Umayyad Caliphate is born
July 25, 661 CE is the date when a brand new political setup rose from the ruins of the Rashidun Caliphate. For the next ninety years, it ruled over all those areas previously governed by the Rashidun Caliphate from its capital, Damascus. 1, 2 It is usually referred to as the Umayyad Caliphate in the annals of history from the fact that all fourteen rulers were from the Umayyah clan of Quraysh. 3, 4 The citizens of the Umayyad Caliphate, however, did not call it by this name. They called their country ‘Allah’s Caliphate.’ 5 Since we have to give a name to the country, which should be different from that of the ruling house, ‘Umayyad Caliphate’ is easy one.
The political history of the Rashidun Caliphate is predominantly a story of how Muslim Arabs conquered vast lands. On the other hand, the political history of the Umayyad Caliphate is predominantly how the Middle East changed profoundly. Let’s start!
The bloody First Arab Civil War left Mu’awiya the only candidate of caliphate in the field. When he entered Kufa triumphantly in July of 661 CE, everybody in the country pledged allegiance to him in without exception. 6, 7 Neither anybody dared to oppose him nor did he deem it necessary to consult anybody.
The Muslim community was generally happy due to the end of the civil war. Their most dreaded fear of losing everything due to infighting was over. The ‘neutral party’ wrapped up their ‘wait and see’ attitude and joined hands with Shi’a Uthman without any hesitation. The Muslims called this year ‘Ām al jama’ah – the ‘year of unity’ (عام الجَمِيعَه). 8 The group that formed as a result of the merger of Shi’a Uthman with a ‘neutral party’ is called “The Unity Party.” (ahl al jami’ah اهلَالجَمِيعَه). The merger took place everywhere in the country.
Mu’awiya takes oath
Hoyland observes that the change of power from Hasan to Mu’awiya would have been a continuation of the same political setup in the eyes of contemporary Muslims. Their illusion soon disappeared. Policy changes from the previous caliphate can be traced back to the time Mu’awiya took an oath of the caliph in September of 661 CE in a ceremony organized for the event. 9 Instead of choosing Medina for this purpose, where all preceding caliphs had taken their oath, Mu’awiya preferred Jerusalem. 10 A debate might have taken place on this issue among the close circles of Mu’awiya because the Maronite Chronicler, who is an eyewitness to the events, notes that Mu’awiya “placed his throne in Damascus and refused to go to Muḥammad’s throne.”11 One of the promises of Abdullah bin Zubayr, the principal challenger of the Umayyads in the 680s, was that he would place Mecca and Medina once more at the heart of the Arab Empire.12 Jerusalem already held a sacred status in the eyes of Muslims.13 They might have accepted it as a suitable alternative to Medina. 14, 15 Mu’awiya officially adopted the title of Amir ul Mu’minin in this ceremony. He used to be called Amir before it. 16
Mu’awiya’s inscription at Sadd Khanaq, near Medina.
An undated inscription about the construction of a dam near Medina has been discovered. It mentions the full official designation of Mu’awiya, which was ‘Abdullah Mu’awiya Amir ul Muminin’. A mawla of Abdullah bin Abbas was the builder and Kathīr bin al Ṣalt and Abu Musa were the overseers. The identification of the builder gives us a hint that the Banu Hashim were co-operating with the new government. 17 Other documents also preserve the official designation of Mu’awiya. One of them is a 674 CE demand written on a papyrus, discovered from Naṣṣanna about 59 Km south of Beer-Sheba in Palestine. 18
Areas under the administration of the Umayyad Caliphate at its inception.
First dynasty in Islam
With the death of the Rashidun Caliphate, an important principle of early Islam died out. A new caliph of ummah must not necessarily be unrelated to the outgoing caliph. A peculiar characteristic of Umayyad Caliphate was the concentration of power within one family. Hawting calls Umayyad Caliphate the ‘first dynasty in Islam’.19 Actually, by the time of rise of Umayyad Caliphate, the dominance of Arabs in the Middle East was no longer a purely religious movement headed by a religious leader. It was a secular state governed by a ruler. Previously, the Islamic state was governed by four ‘leaders of the religion’ unrelated to each other. Now, the first three rulers of the dynasty were descendants of Abu Sufyan. After Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan (661 – 680 CE), his son Yazid bin Mu’awiya (Yazīd يَزِيد) ruled the country (680 – 683 CE). Yazid was followed by his son Mu’awiya (Mu’awiya II مُعاوىَه الثالِث) for a brief period (683 – 684 CE). These three rulers are generally called the Sufyanids. 20.
After the death of Mu’awiya II, the power shifted to another branch of the Umayyah clan. First, Marwan bin Hakam ruled briefly (684 – 685 CE). He was succeeded by his son, Abdul Malik bin Marwan (‘Abd al Malik عَبدالمَلِك) (685 – 705 CE). Abdul Malik was himself succeeded by no fewer than four of his own sons, Walid, (Walīd I وَلِيد الاوّل) (705 – 715 CE), Sulayman (سُلَيمان) (715 – 717 CE), Yazid (Yazīd II, اثانياً يَزِيد) (720 – 724 CE) and Hisham (Hishām هِشام) (723 – 743 CE) up to 743 CE. Their rule was briefly interrupted by their paternal first cousin Umar bin Abdul Aziz (عُمَر بِن عَبدُ العَزِيز) (717 to 720 CE). Then, the power transferred to the third generation of Abdul Malik. Walid II, (743 to 744 CE) was son of Yazid bin Abdul Malik. Yazid III (يَزىِد الثالِث) (744 to 744 CE) and Ibrahim (اِبراهِىم) (744 to 744 CE) were the sons of Walid bin Abdul Malik. None of the third generationists could have a good grip on power. Marwan bin Muhammad, (Marwan II مَروان اثانِياُ) (744 to 750 CE) who had the sad honour of being the last ruler of Umayyad Caliphate, was a grandson of Abdul Malik. Abbasid Caliphate ousted the weak last ruler of Umayyad Caliphate. 21
As each government of Umayyad Caliphate differed slightly from the previous one, we shall discuss political developments during each government separately.
Umayyad family tree.22Adapted from William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources. (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 318{/note]
Mu’awiya consolidates central government writ
After becoming the undisputed ruler of the country, Mu’awiya emerged as a statesman. He introduced such modifications that changed the character of an Islamic state forever. All modifications came gradually over the next twenty years of his tenure, the longest so far for any caliph.
Mu’awiya had inherited everything the Rashidun Caliphate had achieved – its vast area, its varied population, its revenue rich provinces, and its political jumble. A big task at hand for the new Caliph was to bring political stability and good governance in the country. Reining the unruly Ashraf in cantonments and preventing the prominent members of the Quraysh from making personality-based parties to compete for the seat of central ruler was the main goal of Mu’awiya during first decade of his tenure.
Mu’awiya didn’t want to deal with too many petty governors. Within a few months after coming to power, Mu’awiya aggregated management of Medina, Mecca and Taif in one unit called Hejaz and appointed Marwan bin Hakam as its governor. 23 He continued this policy later on wherever possible.
Syria and its dependencies did not have any politicial grouping during the Rashidun Caliphate. It still continued to be pro-government. Two important personalities of Syria had participated in the battle of Siffin from Mu’awiya’s side and had helped in propping him up as a caliph. They were Habib bin Maslamah and Abdur Rahman bin Khalid. As the years passed, Habib bin Maslamah died of natural causes in 661 CE. 24 Mu’awiya remained apprehensive that Abdur Rahman bin Khalid could challenge his authority in Syria. Abdur Rahman had many credentials in his account. He was the son of the most decorated Muslim general. He had earned a reputation of being a brave soldier on his own merit by commanding routinely carried out raids against the Byzantine. The Syrians loved him. According to Tabari, Mu’awiya masterminded the cold blooded murder of Abdur Rahman bin Khalid by poisoning him in Homs around 666 CE. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 The two deaths secured Syria for Mu’awiya.
The brief governorship of Muhammad bin Abu Bakr in Egypt, characterized with mismanagement, had effectively uprooted Shi’a ‘Ali from the province. After Shi’a ‘Uthman came to power, the province and its dependencies remained pro-government. Amr bin As had asked Mu’awiya to appoint his son Abdullah bin Amr bin As as governor of Egypt after Amr’s death. Mu’awiya rejected the proposal tactfully.30, 31. When Amr died on January 6, 664 CE, his son Abdullah bin Amr adopted the governorship of Egypt by default in an attempt to convert the province into a hereditary governate. 32, 33 Mu’awiya tolerated him for two years while he was busy with other more demanding hot spots. 34 Once Mu’awiya gained enough political stability in the country, he sent a dismissal notice to Abdullah bin As around 667 CE. 35 Abdullah had to comply. Mu’awiya appointed a Shi’a Uthman by the name of Mu’awiya bin Hudaij (Mu’āwiyah bin Ḥudaij مُعاوِيه بِن حُديَج) in Abdullah’s stead. 36 Thereafter, matters in Egypt ran smoothly throughout the time of the Umayyad Caliphate as far as the central government was concerned.
The two eastern provinces of the country, Kufa and Basrah, were the main battlegrounds of the First Arab Civil War. A political rift continued there and Mu’awiya had to tread tactfully to handle them.
After the initial experimentations of the governors over Kufa, Mu’awiya appointed Mughira bin Shu’ba, an important ‘neutral’, as governor of Kufa and its dependencies, Azerbaijan and Tabaristan in October 661 CE. 37, 38, 39
Mughira proved to be a successful governor and held his post until his death in September of 670 CE.40 Being a neutral, he did not have any difficulty in recognizing all the political groups of Kufa as equals and dealing them with a uniform policy.41, 42, 43
When Hasan signed the abdication of Mu’awiya, Humran bin Aban (Ḥumrān bin Abān حُمران بِن ابان) had assumed the governorship of Basrah in Mu’awiya’s name. 44, 45 Mu’awiya then sent Busr bin Artat to take over Basrah. He remained there for six months.46 Then, after due deliberations, Mu’awiya brought in Abdullah bin Amir as governor of Basrah and its dependencies of Sistan and Khorasan. 47, 48 To the dismay of Mu’awiya, Abdullah bin Amir proved to be a weak governor for the turbulent province.49
Mu’awiya started looking for a new face for his administration in Basrah. Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan (Ziyād bin Abīhī/Abū Sufyān زِياد بِن اَبِيهئ ابَو سَفيان) was the lieutenant governor of Fars for Ali when Mu’awiya gained power. 50. Ziyad was a prominent member of the neutral party and had not participated in the Battle of Camel or Siffin. 51 Probably he did not expect the dismissal because of his neutrality. On the other hand, perhaps Mu’awiya sensed danger as he was the only member of Ali’s administration reknowned for his efficiency. Mu’awiya summoned him to Kufa (where Mu’awiya was for his triumph ceremony) to give an audit of revenues. Ziyad could smell the danger and refused flatly. Mu’awiya ordered the arrest of his sons in Basrah and threatened to kill them in case Ziyad didn’t comply. Ultimately, Abu Bakra and Mughira bin Shu’ba brokered a deal between them, according to which, Ziyad met Mu’awiya in Kufa, presented a report of his revenues, received an allowance from Mu’awiya to keep what he had accumulated during his governorship, and took a dismissal letter to settle in Basrah. 52 When Mu’awiya decided to dump Abdullah bin Amir, Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan passed through his mind. Ziyad must have been annoyed with Mu’awiya because of the way the latter treated him a few months ago. To parley with him, Mu’awiya declared him the brother and son of Abu Sufyan. 53, 54, 55, 56
When Ziyad started twisting on Mu’awiya’s tunes, the latter dismissed Abdullah bin Amir by the end of 664 CE.57, 58, 59 Then Mu’awiya brought in Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan as governor of this vast and fussy province on July 6, 665 CE. 60, 61, 62
This time, Ziyad took charge of the governorship in Basrah when there was open depravity in the town and in the province. 63 During his introductory speech (khuṭbah), he made clear that the doves of Mu’awiya’s government had gone and the hawk had arrived. 64, 65.
Ziyad enforced a night time curfew in Basrah with orders to kill on sight any person who defies it. 66 He arrested people on mere suspicions of a crime and introduced punishments which were never heard of during the Rashidun Caliphate.67.
Ziyad’s strictness over people bore fruit. He could compel people to obey the government and could implement government prescribed punishments. 68 After a while, Ziyad would proudly announce a government-backed insurance on all stolen goods in the province without the payment of any premiums. He advised people to fire their watchmen in the wake of a newly-announced insurance in the public sector on all goods.69 He could achieve a level of security in the town where women could sleep with their doors unlocked. People would not pick a valuable thing left unattended by somebody for fear of punishment. 70
Ziyad was aware that punishment serves as an exampler for a community. 71 It is not an end in itself. His policy was not stick only. It was carrot and stick. He poured stipends on those who obeyed him loyally to create a group of government loyalists. At the same time, he organized projects for public good. He built provision depots in the whole of the town to demonstrate that the governor was interested in public welfare. 72, 73.
Mu’awiya had appointed Ziyad as the governor of Basrah and its dependencies, initially. Mu’awiya was so impressed with Ziyad’s capabilities that he added Bahrain, Oman and the frontier of Hind to the territory of Basrah.74
Ziyad remained in the good books of Mu’awiya and when the governorship of Kufa had a vacant role due to death of Mughira bin Shu’ba in September of 670 CE, Mu’awiya appointed Ziyad as governor of Kufa. 75 In doing this, Mu’awiya aggregated two important provinces of the country – Basrah and Kufa – in one administrative unit which was called Iraq. 76, 77, 78
Ziyad’s coin. 79
The situation in which the caliph manages Syria and Egypt and their dependencies, all of which were snatched from Byzantine Rome, and leaves the administration of the eastern part of the country, which consisted of the ex-Sasanian empire, into capable hands of a viceroy, arose for the first time during Mu’awiya’s tenure. Later on, it can be seen in the duo of Yazid and Ubaydullah bin Ziyad, and Abdul Malik and Hajjaj bin Yusuf.85
Central government all powerful
After achieving political stability in all the provinces, Mu’awiya felt confident in hiring and firing governors at his own whim. He never gave a reason to a governor while firing him and didn’t give a reason for raising someone to the status of governor.86 The government of the Umayyad Caliphate was no longer a team knit together by a common goal. It was a work group stuck together under boss-subordinate relations to accomplish the boss’s goal.
Government’s administrative tools
The question is how did Mu’awiya successfully harness the restless provinces while his predecessors had bitterly failed to do so?
Mu’awiya had the courage to set religion aside and make practical changes in the administrative structure of the country. Many changes can be easily spotted. Mu’awiya’s predecessors did not have any troops at their personal disposal. They used their religious authority to govern the country. During the later years of the Rashidun Caliphate, Ashraf started disobeying the government by simply rejecting a government order because one of them did not perceive it to be in line with the teachings of Islam. It made the caliph’s religious authority controversial on which he completely banked to manage the country. Mu’awiya had come to power by showing off his ‘Syrian Troops’. He maintained their daunting reputation in the minds of his country fellows by keeping them away from perils of a war but threatening their possible use in case of disobedience. They became a force behind any order that came from caliph’s mouth. Sources don’t record a single occasion where Mu’awiya had to convince his subjects to obey his order because he had a religious authority over them. To assure the loyalty of his Syrian Troops towards the central government, Mu’awiya paid them much more lavishly than what he used pay to their provincial counterparts in Iraq. 87 The Muslim Arabs of Syria were only one part of the Syrian Troops. This elite army comprised of all kind of elements. Many non-Muslim Arabs were recruited. Actually, people from as far as the Copts of Egypt were employed as Syrian Troops. 88 Non-Muslim slaves were an essential part of the Syrian Troops. 89.
The basic troublemakers in cantonments were soldiers who kept only self interest in sight. Their demand for bigger salary and perks was insatiable. Ashraf, who had their own political ambitions and rivalries, utilized their position as an intermediary between the soldiers and provincial governors to play politics on the soldier’s behalf. During the last decade of the Rashidun Caliphate, the soldiers were out of any governmental control. They were armed and the caliph was totally unarmed. They could turn on the caliph anytime and it had happened to Uthman. Mu’awiya was aware of the issue. Restarting Futuhul Buldan was not in the interest of country in the face of internal crisis. Mu’awiya decided to start low impact border raids on all neighboring countries. The policy pushed the troublemaking soldiers out of cantonments and spread them out over lengthy borders. 90, 91
Border raids definitely supplemented their income, changed their mindset from asking the government for handouts to generating for themselves, and reduced their numbers in cantonments and hence their precariousness for the government. Cantonments devoid of soldiers were easily manageable by the small but loyal Syrian Troops at Mu’awiya’s disposal.
The police (shurṭ) were very rudimentary in the Rashidun Caliphate. Mu’awiya established a well-trained police force in each provincial capital and put it at the disposal of its governor. 92 The police were the force behind the orders of any governor. 93 Many policemen were non-Arab Muslims. 94, 95 Mu’awiya made sure that the provincial police force was not strong enough to defy his Syrian Troops if the confrontation arose and it was not weak enough that the authority of a governor was jeopardized. 96.
The tentacles of a successful government are its intelligence agencies. They keep the government aware of internal and external threats. The Rashidun Caliphate did not have any organized intelligence agency. Umayyad Caliphate organized basic ones. These services kept the threat level to the government low. Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan, for example, separated his intelligence department from the police and put Ja’d in charge of it. Ja’d’s function was to ‘deal with evil doers, and to pursue them’.97.
The Ashraf and the soldiers received stipends as their religious right during the Rashidun Caliphate. They insisted that they had created it by participating in the jihad of Futuhul Buldan and government did not do any favour to them by distributing it to them after its collection.98 The Umayyad Caliphate was not bogged with theoretical rights, duties and privileges. The government had attained a physical means to impose its decisions. The Mu’awiya government derecognized the receiving of stipends as a religious right, rather it became a privilege. 99 The government regularly withheld stipend from those who disobeyed the it and lavished it on those who obeyed the it. Once, Mu’awiya became angry with Abdur Rahman bin Hakam (the brother of Marwan bin Hakam), Mu’awiya’s staunch supporter. Mu’awiya withheld his stipend. 100 On another occasion, Mughira bin Shu’ba withheld the stipends of Shi’a Ali in Kufa. 101 On the same lines, Ziyad distributed five hundred of Basran Shaykhs among his companions and provided them with three hundred to five hundred dirhams each by his own discretion. 102.
The Ashraf no longer remained as a mere intermediary between the government and the soldiers. During the Rashidun Caliphate their main duty was to make sure that stipends were distributed in a smooth fashion and in a justified quantity to the group they administered. The Mu’awiya government not only insisted on obedience on the part of a Sharif in order to remain in office, it also expected from him to assure the obedience of his subordinate tribesmen and soldiers to the government. The Ashraf working in this capacity were called ‘Ārif. 103
The pre-Islamic Arab tribal society believed in the principle of talio, which had lingered on. Violence against law-enforcing personnel was common as retaliation to their violent actions committed on behalf of the state. 104 No government can work if it does not give physical protection to its employees. Mu’awiya outlawed any retaliatory action against his officials. 105.
In a nutshell, Mu’awiya gradually introduced all the administrative interventions that the governor’s conference had pondered upon during last days of Uthman’s tenure but Uthman had rejected them.
Mu’awiya was a genius of management. He created many new departments in the central government with someone in charge for each of them. Tabari credits him to be the first one to create a department of seal with a designated in charge of the department. 106. Khalifa gives details of all central government departments in Mu’awiya government.107 The Mu’awiya government continued the tradition of the Rashidun Caliphate of appointing a chief secretary who was responsible for all governmental business. 108
Seal document of dismissal of Abdullah bin Amir.109
Support to Arab Nationalism
Mu’awiya not only changed the administrative structure of the country, he tried to broaden the official ideology on which the country was based. During the Rashidun Caliphate, the basic classification of the masses was between Muslims and non-Muslims. While maintaining it, the Mu’awiya government started patronizing Arab Nationalism. His government hired scholars to write down the history of pre-Islamic Arab kings. 110 History gives a group much needed reasons for belonging to that group. It was a preliminary attempt to reclassify the masses in Arabs and non-Arabs. Arabs would have included Christian tribes of Syria and other places. Non-Arabs would have included those Iranians and Turks who had adopted Islam.
Radif disintegrate completely
The process of disintegration of Radif as a distinct socio-political group and their merger into the broader Arab Muslim elites had started during the First Arab Civil War. One of the leaders of the rebels against Uthman hailed from the Radif tribe of Hanifa. During Mu’awiya’s caliphate, Radif and Ahl al Ayam merged seamlessly. We observe members of ex-Radif tribes being appointed to higher government offices like lieutenant governors. 111 The exact details of the merger are not known. Probably, the attraction was from both sides. When Quraysh and Ahl al Ayam fought among themselves in the First Arab Civil War, the warring groups needed more hands. Radif were welcome to join them. On their part, Radif had realized that even by organizing themselves in a socio-political group, they cannot compel the powerful Ahl al Ayam to share their wealth with them. They found the First Arab Civil War as an advantageous opportunity when Ahl al Ayam were willing to accept them in their elite group. This is an example how a socio-political group disappears once it doesn’t find any reason for lingering on.
Novel punishments
One of the reasons for the decline of the Rashidun Caliphate was a reluctance on the part of the caliph to punish Arab Muslim elites for disobeying the government. Actually, there was a debate in government circles if a Caliph of Muslims had a legal right to kill Muslim political miscreants or not. 112 Similar concepts might have lingered on during the early phase of Mu’awiya’s government. It explains the reluctance to pressurize the people of Kufa on the part of Mughira bin Shu’ba. Later on, the Umayyad Caliphate started devising new kinds of punishments which actually spared the life of the disobedient but insulted them head to heal. Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan was the mastermind behind these punishments. 113 Once, the governor gave a laxative to a loose-talking poet with political inclinations and mounted him on a donkey. When the donkey passed through the alleys of Basrah with him on top of it, defecating in his clothes, he became a laughing stock. A non-Muslim Persian of the town could not help controlling his laughter at the sight and shouted to the poet “een cheest? (What is this?)”. “Resin juice for you,” the irritated poet answered.114.
Some people pelted stones at Ziyad when he reached Kufa and delivered his first introductory speech in the grand mosque. The action started when he praised the people of Kufa for being truth loving so he had come only with his family rather than with two thousand policemen from Basrah. Ziyad tactfully screened the culprits out of the gathering and had their hands amputated on the spot. 115, 116 Later on, the amputation of hands became a standard punishment for throwing pebbles at a governor during his speech. 117
New punishments were not limited to the physical ones. Examples of the imposition of heavy fine for a crime are present. 118.
Security of dignitaries
One aspect in which the Umayyad Caliphate diverged away from the practices of the Rashidun Caliphate was regarding the security arrangements of political dignitaries. It was a need of the time. After the murder of Uthman, the Muslim ummah never agreed on a single caliph. Groups of political dissidents always survived in the society who considered the killing of the sitting caliph or his appointees a pious duty.
Mu’awiya was the first to make use of bodyguards (Ḥaras). The contingent of Mu’awiya’s personal bodyguards had a proper captain. They manned the gates of Mu’awiya’s residence all the time. 119 His governors followed the example. Marwan bin Hakam, Mu’awiya’s governor over Medina, made a maqsurah in the mosque of the Prophet.120 Mu’awiya followed him.121 The Umayyad Caliphate used guards to protect public places as well. Ziyad recruited five hundred guards and stationed them to protect the grand mosque of Kufa under a properly appointed captain. 122
Criteria for a government job
Companions of the Prophet had attained special reverence by the middle of the Rashidun Caliphate when Umar had devised a policy that ideally there should not be a situation whereby a Companion of the Prophet is subject to the authority of a non-Companion. The principle faded during the later years of the Rashidun Caliphate when the rulers realized that competence to meet the demands of a job is more important than being pious. This principle was defunct during Mu’awiya’s tenure. Neither tribal affiliation nor piety or close relationship with the caliph were required qualifications to be a governor or a general during the early years of the Umayyad Caliphate. The only criteria were proficiency and loyalty to the caliph. Mu’awiyah bin Hudaij was known to possess leadership skills and he was loyal to Mu’awiya. Mu’awiya appointed him governor over the important province of Egypt while Abdur Rahman bin Abu Bakr, a Companion of the Prophet, a was resident of Alexandria.123 Mu’awiya also appointed Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan as governor over Basrah. He did not have any verifiable tribal affiliations but was known to be capable.
Companions of the Prophet lost political significance but they retained their religious reverence. If they were appointed to a government post, usually a lower one, they were acknowledged as being a Companion of the Prophet though a notice.124
However, the governors used the religious reverence of the Companions of the Prophet in the eyes of the common people for the advantage of the government. When Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan planned to eliminate crime from Basrah he appointed a Companion of the Prophet as judge in Basrah.125
Mu’awiya’s advisors
Mu’awiya took a U-turn from the practices of the Rashidun Caliphate as far as consultation with peers was concerned. We don’t hear of a single personality who regularly advised Mu’awiya. He definitely took inputs but decided independently.126 He kept a close connection with the Ashraf and used to invite all of the Ashraf of a given province in the form of a delegate to Damascus to meet him in person. Usually the governor of the respective province was present at the occasion. In 679 CE, for example, the governor of Basrah, Ubaydullah bin Ziyad, met Mu’awiya with the notables of Basrah.127 Mu’awiya had created a hierarchy among Ashraf and used to see them one on one, the senior most first. He never seated them in one gathering. His body language during such meetings conveyed a message to them that he was superior to them. He used to sit on a high dice during such meetings.128, 129
What happened to the Kharijis?
The Kharijis were an important factor for internal instability during last years of the Rashidun Caliphate. They had a pivotal role in bringing down Ali’s government. Ali, on his part, had taken a principled decision about them. He had allowed them to keep their ideology as far as they obeyed the government but they were liable to the death penalty if they revolted against the government.130 Shi’a Ali hated them from bottom of their heart and Mu’awiya knew it.
When Mu’awiya camped at Nukhayla outside Kufa waiting for a ceremony to be organized for his triumphant entry in the town, a band of about five hundred Kharijis attacked Kufa. This time, the reason of their terrorist attack was to register their disagreement with Mu’awiya’s rule. Initially, Mu’awiya sent his Syrian Troops to tackle them but they were defeated. Mu’awiya aptly conveyed to the Kufans that the Kharijis were their menace and they had to sort it out. If Kufans didn’t do anything about it, they shouldn’t expect their government to whip the Kharijis into shape for them.131 Mu’awiya’s government upheld this principal throughout its life.
Before we dig into further developments of issue of the Kharijis during Mu’awiya’s tenure, let’s acquaint ourselves with an important pattern of any human society.
Graph of males’ height in North America.
Bell shaped I.Q. graph.
If we measure any human trait in a given population and plot its distribution on a graph we get a bell shaped curve. Let’s take an example of one trait that is easy to measure accurately. The graph in figure I represents the distribution of the men’s height in a given population. Very few males are absolutely short. They take a place at the extreme left end of the curve. Similarly, very few are absolutely tall. They get a place on the extreme right end of the curve. The vast majority of men, who are neither short nor tall, find their place in the middle, swelling the curve upwards in the center. The average height of majority imparts the curve its bell shape. Let’s take another example of another trait, which is slightly more difficult to measure objectively. The graph in figure II represents a distribution curve of human intelligence measured in I.Q. Again, we see that a few people are on the right and left margins of the curve, being highly intelligent and highly unintelligent respectively. The great majority of humans find their place in the middle and they possess average intelligence. Again, the average intelligence of majority gives the curve its bell shape. Religiosity is also a human trait. It cannot be measured precisely as it is a deeply subjective feeling. If one day we succeed in measuring distribution of religiosity in a given society accurately, presumably its graph will be bell shaped like curves of other human traits. A small number of people would find their place on extremes, extremely religious on one end and extremely anti-religious (atheists) on the other end. The great majority of people would fit in the middle. Who are these people? They can be conveniently called ‘secular’. Secular are the people who uphold both religion and worldly pursuits simultaneously. They know how to keep both separate. They also know how to concentrate on one of them at different occasions.
Like all times and all societies, the Muslim society of the Umayyad Caliphate had a range of religious behaviours. On one extreme there were people, albeit few, who did not believe in any religion. Their purpose of life was to strive for their physical needs. 132 On the other extreme there were people, again few, who did not pay heed to any worldly need. The purpose of their life was to strive for their spiritual needs. The overwhelming majority was neither atheist nor religios. They were just living their life. They wholeheartedly strived for their physical needs and at the same time sought spiritual strength from religion. 133 We meet with all three kinds of characters among the Muslim society of the Umayyad Caliphate.
The Kharijis were religious fanatics. By definition, extremists are few. Hence, the Kharijis remained few in number. They had typical political ideology. Here is an excerpt from the speech of Ḥayyān bin Ẓabyān, a Khariji leader, who made it in 662 CE in front of his companions in Rayy delineating Khariji political agenda: let us be off [for jihad], may Allah have mercy upon you, to our city (miṣr, here he means Kufa). Let us join our brothers and summon them to commanding good and forbidding evil (amr bil ma’rūf wal nahi ‘unil munkar) and to jihad against the factions. For we have no excuse for being inactive while our rulers are oppressive, and while Sunnah is abandoned and our vengeance remains unexecuted against those who killed our brothers in the majālis at Naharawan. 134
The Kharijis changed meaning of Jihad in Islam. It was no longer fighting against non-Muslims. The Kharijis preached fighting against their fellow Muslims, because they had abandoned Islam, according to the Khariji dictionary. They used to call non-Khariji Muslims ‘ahl al qiblah’ – meaning nominal Muslims. The Khariji leaders regularly adopted title of Abdullah, Amir ul Mu’minin though the followers of this Amir ul Mu’minin could be as few as three hundred in whole country.135.
Their religio-political thoughts were well known to the people. They canvassed that only reign of Abu Bakr and Umar was just. Both Uthman and Ali were tyrants and they introduced innovations in Islam. The current Mu’awiya government was also tyrannical in the eyes of the Kharijis because it had diverted from true path of Islam by monopolizing use of fay and by failing to apply ḥudūd sentences appropriately. The war against such a government and its supporters was just. 136, 137 Still, the general public never was convinced that they were an ideal alternative to the current political set up. A repeated scenario of Khariji exasperation during Mu’awiya’s tenure was that one person gets attached to Khariji ideology, mostly in Kufa, sometimes in Basra. He gathers a clique of handful supporters. They abscond to an area where government control was weak, such as ex-Sassanian territories indirectly administered by Umayyad Caliphate, Rayy or Khuzestan. There they trained themselves in warfare and then made a surprise suicide attack on either Kufa or Basrah. The purpose of the attack was to inflict as much damage as possible until their death at the hand of law enforcing agencies or civilian vigilante.138, 139.
The government strategy to deal with them was two pronged. One, it unleashed its intelligence agencies on them. The intelligence agencies were capable of detecting small groups of Kharijis in Kufa or Basrah when they were in hatching. The provincial police could then bust up their rings and arrest them to be imprisoned. 140 Second, the government facilitated the establishment of vigilante groups of citizens in Kufa and Basrah whose duty was to kill the Kharijis in case of a surprise attack on their communities. Shi’a Ali were the most enthusiastic members of such vigilante groups. 141.
The Kharijis could spread harassment in Kufa and Basrah during Mu’awiya’s tenure but they never became a threat to the governance of these provinces. Their number never increased more than three hundred on one occasion. 142 The central government didn’t bother to even issue a statement against them. The last Khariji terrorist attack during Mu’awiya’s tenure is reported as occurring on October 674 CE.143 However, the government could not eradicate the Khariji ideology from the society. As they say, the government’s use of violence can kill people not ideology. 144
Shi’a Ali and the Mu’awiya government
It was not the Kharijis who gave tension to Mu’awiya. It was the Shi’a Ali who were on his mind. He took their opposition seriously. 145 All of the Banu Hashim, including Husayn, Hasan, Abdullah bin Ja’ffar and Abdullah bin Abbas had pledged allegiance to Mu’awiya. Still, Mu’awiya didn’t extend a hand of friendship towards them. 146 He made very sure that none of the Banu Hashim got any appointment in his government, even at the lowest level.147
From the very beginning of his government, Mu’awiya banned the public expression of superiority of Ali over Uthman in his domain, though his government had to tolerate such expressions in private. 148 He also ordered his officials to advertise Ali’s faults to the public. 149 He purged the Shi’a Ali using the excuse of revenge of the murder of Uthman wherever possible. For example, in 662 CE he sent his dreadful field commander Busr bin Artat to Medina, Mecca and Yemen. Busr investigated and killed some citizens who were allegedly involved in murder of Uthman. 150, 151
Shi’a Ali had definitely shrinked in size during the later years of Ali’s tenure due to the deteriorating law and order situation in the country. 152 They, anyhow, did not disappear from the political field of the country. Rather they gradually increased in number during Mu’awiya’s reign. At one stage, during Mughira bin Shu’ba’s governorship in Kufa, two-thirds of the Kufan population were Shi’a Ali. 153 They did not show any political activism for a while and remained dormant.
The Shi’a Ali were scattered all over the country but a large number of them had concentrated in Kufa. In the beginning of Mu’awiya’s government, they co-operated with the government in governing the country. They, for example, participated in vigilante groups to eradicate the Kharijis. As years passed, they started showing passive resistance. 154 They never challenged the authority of the central government but used to irritate Mughira bin Shu’ba, the governor of Kufa on regular basis. 155 Hujr bin Adi (Ḥujr bin ‘Adi حَجر بِن عَدى) of the Kindah tribe was foremost in these activities. 156, 157 When Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan took charge of the governorship of Kufa in September of 670 CE, some miscreants threw pebbles on him in the grand mosque of Kufa where they had gathered to listen to his introductory speech.158 That time, the government decided to crack down on the Shi’a Ali of the town.
Ziyad swiftly unleashed his police over them, dug out their ring leaders, arrested them and sent them for their final trial in ‘Adhra’ in Syria. Ziyad recorded the statements of about seventy witnesses implicating them in expressing pro-Ali views, assembling people around them and instigating them to rebel against the government. In the sham court trial whose judge was Mu’awiya himself, all of them pleaded not guilty. They reiterated their loyalty towards the government. In this scenario, the charges of instigating people to rebel against the government didn’t stand. Rather, the court insisted on them denouncing their pro-Ali views publicly to be acquitted. None of them did so. The court handed over a range of punishments on them. Seven of them were exiled away from Kufa. Six of them, including Hujr bin Adi, were executed by a single stroke of sword after their graves were dug in front of their eyes and the shrouds put nearby. One of them was executed by burying alive. ‘Amr bin Ḥamiq escaped from Kufa during the government crackdown campaign. He got caught in Mosul where he was executed on the orders of Mu’awiya for murdering Uthman. 159, 160, 161
The description of the trial by Tabari unveils a very important precept. The Shi’a Ali did not mind expressing loyalty towards the government of Mu’awiya, which was their political stand. However, they preferred death to denouncing the superiority of Ali over Uthman. It was their moral stand. The Shi’a Ali was no longer a purely political party. It had started changing into a faith-based sect.
Shi’a Ali never revolted openly against the Mu’awiya government. However, they maintained their political identity and kept presenting themselves to malcontent portions of masses as an alternate political set up. They kept producing propaganda material which would have disseminated secretly. Here is a piece. Hind bint Ziyad bin Makhramah of Ansar lamented Hujr’s death:
O Ḥujr, Ḥujr of Banū ‘Adi
May safety and happiness receive you.
I fear for you what destroyed ‘Adi
While an old man is roaring in Damascus
He thinks killing the best is all right for him
Who has a wazīr from the worst people.162
Constitutional reforms of Mu’awiya
Mu’awiya’s concept of a ruler was different from all those who ruled the Islamic state before him. He used to express it when he was not even the governor of Damascus. When Umar came to Syria on an official visit and Mu’awiya had to pay him a courtesy call as a field commander, he came in form of a pompous procession. At Umar’s objection, he justified that opponents of the Rashidun Caliphate must know that its officials were powerful. 163 On assuming caliphate Mu’awiya made far reaching changes in the personal appearance, constitutional role and legal powers of a caliph.
“Then came Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan,” reports Ya’qubi, “He built palaces, ……. he acquired guards, acquired a police force (shurṭah), established chamberlains.[ḥujjāb, its sin. is ḥājib – a person whose duty was to screen people so only few could see a ruler], and built ruler’s compartments (maqṣūrah) in mosques. He rode good-looking mounts and padded saddles. He wore silk and brocade.”164 “Mu’awiyah was the first in Islam to institute …. gate-keepers [bawwābūn. pl. of bawwāb]; to drape-curtains [sitr, pl. sutūr; to conceal the caliph from the gaze of visitors]; and to have men walk in front of him with lances. He was the first to ….. sit on a throne (sarīr) with the people below him,” Ya’qubi continues.165 Mu’awiya never formally announced that he had different rights and privileges from those of his predecessor caliphs. His body language showed that he had transformed the office of a caliph. The caliph no longer remained primus inter pares. He became a superior comparari pares.
The change in the get-up and the role of a caliph was not by coincidence. It was a well-conceived strategy. Mu’awiya is the first ruler in Islam whose name appears on monuments and coins. It gives Jeremy a clue that Mu’awiya had ‘royal ambitions’ from the beginning of his rule. 166
A coin with Mu’awiya’s name.167
A point to note is that Mu’awiya himself never claimed to be a king. “Mu’awiya did not wear a crown like other kings in the world,” observes a contemporary Chrisitian, the anonymous writer of the Maronite Chronicle.171 His reputation, however, persisted as a king. “Mu’awiya was the first ‘king’ in Islam and he converted caliphate into kingship,” writes Hawting. 172 Abdallah bin Khalifa was a political exile and a Shi’a Ali sympathizer during Mu’awiya’s reign. Lamenting the execution of Hujr, he referred to Mu’awiya:
So, O Ḥujr, who will bleed the throats of the horses [meaning lead them in battle]
And of the aggressive king whenever he acts unjustly. 173
Mu’awiya’s other constitutional reform was distancing the caliph’s office from the religious affairs of Islam. Mu’awiya was a Companion of the Prophet and so was his scribe. 174 If he wished he could use his good relationship with Prophet Muhammad as an excuse to continue to act as director of religious affairs as his predessesor caliphs had been. He separated the institution of caliph from day to day business of religion. Let’s take up a case study. Prophet Muhammad had determined the boundaries of Haram around Ka’ba. They were marked by pillars (anṣāb) on all the roads entering Mecca. The pillars used to get blurred now and then due to the desert conditions. The sitting caliph had to reconfirm the boundaries before their renovation, as the caliph was expected to be the supreme authority in religious matters.175 When the time of renovation came during Mu’awiya’s tenure he did not bother to determine the location of the pillars himself. He rather ordered a common Meccan, Kurz bin ‘Alqamah of the Khuza’ah tribe, to figure out where exactly these pillars should be installed.176
We don’t find a single example throughout the reign of Mu’awiya where the caliph reminded people of their religious duties. Nor we hear of any episode in which the caliph claimed that he had heard a certain thing from the Prophet, or presented a quote from the Qur’an to reinforce his arguments. Caliph Mu’awiya never acted as a judge in bickering over religious matters of Islam. Perhaps Mu’awiya had learned from the woes of Ali who emphasized too much on religious role of the caliph and submersed into a morass of religious controversies.
In theory the caliph remained the supreme spiritual leader of Muslims but practically religious scholars took over this role.
Finally, Mu’awiya dismantled the political doctrine of the Rashidun Caliphate that a person must be a pioneer in Islam to qualify as caliph to the Prophet. Instead, he introduced a new concept that it is Allah Himself who picks the rulers and whoever Allah wishes, choses. It is the duty of masses to obey him with words and deeds instead of pondering over his affiliation to Islam or his nearness to the Prophet. 177 Extending on this principle, the title of khalifa rasul Allah started changing into Khalifa Allah during Mu’awiya’s tenure. The phrase simply meant that a Khalifa is directly appointed by Allah. People used to call Mu’awiya ‘khalifa Allah’, especially when they had to accolade him to get a benefit. Mu’awiya never corrected their grammar. 178 Such changes in the title of Khalifa might have gone through easily because a lot of grass root level administrators who were still non-Muslims didn’t appreciate the terminology of the ruling Arab Muslims. 179
All of the constitutional reforms of Mu’awiya were destined to last longer than his life. Resultantly, Islam split into two streams. One stream was the Islamic state and its caliph. Like any other state, its sole function became to administrate the country and strive for the political stability and prosperity of its people. The other stream was the preservation and spread of Islam. Religious scholars became skippers in that stream. 180.
Genial relations with non-Muslims
Once the turbulence of Futuhul Buldan was over, the Rashidun Caliphate had started building a bridge between the ruler of the state and the non-Muslim subjects. There was a realization that they were the back bone of the economy and the main tax payers in the country. If they revolted successfully, the Arab Muslim elite would have to abandon the comfortable garrision towns and flee to their pasturelands in Arabian Peninsula. Mu’awiya comprehended it more than his predecessors. His power base was Syria, which was the bastion of staunch Christianity. He could hardly afford a discontent population in his own province.
Mu’awiya had chemistry with his Christian subjects. The intimacy had started when Mu’awiya was governor of Damascus during the Rashidun Caliphate. When Uthman sent the ten political dissidents to Damascus, Mu’awiya had no trouble in lodging them in a church with the consent of local Christians. 181 From day one of his tenure as a caliph, Mu’awiya started creating an impression that the caliph was caretaker of all religious groups of the country, including Muslims and Christians. After taking the oath of his office in Jerusalem, Mu’awiya went to the sacred Christian sites in Jerusalem to pray there. 182 The gesture would have worked as a confidence building measure.
Mu’awiya knew that the Christians were divided in denominations. Members of one denomination hated the other one more than they hated members of other religions. Mu’awiya took full advantage. One incident recorded by the anonymous chronicler of Maronite denomination provides evidence. The Maronite and Jacobites had a religious disputation in the capital Damascus in June of 659 CE with Mu’awiya acting as a judge between them. Mu’awiya judged the Jacobites to be defeated. He ordered the bishop of Jocobites to keep quiet in future and to pay twenty thousand dinars annually to Mu’awiya as a cost of protecting the Jacobites from attacks of other denominations. 183 Mu’awiya had not only created a permanent source of income for his government through the debate, he also won the favour of Maronites.
Mu’awiya looked after the interests of Christians of Syria throughout his tenure. Over time, the Muslim community of Damascus greatly increased in numbers and there was a dire need to extend the grand mosque of Damascus. Mu’awiya announced that his government would extend the mosque by annexing the cathedral of Saint John. Christians objected to the plans. Mu’awiya didn’t offend his Christian subjects, rather he withdrew the plan. 184, 185
Ya’qubi asserts that Mu’awiya was the first ruler in Islam to appoint Christians to the highest bureaucratic post of a central government secretary.186 Most rekowned of them was Sarjūn (Sergius), the finance secretery.187 One might argue that Sarjun was already a bureaucrat in the Byzantine Roman setup and the Rashidun Caliphate retained the services of Roman bureaucracy, just like they did with the Sasanians. 188 Yet, we can spot new Christian faces in Mu’awiya’s bureaucracy. Mu’awiya’s tax collector at Homs was Uthāl, a Christian by faith. 189 The re-use of the bureaucratic apparatus of pre-existing states was a norm from the Rashidun Caliphate times. Creating new bureaucrats from Christians was not a precedent.190
Mu’awiya’s pro-Christian policies must have borne fruit for the Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyad Caliphate enjoyed more political stability in Christian dominated provinces of the country, like Syria, Jazira, and Egypt throughout its life.
Religious tolerance under the Umayyad Caliphate
“Justice flourished under his reign, and a great peace was established in the countries that were under his government, and allowed everyone to live as they wished,” are the words of John bar Penkaye, a contomprary Christian who compiled a chronicle around 688 CE.191 The early Islamic practice of allowing non-Muslim subjects the right to live according to their own customs and laws seems a continuation of the Sasanid institution of the semi-independent religious communities. 192 In general, it was in the Muslim’s own interest to maintain the conquered communities intact, insofar as they provided a stable economic base for the nascent Muslim empire.193 Not surprisingly, this tolerance is nowhere more noticeable than in the former Sasanid territory itself, among the subjugated Zoroastrian community. In a comparative study of both pre- and post-conquest Zoroastrian legal texts, Bodil Hjerrild is able to conclude that 1) Zoroastrians were not persecuted under Arab rule, and 2) new legal texts, applicable to all within the community, continued to be complied into the tenth century CE at least; and no greater indication of the degree of this tolerance is to be found than the continuation – encouragement, even – of a practice which offends a very ancient Semitic principle and undoubtedly seemed abhorrent to Arab Muslims: the Zoroastrian custom of marriage within the forbidden degrees. 194.
Though the Umayyad Caliphate upheld the tradition of religious tolerance already being practiced during the Rashidun Caliphate, anecdotes of intolerance can be found in history books. For example, in 770 CE Ubaydullah bin Abi Bakra, the lieutenant governor of Sistan ordered to execute the hirbidhs (Zoroastrian priests) and to extinguish all the ritual fires in Sistan. 195 Since such episodes are rarely mentioned in historical texts, one can assume that it might have resulted from local inter-religious tensions, and was not a stated government policy.
Worth noting is that we don’t find any evidence of efforts on the part of the government or Arab Muslim elites to appease Zoroastrians. As far as Zoroastrians were concerned, the Umayyad Caliphate was totally neutral.
Pro-Muslim policies of Mu’awiya
Mu’awiya’s gestures of goodwill towards Christians were to neutralize their negativism towards Muslim rule. Mu’awiya never intended to prop them up as his power base. His power base always remained the Arab Muslim elite, especially the Ashraf. Whenever Mu’awiya got a chance, he used gimmicks to impress his Muslim subjects. The Umayyad Caliphate was still using Byzantine Dinars as its currency. According to the anonymous Maronite chronicler, Mu’awiya removed the Christian symbol of cross from the coins. 196 It might be true. Archaeologists are aware of at least three coins up to now, which are in line with the statement of the anonymous Maronite chronicler. 197 The experiment, however, didn’t go well and Mu’awiya had to revert to the old design. The anonymous Maronite chronicler tells the inner story – the new currency was not acceptable to the Christians.198, 199.
Top: Solidus of Heraclius. Middle: Umayyad modifications in Solidus of Heraclius. Bottom: Umayyad coin without cross. 200
Mu’awiya was not neglecting the Ka’ba at expense of Jerusalem, anyhow. He was the first caliph who covered the Ka’ba with brocade (dībāj) and brought slaves to serve it. 202 As the country’s law prohibited keeping a Muslim in slavery, it can be safely assumed that the slaves serving the Ka’ba for menial jobs were non-Muslims.
Soldiers vs generals vs central government
The formula for the division of booty between the soldiers, the commanding generals and the central government changed fundamentally during the Mu’awiya government.
The issue of larger remuneration for the general as compared to ordinary soldiers settled in favour of generals. When a military force raided Ifriqiya under command of Mu’awiya bin Hudayj in 670 CE, Mu’awiya bin Hudayj set aside one fifth of booty as central government share. He gave only half of the remaining booty to the soldiers. 203 One can assume that the general kept the remaining half in his pocket.
As the Umayyad Caliphate was not pursuing a policy of border expansion during its first three decades, it was less dependent upon soldiers who were willing to cross borders into other countries. The soldiers, on the other hand were desperate to supplement their income with booty. In this background, the one fifth share of the central government no longer remained fixed. It became flexible and negotiable. Take a note of two events.
Ḥakam bin ‘Amr, a lieutenant governor of Khorasan, raided a Turkish community sometime around 670 CE. He collected a lot of booty which included felts and vessels made up of gold and silver and other precious objects. The Caliph Mu’awiya demanded that all the vessels made up of gold and silver and other precious objects should be delivered to the central government without delay. Hakam neglected the orders, arguing that the caliph’s orders cannot supersede the Qur’an which clearly prescribed one fifth share for the central government. He sent one-fifth to the central government and distributed the remaining equally among his soldiers. His immediate supervisor, Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan, the governor of Basrah, got so angry with Hakam that he vowed to behead him. It was Hakam’s good luck that he died naturally before Ziyad could fulfill his vow. 204
In 680 CE ‘Amr bin Mu’awiya, a field commander of the Syrian contingent, returned from a summer campaign against Byzantine. Caliph Mu’awiya asked him how much the khums amounted to. He informed him, and Mu’awiya asked where it was? ‘Amr said “You are asking me about the khums, while I see one of the emigrants walking on foot. Shouldn’t I give him a mount?” Mu’awiya said, “He will not get it as long as I live.” ‘Amr said, “Then I don’t care!” and recited:
The Quraysh in Damascus are given my booty,
While I abandon my friends. That is unjust.
I am not an amīr who accumulates money like a merchant,
And I do not seek a long amirate with miserliness.
So if the shaykh of Damascus withholds his wealth, fine;
But I do not wish to lock up my wealth.205.
The moral of the story: Sometimes the center demanded more than one-fifth of the booty and the commander refused. Other times, the center demanded at least one fifth, and the commander slipped out with money.
The central government’s share of the booty was still called a ‘fifth’ though it was no longer exactly 20%.
The share of the booty of the cavalry remained double that of the infantry. 206
Remunerations of governors
The governors and lieutenant governors had to work for a basic salary during the Rashidun Caliphate. They routinely stole from the tax money to supplement their income. The caliph, in his part, routinely used to audit the governor and lieutenant governor, confiscate the illegally acquired wealth, and punish the governor or lieutenant governor by dismissal. The practice developed a clash of interest between caliph and governors. Instead of doing his job perfectly, the governor concentrated on hiding his wealth and avoiding audit. By auditing a governor, the caliph tarnished the image of his governor in eyes of the very people on whom he was expected to govern.
Mu’awiya changed it all. The salaries of governors and lieutenant governors increased in recognition of their services. The salary of Ziyad was twenty-five thousand dirhams annually while that of junior government officers was one thousand dirhams annually. 207 On top of salary the governors and top government officials, received commission for their work. They regularly pocketed some amount of the tax that they collected. The central government never audited them during their tenure. At the time of their dismissal or death, the central government asked for audit. At that time, the central government determined rate of their commission. The governor, or his family in case of his death, could either keep whole amount he had accumulated or half of it. Probably, the rate of commission depended upon the way a governor managed his domain, and the way he kept the caliph satisfied. In this method, the governor did not have to steal. His public image never shattered. His whole mind focused on his performance and to be in good books of the caliph. 208 Mu’awiya didn’t want to leave an impression that he was confiscating wealth of his governors at the end of their tenures just as a grudge against them. Rather, it was the fiscal policy to run the Umayyad Caliphate properly. 209 Commission-based remuneration didn’t mean the central government had given the governors a free hand to rack up whatever they wished. They were given a tight target of tax revenue collection that was based upon a figure calculated by the auditors of the central government specifically assigned for that particular province. 210 They were not allowed to increase the tax rate because it carried political risks.
This arrangement of commission based remuneration of governors imparted the governors a capacity to pay those subordinates lavishly who obediently served their interest. Ziyad bin Abihi/Sufyan granted ‘Ubayd bin Ka’b of the Numayr tribe a piece of land for a successful representation of Mu’awiya for Ziyad.211
Distinction between state’s and caliph’s property
Theophanes the Confessor informs us that “Mu’awiyah used to live at Damascus in royal style and stored up his monetary treasures there.” 212 Ya’qubi confirms it. In Ya’qubi’s own words, “Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan…. built palaces, constructed houses, ….. rode good-looking mounts and padded saddles….. wore silk and brocade. He acquired crown lands (ṣawāfi) … Ṭirāz (from Persian word meaning an ornamental band of cloth with woven or embroidered inscriptions) was made for him in Yemen, Fustat, Alexandria and Ruha. His family, children, and officials acquired what he acquired and did as he did. 213 A mere salary cannot buy luxuries. Obviously he was using state money on his personal expenditures and was not accountable to anybody for it. The boundary between state exchequer and caliph’s personal wealth got blurred. “Mu’awiya did in Syria, the Jazira, and Yemen what he had done in Iraq, setting aside for himself and making him own the estates that had belonged to the (former) kings, and he granted them to members of his family and entourage. He was the first to have such estates throughout the world, even in Mecca and Medina, and loads of dates and wheat from them used to be delivered to him every year,” notes Ya’qubi. 214 This approach gave his opponents an argument that he was appropriating fay for himself and his family. 215 This argument continued to echo throughout the life of the Umayyad Caliphate for each caliph. It can be found on lips of anybody who opposed the Umayyad rule.
Mu’awiya’s inscription on a dam near Taif. 216
Umayyads got filthy rich
Granting crown lands to the political dignitaries was a usual practice of the Rashidun Caliphate. The dignitaries received lands, not the caliph himself. The Mu’awiya government modified this. It persued the policy of granting crown lands exclusively to caliph’s clan members, particularly those who were in his good books. First among them was the caliph himself. Ya’qubi asserts that Mu’awiya not only allotted crown lands to himself but to his relatives. 217 Baladhuri holds the same opinion. 218 Again, the reason behind the nepotism was that constitutional check and balance on the ruler were loose. A new logic had emerged that caliph is appointed by Allah and he is responsible only to Allah. He could do whatever he wished in financial matters. If he was wrong, only Allah could judge him.
Pomp and show of the governors
The exhibition of wealth and power was not limited to the caliph in the Umayyad Caliphate. It trickled down to the governors, lieutenant governors and probably to the Ashraf as well. Wealth definitely bestows a comfortable life to its owner. Nonetheless, the display of wealth has nothing to do with comforts of life. It is basically to impress the onlooker. Its aim is to emphasize the wealth-based hierarchy in which the poorest are at the bottom. Showing off wealth is to prevent the poorer members of a society from challenging the authority of wealthier. It is to snub possible criticism on the moral conduct of the affluent. When it imparted so many advantages to those responsible for governing of the country, it is very likely that the caliph himself encouraged such behavior by setting an example. It is generally known that behavior of a subordinate is reflection of that of the boss. 219.
A big procession of people used to walk in front of Ziyad bin Abihi / Abu Sufyan, holding spears and clubs whenever he appeared in public, asserts Tabari. 220 Tabari also gives graphic details of the pomp and show of the procession that took Ubaydullah bin Ziyad from Syria to Khorasan after the later was appointed lieutenant governor there.221.
That was the time rulers started using plural pronouns for themselves.222
Mu’awiya government’s taxation policy
The Mu’awiya government strived to increase the income of the central government and that of the caliph and his well wishers. The central government needed higher revenues to pay the Syrian Troops who were absolutely essential to maintaining the government writ. The government also needed more money as the size of the government was increasing. Mu’awiya introduced many beurocratic departments, which were not heard of during the Rashidun Caliphate. For example, the office of seal (dīwān al Khātam), which was apparently established to authenticate and prevent the falsification of caliphal documents, was a Mu’awiya government innovation. 223 The maintenance of communication and intelligence over the vast areas needed more sources than those at the disposal of the Rashidun Caliphate.
The main tax payers of the country were non-Muslims. All of them had entered into sulḥ contracts with the state during the Rashidun Caliphate, which stipulated how much each community would pay. Dishonouring those contracts and compelling them to enter into new contracts might be politically risky. The Mu’awiya government didn’t touch them. It simply introduced a new indirect tax. It was customary for the Iranians/Zoroastrians to give gifts to higher ups on the occasions of their festivals during pre-Islamic times. They kept on giving such gifts to the officials of the Rashidun Caliphate. The rulers of the Rashidun Caliphate didn’t mind the practice because the gifts were mostly token. 224 The officials of Mu’awiya government didn’t hesitate accepting high value gifts on the occasions of Zoroastrian festivals. Ya’qubi reports that “Mu’awiya ordered that he should be brought gifts at Nowrūz and Mihrajān. So one million dirhams would be sent to him at Nowruz and other occasions, and ten million dirhams on Mihrajan. 225 The tax was obviously discriminatory. The Christian population of the country didn’t have to enjoy paying gifts to the government officials on the occasions of Christmas and Easter.
Soldiers and recipients of ‘Aṭa’ were exempt from any kind of tax during the Rashidun Caliphate. This was no longer the case during the Mu’awiya government. Mu’awiya imposed zakat tax on the ‘Ata’ income.226 The move brought many more citizens of the country in a tax bracket.
As the income of the central government increased, it was more in position to spend on development projects. Mu’awiya ordered a land survey to be conducted in whole of Iraq and all the crown lands (ṣawāfi). He built dams on them and the revenue of these lands only from the province of Kufa was fifty million dirhams. Mu’awiya took this revenue. 227, 228
The Mu’awiya government allegedly confiscated the properties of those who dared to oppose the government. 229 The policy might have supplemented the government income.
Stunned territorial growth
Mu’awiya spent all his life fixing the intrinsic problems of the country he had inherited from the Rashidun Caliphate. The Umayyad Caliphate didn’t add a single square inch of land to the country during Mu’awiya’s tenure. 230 The state didn’t even plan or wish to do so in all sectors except Byzantine Rome. The Umayyad Caliphate was a big country surrounded mostly by petty principalities. It could survive without demarcating its borders with its neighbours through mutual treaties and crossing the effective line of control as and when it wished. Realities at the borders shaped foreign policy of the Umayyad Caliphate during Mu’awiya’s tenure. It was to raid all neighbouring countries on a regular basis. None of the raiding expedition intended to occupy any area permanently. All were small in size, comprising of cavalry only and scanty in heavy military hardware. The raids definitely enriched the participants, produced a source of income for provincial and central governments, and kept the public of Umayyad Caliphate in illusion that the government had not abandoned jihad against infidels.
African Front
Egypt and its dependencies never raided the principalities located to the south along the River Nile. The soldiers of the Umayyad Caliphate loved their eyes. There was no harm in raiding the other adjacent areas of Africa, anyhow. The Umayyad Caliphate raided them regularly as its birth right. It never faced much resistance during these raids and never was disappointed by the amount of booty they yielded. The raids appear to be regularly carried out every two years. Their description is brief, meaning the purpose of raids is clear to the sources. In 665 CE “Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan sent Mu’awiya bin Hudayj on a raiding expedition. He reached Fḥṣ and took some captives, but did not conquer any city or fortress. Then he returned,” reports Khalifa.231, 232 If people are regularly mentioned as enemies in these raids, they are non-Muslim Berbers. There is only one exception to raiding policy and it merits attention. Carthage maintained its status as a sole Byzantine Roman colony on the African coast for a while. In 679 CE, the army of the Umayyad Caliphate reached Carthage under the command of Dinar Abu Muhajir. After fierce fighting, which lasted two years, and during which many died and wounded from both sides, the opponents struck a peace deal. They evacuated the peninsula for Dinar’s army, probably temporarily. 233, 234, 235 Despite pressure, the Mu’awiya government failed to get full hold of the Byzantine colony.
Indian Front
The Makran-Hind front was active as early as 662 CE when a contingent of the Umayyad Caliphate penetrated deep into Sind under the command of a local lieutenant governor.236 However, the raids in this direction didn’t prove profitable. We hear of a few raids on Qīqān during the next eight years with very little mention of booty but a lot of casualties on the Muslim side and successes of ‘polytheists’. Perhaps the Umayyad Caliphate shelved its plan of border raids on this front after the death of its lieutenant governor on the battlefield in 670 CE. 237, 238, 239
The Sistan-Hind front has similar story. We hear of very few raids across the border from this front. In one particular raid in 664 CE, the forces of the Umayyad Caliphate marched to Qandabil, from where they proceeded to Banna and reached up to lhwn /hwz and returned home with their hands full of booty. 240, 241 In another raid in 673 CE, which originated from Kandahar, the raiders reached Bayt adh Dhahab. 242, 243.
Busyness with local nobles explains the lack of action on the Sistan borders. We hear of many notices of disobedience from the local nobles. The Umayyad Caliphate had to re-subdue Amol, Rokhhaj, Zubulistan, Zaranj and Kandahar on different occasions. 244, 245
The revolt of Kabul particularly attracts attention. It started in 664 CE when the troops of the Umayyad Caliphate had to discipline the district. 246 Two years later, the Shah of Kabul, whose title was Zunbīl, expelled the Umayyad Caliphate monitors from the town and expanded his influence up to Zabulistan and Rukhhaj. The Umayyad Caliphate could only halt him at Bust. Zunbil held his grounds for four years until the Umayyad Caliphate would impose a tax of one million Dirham on him again in 672 CE. 247, 248
Central Asian Front
The Khorasan-Central Asia border was the farthest from the capital. It was also far away from the provincial capital of Basrah, which controlled it. The Umayyad Caliphate had a dual job in this area. It had to quell periodic revolts of local non-Muslim nobles and tailor to unceasing cross border raids.
Over the twenty years of Mu’awiya’s caliphate, the forces of the Umayyad Caliphate in Khorasan had to re-subjugate the mountainous district of Ghūr and Farāwandah, Quhistan, as well as Balkh. 249, 250
River Oxus marked the boundary of the Umayyad Caliphate. Cross border raids were essentially across River Oxus. Annual raids became routine in the area. After the First Arab Civil War, when the Mu’awiya government adopted a policy of stable borders, Central Asia provided a fertile ground for the Umayyad Caliphate for treasure hunting. Winter was bitter in the region. Campaigns were possible only duing summer. Each spring, the troops of the Umayyad Caliphate used to cross the River Oxus, raid any prinicipality that was not on alert that summer, grab booty, and return to comforts of Merv before winter. 251
Landscape of Khorasan. 252
Sources specifically mention an abundance of booty in the raids carried out by Merv. Apparently, the success of the raids was the result of the mutual hostility of Turk princes, and their willingness to co-operate with the invaders to harm their opponent prince. 255
Northern front
The northern border of the Umayyad Caliphate, across which laid the powerful Khazar Khanate, remained passive. Here, the border was formed after the defeat of the Rashidun Caliphate when two big powers had come face-to-face. The only time the Muslims raided across this was immediately after Mu’awiya assumed power in 662 CE. This was against the people of Alāns.256, 257.
Byzantine Rome front
Syria and its dependencies, Mu’awiya’s own province, bordered the hottest front of the country. When Mu’awiya came to power, he was already in a truce with the Byzantine Rome. 258 We don’t know how the truce broke. Baladhuri alleges that the Romans were perfidious. 259 Ya’qubi asserts that Mu’awiya had consolidated his power over the Umayyad Caliphate, he no longer needed the truce. 260 In any case, whatever the reason, the truce was already over in the second year of Mu’awiya’s caliphate because Tabari alleges that in 662 CE, Muslims raided the Byzantine and inflicted a shocking defeat on them, reportedly killing several generals (baṭāriqah). 261, 262
Since then, the winter and summer raids against Byzantine Rome each year became routine. According to Baladhuri the campaigns started from the border cities of Syria and Jazira and from the naval bases of coastal cities. The Umayyad Caliphate used to delay invasions if it perceived the enemy to be strong and vigilant. 263 The raiders used to traverse the whole of Anatolia and reach up to the fringes of Constantinople. 264 There was not a single year up the death of Mu’awiya when the Umayyad Caliphate didn’t raid Anatolia once or twice a year. Sometimes, the raids were a combination of land and sea attacks. 265
Mostly the notices of these campaigns are short. 266 It means the primary aim of the Umayyad Caliphate for these raids was to harass the Byzantine Rome and to keep it on its toes. Over and above regular raiding, the Umayyad Caliphate didn’t lose any other chance of destabilizing the Byzantine Caliphate. In 668 CE, for example, general Saborios of Armenia rebelled against Emperor Constans. Both quickly sent their envoys to Damascus to win over Mu’awiya’s support. The envoy of Saborios asked for military support and the envoy of Emperor Constans requested neutrality. Mu’awiya’s leaning was towards supporting the rebel forces. He pushed both envoys into a war of bidding, in which the winner would get Mu’awiya’s support for his cause. Emperor’s envoy could not offer to pay what Saborios’s envoy was willing to. Mu’awiya had been sending campaigns into Byzantine lands and helping Saborios was not an extra burden for the Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyad Caliphate sent its usual campaign with instructions to help the rebels. The matter didn’t go further because Emperor Constans defeated the rebel forces before the Arabs could help them. 267
The full efforts to keep Byzantine Rome on its toes was for a purpose. Mu’awiya had not learned any lessons from the defeat of 656 CE at Constantinople. He was still dreaming of capturing Constantinople with an amphibian attack, killing the Emperor and ending the empire. To achieve its target, the Umayyad Caliphate occupied many islands in and around Aegean Sea and established military posts on them. “Tighten the noose around the Byzantines, for then you will have other nations in your power,” was Mu’awiya’s message to those soldiers of the Umayyad Caliphate who were preparing to capture one such island.268 Many of these islands were otherwise uninhabited.
The Umayyad Caliphate occupied and stationed military in Rhodes, Crete, Cicily and many small unnamed Islands one by one. The occupation of Sicily was the last and most difficult. Raids on it started from Egypt during the governorship of Mu’awiya bin Hudayj (664 – 670 CE). At the long last, the island surrendered partial areas for permanent occupation by the Umayyad Caliphate in 680 CE. 269, 270, 271, 272
The catalyst of Mu’awiya’s hope of finishing off Byzantine Rome was the internal weaknesses of Byzantine Rome itself. The country had hardly given a stiff resistance to the sorties sent by the Umayyad Caliphate. The only restraining factor on advance of the Umayyad Caliphate was absence of any population group in Byzantine Rome willing to co-operate with Arabs. The country was a theocracy and was bogged by religious differences among its population. The Emperor was not strong enough to force the antagonizing groups into sub ordinance. Fights among the Emperor and the generals for power always fanned opposing religious ideas further. Such conspiracies and theological differences were the background of the assassination of Emperor Constans in 669 CE in Sicily. His son, Constantine (IV) had to fight wars against the conspirators to gain the throne of his father. 273
Constantinople and its surroundings.
When the Umayyad Caliphate achieved full internal stability and the the scars of the First Arab Civil War were over, Mu’awiya decided to launch a full-fledged amphibian attack on Constantinople. Theophanes the Confessor gives vivid details: “In March of 673 CE a rainbow appeared in the sky and all mankind shuddered. Everyone said it was the end of the world.” 274 The rainbow was a bad omen for the Byzantine Romans from God in Theophanes’ worldview. “In this year the deniers of Christ readied a great expedition. They sailed to and wintered in Kilikia; Muhammad bin Abdullah was at Smyrna and Qays in Kilikia and Lykia. Mu’awiya also sent the emir Khalid with yet another expedition to help them” while “there was a plague in Egypt”. 275, 276 By that time Byzantine Rome had acquired a secret weapon – Greek fire – which the Umayyad Caliphate was completely unaware of. Theophanes gives the credit of its invention to a certain Kalinikos, who was an artificer from Heliopolis, and had fled to the Romans. He had devised a sea fire which had a capacity to ignite the Umayyad Caliphate’s ships and burn them with soldiers on board. 277, 278 When the military and the navy of the Umayyad Caliphate advanced and “Constantine (IV) learned of the movement of God’s enemies against Constantinople, he prepared huge two-storied warships equipped with Greek fire and siphon-carrying warships, ordering them to anchor in the Proklianesian Harbour of the Caesarium. 279, 280. In the spring, of 674 CE the expedition of enemies of God anchored in the Thracian territory from the heights of Hedbomon known as Magnaura on the west to the cape of Kyklobion on the east. 281. The clashes between the two sides continued from April to September. The Arabs retreated to Kyzikos, which they had taken, to winter there. In the spring [of 675 CE] they set out in the same way to meet the Christians in sea-battle. ….. but with the aid of God and His Mother they were disgraced, expending a host of warlike men. They retreated in great distress, with severe wounds inflicted on themselves. As their expeditions were going away after God had ruined it, it was overtaken by a tempestuous winter storm near Syllaion. It was shivered to atoms and completely destroyed. A second brother, Sufyan bin Auf, joined battle with Roman force under Florus, Petronas, and Kyprianos’ 30,000 Arabs were killed”. The “sea fire ignited the Arab ships and burned them with all hands. Thus it was that the Roman returned with victory.” 282, 283 Greek fire was such a defensive ‘atom bomb’ for the Romans that its design and composition became a highly classified state secret. Still scholars debate about its nature. 284, 285, 286
Greek fire.287
Byzantine Rome was still not powerful enough to send an army all the way across Anatolia to Syria. Their only option was sabotage operations along the southern and eastern Mediterranean littoral. Around 676 CE Emperor Constantine IV dispatched a guerrilla force, dubbed “insurgents” (mardaites). They sailed to the coast of Tyre and Sidon. After disembarking they dispersed into the mountains of Lebanon. Jarājimah were the Christian inhabitants of the rural areas around Antakya. They never paid Jiziya after Futuhul Buldan because they agreed to provide the Rashidun Caliphate with spying services on Byzantine Rome. However, mostly they played a role of double agent. This time they were aware of arrival of mardaites and were waiting to join them. In addition, many run away slaves and native peasants joined the mardaites. The numbers of the guerrilla force swelled into the thousands within short time. The insurgents played havoc from the peaks of Lebanon Mountains to Jerusalem. The Umayyad Caliphate didn’t have the ability to curb them. Hesitantly, Mu’awiya government heeded to Byzantine Rome for Armistice. After prolonged negotiations the two sides agreed on a written peace accord for thirty years term to be taken under oath. The Umayyad Caliphate had to pay three thousand Dinars, fifty prisoners, and fifty high bred Arabian horses. The two parties exchanged the copies of the treaty with each other. The humiliating conditions of the peace accord enhanced the status of Byzantine Rome in eyes of its neighbours. Avar Khanate and the rulers of the countries on the western borders of Byzantine Rome re-confirmed their peace agreements with Byzantine Rome. 289, 290
Due to constant raiding of frontier regions of Anatolia, the Byzantine side of the border remained deserted. Few people settled there after Heraclius’s abandonment of the forts. They had to flee for safety every time Umayyad Caliphate raided. Sometimes Byzantine government brought and stationed some fighters in the area as a transient measure.291
On the Byzantine Rome frontier, Armenia remained a thorn in the side of the Umayyad Caliphate. It was within the boundary of the Umayyad Caliphate but its people got inspiration from Byzantine Rome. Umayyad Caliphate had to calm down its regional revolts time and again. 292.
New cantonments incepted / Military organization/ lieutenant governors
Constant raiding in the border areas necessitated different military infrastructure from that of Futuhul Buldan. The Umayyad Caliphate organized the military on an altered module from that of the Rashidun Caliphate. The districts located on the borders were called Junds. 293 The Umayyad Caliphate took out troops from centrally located cantonments and stationed them in Junds.294 Some of the border towns had much influx and so much regular military activity that they grew into a cantonment town in their own right. uring ‘Ali’s tenure a number of soldiers from both kufa and Basrah garrisons refused to serve ‘Ali anymore. They immigrated to Syria to join Mu’awiya. He settled them in Qinnasrīn and converted this rural district attached to Homs into a garrison city.295 Another example of extension of pre-existing town into a cantonment is Merv.
There were border areas which did not have any big towns. If Umayyad Caliphate had to maintain constant raiding in the area it had to lay foundation of new safe residential complex. Such is the case of Kairouan (Qayrawān). Kairouan was built on pattern of Kufa, Basrah or Fustat in 670 CE. The land was cleared of thickets, the wildlife chased away, lots cut and houses built. Governor house and grand mosque decorated the central plaza. 296, 297, 298, 299
Junds were attached to the relevant provincial governments for governance. However, they had their own administrators. They were tax collectors cum military commanders and were called Amīr (lieutenant governor). The lieutenant governors were mostly appointed by the provincial governor. Sometimes they were appointed directly by the caliph.300, 301
They were responsible to the provincial governor directly and to the caliph indirectly. The lieutenant governors of Rashidun Caliphate did not have legal powers to take the troops across the border without permission of the provincial governor. Lieutenant governors of Umayyad Caliphate were expected to do so. The military stationed in the junds was at their disposal. 302
The lieutenant governors had to be palpably unpredictable. They raided the neigbouring country whenever they perceived that the ‘enemy’ was in distress or unvigilant. Their troops were not equipped with heavy militaryware.303 They were all cavalry for swift movement.304
The arrangement of the surprise attack would have been incomplete without naval support for the raids on Anatolia. The Umayyad Caliphate built a large naval base at Acre where military ships were. 305
Transplantation of population
Both voluntary and forced transplantation of big groups of the population from one part of the country to another continued. When Mu’awiya took over Kufa from Hasan he expelled many Shi’a Ali from the town and settled them in Syria, Basrah and Jazira. 306
In 662 CE Muy’awia transplanted many Persians from Baalbek, Homs and Antakya to the sea coast of Jordan, i.e. Tyre, Acre and other places. He also moved people of other ethnicities from Baalbek, Homs, and Kufa to Antakya.307 In the same year, or a year before or after, he also transplanted some asāwirah from Basrah and Kufa to Antakya.308
Sa’id bin Uthman bin Affan, Mu’awiya’s lieutenant governor over Khorasan had taken fifty youths, sons of grandees of Samarkand, as hostage as a guarantee of good conduct on their part. When Mu’awiya dismissed him, Sai’d broke his agreement in frustration and took all of them to Medina.309
A new political group – mawla
The term ‘mawla’ (mawlā) orgininated from the pre-Islamic era. It designated those weak men who received protection from a tribe they were not born in. During the Rashidun Caliphate, the concept of mawla changed a bit. He was a slave who earned his freedom by converting to Islam. The process of creating mawla in this way continued. Side by side, another way of creating mawla emerged as well. This was conversion of non-Arab free men into Islam. When an individual or a group of non-Arabs converted to Islam, they sought the blessing of an influential Arab personality or tribe. This personality or tribe claimed that it was a catalyst in their conversion and symbolically relieved the converts of ‘political slavery’. The non-Arab new Muslims were thus recognized by the state as mawla of the Arab personality or the Arab tribe who catalyzed their conversion. The mawlas usually remained politically and socially loyal to their catalyzer. They participated in political struggle from the side of their catalyzer.
Most of the mawlas adopted an Arabic name at the time of conversion. 310. That is the reason it is difficult to recognize them in historical sources unless the source explicitly mentions the origin of that person. 311 Mawlas belonged to almost all ethnicities.312 We cannot label each and every mawla to be Persian by default. The identification of a mawla in historical sources has one more problem. All Mawlas mentioned in historical sources were not newly converted Muslims. Sometimes, Islamic sources use this term for those non-Muslims who were in the employment of the Arab Muslim elites. 313, 314. Mawlas were not slaves (mamlūk or ‘Ābid).315 However, Islamic historical literature sometimes confuses the two in the flow of writing. On occasions, Islamic sources use the word mawla explicitly for a person who is actually a slave and a non-Muslim.316 On other occasions Islamic sources use the word ‘Abd for a person who is technically a Mawla.317 Basically, whenever Islamic sources wish to emphasize a superior–inferior relationship between two persons, they tend to choose the term mawla, though the inferior might not be technically a mawla. He might be a slave or an employee. When term mawla is used for such non-mawlas, it appears, the source intended to emphasize loyalty on the part of the inferior towards the superior.
Mawlas – newly converted Muslims – became part of Arab politics from the time of the battle of Siffin when they participated in the battle from both sides. As time passed their presence in politics increased. However, mawlas did not have any independent political views during the early years of the Umayyad Caliphate. They appear in politics under the leadership of an Arab Muslim and toe his line of action.
Mawlas were going to play a pivotal role in the history of Islam from now onwards.
Mu’awiya’s vision of future
In pre-Islamic Arab traditions, many of which were still lingering on, tribal leadership changed hands on a qu’dūd basis. People pushed the seniormost figure of a tribe to a leadership role after the death of the existing chief. This was not the case for the transfer of power in a state-like entity. The leadership transferred to the most capable among the descendants after the death of a ruler. 318 When Islamic Arab society matured from its tribal form to the bureaucratic form, the rule of qu’dūd changed into primogeniture form. The last change of power in the Rashidun Caliphate was between the father and the son – Ali and Hasan.
Once Mu’awiya became the undisputed ruler of the country and could maintain a reasonable political calm, one question preoccupied him. Who would rule the country after him? Umayyad Caliphate had still not made any hard and fast rules regarding succession.
The generation of the earliest Muhajirun who had governed the country in the past had already passed away. 319 Now their second generation had come of age. It was discernible that after Mu’awiya the power would go to the next generation of stalwarts. The question in the air was whose generation? Should it be the next generation of caliphs preceding Mu’awiya according to the qu’dūd rule or the next generation of caliphs according to the primogeniture rule? Being caliph was no longer merely an honor of serving the Muslim community as their head. The long and autocratic rule of Mu’awiya had added a new dimension to being a caliph. It was understandable that whoever would succeed him, would not only have unchecked political powers but also would be able to determine his remunerations lavishly without needing pre-authorization from any institution. The post of caliph had become extremely lucrative.
Mu’awiya deemed it a right of the sitting caliph to pick the next caliph and didn’t see any discrimination if the picked man was the caliph’s own son. However, Mu’awiya had one problem. His twenty-three-year-old son Yazid, who could potentially take over the caliphate, was not fit for the job. “He loved children’s games and the pastime of idle”, blames John bar Penkaye. 320, 321, 322 Each society has a moral ideal that it wishes to see in its ruler. This moral ideal is always lofty and the majority of society’s own members do not follow it. Yazid lacked the character which was necessary to be the caliph of Muslims. 323 Mu’awiya was aware of the shortcomings.324.
Before Mu’awiya promoted his son as heir apparent, he started building his image. He gave him command of a contingent to raid Byzantine Rome. The contingent included almost all prominent men of Quraysh like Abdullah bin Zubayr, Abdullah bin Umar and Abdullah bin Abbas. It also included the respected nonagenarian Abu Ayub al Ansari, who was one of the few surviving Companions. The contingent reached the vicinity of Constantinople in 669 CE.325, 326, 327, 328, 329. The aim of the campaign was definitely not assaulting Constantinople. Mu’awiya did not send any supporting navy. Theophanes gives the numbers of accompanying soldiers to be only five thousand. 330 It returned home like any other summer campaign.
Mughira bin Shu’ba could surmise Mu’awiya’s commotion at this stage and publicly tipped him to declare Yazid as heir apparent.331. After the death of Mughira, Mu’awiya requested Ziyad to advise Yazid to mend his etiquette. 332, 333.
After securing reassurances from his confidants, Mu’awiya wrote a will and revealed it to an assembly of like-minded Ashraf in Damascus. Everybody accepted Yazid as their heir apparent (walī al ‘ahd). 334 Soon after, the governors of the provinces secured similar acceptance from the Ashraf of their respective provinces. 335. Nobody gave a second thought to the proposal including most of the Quraysh, all of the Ansar and all of the other tribes of Arabia. 336, 337.
Not everybody in the country agreed with Mu’awiya’s plans. When Mu’awiya went to perform Hajj in 670 CE, five prominent members of Quraysh, residents of Medina, met with him and conveyed their reservations. They were Abdur Rahman bin Abu Bakr, Abdullah bin Umar, Husayn bin Ali, Abdullah bin Zubayr and Abdullah bin Abbas. They objected to the procedure of choosing next caliph without a wider consultation. None of them showed any intention to consider any of them as a potential candidate but they did express that a son of any of the past caliphs could be the next caliph. So, why only Mu’awiya’s son? 338, 339 The opposition was so meagre, so feeble and so divided that Mu’awiya showed indifference to it and left it for Yazid to sort it out after becoming caliph. We don’t hear of any actions from the opposition during Mu’awiya’s tenure.340, 341 Probably, they were aware of their weak position and postponed the issue to the death of Mu’awiya.
Death of Mu’awiya
Paving Yazid’s way to the dice of the caliphate was Mu’awiya’s last political action. He died of a short suppurative ailment on April 21, 680 CE. 342, 343, 344 Mu’awiya had a shirt of Prophet Muhammad and his nail clippings. He willed to be wrapped in that shirt for burial and wanted the nails ground and put in his eyes and mouth. 345, 346 It is customary for Muslims to proclaim shahada at the time of death so everybody present could know that he died on Islam. Mu’awiya had been being blamed of abandoning his faith throughout his political life. 347, 348 His will to bury the regalia of the Prophet with him could be equivalent to shahada.349
Mu’awiya’s place in history
Mu’awiya was at the helm of power for twenty years as governor of Syria and twenty further years as caliph.350 Due to the longest tenure so far he had more potential to shape early Islam than any of his predecessors. Mu’awiya was definitely a statesman.351 In his eulogy Ḍaḥḥak bin Qays said that he brought unity to the divided Ummah. 352 Given the fact that Mu’awiya faced only symbolic opposition as compared to his predecessors, Ali and Uthman, one can assume that Mu’awiya was a popular ruler. “While Mu’awiya reigned there was such a great peace in the world as was never heard of,” writes John bar Penkaye, a contemporary Christian who compiled a chronicle around 688 CE.353, 354 These flaws included his appointment of troublemakers to rule the community without consulting its members, even though there were remaining Companions and virtuous individuals among them; his appointment of his son as his successor, who was known for being a drunkard, a winebibber who wears silk and plays ṭunbūrs [a musical instrument]; his allegation about Ziyad, while the Messenger of Allah has said, “The child belongs to the bed, and the adulterer should be stoned; and his killing of Ḥujr. Woe unto him twice for Ḥujr and his companions. 355
His contribution in relieving the institution of the caliph of the burden of religious jurisprudence and assigning this load to the shoulders of religious scholars cannot be neglected. It helped further the development of Islam independent of the tutelage of the state and granted the future caliphs the flexibility to formulate laws according to the need of hour. He, anyhow, bitterly failed to develop a constitutional principle about the succession of a caliph and his death heralded another war of succession known as the Second Arab Civil War.356
Human society has experienced many different forms of government. One common form is autocracy. It is the rule of a legal but strong leader. 357 Such leader gathers enough power to run the government affairs by his own will, without getting any inputs from anybody else. 358 Another common form is democracy. It is arbitrarily defined as ‘a government of people, by the people, for the people. Yet there is another form of government. It is called an anocracy. An anocracy is a middle ground between an autocracy and a democracy. 359 Walter discovers that autocratic countries and full democracies are largely immune to civil war. It’s the countries in the middle ground that are most vulnerable. Walter further claims that the best predictor of a civil war is a country moving away from autocracy or a country moving away from democracy. 360
We know the Rashidun Caliphate was a rudimentary democracy in the beginning. 361 The common peoples’ inputs were valued not only at the time of selection of a new ruler but also during the governance. We also know that the Abdul Malik bin Marwan government that emerged at the end of the Second Arab Civil War was an autocracy. The Mu’awiya government might be in the middle ground – an anocracy. The risk factors for a civil war were present.
Here one should keep in mind that the theory of cause and effect relationship between change to anocracy and civil war, promoted by Walter and other likeminded political scientists, is in its infancy. It doesn’t have any predictive value. Numerous examples are present, from the past and present, where a country slipped into anocracry. All of them didn’t end up having a civil war. Probably another factor must be present in addition to a country moving in the direction of anocracy. That is either absence of constitution or neglect of it in the near past.
End notes
- The central administration of the Caliphate remained in Damascus except for the last few years when Caliph Marwan II took it to Ḥarrān. However, some caliphs chose to live in the vicinity of Damascus, rather than the city itself. An early Christian source notes only Damascus as the capital of this state.
- Harran is the village of Harran in modern Turkey, 44 km southeast of Sanliurfa. The city was called Hallenopolis in Greek and Carrhae in Latin.
- For the length the of the Umayyad Caliphate and the number of rulers see: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000)
- The name “Umayyad Caliphate” is not an invention of modern historians. Early Islamic sources call the rulers of this caliphate ‘Banu Umayyah’. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 221. AND Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 76.
- For the name of the country see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),102.
- “Mu’awiya went down to al-Hira where all the Arab forces proffered their right hand to him” are the words of Maronite Chronicle. (Andrew Palmer, The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993). Maronite Chronicle is an anonymous chronicle written by a Maronite Christian in Syriac language shortly after 664 CE. The author is widely believed to be an eyewitness to the events of the Umayyad Caliphate up to the time of his writing. The Manuscript of this chronicle, which was copied in either the eighth or ninth century, is preserved in the British Museum. For the cataloguing of the manuscript see: William Wright, “Catalogue of Syriac Manuscripts in the British Museum, Acquired Since the Year 1883, (London: The British Museum, 1872). Volume III; Page 1041; article number DCCCCXV; manuscript number Add. 17,216, Foll. 2 – 14. For an English translation and the dating of the manuscript see: Andrew Palmer, The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles (translated texts for historians XV) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993, pages 29 – 35.
- The anonymous chronicler of ‘The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741” notes that “indeed twenty years Mu’awiya carried through with complete success, with the obedience of all the people of Ishmaelites.” (The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 620).
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 53, Year 41. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 97, 211.
- For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al-Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 210, 211.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 6.
- Andrew Palmer, the seventh century in the west-Syrian chronicles ( Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 30.
- Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 129.
- Early Islamic sources document the sacredness of Jerusalem in the hearts of Muslims much before Mu’awiya’s oath-taking. Waqidi claims that Maymona, the wife of Prophet Muhammad, prayed for Bayt al Maqdis. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 426).
- It is noteworthy that Mu’awiya did not choose Damascus for this ceremony because it was not a sacred site in Islam. In this sense, it was absolutely unacceptable to the Muslims that a caliph to Prophet Muhammad take oath in that cit.
- Some historians insist that it was the Umayyad dynasty that was mainly responsible for promoting Jerusalem as the third most holy city of Islam. See for example: Jacqueline Chabbi, “The Origins of Islam”, in Roads of Arabia, eds. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhīm Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 109. However, Umar bin Khattab’s special visit to the town negates the notion. The Arab invaders built mosques in all of the towns they conquered during Futuhul Buldan. Umar left the designing of the mosques in the hands of the respective commanders. It was only Jerusalem where Umar determined the qibla of would be mosque personally and chose the location of the mosque in such a way that the rock would be on its back. A late Christian source notes that it was Umar who ordered construction of a dome on top of the rock. So it is possible that there once existed a meagre building on the rock before caliph Abdul Malik built the magnificent dome.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 6.
- Sa’d bin ‘Adb al-Azīz al Rashīd, Dirāsāt Fī Al-āthār al-Islāmiyya al-Mubakkira bī-l-Madīnat al-Munawwara (Riyadh: 2000), 46 – 60. AND R. Hoyland, “New Documentary Text and The Early Islamic State”, Bulletin Of The School of Oriental And African Studies 69 no.3 (2006), 413.
- A. Grohmann, “Zum Papyrusprotokoll in Fruharabischer Zeit”, Jahrbuch Der Osterreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft, Volume IX (1960), 5 – 9. AND H. I. Bell, “The Arabic Bilingual Entagion”, Proceedings of The American Philosophical Society, 1945, Volume 89, Pp. 538 – 539. AND B. Gruendler, The Development of the Arabic Script: From the Nabatean era to the First Islamic Century according to the Dated Texts, Harvard Semitic Series No. 43, (Scholars Press: Atlanta (GA), 1993), 22 – 23. The papyrus is called P. Colt. No. 60. Its current location is not known.
- G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 1.
- For the name of the family see: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 34. For the names and tenures of the rulers see: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 40.
- For the names and dates of the Marwanid rulers see: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 46, 58, 72.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 55, Year 41.
- Habib bin maslamah campaigned against Byzantine in the summer of 661 CE. This was the last campaign of his life. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 923.
- For the popularity of Abdur Rahman among Arabs and its causes see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 88. For Abdur Rahman’s murder and Mu’awiya’s role in it see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 89. The cold-blooded murder of Abdur Rahman bin Khalid might have taken place just after 666 CE because sources don’t mention him afterwards.
- For the details of the military career of Abdur Rahman bin Khalid see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 58, Year 44; P 59, Year 45; P 60, Year 46. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 87. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 48, annus mundi 6156. For a detailed description of one of Abdur Rahman bin Khalid’s campaigns noted by the Maronite Chronicler, a contemporary Christian see: Andrew Palmer, the seventh century in the west-Syrian chronicles (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 33 – 34.
- Mu’awiya revoked kharaj of Ibn Uthāl, the murderer of Abdur Rahman, and appointed him as a kharaj collector. After a while Khlid, Abdur Rahman’s son, killed ibn Uthāl to avenge the murder of his father at the instigation of Urwah bin Zubayr, a resident of Medina. Mu’awiya imprisoned Khalid bin Abdur Rahman for several days and fined him the blood price of Ibn Uthāl so no one should retaliate against Khalid for killing ibn Uthāl. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 89. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 897).
- Abdur Rahman’s son, Khalid bin Abdur Rahman bin Khalid bin Walid took a job in military service after the death of his father and in this capacity lead raids on Byzantine Rome in 668 CE. These were sea raids and Egyptians and people of Medina were under his command during these raids. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 92.
- Lassner is of the opinion that sudden deaths by natural causes, like acute appendicitis, were always prone to be later described as poisoning. See: Jacob The Shaping of ‘Abbāsid rule (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1980), 46. Actually, Arab Muslims blamed poisoning for any suspicious death. Muslim bin Uqba, the general who invaded Hejaz (see below) had given a piece of his wealth to his slave wife. Uqba got sick and was at the verge of his death. A son of his blamed Muslim’s wife for poisoning him. Muslim confronted his son, saying he was a liar and actually he was dying of a stomach ailment that ran in their family. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 223.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 222.
- Amr and Mu’awiya had a perpetual political cold war. See for example: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 217. Anyhow, they never confronted each other. They avoided testing each other’s power.
- For the date of Amr bin As’s death see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 57, Year 43. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 32. For the assumption of power by Abdullah bin Amr bin As see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 589.
- Abdullah bin Amr bin As had served the army of the Rashidun Caliphate during Uthman’s tenure. He had participated in the campaign of Tabaristan in 651 CE under the command of Sa’id bin As. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42.
- Mu’awiya gave the impression that he himself had appointed Abdullah bin Amr bin As. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 32.
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 589. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 91.
- This Mu’awiya bin Hudaij was from the Kindah tribe. He was a prominent leader of the Shi’a Uthman in Egypt. He had joined Amr’s army at the time of the invasion in Egypt. He is the one who hunted down and killed Muhammad bin Abu Bakr. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),848, 849. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 91.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 13, 122. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 890.
- According to Tabari, Mu’awiya first appointed Abdullah, the son of Amr bin As, as governor over Kufa. He soon realized that he had strengthened Amr bin As’s position against himself. He dismissed Abdullah and appointed Mughira bin Shu’ba in his stead. But he did not give Mughira the portfolio of revenue in the beginning. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 13.
- Tabaristan was a territory of Kufa. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 81, year 54.
- For date of his death see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 62, year 50. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 906. See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000) 40.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 23, 24.
- Mughira was gentle in manners and did not punish people of kufa for being Shi’a Ali while they sometimes insulted him. He used excuse of his old age to justify his ‘neutral’ policies to the central government. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 125).
- Mughira bin Shu’ba was a tall man with an injured eye which got wounded in Yarmouk. He died from the plague in Kufa at the age of seventy. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 62, year 50. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 95, 96.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 13.
- Humran bin Aban was Uthman’s servant who was caught in Ayn al Tamr and who rebelled against him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 13, foot note 60).
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 14, 15.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 55, Year 41. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 18. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),886.
- Kufa had the same dependent territories that it used to have during the Rashidun Caliphate. Azerbaijan was Kufa’s provincially administered territory. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 62, Year 49.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 70.
- Ziyad was governing Fars when ‘Ali was killed. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 230 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 18. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 888.
- Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan played neutral during Camel. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 168. He pledged allegiance to Ali after the latter gained control over Basrah. Ali offered him governance of Basrah but he refused. Then ‘Ali appointed him as a tax collector of Basrah. Once Ziyad gave advice to Abdullah bin Abbas, the governor of Basrah for Ali, ‘use those who obey you against those who disobey you, and if cutting off the heads who disobey you brings strength to Islam don’t hesitate from it.’ See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 169).
- This happened in 663 CE. See the details of the incident: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 14 – 18, 26, – 30. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 888. Khalifa designates this event to 664 CE. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 58, Year 44.
- Tabari informs us that Ziyad had produced witnesses in this regard. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 74. See a more detailed version of events at: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 888 – 890.
- Ziyad was son of a black woman by the name of Summayah, who was a slave and worked as a prostitute for her master. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 29, 73. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 889 – 890. She was a resident of Taif during pre-Islamic times. When Ziyad was born, no man took the responsibility as the father of the newborn. Hence he grew up being called Ziyad bin Abihi, meaning Ziyad son of his father whoever he could be, though he was officially a member of Thaqif. Tabari notes that Ziyad had requested Mu’awiya to recognize him as the son of Abu Sufyan at the time when he had met Mu’awiya in Kufa to discuss his golden handshake. Mu’awiya dismissed the idea on grounds that Ziyad had no reliable witnesses to support his claim. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 74.
- Banu Umayyah didn’t recognize this addition to their clan as legitimate. Abdullah bin Amir was a political rival of Ziyad in Basrah. He claimed that he had Quraysh witnesses who could swear that Abu Sufyan never saw Sumayyah. Mu’awiya told Abdullah that the former was the most noble in pre-Islamic times and the Arabs knew it. Islam had increased his nobility further. Being Ziayd’s brother didn’t further increase Mu’awiya’s nobility. On the other hand, Ziyad considered it his right to be acknowledged this way and Mu’awiya had set him in his place (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 74.). Abu Bakra, Ziyad’s half-brother from their mother’s side, didn’t like the idea either. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 906). Even the general public remained skeptical of the deal. See qasīdah of Farazdaq noted by Tabari taunting Ziyad on his dubious lineage. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 115, 116.). Ziyad kept trying to prove himself. Once, he asked for permission from Umm Ḥabībah bint Abu Sufyān, Mu’awiya’s sister and Prophet Muhammad’s widow, to let him in to see her. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 907. Being a veiled woman, she was supposed to see only her close relatives. Ziyad wished to prove that he was her brother.
- For dedicated studies on Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan see: Henri Lammens, “Ziad ibn Abihi vice-roi de l’Iraq, lieutenant de Mo’āwiy l.” Rivista Degli Studi Orientali 4 (1911- 12): 1 – 45, 199 – 225, 653 – 93. AND K. A. Fariq, “A Remarkable Early Muslim Governor, Ziyād ibn Abih.” Islamic Culture 26 no. 4 (1952): 1 – 31.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 59, Year 45. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 71.
- This was the last political appointment of Abdullah bin Amir. He died in 679 CE. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 87, Year 59.
- Abdullah bin Amir is attested on coinage of the east. See: Heinz Gaube, Arabosasanidische Numismatik (Braunchweig: Klinkhardt und Biermann, 1973), 22 – 25.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 59, Year 45. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 76, 78.
- After dismissing Abdullah bin Amir from the post of governor of Basrah, Mu’awiya appointed Ḥārith bin ‘Abd Allah of Azd tribe, a resident of Syria for four months temporarily as a stalking horse. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 76.)
- It appears that Mu’awiya needed a person with no clear clan affiliations so he could not challenge Mu’awiya ever. Moreover, such person, when given Mu’awiya’s surname, would be willing to take such administrative actions which were perceived by some quarters to be un-Islamic but were necessary to manage the country.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 78.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 78.
- The need of a Hawkish governor might have been being felt on ground level as well. When Ziyad finished his famous introductory speech, people told him that the praise for him would come after performance and commendation after stipends. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 81.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 82.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 82.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- Ziyad had taken up the post with a detailed action plan in his mind. In the beginning of his governorship, people complained to Ziyad that the provincial roads were unsafe. He said his strategy was to first control the city. Once the city came under his control, the outside the city would be tackled. If the city cannot be controlled, controlling other things would be difficult. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 78 – 81.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 62, Year 50. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 95.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 62, Year 50. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 906. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 95.
- Archaeology attests Tabari’s claim that Ziyad’s authority extended over whole of Umayyad Caliphate’s east. He was able to have his coinage of 671 -74 CE stuck at more than twenty-four mints spread right across modern Iran. He was also the first to add religious slogans in Arabic to the coinage, inscribing the phrase “in the name of Allah my lord” (bismillah rabbi). For details of coins of Ziyad see: Heinz Gaube, Arabosasanidische Numismatik (Braunchweig: Klinkhardt und Biermann, 1973), 22 – 25. For Hoyland’s comments see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 130.
- After obtaining its governorship Ziyad shifted to Kufa and left a lieutenant in Basrah. Then, Ziyad used to spend six months in Kufa and six in Basrah with a lieutenant in the town from where Ziyad was absent. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 97. The practice continued whenever the central government combined the provinces of Kufa and Basra in one unit until founding of Wasit.
- current location: British Museum. (OR.8999). Minted at Arbashahr in 673 CE.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 82, 83.
- For the date of death of Ziyad see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 65, Year 50 and P 75, year 53. See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 167. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 916. AND G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000) 4.
- Ziyad died in Kufa at the age of 53 due to plague. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 65, Year 50; P 76, Year 52; and P 75, year 53. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 918. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 167, 168. He had a red face (probably brown due to his Arab father and black mother), a squint in his right eye, a white triangular beard, and used to wear a trademark patched shirt (qamīs). (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 170.).
- Lately Mu’awiya had added Yamama to Ziyad’s administration. Preparations were underway to add Hejaz to Ziayd’s territory when he died. The people of Hejaz were against such schemes. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 167, 168.
- Basrah and Kufa received separate governors after Ziyad’s death. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 170.)
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 181, Year 95. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 31.
- As a case study, Mu’awiya dismissed Marwan bin Hakam from his role as the governor of Medina in April of 669 CE. He appointed Sa’īd bin ‘Āṣ in his place. In 674 CE, he dismissed Sa’id bin As from governorship of Medina and re-appointed Marwan bin Hakam there. Mu’awiya dismissed Marwan bin Hakam once again from governorship of Medina in September of 677 CE and appointed Walīd bin ‘Utbah bin Abu Sufyan. Sources don’t give any reason for these changes. Each time, the dismissed governor accepted the orders faithfully and returned to his same post if offered the position. See for details: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 61, Year 48; P 84, year 52 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 94, 172, 191.
- “Mu’awiya overpowered them, humbling the inhabitants of Persia i.e. the eastern province and favouring those of Syria. He called the ones Isamitai and the others Herakitai. He gave a donotive of Isamitia of 200 nomismata Dinar and to Herakitai only 30 nomismata” is the notification of Theophanes the confessor. See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 47, annus mundi 6152.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 124.
- For evidence of use of slaves to fight on the side of Syrian Troops see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)116.
- For example, Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan sent fifty thousand men (twenty-five thousand from Basrah and twenty-five thousand from Kufa) to Khorasan under a united command. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 87.
- Due to the constant intrigues of the Ashraf of Basrah and Kufa provinces, one tends to assume that this class was present in these two provinces only. That is not true. The Ashraf were present in Syria too. For their presence in Syria see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 82. The Syrian Ashraf were just under the nose of the Caliph and did not have same opportunities as their Kufan and Basran counterparts had.
- For the presence of a proper police force in Basrah, for example, see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 82.
- See Hawting’s comments in this regards: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 35.
- Ḥamra’, the Persian Muslims, were abundant in Kufa Police. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 129, 156.
- The job of a policeman was not an easy one. The military fought at the borders while the police fought with its own people. Once, a Ḥamra’ policeman of Kufa clubbed a man on the governor’s order. The victim’s supporter later recognized him when that policeman came into contact with the supporter in his private capacity. The supporter clubbed the policeman to avenge the man. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 129, 130.). When a policeman of the Ḥudhām tribe clubbed a person on the governor’s order in Kufa, the tribesmen of the victim blew the policeman and knocked him down. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 130.).
- The strength of Ziyad’s police in Basrah was four thousand heads. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83)
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- See above.
- The government did not bluntly change the formula of distribution of ghanimah and fay’, which was originally practiced by Prophet Muhammad and followed by Rashidun Caliphate. It simply made it subject to another religious tenant – obedience to amīr.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 205.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 124.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- The government had appointed arif in Basrah. They were tribal heads. Part of their duty was to take responsibility of political upheavals in the group they managed. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 35, 33 and foot note 154 and M. A. Shaban, Islamic history I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 87 – 88. Later on, Ubaydullah bin Ziyad, the governor of Iraq for Yazid bin Mu’awiya, executed a messenger from the rebellious people of Basrah and warned the people of Basrah against any rebellion and that in such a scenario the Arif and Wali of their tribal group would be punished (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 33). On another occasion, Ubaydullah bin Ziyad threatened to cancel payments of any Arif of Kufa who fails to report the wanted people in his jurisdiction to the government. In that case, he also stood a chance of being crucified or exiled to the island of Zārrah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 35).
- See above.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 181.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 219, 217.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 88, Year 59.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 216.
- Current location: private collection.
- ”Mu’āwiyah bin Abu Sufyān summoned from Yemen one, ‘Ābid bin Sharyah, and asked him about past events, histories of Arabs and foreign kings and ordered that the answers be recorded.” (Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. and trans. Gustav flūgel, (Leipzig: Verlag von F. C. W. Vogel, 1872), 89.
- Khulayd bin ‘Abdallah, the last lieutenant governor over Khorasan under Mu’awiya government, was from Hanif. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 919.
- See above.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 83.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 203.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 97.
- Ziyad used maqsurah of the mosque as a shelter when people pelted stones on him. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 99.
- See for example: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 180.
- For an example of fine – three hundred thousand dirhams, see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 200.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 216.
- Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 20, 21. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 75.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 896.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 85.
- For Abdur Rahman’s residence in Alexandria see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 91.
- When Mu’awiya appointed Nu’man bin Bashīr of Ansar, a Companion of the Prophet, governor over Kufa in 679 CE, nobody acclaimed in his credentials this point as a cardinal reason for his appointment. Tabari just takes a small notice that he was a Companion. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 199, 200). More convincing evidence comes from the appointment letter of Ḥakam bin ‘Amr al Ghifāri, a Companion of the Prophet, who was appointed as lieutenant governor of Khorasan in 664 CE by Mu’awiya himself. Hakam had to report to Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan, the governor over Basrah before assuming duty. The appointment letter was addressed to Ziyad and it read, “There is in your area a man from the Companions of Allah’s Messenger: appoint him over Khorasan – he is al Ḥakam bin ‘Amr al Ghifāri.” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 895). Similarly, Ziyad appointed Ghālib bin Faḍālah of Layth tribe as lieutenant governor of Khorasan in 669 CE. Tabard again gives a short notice that he was a Companion of the Prophet. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 92.)
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 85.
- Tabari describes the situation in these words, “Mu’awiyah never failed to take advice from the dignitaries who supported him. They were prominent members of Quraysh but also of other tribes like Sulaym, Hamdān, Kindah etc.” See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 148.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 105, 200.
- For details and example see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 106, 201.
- For the hierarchy of the Ashraf and their salaries according to their status see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 105, 106. Salary of leading Ashraf of Basrah like Aḥnaf bin Qays, Jāriyah bin Qudāmah, Ka’b bin Sa’d, and Jawn bin Qatādadah was one hundred thousand dirhams each. While that of Ḥutāt bin Yazīd was seventy thousand dirhams.
- See above
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 12, 13. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 885, 886.
- Shamir bin Dhi al Jawshan proudly called himself “the one who worships Allah very shakily on the edge”, referring to Quran 22:11. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 124).
- Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan classifies people of his time into only two broad categories, the men of other world and the men of this world. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 184. On similar lines Yazid bin Mu’awiya divides the people into pious and profligate. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 10.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 22, 23.
- For example, three hundred of followers of Mustawrid bin ‘Ullifah considered him Abdullah, Amir ul Mu’minin. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 46.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 46.
- According to their doctrine, the Rashidun Caliphate ended after the death of Umar bin Khattab.
- For details of their tactics see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 62, Year 49. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 21 – 26, 33 – 68, 89, 90).
- Here is detail of one such episode noted by Khalifa: In September of 673 CE, during the fasting month of Ramadan, when Ziyad was governor of Kufa, seventy kharijis rebelled under their leaders Qurayb and Zahhaf. Both were maternal cousins. “We were standing in the mosque, when suddenly they were at the doors of the mosque,” tells an eyewitness. “They were uttering slogan “Judgement belongs to Allah alone”. They turned against the people in the mosque to kill them. The people jumped over the partitions and ran for the doors. A man ascended the minaret and began to call, “Cavalry of Allah, mount up and ride!” They went up after him, and killed him. Only after everyone in the mosque had fled or been slain did they go out into the street, shouting, “Judgement belongs to Allah alone!” A man of Banu Qutay’a (the attacked building was neighborhood mosque of Banu Qutay’a) went out the door of his house and found himself face to face with them as they passed his door. One of them struck him with his sword the moment he stuck his head out [of the door], and cut off his chin. He went back in, and closed the door. He had just recently been married. His wife went to him and bandaged him with a veil (Khimār) of hers which was dyed with Brazilwood. It healed and he recovered.” The Khariji went on. A man from the neighborhood approached them with a sword in his hand. Some people looking down on him from the roofs of the houses called out to him, “Oh so-and-so! Watch out for the Harurites!” one of them said, “We are not the Harurites. We are the guard.” So the man felt safe, and continued on until they came upon him and killed him. They proceeded until they entered the mosque of the Ma’awil, and killed everyone in it. Then they went out to the dwelling of the Banu ‘Ali, who came out to battle them. Banu ‘Ali shot arrows on them and killed them all. The women and children had climbed up the roof tops in this neighborhood and pelted stones on the Kharijis to help the men in killing them. In the morning they had been gibbeted at Hafr As Sa’diyin. A young woman came with a large bowl filled with money. She said “Peace to you, for all that you have steadfastly endured. How wonderful is the reward in Paradise.” She was seized and gibbeted with them. After the surprise attack was over, governor Ziyad came down from Kufa to assess the damage in Basrah. He upbraided the Ashraf of the town for not quickly organizing vigilante. Many different tribal communities confronted the Kharijis during investigations into the incident. However, Ziyad diligently established that it were Banu ‘Ali who finished them. Ziyad didn’t praise them. He rather declared that, had the residents not killed the Kharijis, he would have thrown them in jail. And if Banu ‘Ali would not have finished them, Ziyad would have suspended their stipend. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 76 – 80 Year 53.).
- For details of intelligence agencies of Kufa working against Kharijis in 662 CE see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 21 – 26, 34.
- For working of vigilante groups in Kufa and Basrah see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 33 – 68, 101 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 911.
- See, for example: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 33 – 68.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 100.
- For some encounters with the Kharijis during Mu’awiya’s reign see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 892. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 194, 195, 198.
- At time of his appointment as governor of Kufa, Mu’awiya instructed Mughira bin Shu’ba not to refrain from abusing Ali and criticizing him, nor from asking Allah’s mercy upon Uthman and His forgiveness for him. Continue to shame the companions of Ali, keep them at a distance, don’t listen to them. Praise the faction of Uthman, bring them near, and listen to them. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 123.).
- Banu Hashim definitely had grievances against the Mu’awiya government. Mu’awiya dropped by Medina in February of 665 CE on his way back from Hajj. A delegate of Banu Hashim under the leadership of Abdullah bin Abbas met him to file their complaints. Mu’awiya told them bluntly that it was benevolence of his government that they were alive. They deserved the death penalty for murdering Uthman. Abdullah bin Abbas couldn’t control his anger and raised his voice on Mu’awiya, blaming him for the murder of Uthman and accusing him of later benefitting from it by misguiding people about the facts. Mu’awiya dismissed the meeting with a smile and comments, “By Allah, how nice was it [the past] when you didn’t speak to me!” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 898).
- Mu’awiya government didn’t recognize the Shi’a Ali as legal opposition. Mu’awiya’s officials used to call them by derogatory names. Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan names them Turābiyyah and Sabāiyyah. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 145.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 44.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 44.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 26.
- This is the last entry of Busr bin Artat in history of Islam. He was a Companion of the Prophet. He lived a long retired life and died during Abdul Malik’s reign. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 160, year 86).
- They were only twelve hundred in Kufa who sided with Hasan against Mu’awiya – see above
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 124.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 42, 43, 44.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 907. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 122.
- For the name and tribal affiliations of Hujr bin Adi see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 122. He is reputed to be a Companion of the Prophet. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 156, 157.
- Hawting is of opinion that policies of Mughira bin Shu’ba to avoid rather than to deal with the trouble, taking little positive action himself, must have left his successor to face the consequences. (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 40.).
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 97.
- For details of the incident see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 122 – 127, 145 – 151. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 908, 909. Khalifa states that there were four people executed. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 67, year 51. See also: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 41).
- News of the violent death of Hujr bin Adi hurt many hearts in Medina. Sa’d bin Waqqas commented, “If Mu’awiya had seen the part Hujr had taken in the reduction of Hulwan he would have realized of what great value he was to Islam.” (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 470). Aisha asked Mu’awiya, “Where did your forbearance (ḥilm) go when it came to them? (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 910)
- The arrest at Ziyad’s hands should have been the last thing Hujr would have imagined. Both were colleagues during Ali’s government. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 908).
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 154, 155.
- According to Tabari, when Umar left for Syria, he saw Mu’awiya come to receive him with a procession – Mu’awiya had gone out to Umar with a retinue. At that, Umar told him, “O Mu’awiya, you go with a retinue, and you leave in the same way. I heard that you start the day in your residence while petitioners are at your door.” Mu’awiya replied, “O Commander of the Faithful, our enemy is close to us, and they have scouts and spies, so I wanted, O Commander of Faithful, for them to see that Islam has power.” Umar answered, “This is the ruse of an intelligent man or the deception of a clever man.” Mu’awiya then said, “O commander of the Faithful, instruct me with what you want and I shall fulfill it.” Umar replied, “Woe unto you! Whenever we discuss something which I disapprove of you doing, you leave me not knowing whether I should order you to do it or forbid you.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 218).
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),37.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 911, 912.
- Jeremy Johns, “Archaeology and the History of Early Islam: The First Seventy Years”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 46, No 4(2003), 418.
- Current location Ashmolean Museum. (Shamma Collection, 7481). Observe: Typical late Arab-Sasanian bust and written in the Middle Persian Maawia amir i-wruishnikan (Mu’awiya, commander of the faithful) in the field. Bism Allāh (in the name of Allah) on the margin in Arabic script. Reverse: Typical Arab-Sasasanian fire-alter with attendents and the name of the mint (Darabgird) and the date 43 AH. See: Stephen Album and Tony Goodwin, Sylloge of Islamic Coins in the Ashmolean. Volume I (Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 2002), 10, Plate 17.245.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 74, Year 51.
- See Hawting’s comments about difference between king and a caliph among Muslims: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 12, 13.
- Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 134.
- Andrew Palmer, the seventh century in the west-Syrian chronicles (translated texts for historians XV) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993, 32.
- G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 43.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 158.
- Tabari insists that Uthman bin Affan and Ali bin Abu Talib were the primary scribes of the revelations. The Prophet used the services of Ubayy bin Ka’b and Zayd bin Thābit to write down the revelation only if Uthman or Ali were not handily available. Khalid bin Sa’id bin As and Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan wrote only letters about Prophet Muhammad and other worldly affairs. Other people in this category were Abdullah bin Arqam bin Abd Yaghūth and ‘A’lā’ bin ‘Uqbah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 214.)
- For the renovation of the pillar marks of Haram during Umar’s and Uthman’s tenure see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 800. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),109. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 14.
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 84. This kurz was a foot-print tracker by trade. Quraysh had hired this guy to trace the path of Prophet Muhammad during Immigration. He led them to the cave of Hira but found that the steps disappeared from there and he saw spider web on the cave. At the time of Mu’awiya’s order, he was a resident of Medina.
- Talking to Abdur Rahman bin Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib in Damascus, Mu’awiya claimed that it is Allah who has graced his clan over Ali bin Abu Talib. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 898).
- Actually the term ‘Khalifa Allah’ was known to Arab Muslims from the time of Umar bin Khattab. Each time it was used, it came out of tongue of a flaterer to pamper the ruler. It was used for the first time for Umar himself. Umar snubbed it with utmost disgust. (See above). When Abu Bakrah had to get the favour of Mu’awiya to forgive his half-brother Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan, he appeased Mu’awiya saying, “you have taken a great thing upon yourself – the Caliphate of Allah over His creation.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 17.) Mu’awiya did not bother to snub Abu Bakrah. Mu’awiya probably enjoyed the complement. Mu’awiya is called Khalifaht Allah in a poem written by Ḥārith bin Badr Ghudāni, a Shaykh of Basrah as well. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 84). Again, Mu’awiya did not have any objection to the wording in the poem. See Hawting’s comments on the phrase Khalifa tul Allah. (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 13).
- Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan and Amr bin As are known to have had a cold war when Mu’awiya was caliph and Amr was the governor of Egypt. Once Amr, and his Egyptian entourage planned a procedural meeting with Mu’awiya in Damascus. Amr told his officers, “Pay attention when you enter the presence of Ibn Hind lest you greet him as caliph. That will make you great in his eyes. Reduce him as much as you can.” When they came to him, Mu’awiya told his gate-keepers, “Indeed, as I know Ibn Nabighah, he will have reduced my position with the folk, so pay attention when the delegation enters, shake them as strongly as you can, and don’t let a single one of them reach me unless he is concerned about his own destruction.” The first one who entered his presence was an Egyptian called ibn Khayyāt. He entered shaken, saying, “Peace be upon you, O Messenger of Allah!” The folks did that in succession, and when they left, Amr told them, “Allah curse you! I forbade you to greet him as amīr, so you greeted him as Prophet.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 217).
- The caliph did not grant the religious scholars a right to promulgate laws. He kept this power in his own hands. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 137).
- Mu’awiya not only lodged Muslims in the church which was named after Mary, but he also used to go there and eat lunch and evening meals with the exiles. This event took place around 654 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 115).
- “Many Arabs gathered at Jerusalem and made Mu’awiya king and he went up and sat down on Golgotha; he prayed there, and went to Gethsemane and went down to the tomb of the blessed Mary and prayed in it”, writes the anonymous Maronite Chronicler, who is widely believed to be an eyewitness of the events. (Andrew Palmer, the seventh century in the west-Syrian chronicles (translated texts for historians XV) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993, 29). The selection of sites was such that Muslims could not object. One was the site of Jesus Christ’s crucifixion and one was the tomb of Mary.
- Andrew Palmer, the seventh century in the west-Syrian chronicles (translated texts for historians XV) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993, 29.
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 191. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 131.
- Theophanes the confessor reports the re-building of a church in 679 CE at Edessa which had fallen down in an earthquake. Umayyad Caliphate gave a government grant for the purpose. See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982),P 54, annus mundi 6170.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 911, 912.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 18, 30.
- Sarjūn (Sergius) was from a Greek Orthodox family which had served the Byzantine administration of Damascus. Sarjun was the father of an important Orthodox theologian, St. John of Damascus (d. about 748 CE). (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 42).
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 897.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 897.
- Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75. See also: M. P. Penn, When Christian First Met Muslims: A Sourcebook of the Earliest Syriac Writings on Islam, (University of California Press, 2015), 98.
- Hoyland, Robert. G. Seeing Islam As Others saw It: A Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish And Zoroastrian Writings On Early Islam. (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 15.
- John victor Tolan, ed., Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam: A Book of Essays (New York: Garland Publishin, 1996) 6.
- Bodil Hijerrild, studies in Zoroastrian Family Law: A comparative Analysis (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2002), 14 – 15.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 63, Year 50.
- Andrew Palmer, the seventh century in the west-Syrian chronicles (translated texts for historians XV) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993, 30.
- The three known gold coins are usually grouped under the “Arab imitation of Byzantine solidi”. One of them is from the era of Phocas and two of them are from the era of Heraclius. All the three are exactly similar in design to their known Byzantine proto-types. The only difference is that the symbol of cross on the crowns of the Emperor and on the podium on revers is absent. There is no Kufic inscription on the coins. The only way they can be ascribed to the Arabs is the absence of the cross. The experts who have described them tend to date them arbitrarily from early years of the 690s. (see: J. Walker, A Catalogue of the Muhammadan Coins in The British Museum, 1956, Vloume II – Arab-Byzantine and Post Reform Umayyad Coins, British Museum: London, pp 18. AND G. C. Miles, “The Earliest Arab Gold Coinage”, The American Numismatic Society Museum Notes, 1967, Volume 13, PP 207 – 209, Plate XLV. For dating see pp. 228 – 229. AND M. L. Bates, “History, Geography And Numismatics In the First Century Of Islamic Coinage.”, Revue Suisse De Numismatique, 1986, Volume 65, pp. 243 – 229.). Anyhow, there are no arguments to reject the hypothesis that these are the coins the anonymous Maronite chronicler is mentioning.
- Andrew Palmer, the seventh century in the west-Syrian chronicles (translated texts for historians XV) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993, 30.
- Kaegi gives a new explaination of Muyawiay’s attempt to remove cross from the coins. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 224).
- Solidus of Heraclius: Current location: Metropolitan Museum of art, New York. Accession number: 04.2.822. Obverse: three imperial standing figures with crowns on their head and cross on top. Reverse: a cross on stepped podium in the field. Victory of the emperors; Constantinople, fine gold in Greek on the margin. No date is written on the coin. Guessed to be minted between 638 and 641 CE. See: Helen C. Evans, Byzantine and Islam: Age of Transition, 7th to 9th century, (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2012): 7, 124, 140. No. 86c. Umayyad coin in modification of Solidus of Heraclius: current location: The British Museum. Obverse: Three standing imperial figures. The crosses on the heads and on the stakes of the Herculean coin are gone. Reverse: The horizontal arm of the cross is gone. For the dating see: J. Walker, A Catalogue of the Muhammadan Coins in the British Museum, Vol II – Arab Byzantine and Post Reform Umayyad Coins, British Museum: London, 1956: PP 17 – 18, Plate V. AND M. L. Bates, “History, Geography and Numismatics in the First Century of Islam Coinage”, Revue Suisse De Numismatique, 65 (1985): 243 – 250. Umayyad coin in imitation of Heraclean solidus. Current location: unknown. Obverse: Three standing imperial figures, crosses absent. Reverse: cross replaced with a vertical staff ending in a globe in the field. Arabic formula on the margin: bism Alla.h / la. Ila.ha / Muhammad / Muhammad rasu.l allah. For the dating see: J. Walker, A Catalogue of the Muhammadan Coins in the British Museum, Vol II – Arab Byzantine and Post Reform Umayyad Coins, British Museum: London, 1956: PP 17 – 18, Plate V. AND Michael L. Bates, “History, Geography and Numismatics in the First Century of Islam Coinage”, Revue Suisse De Numismatique, 65 (1985): 243 – 250.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 101. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 920.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 920.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 66, Year 50.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 119 – 121.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 90, year 60.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 946.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),915.
- Mu’awiya confiscated half of the wealth of Amr bin As at the time of his death. When asked, he answered, it is sunna of Umar bin Khattab. Amr was the first to be dealt with like that. Then it became routine. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 894). Mu’awiya didn’t spare his favourite governor Ziyad bin Abihi/Sufyan. He confiscated half of Ziyad’s wealth on his death. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), Vol. I, P 38. Mu’awiya himself bequeathed half of his wealth to the public exchequer at the time of his death. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 213.)
- For threatening governors with audits at the time of their dismissal but letting them keep their wealth see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 73.
- When Ibn Ziyad was the governor of Basrah for Mu’awiya, the central government assessed the tax on his province to be hundred million Dirhams through his auditors. Mu’awiya asked Ibn Ziayd either to collect this amount or resign. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 36.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 185.
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 47 annus mundi 6151.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 37.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 914.
- See for example: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 24.
- G. C. Miles, “Early Islamic Inscriptions Near T.aif in the H.ijaz,” Jopurnal of Near Eastern Studies 7 no 4 (Oct. 1948): 236 – 242.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 37, 914.
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 450.
- Ya’qubi expresses this point before explaining changing attitudes of general public along with changing governments. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 40.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 85.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 177.
- for use of plural pronouns by Ziyad see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 136.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 911, 912.
- see above.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 887.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 911, 912.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 886, 887.
- For general discussion of population census and land survey duing Umayyad Caliphate see: Wadād al Qāẓi., “Populations Census and Land Surveys under the Umayyads (41 – 132/661 – 750)”, Der Islam 83(2) July 2008: 341 – 416.
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 911, 912.
- A detailed survey of all available sources doesn’t yield any notice of appointment of a resident governor over a newly acquired area during Mu’awiya’s tenure. It is indirect evidence that the Umayyad Caliphate didn’t add any territory.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 59, Year 45
- Fhs is El Fahs in modern Tunisia, about 60 km southeast of Tunis.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), p 84, 85, year 59.
- For details of the campaigns in Ifriqiya during the Mu’awiya government see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 57, Year 43; P 59, Year 45; P 61, Year 47; P 63, Year 50; P 63, Year 50; P 84, Year 52; P 85, Year 58. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 906. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 51, annus mundi 6161. For one campaign carried out by Abdullah around 670 CE and described by the anonymous chronicler of “The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741” see: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 618. See also: Hoyland: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 123 – 126.
- The ruins of Carthage can be seen in the Qarṭāj neighbourhood of Tunis in modern Tunisia. It is Tūnis in Arab sources.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 56 Year 42.
- For the details of these raids see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 59, Year 45; P 60, Year 47; P 61, Year 48; P 66, Year 50. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),914, 915, 918.
- The front must have been active up to 670 CE because Tabari mentions Sind in jurisdiction of Basrah Province in that year. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 103.)
- Qiqan is identified with Kiskanan, modern Kalat in Pakistan. See: Ḥudūd al-‘Ālam, ed. and trans. Viladimir Minorsky, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), 373.
- Khalifa Ibn (Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 58, Year 44.
- Qandabil in Arabic sources has been identified as Gandawah in modern southwestern Pakistan. See: Barthold W., An Historical Geography of Iran, ed. C.E. Bosworth, trans. Svat Soucek, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 57. Also see: Yaqut Mu’jam, IV, 402. ; Banna is an unidentified place. Baladhuri and Yaqut both mention a place by this name and put it to be somewhere between Multan and Kabul. In this sense, it could be Bannu in modern Pakistan. See: Khalifa Ibn (Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 58, Year 44, footnote 66. l h w n / h w z is again difficult to read from the original manuscript and yet unidentified. Khalifa gives its location at the foothills of Kabul. Hoyland suggested Lahore from vocal similarity. See: Khalifa Ibn (Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 58, Year 44, footnote 67.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 75, 76. Year 53.
- Hoyland identifies Bayt adh Dhahab as a shrine in Multan. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), 75, 76. Year 53, footnote 228
- See for details: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 57 Year 43; P 75, 76 Year 53. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),76.
- Amol is unidentified location; Rukhkhaj of Arabic sources is Arachosia of Greek sources. It is Arghandab Valley in modern southeastern Afghanistan, near Kandahar. Zubulistan of Arabic sources is modern province of Zabul in southeastern Afghanistan.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 57, Year 44. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 886
- For details see: (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 60, Year 46; P 75, Year 52.
- Bust is Lashkar Gah in modern Afghanistan, near Kandahar.
- For details see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 65, Year 50. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 92. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 886, 895
- Ghur is the modern province of Ghor in central Afghanistan. Fafawandah is an unknown location.
- The campaign season was the beginning of spring and ended before winter. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 138.)
- Modern day Kirghizstan.
- For details see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 80, 81. Year 54; P 83, Year 56. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 164, 178, 179, 190. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 918
- Samarqand on Zarafshān river was the main city of Ṣoghdia. Tirmidh was the most important town in the district of Saghāniyān, north of the upper Oxus River between its confluence with the Wakhsh and Surkhān rivers.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 187, 188. AND Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 98, Year 62
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 20
- Alan of Arabic sources is modern North Ossetia-Alania Republic in Russia. Its people are of Iranian descent. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 20, footnote 87
- See above. Khalifa gives a later date of 662 CE to this truce. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 55, Year 41. Ya’qubi agrees with Khalifa and gives a more precise date of April 662 CE. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 886
- According to Baladhuri, Mu’awiya used to pay money to the Romans to maintain the truce. The Romans had given Mu’awiya hostages as a guarantee to abiding by the truce. Mu’awiya kept them in Baalbek. The Romans proved perfidious to Mu’awiyah, but still Muslims did not consider it legal to put the hostages in their hands to death. So they set them free, saying, “Loyalty against perfidy is better than perfidy against perfidy.” (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 245, 247).
- Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 886).
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 20.
- Theophanes the confessor gives the same year for the first invasion of Byzantine territory during Mu’awiya’s reign. “Arabs campaigned against Romania, taking many prisoners and devastating many places”, writes Theophane: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 47, annus mundi 6154.
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 251.
- See for example the winter raid of 663 CE: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 75, Year 43. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 32).
- For details of raids of each year see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 75, Year 43; P 58, Year 44; P 59, Year 45; P 60, Year 46; P 60, Year 47; P 61, Year 48; P 62, Year 49; P 62, Year 50; P 64, Year 50, P 90, year 60; P 91, year 60; P 92, Year 60. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 195, 247, 251, 253 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 32, 87, 91, 92, 94, 96, 122, 164, 172, 207. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 923 – 926.
- For mentions of these campaigns in early Christian sources see: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 618. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 47, annus mundi 6154; P 47, annus mundi 6155; P 48, annus mundi 6156; P 48, annus mundi 6157; P 48, annus mundi 6158; P 51, annus mundi 6162; P 51, annus mundi 6163; P 53, annus mundi 6166.
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 47 – 50, annus mundi 6159.
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 92, Year 60
- For details of the warfare over islands see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 85, Year 58; P 90, Year 60; P 91, year 60 . See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 375, 376. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 166, 172. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 47, annus mundi 6155. AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 248
- Rhodes is an Island in modern Greece. It is Rūdis in Arabic sources. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 375; Crete is an Island belonging to modern Greece. It is Iqrīish in Arabic sources. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 376; Sicily is part of modern Italy located at its southern tip. It is Siqlilliyah of Arabic sources. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 375.
- An interesting study could be: Romilly James Heald Jenkins, Cyprus between Byzantium and Islam, A.D. 688 – 965. (Saint Louis: Washington University, 1951.
- The forces of the Umayyad Caliphate got very little booty in occupying these islands. What they received in one campaign in Sicily, according to Khalifa, was one hundred Dinars, an ounce of gold and a brass bottle. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 91, year 60.) The campaigns were purely strategic in nature.
- See for details: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 50 – 51, annus mundi 6160; P 51, annus mundi 6161. AND Mozarabic chronicle of 754 in: Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain: Translated Texts of Historians, Second Edition”. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 111 – 160. AND The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 619.
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 51, annus mundi 6164.
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 52, annus mundi 6164.
- kilikia of Greek is Cecilia; Smyrna is modern Izmir; Lykia is modern provinces of Antalya and Mugla on southern coast of Turkey.
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 52 – 53, annus mundi 6165.
- There were a number of towns by the name of Heliopolis. Probably Theophanes means Fustat
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 52, annus mundi 6164.
- Proklianesin Harbour is Prosphorion Harbour. It was a small harbour located just east of present day Galata Bridge in Golden Horn. Currently new construction has almost filled it up.
- Hebdomon is modern Bakiroy and Kyklobion is modern Zeytinburnu. Both were suburbs of Constantinople located on the European shore of Sea of Marmara.
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 52 – 53, annus mundi 6165.
- Kyzikos was ancient Cyzicus. Its ruins can be seen on the Asian Side of Sea of Marmara near present day Erdek in modern Turkey; The ruins of Syllaion can be seen near the city of Antalya on the southern coast of modern Turkey.
- It was definitely a flammable liquid which would burn on the surface of the sea. A modern analog might be napalm. The “siphon” was a metal tube through which Greek fire was discharged
- According to Theophanes the war wasted seven years of the Umayyad Caliphate. Obviously he is counting all the years which involved the preparation, assault in spring of 673, the siege, fighting and the retreat.
- For details of the siege from modern historian’s perspective see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 243, 248. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 108 – 110.
- A miniature from John Skylista’s Synopsis of Histories dating from early 12th century CE. Current location: Biolioteca Nacional de Espana, Madrid. Here the illustration is the use of Greek fire against Thomas Slav, a 9th century rebellious Byzantine general. Further reading: Nicholas D. Cheronis, “Chemical Warfare in the Middle Ages: Kallinikos’ ‘Prepared Fire’ ”, Journal of Chemical Education, 14 (8) (1937): 360 – 365. AND James Riddick Partington, A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder, (John Hopkin University Press, 1999).
- Kaegi considers the council of 680 CE a symptom of this confidence. See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 229.
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 53 – 54, annus mundi 6169 AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 246 – 247. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 128. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),989
- Tyre and Sidon are still known by the same names and are located in modern Lebanon; Instead of peaks of Lebanon Mountains, historic sources mention Mount Mauros, which is Qurnat as Sawda’ peak in modern Lebanon. They mention Holy City for Jerusalem.
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 253
- Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 227. AND Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 155
- For use of word ‘jund’ in this sense and description of some junds along the Byzantine Rome border see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 202, 203. There are many versions of origin of word “jund”. Basically a Jund was a military district that had a resident army which received a monthly allowance.
- The soldiers deployed on the borders had to make the border town their permanent abode. They could rotate between central cantonments and the border towns if they wished. However, the government encouraged their permanent residence in border towns by incentivizing with perks for this kind of behavior.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),44.
- see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 63, Year 50. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 357, 358, 359, 361. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 102. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 905. AND G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 7.
- Qayrawan in Arabic sources is Kairouan, located 156 km south of Tunis, in modern Tunisia.
- Apparently, the Arab Muslims were reluctant to take an abode in the city of Kairouan built in the middle of wilderness. All Islamic sources particularly emphasize that the site was full of bugs, reptiles and beasts. They receded from the town due to piety of Uqba bin Nafi. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 63, Year 50. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 905. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 103.
- Kairouan was very close to Carthage. The Umayyad Caliphate might have considered the presence of this Byzantine Roman colony as a security threat. It explains the costly campaign against Carthage in 679 CE at a time when the Umayyad Caliphate was at back foot Vis a Vis Byzantine Rome
- For example, when Mu’awiya dismissed Mu’awiya bin Hudayj the governor of Egypt and Uqba bin Nafi as the lieutenant governor of Ifriqiya, he appointed Maslamah bin Mukhallad as governor. At the same time Mu’awiya appointed his mawla Dīnār abu Muhājir lieutenant governor over Ifriqiya. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 103. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 905)
- Uqba bin Nafi continued his military career as a field commander after his dismissal as lieutenant governor. In one of the raids in Ifriqiya, ‘Uqba bin Nafi’ was confronted by a Christian by name of Kusayla bin Mkyzm/Kyzm at Sus al Quswa (Extint town of Sus al Aqsa in Morocco) in 683 CE. ‘Uqba got killed. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 105, Year 63)
- The strength of the military depended upon the nature of the operation. The province could send reinforcements if the operation was big. The strength of ‘Uqbah bin Nāfi’ was ten thousand heads when he invaded Ifriqia with an intention to permanently occupy a piece of land and build kairouan there in 670 CE (See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 63, Year 50. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358).
- We hear of use of ballistics by them only once. That was during one raid in Ifriqiya. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 63, Year 50
- Ubaydullah bin Ziyad, lieutenant governor over jund of Khorasan, surprised everybody when he raided Bukhara on camels. Tarabi was compelled to declare that it was a first in Islam. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 178, 179.
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 180, 181
- It is they who were called ‘transferees’ (al-nawāqil) in the garrison towns. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 97)
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 180, 228
- Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 180
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 190.
- All Mawlas had not changed their names, for example, one was Warrād in Basrah during the Zubayrid government. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 46
- Baladhuri mentions a person by the name of Muslim bin ‘Abdallah, whom Mu’awiya moved from inland to Antakya around 662 CE. If Baladhuri didn’t mention specifically that he was of Persian ethnicity nobody could guess it. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 180.
- For a mawla of Turkish ethnicity by the name of Rashīd see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 62.
- Tabari labels Sarjūn as a Mawla of Mu’awiya. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 18, 30.
- For further study on Mawla see: ‘Abd al-Ameer ‘Abd Dixon, The Umayyad Caliphate, 65 – 86/684 – 705: (a political study), (London: Luzac, 1971), 48 – 49.
- For a clear difference between Mawla and a slave see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 12
- For use of the word mawla for a slave see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 180
- For an example of such use of the word ‘Abd see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 206, 207
- See above the transmission of power from father to son to grandson among pre-Islamic Kindah rulers
- The last of them, Sa’d bin Waqqas died in 674 CE.
- Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75
- Yazid was born in 646 CE: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 13. In another place, Tabari gives the year of Yazid’s birth as 643 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 41).
- Mu’awiya had two sons from his principal wife Fakhita who happened to be from Quraysh. His firstborn was ‘Abd al Rahmān who died young. His secondborn was Abdullah who happened to be a lunatic. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 215.) Yazid’s mother, Maysūn bint Baḥdal was from strong northern tribe of Kalb. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 188, 215.) Generally, Kalb had not accepted Islam. Most historians guess that Maysun, Yazid’s mother, might be a Christian. (For example Hoyland: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 130, 131.). Mu’awiya had three more sons in addition to Yazid who survived Mu’awiya: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 922.
- Ya’qubi puts in the mouth of Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan, “Yazid plays with dogs and monkeys, wears dyed clothes, is addicted to wine, and dances to the accompaniment of tambourines”. Ya’qubi also places similar words in the mouth of Abdullah bin Umar. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 891, 904.
- For Mu’awiya’s acknowledgement of Yazid’s shortcomings see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 184, 185
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 94. Khalifa assigns this campaign to 670 CE: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 64, Year 50.). Theophanes assigns 668 CE to this campaign and admits that Yazid reached up to Chalcedon and that he was accompanied by another Arab commander. See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 50, annus mundi 6159.
- This campaign of Yazid has survived in almost all historical accounts. The anonymous chronicler of “The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741” writing in Spain in 741 CE in the Latin language gives the number of soldiers on the Umayyad Caliphate side as one hundred thousand. This chronicler, who is disproportionately favourable to the Umayyads, further elaborates that the campaign reached up to Constantinople and besieged it all the spring time until the soldiers could not bear hunger and pestilence. On their way back, they captured many towns and took plunder to Damascus. According to the anonymous chronicler of 741, the campaign lasted for two years. See: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 619
- Mu’awiya could afford the farce because campaigns against Byzantine Rome were relatively safe. We hear of very few deaths from the Umayyad Caliphate’s side in all those campaigns over twenty years. Obviously the Byzantine had neglected the defense of Anatolia and previous campaigns had easily returned to the safety of base camp. None of them had yet attacked Constantinople. Ya’qubi reports that Mu’awiya sent his commander Sufyān bin ‘Awf al Ghāmidi as vanguard so he could clear the way. Some of soldiers got small pox in Byzantine territory. Yazid dodged going on campaign and preferred lying on a rug with his wife. When Mu’awiya came to know he got furious and made sure that Yazid leaves and reaches Constantinople. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 905)
- It was this campaign during which Abu Ayub al-Ansari died of old age and got buried in the vicinity of Constantinople. (Khalifa assigns this campaign to 670 CE: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 64, Year 50.).
- This was Yazid’s first and last military campaign
- Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 50, annus mundi 6159.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 184. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 890
- Ziyad advised Yazid to mend his ways in order to be acceptable to the people. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 185.) Ya’qubi insists that the advice had come from Ziyad on his own. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 891). Apparently Yazid was in a ‘crisis of identity confusion’ at this time. Mu’awiya had to arrange for an ‘uncle’ for advice. Mu’awiya mentioned Yazid as their nephew when he talked to Mughira and Ziyad about him: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 890, 891
- Mu’awiya’s selection of his Kufan governors to involve in the matter sheds a light on his fears that Kufan people would definitely challenge the proposal. For Mu’awiya’s fears see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 184
- Khalifa assigns this event to 670 CE. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 64, Year 50. Tabari confuses it with a later year, 676 CE. For Tabari’s date, how he confuses it with the year of Mu’awiya’s pilgrimage and the use of word walī al ‘ahd see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 183, 185, 186.
- For details on the governors working towards the project see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 184.
- G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 13, 14, 46. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 105
- For Yazid’s acceptance by certain Companions of the Prophet and their reasons to do so see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 73, Year 51
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 67, 68, 72. Year 51. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 185, 186, 187. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),904
- Out of all who opposed Yazid’s nomination as future caliph, it was only Abdullah bin Umar who was officially considered a Companion of the Prophet. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 70, Year 51
- Ya’qubi discloses that Mu’awiya did not force them to take allegiance to Yazid: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 905). However the issue remained on Mu’awiya’s mind up to his death bed. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 208, 209
- Conspicuous absentee from the five some were sons of Uthman bin Affan. Mu’awiya sidelined them during his caliphate. They had a grievance that Mu’awiya used the name of their father to climb the ladder of power but didn’t pour any favours over them as acknowledgement. When Mu’awiya made clear that he had made Yazid his heir apparent, Sa’īd bin ‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān presented his frustration with the situation to Mu’awiya. Mu’awiya appointed him as lieutenant governor of Khorasan in 676 CE. Sa’id proved to be incompetent and people around him got the impression that he was timid. Mu’awiya dismissed him soon after. (see for details: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 83, Year 56 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 187, 188, 189. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 919). All of Uthman’s sons were in Uthman’s party, in any case, and supported Yazid’s appointment. When Walid bin Utbah, governor of Medina for Yazid, was reluctant to arrest Husayn and Ibn Zubayr, he sent Abdullah bin ‘Amr bin Uthman to them to convey his message. Abdullah was a young lad by that time. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 3). Yazid knew about their grudge and his men insulted the sons of Uthman whenever they got the chance. ‘Amr bin Uthman was among those Banu Umayyah who escaped from Medina after Ibn Zubayr’s take over. Probably, he did not participate in the Battle of Harrah. Muslim bin ‘Uqbah, Yazid’s commander of the army that was marching towards Medina to suppress Ibn Zubayr’s uprising, upbraided him to insult him (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),202, 206, 217). The political association of Uthman’s descendants with the ruling Umayyads still remained intact. The person who exercised the most influence on Caliph Yazid bin Abdul Malik was Sa’īd bin Khalid bin ‘Amr bin Uthman bin Affan. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1031). Abdul Malik also appointed Aban bin Uthman as governor over Hijaz, though only temporarily. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 1610, year 86). Aban bin Uthman died during the caliphate of Yazid bin Abdul Malik. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 217, Year 105.). The association continued until the end of the Umayyad Caliphate. In 126 Yazid III appointed Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin ‘Amr bin Uthman bin Affan the governor of Medina. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 238).
- Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 86, Year 59; P 90, Year 60. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 210, 211, 212, 213. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 921. Theophanes the Confessor gives the date of May 6, 680. (Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 55, annus mundi 6171.) Earlier sources don’t give a date. See: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997),620
- Mu’awiya’s exact age at the time of his death is not known. Khalifa gives four figures of 78, 80, 82 or 86. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 86, Year 59, P 92, Year 60.). Tabari gives six different figures vis. 73, 74, 75, 78, 83, or 85. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 211. Ya’qubi gives a range of ages from 60, 77 to 80. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 921. See also: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 305.
- Mu’awiya got buried in Damascus, Dahhak bin Qays prayed over him. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 86, Year 59. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 210. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 922. Ya’qubi is clear that Dahhak had to pray over Mu’awiya because Yazid was away. Both Khalifa and Tabari mention Yazid bin Mu’awiya’s name as well though both mention that he was away at the time of Mu’awiya’s death. Mu’awiya was a grim faced man with medium beard and bulging eyes. His chest was broad but legs were short and stout. He had got frail and weak in later years. He had lost weight, and lost front teeth too. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 921.)
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 212.
- This action of Mu’awiya surprises Hawting. He believes that the Umayyads were not proud of being the successors of the Prophet. It were the Abbasids who used Prophet’s cloak at their regalia. See: G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 44.
- ‘Ali’s messenger to Mu’awiya during the Battle of Siffin, Sa’ṣa’ah bin Ṣūhān blamed him and his supporters to be infidels and wine drinkers and wanton, for example. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 15.).
- Indictment given by Mu’awiya’s opponents about his religious beliefs had such a long lasting impact that many modern historians consider him to be either Christian, or non-confessional monotheist. See: Karl-Heinz Ohlig and Gerd- R. Puin, eds., The Hidden Origins of Islam: New Research into its Early History (New York: Prometheus Books, 2010), 40 – 41, 52, 144 – 45. Also see: F. Donner, “From Believers to Muslims: Confessional Self-Identity in the Early Islamic Community,” al-Abbath 50 – 51 (2002 – 3), 26. AND Y. Novo, “Towards a Prehistory of Islam,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 17 (1994), 110. AND Fred M. Donner, Muhammad and Believers: At the Origins of Islam, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 74.
- For further details of Mu’awiya’s expression of faith at the time of his death see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 213. Mu’awiya had expressed his belief in Islam many times categorically before his death. Once, Mu’awiya wrote to emperor Contans: Deny [the divinity of] Jesus and turn to the Great God whom I worship, the God of our father Abraham. (Sebeos 144) Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),
- Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 68
- Hoyland glorifies him as founder of first Islamic state. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 98).
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 214
- Sebastian P. Brock, “North Mesopotamia in the late seventh century: Book XV of John Bar Penkaye’s Rish Melle”, Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam, 9 (1987), 51 – 75
- Not everyone in the country had a good opinion about Mu’awiya. Here is statement of Hasan bin Ali about the character of Mu’awiya: Mu’awiya had four flaws, and any one of them would have been a serious offence.
- Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 154.
- M. A. J. Beg, ‘The Reign of Mu’awiya: A Critical Survey’, Islamic Culture, 51 (1977): 83 – 107. Islamic sources term this war as al-fitan. For the use of this word in this sense see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 109. Second Arab Civil War was direct result of Mu’awiya’s action of nominating his son as heir apparent. (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 43)
- For the definition see: Berber F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start and How to Stop them, New York: Crown, 2022.
- Autocracy is not dictatorship. Dictatorship is a form of government where the ruler has illegally usurped the government and runs the country by force. As a rule of thumb dictatorship cannot last long. It creates so much social chaos that eventually it dies out.
- Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Berber F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start and How to Stop them,” (New York: Crown, 2022), 11.
- See above.