiya had started the mutilation of dead bodies and parading their heads through the town to incite terror in the general public. The first head that was rotated through the town on top of a spear was that of ‘Amr bin Ḥamiq of Khuza’a tribe, an Ansar and Companion of the Prophet. Mu’awiya’s lieutenant governor of Mosul had killed him on charges of murdering Uthman. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 910). A few days later, Ubaydullah bin Ziyad had ordered killing of Muslim bin Aqil by the stroke of a sword and threw his body in the street without praying over him.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 61).  He had severed the heads of Muslim and Hani’ and had sent them to Yazid as trophies (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 63. The severed heads used to be treated with chemicals to prevent decay before transporting them.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1071.)
117. One very important personality of Banu Hashim who did not accompany Husayn and decided to remain in Medina was Abdullah bin Ja’far. He was bitterly against Hasan’s decision to surrender in favour of Mu’awiya. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 5). Since then he had stayed in Medina.  We don’t know of his reasons not to accompany Husayn. A guess could be that he disagreed with Husayn’s line of action. A clue comes from the tradition that when the governor of Medina, Amr bin Sa’id, tried to prevent Husayn from traveling from Mecca to Kufa, he sent Abdullah bin Ja’far to convince Husayn. Abdullah told Husayn that this journey would bring destruction to him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 73, 74.)  Abdullah bin Ja’far’s two sons Awn and Muhammad got killed along with Husayn at Karbala.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 152).  When the news reached Medina, Abdullah bin Ja’far mourned the death of his two sons and that of Husayn.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 177, 178). Abdullah bin ja’far is known to have received one million Dirhams from Yazid bin Mu’awiya after murder of Husain bin ‘Ali. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 200).  This is the last entry of Abdullah bin Ja’far in the history of Islam. He died in Medina in 699 CE. He was financially destitute that time.  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 143, Year 80.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 981
118. Some soldiers from the provincial forces plundered Husayns’s personal belongings, turmeric, garments and the camels. Then they turned to womenfolk and ripped the clothes off their backs. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 935). When Umar bin Sa’d came to know the incident he strictly forbade to plunder belongings of Husayn’s camp or to enter into the women’s tent. He also ordered to return the already plundered items. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161, 162)
119. One of Husayn’s soldiers, Suwayd bin ‘Amr bin Abi Muṭa’, was wounded and unconscious on the battle field.  When he gained consciousness the battle was over and Husayn was killed.  He started fighting again and got killed.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161).  Technically he was the last to be killed.  One of Husayn’s soldiers did not get killed.  He took refuge with people of his tribe Asad, part of opposition forces.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 163).  One of Husayn’s soldiers fled from the battle field after informing Husayn of his intention and getting permission from Husayn to do so.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 148, 149)
120. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 163
121. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 163
122. When Husayn advanced from Mecca to Kufa, a number of tribesmen had joined his caravan in hopes of being in good books of the next caliph.  When the troops of the provincial government halted the caravan near Kufa, Husayn allowed everybody to leave if they wished so.The tribesmen left. Only those remained with him who ultimately died with him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 89, 115. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 934.). The total number of people who fought from Husayn’s side was definitely not enormous. Traditionalists differ from each other in the exact number. At one place, Tabari states that the total strength of Husayn’s fighters was forty five horsemen and hundred foot soldiers. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),75.). Those who died are however a total of thirty two horsemen and forty foot soldiers with Husayn. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),120) Out of those who fought and died few were Husayn’s family members. Others were Shi’a Ali’s. The number again differs in different traditions. At one place, Tabari states that out of those who fought from Husayn’s side, eighteen were his relatives and eighty were Shi’a Ali’s. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 169). At other place he tells that in Husayn’s entourage there were five sons of Ali and sixteen members of banu Hashim [total twenty-one] and all others were from other tribes who were their allies (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 80). Full list of those who got killed on Husayn’s side can be seen at: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 96, 97 Year 61 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 179
123. For details of the incident in modern historical literature see: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 307 – 311.
124. Photographer G. Eric and Edith Matson, 1932. Current location Matson Photograph Collection at library of Congress. Accession number: LC-M33-4770.
125. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 182
126. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 91
127. See Hawting’s brief comments on the future significance of incident of Karbala.  (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 50).
128. The events of Karbala and their explanation made a core part of the religious beliefs of the Shi’a sect of Islam. Muir notes, “The tragedy is yearly represented as a religious ceremony, especially by the Shi’a, in the “Passion Play,” throughout which are interwoven, in a supernatural romance, the lives of the early worthies of Islām, ending with the pathetic tale of the martyr company of Kerbalā; while Abu Bekr, ‘Omar, and ‘Othmān are execrated as usurpers, and the whole Umeiyad crew, ‘Obeidallh, Al- Ḥajjāj etc., are held up to malediction.”  (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 312.).  The details, and the way they are narrated have seen many changes over time.  (Kamran Scot Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran, (Seatle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 111).
129. For the earliest narration of events of Karbala and the lives of Shi’a Imams from Shi’a’s point of view see the 1022 CE book: Shaykh al-Mufid, Kitab al-Irshad: the book of guidance into lives of the twelve Imams. Trans. I. K. A. Howard (Tahrike Tarsil e Quran inc., 1980).
130. G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 51
131. Umar bin Sa’d sent the heads of Husayn and seventy two others to Ibn Ziyad the same day they were killed. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 163, 164).  Ibn Ziyad displayed the head of Husayn in front of an assembly of the Ashraf in the town’s governor house.  Then he circulated it around Kufa in display. After that he sent Husayn’s and all other heads to Yazid bin Mu’awiya. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 165, 168). Yazid came to know about death of his opponents on receiving the heads. To express his pleasure Yazid poked the mouth of Husayn’s head with his cane disgustingly. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 936)
132. For Yazid’s pleasure with the news and the early understanding of his blunder see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 9, 10.  See also comments of Muir: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 311.
133. Yahya bin Hakam was brother of Marwan bin Hakam.  He was present in Yazid’s court when the heads of dead ones were brought.  Apparently it was after his criticism that Yazid changed his stance. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 170). Actually, the criticism of Yazid among his own inner circle started when the news of the murder of Husayn reached Damascus.  When Yazid poked the mouth of head of Husayn with his cane in an insulting way, a courtier of his, who according to Ibn Sa’d’s Tabaqat was a Companion of the Prophet, reminded Yazid of relationship of this mouth to the Prophet.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76.
134. Yahya bin Hakam served as governor over Medina briefly when Hajjaj was appointed in Iraq. Later, he left for Syria assigning his position to Aban bin Uthman, whom Abdul Malik confirmed. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 1610, year 86.  He left for Syria in Oct/Nov 695 Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Everett K. Rowson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 92
135. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 81, 169
136. Umar bin Sa’d left the site of Karbala two days after the battle, along with the daughters and sisters of Husayn and the children who were with them including ‘Ali bin Husayn who was sick.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76, 164). Ibn Ziyad imprisoned them all.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),81).  He asked for instructions from Yazid what to do with them. Yazid ordered him to send all of them to him.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 173).  The heads of seventy-two bodies had already reached Yazid by that time.  The provincial government bore the cost of the imprisonment and travel to Damascus (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),81
137. It appears that initially, on their arrival, Yazid impressed his supremacy over them.  Yazid could have arranged a secluded housing for the women and children before their arrival, if he wished to express unconditional regard.  Instead, he designed their appearance in front of him in presence of his officials and soldiers, like common prisoners of war.  Nobody provided veils to the women and low ranking soldiers present there would comment on their beauty and ask for them vulgarly. Yazid argued with the women and children about them being politically and religiously wrong. His gestures assured everybody present that he had power to harm them but he didn’t. Only after that he ordered arrangements to escort them to Medina in a way which was honorable in eyes of Muslim Arabs. While the arrangements were being made, he kept them in secluded place with his own womenfolk.  He also compensated them for the looting of their property. See details: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76, 77, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175.  Observers knew that Yazid’s behavior of initially intimidating the women and children when they arrived and then getting soft on them was to impress on them that he had subdued them.  See the letter Abdullah bin Abbas wrote to Yazid: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 942, 943.
138. Ali al-Asghar bin Husayn bin Ali survived the tragedy of Karbala.  He was sick and did not participate in the war.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76).  When Sa’d bin Umar came to know about him, he ordered his soldiers not to harm him and sent him to Ibn Ziyad.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161, 162).  Ibn Ziyad subjected him to medical examination and, finding that he had attained adulthood, wished to kill him as a prisoner of war. Zaynab bint Ali’s passionate plea spared the life of Ali al Asghar. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76, 167).  Ibn Ziyad sent him along with the women to Yazid on Yazid’s orders. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76). After initial arguments with him in the presence of his officials, Yazid lodged him in the secluded house where the other women were lodged. He used to invite Ali bin Husayn to eat meals with him and used to tell him that if it were up to him, he would not have killed Husayn. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 172)
139. The life of three boys of Banu Hashim was spared due to their tender age. Ali bin Husayn, Hasan bin Hasan bin Ali, and ‘Amr bin Hasan bin Ali. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 180, 181).
140. Ya’qubi states that Ali bin Husayn’s mother’s name was Ḥarār bint Yazdagird and tells that Husayn used to call her Ghazālah. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 937, 1016)
141. Sukayna bint Husayn bin Ali was probably one of the prisoners.  She died in Medina in 735 CE.  Ali’s daughter Fatima also died in the same year. (Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Ummayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 234, Year 117. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 123. )
142. When Yazid requested him to attack Ibn Zubayr few months later, he refused flatly saying he will not commit two actions, killing of the son of Apostle of Allah and attacking the House of Allah for the sake of a sinner [Yazid]. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 204. Ibn Ziyad never denied that he had anything to do with the murder of Husayn. When Ibn Ziyad was on the run after being chased away by the people of Basrah, somebody asked him a pinching question if he ever repented for the killing of Husayn. He answered no. “Husayn came wanting to kill me, but I preferred killing him to his killing me,” was his explanation.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 35, 36). He simply wanted Yazid to be co-responsible for the action.
143. Tough he could not produce the letter when Ibn Ziyad insisted on it.
144. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 64.
145. See comments of Muir: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 313.
146. Mecca had supported Mu’awiya during the First Arab Civil War. Banu Umayya had left Mecca since then. They had either gone to provinces for government posts or had taken residence in Medina. By the time of the Second Arab Civil War, no notable personality of Banu Umayyah resided in Mecca.
147. Immediately Husayn left Mecca for Kufa, political observers like Abdullah bin Abbas could note that Ibn Zubayr was in a position to take care of Hejaz. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 68).
148. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 189.  See also brief comments of an anonymous chronicler of 741 CE: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 620
149. There was no one in Mecca, Medina or Taif who did not accept Ibn Zubayr as the local ruler. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)
150. In a fierce speech on the occasion of the declaration of independence made in front of a supporting crowd, Ibn Zubayr condemned the murder of Husayn, placed the responsibility of the murder on Yazid, and praised Husayn as more worthy of being caliphate than Yazid was. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 189, 190). It was apparently attempt to win over Shi’a Ali of Hejaz.
151. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 218.
152. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 191
153. Yazid dismissed Amr bin Sa’id just after murder of Husayn.  He accused him of being soft at Ibn Zubayr. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 92, Year 60; P 97, Year 61. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 188, 193, 196.).
154. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),196
155. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 197
156. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 197
157. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 197, 198
158. Somewhere by this time, Yazid even offered Ibn Zubayr governorship of Hejaz if he accepts Yazid as caliph. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 107, Year 63)
159. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 198
160. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 99, Year 63.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 198, 219
161. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 99, Year 63. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 198, 199, 219
162. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 198
163. Khalifa notes that despite the hatred against Yazid and the love for Ibn Zubayr, the inhabitants of Medina were so divided that, when the council of common people had to select a leader, they could not agree on one name.  Resultantly they chose two leaders. One by the name of Abdullah bin Hanzalah for Ansar and another by the name of Abdullah bin Muti’ al ‘Adawi for the Quraysh. Neutral political observers, like Abdullah bin Abbas, expressed that the development was doomed from the beginning. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 100, Year 63.)
164. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 100, Year 63. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 201, 206
165. Total number of exiled was one thousand.  They included governor Uthman bin Muhammad, all of Banu Umayyah residents of Medina and their Mawlas and some Quraysh supporters of the government.  They all gathered in Marwan bin Hakam’s house.  Marwan acted as their leader in negotiating safe exit for the group.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 202.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 943)
166. Khalifa informs us that hordes after hordes of Medinans were willing to fight against Syrian army.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 101, Year 63
167. Each of the twelve thousand men got one thousand Dirhams extra in addition to his usual salary.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 203
168. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 208, 217.  Khalifa gives the date of August 26, 683 CE.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 104, Year 63
169. For location of Harrah see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 207
170. For details of the fight see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 101, 102, Year 63.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 208, 209,210, 211, 212, 219, 220. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 943, 944, 945
171. Total casualties on the Medinan side was three hundred and six. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 104, Year 63
172. An important personality who got killed fighting from the Medinan side was Zayd bin Abdur Rahman bin Awf.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 210). Another prominent personality who fought from Medinan side but survived was Muhammad bin Sa’d bin Waqqas.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 213.
173. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 102, 103, Year 63.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 213.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 944.  See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 47, 48.  AND M. J. Kister, ‘The Battle of the Ḥarra:  Some Socio-Economic Aspects’ in Studies in memory of Gaston Wiet, ed. Myriam Rosen Ayalon, (Jerusalem: Institute of Asian and African Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1977), 33 – 49.
174. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 214, 220, 223
175. For the details see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 205, 206, 218, 219).
176. Ali distrusted Yazid’s promises. When he was brought in the presence of the triumphant commander in Medina, who was otherwise executing prisoners of war after mocking them, Ali was trembling for his life.  The commander informed him that he would obey Yazid’s orders and organized a mule for Ali to take him back to Yanbu.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 218, 219. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 944).  Ali bin Husayn must have been profoundly depressed.  Ya’qubi stated that nobody had seen him laugh since the murder of Husayn.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 957).  At another place Ya’qubi reports that his fellows never saw him laughing throughout his whole life. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1016)
177. Photographer unknown. C. 1924, printed in: countries of the world edited by John Alexander Hammerton in 6 volumes. London: Fleetway House, 1924.
178. The Ansar had favoured Ali during the First Arab Civil War. They never supported the Umayyad government, though some of them begged for high-ranking government positions, like Nu’man bin Bashir.  In February of 665 CE, when Mu’awiya came to Medina, they met him in the form of a delegate to apprise him of their grievances and demands.  The delegate was rude to him, and mentioned how Ansar financed the battle of Badr which resulted in killing of so many of Mu’awiya’s blood relatives, including his grandfather, Ḥarb bin Umayyah.  Mu’awiya simply dismissed the delegate telling them that the Prophet Muhammad had taught them to be patient, so be patient and don’t expect Mu’awiya to fulfill anything from their wishlist. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 896)
179. Jacqueline Chabbi, in the origins of Islam in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhīm Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 109.
180. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 221
181. On the way to Mecca, the commander of army, Muslim bin Uqba, died and Husayn bin Numayr of the Sakun clan of Kindah tribe replaced him.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 110, Year 64 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 222
182. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 223
183. Najada had parleys with Ibn Zubayr during the pilgrimage of August 682 CE about a year earlier. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 197).  That year (62 AH), for the first time in the history of Islam, there were three banners at the time of Hajj. Abdullah bin Zubayr led his followers. Najda lead his followers. As Hajj was open for all Muslims, Ahl al Jami’ah attended it under leadership of Uthman bin Muhammad, Yazid’s governor over Hijaz (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 997, Year 62. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 197)
184. For the blockade of all roads leaving Mecca see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 115
185. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),196
186. The Hajj in August of 683 CE coincided with battle of Harrah. It appears that none of the Ahl al Jami’ah could attend Hajj.  The only groups mentioned at the time of Hajj are the Kharijis and the followers of Ibn Zubayr.   (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 105, Year 63.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 218,)
187. An important person who died fighting the skirmishes from Ibn Zubayr’s in the early days of the siege was Mu’ṣab bin Abdur Rahman bin Awf.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 223
188. The army had reached Mecca on September 23, 683.  The ballistic attack on Mecca started on October 31, 683 CE.  See for dates:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),222, 223, 224
189. Folio 135a and 134b of Bodleian Library MS. Huntington 264. Considered to be a part of al Tarsusi’s ‘Instruction of the Masters on the means of deliverance in wars from disaster, and the unfurling of the banners of information: on equipment and engines which aid in encounter with enemies’. Current location: Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford.
190. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 74, 75 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 224, 225
191. For the date of burning, October 31, 683 CE, see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 224.  See also: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 108, 110, year 64
192. The black stone splintered into three pieces. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 958.
193. Khalifa maintains that a Syrian soldier ignited the fire at Banu Jumah Gate. Ibn Zubayr had converted the Ka’ba enclosure into a campground to use Ka’ba as a defensive shield for his soldiers.  The fire got out of control and the tents in the premises of Ka’ba caught fire. Both parties present at the venue were afraid. One Syrian soldier commented that the fire had destroyed both participants. Ibn Zubayr repented, saying that he didn’t anticipate that he had made Ka’ba so vulnerable by erecting tents near it.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 1070, Year 63.). Ya’qubi blames the Syrian army for burning the Ka’ba with fire but also states that Ibn Zubayr did not take any measures to extinguish the fire because he wanted to gain political scores from it. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 945). Wars are never fought without opening a media front. Ibn Zubayr’s strategy was to blame the central government for regularly neglecting the commandments of Prophet Muhammad, like the inviolability of Harams. The central government’s strategy was to blame the opposition for the sin of dividing Muslim Ummah by encouraging people to disobey the caliph (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 946
194. “They even set fire to their own place of worship,” wonders John bar Penkaye: Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75.  See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 48.
195. Ibn Zubayr appears to be under pressure to reinstate the earlier policy of payment of some amount to the Hijazi population out of the fay’ taxes collected in the cantonments. When Abdullah bin Muti, Ibn Zubayr’s governor designate for Kufa and its dependencies, made his introductory speech he mentioned an important thing. He told the people that Ibn Zubayr had ordered him to levy the income due to them from the lands which they had conquered (fay’akum) and not to remove the surplus of that income away from them without their approval, the dispositions which Umar al Khattab made at the time of his death and the manner of conduct which Uthman bin Affan pursued regarding the Muslims. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 187.)  Meaning, the people of Kufa should amicably agree to let the government of Ibn Zubayr divert some fay’ funds from them to the people of Hijaz as had been being practiced during Umar’s and Uthman’s tenure.  The people of Kufa rejected the proposal.  A Shi’a Ali of Kufa commented harshly to Abdullah bin Muti that the Kufans had sirah of Ali, they didn’t need Sirah of Uthman or Umar regarding fay’. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 187.)  This is indirect proof that the people of Mecca and Medina did not get anything from fay’ during Ali’s tenure.
196. The Arabs knew that it was an inter-Quraysh affair. Ma’qil bin Sinān was a resident of Medina who had gone to meet Yazid with the delegation of Medinites. He was probably from Ghatafan. He had declared on his return that he will depose Yazid and bring to authority a son of Muhajirun. When he got caught after the war of Harrah, Muslim bin Uqba, the commander, taunted him by saying, ‘What tribes of Ghatafan and Ashja’ have to do with deposing and installing a caliph?’ Then, the Muslim executed him.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 215)
197. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 205.  Hawting translates mulhid as an evil doer but Gordon traces its origins to Qur’an and believes that in the period of the Umayyad Caliphate, it was meant to be a heretic or atheist. (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 49.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 938, footnote 1936).
198. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 107, Year 63
199. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 96
200. See Hawting’s comments:  G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 69, 70, 71
201. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 111, 112, Year 64.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 183, 184
202. Later on, four persons of the Khariji view murdered ‘Abbād bin Akhḍar in Basrah when he was coming out of the governor’s house after meeting the governor.  ‘Abbād bin Akhḍar was the commander of the government force that defeated Mirdas and his companions.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 184)
203. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),38
204. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 197.
205. Such role of Mawlas can be traced to the latter half of Mu’awiya’s tenure when Mu’awiya assigned his own Mawla Dinar abu Muhajir duty of leutinent governor in bordering junds of Ifriqiya (see above).
206. The time Ubaydullah bin Ziyad was weak in the town of Kufa and Muslim bin Aqil had infiltrated in the town to the extent that Ibn Ziyad could not trust any of Kufans, he sent his mawla with three thousand dirhams to feign as if he was a supporter of Husayn from Homs, and wished to donate this money to his cause. In this way, the Mawla could trace Muslim (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 18)
207. The son of the woman who gave shelter to Muslim bin Aqil was a Mawla of Muhammad bin Ash’ath.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 21.
208. Shi’a of Basrah used to gather in house of a woman from Abdul Qays tribe by name of Māriyyah bint Sa’d or Munqidh to discuss future strategy after death of Mu’awiya when Husayn was weighing his options to dislodge Yazid.  Mariyyah is said to be a sympathizer of Husayn.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 26, 27). The name indicates that she was a Christian.  If she were a Muslim, her name should have been Maryam.
209. For details see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 98, Year 62. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 187
210. For raids conducted from the African border during Yazid’s rein see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 105, Year 63.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359
211. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 98, Year 62.
212. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 104, Year 63
213. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236, 237, 376) AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 166, 172
214. Baladhuri states that Yazid received a large bribe for this action of his and gives the impression that the masses of the Umayyad Caliphate didn’t favour such policy.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 237.
215. For details of such raids see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 97, year 61; P 98, Year 62; P 109, Year 64.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 949
216. For the days of siege see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 224.  Another version is that they besieged for 40 days.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 1. See also Khalifa who tells the siege lasted 40 days: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 110, Year 64
217. Ya’qubi asserts that the men got demoralized by the news of death of Yazid. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 948
218. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 1, 2
219. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 5
220. The siege was still going on December 13, 683 CE. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 115. The reason is that news of Yazid’s death had not reached there.
221. He was 38 at the time of death. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 109, 111Year 64. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 225). In another version Yazid was thirty five years at the time of his death. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 226. See also: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 315.
222. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 3
223. For Yazid’s denial of charge of drinking alcohol see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 204.  See also: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 316.
224. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 202
225. See for the date: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 225.  AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 108, 109, Year 64.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 947.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 138
226. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),11
227. See Muir’s comments on effects of Yazid’s death on Umayyad house: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 317.
228. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),71.
229. Huwwārīn was the village where Yazid used to frequent.  He was there when Mu’awiya died.  He himself died at Huwwārīn.  It was between Damascus and Palmyria, two stages from the latter (Yaqut buldan II 315).  Khalifa describes it near Homs.  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 111, Year 64.  Some sources disclose that it was his hunting ground.
230. Yazid knew that all Muslims including pious and profligate hated him because of his killing of Husayn.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 10
231. See such blames being propagated by Yazid’s political opponents: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 107, Year 63.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 190, 198.
232. For the detail of the dialogue see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 170, 171.
233. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 76.
234. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 76.
235. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 2
236. The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 620. The Identitiy of the writer is not well established. Since Lantin was the literary language of Spainish Christians, many researchers believe that he might be a Christian. On the other hand, the chronicle is so favourable to Muslims that Dubler suggests that the writer was a Spanish Christian converted to Islam (Cesar E. Dubler, “Sobre La cronica: Arabigo – Bizantina de 741 y la influencia bizantina en peninsula iberica,” Al Andalus, vol. 11 number 2 (1946) pp 283 – 349)