Politics | History of Islam

The Prophet dies

No other single day is more important in the political history of Islam than the day on which Prophet Muhammad died. And events of no other single day are as censored as the events of that day. ¹ According to Ibn Ishaq, the Prophet did not nominate any successor. ² None of early Islamic sources holds a dissenting opinion from that of Ibn Ishaq. ³, ⁴ Ibn Ishaq’s rendering of the events of death of the Prophet, anyhow, gives an impression to the reader that question of succession was already in the air when he was hopelessly sick. ⁵

Prophet Muhammad’s funeral prayer had still not been offered when Ansar (Anṣār Helper اَنصار ) gathered around Sa’d bin Ubada (Sa’d bin ‘Ubādah سَعد بِن عُباده ) in the Community Hall of Banu Saida (Saqīfah Banū Sā’idāh,سقيفه بنو ساعده ) and Ali bin Abu Talib (‘Alī bin Abu. Ṭālib عَلى بِن ابُو طالِب), Zubayr bin Awwam (Zubayr bin ‘Awwām زُبَير بن عوّام), and Talha bin Ubaydullah (Ṭalḥah bin Ubaydallah طَلحَه بِن عُبَيد اُللّه ) separated themselves in Fatima’s (Fāṭimāh فاطِمَه ) house. Rest of the Muhajirun ( Muhājirūn مُهاجِرُون ) gathered around Abu Bakr. ⁶ ⁷ The only clan of Ansar who gathered around Abu Bakr was Abdul Ashhal (‘Abdu’l Ashhal عبدالاشهل) of Aws under their leader Usaid bin Hudhair (Usayd bin Ḥuḍayr اُسَيد بِن هُضير ).⁸Air of Medina was partisan. Prophet’s family locked their door with the body of the Prophet inside. ⁹

Prophet Muhammad had insisted on the army of Usama bin Zaid (Usāma bin Zaid اُسامَة بِن زَيد ) to leave Medina on the first day of his illness, but they pitched camp one stage outside Medina awaiting outcome of the Prophet’s illness. This army contained many early Muhajirun. When the illness got more serious, the army returned the next day of the illness. ¹⁰ So almost whole population of the town was in Medina on the day of Prophet’s death.

Abu Bakr selected as caliph

On hearing the news that all clans of Aws and Khazraj, except Abdul Ashhal of Aws, were in meeting at the Community Hall of Banu Saida, a group of Muhajirun rushed to them. ¹¹ ¹² They could be many in number, but those who spoke on the occasion were Abu Bakr and Umar bin Khattab. (‘Umar bin Khaṭṭāb عُمَر بِن خَطّاب ).¹³ ¹⁴ The Ansar present there wished to proclaim Sa’d bin Ubada of Saida clan of Khazraj as caliph of the Prophet. ¹⁵¹⁶ At that moment Sa’d was acting not only as a leader of Khazraj but of almost all of Ansar. ¹⁷ As soon as the group of Muhajirun confronted them they changed their stance. They asked for two separate caliphs, one for Muhajirun and the other for Ansar.¹⁸ This development gives a clue to Donner that actually they just wanted ‘home rule’. ¹⁹ The arguments that ensued between supporters of Sa’d bin Ubada and Muhajirun under leadership of Abu Bakr, Umar bin Khattab and Abu Ubayda bin Jirrah (Abu. Ubaydah bin al Jirrāḥ. اَبُو عُبَيده بِن اَلجِراح ) were so heated that, according to Ibn Ishaq, the two could plunge into violence. ²⁰ In any case, violence did not take place. Strength of logic subdued the passions. The most powerful reason floated that day came from the tongue of Abu Bakr, “Arabs will recognize authority only in this clan of Quraysh, they being the best of Arabs in blood and country”. ²¹ Guillame opines that the Ansar could quickly assess that they were not in a position of war and that they shall have to take a subordinate role. ²³ ²⁴

Obviously, Medinan Quraysh had joined hands with the Meccan Quraysh just two and half years ago. They were rich and willing to support a candidate from Quraysh. ²⁵ Point to note is that Abu Bakr did not say that Quraysh should be rulers as the Prophet was born among them. Rather they should rule because other Arabs would respect their superior genealogy. Abu Bakr’s words proved to be predictive. For many centuries to come the caliph was from Quraysh.

The bitterness that aroused in Umar’s mind that day against Ansar, never subsided. It is only Umar who is reported to have used rough language against Sa’d bin Ubada during the debate. ²⁶ Later on, none of Ansar ever got any high office of the government until Umar’s death. None of them became a general or a governor. They could get job in army as ordinary soldiers or at the maximum field commanders. They never got a promotion higher than a middle ranking official in the civil services. ²⁷

The bitterness can be traced on Ansar’s side as well. They took part in Ridda Wars but used to undermine authority of the supreme commander of the force who always happened to be one of the Quraysh. For example, they objected strongly to fight under Khalid bin Walid (Khālid bin Walīd خالِد بِن وَلِيد) against Tulayha. Abu Bakr had to appoint one of them as commander over them instead of Khalid. ²⁸ Umar never divulged his policy of excluding Ansar from high profile jobs publicly. Instead, he used diplomacy to avoid appointing an Ansar, whenever any such situation arose. For instance, when he sent a small army to fight in Battle of Jisr, he appointed Abu Ubaid bin Mas’ud of Thaqif (Thaqīf ثَقِيف ) as its commander. Salit bin Qays (Saliṭ bin Qays سَلِط بِن قَيس ) of Ansar, a veteran of Badr, was in this army. Umar said to him “Had it not been for the fact that thou art too hasty, I would have put thee in chief command. But warfare is a stubborn thing, and only the cautious man is fit for it. ²⁹

After curtailing aspirations of Ansar, the group of Muhajirun aptly presented their own candidate from one of the Quraysh. He was sixty one years old Abu Bakr of Taym clan of Quraysh, a merchant by vocation. ³⁰ All present there diligently committed allegiance to him except Sa’d bin Ubada ³¹ ³²

While seconding Abu Bakr’s candidacy Umar established another principal that dominated Muslim politics throughout the life of Medinan caliphate. He convinced everybody (or at least the Muhajirun who were present there) that Abu Bakr was ‘the best’.³³ Now, sources are quiet about what exactly did Umar mean by this phrase. We are left on our own to compare all those present on that occasion with Abu Bakr and to find out what was ‘the best’ in him. Abu Bakr had impressive curriculum vitae. He associated himself with Islam from the very beginning.³⁴ He financed Islamic movement in Mecca at a time when resources of Muslims were meagre. ³⁵ He used his purse to finance immigration of the Prophet and he paid for the land of the mosque of the Prophet. ³⁶ During later years the Prophet provided Abu Bakr with some financial resources. Abu Bakr got an estate from the lands of Naḍīr in 626 CE. ³⁷ Prophet Muhammad always remained thankful to Banu Hashim (Banū Hāshim بَنُو هاشِم ) and Banu Muttalib (Banu al-Muṭṭalib بَنُو المُطّلِب ) for their support during the boycott. Defending his decision to allocate permanent shares from his fifth of booty of Khaybar to members of Banu Hashim and Banu Muttalib, the Prophet expressed his thankfulness to them vividly. The only person who did not belong to either of these two clans but still got a share was Abu Bakr. ³⁸ Abu Bakr was the most trusted advisor to the Prophet. From Badr to Fathe Mecca (Fathe Makkah, The conquest of Mecca, فَتِح مكّة ) there is not a single occasion of political importance when the Prophet did not seek his opinon. ³⁹ Anyhow, the Prophet did not appoint him a general or a field commander during any of the campaigns. The Prophet used to choose comparatively young men for this kind of job. The only known expedition during which Abu Bakr led a small Muslim battalion was that towards Nejd. ⁴⁰ This campaign had no significance towards propping up Islam as a leading force in Hejaz. None of those present at the Hall of Banu Saida was associated with Islam longer than Abu Bakr and none of them was as steadfast with Islam as was Abu Bakr. Umar established ‘earlier acceptance of Islam and deep commitment to it’ as ‘the best’ in Abu Bakr. ⁴¹

Humans are naturally hierarchical. In theory, Islam considered all its adherents equal. Practically, hierarchy was well entrenched among Muslims at the time of death of Prophet Muhammad. Once Prophet Muhammad sent Mu’adh bin Jabal (Mu’ādh bin Jabal مُعاذ بِن جَبَل) as his messenger to Zur’ah bin Dhi Yazan, a Ḥimyār who had accepted Islam. In his paper of credentials the Prophet introduces Mu’adh as one of the righteous among his immediate companions. ⁴² ⁴³ It means some companions of the Prophet were ‘his immediate’ – his inner circle. And even in that inner circle there was hierarchy, some were ‘righteous’. Umar did not have to argue with those present at the Hall of Banu Saida that Abu Bakr was the most senior in hierarchy. They understood it. This is the only reason, though Abu Bakr had floated the idea that caliph would be only from Quraysh, none of prominent Quraysh contested with Abu Bakr for leadership. It includes those men of Quraysh who were still in Mecca and could have challenged Abu Bakr later on if they wished, like Abu Sufyan (Abū Sufyān اَبُو سُفيان ).⁴⁴

Ibn Ishaq doesn’t report any overt political discord among Muhajirun at the time of selection of first caliph. Though, according to Ibn Ishaq’s rendition of the events, ambitions ran high among the two surviving male relatives of Prophet Muhammad. During the final illness of Prophet Muhammad, Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib (‘Abbās bin ‘Abdul Muṭṭalib عَبّاس بِن عَبدُالمُطَّلِب ), paternal uncle of the Prophet suggested to Ali bin Abu Talib to ask the Prophet “if authority is to be with us, we shall know it, and if it is to be with others we will request him to enjoin the people to treat us well” but Ali refused saying “if it is withheld from us none after him will give it to us”. ⁴⁵

Ya’qubi claims that when the group of Muhajirun returned to downtown Medina, where the mosque of the Prophet stood, the group of people who were present in the house of Fatima, probably mourning the death of the Prophet as his household members, denied taking oath of allegiance with Abu Bakr. Here Ya’qubi gives a list of people who refused to take oath of allegiance, including both Quraysh and Ansar. They were Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, Fadl bin Abbas (Fad.l bin ‘Abbās فَضَل بِن عَبّاس ), Zubayr bin Awwam, Khalid bin Sa’id (Khālid bin Sa’īd خالِد بِن سَعِيد ), Miqdad bin Amr (Miqdād bin Amr مِقداد بِن عَمرؤ ), Salman Farsi (Salmān al Fārsi سَلمان الفارسى ), Abu Dharr Ghifari (Abu Dharr al Ghifari اَبُو ذَرّ الغِفارى ), Ammar bin Yasir (Ammar bin Yasir عَمّار بِن ياسِر ), Bara bin Azib (Barā’ Bin ‘Āzib بَراء بِن عازِب ) and Ubayy bin Ka’b. ⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ Ya’qubi also asserts that Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, Fadl bin Abbas and ‘Utba bin Abu Lahab openly demanded that the khalifa should be one of Banu Hashim. However, Ya’qubi insists that Ali forbade all of them from saying so. ⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ Tabari, who is chronologically three decades after Ya’qubi, also reports such events but in a softer tone. ⁵⁰

Meticulous examination of Islamic sources establishes a diagnosis of difference in opinion among early Muhajirun rather than a row. The group in Fatima’s house expected the caliph to be from Hashim clan of Quraysh rather than from Taym. This group was not in a position to press on their demand due to insufficient support from other clans of Quraysh. ⁵¹ Ya’qubi reports that the majority had accepted Abu Bakr as caliph. ⁵²

The matter settled amicably. Tabari shows Ali, Zubayr, Talha and Abdullah bin Mas’ud (‘Adballah bin Mas’ūd عَبداُللّه بِن مَسعُود ) participating in defence of Medina against intruders under orders of Abu Bakr just few days after his selection. ⁵³ Ya’qubi informs us that the people who refused to take oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr on first day of death of the Prophet, gradually started taking oath, the last being Ali, six months down ‘Abu Bakr’s tenure. ⁵⁴ ⁵⁵ The change of mind among ‘Mensheviks’ of Muhajurun could be due to victories in Ridda Wars which Abu Bakr started securing one after another. Tabari asserts that by the time of death of Fatima, six months after selection of Abu Bakr, Ali had lost the attention of people, which he used to get. Hesitantly, he sought a one on one meeting with Abu Bakr. In this meeting they discussed matter of Prophet Muhammad’s inheritance and Ali’s perception that Hashim clan had a right to caliphate. Abu Bakr didn’t inch back from his position on both of these matters. After that meeting, all of Banu Hashim took oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr. ⁵⁶ Actually, Ya’qubi shows Ali to be in the post of advisor to Abu Bakr as early as beginning of 634 CE when Medinan Caliphate invaded Byzantine Syria. ⁵⁷

Reports of deviating meetings and debates around selection of first caliph tend to strengthen the authenticity of Abu Bakr’s later statement, ‘I took caliphate (khilāfat) because I knew that people were in dispute and I feared that they would be destroyed. ⁵⁸ And contradictions in those reports of meetings and debates strengthen our suspicion that the events of the day the Prophet died are highly censored.

Leader of prayer

Leader of ritual prayer (ṣalāt) definitely gets stamp of seniority in religion among Muslims. ⁵⁹ Though the Prophet used to appoint others to lead a prayer on occasions when he was not physically present, the only occasion when he himself offered prayer under lead of another person was Tabuk (Tabūk تَبُوك ). The Prophet got late while performing ablutions (wuzū) and the Muslims tipped Abdur Rehman bin Awf (‘Abd ar Reḥmān bin ‘Awf عَبد اُلرَحمان بِن عَوف ) to lead the prayer. The Prophet later joined them, giving a nod to Abdur Rehman to continue with the lead. ⁶⁰ Traditions from many different sources mention that Propeht Muhammad ‘ordered’ Abu Bakr to lead the prayer during his final days. ⁶¹ Abu Bakr might have got a token of seniority in religion by this act of the Prophet, he definitely didn’t get emblem of political leadership. ⁶² After Prophet’s death, the Muhajirun didn’t use the honour Abu Bakr earned by leading the prayer during lifetime of the Prophet as an argument that the Prophet had tipped him as potential caliph. ⁶³

Abu Bakr takes oath

On June 8, 632 CE, the next day of bickering in the Hall of Banu Saida, Umar asked everybody present in the Prophet’s mosque to swear fealty to Abu Bark and everybody present did it. In his acceptance speech Abu Bakr said ‘Obey me as long as I obey Allah and His Apostle, and if I disobey them you owe me no obedience’. ⁶⁴ Abu Bakr effectively defined the governing principal of the theocracy he was going to preside over. Obedience to caliph (and state) was not unconditional. It was subject to a condition that the caliph (and the state) would function within limits of religious doctrine.

What Abu Bakr had accepted, was not a glamorous position at that point in time. It was the most difficult job. Muslims were internally divided. Tribes previously loyal to Islamic state of Medina were perplexed. People in many parts of Arabia were discarding the older form of organization – tribal confederation. Rather they were organizing themselves in newer form – religious fraternities. In this scenario Abu Bakr desperately needed to generate support at grass root level for his caliphate. Aisha says “after the death of the Prophet, what befell my father would have softened the firm mountains if it had befallen them. Hypocrisy in Medina exalted itself, and the Arabs apostatized from their faith. By Allah, not a point they disagreed upon, which my father did not cause to disappear as something without which Islam could do [?].” ⁶⁵

Abu Bakr picks deputy

The army of Usama had returned to Medina due to illness of Prophet Muhammad. When it was ready to depart after death of the Prophet, Abu Bakr asked Usama to spare Umar from military duty so he could assist Abu Bakr in running affairs of the state.⁶⁶ Abu Bakr didn’t create office of deputy caliph formally. Still, we don’t hear of a single decision of political significance taken by Abu Bakr in which Umar had not given inputs. Moreover, on many occasions, Umar alone registered his dissent from decisions of Abu Bakr. Furthermore, we don’t hear of any other’s inputs that might have helped Abu Bakr in changing his mind. Umar was effectively deputy to Abu Bakr throughout his rein. Islamic sources knew it. Ya’qubi informs us that the only person who had great influence on Abu Bakr was Umar.⁶⁷ Tabari also writes many traditions expressing this theme. ⁶⁸

Rashidun Caliphate is born

Mainstream Islamic historians and scholars of mid-9^th century gravitate towards the idea that there was a ‘just golden rule’ in the beginning of Islam, followed by a ‘tyranny’. They named that just golden rule, era of rightly guided caliphs – khulafa ur Rāshidūn (خُلَفاءُالراشِدون). Mid-9^th ⁶⁹ century Islamic historians and scholars unanimously believe that the process of revelation had stopped by the death of Prophet Muhammad. ⁷⁰ However, they believe, that somehow Allah was guiding khulafa ur Rāshidūn directly. Baladhuri puts words in Abdullah bin Mus’ud’s mouth, “Allah ordered Abu Bakr to fight with them [apostatizing tribes].” ⁷¹

The debate who should be included in khulafa ur Rāshidūn and who should be excluded finally settled when a highly respected Baghdadi scholar Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 855 CE) agreed that Ali was one of khulafa ur Rāshidūn. He had been excluding Ali from the list in his earlier views. When questioned by his colleagues about his change of heart, he replied that since caliph Umar bin Khattab “was satisfied with the idea of Ali as caliph of the Muslims . . . and since Ali called himself commander of the faithful, who am I to say that he was not?” ⁷²

The final list drawn by mainstream Islamic historians and scholars included the first four caliphs, Abu Bakr (632 – 634 CE), Umar (634 – 644 CE), Uthman (644 – 656 CE) and Ali (656 – 661 CE) as rightly guided caliphs. ⁷³ Small number of Muslim historians and scholars disagreed. For them the rightful caliphate had started with Ali and got interrupted quickly by Ali’s assassination.⁷⁴ ⁷⁵

For most of its life Medina served as capital of Rashidun Caliphate, also called Medinan Caliphate. During the last four years of Medinan Caliphate, Kufa served as its capital. The ruler of Medinan Caliphate held wide ranging powers – all the powers that Prophet Muhammad had. He was the head of the executive branch of government, he was the sole law maker of the country, he was the supreme commander of army, he was the chief justice of the land and he was the final religious authority over Muslims living anywhere in world.

Abu Bakr picks administration

Never a ruler rules all alone. It is always a team work. As a bottom line, it is a derogative of the ruler to appoint government of his choice after attaining power. He strives to appoint his trusted people who usually have been supporting him before his elevation to power. It guarantees smooth functioning of his government. All the governors and generals Abu Bakr appointed during two years and two months of his tenure were members of Quraysh. Some of them had converted to Islam after Fathe Mecca.⁷⁶ The fact gives indirect evidence that in addition to the Quraysh of Medina, who went to the Hall of Banu Saida with him, it were Quraysh residents of Mecca who supported his appointment as caliph.

Inheritance of the Prophet and the case of Fadak

The first legal case Abu Bakr had to judge as chief justice of the country was the inheritance of Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet had four daughters and three sons from Khadija.⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ He had one son from Maria the Coptic (Maria Qibṭiya ماريةُ القبِطيه ), the slave girl gifted to him by Muqawqis ( Māqus مَقُوقَس ) of Egypt.⁷⁹ ⁸⁰ All of Prophet’s children had died in his lifetime except Fatima. ⁸¹ He was also survived by nine of his wives.⁸² They were all heirs to the Prophet’s property. ⁸³

The Prophet had three properties. Agricultural land in Medina, got from Naḍīr; agricultural land in Fadak, got as fay’; and share from Khaybar. He reserved income from the land of Naḍīr for any unforeseen misfortunes, reserved income from Fadak for wayfarers and divided income from Khaybar into three parts. He used one part for provisions to his family and gave left over in alms to needy Muhajirun. He divided the other two parts among Muslims. ⁸⁴

The Prophet, along with his wives, and Ali along with his wife and children, used to live in the Prophet’s mosque.⁸⁵ Abu Bakr had bought its land and the community as a whole had provided labour and material to build it. ⁸⁶ In this sense it was not the Prophet’s personal property. Still, Caliph Abu Bakr allowed his widows to continue living in it without paying rent.

The Prophet used to get cash income from ṣadaqah and jizyah. In addition he used to get his fifth share from the booty. As he did not have any cash saved at the time of his death, it is apparent that he considered all that money state property and spent it into state expenditures, like winning chiefs of tribes towards Islam, giving subsidy to the tribes, propagation of Islam etc. etc.

Dispute about disbursement of Prophet’s income had started during his own lifetime after conquest of Khaybar.⁸⁷ Apparently the dispute lingered on, as Waqidi notes that during his caliphate Umar withheld certain funds from portions of Banu Hashim because they refused to use that money to marry off widows and salvaging indebted from this amount.⁸⁸

Most well-known dispute of Prophet’s estate is not that of Khaybar but it is that of Fadak. And this is the civil suite which Abu Bakr had to decide early during his caliphate. At the time of its surrender, the People of Fadak had given half of their land to the Muslims. The Prophet kept half out of it for himself. ⁸⁹

The widows of the Prophet wished their inheritance from Khaybar and Fadak. (Islamic sources don’t mention lands gained from Naḍīr in any dispute of inheritance). They delegated Uthman bin Affan (‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān عُثمان بِن عَفّان ) as their attorney to plead their case with Abu Bakr. Later, Aisha dropped the civil suit on behalf of everybody saying that they were ṣadaqah lands whose income was used for the benefit of people of Muhammad and should be used for the same purpose by the one who is in authority after the Prophet.⁹⁰ Fatima Bint Muhammad brought her sole claim for Fadak pleading that Prophet Muhammad had assigned it to her. She presented Ali bin Abu Talib, her husband, as her witness. Abu Bakr demanded another witness. So she brought Umm Aiman. Abu Bakr dismissed the case on grounds that either two male witnesses or one male and two female witnesses were required to establish the claim. ⁹¹ Abu Bakr wrote in his judgement that the Prophet wished that the ṣadaqah established by him will continue for the benefit of Muslims after his death. ⁹²

Seemingly, each party involved accepted the ruling. Prophet’s wives continued to get their ration from Khaybar. The rest of the income continued to be spent as ṣadaqah as Waqidi mentions that income generated by Prophet’s property was given to orphans, poor and wayfarers by Abu Bakr, Umar and Ali. ⁹³ ⁹⁴

First thing first

Abu Bakr was determined to demonstrate that he started his political mission from exactly where sudden death of Prophet Muhammad had interrupted it, and that his tenure was a continuation of Prophet Muhammad’s policies. He sent Usama with three thousand men to invade Yibna, as was planned by the Prophet.⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ Usama ambushed Yibna’s residents, killing some people and taking some prisoners. He plundered the town and then burnt it. Not a single Muslim got wounded. Heraculis, the king of Byzantine Rome, who was in Homs that time, got upset at the news that the Bedouins raided from one month’s journey, and left without being hurt. Consequently he strengthened his borders at Balqā’.⁹⁷ ⁹⁸ ⁹⁹ Actullay, Yibna was twenty night’s journey from Medina but Heraclius counted it thirty day’s journey. ¹⁰⁰ This was the level of Heraclius’s knowledge about geography of Arabia. As people had warned Abu Bakr not to send Usama in the wake of apostasy and Waqidi notes that the expedition took place almost one month after death of the Prophet, we can calculate that it would have taken place in July 632 CE. ¹⁰¹

The narration of battle – ambush, no Muslim wounded, Heraclius takes it as Bedouin raid – validates that it was a political gimmick. It was merely a show of power by Abu Bakr. It was his effort to demonstrate that his manifesto was to toe line of action of Prophet Muhammad. It was his endeavour to seal the cracks that had appeared in the Muslim community of Medina after selection of caliph and to establish his authority firmly over them.¹⁰² By the time the military was away from Medina, changes in political climate of Arabia had already convinced Abu Bakr that it was time to shelve Prophet’s northern policy and to attend more pressing issues nearby. During absence of the army of Usama, Abu Bakr had met a tribal delegation confirming that they won’t pay tax though they don’t mind praying ṣalāt.¹⁰³ Simultaneously, the hostile tribes in proximity of Medina started harassing Medinan Caliphate, exploiting the fact that its military was away.¹⁰⁴

Ridda Wars (Ḥurūb ar-Riddah)

Just after death of Prophet Muhammad a big war engulfed whole of Arabia in its flames – a war that killed more people than those killed in all the Prophetic Wars combined.¹⁰⁵ The series of battles, that lasted for almost one year, is called ‘Ridda Wars’(Ḥurūb ur Riddah حُرُوب اُلرِدّه ), or ‘War on Apostasy’ (Fitnah tul Irtidād فِتنَةُ الاِرتِداد ) by Islamic sources.¹⁰⁶ Modern historians consider it a misnomer.¹⁰⁷ They believe the war was not about fighting against apostates (sin. murtadd, pl. murtadīn). Watt rejects the notion of apostasy on logical grounds. He is of opinion that the nature of Arab society during the Prophetic times was such that public declaration meant far more to an Arab. Once anybody converted, his faith was genuine.¹⁰⁸ Apostasy was contrary to Arab’s murūʾah.

Baladhuri, who is the first historian to record the events of Ridda Wars, describes the problem, “When Abu Bakr was proclaimed caliph, certain Arab tribes apostatized from Islam and withheld ṣadaqah. Some of them, however said, ‘We shall observe prayer but not pay zakāt.’” ¹⁰⁹ Even if we take Baladhuri’s statement on face value it is evident that some, not all, of the tribes apostatized but all of rebel tribes refused to pay tax to Abu Bakr.

Let’s examine the issue closely. Explaining start of Ridda War against Kindah tribe, Baladhuri writes that Ziyad bin Labid (Ziyād bin Labīd زياد بِن لَبِيد) was Prophet’s zakāt collector to Haḍaramaut. Abu Bakar extended his tax circle to the tribe of Kindah. He was resolute and sturdy in his manners. He developed a dispute with Kindah over assessment of ṣadaqah. Ash’ath bin Qays ( اَشعَث بِن قَيس ) of ‘Amr bin Mu’āwiyah clan of Kindah approached him to reconsider his assessment of ṣadaqah. Ziyad refused to change his mind. It resulted in general revolt of Kindah against him. The only Kindah clan that did not take part in the revolt was Sakun.¹¹⁰ Here, Baladhuri clearly demonstrates that the party, whom he calls apostates, was willing to pay tax if it was reasonable. The dispute was economical, not religious. As Baladhuri is writing this event in context of apostasy in Yemen, evidently he confuses tax evasion and resistance to tax collectors with apostasy. Actually, all Islamic sources collectively fail to point out a single tribe in Arabia who had been praying ṣalāt and refused to do so after death of Prophet Muhammad.

We don’t know their reasons why some tribes refused to pay tax. As in the above example, some perceived it to be high. It is also possible that some of them didn’t feel obliged to pay tax to Abu Bakr as they had entered into agreement with Prophet Muhammad, not with an invisible state. We know Abu Bakr asked them to renew the contracts and some of them did it on the same terms as they were with Prophet Muhammad without any resistance, for example, people of Najran.¹¹¹ Furthermore, it is also possible that some tribes did not perceive Abu Bakr to be capable of providing them with ‘protection’ that was guaranteed in lieu of paying tax. Lastly, so many tribes against whom forces of Medinan Caliphate fought during the Ridda wars are not heard of paying any tax to Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime. Vivid example is Bakr bin Wa’il. (Bakr bin Wā’il بَكر بِن واءِل ).

Actually, Medinan Caliphate had two goals in mind to launch the Ridda Wars. Firstly it was a campaign to bring those tribes back under government authority who had started thinking of self-rule after election of Abu Bakr. Secondly, after attaining the first goal, to bring all others tribes and polities in Arabia under administration of Medinan Caliphate, and to eliminate all bastions of resistance. Then, why does Baladhuri, and all other Islamic sources, call it war against apostasy? It is because they toe the line of Ibn Ishaq who claims that all and sundry accepted Islam during the last two years of Prophet Muhammad’s life. If Mednian Caliphate had to fight against them under leadership of Abu Bakr, naturally, they had to be shown as apostates.

Tribal affiliation was guiding principal of those who opposed Medinan Caliphate in Ridda wars, though some had started galvanizing around a religion. Caetani, the Italian scholar, classifies the Arab tribes into four categories according to their relations with Prophet Muhammad by the time of his death; (i) tribes that submitted to Prophet Muhammad and converted to Islam (ii) tribes that submitted to Prophet Muhammad and made progress in Islam: Hawazin (Hawāzin هَوازِن ), Amir, Tayy (Ṭāʾī طاءِى ) and Sulaym (iii) tribes which lived on the periphery of the state of Medina which submitted politically to Islam and were euphemistically called Muslim (iv) tribes which kept their independence from Medina, among whom a small minority sought the help of the Prophet against adversaries: Hanifa (Ḥanīfāh حَنِيفَه ), Asad, and the tribes of Oman and Ḥaḍramaut among others.¹¹²

Tribes that supported Abu Bakr in achieving his goals of Ridda Wars seem to include Aslam, Ghifar (Ghifār غِفار ), Muzayna, Ashja’, Juhayna, Ka’b bin Amr, parts of Sulaym (all from Hejaz), parts of Tayy (perhaps only Jadīla and Ghawth clans), parts of Tamim (Tamīm تَمِيم ), and perhaps sections of Asad and Ghatafan (Ghaṭafān غَطَفان), (all from Nejd), and probably Bajila (Bajīlah بَجيله ) and various sections of Yemeni tribal groups that remained loyal to Medinan Caliphate, such as Sakun (Sakūn سَكُون ) of Kindah. Tribes of Northern Hejaz, Syria and Iraq had not participated in Ridda Wars. They included Bali, Udhra (Udhrah عُذ ره ), perhaps parts of Quda’a (Quḍā’a قُضاعه ), such as kalb.¹¹³ Not to mention, Quraysh, Khazraj, Aws and Thaqif were Abu Bakr’s main strength.¹¹⁴

All tribes supporting Abu Bakr fought under command of individuals who belonged to Quraysh. As Quraysh came out triumphant in Ridda Wars they attained position of political elite among Arabs and played a vital role in future extension and management of Islamic empire.¹¹⁵

The defeated and hence conquered tribes like Hanifa and Asad remained in their traditional territory persuing pastoralism, agriculture, artisanry or trade, and played no active part in the management and expansion of Medinan Caliphate. They remained the administered population of Arabia, subject to the Islamic ruling class, to which they paid taxes in return for the regime’s protection against external interference and its services in adjudicating their tribal disputes. As former rebels, they were deemed untrustworthy, and in order to keep them under control, Abu Bakr appears to have taken prisoners from these subjected tribes to hold hostage as a guarantee of the tribe’s continued good behavior.¹¹⁶

Medinan Caliphate did not have funds to pay to its soldiers fighting in the Ridda Wars. Their salary was their booty (ghanīmah).¹¹⁷ Abu Bakr sent his field commander Ikrima bin Abu Jahl (‘Ikrimah bin abu Jahl عِكرِمه بِن اَبُو جهل ) to reinforce his agents Ziyad bin Labid and Muhajir bin Umayah (Muhājir bin Umayah مُهاجِر بِن اُميّه) in Yemen after Ikrima had finished his job in Oman. Ziyad and Muhajir had already reduced the fort of Nujair by the time Ikrima reached. They had to share their booty with Ikrima on Abu Bakr’s request.¹¹⁸

Realignment of Tribes of Nejd and Hejaz

First events of Ridda Wars took place by end of July 632 CE, few weeks after Abu Bakr took the office.¹¹⁹ ¹²⁰ By that time Abu Bakr had decided to get rid of vestigial resistance to Medinan Caliphate in Hejaz and Nejd, and then to subjugate whole of Arabia, before he pursues any northern policy.

The force that went to Hejaz, Nejd and later, Yamama appears to be drawn mainly from Muhajirun of Medina, Quraysh of Mecca, Ansar, and Thaqif.¹²¹

Most of tribes based in Hejaz and Nejd or at least part thereof, had paid tax to Prophet Muhammad during last two years of his lifetime. They were the fundamental groups who refused to pay a damn. During first month of his caliphate Abu Bakr received delegates of Asad, Ghatafan, Hawazin, Tayy and Quda’a in Medina one by one. All of them presented their petition to Abu Bakr to get tax exemption.¹²² All of them were Bedouin. As all of them promised to pray ṣalāt as prescribed, it is evident that they represented only Muslim clans of their respective tribes and that they didn’t apostate in true meanings of the word.¹²³ Many of the leading figures of Medinan Caliphate, cognizant of sinister situation, urged Abu Bakr to yield to their petition. Abu Bakr took a resolute stance against them.¹²⁴ “If they refuse me a hobble [iqāl, the rope worn by the camel], I shall fight them for it,” reiterated Abu Bakr.¹²⁵ Thus Abu Bakr crafted the blueprint for survival of the feeble polity he was presiding over.

Fazara (Fazārah فَزارَه ) clan of Ghatafan and Khuzayma bin Asad were two tribes who had been switching parties during Prophetic times and were still buddy with each other. During last months of Prophet Muhammad’s life, Tulayha bin Khuwailid (Ṭulayḥah bin Khuwailid طُلَيحَه بِن خُوَيلِد ) of Asad bin Khuzaimah had declared himself a prophet.¹²⁶ ¹²⁷ He not only posed tribal but ideological threat to Medinan Caliphate.¹²⁸

First encounter with Ghatafan-Asad tribal confederation was trivial. Kharija bin Hisn (Khārijah bin Ḥiṣn خارِجَه بِن حِصن ), who was brother of Uyayna bin Hisn (‘Uyaynah bin Ḥiṣn عُيَينه بن حِصن) and Manzur bin Zabban (Manẓūr bin Zabbān مَنظُر بِن زَبّان ), both of Fazara clan of Ghatafan showed up near Medina.¹²⁹ Abu Bakr’s field commander Talha bin Ubaydallah of Taym clan of Quraysh chased them away.¹³⁰ ¹³¹ Then Abu Bakr sent his commander in chief, Khalid bin Walid, against Tulayha. Tulayha came with his brothers Hibal (Ḥibāl حِبال ) and Salamah. Uyayna bin Hisn of Fazarah tribe had joined him with seven hundred men.¹³² Khalid’s army included some clans of Asad, though main body of Asad were in Tulayha’s camp.¹³³ Tayy generally supported Tulayha.¹³⁴ Ashja’ clan of Ghatafan was pro-Medinan Caliphate.¹³⁵ In the middle of the fight Uyayna withdrew his men blaming Tulayha to be a false prophet. After routing the enemy, Muslims could capture Uyayina bin Hisn and took him to Medina. Abu Bakr spared his life and set him free. Tulayha fled from the scene but was caught later. He was sent to Medina where he confessed Islam.¹³⁶ ¹³⁷ ¹³⁸ During the same campaign Khalid sent a battalion under Hisham bin As (Hishām bin ‘Āṣ هِشام بِن عاص ), brother of Amr bin As, of Sahm clan against Amir bin Sasa’a (‘Amir bin Ṣa’ṣa’ah عامِر بِن صَصَعه) but they did not resist and professed their belief in Islam. Their leader Qurrah bin Hubairah was arrested and sent to Abu Bakr on charges of reinforcing Tulayha. Qurrah pleaded not guilty, Abu Bakr accepted it.¹³⁹ Kharija bin Hisn was still on the run. Khalid could kill him in an encounter, his companions fled.¹⁴⁰

Tulayha’s and Uyayna’s decisive defeat was a game changer in Hejaz. Many other tribes of Hejaz, like Hawazin, portions of Amir Bin Sasa’a and portions of Sulaym had withheld tax. They were watching the match between Abu Bakr and Tulayha vigilantly. The outcome convinced them to enter into tax agreement with Medinan Caliphate without further defiance.¹⁴¹ ¹⁴² Abu Bakr’s lenient demeanor towards the arrested leaders of Ghatafan, Asad and Amir Bin Sasa’a would have contributed towards alleviating their ambivalence.

Very few clans of Sulaym had rebelled.¹⁴³ After finishing off Ghatafan, Asad and rebel portions of Tayy, Khalid advanced on disobedient sections of Sulaym who had gathered under their leader Amr bin Abdul Uzza (‘Amr bin ‘Abd al ‘Uzza abu Shajarah اَبُو شَجرَه عَمرؤ بِن عَبدُ العُزّئ ). Khalid defeated them and burnt some of them.¹⁴⁴ Amr accepted Islam.¹⁴⁵ All encounters mentioned up to now were small scale scuffles. Baladhuri doesn’t mention any casualty on Muslim side.¹⁴⁶

How did Tamim behave during Ridda Wars is obscure. It is partly due to the reason that main transmitter of Ridda Wars, Sayf bin Umar was from Tamim and he would have covered it up.¹⁴⁷ They were predominantly Christian.¹⁴⁸ Apparently they were indifferent to Medinan Caliphate initially. Later, when Medinan Caliphate defeated Hanifa decisively, they started co-operating with Muslims. Name of a woman of Tamim surfaces up during Ridda Wars. She was Saja Bint Aws (Sajāh. bint Aws Umm Ṣādir سَجاح بِنت اَوس اُمّ صادِر ) from Hanzala (Ḥanẓalah حَنظَله ) clan of Tamim. Her mother was from Taghlib. She used to claim being a kāhin and a Prophetess. She had appointed her own muazin. Few clans of Tamim and Taghlib believed in her, mainly her own relatives. She asked her supporters to invade the town of Ribāb after claiming that the Lord of Heavens had advised her so. Her force got defeated. She then came to Musaylima in Ḥajar and married him, joining her religion with his. After Muslayma’s defeat Saja disappeared into anonymity. Some say she returned to her brothers, others say she accepted Islam and started living in Basrah where she died.¹⁴⁹

Baladhuri is not very sure about any of Khalid’s campaigns against Tamim. According to some reports that reached Baladhuri, Khalid fought with Tamim at Buṭāh and Ba’ūḍah. In other reports it was Dirar bin Azwar (Ḍirār bin Azwar ضِرار بِن اَزوَر ) of Asad who fought against Malik bin Nuwaira (Mālik bin Nuwairah مالِك بِن نُويره ) of Hanzala clan of Tamim. Dirar could capture Malik and brought him to Khalid. Khalid ordered Malik to be beheaded. Malik was Prophet Muhammad’s ‘āmil for collecting ṣadaqah from the Hanzala clan. Baladhuri reports that at the death of the Prophet he withheld the money and asked Hanzala to keep their money. But in any case, at the time of execution he claimed that he had not apostatized.¹⁵⁰ ¹⁵¹

False Prophets

Before we proceed further on events of Ridda Wars let’s acquaint ourselves with the phenomenon of ‘false Prophets.’

Islamic sources have preserved names of at least four people living in Arabia during the Prophetic times and during Abu Bakr’s tenure as caliph, whom they call ‘false Prophets’. Aswad, Tulayha and Saja have already been discussed. The only one left is Musaylima.

Many historians identify the rise of various persons claiming prophet hood at the same time as Prophet Muhammad, a social phenomenon.¹⁵² Al Askar, the Saudi scholar who has studied Musaylima and war of Yamama in detail, calls the seventh century as century of prophets for Arabia.¹⁵³ The social organization of people no longer remained purely tribal by the time of death of Prophet Muhammad. It was an early form of religio-tribal organization.

All the ‘false Prophets’ failed to attract any significant followership except one. He was Musaylima. We shall discuss him briefly below.

War of Yamama

In spring of 633 CE a fierce battle took place on the plains of ‘Aqraba – a battle that was most horrible of all the battles Islamic army had taken part in up to now, including the Prophetic Wars.¹⁵⁴ The size of opponents is said to be forty thousands, the largest an Islamic army had ever faced.¹⁵⁵ The size of Muslims is reported to be four thousands only.¹⁵⁶ The death toll on Muslim side alone could be in tune of seven hundred to seventeen hundred, which makes a hefty forty percent of the whole army.¹⁵⁷ Similar magnitude of loss is estimated on the opposite side – thirty five percent.¹⁵⁸ The war, though considered part of Ridda Wars by Islamic sources, has its own name – the War of Yamama.

As mentioned earlier, Yamama was a geographic and political entity of Arabia on its own in pre-Islamic times.¹⁵⁹ It was located around the mountains which are now called Jabl Tuwayq.¹⁶⁰ Yamama was completely sedentary. Main inhabitant of the region was the tribe of Hanifa, though some clans of Tamim had settled in the regions as well.¹⁶¹ Hanifa were dominant social group and were owners of best and richest resources. Agriculture was main activity in Yamama. Wheat and dates were major crops. Handicrafts and mining industries are also said to be flourishing.¹⁶² Main town in the region and its capital was Ḥajar. ¹⁶³ ¹⁶⁴

It appears that Hanifa were strong under leadership of Hawdha bin Ali and that Prophet Muhammad had contacted them when he was looking for a community for protection just after his visit to Taif.¹⁶⁵ First contact between Islamic state of Medina and Yamama was late spring or early summer of 628 CE just after Peace treaty of Hudaybiah when Prophet Muhammad wrote a letter to Hawdha inviting him to Islam.¹⁶⁶ Baladhuri states that people of Yamama sent a delegate to Medina in response to the letter.¹⁶⁷ Islamic sources are thoroughly contradicting each other about details of this delegation but one thing is sure, no concrete outcome emerged from this ambassadorial exercise. Hawdha was, however, an old man and he soon died around 630 CE.¹⁶⁸ ¹⁶⁹

Musaylima bin Habib (Musaylimah bin Ḥabīb مُسَيلِمه بِن حَبِيب ) of Hanifa better known as Musaylima, the arch liar (Kazzāb) succeeded the late King of Yamama, Hawdha bin Ali and within four years he transformed Hanifa into a single religious and political agglomeration under his leadership.¹⁷⁰ ¹⁷¹ Previously, Hawdha had organized them around tribal affiliations. As we don’t hear of any Sasanian presence in Yamama during Musalyma’s tenure, we can assume that either he had asked them to leave or they had left themselves.¹⁷²

Why did Musaylima succeed Hawdha and how did he transform the region into a powerful polity is not known exactly. Caetani asserts that it was very likely that Musaylima had already achieved renown for his religious ideas during the lifetime of Hawdha and that after Hawdha’s death he had come to power, without any sort of revolution, as the most worthy and popular individual in Yamama.¹⁷³ Baladhuri confirms that Hanifa and others in Yamama followed Musaylima.¹⁷⁴ So, we can see there was formation of a state around religion, a process that appears to be very similar to state formation in Medina.

It is known that Musaylima had proclaimed prophet hood during lifetime of Hawdha. Waqidi reports him to have claimed Prophet hood at the time of Badr.¹⁷⁵ It is also known that Musaylima came to Medina along with delegation of Hanifa which they had sent in response to the letter of the Prophet to Hawdha.¹⁷⁶ According to Ibn Ishaq he did not meet the Prophet.¹⁷⁷

Very little is known about the religion Musaylima carried. Ibn Ishaq tells that he had an imitation of Qurʾan called saj’ which had rhymes like, “Allah has been gracious to the pregnant woman; He has brought forth from her a living being that can move; from her very midst.” He permitted his followers to drink wine and to fornicate and let them dispense with ritual prayer.¹⁷⁸ Baladhuri tells us that Ḥujair was muezzin of Musaylima. He used to call to prayer chanting: I testify that Musaylima claims to be the prophet of Allah.¹⁷⁹ As Musaylima has survived only through agency of Islamic sources, Askar argues that it is difficult to judge Musaylima and his mission objectively from the accounts that are hostile to him.¹⁸⁰

Bitter hostilities between Islamic state of Medina and the religious state of Yamama had erupted during the Prophetic times as soon as boundaries of both came nearer. Prophet Muhammad labeled him ‘the arch liar’ (Kazzāb).¹⁸¹ As Ibn Ishaq mentions this in the same tradition where the Prophet also used similar words for Aswad al Ansi of Yemen, we can safely assume it happened only after Musaylima came to power. Musaylima wrote a letter to Prophet Muhammad saying, “From Musaylima the apostle of Allah to Muhammad the Apostle of Allah. Peace upon you. I have been made partner with you in authority. To us belongs half the land and to Quraysh half, but the Quraysh are a hostile people.” ¹⁸² ¹⁸³ Or in other words let’s recognize each other’s authority over whatever we possess. According to Ibn Ishaq, the Prophet got so enraged to read the letter that he wished he could have beheaded the two heralds who brought the letter if they were not envoys. ¹⁸⁴ Then the Prophet replied, “The land belongs to Allah and He gives it to any of His servants He is pleased with.” ¹⁸⁵ Ibn Ishaq gives the date of this correspondence spring of 632 CE.¹⁸⁶ Musaylima had strengthened his position in Yamama by that time. He cut hands and feet of Habib bin Ziyad (Ḥabīb bin Zyād حَبِيب بِن زياد ) of Najjār clan, the Prophet’s envy to Yamama and sent him back with his fellow envoy Abdullah bin Wahb of Aslam.¹⁸⁷ This event might have taken place just before death of Prophet Muhammad.

The only person from Hanifa who accepted Islam during Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime was Thumama bin Athal (Thumāma bin Athāl ثُمامه بِن اثال ).¹⁸⁸ Askar considers him a leader of semi nomad clans of Hanifa.¹⁸⁹

As there is no clue that Musaylima opposed pre-existing religious believes nor there is any clue that he opposed those who did not believe in his Prophet hood, one can assume that he was simply eager to establish a state in Yamama independent of Medina, Iran or Hira (Ḥīrah حِيرَه ).¹⁹⁰

In the end, Hanifa got defeated at war of Yamama in spring of 633 CE and were ruled by Medinan Caliphate. According to Baladhuri’s report Abu Bakr sent Khalid bin Walid to Yamama a few months down his caliphate when he had already subdued the people of Nejd who had apostatized.¹⁹¹ After getting rid of hostile clans of Ghatafan and Asad and the like, Abu Bakr attacked Yamama with full vigor.

Khalid had three main encounters. In the first one he could capture Mujja’a bin Murara (Mujjā’ah bin Murārah مُجّاعه بِن مُراراه ) and bound him in chains.¹⁹² ¹⁹³ Then Khalid faced Banu Hanifa in the second encounter which was particularly harsh and in which a number of prominent Muslims fell. Ultimately, Banu Hanifa got defeated and their commander Rajjal bin Unfuwa (Rajjāl bin ‘Unfuwah رَجّال بِن عُنفُواه ) got killed.¹⁹⁴ ¹⁹⁵ The surviving troops of Hanifa retreated to Ḥadīqah where, in the final encounter, a lot of them lay dead including Musaylima.¹⁹⁶ ¹⁹⁷ Wahshi bin Harb (Waḥshi bin Ḥarb al Ḥabshi وَحشى بِن حَرب الحَبشى ) was the one who killed Musaylima.¹⁹⁸ ¹⁹⁹

People of Yamama negotiated through mediation of Mujja’a bin Murara the terms of truce (Ṣulḥ صُلح ) which were acceptance of Islam and payment of ṣadaqah.²⁰⁰ They were not treated as ‘people of book’. The first Muslim governor of Yamama was Samurah bin Amr of ‘Anbar clan of Tamim.²⁰¹ ²⁰²

Though defeated physically and converted to Islam socially, Hanifa could not attach with Islam emotionally for a while. They did not participate in Wars in Iraq and Syria. Some of them continued to believe in prophet hood of Musaylima though they had announced conversion to Islam. Abdullah bin Mas’ud, assistant governor of Kufa during Umar’s caliphate, executed a group of Hanifa on charges of believing in prophet hood of Musaylima. ²⁰³ ²⁰⁴ ²⁰⁵ ²⁰⁶ ²⁰⁷ ²⁰⁸

Battle of Yamama was a turning point in Ridda Wars. It was only after this victory of Medinan Caliphate that all Arabs got convinced that Muslims, under Abu Bakr, were invincible and resistance to them started dying out. Arabs got less reluctant to accept Muhammad as Prophet. Muslim army participated only in small battles afterwards in Bahrain, Oman or Yemen to establish authority of Medinan Caliphate over Arabia.

Rebellion of Bahrain

Region of Bahrain had witnessed a mini rebellion against local Muslim leaders after death of Prophet Muhammad. Abu Bakr had to dispatch Khalid bin Walid for Bahrain on request of A’la bin Hadrami (Ā‘lā bin Ḥaḍrami اَعلئ بِن حَضرَمى ) after Khalid finished the business of Yamama. ²⁰⁹ Abu Bakr had appointed A’la bin Hadrami governor over Bahrain after death of Mundhir bin Sawa (Mundhir bin Sāwah مَنذِر بِن ساوَه ).²¹⁰ A’la could not establish his authority from the very beginning.

Mundhir bin Sawa remained the staunchest supporter of Prophet Muhammad in Bahrain.²¹¹ He died after the death of Prophet Muhammad but before the rebellion of the people of Bahrain.²¹² Watt points out that almost simultaneous death of Prophet Muhammad and Mundhir bin Sawa would have given an opportunity to the pro-Sasanian party in the region to establish an independent local principality under patronage of the Sasanians.²¹³ They wished to return the kingship of Bahrain to the family of Mandhir of Hira.²¹⁴ Their candidate for kingship was Gharur bin Mundhir bin Nu’man (Gharūr bin Mundhir bin Nu’mān غُرُور بِن مَنذِر بِن نُعمان ).²¹⁵ ²¹⁶ We do not hear of any personality of Bakr bin Wai’l who converted to Islam during lifetime of Prophet Muhammad. It gives an impression that Bakr bin Wa’il remained royal party and they could organize an uprising when they got the first chance.

Bakr bin Wa’il raised banner of rebellion under their military leader Hutum bin Zubaya (Ḥuṭum bin Ḍubay’ah حُتُم بِن ضُبَيعه ).²¹⁷ Some clans of Abdul Qays ( ‘Abd al Qays عَبدُ القَيس ) joined the rebellion.²¹⁸ Majority of Abdul Qays remained loyal to Islam, along with their leader Jarud (Jāru.d جارُود ), though.²¹⁹ ²²⁰ All rebellious groups joined hands with each other to form an alliance against the Muslims.²²¹ Muslim party had both Arabs and non-Arabs in their folds.²²² After an initial fight A’la besieged himself in the fortress of Juwātha along with his troops.²²³ ²²⁴ Later, on getting a chance, A’la and his men could ambush on enemy at night killing Hutum.²²⁵ Gharur, along with the clans supporting him, retreated to Khaṭṭ.²²⁶ ²²⁷ Muslim party was still not strong enough and had to call for external help.²²⁸ A’la could march upon Gharur killing him, albeit with the help of Khalid bin Walid.²²⁹

Main rebellion of Bahrain ended in 633 CE.²³⁰ Yet, unrest and resistance in Bahrain persisted during Abu Bakr’s reign. Druing pre-Islamic times Kisra had sent Fairuz bin Jushaish (Fairūz bin Jushaish al Muka’bar فَيروز بِن جُشيش المكعبّر), an ethnic Persian, to annihilate Tamim for raiding Kisra’s caravan. He had settled in Bahrain. He fortified himself in Zārah along with his Zoroastrian supporters from town of Qaṭīf and the surroundings. They refused to pay tax. A’la could subdue them only during early years of Umar’s caliphate.²³¹ ²³² The Zoroastrian insurrection must be widespread because A’la had to conquer Sābūn, Ghābah and Dārīn one by one to suppress it.²³³ ²³⁴ This state of affairs is noted by a contemporary Armenian source of Christian belief, Sebeos, who informs us that only after the Arabs had invaded Syria and Iraq did they then penetrate with royal armies into the original borders of the territory of Ishmael.²³⁵ As Sebeos mentions this in context of later Arab invasion on Iran by sea, it is assumed that he is talking about east Arabia.²³⁶ This Zoroastrian refusal to pay tax was the first non-Muslim civil disobedience which Medinan Caliphate faced. It faced many others in later years.

A’la continued to govern over Bahrain until Umar fired him around 638 CE. Then Umar appointed Abu Hurairah of Daus tribe of Yemen as governor.²³⁷ ²³⁸

Disobedience of Oman

Oman’s situation was similar to Bahrain. Islamic State of Medina had established links there but Oman had never sent any tax to Medina. Just after the death of Prophet Muhammad, in fall of 632 CE, Azd tribe of Oman rebelled under their leader Laqit bin Malik (Laqīt bin Mālik dhu-at-Tāj لَقِيت بِن مالِك ذُوالتاج ) and gathered in Dibba.²³⁹ ²⁴⁰ The rebellion was against Julanda (Julāndah جُلاندَه ) brothers who had to take refuge in the mountains. ²⁴¹ Laqit had pre-Islamic enmity against Julanda brothers and lately he had claimed prophethood.²⁴² Abu Bakr asked a local guy by name of Hudhaifa bin Mihsan (Ḥudhaifah bin Miḥṣan حُذَيفه بِن مِحصن ) to sort the matter out.²⁴³ ²⁴⁴ Hudhaifa alone was not powerful enough to eradicate the rebellion. Abu Bakr had to send a reinforcement under his field commander, Ikrima bin Abu Jahl.²⁴⁵ Combined troops of Ikrima, Hudhaifah, Julanda brothers and many other local clans met Laqit in environs of Dabba.²⁴⁶ Laqit got killed by his own companions during the war. Muslim army won the day and sent many captives from Dabba to Abu Bakr. Thus Azds returned to Islam.²⁴⁷ As Abu Bakr did not have to send his Commander in Chief Khalid bin Walid to subdue Oman, we can assume that rebellion was not vigorous. We don’t hear about Julanda brothers anymore. Probably they were weakened enough to resign from active politics. After these skirmishes Oman remained calm.²⁴⁸ Abu Bakr could appoint his man Hudhaifah bin Mihsan as governor of Oman and he served in this position until death of Abu Bakr.²⁴⁹ ²⁵⁰

Unrest at Yemen

Matter of Aswad al Ansi’s power grab in Sana’a was still in limbo when Abu Bakr came to power. Qays bin Hubayra al-Makshuh (Qays bin Hubayrah al-Makshūh قيس بِن هُبيره المَكشُوه ) had already assassinated Aswad but its news reached capital Medina on 23^rd June, 632 CE, almost two weeks after Abu Bakr’s oath taking ceremony.²⁵¹ Death of Aswad did not necessarily clear the way for Medinan Caliphat to assimilate Yemen. Qays bin Hubayra gathered around him all fractions and troops that had supported Aswad and tried to consolidate his own power in Sana’a by expelling Abnā’ out of it.²⁵² He fanned xenophobia against Abnā’, calling them foreigners.²⁵³ Abnā’, Ḥimyār and some other Arab clans who did not support Qays had to look forwards to Abu Bakr for their protection. Situation of Medinan Caliphate was fragile at this time due to disobedience of tribes in Hejaz and Nejd. Abu Bakr wasn’t in any position to send an army. He used local loyal groups to form an alliance against Qays.²⁵⁴ In the long last, Abu Bakr’s appointed governor, Muhajir bin Umayah could arrest Qays after entering Sana’a. Muhajir sent Qays to Medina where he was tried for murder of Dadhawaih (Dādhawaih داذَوِيَه ), the leader of Abnā’.²⁵⁵ ²⁵⁶ ²⁵⁷ The affair of Yemen might have taken a few months to resolve.²⁵⁸

By the time Khalid finished his job in Bahrain, Yemen was ready to provide recruits for war in Iraq, and later Syria.

Ḥaḍaramaut was sandwiched between Yemen and Oman. It manifested rebellious tendencies too. Cases of two tribes are well known. One is Kindah and the other is Mehara.

Beginning of rebellion of Kindah has already been discussed. Baladhuri reports on authority of ‘Abd ar Razzāq that after assuming office, Abu Bakr wrote to both Ziyad bin Labid, Prophet’s zakat collector in Ḥaḍaramaut and Muhajir bin Umayah, Prophets zakat collector in Sana’a, ordering them to work hand in hand in order to secure for him the caliphate and to fight against him who refrains from paying ṣadaqah and that they should get the help of the Beleivers against Unbelievers and of the obedient against the disobedient and transgressors.”²⁵⁹ From this statement of Baladhuri it is apparent that Ziyad and Muhajir had to canvass for the appointment of Abu Bakr, had to reinforce his authority as caliph and had to get help from local Muslims if there was any resistance.

After the dispute started on assessment of ṣadaqah, Kindah tribe raised banner of rebellion under its leader Ash’ath bin Qays. Ziyad party ambushed Ash’ath party at night killing four brothers and a sister of the same family. In retaliation Ash’ath bin Qays inflicted heavy losses on Ziyad party. Ziyad got compelled to write to Abu Bakr for reinforcement. Abu Bakr instructed Muhajir bin abu Ummayah to help.²⁶⁰ ²⁶¹ After a brief encounter in field Ash’ath and his men besieged themselves in the fort of Nujair. Ultimately, when the besieged could no longer hold, Ash’ath surrendered on condition that all his companions would be guaranteed of safety and only he himself would be arrested. After his arrest Ziyad sent him to Medina.²⁶² ²⁶³ He was therefore brought to Abu Bakr who pardoned him and gave his sister to him in marriage.²⁶⁴ ²⁶⁵ ²⁶⁶

Matter of Maharah was the most painless. Some tribes in their neighborhood had gathered at Shiḥr after apostatizing. Ikrima bin Abu Jahl, on his way to Yemen from Oman, overpowered them, killed many of them and got booty from them. Actually, Maharah needed only threat to pay ṣadaqah after other tribes got defeated at Shiḥr.²⁶⁷ ²⁶⁸

Another tussle we hear about is from Khaulān tribe. Abu Bakr directed Ya’la bin Munya (Ya’lā bin Munyah يعلئ بِن منيه ) against Khaulān and they yielded and agreed to pay ṣadaqah after a brief fight.²⁶⁹²⁷⁰ ²⁷¹

When pockets of resistance got eliminated in Yemen and Ḥaḍaramaut, Abu Bakr divided its administration among four men. He assigned the land between Najran and Hejaz to Abu Sufyan. He appointed Muhajir governor of Sana’a. He gave to Ziyad what he already held (Ḥaḍaramaut). He assigned some parts of southern Yemen to Ya’la.²⁷² Since that day Yemen became a permanent part of Islamic civilization. Yemen had a proud tradition of one millennium old civilization at the time Islam reached there. Very little of its long traditions of literature and history became a part of the Islamic worldview beyond the haziest of recollections.²⁷³

Though Yemen was a major supplier of troops to the Arab armies during Futuhul Buldan, Yemenis contributed very little to higher echelon of Medinan Caliphate. Only two men from Yemen stepped into Medinan Caliphate’s top level state apparatus. They were Abu Huraira and Abu Musa Ash’ari – both Prophet’s companions. (Abū Mūsā al-Ash’ari اَبُو موُسئ الاشعَرى )

Tackling of Dumat al jandal

Baladhuri reports that Ukaider bin Abdul Malik (Ukaider bin ‘Abd al Malik اُكيدَ ر بِن عَبدُ المَلِك ), ruler of Dumat al Jandal violated his contract with the Prophet after his death and stopped payments. Later, he had to abandon his place and property and went to Hira where he built a palace. His brother Huraith bin Abdul Malik (Ḥuraith bin ‘Abd ul Malik عَبدُ المَلِك حُريس بِن ) embraced Islam and took possession of his property.²⁷⁴ Baladhuri doesn’t give the reasons why did Ukaider abandon his property.

Abu Bakar later sent Khalid bin Walid from ‘Ain at Tamr in Iraq to kill Udaiker before Kahlid left for Syria.²⁷⁵ This report of Baladhuri gives an impression that Udaiker was still in Hira at the time of his murder.

Attitude of northern tribes

Arab tribes of north were under influence of Christianity. We overhear a few battles between Khalid bin Walid and some tribes of north. Khalid fought against Taghlib bin Wa’il at places of Muḍaiyaḥ and Ḥuṣaid. Their leader was Rabi’ah bin Bujair. Khalid put them to flight and took captives and booty from them. Khalid sent captives to Medina.²⁷⁶ In another encounter Khalid killed Hurqus bin Nu’man (Ḥurqūṣ bin Nu’mān حُرقُوص بِن نُعمان ) of Quḍā’ah clan of Bahra tribe.²⁷⁷

Baladhuri notes these events after subjugation of Hira and when Khalid was on his way to Syriā²⁷⁸ Doner doubts the timings and believes that Khalid cannot be proved to have enough time to fight on his way during his journey. Doner proposes that Baladhuri confuses these events with earlier ones.²⁷⁹ Whatever the timings of these events, the events are non-significant and it appears that the armies of Medinan Caliphate did not clash with northern tribes on a large scale. Tabari reports that Bahrā’, Kalb, Salīḥ, Tanūkh, Lakhm, Judhām, Balqayn, Bali, ‘Amilia and Ghassan (Ghassān غَسّان ) were all under Byzantine Roman’s influence at the time of invasion of Syria by Medinan Caliphate. Romans mobilized them to fight against Medinan Caliphate. They accepted Islam later when attack on Syrian was underway.²⁸⁰

Invasion on Iraq

The area of modern Iraq west to River Euphrates is geographically part of Arabian Peninsula and is called ‘Irāq by Islamic sources. It is a stony plain interspersed with rare sandy stretches. With rain as little as fifteen millimetres in a year, it is mostly arid. It gets extremely hot and dry during summer. The little rain that the area receives comes in winter and spring, helping growth of vegetation and converting the land into steppes rather than pure desert – ideal for grazers. The land nearer to the west bank of river Euphrates, though geographically contiguous with the rest, had availability of water from the river. It had been being cultivated for mellinea.²⁸¹

In pre-Islamic times main residents of Iraq were Arab tribes both sedentary and nomads. Persian presence was prominent in the towns of this region as it had been being governed indirectly by them through their Lakhmid allies for centuries. All Arabs of this region were Nestorian Christians.²⁸²

Unlike Syria, Iraq was a region that had not particularly attracted the attention of Islamic state of Medina created by Prophet Muhammad. There is no evidence to suggest that Prophet Muhammad or the early Muslims had any special ambitions in Iraq, whether rooted in religious tradition or in commercial interest, comparable to their aspirations in Syria.²⁸³ Abu Bakr’s decision to interfere into Iraqi politics by sending forces under Khalid bin Walid, sprang from his desire to complete the process of state consolidation over the tribes of Arabia that had been undertaken during the Ridda Wars, rather than from some specific commercial, religious, or even military interest in Iraq itself.²⁸⁴ The invasion was against Arab tribes. Clashes between Medinan Caliphate’s army and the Iranian border guards, the first of their nature between the two armies, were byproduct of the invasion.²⁸⁵ Baladhuri gives a clear impression that invasion on Iraq was part of Ridda Wars, not part of invasion on Sasanian Iran.²⁸⁶ Shoufani agrees with him. ²⁸⁷ ²⁸⁸

Baladhuri reports that Muthanna bin Haritha (Muthanna bin Ḥārithah مُثَنّئ بِى حارِثه ) of Shayban (Shaybān شعبان ) tribe used to lead insurrections with some of his men against Swad (Sawād سواد ), the region of modern Iraq between Euphrates and Tigris in their lower reaches. Having heard of it, Abu Bakr made inquiries regarding him and learned that this man was of reputation, known origin and with good support. Then Muthanna presented himself before Abu Bakr and said to him, “Caliph of the Prophet of Allah, make me your lieutenant over those of my people who have accepted Islam that I may fight against those foreigners, the Persians”. Abu Bakr wrote him a covenant to the fact. Muthanna went to Khaffān and invited his people to Islam.²⁸⁹ So allure was from both sides.

According to Baladhuri Abu Bakr ordered Khalid to go to Iraq. He also wrote to Muthanna to receive him and obey his orders.²⁹⁰ Muthanna was far needier for Medinan Caliphate’s support then Medinan Caliphate was for his. The combined forces were to be led by Abu Bakr’s general. Previously, Madh’ur bin Adi (Madh’ūr bin ‘Adi مَدهُور بِن عَدى ) of Ijl tribe had written to Abu Bakr presenting his case and the case of his people, asking to be put in charge of the campaign against the Persians. Abu Bakr ordered him to join Khalid and obey him.²⁹¹ Muthanna met Khalid on his arrival at Nibāj.²⁹² ²⁹³ Thence the combined forces of Khalid and Muthanna proceeded to Ubullah.²⁹⁴ ²⁹⁵ Suwaid bin Qutba (Suwaid bin Quṭbah adh-Dhunhli سُويد بِن قطبَه الذُنهلى ) of Bakr bin Wa’il had same designs regarding Ubullah as Muthanna had for Hira.²⁹⁶ He joined the Arab army with a band of his followers.²⁹⁷

The army that appeared on Iraq, hence, consisted of remnants of Khalid’s force from Yamama, mainly Quraysh, Ansar and Thaqif.²⁹⁸ Some of Hawazin, Asad, Tamim, and Bajila of Yemen were in his company as well.²⁹⁹ Ijl, Shayban and Bakr bin Wa’il reinforced them.³⁰⁰ Abdul Qays of Bahrain did not join them. Seemingly they were content with governorship of Bahrain. Nor any of the tribes of other regions newly assimilated in Medinan Caliphate, like Oman or Yamama joined the army. Basically it was a military alliance of north-western tribes with core tribes of Medinan Caliphate resident around Mecca and Medina with some support from Yemen. Scholars doubt if all participants of the army were Muslims. We know northern tribes were Christians and, for example, no explicit record of conversion of Suwaid bin Qutba and Madh’ur bin Adi to Islam is present in sources. Donner calculates the strength of original force of Khalid to be about one thousand. After Iraqi tribes joined them, they could have increased to around two thousand.³⁰¹

Date of Khalid’s debut in Iraq cannot be precisely calculated. We are told that Khalid left for Iraq from Bahrain and he had already sent his first booty from Iraqi campaign to Abu Bakr in Medina before the caliph wrote to the people of Mecca, Taif and the Yemen asking them to join an expedition against Syria.³⁰² As the armies left Medina for Syria in the middle of autumn of 633 CE, we can assume Khalid was already in Iraq by this time. Then tentative date of his departure for Iraq can be later spring to early summer of 633 CE.³⁰³

First encounter took place at Ubullah. The battle was significant. Many of Ubullah residents got killed, a lot of them drowned in Dijlat al-Baṣrah. After subduing small towns in vicinity of Ubullah like Khuraibah, Mar’ah and Madhār, Khalid occupied the whole district and presented it to Suwaid bin Qutba to rule over it saying “We have crushed the Persians in thy district in a way that will humiliate them before thee.”³⁰⁴ ³⁰⁵ ³⁰⁶

From there Khalid left for Hira. After reducing small towns on the way, like Zandaward, Durna and Hurmuzjarad Khalid reached Ullais.³⁰⁷ ³⁰⁸ Here the Muslim Arab army encountered Iranian border guards for the first time. It was their captain Jaban (Jābān جابان ) who got defeated by Muthanna. ³⁰⁹ All clashes with Iranian troops at this juncture of Arab history appear to be with border guards because sources don’t report use of elephant from Sasanian side in these battles, which was essential piece of arsenal of Sasanian Iranian armed forces. By this time Sasanian Iran had plunged into civil war after murder of Khosrau II Parvez in 628 CE. His son, Qubad II (Qubād قُباد) was in power and fractioning nobles used to control his policies.³¹⁰ Nobody would have thought of raising huge army to fight against two thousand horsemen of Khalid who had not crossed into Iranian borders. Before army of Medinan Caliphate could take control of Ullais, it had another encounter with Iranian border guards at the border post of Mujtama’ al Anhār. Captain of Iranians, Azādhbih got defeated.³¹¹ ³¹²

After a brief sojourn at Khaffān Khalid reached Hira.³¹³ ³¹⁴ Initially, on hearing appearance of an army, people of Hirah fortified themselves in the three fortresses they had got. But the maximum they needed to surrender was a show of power. Muslims went around them on horseback in open spaces among their buildings.³¹⁵ They quickly sent their three dignitaries to meet Khalid. They were Abdul Masih bin Amr (‘Abd al Mashīḥ Bin Amr عَبدُ المَسيح بِن عمرؤ) of Azd tribe, Hani bin Qabisa (Hāni bin Qabiṣah هانى بِن قَبيصَه ) of Shayban tribe, and Iyas bin Qabisa (Iyās bin Qabiṣah اِياس بِن قَبيصه ) of Tayy tribe. This Iyas was representative of Khosrau II Parvez over Hira after Nu’man bin Mundhir (Nu’mān bin Mundhir نُعمان بِن مَنذِ ر ). The three men made terms with Khalid stipulating that the people of Hira would pay hundred thousand Dirhams per year, and that they would act as spies for Medinan Caliphate against Iranians and that Khalid won’t destroy any of their churches and citadels.³¹⁶ ³¹⁷ They also agreed not to speak evil of Muslims.³¹⁸ The money so generated was the first to be sent to Medina from Iraq.³¹⁹ Muslim Arabs took control of Hira in 633 CE.³²⁰

After surrender of Hira Muslim army bumped into two different border guards. One were Iranians in Bāniqiya whose captain Farrukhbanda (Farrukhbaundāth فَرّخ بَنده) got killed in the encounter and his troops fled.³²¹ ³²² Then Muslims capitulated Bāniqiya without a fight.³²³ The other were Byzantine Romans in Falālij. Both, Muslims and Romans avoided encounter.³²⁴ ³²⁵ Kaegi suggests that they could be Roman soldiers whom Heraclius had deliberately not withdrew after Roman Byzantine treaty of 628 CE.³²⁶ Or this could be a sortie sent by Romans. After sorting out administrative hitches in Hira, Khalid proceeded to Anbār whose people fortified themselves. Muslims then invested the inhabitants of Anbār and set up some fires in the environs to threaten them. The inhabitants of Anbār made terms with Khalid that satisfied him and he left them in their homes.³²⁷ ³²⁸

Then Khalid advanced to ‘Ayn at Tamr and invested in its fort where a big frontier guard of Persians was stationed. The guard initially fought then they confined themselves to the fort. Khalid besieged them until they sued for peace. Khalid refused to promise them security. He reduced the fort by force, slaughtering and carrying away captives.³²⁹ ³³⁰ ³³¹ Here Hilal bin Aqqa (Hilāl bin ‘Aqqah هِلال بِن عَقّه ) was head of tribe of Namir bin Qāsiṭ in the vicinity of ‘Ayn at Tamr. He gathered an army at ‘Ayn at Tamr and fought against Khalid. He got defeated, killed and crucified.³³²

Settled clans of Taghlib used to live near ‘Ayn at Tamr. Khalid gave them a surprise raid, killing many and enslaving others. He did the same thing to settled clans of Rabi’ah in the district of ‘Ayn at Tamr.³³³ Then Khalid sent small parties to Tikrīt, ‘Ukbarā’ , Baradān, and Mukharrim, up to the bridge near Qaṣr Sābūr.³³⁴ ³³⁵ They all appear to be merely scout parties.

As we look at the account of conquest of Iraq, given by Baladhuri, we can easily see some salient features. First, Arabs of Iraq had no contact with Medinan Caliphate beforehand as we don’t find any Muslim group there awaiting to co-operate with invaders as was in other parts of Arabia. The first reaction of the residents towards the invasion was that of fear, not of joy. No city welcomed the Muslim army with garlands in hands. Some resisted, others initially closed the doors. Second, soft resistance from Arab residents of Iraq points out lack of any effective leadership on their part. Byzantine Romans had withdrawn from the region and Iranians had still not re-occupied it completely. Individual cities and towns of the land had to defend themselves on their own. Four main towns of the region, namely Ullais, Hira, Bāniqiya and Anbār surrendered absolutely without any fight. Those who decided to resist, like Ubullah and ‘Ayn at Tamr, could not give a tough time to the invaders. Casualty on Muslim side in these battles was limited to one or two each. Casualties on opponent side were not numerous either. The only time when opponents got killed in large numbers was campaign of Ubullah. The other times they got killed were the encounters with Iranian border guards. Third, decades of lawlessness and war had damaged the regional economy. It is evident from the fact that Muslims found castles of Mundhir in Hira in ruins. They used their material to build the Grand Mosque of Kufa.³³⁶ Fourth, the conditions of surrender were not uniform for each town. Hurmuzjarad surrendered with promise of security.³³⁷ Ullais surrendered stipulating that they act as spies, guides and helpers of Muslims against Persians.³³⁸ The leader of Bāniqiya, Busbuhra bin Ṣalūba, refused to fight and made terms on hundred thousand Dirhams and one mantle.³³⁹ ³⁴⁰ Baradān and Mukharrim both reduced at promise of security and that they would offer food to Muslims and their animals.³⁴¹ It appears that Khalid, as general on the ground, had freedom to take decisions independently on day to day matters. For example, he refused to do truce with Iranian border guards at ‘Ain at Tamar. But he had to take approval on important decisions from Abu Bakr. For example, he wrote to Abu Bakr for approval of the terms of surrender of Hira and ‘Ain at Tamr.³⁴² Apparently terms of surrender were not pre-determined by this phase of conquests and had to be negotiated on individual case basis. Fifth, Medinan Caliphate had in mind by that time to use Iraq as a springboard to attack Sasanian Iran in case they decide to do so. Condition of surrender of many towns was that its inhabitants will act as spy against Iranians. Mainly, the purpose of whole campaign was to subjugate Arab tribes. Only three towns, Ulais, Hira, and Bāniqiya, entered into any kind of permanent contract (Ṣulḥ) with Medinan Caliphate. ³⁴³

Army of Medinan Caliphate did enslave people. Khalid, took all inhabitants of Khuraibah into captivity, according to Baladhuri.³⁴⁴ When Baladhuri says ‘all,’ naturally, it means all, men, women and children. We don’t know what criteria they used to decide who should be enslaved.

Looting did take place during the raids. Khalid came to know about Sūk Baghdādh [market of Baghdādh] on his way to Anbār. Khalid sent Muthanna, who raided the market and Muslims filled their hands with gold, silver and commodities light to carry. They spent the night in Sailaḥīn and the next day joined Khalid in Anbār.³⁴⁵ ³⁴⁶ Similarly, somebody pointed out to Khalid that there was a market to the north of Anbār in which the people of Kalb, Bakr bin Wa’il and others from Quda’a used to meet. Khalid dispatched Muthanna, who raided it and carried as booty whatever he found. Muthanna slaughtered people and took captives in the process.³⁴⁷

Not a single soul in Iraq converted to Islam as a result of invasion. The whole population kept their religion, which was Nestorian Christianity. As a matter of fact, if we look at the account given by Baladhuri closely, Islam was not even offered to anybody. A provision to convert to Islam to save property, life, family, career or future tax burden was not included in any of the truce agreements signed. Medinan Caliphate wanted its soldiers to get rich from this war so more people could be allured in the business of war.

When Khalid received instructions of Abu Bakr to march towards Syria, in early summer of 634 CE, he left Muthana bin Haritha incharge of Hira.³⁴⁸

Aftermath of Ridda Wars

‘Ayn at Tamar was the last town to surrender in Iraq. It’s surrender symbolized the end of the Ridda Wars. Ridda Wars produced two very significant results.

For the first time in the history of Arabia the whole land united under one state. Arabs achieved sovereignty. The neighboring countries no longer had to take pains of telling the Arabs how to run their country.

Arab polytheism came to an end. All polytheists either died or converted to Islam. Medinan Caliphate didn’t give them option to pay Jizyah. As polytheists were the largest religious group in pre-Islamic Arabia, we may assume that Islam became the religion of majority in Arabia.

Nobody took personal credit of victories in Ridda Wars. Victory was attributed to Allah. Abu Bakr emerged undisputed political leader of Medinan Caliphate. Dissident Muhajirun got convinced that Allah was pleased with Abu Bakr.

Historians have a habit of dividing history into eras. They generally consider end of polytheism in Arabia as end of late antiquity and beginning of medieval ages in the Middle East.³⁴⁹

Improvement in law and order situation

While pushing the borders of Medinan Caliphate outwards, Abu Bakr didn’t neglect the domestic issues. Crummy condition of law and order in Arabia was a basic menace of nomadic zone during pre-Islamic times. One of the early achievements of Abu Bakr was improvement of law and order. He tackled the criminals harshly. Once he punished Iyas bin Abdullah (Iyās bin ‘Abdullah bin Fujā’a اِياس بِن عَبدُ اللّه بِن فُجاعَه) of Sulaym for highway robbery by burning him to death.³⁵⁰ ³⁵¹ It might be this time about which Adi bin Hatim (‘Adi bin Ḥaṭim عَدى بِن حاتِم ) said, “a woman could travel safely from Syria to Mecca.” ³⁵²

Treasury separates from the personal property of the ruler

Abu Bakr made himself busy in financial reforms in the country from day one of his tenure. We know Prophet Muhammad had many sources of income but he did not build his personal house. Neither had he left any cash behind for his heirs. It means he had budgeted a capped amount from his income for use of his wives, which was enough for day to day expenses but not enough for saving. He spent all the remaining income on state affairs. The State exchequer was, anyhow, not officially separate from personal portfolio of the ruler, though the ruler spent money from the state exchequer judiciously. Abu Bakr took steps to clearly demark state exchequer from personal estate of the ruler. He used to draw a fixed salary of three Dirhams per day from state exchequer.³⁵³ (Approximately eleven hundred Dirhams per annum). He, furthermore, did not touch the one fifth of booty that used to pour in Medina periodically.³⁵⁴ He distributed each penny of it equally among the population of Medina including black and red, free and slaves.³⁵⁵

Conquests at a larger scale (Futuhul Buldan فُتوح البُلدان )

Invasion on Iraq was still unaccomplished when Abu Bakr started raising army for another invasion. These invasions, which were temporarily halted by First Arab Civil War, resulted in almost half of Byzantine Rome and all of Sassanian Iran being occupied by Medinan Caliphate. The events of ‘conquests at a larger scale’ started in 634 CE and almost completed by 654 CE.³⁵⁶

Humans have been awe stricken with the magnitude of Arab conquests. Such colossal victories in such a short period had been attained only once in human history before this. That was about one Mellinium ago by Alexander, the king of Macedonia.³⁵⁷ ³⁵⁸ In Sebeos’ words, “the armies of the Ishmaelites unexpectedly moved forth and, in a moment’s time, overthrowing the might of both kings seized from Egypt to this side of the great Euphrates river and to the border of the Armenians, from the shores of the great sea in the West to the court of the Iranian Kingdom, all the cities of Mesopotamia of the Syrians, and Ctesiphon, Veh Artashir, Marand, Hamatan as far as the city of Gandzak, and the great Hart which is located in the district of Atrapatakan.”³⁵⁹

Before we proceed to survey of the invasions and the wars that ensued let’s look at some basic questions around the invasions.

Who were the invaders?

Generally speaking the invaders were Arabic speaking tribes, at least in the beginning of the conquests. Military cadre predominantly consisted of Bedouins but top brass came from sedentary Quraysh.³⁶⁰ We are not sure if all of them were Muslims. Yet, they were predominantly Muslims.

Those people of Arabia who kept their religion and paid Jizyah were exempted from military services, for example, people of Najran.³⁶¹ It is unlikely that non-Muslim Arabs might have participated in the risky business of war in their hordes because they did not face any social pressure to do that.

Still, some non-Muslims participated in the conquests from Muslim side. As Islamic state of Medina during Prophetic times, and later Medinan Caliphate during Ridda Wars, did not tolerate survival of polytheists, they were non-existent by end of 633 CE. Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians managed to survive. Jews became much less important by this time and Christians much more so.³⁶² Out of the three surviving religious groups in Arabia, only Christians participated in conquests. It is evident from Tabari’s description where he shows Namir and Taghlib fighting from Muslim side while they were Christians.³⁶³

Tabari also documents people of Daylām participating in battle of Qadisiyyah from Muslim side without converting to Islam.³⁶⁴ ³⁶⁵ Hoyland argues that all conquering forces throughout history have welcomed extra manpower from any quarter.³⁶⁶ Why would Muslim Arab army have declined such help?

Why did they invade?

Modern historians are divided on political lines about the reasons of conquests. On one extreme is a view that the sole reason of invasion on neighbouring countries was to spread and establish Islam. On the other extreme is another view that Arab tribes did it solely to enrich themselves at the expense of conquered people.³⁶⁷ Arguing in favour of ‘Islam the only motivation’ Donner remarks: ‘It is my conviction that Islam began as a religious movement – not as a social, economic or ‘national’ one.’³⁶⁸ Hoyland differs saying: ‘Yet even a cursory study of religious movements practicing violence, whether Christian (e.g. the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda) or Muslim (al-Qa’ida, etc.) or Buddhist (Burma’s 969 group), makes it clear that one cannot separate religion from socioeconomic issues and identity in such movements. If there were nothing material at stake, one would not need to fight.³⁶⁹

History of Wars is a messy affair. The composition of the opposing sides and reasons for which they are fighting are often diverse and shifting. However, those who wage the Wars and those who document them have a strong interest in portraying the situation as black and white; believers against infidels, good against evil, justice and freedom against tyranny and oppression. ³⁷⁰ Impartial analysis of the surviving accounts of any war points out more than one reasons behind it.

Arab ‘conquests at a larger scale’, referred to as Futuhul Buldan (Futūh al Buldān فُتوح البُلدان ) by Islamic sources, might have multiple causes, all working simultaneously. Easy availability of plunder due to the weakness of the Byzantine Roman and Sasasanid Iranian empires and economic/environmental impoverishment in Arabia were definitely factors.³⁷¹ But the factor that Arabs had gathered around concepts of ummah and jihad ( Jihād جِهاد ) for the sake of ummah cannot be neglected.³⁷² ³⁷³

In face of equivocal results of the debate on the issue, let’s take Baladhuri’s statement on face value: “Abu Bakr invited people of Mecca, Taif, whole of Hejaz and Nejd and Yemen to Jihad arousing their desire in it and in obtaining booty from the Greeks [Byzantine Rome]. Accordingly, people, including those actuated by greed as well as those actuated by the hope of divine remuneration, hastened to Abu Bakr from all quarters, and flocked in Medina.” ³⁷⁴

By the way, fighting for booty alone was not a taboo among Muslims even during Prophetic times. Waqidi shows the Prophet arguing “Abu Wahb, when you come out with us for this battle, perhaps you must bring back Byzantine girls with you” when trying to convince a reluctant follower to participate in Battle of Tabuk, who was apparently not impressed by appeal of Jihad.³⁷⁵

Two points are worth noting here. One, whatever the root cause of Futuhul Buldan, official position of Medinan Caliphate leadership was, anyhow, spread of Islam – export of their revolution. When the two armies encamped opposite each other before Battle of Qadisiyyah and started a round of last ditch peace deal negotiations, Umar bin Khattab, then caliph of Medinan Caliphate, insisted on Sa’d bin Waqqas, the general of Medinan Caliphate, to send a delegate to the Kisra to invite him to Islam, before Muslims kickoff the war.³⁷⁶ Here, we can note that the Islamic delegation presented Islam to Kisra in a fashion that they were securing a ‘no’ answer. First, they built up military on his border before sending the delegation, so he should take invitation to Islam as a threat. Second, the deputation was discourteous to him so he shouldn’t have any option but to decline it.³⁷⁷ Medinan Caliphate had made up its mind to conquer his realm but only after documenting that a notice to convert to Islam was duly served and it was he who rejected the offer.³⁷⁸ ³⁷⁹

Use of religion to justify a war was a norm in the Middle East of seventh century CE. In an official victory bulletin from the field, after defeat of Sasanian Iran in 628 CE, Heraclius claimed that his victory was a certain proof of the truth of Christianity.³⁸⁰ ‘Spread of Islam’ as official reason of Medinan Caliphate for Futuhul Buldan is not surprizing.

Two, war is the most gruesome social invention of humans. It obviously ruins the defeated but ostensibly inflicts on victor as well. Those who have a potential to die in a war can’t buy promise of being rich as an exclusive rationale to participate in it. From the war of Hamoukar, that was fought in Jareerah area of modern northwest Syria around 3500 BC to the war on ISIS, fought in this century, we fail to find a single example where soldiers were fighting solely for the sake of money.³⁸¹ A soldier needs a passion to console himself in the face of death. It can be tribal honour, nationalism, sense of duty or anything above and beyond money. In case of Futuhul Buldan dominant passion among Muslim soldiers was religion. Look at the way Sa’d bin Waqqas encouraged his soldiers before Qadisiyyah. He addressed them with an aim to increase a desire of Jihad in them and told them of what Allah promised His Messenger by way of victory and making the religion triumphant. (iẓhār al-dīn).³⁸² At the same time, no army from the war of Hamoukar to the war against ISIS, has ever fought without remuneration. In case of forces of Medinan Caliphate, the state did not have any money to pay them. They were promised booty as their remuneration.

Medinan Caliphate conquers Syria

Whole chunk of land to the northwest of Arabian Peninsula, extending eastwards from the Mediterranean to the River Euphrates in the north and Iraqi steppe in the south is generally called Syria (Shām شام ) by early Arabic sources. It was also sometimes referred to as Levant.³⁸³ Syria of Arabic sources accommodates modern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Israel.³⁸⁴ Just like now, this region was not a single political entity in pre-Islamic times. Byzantine Rome had created administrative provinces of Palestina III, Palestina I, Palestina II, Arabia, Phoenice Paralia and Phoenice Libanensis out of it.³⁸⁵ Islamic sources divide the region into Palestine, Jordan, Ḥawrān and Syria.³⁸⁶

Topography and people

Syria is a geographic extension of Arabia. The topographical configurations that characterize the Arabian peninsula – that great slab of limestone, lifted up at its western and southern edges to form the stoop coastal ranges of the Hejaz and Yemen, and sloping gradually down toward sea level at the Persian Gulf – are repeated in Syria’s parallel ranges of mountains running along the Mediterranean coast, and in the flatter expanses of the Syrian steppe, sloping gradually downward toward Iraq. Within this basic topographical pattern there is, of course, considerable local variation. The Mediterranean coastal range, which rears up along the central Syrian Littoral to form the towering barrier of Mount Lebanon, is much lower along the northern coast of Syria in the Jabal Ansariyya area and becomes little more than a set of rolling hills in Palestine. In general, however, the mountain folds become lower and less dramatic as one moves inland from the Mediterranean coast, across the Lebanon range, the Anti-Lebanon, the Jabal al-Ruwāq, and so on, until the ridges finally give way to form the essentially level Syrian Steppe. The main exception to this pattern, the massive pyramid known as Mount Hermon that rises out of the southern end of the Anti-Lebanon, does not alter the general picture.³⁸⁷

Though Syria’s topography is a continuation of that of Arabia, however, its landscapes are tempered and made more gentle than Arabia’s by their more northerly location and, particularly, by the proximity of the Mediterranean Sea, whose moist breeze leave rain in quantities unknown to the Arabian Peninsula itself. This gift of moisture is not bestowed equally on all parts of Syria, of course. As the prevailing westerly winds carry the moisture-laden clouds eastward, over the successive chains of mountains and hills, the water is increasingly coaxed out of them, so that by the time they reach the central Syrian steppe there is relatively little moisture left. Thus the coastal ranges receive several months of heavy rainfall, mainly during the winter and spring, whereas the central steppe is favored only with a few centimeters during the course of the year and begins to display, during the driest summer months, the truly desert conditions found farther south in Arabia proper. In areas where rainfall is sufficient, however, it has permitted the cultivation of crops by dry-farming, something virtually unknown in northern and central Arabia (though practiced in limited measure in the Yemen). The green hills of Palestine, the tangled thickets and dense, wooded ravines of Lebanon, the fertile open basins of the Litani, Orontes, and Jordan rivers, carrying the runoff of mountain springs and seasonal rain and snow, all give Syria a general aspect of verdure and moisture unknown to Arabia. It is little wonder that Arabians viewed Syria as a kind of paradise on earth, a land of prosperity and plenty and of blessed relief from the heat and aridity of the peninsula.³⁸⁸ Alexander of Macedonia had introduced Hellenistic culture in Syria. Syria remained dominated by it for more than a millennium under Roman and Byzantine rule.³⁸⁹ This assertion holds particularly true for the towns and cities that ranged up and down the coast and in the fertile, rain-fed districts a short distance inland. These towns, which drew their economic support from the high productivity of Syria’s valleys and cultivated hillsides, received cultural sustenance from a steady flow of intellectual currents and stylistic tastes that pulsated from the West together with more mundane articles of commerce along the arteries of international maritime trade. These urban centers were not only major Syrian cities; they were also great centers of Greco-Roman civilization.³⁹⁰

The Hellenistic impact on Syria was, however, always a bit superficial. It could not make roots to great masses of Syria. Syrians never embraced the Greek tongue to the extent that some other groups – the diverse people of Asia Minor, for example – certainly had. With the exception of city elite, settled Syrians in 600 CE still spoke some form of Aramaic, the language of Jesus and of Palestinian Temlud; and one dialect of this language, Syriac, had become by this time the medium of an extensive and growing Christian literature. ³⁹¹

Third important element of population in Syria was nomads and semi nomad pastoralists. They were the least affected by Hellenism and used to speak Arabic. Culturally they were more akin to the nomadic population of northern Arabia than with the settled communities of Syria. Rigors of life left little room for them to adopt elements of high culture that we call Hellenism (like literature and art).³⁹²

Christianity was almost universally adopted in Syria. Majority of Syrian population, who spoke Aramaic, believed in Monophysite Christianity and so did the Arabic speaking nomads and semi-nomads. Chalcedonian church (Byzantine) was essentially restricted to the Greek-speaking urban elite.³⁹³

A significant element of population in Syria was Jews. They stuck to their Hebrew language. A subgroup of Jews, Samaritans were particularly noticeable. They themselves were divided into two group – Dustān (Dositheans) and Kūshān.³⁹⁴

Presence of Iranians in pre-Islamic Syria has been attested by sources. The inscription of Kartir confirms Zoroastrians’ presence in Antakya and Qayṣariyah in Syria, Tarsus in Cilicia, and in Cappadocia to Balatia and in Armenia, Georgia and Albania and from Balaskan to Alans’ pass.³⁹⁵ Baladhuri verifies presence of significant Iranian population in Roman town of Sinjār.³⁹⁶ Most probably they spoke Pahlavi and retained their Zoroastrian religion.³⁹⁷

Different population groups were not uniformly scattered all over. Syrian steppe was totally dominated by Arabic speaking nomads.³⁹⁸ Greek speaking Chalcedonians were concentrated in towns. Hebrew speaking Monophysites formed major part of populations in towns and settled rural areas.³⁹⁹ Jews diffused all over. Iranians were limited to few towns only.⁴⁰⁰⁴⁰¹

We don’t know exact proportion of each population group. It is guessed that nomads were nearly as ubiquitous (if not as numerous) in many inland districts of Syria as they were in Arabian Peninsula itself.⁴⁰² Arabs formed the principal part of the local population.⁴⁰³ Their presence is verified by sources in as far off cities as Sinjār and Baalbek.⁴⁰⁴ Greek speaking Chalcidonians appear to be medium sized group of population. Probably their numerical strength increased from south to north, away from border of Arabian Peninsula towards border of Anatolia. Jews were definitely a minor group. Iranians were insignificant.⁴⁰⁵

Many nomadic and semi nomadic groups living in Byzantine provinces of Palaestina II, Palaestina III, Arabia, Pheonicia ad Libanum and perhaps northern Syria were under Ghassans.⁴⁰⁶ ⁴⁰⁷

Prewar political situation

By summer of 629 CE the last Sasanian soldier had left Syria in the wake of Heraculis Shahrbaraz treaty of Arabissos.⁴⁰⁸ The Romans had got only five years to reassert their authority on the region. And their difficulties were plenty.

First and foremost, Byzantine Rome was strained by austerity measures. They had difficulty paying army. Evidently, when a group of Arabs duty-bound to defend the desert passages from Arabia into Syria, demanded their subsidies, the paymaster answered, “The emperor pays his soldiers with difficulty; with how much more to such dogs as you!” ⁴⁰⁹ Second, the population of Syria was politically divided. They used religion as proxy to political differences. Being a theocracy, the Byzantine state was bent upon imposing its state religion – Chalcadonian Christianity – on other religious groups. It could be a part of Heraclius’s strategy to reassert government writ on these areas. Jews were particularly under pressure. The Jews had openly joined hands with Iranians during the Sasanid Iranian attack of Last War of Antiquity. Sebeos notes that they had a zeal to make their own homeland.⁴¹⁰ Theophylact Simocatta, Heraclian court historian, expresses contemporary hostility to Jews: “they are a wicked and most untrustworthy race, trouble-loving and tyrannical, utterly forgetful of friendship, jealous and envious, and most implacable in enmity.” ⁴¹¹ Antiochus, a monk of Palestine active in 7^th century, informs us that under pressure from Chalcedonian clergy, Heraclius had ordered a massacre of Jews around Jerusalem and in the mountains of Galille.⁴¹² Presumably it happened in 630 CE.⁴¹³ ⁴¹⁴ Christian (most likely Chalcedonian) petitioners claimed that they feared that if another enemy people came against them, the Jews might side with them against the Christians as the Jews had done when Persians came.⁴¹⁵ ⁴¹⁶

The country had been under Sasanian administration for twenty years in the recent past. A whole generation had grown up during occupation and it might be struggling to familiarize with Byzantine Rome. A number of factions in Syrian populace were antagonist to Heraclius’s efforts of nation building.

The region had its economic woes on top of everything. The region was devastated by plagues from 550 CE onwards. Plagues affected thickly populated towns and agricultural lands more than pastoral lands where contagion thinned out. That is the reason worst affected were coastal towns of Syria and towns of Iraq. Steppe dwellers got abundant. It is evident from the fact that Heraclius could gather only five thousand men while the Turk Kaghan, who came for his help, brought forty thousand men in his 627 CE campaign.⁴¹⁷

Despite all odds, it appears that Byzantine could reassert lose control over the area after retreat of Iranian army. Reports of Battle of Mu’ta suggest that there was Byzantine presence as far south. They swiftly hired Arabs to help guard against incursions by other Arabs.⁴¹⁸ Still they did not have undisputed mastery of the region. Different deals reached between Prophet Muhammad and city administrations of Ayla and Udhruh during campaign of Tabuk suggest that the Byzantine left these towns on their own.⁴¹⁹ ⁴²⁰

A particular problem for Byzantine Rome and a favourable scenario for Medinan Caliphate was that there were no organized local self defence units in Byzantine towns. ⁴²¹ The Byzantine Rome had prohibited possession of arms by civilians.⁴²² The civilian population totally depended on military for defence. Byzantine policy was not to depend upon self-defence by local population, rather it depended upon professionals and highly paid soldiers.⁴²³

Study of Byzantine sources reveals that Romans did not have any solid intelligence reports about Muslim military build-up and their intentions.⁴²⁴ Kaegi argues that Hraculis was in Jerusalem in March 630 CE, just few months after Battle of Mu’ta. He might have heard of military build-up on his southern borders.⁴²⁵ Late Byzantine historians, like Nicephoros (d. 828 CE), confirm this hypothesis.⁴²⁶ Still, no contemporary Christian source reports any preparations against possible Arab attack.⁴²⁷ Either Romans simply lacked ability to draw on adequate resources to meet the challenge or they simply underestimated the challenge.⁴²⁸ ⁴²⁹ Actually, Byzantine government even didn’t warn the population of imminent danger. Writing in 634 CE Sophronius of Jerusalem reports that the attack was ‘unexpected.’ ⁴³⁰ On the other hand, Muslims knew Heraclius well and they could have predicted his moves.

Muslim aspirations on Syria

“The Prophet gave fief of Ḥibra, Bait-‘Ainūn and Masjid Ibrāhīm to Tamim bin Aws and Nu’aim bin Aws, two brothers of Lakhm tribe. When Syria got subdued, those fiefs were given to them”, proclaims Baladhuri.⁴³¹ Talks of conquering Syria were already in air during the Prophetic times and tribes bordering Syria were being enticed to participate. Sudden death of Prophet Muhammad and, later on, Ridda Wars had hindered progress on this front. No surprise that ‘when Abu Bakr was done with the case of those who apostatized, he saw fit to direct his troops against Syria’.⁴³²

Date of attack

Chronology of Futuhul Buldan is the weakest point of our sources.⁴³³ In absence of any universally agreed dates in the sources, modern historians pick up a few dates from the literature, which they deem accurate. Then they schematize all other events of Futuhul Buldan around those dates. Baladhuri gives the date armies left Medina to be April 6, 634 CE.⁴³⁴ Kaegi feels that this date doesn’t fit well with other data and that the attack on Syria could have already been started by late 633 or early 634.⁴³⁵ Tabari gives a little earlier date of March 634 CE.⁴³⁶

Constitution of army

Abu Bakr invited only people of Mecca, Taif, whole of Hejaz and Nejd and Yemen to Jihad.⁴³⁷ He didn’t bother to ask people of Yamama, Bahrain and Oman etc. to participate in the war. He particularly excluded the former apostate tribes and clans from recruitment.⁴³⁸ The army, so raised, had a large number of Yemenis. Modern population estimates demonstrate that the Yemen, despite its relatively small area, still supports a disproportionately large percentage of the population of the Arabian peninsula; four to five million out of an estimated total population of ten to thirteen million.⁴³⁹ Donner uses this argument to support the idea that Yemen might be thickly populated in pre-Islamic times.⁴⁴⁰ Overrepresentation of Yemen in this army might be a reflection of its overall populous status.

The aspirant soldiers gathered in Medina. Abu Bakr organized them in three divisions led by Yazid bin Abu Sufyan (Yazīd bin Abu Sufyān يَزِيد بِن اَبُو سُفيان ), Shurahbil bin Hasana (Shuraḥbīl bin Ḥasanah شُرَحبِيل بِن حَسَنه ) and Amr bin As ( ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ عَمرؤ بِن عاص ).⁴⁴¹ Total strength of the army that ultimately reached borders of Syria was twenty four thousand.⁴⁴² Each participant tribe in the army flew its own banner, while there was one overall banner for each of the divisions.⁴⁴³ The three divisions were to take three different routes and attack at three different sectors. Amr’s division was to attack Palestine, Shurahbil’s to Jordan and Yazid’s to Damascus. They were supposed to liaise with each other when need arose.⁴⁴⁴ Abu Bakr’s commander in chief, Khalid bin Walid had still not finished his job in Iraq by that time. Apparently each soldier arranged his own armaments and transport.

Medinan Caliphate was going to attack most feared super power of the world. Pre-war nervousness was natural. Apparently there was difference of opinion among Abu Bakr and Umar on appointments of commanders. Analysis of Umar’s opposition to Abu Bakr’s decision to appoint Khalid bin Sa’id (Khālid bin Sa’īd خالِد بِن سَعِيد ) as commander of one of the three armies and the reasons given by Umar that he is “a vain-seeking man who tries to make his way through dispute and bigotry,” delineates difference in managerial principals of the two leaders.⁴⁴⁵ Abu Bakr bent upon appointing the same men blindly who were once appointed by the Prophet. Umar wished to base their appointment on merit as well. Khalid bin Sa’id’s failure to contain Aswad’s issue in Yemen might have compelled Umar to make a negative opinion about him.⁴⁴⁶ There was absolutely no difference between the two leaders, anyhow, on avoiding appointment of any non-Quraysh to a position of authority.

The army commanders were not very confident of their success. On his arrival in the first district of Palestine, Amr bin As wrote to Abu Bakr about great number of the enemy, their great armaments, wide extent of their land and enthusiasm of their troops. So Abu Bakr instructed Khalid bin Walid to move to Syria from Iraq and to take supreme command of whole army in Syria. The army accepted this appointment with satisfaction due to Khalid’s proven strategic abilities.⁴⁴⁷

First military encounter – Dāthin

First encounter between army of Medinan Caliphate and that of Byzantine Rome took place at Dāthin ( داثِن ).⁴⁴⁸ Dāthin was a village near Gaza.⁴⁴⁹ The event happened before Khalid bin walid had joined as supreme commander.⁴⁵⁰ Thomas the Presbyter gives the date of Feburary 4, 634 CE.⁴⁵¹ ⁴⁵² Kaegi agrees with it.⁴⁵³ ⁴⁵⁴

Arab division under command of Amr bin As fought against a Roman battalion of three hundred men led by Sergios, a Candidatos.⁴⁵⁵. Muslims were victorious.⁴⁵⁶

Small number of Romans in the battle strengthens the hypothesis that at first Byzantine underestimated Arabs, assuming them to be merely Bedouin raids, the likes of which they had experienced for centuries.⁴⁵⁷

Kaegi points out though Dāthin was a small battle, its psychological impact was great.⁴⁵⁸ Victories in earlier clashes gave psychological moral boost to Muslim Arabs and the reverse to Byzantine.⁴⁵⁹

As soon as the first encounter between the established power and the emerging power took place a new level in historiography of Islam dawned. This is the first event in history of Islam that is reported by a contemporary source.⁴⁶⁰ Interestingly, this source, Thomas the Presbyter, calls the invaders ‘Ṭayyāye. of Mhmt.’ It means from the very onset invaders introduced themselves as Muslims, fighting for religion of Muhammad and not unified Arab tribes fighting for Medinan Caliphate.

As a rule of thumb, when armies move in enemy’s territory, unnecessary violence, murder, rape and looting abound. And as a rule of thumb, the victim party cries foul loudly and the perpetuator party tries to play it down. It is quiet intriguing to read two different descriptions of the war of Dāthin. One is by Thomas the Presbyter, the contemporary Christian source. Another is by Baladhuri, the first Muslim source who described the war in 9^th century:

In the year 945, indiction 7, on Friday, 4 February, at the ninth hour, there
was a battle between the Romans and the Ṭayyāye. of Mḥmt in Palestine
twelve miles east of Gaza. The Romans fled, leaving hind the patrician
Bryrdn, whom the Ṭayyāye killed. Some 4000 poor villagers of
Palestine were killed there, Christians, Jews and Samaritans.
The Ṭayyāye ravaged the whole region. ⁴⁶¹

The first conflict between the Muslims and the enemy took place in Dāthin,
one of the villages of Ghazzah, which lay on the way between the Muslims
and the residence of the Patrician (biṭrīq) of Ghazzah. Here the battle raged
furiously, but at last Allah gave victory to His friends and defeat to His
enemies whom he dispersed. All this took place before the arrival of Khalid Ibn
al Walid in Syria.⁴⁶²

Anyhow, war has never been a pleasant event. Describing a war that was fought a few decades earlier during the reign of Hormizd IV [c. 579 – 590], Sebeos writes: ‘Byzantine departed for Atrpatakan [Azerbaijan]. They ravaged the entire country, putting all men and women to the sword. Taking all the loot, captives, and booty, they returned to their country.⁴⁶³ The Arab Futuhul Buldan was going to be havoc for the Middle East.

First city captured

It is almost impossible to establish with certainty which Syrian city did Medinan Caliphate capture first of all. There is a tie between Boṣra and Ma’āb.⁴⁶⁴ Baladhuri reports that Khalid occupied Boṣra on his way from Iraq to Damascus.⁴⁶⁵ He further reports that ‘Abu Ubayda conquered Ma’āb and finished it with the same conditions as were for Boṣrā, meaning it was conquered after Boṣrā.⁴⁶⁶

Sebeos, writing before Baladhuri, reports a major battle near Rabbath Moab in the earlier part of his version of events.⁴⁶⁷ Later Tabari confirmed that Ma’āb was the first Syrian city taken.⁴⁶⁸ Kaegi agrees with Tabari and calculates the event to have taken place in late 633 CE or early 634 CE.⁴⁶⁹

Whoever the first, both Boṣra and Ma’āb surrendered on exactly the same conditions, according to Baladhuri.⁴⁷⁰ One of them – contract with Boṣra – has survived. ‘At last its [Boṣra’s] people came to terms stipulating that their lives, property and children be safe, and agreeing to pay the poll-tax. According to some reporters, the inhabitants of Boṣra made terms agreeing to pay for each adult one dīnār and one jarīb of wheat. In return they were given security of their lives, property and children’.⁴⁷¹ The contracts, at this stage of invasion, didn’t have any provision of avoiding tax by converting to Islam.

Same contract entered into by two different divisions of Muslim army with two different communities suggest that it was a well-conceived, well-co-ordinated and well planned attack. The attackers were instructed in detail beforehand by their caliph what to do and how to do. It was not merely a plundering campaign, modifiable by local opportunities as they arise.

Agreement of safety of lives and possessions with the defeated party, anyhow, was not a Muslim invention. Such agreements were part of ancient Middle Eastern military traditions and can be traced back to as far as third millennium BC. The dominant model at the time of Arab conquests was Roman/Byzantine deditio in fidem, whereby a community offered its surrender (deditio) in anticipation of a promise from the victors to act in good faith (fides), usually safeguarding the lives, possessions, and laws of the community in return form the fulfillment of certain conditions, all of which was set out in a treaty (Pactum) accompanied by binding oaths. Although the fate of the conquered was now in the hands of the conquerors, there was an expectation of justice and mercy.⁴⁷² “Not only must we show consideration to those whom we have defeated by force,” acknowledges the Roman statesman Cicero, “but we must also receive those who, having laid down their arms, have made recourse to the good faith (fides) of our generals, even though their battering rams have struck against our walls.” ⁴⁷³ This kind of principal was also applied by Sassanid Iran. Emperor Khusrau II urged his generals to “put to the sword all those who offer resistance,” but he also instructed them to “receive in a friendly way those who will submit and keep them in peace and prosperity.” This was in connection with Iranian assault on Eddesa, which after initial resistance, sued for peace and requested for an oath that the Iranians would not destroy their city.⁴⁷⁴ Here Hoyland adds that Arabian terms aman and dhimma equate to the Latin fides, and Muslims Lawyers also employed the Roman/Byzantine categories of voluntary surrender and forced surrender. The point here is not that the Arabs borrowed these concepts from the Roman/Byzantines, but rather that the Arabs belonged to the same world and so shared many of its presuppositions.⁴⁷⁵

Muslims did not occupy many cities of Syria during early phase of the attack. It gives Kaegi an impression that their strategy was to consolidate their power over steppes of Syria and its inhabitants before advancing further.

Battle of Ajnadayn

The site of Battle of Ajnadayn (Ajnādayn اجنادَين ) has been identified about thirty seven kilometer southeast of modern Jerusalem, near Bayt Jibrīn on the Wādī ‘l Samt.⁴⁷⁶ Both Muslim and Christian sources describe a fierce battle at Ajnadayn.⁴⁷⁷ Ya’qubi gives the date of the battle to be July 30, 634 CE.⁴⁷⁸ Apparently, Heraclius was in Homs overseeing integration of his eastern provinces in Byzantine Rome when Muslim attack started.⁴⁷⁹ After initial miscalculation of the Muslim attack as usual nomadic penetration to be tackled by his Arab allies, Heraclius had started realizing factual conditions on the ground. He got compelled to raise a force to defend his territory, despite his economic woes. Kaegi comments that part of Byzantine strategy to counter with enemy in their previous wars was deceit, bribe, promises and false information, hence creation of division among enemy. This time Byzantine failed to use bribery, guile, and emissaries to break up the cohesion of the invading army. They reluctantly joined battle with Muslims.⁴⁸⁰ Actually, Byzantine never took initiative throughout the war in Syria. They merely reacted to Muslim initiatives.⁴⁸¹

‘In this battle about hundred thousand Greeks [Romans] took part’, Baladhuri alleges, ‘majority of whom were massed one after the other by Heraclius (Hiraql هِرقَل ), the rest having come from the neighbouring districts….. against this army, the Muslims fought a violent battle … at last, by Allah’s help, the enemies of Allah were routed and shattered into pieces, a great many being slaughtered’.⁴⁸²

Ajnadayn was definitely a big and decisive war which shattered Byzantine army.⁴⁸³ It created such a panic and fear that both soldiers and civilians escaped to the walled cities of Syria to protect themselves.⁴⁸⁴

Khalid joins the army

The three Muslim army divisions active in Syria joined hands at Boṣra and received the battalion which Khalid bin Walid brought along with him from Iraq. At this occasion they accepted Khalid as their commander in chief.⁴⁸⁵⁴⁸⁶

Fight for Boṣra took place after union of all Muslim forces under command of Khalid bin Walid.⁴⁸⁷ Now they started eying big and prosperous cities of Syria.

As army of Medinan Caliphate started capturing cities one by one, they sent twenty percent of the booty to Medina without delay. Sending part of booty to the sitting king and dividing part of it among soldiers was not a Muslim invention. It was known to the Middle East before Islam. Sebeos mentions, when force of Theodore Rshtuni defeated army of Medinan Caliphate in Armenia in 643 CE, Theodore sent emperor Cosntas gifts from the booty, including one hundred most select hosrses.⁴⁸⁸ Even before that, in Sebeo’s compedium, ‘an Iranian general by name of Vahramn [Bahram] fought against king of the Mazk’ut’during reign of Shahanshah Hormizd IV[ c. 579 – 590]. After his victory Vahhram ‘sent to the Iranian king only an insignificant part of the loot from the very great treasures he captured – the insignia of the [fallen] kingdom and some honored goods. He dispensed all the [rest of the] treasure among his troops according to each one’s merit.’ The King felt betrayed by this action of his general.⁴⁸⁹ Muslims were more disciplined in this regard. They knew exactly how much would be the portion of central government.

Routing of Byzantine Roman army at Ajdnadayn had rendered many areas defenseless. Muslims quickly took control of whole district of Ḥaurān [Auranitis] around Boṣrā.⁴⁹⁰ Then Khalid dispersed small battalions in different directions. They advanced to Palestine and Jordan and occupied their cities and districts. Most of them, like Adhri’āt and ‘Ammān Balqā’ surrendered without fighting.⁴⁹¹ ⁴⁹²

Death of Caliph Abu Bakr

A gloomy event took place in Medina from Medinan Caliphate point of view at the time when Muslim army was busy imposing Caliphate’s administration on up to now occupied districts and towns of Syria. Almost one month after battle of Ajnadayn, Abu Bakr died on August 13, 634 CE.⁴⁹³ Army of Medinan Caliphate in Syria was combating at Yāqūṣaḥ when the news reached them.⁴⁹⁴ ⁴⁹⁵ The exact cause of Abu Bakr’s death is not known but he is reported to suffer from a short illness that lasted twenty days.⁴⁹⁶ ⁴⁹⁷

Abu Bakr, as founder of Medinan Caliphate, proved to be a successful statesman. From the humble beginning of the Caliphate, limited to parts of Hejaz and Yemen at the time of his inauguration, he converted it into a potent state, master of whole Arabia and powerful enough to test its muscle with Byzantine Rome. The careers of Prophet Muhammad and Abu Bakr together form a single phase in the continuing story of the rise of the Islamic state to power in Arabia and beyond. This continuity is marked not only in the process of consolidation itself, but also in the methods employed.⁴⁹⁸

Abdullah bin Mas’ud, an early Meccan Muslim, said in his obituary, “After the death of the Prophet we found ourselves in a state in which we would have perished had not Allah favored us with Abu Bakr.” ⁴⁹⁹

Abu Bakr appoints Umar as caliph

Sources do not record any disputes or difference of opinions in selection of Abu Bakr’s successor. We are informed that Abu Bakr willed for Umar bin Khattab to be his successor and no body objected to it.⁵⁰⁰ Apparently, Abu Bakr’s political appeal was across the board by this time. His decision received a jubilant acceptance.⁵⁰¹ Umar was instrumental in almost all political decisions made by Abu Bakr and knew the reasons behind the decisions. The hand over must have been smooth.

Umar, like Abu Bakr, had impressive curriculum vitae. The last significant convert in Mecca before immigration, he was a man of opinion. He emerged as hawkish advisor to Prophet Muhammad in the aftermath of Badr when he gave his opinion to kill all prisoners of the war.⁵⁰² Since then he managed to register his opinion on each and every matter of political importance until Prophet’s death.⁵⁰³ Apparently, the Prophet gave more weightage to the opinion of Abu Bakr on domestic policy (for example who should be governor over Thaqif), and gave more weightage to opinion of Umar on foreign policy (for example decision of strategic retreat after show of power at Tabuk).⁵⁰⁴

Umar was, in any case, not a man of sword. Though he participated in all the Wars in which Prophet Muhammad participated, the Prophet never gave him charge of an independent campaign except one small campaign against a small group of Hawazin.⁵⁰⁵ No fighting took place even in that campaign.

Fifty three years old Umar of ‘Adi clan of Quraysh, merchant by trade, took oath few days after death of Abu Bakr.⁵⁰⁶ ⁵⁰⁷ Muslim army fighting on northern front of the country digested the news of death of Abu Bakr and appointment of Umar with integrity. Province of Yemen complied quietly. Even provinces of Yamama, Bahrain or Oman, who had not contributed to the war by supplying manpower, and where governors of Medinan Caliphate were managing the affairs without presence of supporting garrisons at their disposal, accepted appointment of Umar without hesitance. Abu Bakr had succeeded in bringing internal political stability in the country. Probably, people were generally happy with news of early successes against Byzantine Rome and incoming booty. They wanted uninterrupted continuation of policy of war.

First surrender of Damascus

Change of Caliph at Medina did not bring lull to the war for a single day. After consolidating occupation of newly acquired cities and their surrounding rural areas, Muslim armies converged on Damascus and laid siege to it.⁵⁰⁸ ⁵⁰⁹ ⁵¹⁰ The siege lingered on for four months.⁵¹¹ Damascus, eventually, surrendered to Muslim army on March 10, 635 CE.⁵¹²

Interestingly, after reaching the environs of Damascus with an intention to lay siege, the Muslim army gathered at a place called Thanīyat. There Khalid unfurled the banner and the army stood underneath it for one hour. This was the same black banner, called ‘Uqāb, which the Prophet had used. The ceremony lived in political memory of later Muslims and the place was still called Thanīyat al ‘Uqāb at the time of Baladhuri’s writing.⁵¹³

Defeat at Ajnadayn and then surrender of Damuscus should have been quiet shocking to Heraclius. ‘On hearing the news of defeat and further advance of Muslim army into Syria, Heraclius fled to Antakya’ states Baladhuri.⁵¹⁴ ⁵¹⁵

Umar demotes Khalid bin Walid

One of the first acts of Umar after assuming office was demotion of commander in Chief, Khalid bin Walid, to field commander.⁵¹⁶ He appointed Abu Ubayda bin Jirah in his place. Abu Ubayda of Fihr clan of Quraysh was tipped by Abu Bakr to be supreme commander of army that was camping in Jurf near Medina awaiting orders to march towards Syria. But he apologized to take this responsibility and rather wished to participate in the war as a common soldier.⁵¹⁷ Why did Abu Ubayda not accept the job that time and why did he accept the same job when Umar asked him is not clear.

The army received these orders in the midst of the siege of Damascus.⁵¹⁸ Abu Ubayda received his appointment orders through the same letter which demoted Khalid. He did not disclose it immediately fearing drop of moral of the army and of Khalid.⁵¹⁹ Umar did not write his reasons for demotion of Khalid. It has led to a plethora of opinions among later historians.

No doubt, Khalid was a master military tactician. His generalship had become synonymous with success. Khalid’s legendary march from ‘Ain at Tamr to Boṣra across the desert with a battalion of army remained alive in Arab political memory for generations to come. ‘Khalid made his camels to drink as much water as they could before he embarked onto desert and he thrust spears in their lips to keep their mouths closed so they may not loose water’ says Baladhuri, ‘on the way his men slaughtered camels one by one to drink water from their bellies’.⁵²⁰

But this brilliant general was notorious for disobeying civilian authority.⁵²¹ It is also known that Khalid was not in good books of Umar. Umar had criticized him previously for commission of war crimes.⁵²² He had also criticized him bitterly for his behavior which was unbecoming of a Muslim general.⁵²³ Umar was also disgusted the way field commanders on Syrian front had asked for Khalid’s appointment as commander-in-chief. Umar wished to nip the idea in the bud that a human and not Allah secured victories.⁵²⁴ We shall never know which of these potential reasons for demotion worked.⁵²⁵ ⁵²⁶ ⁵²⁷

First surrender of Homs

After conquering Damascus Abu Ubayda concentrated on management of territory subdued so far. He appointed Yazid bin Abu Sufyan his lieutenant in province of Damascus, Amr bin As over Palestine and Shurahbil over Jordan.⁵²⁸ ⁵²⁹ Abu Ubayda, then, advanced on Homs. On his way he passed through Baalbek whose inhabitants agreed to capitulate.⁵³⁰ ⁵³¹ ⁵³² ⁵³³ Homs was taken the same year in which Damascus surrendered, 635 CE.⁵³⁴

According to the pact inhabitants of Homs surrendered one fourth part of St. John’s church so it could be converted into mosque.⁵³⁵ Building a grand mosque as a symbol of Muslim presence in any town Medinan Caliphate captured was a tradition that can be traced back to Prophet Muhammad himself. This policy continued during conquest of Iran, as well, when Sa’d bin Waqqas built mosque in Tyswn after its conquest.⁵³⁶

Abu Ubayda appointed Ubada bin Samit (‘Ubādah bin Ṣāmit عُبَيده بِن صامِت) of Ansar lieutenant governor over Homs.⁵³⁷ This was the first and the only appointment of an Ansar over a position of authority during the tenure of first two caliphs, albeit a middle ranking one, and of temporary nature.⁵³⁸ ⁵³⁹

Medinan Caliphate captures city after city

Muslim scheme of overpowering city after city continued temporarily. They occupied Baldah, Jabalah, Ḥamāh, and Shaizar in the north.⁵⁴⁰ ⁵⁴¹ They also held Gaza (temporarily), Sabasṭiyah, Nāblus, Ludd, Yibna, ‘Amwās and Bayt Jibrīn in Palestine.⁵⁴² ⁵⁴³

Battle of Yarmouk

Climax of Medinan Caliphate’s invasion of Byzantine Rome, according to both Muslim and Christian sources, was Battle of Yarmouk (Yarmūk يَرموك ). It was a battle in the fullest sense of the term.⁵⁴⁴ The war was fought in August 636 CE.⁵⁴⁵

The worst case scenario Heraclius would have imagined was presenting his Eastern Provinces to Muslim Arabs like a cake in a plate. He was not sitting idle in Antakya recognizing surrender of his city after city. He was busy organizing a big army to get rid of Arab Muslims once and for ever. Exact strength of the army he could amass is not known but by all accounts it was huge.⁵⁴⁶ He appointed an Armenian by name of Vahān supreme commander of this army ⁵⁴⁷ and sent his brother Theodore as lieutenant general.⁵⁴⁸ Heraclius shunned from leading the army himself. He was still ruler of a super power extending in Asia, Europe and Africa. Maintaining grip on power was his first priority. Probably, he didn’t intend to take any blame on his person in case of defeat. Still more likely, he didn’t want to risk his life.

When tensions of the war broke Muslims strategically evacuated Damascus and Homs returning the inhabitant Jizyah they had collected from them.⁵⁴⁹ Probably they didn’t want a big hostile population on their rear and wished the supply line of Byzantine Romans to elongate by few hundred kilometers. Ultimately the two armies drew battle line along River Yarmouk, a tributary to River Jordan that runs east to west along border of modern Jordan and Syria.⁵⁵⁰

Battle of Yarmouk was a series of clashes that started about five kilometers northeast of modern Nawā in Syria and ended at the confluence of Yermouk River with Wādī ul Ruqqād.⁵⁵¹ Byzantine defeat was profound. Loss of life on Byzantine side was collosal.⁵⁵² They fled pell-mell. Muslims chased Byzantine soldiers, many of whom were Armenians, up to as far north as Marj al Ṣuffar.⁵⁵³ ⁵⁵⁴ Vahān either died at the battle field or retired in disgrace, as Eutychius of Alexandria claimed, to a monastery at Sinai.⁵⁵⁵ ⁵⁵⁶

Stories of valour of victorious Arab soldiers outlived the war. “Among war of Yarmouk was a soldier by the name of Ḥubāsh bin Qays”, writes Baladhuri, “who lost his leg without knowing and after war started looking for it”.⁵⁵⁷ And those of the defeated did not even crop up as if none of them were brave.

Heraclius accepted his defeat in Syria resignedly. According to Baladhuri, on receiving news of defeat at Yermouk, Heraclius fled from Antakya to Constantinople. As he passed through Darb [a pass of Taurus Mountains] he said ‘Peace unto thee, O Syria, and what an excellent country this is for the enemy!” ⁵⁵⁸

News of Byzantine defeat spread to far off corners of the world. Frankish historian Fredegarius, writing around 658 CE elaborates that “Muslims were two hundred thousand. Army of Heraclius was smitten by ‘Sword of the Lord’ and fifty two thousand Romans were slain”.⁵⁵⁹ ⁵⁶⁰

Soon after, people with political acumen started realizing that Battle of Yarmouk was a turning point in world history. A late 7^th century Christian observer testifies to the importance of the battle by labeling it ‘the first and fearful and incurable all of the Roman [Byzantine] army, I mean the bloodshed at Gabitha [Jābiya] and Yarmouk’.⁵⁶¹ ⁵⁶² Yarmouk proved to be a historic watershed. It was the starting point of pushing Hellenistic civilization out of Asia and Africa and spread of another civilization in its place, which was destined to be known as Islamic civilization.

Aftermath of Yarmouk

By end of August 636 CE Byzantine Rome had lost capacity to defend Syria. Its towns and rural areas were on Muslim’s mercy. Arab Muslims could capitulate any of them at the timing of their own choosing.

The chronology of events following battle of Yarmouk is guessed by Kaegi.⁵⁶³ Medinan Caliphate recaptured Damascus in late 636 CE or early 637 CE; followed by Baalbek and nearby Wādī Biqā’ and Qinnasrīn.⁵⁶⁴ ⁵⁶⁵ Homs surrendered sometimes in 637; Jerusalem yielded to Muslims also sometimes in 637 CE; so did Gaza, at the end of June or in early July 637; the first surrender of ‘Asqalān may have taken place in the summer of 637;⁵⁶⁶ ⁵⁶⁷

In late 637 CE the Byzantine Rome and Medinan Caliphate had consented to a truce at Qinnasrīn. At the end of that truce, in 638 CE, the Muslims occupied the remaining parts of northern Syria including Antakya , Cyrrhus, Niqābulus, Shaizar, Aleppo, Manbij ‘Arājin and Bālis without encountering further resistance.⁵⁶⁸ ⁵⁶⁹ ⁵⁷⁰

Medinan Caliphate also took all cities of Jordan without any resistance including Tabariyyā, Baisān, Afīq, Sūsiyah, Jerash, Bait-Rās, Qadas, Jaulān, Arandal, and Sājūr.⁵⁷¹ ⁵⁷²

Some of the cities had calculated that resisting Muslim army was pointless. They welcomed Muslim Army with music and songs of peace in a hope to get better deal, for example, Homs and Shaizar.⁵⁷³ Others still tried to hold on in a hope that Heraclius might send reinforcement by sea route, for example, Antakya.⁵⁷⁴ Actually, resistance from some of the towns was fierce.

Army of Medinan Caliphate was not merciful to those who showed resistance. Combatant prisoners of war were executed except if they wished to accept Islam. The story of sixty martyrs of Gaza, preserved in manuscripts of Vatican Museum, is a typical example.⁵⁷⁵ Execution of prisoners of war was a norm in pre-Islamic Middle East. Once Khosrau II Pervez ordered about his Byzantine prisoners of war that the multitude of arrested horsemen and elephant-riders be stripped, their hands be tied upon their shoulders, and they be trampled under the elephants’ hooves.⁵⁷⁶

Army of Medinan Caliphate had to post garrisons only at dangerous towns, (probably where they expected resent). They simply appointed ‘amils at all other conquered towns.⁵⁷⁷ ⁵⁷⁸

Muslim takeover of Jerusalem

Muslim takeover of Jerusalem by autumn of 637 CE was the most symbolic event during war in Syria and needs special mention.⁵⁷⁹

Jerusalem had been a sacred city for the Jews for centuries. (See photo). Lately, it had become focus of Christian religious tourism after the Byzantine Roman king Constantine had built landmark churches on the spots traditionally believed to be associated with the birth and crucifixion of Jesus Christ.⁵⁸⁰

Jerusalem was already a bone of contention between Jews and the Christians before Arab Muslim attack. Antiochus Strategos, who is eyewitness to sack of Jerusalem by a Sasanian Iranian army in summer of 614 CE, informs us that after a successful siege of the town for twenty one days Iranian army could break the city wall and enter the city. They resorted to indiscriminate massacre of civilian population. When they got fatigued of murdering people, they terminated the massacre. The hiding masses, exhausted with hunger, returned to the town to be arrested. Iranians locked them up in a reservoir outside the town. That time the Jews of the town bought those poor Christians from the invaders and slew them.⁵⁸¹ Antiochus doesn’t implicate the Jews of the town in any other crime but his account generates suspicion that Jews were in collaboration with the invading army. Sebeos divulges further details, slightly differing from Antiochus. He says that there was infighting between the Jews and Christians of the town prior to the attack. Christians outnumbered Jews. They killed many of the Jews, remaining escaped to the Iranian army by jumping over the walls of the city. They helped the Sasanian Iranians in capturing the town. They, afterwards, participated in three day massacre of Christians.⁵⁸² ⁵⁸³

It appears that killing innocent Christians was a local affair of Iran-Jew alliance. It was not official policy of Sasanian Iran. Antiochus’s account doesn’t disclose any brutalities committed by Shahanshah Khusrou II Pervez on the civilian captives of war.⁵⁸⁴ Sebeos and anonymous chronicle of Khuzestan both agree that Khusrou himself reconstructed the destroyed churches and restored the Christian prisoners to their town.⁵⁸⁵ ⁵⁸⁶

The animosity between Jews and Christians of Jerusalem, anyhow, continued. Jerusalem used to house Holy Cross. Christians believed it to be the original cross on which Jesus Christ was crucified.⁵⁸⁷ Iranians had carried away the Holy Cross after fall of Jerusalem to their capital, probably as a war trophy.⁵⁸⁸ After their defeat at the hands of Byzantine Rome in the last war of antiquity, they returned the Holy Cross.⁵⁸⁹

Heraclius had chosen to use religion to unify this shattered region and he used city of Jerusalem to boost his personal image. In 630 CE Heraclius converted return of Holy Cross of Jesus to Jerusalem into a political event. He entered the city with the Holy Cross with pomp and celebration.⁵⁹⁰ He not only restored the Holy Cross to the city but also put the vessels of the churches back, which were temporarily removed to Constantinople to save them from Iranians.⁵⁹¹ Then Heraclius reserved Jerusalem for Christians and banned entry of the Jews into it, lest they might attempt to rebuild the third temple.⁵⁹²

This was the political milieu of Jerusalem – Christians claiming it to be the most sacred place on earth and Jews trying to reclaim it for themselves – when army of Medinan Caliphate under leadership of Amr bin As laid siege to Jerusalem.⁵⁹³ People of Jerusalem adhered to policy of maximum resistance but their position became precarious when a big army under command of Abu Ubayda reached and relieved Amr of his duties.⁵⁹⁴ Christians of the town hastily shipped the Holy Cross to Constantinople by sea for safekeeping.⁵⁹⁵ Then people of Jerusalem and the Byzantine Roman garrison there surrendered within two to three days without fighting.⁵⁹⁶

Sebeos narrates the events in Jerusalem after its surrender to Muslims. “Now I shall speak about the plot of the Jewish rebels, who, finding support from the Hagarenes for a short time, planned to [re]build the temple of Solomon. Locating the place called the holy of the holies, they constructed [the temple] with a pedestal, to serve as their place of prayer. But the Ishmaelites envied [the Jews], expelled them from the place, and named the same building their own place of prayer. [The Jews] built a temple for their worship, elsewhere. It was then that they came up with an evil plan; they wanted to fill Jerusalem with blood from end to end, and to exterminate all the Christians of Jerusalem…… they just slaughtered two pigs ….. and put them [in the Muslim] place of prayer. Then many [Muslims] entered the place and saw the evil, and they spread a lament throughout the city. The Jews told the prince [lieutenant governor] that the Christians had desecrated their place of prayer. The prince issued an order and all the Christians were gathered together. Just as they wanted to put them to the sword, [a] man came and addressed them: ‘why shed so much blood in vain? Order all the Jews to assemble and I shall point out the guilty ones.” As soon as they were all assembled and [the man] walked among them, he recognized the three men. Seizing them, [The Arabs] tried them with great severity until they disclosed the plot. [The Arab prince] ordered that six of the principals involved in the plot be killed. He permitted the other [Jews] to return to their places”.⁵⁹⁷

By early 638 CE, few months after capitulation of Jerusalem, Umar had to come to Jerusalem on state visit.⁵⁹⁸ On his way to Jerusalem, Umar first halted in Jābiyah.⁵⁹⁹ Purpose of Umar’s visit is not clearly mentioned in sources. Kaegi feels it could be to dispose off conquered properties and to reorganize Muslim administrative structure in Syria.⁶⁰⁰ Umar definitely performed some administrative tasks in Jābiyah.⁶⁰¹ However, this explanation is far from complete. If it was merely administrative visit, why did he decide to go to Jerusalem, which was not an administrative hub? Moreover, Medinan Caliphate conquered many countries during Umar’s tenure, including Sasanian Iran. Why Umar not had to go there as well? Ya’qubi emphasizes that Abu Ubayda wrote to Umar that the siege of Jerusalem was taking long and that the inhabitants have asked the caliph himself to make a peace agreement with them. So Abu Ubayda prepared that documents of the truce and Umar departed for Syria.⁶⁰² Again this reason of visit is doubtful. Many cities in the region, for example Damascus, had prolonged sieges. No body called the caliph to negotiate the truce. Why only Jerusalem?⁶⁰³ Something else emerges as a cause of Umar’s visit as we analyse his activities in Jerusalem. A Muslim eyewitness of the events, who accompanied Umar to Jerusalem, has survived through annals of Tabari. He states, “He [Umar] set out from al-Jābiyah, leaving it behind until he came to Jerusalem. He then went on and entered the masjid. Then he went on toward the miḥrāb Dāwūd, while we were with him; he entered it, recited the prostration of David, [Quran 38: 21 – 25] and prostrated himself, and we prostrated ourselves with him.” ⁶⁰⁴ Scholars interpret ‘masjid’ in this passage as the Temple Mound.⁶⁰⁵ The meaning of miḥrāb Dāwūd is still debated without any definite outcome. Anyhow, it could be a place very near to the Temple Mound, or who knows, on Temple Mound itself.⁶⁰⁶ Clearly, Umar’s purpose was to lay a Muslim claim to the site of Temple Mound and to broadcast to the public at large Muslim’s staunch belief in Prophet hood of David.

Islamic and Jewish sources agree with Seobos that after a shot lived honeymoon between Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem they broke up.⁶⁰⁷ That must be the time Umar ordered building a mosque at Temple Mound.⁶⁰⁸ In an anecdote preserved in Pratun Spirituale of John Moschus, Sophronius, the Chalcedonian Christian Patriarch of Jerusalem, who had surrendered the town to Muslim Arabs, says to one of the skilled marble-worker working on construction of the mosque, “the godless Saracens entered the holy city of Christ our Lord, Jerusalem, with the permission of God and in punishment for our negligence, which is considerable, and immediately proceeded in haste to the place which is called the Capitol. They took with them men, some by force, others by their own will, in order to clean that place and to build that cursed thing, intended for their prayer and which they call a mosque (midzgitha).” ⁶⁰⁹ As we know Sophronius had died by 639 CE, presumably the construction of mosque had started by that time.⁶¹⁰

Arculf was a Gaul bishop. He visited Jerusalem in 670’s.⁶¹¹ In his travelogue he confirms that a mosque was built exactly on ruins of temple: ‘in that famous place where once stood the magnificently constructed Temple, near the eastern wall, the Saracens now frequent a rectangular house of prayer (orationis domus) which they have built in a crude manner, constructing it from raised planks and large beams over some remains of ruins. This house can, as it is said, accommodate at least 3000 people.’ ⁶¹² Umar deliberately kept the rock on the back of the mosque so it could not intervene between the mosque and ka’ba.⁶¹³ ⁶¹⁴ The mosque was called Aqṣā ( اَقصئ ).⁶¹⁵

Byzantine provinces buy Temporary Truce

Learning from hopeless defeats of Byzantine Romans in Syria, eastern Byzantine provinces, still under Byzantine rule hastened to purchase expensive truces from Medinan Caliphate. Egypt took initiative in 636 CE at the time when Medinan Caliphate occupied Palestine after Battle of Yermouk. Its Byzantine governor, Cyrus, agreed to pay one million and two hundred thousand Dirhams annually for three years in case Medinan Caliphate doesn’t attack Egypt.⁶¹⁶ ⁶¹⁷ Jazirah followed. Its Byzantine governor, Jogn Kataias agreed at Qinnasrīn in 637 CE to pay one million Dirhams annually provided the army of Medinan Caliphate doesn’t cross Euphrates to invade Jazirah.⁶¹⁸ ⁶¹⁹

Truces were signed with Muslim upper hand. Such truces made good strategic sense for Medinan Calipahte at this juncture of war. Medinan Caliphate had quadrupled its area in the last five years. It needed lull in the war to established proper authority in newly conquered areas. Payment of money, attached with truce agreements was extra benefit.

When Heraclius came to know about these truces he raged with anger. He replaced Cyrus of Egypt with Manuel with immediate effect. Egyptians didn’t pay anything and the truce stood null and void.⁶²⁰ Jazirah paid only one year’s amercement before Heraclius could find replacement of Kataias in the form of general Ptolemaios.⁶²¹

Kaegi proposes that Heraclius’s anger stemmed from expense of the truce which would have deprived the central government of revenue, would increase prestige of Muslims and enhance their capability to recruit more army.⁶²²

Completion of conquest of Syria

Byzantine Rome lost its control over Avars and Slavs in Europe at the same time when it lost Syria.⁶²³ Heraclius’s position must be bleak. Between 638 CE and 639 CE he ordered evacuation of all Byzantine Roman fortifications northwest of Antakya to create an empty zone or no man land between his country and Medinan Caliphate.⁶²⁴ Medinan Caliphate complemented Heraclius’s efforts by destroying some fortifications in the area.⁶²⁵ ⁶²⁶

Meanwhile, when the Byzantine were regrouping in Anatolia, the Muslim Arabs completed their conquest of Byzantine Syria by occupying the coastal cities, including Qayṣariyah (640 CE), followed by Beirut, Gabala and Ladhiqiyyah. ⁶²⁷ ⁶²⁸ Somewhere during this time Muslims took Yāfa, Rafaḥ, Ṭarṭūs, Acre, Tyre, Ṣaffūriyah, Sidon, ‘Irqah, and Jubail Step by step.⁶²⁹ ⁶³⁰

Many coastal towns surrendered without resistance but some offered stiff resistance.⁶³¹ A dim hope of getting reinforcement through sea route from Byzantine Rome explains their resistance. In the last Muslims got control of all the passes of Taurus Mountains.⁶³²

We can enumerate so many towns of Syria, which fell into Muslim hands after Battle of Yarmouk quiet easily. Generally speaking, their resistance was not fierce after Battle of Yermouk. Hoyland points out that the lenient conditions of terms could be one reason.⁶³³ The people of the region had experienced deceit after entering into a peace contract in near past. For example, people of Niṣībayn once rose against Khosrau II Pervez. Khosrau’s general Nakhorgan promised safety. People of the city believed in him and opened the gates. Nakhorgan then changed his mind and killed nobles of the city.⁶³⁴ ⁶³⁵ When Syrians observed the invading Muslims keeping their promise after writing of a contract, they molded towards surrendering

Conditions of submission

Whichever town Muslim army acquired in Syria, the commander of Muslim army entered into a contract (Ṣulḥ) with the local dignitaries. Many of these contracts have survived. All slightly vary from each other underscoring local conditions. Foundation of all is laid on the same principals. The contract written between Abu Ubayda and Baalbek city is preserved by Baladhuri in almost original form. It mentions that there were Romans (Greek), Persians and Arabs in the city. All of them got the same terms. They were allowed to keep their lives, houses, churches and businesses including pastures and mills, in lieu of payment of Jizyah and Kharāj. Their merchants were allowed to do business in all of Islamic state. If anyone of them decided to accept Islam, he would have the same rights as any other Muslim.⁶³⁶

Salient features of this contract are that all and sundry among the submitting people are encouraged to continue with their usual commercial activities. They are encouraged to take advantage of opportunities created by elimination of borders between large areas. They have to pay taxes as they would have to pay to any other government. Medinan Caliphate won’t interfere in their personal lives, especially with their religion. They are free to practice any religion they like. However, they can reduce their tax burden by converting to Islam. Medinan Caliphate will provide protection of life and property to their community in lieu of the taxes, like any other government. Medinan Caliphate will use its own military for this purpose. They are not obliged to take military job.

Medinan Caliphate had forced Arab polytheists to convert to Islam. They had only two options after their defeat. Either convert to Islam or die. Its attitude during Futuhul Buldan was entirely different. During initial one or two years of Futuhul Buldan, when Medinan Caliphate was not economically healthy, they encouraged the defeated communities to keep their religions and pay more taxes. After success in Battle of Yarmouk, Medinan Caliphate started offering tax incentives for conversion to Islam. They didn’t force anybody to convert to Islam. They left it to individual’s discretion.

The inhabitants of conquered towns didn’t have peace of mind, anyhow. They had accepted rule of Medinan Caliphate as a last choice. Some of them, for example Qinnasrīn and Antakya challenged the new rulers with civil disobedience immediately army of Medinan Caliphate left the city after signing the contract.⁶³⁷ The army of Medinan Caliphate had to return to bring them back into ambit of the contract. Muslims were not bent on bloodshed. Whenever a town underwent civil disobedience and it was re-conquered, for example Ṭabaraiyah, its inhabitants were not punished like combatants.⁶³⁸ They were given the same terms of contract again.

New borders at Tauras mountains

Byzantine Empire shrank to the Taurus mountain zone on the south-eastern edge of Cappadocia, and to Cyprus in the Mediterranean as a result of Futuhul Buldan.⁶³⁹ Iconium and Caesarea in Cappadocia became border towns of Byzantine Rome whereas Aleppo and Antakya became border towns of Medinan Caliphate.⁶⁴⁰ ⁶⁴¹

Apparently, Heraclius and Umar both wished, at least temporarily, to create a frontier along the passes of the Taurus and Antitaurus. This frontier became a new barrier for civilian and military movement.⁶⁴² Subsequently most willful contacts of a non-military kind between the Caliphate and Byzantine passed by sea, not through the land frontiers, despite occasional famous embassies to Damascus. ⁶⁴³

Halt of Muslim invasion at Taurus Mountains by 639 CE cannot be explained solely by geography. People of Central Anatolia did not have any resident Arabs among them. Neither did the population have serious religious divisions. Medinan Caliphate had difficulty finding a portion of population willing to cooperate with them. They were left with only military choice, and, they could not devise any solid military strategy to advance forward.⁶⁴⁴

Muslim army didn’t cross Euphrates in the east leaving Byzantine possession there, honouring the Qinasrīn truce.⁶⁴⁵

Heraclius was busy mending his political image. He hastily erected his image on a pillar near Qinnasrīn. Probably the border between two countries passed by this place by that time and the fleeing refugees used this route. Eutychius of Alexandria tells an interesting story by which an Arab accidentally damaged one eye of the image. Heraclius got so touchy that he wrote to Abu Ubayda for compensation. Abu Ubayda compensated with apology.⁶⁴⁶

Role of ethnicities in Syria

It is practically impossible for a small army, like twenty four thousand Arabs, to conquer and keep occupying a thickly populated country, like Syria, which has its own army of hundreds of thousands available to defend, unless a portion of the population has soft corner for the invaders.

It appears Arab residents of Syria were ambivalent when Medinan Caliphate’s attack started. They sided with Byzantine Rome but their resistance to the invading Arabs was not stiff. Cultural commonality with the invaders might explain it. Jabalah bin Aiham, the last Ghassan king, joined rank and file of Byzantine Rome in the beginning of Battle of Yarmouk.⁶⁴⁷ Exactly in the midst of the battle he switched sides citing his kinship with Ansar as an excuse.⁶⁴⁸ It might be a pre-pondered scheme that Muslim Arabs chose Yarmouk as battlefield by retreating from already occupied areas. Yarmouk was in vicinity of Jābyah, the town of Ghassans. Adhri’āt, where Qaynuqā’ had taken refuge, was in their rear.

Attitude of invaders towards Arab residents of Syria was reciprocally different from that towards Greek speaking urban dwellers. During his official visit to Jābiyah in 638 CE, Umar negotiated with Jabalah bin Aiham to convert to Islam. Jabalah rather opted to keep his religion and pay ṣadaqah. Umar insisted on paying Jizyah in case he keeps his religion. He refused and left to Byzantine Rome along with thirty thousand of his supporters. Ubada bin Samit, Leutinent governor of Homs, gently reproved Umar saying ‘if thou hadst accepted ṣadaqah from him and treated him in a friendly way, he would have become Muslim.’ ⁶⁴⁹ The incident proves that Muslims used to go out of their way to convince the Syrian Arabs to convert to Islam, and Syrian Arabs expected to be treated differently. Actually, Umar did not close the matter as settled. In summer of 642 CE he sent ‘Umair bin Sa’d of Ansar as along with an army across the border to Byzantine Rome to appeal to Jabalah through the blood relationship between them, to return to the land of Muslims with an understanding that he would keep his faith and would pay ṣadaqah. Jabalah rejected the offer.⁶⁵⁰

On the same note, the invading armies got their earliest converts to Islam only from Arab tribes. For example, at the time of surrender of Qinnasrīn, many clans of Tanūkh tribe, residents of satellite town of Qinnasrīn converted to Islam. Some of them, like Saliḥ Clan, remained Christians.⁶⁵¹ None of the Greek, Persian or Jew population of the town converted at this occasion.

Jews were definitely happy on Muslim invasion.⁶⁵² They co-operated with invading Muslim armies as much as they could. Samaritan Jews provided spying services to the Muslims and they paid them accordingly.⁶⁵³ They might have even joined the Muslim armies planning to attack further lands. John of Nikiu mentions presence of a Jew among Muslim army that invaded Egypt.⁶⁵⁴

The Syriac speaking Monophysites were under hostile pressure from central government of Byzantine Rome.⁶⁵⁵ Though they did not back invaders actively, their resistance was soft. At some places, we hear, a member of clergy helped Muslims in reducing the town while the remaining population of the town was not in that mood. When siege of Damascus lingered on during the first attempt on the town, it was the bishop of Damascus who communicated with Khalid and opened the gate of city covertly when the city was busy in a feast.⁶⁵⁶ As Greek speaking Chalcedonians were bitterly opposed to Muslim occupation of the town, he was definitely not Chalcedonian. He might be a Monophysite.

It is on record that Monophysite and other Christian dissident clergy limited itself to verbal laments against invading Muslims. They did not encourage their communicants to resist the Muslims to death. Christians, generally, did not see this war as a war of survival for Christian religion.⁶⁵⁷

Some historians believe that Christian sectarian differences were not a cause of the failure of Byzantine resistance, or in any case, they surely were not the primary cause.⁶⁵⁸ Even if we totally reject the idea that anti-Chalcedonian communities of Syria, and later Egypt, did not actively support Muslim invaders, still it is likely that prolonged persecution at the hands of the Chalcedonian authorities in the late sixth and early seventh centuries had alienated anti-Chalecedonians and made them more amenable to accommodation with Arab rule, once the initial period of fighting and uncertainty had ended and it had become clear that the Arabs were going to leave people to practice their own faith in peace as long as they paid jizyah.⁶⁵⁹

The great plague

Muslim army in Syria had hardly finished thrashing Byzantine Romans, when in 639 CE, it faced another enemy. This enemy was far more scowling than the Byzantine army and it killed more Arabs than Byzantine Roman army could. It was the great plague, which lasted for almost one year.⁶⁶⁰ Plague of ‘Amwās – co called because it started from town of ‘Amwās – killed at least twenty five thousand soldiers of Medinan Caliphate. This figure was apart from those who suffered from the debilitating effects of the disease but did not die.⁶⁶¹ ⁶⁶²

Most probably Arabs had no immunity against the disease which was almost endemic in the area. According to conservative estimates the epidemic killed about 40% of Muslim army within a few months.⁶⁶³ The Plague of ‘Amwās might have prevented Arab Muslims to build a cantonment town in Syria parallel to those they built in Iraq and Egypt.

The pestilence perished almost whole leadership of army of Medinan Caliphate in Syria. Most notable death was that of commander in chief and Umar’s right hand man, Abu Ubayda, who died at a young age of fifty eight.⁶⁶⁴ Other notables who vanished were field commander Shurahbil bin Hasana at the age of sixty nine, and field commander Yazid bin Abu Sufyan.⁶⁶⁵ Two noteworthy survivors were Amr bin As and Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan (Mu’āwiyāh bin Abū Sufyān مُعاوِيَه بِن اَبُو سُفيان ). Apparently the plague was most devastating in and around Damascus where most of the people died.⁶⁶⁶ Mu’awiya survived as he was busy in campaign of coastal areas. Amr survived because he was leading his army towards Egypt.⁶⁶⁷

Arabs knew conventionally that spreading out to isolate from each other controls the contageons.⁶⁶⁸ Their reluctance to do that in this case might be due to their fear of Byzantine re-emergence.⁶⁶⁹

Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan’s climb to prominence

Unpredictable deaths of governors and commanders one after another created a crisis of provincial leadership of Medinan Caliphate in Syria. A new provincial governor would hardly take charge of his office when he would die.⁶⁷⁰ The last significant death was that of governor Yazid bin Abu Sufyan by the end of 639 CE.⁶⁷¹ It paved the way for appointment of his brother Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan as governor of Syria and commander in chief of Medinan Caliphate’s army in Syria by Umar.⁶⁷²

Future events proved that Mu’awiya’s appointment as governor of Syria had far reaching consequences to Medinan Caliphate than any other appointment of a governor. Mu’awiya was a young and energetic man at the time of his appointment.⁶⁷³ Born in an august family of Abu Sufyan, Mu’awiya grew up in environment of business and politics. Though Mu’awiya had participated in the Battle of Khandaq from the side of Meccan polytheists as an ordinary soldier, he came to prominence in the history of Islam for the first time when he married divorcee of Umar just after Hudaybiah.⁶⁷⁴ He was one of those chiefs who got hundred camels at the time of Jiranah.⁶⁷⁵ He joined the army of Medinan Caliphate as a soldier and participated in war of Yamama under Khalid bin Walid in this capacity.⁶⁷⁶ Medinan Caliphate, then, transferred his services to the Syrian sector. He proved himself an outstanding warrior and his superiors, especially his brother Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, started giving him solo campaigns confidently.⁶⁷⁷ He didn’t disappoint his superiors and demonstrated his military and administrative talent during those campaigns, which were mostly against coastal towns of Syria.⁶⁷⁸

Tacit truce with Byzantine Rome at Taurus border

War between Medinan Caliphate and Byzantine Rome in Syria didn’t end with a formal peace treaty and mutual recognition of new borderline. Heraclius and Umar exchanged diplomatic notes but they did not progress beyond token contacts.⁶⁷⁹ None of them was serious about formal ceasefire The Taurus frontier between Byzantine Rome and Medinan Caliphate remained unstable, suspicious, and hostile.⁶⁸⁰ Umar sent an expedition as late as 641 CE under leadership of Maysara bin Masquq (Maysara bin Masqūq ميسره بِن مَسقُوق ) of ‘Abs tribe against Byzantine Rome territory (arḍ al Rūm, Asia Minor).⁶⁸¹ According to Ya’qubi it was the first operation of its kind across Taurus into Anatolia.⁶⁸² The expedition reached up to Zandah facing Byzantine Roman troops and their Arab allies (musta’ribah ‘Arab) of Ghassan, Tanūkh and Lyād tribes.⁶⁸³ ⁶⁸⁴ Apparently the expedition could not gain anything except safety of their own lives.

Umar sent a second campaign, after the above mentioned one, under the leadership of Habib bin Maslama (Ḥabīb bin Maslamah حَبِيب بِن مَسلَمه ) of Fihr clan.⁶⁸⁵ ⁶⁸⁶ Again no achievements of this campaign are noted. This was the last campaign against Byzantine territory during Umar’s caliphate.⁶⁸⁷ Target and purpose of both these campaigns are not clearly understood as Umar had already expressed his wish to make the Taurus mountains line of control and both Constantinople and Medina had taken measures to create a no man’s land there.

Medinan Caliphate kept high level of fortification and military alert in the border areas as they anticipated Byzantine Rome’s counter attack.⁶⁸⁸

Jizyah was humiliating tax

Tax is twin of state. It took birth the same day when state was born. Population of Syria must have been paying taxes to the precursors of Medinan Caliphate. They might still be willing to pay taxes. However, they perceived Jizyah imposed on non-Muslims (virtually over whole population), as a tax of pejorative character.

Jabalah rejected payment of kharāj or Jizyah on grounds that he was Arab and these taxes were for peasants (‘ulūj).⁶⁸⁹ Banu Taghlib bin Wa’il were Christian Arabs. Medinan Caliphate wished to levy Jizyah on them. They fled to far off lands. Pleading to Umar on their behalf Nu’mān bin Zur’ah said, “I plead in Allah’s name for Banu Taghlib. They are body of Arabs too proud to pay Jizyah, but severe in warfare. Let not thy enemy, therefore, be enriched by them to thy advantage’.⁶⁹⁰ On convincing power of economic argument that they would still pay tax to government of far off lands and would deprive Medinan Caliphate of revenues, Umar called them back. This time Umar ‘doubled the ṣadaqah laid on them’ meaning their tax rate was not cut but its name was changed.⁶⁹¹ Probably this kind of arrangement was made with many Christian Arabs because later Zuhri noted that none of the ‘people of book’ pay ṣadaqah except Christian Arabs and they pay twice what the Muslims pay.⁶⁹²

Jazirah falls to Medinan Caliphate

The area between upper reaches of rivers Euphrates and Tigris, currently located in northern Syria and south-eastern Turkey, is called Jazirah (Jazirah جَزِيره ) by Islamic sources.⁶⁹³ It corresponds to the Byzantine Roman provinces of Osrhoene and Mesopotamia in sixth century CE. ⁶⁹⁴ River Khābour, a small tributary to River Euphrates used to make the border between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran here. (Not to be confused with Khabur Tigris).⁶⁹⁵

Christianization of the population was complete in Jazirah. Like Syria, the population was a mixture of Greek speaking town dwellers and Arabic speaking tribes scattered in rural areas. Ethnic Persians had their presence, as had Jews.⁶⁹⁶

By the beginning of 639 CE Jazirah protruded into Medinan Caliphate, separating its Syria and Swad territories, and thus important communication route. This area provided an access between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran in case they decided to collaborate with each other. Armenia, located to the north of Jazirah was main recruiting ground for Byzantine Roman military. If occupied by Arab Muslims, they could threaten Armenia easily. Last, but not the least, Jazirah was fertile agricultural region. Arabs had all reasons to occupy it and Byzantine Romans had all reasons to hold it.⁶⁹⁷

Heraclius could smell the danger and sent military reinforcements to Jazirah in 638 – 9 CE neglecting defence of Egypt that was exposed to aggression by any time.⁶⁹⁸

Just when plague of ‘Amwās was over, Umar asked Iyad bin Ghanm (‘Iyād. bin Ghanm عياض بِن غَنم ) of Fihr clan of Quraysh to march on Jazirah in 639 CE.⁶⁹⁹ ⁷⁰⁰ His military strength was five thousand men.⁷⁰¹ The Byzantine Medinan truce prevented any Arab Muslim attack on Jarzirah during 638 CE.⁷⁰² At the annulment of the truce of Qinnasrīn in 639 CE Iyad bin Ghanm’s troops crossed Euphrates and penetrated into Jazirah the way knife penetrates melon.⁷⁰³ City after city the army capitulated. Starting from Raqqah, to Ruha, Diyarbakir, ‘Ain al Wardah, Dniṣar, Mardīn, whole region of Ṭūr ‘Abdīn, Niṣībayn, Daras, Khāūr, Sinjār, and Qarqisiya, the army reached up to Mosul in the northeast and Hīt in the southeast, until they shook hands with their colleagues active in Swad.⁷⁰⁴ ⁷⁰⁵ Very few towns, like Tella, Daras and ‘Ain al Wardah had courage to resist the invading amry.⁷⁰⁶ ⁷⁰⁷ The occupation of Jazirah completed in 640 CE at a time when some coastal towns of Syria, for example Qayṣariyah, were still resisting Muslim army. ⁷⁰⁸

Heraclius didn’t concede defeat aptly. He sent Byzantine Generals Dawit’ (David), Urṭaya, and Titus, who made an abortive campaign in Jazirah in the year of 640 CE.⁷⁰⁹ Loss of Mesopotamia deprived the Byzantine Romans of Arab recruiting grounds for their armies. They had to look around for new sources. Medinan Caliphate could practically prevent Byzantine from helping the collapsing Sasanian Iran as they had done in 590-1 CE and in 628-30 CE.⁷¹⁰

Medinan Caliphate occupies Egypt

The Byzantine Rome’s province of Aegyptus, Miṣr of Islamic sources, was located at confluence of Africa with Asia.⁷¹¹ Separated from Arabia by the Red Sea, the land was an alluvial plane. Life giving River Nile traversed it from south to north, its sluggish waters making a wide delta before emptying in the Mediterranean.⁷¹² At the eve of Islamic invasion, the water of Nile was already fully utilized by digging of canals.⁷¹³ The network of canals had generated a fertile agricultural plane that was able to produce grain in excess to the local need. Egypt was net exporter of grain in Byzantine Rome. It exported three hundred million bushels of grain to Constantinople.⁷¹⁴ To the south of this rich and relatively safe land was the state of Nubia. To its southwest were vast wastelands of Great Sahara desert where Blames nomads used to live.⁷¹⁵

Like Syria, Alexander of Macedonia had introduced Hellenic civilization to Egypt. However, like Syria, it was limited to town dwellers that, by the way, spoke Greek and practiced Chalcedonies principals of Christianity. They were main supporters of Byzantine Roman king, Heraclius. The vast majority of population, who concentrated mainly in rural areas, called themselves Egyptians (Qibtī of Arabic sources) to distinguish Greek speaking Romans. They spoke their own language called Coptic. They had their own Christian Church – Coptic Church – a variation of Monophysite sect.⁷¹⁶

The last war of antiquity disturbed the relative peace of Egypt when Iranians occupied Egypt briefly from 617 to 619 CE.⁷¹⁷ After departure of Iranians, Byzantine Rome reasserted its sovereignty over Egypt. Heraclius’s strategy to assimilate Egypt in Byzantine Rome was the same as in Syria – unifying the population around Chalcedonian Church. His governor in Egypt, Cyrus, had to resort to ruthless persecution of Monophysites in attempt to meet the goal. This action of Cyrus had alienated the Monophysite population of Egypt from central government.⁷¹⁸

Not only this, the economic difficulties which Byzantine Rome was facing at that time were apparent in Egypt as well. They were devising means of reducing expenses on salary of soldiers. One suggestion was to reduce number of soldiers.⁷¹⁹ Uncertainty of job definitely doesn’t boost morale of a soldier. Defeats of Byzantine Rome in Syria must have demoralized Byzantine army in Egypt further.⁷²⁰

After the Arab invasion started in Syria, Heraclius was clearly aware of vulnerability of Egypt. He knew Arab invasion on Egypt was just a matter of time. What he didn’t know was how to tackle the issue. Heraclius had asked certain John of Barqa (modern northeast Libya) to defend Egypt against Arabs.⁷²¹ We don’t have any hint if John acted on the instructions. There is evidence that pre-emptive defence arrangements were made by the patriarch of Alexandria at local level when Arab Muslim attack was imminent. He deployed army and scaled the entrances and the exits of the land and built walls along all the banks of the Nile in all regions.⁷²²

Planning of attack

During Umar’s official visit to Syria in spring of 638 CE, Amr bin As met him and asked his permission to conquer Egypt. Amr argued ‘if we conquer it, it will be strength for the Muslims, for it is among the richest of lands and the least capable of fighting.’⁷²³ Kaegi guesses that Amr bin As, being in Gazza area at the time of war of Dāthin, would have become familiar with Byzantine weakness in Egypt.⁷²⁴ In any case, Amr apparently failed to convince Umar because Jazirah was at Umar’s mind. He returned to supervise the siege of Qaiṣariyah.⁷²⁵ After sudden death of Abu Ubayda, when Yazid bin Abu Sufyan came to power in Syria, Amr did not ask anybody’s permission, lifted the siege of Qaiṣariyah and led his army of thirty five hundred men to Egypt.⁷²⁶ All his army belonged to ‘Akk tribe of Yemen.⁷²⁷ Umar got seriously unhappy on disobedience of Amr.⁷²⁸ First he instructed Amr to halt the operation if he had still not reached the land of Egypt. Amr neglected the orders.⁷²⁹ Then Umar quickly raised a huge army of twelve thousand men in Hejaz and dispatched it to Egypt under command of Zubayr bin Awwam. ⁷³⁰ On the surface, this act of Umar was to reinforce Caliphate’s army in Egypt, but under the surface it could be to counter Amr’s attempt to gain power for himself in Egypt. Sudden attack on Egypt shattered Medinan Caliphate’s ambitions to push Heraclius’s army further north of Taurus Mountains in Cappadocia.⁷³¹

Date of attack

Exact date of Medinan Caliphate’s invasion on Egypt is controversial. An inscription from Alexandria, written in 698 CE gives the date of invasion to be 633 CE.⁷³² Such an early date doesn’t fit into any scheme. Baladhuri gives the date of start of invasion January of 640 CE.⁷³³ Even this doesn’t fit with events well. Ya’qubi informs that Amr had conquered Alexandria and other districts of Egypt by 641 CE.⁷³⁴ From here modern historians believe that the invasion might have started in winter of 639 CE.⁷³⁵ If winter of 639 CE is the date of invasion, that was the time when Iyad was engaged in Jazirah.

Execution of attack

John of Nikiu, a Coptic priest and resident of small delta town of Nikiu in Egypt, is an eyewitness of Arab invasion to Egypt. He gives a vivid account.⁷³⁶ ⁷³⁷ John of Nikiu informs us that Theodore was commander in-chief of Roman army in Egypt by that time.⁷³⁸ Amr’s army proceeded straight to Fājūm and occupied it.⁷³⁹ ⁷⁴⁰ ⁷⁴¹ Islamic sources differ from John of Nikiu. Both Baladhuri and Ya’qubi assert that the first town Amr encountered was Faramā’.⁷⁴² ⁷⁴³ Defeat of Faramā’ was not a quickie. It took full three months for Amr to defeat the town. ⁷⁴⁴

Then Amr laid siege to the castle of Alyuna (Alyūnah اَليُونَه ).⁷⁴⁵ ⁷⁴⁶ ⁷⁴⁷ It was the siege of Alyuna during which reinforcement under command of Zubayr bin Awwam reached and joined Amr. ⁷⁴⁸ The resistance was fierce and the conquest was slow.⁷⁴⁹ Army of Amr bin As could conquer the castle of Alyuna only by summer of 640 CE.⁷⁵⁰ ⁷⁵¹

Surrender of Alyuna was heartbreak for Byzantine army present in Egypt. They had taken all measures to protect the castle and had dug moats before arrival of enemy.⁷⁵² The news created panic in Egypt. Soldiers and civilians started fleeing towards Alexandria after fall of Alyuna.⁷⁵³ ⁷⁵⁴ Amr dispatched small contingents in different directions in Egypt to subjugate the rest of villages of the country, before tackling Alexandria. ⁷⁵⁵ Certain villages of Egypt resisted and Amr carried away their inhabitants as prisoners. They were sent to Medina.⁷⁵⁶ Majority of villages didn’t find power to resist and simply applied for terms.⁷⁵⁷ Whole of Egypt came under Muslim control except Alexandria and its surroundings.⁷⁵⁸

Amr used violence as a strategy of war to generate fear in civilian as well as military circles. Here is description by John of Nikiu of Arab’s taking of his native city, Nakiu, “Amr and the Muslim army, on horseback, proceeded by land till they came to the city of Kebrias …. and on this occasion he attacked the general Domentianus. But when the latter learnt of the approach of the Muslim troops, he embarked on a ship and fled and abandoned the army and their fleet. And he sought to enter the small canal which Heraclius had dug during his reign. But finding it closed he returned and entered the city of Alexandria. Now when the soldiers saw their commander had taken flight, they cast away their arms and threw themselves into the river in the presence of their enemies. And the Muslim troops slaughtered them with the sword in the river, and none escaped save one man only, named Zechariah, a doughty man and a warrior. And when the crews of the ships [in River Nile] saw the flight of the troops, they too took to flight and returned to their own country. And thereupon the Muslims made their entry into Nikiu and took possession, and finding no soldiers, they proceeded to put to the sword all whom they found in the streets and in the churches, men, women and infants, and they showed mercy to none.⁷⁵⁹ ⁷⁶⁰ Probably, Amr wanted to create terror among those who had taken refuge in Alexandria and surroundings.

The terms of truce were the same usual. People will pay Jizyah and Kharāj. Those who wish to convert to Islam will be exempt from these taxes.⁷⁶¹

Amr’s strategy of violence bore fruit. Soon Population of Lower Egypt divided into two parties. Of these, one sided with Theodore, but the other wished to join the Muslims. And straightway the one party rose against the other, and they plundered their possessions and burnt their city.⁷⁶² There was also violence between ‘Blue’ and ‘Green’ ⁷⁶³

Death of Heraclius

Egypt was yet in a state of limbo, with Muslim Arabs being master of southern parts and Byzantine Romans sticking to Alexandria and its surroundings, when the residents of Alexandria heard the dismal news. Heraclius died at the age of sixty six years after a short febrile illness on February 11, 641 CE, after thirty one years of reign.⁷⁶⁴ ⁷⁶⁵ ⁷⁶⁶ ⁷⁶⁷ Anonymous author of Khuzestan Chronicle shows Heraclius grief-stricken at his deathbed due to seizure of Egypt, Thebes, and Africa by his enemies despite their excellent defenses and that by then they were in a position to march to his capital.⁷⁶⁸

Sudden death of the king left Byzantine Rome with political instability at a critical time when they were facing threat of extinction at the hands of Arabs.⁷⁶⁹ Family feud among his children over the throne was natural. It got complicated when clergy and generals started fishing in troubled waters for their own sake.⁷⁷⁰

Initially, Heraclius’s son Constantine (Constantine III) sat on the throne. He died of hematemesis due to poisoning by Martina after ruling for only hundred days, and without leaving any political impact, in May 641 CE.⁷⁷¹ Constantine’s death paved way to power for Martina (Heraclius’s second wife whom he had married after death of his first wife and who happened to be his Father’s brother’s daughter and the Christian clergy considered it incestuous relation) and her son Heracleonas.⁷⁷² Clergy was not willing to accept Heracleonas as king.⁷⁷³ They considered the king born out of illegitimate marriage.⁷⁷⁴ Byzantine Rome got divided into two political parties. One, that favoured Martina and her son and also favoured accommodation with the Arabs. Other, that favoured Heraclius’s eleven years old grandson from Constantine III, Constans (Constans II, Qusṭunṭīn قُسطُنطِين) to be a king, represented by a senior general named Valentine, who advocated a more hawkish policy towards Arabs.⁷⁷⁵ ⁷⁷⁶

Among scenes of rioting, Valentine entered Constantinople in September 641 CE and deposed Martina and her son.⁷⁷⁷ General Valentinus crowned young Constans, and using latter’s tender age as a pretext, Valentinus sought to usurp the de facto military and political powers of the imperial office for himself.⁷⁷⁸ As Hawkish party had come to power, General Valentine sent his troops to fight the Arabs.⁷⁷⁹

Usurpation of power by general Valentinus offended popular opinion. He was arrested and brought before Constans. The young emperor magnanimously accepted his plea that he had only acted out of a desire to save the empire from the Arabs and appointed him head of the imperial guard.⁷⁸⁰ Byzantine internal instability continued. In early 642 CE General Valentinus tried an abortive coup. It was only after hanging of General Valentinus by an angry mob when Constans became secure and brought political stability to the empire.⁷⁸¹ This event took place after Muslim Arabs had snatched Egypt and were beginning invasion of Barqa (Cyrenaica).⁷⁸²

The fall of Alexandria

After fall of Alyuna and most of the Egyptian lands, there were still people in Egypt who believed they could defeat the invading army. The Romans and the Copts who lived to the south of Egypt decided to fight with Amr before he makes any attempt on Alexandria. Some residents of far off villages also joined the army. The two forces met at Kariūn. Amr was victorious.⁷⁸³ ⁷⁸⁴ Theodore fled to Alexandria after this defeat.⁷⁸⁵

Alexandria was the most defendable city in Egypt. It was protected by strong walls, and the water of the Nile surrounded it. ⁷⁸⁶ All people of Egypt, who did not want to be administrated by the Muslim Arabs, had fled to it and had fortified themselves in it.⁷⁸⁷ Amr advanced and laid siege to Alexandria.⁷⁸⁸ All its inhabitants were ready to resist him except the Copts who were double minded. The Copts asked for some time to cogitate but Amr refused. The siege prolonged for three months.⁷⁸⁹ After three months of siege Muqawqis of the town offered peace deal. At that time Heraclius was still alive and was at the helm of affairs. He didn’t approve Muqawqis’s proposal.⁷⁹⁰ Heraclius was confident of providing reinforcements to the besieged town via sea route which was still open. Heraclius’s sudden death at this juncture changed the schema. Like everywhere else in Byzantine Rome, the war of succession divided the Roman population of Alexandria bitterly.⁷⁹¹ As Byzantine Rome remained in a state of flux due to disputes of succession, commander in chief General Valentine was unable to commit any troops to Egypt.⁷⁹² When things started settling in Constantinople, the Roman King sent troops to Alexandria, closed the gates of the city and announced to Umar his readiness for war.⁷⁹³ Muslims were aware of divisions among the population of Alexandria. They got boldened by it.⁷⁹⁴ Still, they did not try to recruit the dissidents as fifth columnists. They distrusted them.⁷⁹⁵ Apparently, the central government of Byzantine Rome failed to send enough reinforcements to the town to repel the besieging Medinan Caliphate army. Disppointed, people of Alexandria sent Cyrus for truce, who was re-appointed by Constans [Heraclius younger].⁷⁹⁶ The Roman soldiers in Alexandria left for Cyprus under general Theodore and Muslims entered the city without effort.⁷⁹⁷ Amr took whatever was present in the town but he did not take any captives or kill anybody.⁷⁹⁸ The town must have fallen to Muslim Arabs by the end of September 642 CE.⁷⁹⁹

Amr returned to Alyuna along with Muslim cavalry. Medinan Caliphate kept Alyuna as its administrative head quarter in Egypt.⁸⁰⁰

The Coptic population of Egypt had not seen invading Arabs as their saviors. Neither Arabs saw them as their allies.⁸⁰¹ However, Coptics were apt to accommodate with Arab rule. After Arab occupation of Alexandria Abba Benjamin, the patriarch of Coptics, returned to the city in the thirteenth year after his flight from Romans.⁸⁰² ⁸⁰³

Conquest of the Maghreb

Medinan Caliphate’s intrusion in Africa westwards continued after subjugation of Egypt. A flat coastal road connected Alexandria to the town of Barqa.⁸⁰⁴ Whole region surrounding this road, sandwiched between desert to the south and the Mediterranean to the north, was called Barqa by Islamic sources.⁸⁰⁵ ⁸⁰⁶ Barqa was dominated by the mountain range known as the Jabal Akhdar and attracted enough rainfall to provide a fertile hinterland for agricultural settlements.⁸⁰⁷ Officially Barqa was a province of Byzantine Rome.⁸⁰⁸ After establishing administrative mechanisms in Egypt, Amr invaded Barqa in 642 CE and conquered the area up to the town of Barqa. Once Egypt subjugated, Berqa neither had defenses nor any hope of reinforcement from emperor Constans of Byzantine Rome. Its conquest was an easy affair.⁸⁰⁹ Inhabitants of Barqa were the most docile of all the conquered lands, according to Baladhuri. They kept paying their Kharāj without demand notice from the governor of Egypt.⁸¹⁰

During his adventures in Barqa Amr came across Berber nomads.⁸¹¹ To the south of coast of Barqa, in the pre-desert land, there lived warlike Berber tribe of Luwātah. They could never be controlled properly by Byzantine Romans. Amr continued the same policy of keeping them semi-independent.⁸¹² Hoyland thinks that Baladhuri’s statement that “Amr compelled Luwātah to sell their children and wives in order to pay the jizyah” is an allusion of vibrant slave trade.⁸¹³ ⁸¹⁴

Medinan Caliphate got defeated near Sub-Saharan Africa

The rule is fittest to survive, not the mightiest to survive. Hare lives in the same jungle where lion lives. Vivid case illustration is Medinan Caliphate’s defeat at the hands of Nubians in 642 CE.⁸¹⁵ To the south of Egypt, between Aswan in modern Egypt and Wadi Halfa in North Sudan, there lived a small country. Its name was Nūba.⁸¹⁶ Whole region was fully christianized.⁸¹⁷

Boldened by his successes in Egypt and Barqa, Amr sent a detachment of cavalry under command of Uqba bin Nafi )Uqbah bin Nāfi’ عُقبَه بِن نافِع ) of Fihr clan of Quraysh to Nūba.⁸¹⁸ The fight was unexpectedly fierce and Medinan Caliphate’s defeat was solid.⁸¹⁹ Baladhuri gives the superior military skills of Nubians as cause of defeat. “Nubians were master of arrow throwing. Their aim never missed. They aimed at eyes. Arabs lost 150 eyes in the raid. Arabs were used to sword warfare”, he asserts.⁸²⁰

Amr was reluctant to digest the defeat.⁸²¹ It was only his successor, Abdullah bin Sa’d, governor of Egypt who made formal truce agreement with Nūba, with boundary demarcation, around 650 CE during the Caliphate of Uthman.⁸²² An Auxilary bilateral trade agreement (muwāda’ah) was also signed, according to which, Nūba would trade slaves with Medinan Caliphate in return for food.⁸²³

Southward thrust of Medinan Caliphate halted in Africa

Resilience of Nūba, no doubt, halted Medinan Caliphate’s advance into Sub-Saharan Africa via an overland route. ⁸²⁴ Relations between Ethiopia (Axum) and Medinan Caliphate were not at their best. We get a clue to it from Ibn Ishaq that in 630 CE there was a suspicion of attack from Ethiopia and Prophet Muhammad had to take defensive measures.⁸²⁵ We again hear that Umar sent a naval campaign against Ethiopia on hearing rumours of invasion in 641 CE.⁸²⁶ Ethiopia (Axum) had already passed its prime.⁸²⁷ In the past Ethiopia had invaded Yemen. Arab Muslims had all reasons to capture Ethiopia but they did not throw a single arrow in that direction. Halt of Arab Muslim offensive by Nūba spared life of Axum. By this time Medinan Caliphate had naval capacity. ⁸²⁸ Sea route was open to them, but Umar was reluctant to use navy in wars.⁸²⁹

Fustat established

After the ill-fated expedition of Nūba, army of Medinan Caliphate got busy in establishing a cantonment town for themselves to administrate the newly acquired territory. They selected Giza but Umar did not approve it. He did not want the river a hurdle between Medina and the cantonment. The site of cantonment town of Fustat (Fusṭāṭ فُسطاط ) was thus selected on the right bank of Nile just near Alyuna.⁸³⁰ Fustat is derived from Latin Fossatum, meaning a place surrounded by defensive ditch.⁸³¹

Further extension in the Maghreb

Disappointed by defeat in Nūba Amr decided to expand eastwards. In 643 CE he marched along the coast of Mediterranean up to the town of Tripoli (Ṭarābulus طَرابُلَس ) and conquered it and its surrounding districts.⁸³² ⁸³³ ⁸³⁴ He wished to continue further east to conquer the Byzantine Roman province of Ifriqyia )upper half of modern Tunis (but Umar forbade him harshly saying ‘it is widely dispersed and no one shall raid it as long I remain alive.’ Umar did not see any revenue advantage there.⁸³⁵

Restrained by Umar in his eastwards march, Amr sent his field commander Busr bin Artat (Busr bin Abi Arṭāt بُسر بِن اَبِي أرطاة ) to south to occupy Waddān and its surrounding Fazzān in modern southern Libya, up to Zawīlah.⁸³⁶ ⁸³⁷ None of these cities and regions had power to resist the invading army as we don’t hear of any fierce battles there.

Amr appointed Uqba bin Nafi as lieutenant governor over Barqa, Tripoli, and Fazzān combined together in one region, which he called al-Maghrib.⁸³⁸ Medinan Caliphate didn’t have any intention to create enormously big provinces. Neither had it aspired to create numerous provinces. Generally, the area at the border of Arabian Peninsula became a main province after its conquest. The farther areas, adjacent to the main one, became a ‘provincially administered territory’ attached to it.⁸³⁹

Medinan Caliphate eyes on Armenia

The highlands jammed between south-eastern portion of Taurus Mountains and the Black Sea used to be called Armenia. Its western boundary was arbitrarily high reaches of river Euphrates and its tributary Yesilimak River in modern eastern Turkey. In the east lesser Caucasus Mountains and Zanagur range separated it from Azerbaijan.⁸⁴⁰ ⁸⁴¹ ⁸⁴² Jurzān with its main town Tbilisi (Tiflīs) was a part of Armenia.⁸⁴³ It had a dry and hot summer but a short and cold winter with a lot of snow.

Armenians had developed a strong sense of nationalism by seventh century CE. Many of them used to live in countries and territories beyond limit of historic Armenia. Even they shared the nationalist feelings with their country fellows living in Armenia proper.⁸⁴⁴ All Armenians were Christians. Even those Armenians living in regions other than Armenia itself were Christians. In line with their strong nationalistic affiliations, they had their own Armenian Church.⁸⁴⁵ Being mainly pastureland, core trade of Armenians was military service. Armenia was main recruiting ground for both Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran.⁸⁴⁶

Pre Islamic political state

The tiny nation of Armenia abode at the confluence of three major powers, Byzantine Rome to their southwest, Sasanian Iran to their southeast and Khazar Empire to their northwest. This very fact became their biggest nightmare. After dissolution of kingdom of Armenia in 428 CE, the area became a main conflicting point between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran, with Turks (including Khazars) in the north trying to contribute proportional to their stature. And the very fact that Armenia was highland with rugged terrain became their nature’s gift. Nobody could subjugate them completely.⁸⁴⁷ By the end of 6^th century CE, Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran had divided Armenia among themselves on paper.⁸⁴⁸ Byzantine Sasanian borders ran just east of Erzurum, then south along the Gunek River, then south along the River Batman, then east along the Tigris to just beyond Hasankeyf, and then south in Mesopotamia along the Khabour river to the Euphrates at Busayrah.⁸⁴⁹ ⁸⁵⁰ ⁸⁵¹ ⁸⁵² Armenians, being independent minded martial race, proved difficult for both Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran to control. Once emperor Maurice wrote to Khosrau II Parvez about Armenian Princes: ‘there is a crooked and disobedient people which dwells between us and causes trouble. Come now, I shall assemble mine and send them to Thrace. Assemble yours and have them taken east. Should they die, [our] enemies will be the one dying, should they kill others it will be our enemies who perish, and we shall live in peace. But should they remain in their own country, we shall have not rest’. ⁸⁵³ Sebeos preserves a brave attempt on the part of Armenians to snatch independence during reign of Khosrau II Parvez, which was crushed by joint forces of Byzantine Rome and Iran.⁸⁵⁴ Sebeos asserts that they would have succeeded in gaining independence provided Huns (Western Turks) would not have threatened them, due to which they were compelled to compromise.⁸⁵⁵

Byzantine Romans used their brand of religion as an ideological weapon to subjugate other nations. In case of Armenia they failed bitterly. Once Emperor Maurice issued an order for Armenians to accept Chalcedonian Christianity but few Armenians joined it.⁸⁵⁶ Wrangling of both, state and non-state actors, continued in Armenia even after truce of 628 CE between Sasanian Iran and Byzantine Rome.⁸⁵⁷ Muslim conquest of Syria, Palestine and Jazirah had diverted attention of Byzantine Roman central government from Armenia. Heraclius’s attempts to unify Armenian Church with his own Monothelite church, and crisis of succession after Heraclius’s death had created local turbulence in Armenia which had encouraged naxaras, or Armenian lords, to engage into strife among themselves. They and their powerful and proud families were on the way to independence.⁸⁵⁸ ⁸⁵⁹ Control of Byzantine Rome over its Armenia remained loose after truce of 628 CE and apparently Sasanian Iran was in no position to play any role in Iranian Armenia after its defeat at Qadisiyyah.

First Medinan Caliphate attack

The Medinan Caliphate’s reason to eye on Armenia might not be booty as its timber was difficult to export out in a cost-effective manner.⁸⁶⁰ Medinan Caliphate was struggling with Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran simultaneously. Desire to cut off their supply of new recruits was the main incentive.

Unlike Syria, inhabitants of Armenia were armed. Byzantine Rome never imposed its prohibition against possession, sale or purchase of weapons by private individuals in its Armenian territories. The terrain, the remoteness of the area, together with local traditions, probably hindered any such enforcement.⁸⁶¹ Anyhow, the contentiousness of Armenians had made it impossible for them to organize an effective defense against Medinan Caliphate. Their ecclesiastical disagreements concerning Chalcedonism and Monotheletism and their internal division and strive were fundamental local impetus favouring Medinan Caliphate.⁸⁶² ⁸⁶³

The first Armenian raid by Medinan Caliphate was in late fall of 640 CE⁸⁶⁴ It originated from Jazirah under command of Iyad bin Ghanm.⁸⁶⁵ Kaegi guesses that Iyad’s army might be five thousand strong.⁸⁶⁶ That was the time when Amr’s army had held all of lower Egypt and Heraclius was still in shock of potential loss of whole of Egypt. The news of the raid might have increased his sorrows as he was ethnic Armenian.⁸⁶⁷ As no attempt can be traced on part of Iyad to leave permanent garrisons inside Armenia during this campaign, it appears that the purpose of the assault was to prevent Armenian raids on Jazirah.⁸⁶⁸ ⁸⁶⁹

During this invasion Iyad bin Ghanm could not penetrate further than Bidlis and khilāṭ, though he could enrich himself and his men by plundering Armenian towns and countryside.⁸⁷⁰ ⁸⁷¹ ⁸⁷² ⁸⁷³ By 639 CE Theodore Rshtuni, an Armenian prince, had emerged stronger than others and had united the eastern and western parts of Armenia. There is no evidence that he organized any serious resistance to this raid.⁸⁷⁴ ⁸⁷⁵ Though nothing material could be gained by this invasion, Medinan Caliphate had laid its teeth on Armenia. ⁸⁷⁶ ⁸⁷⁷

The unhindered penetration of Iyad in Armenia and his unscathed return was an eye opener for the new Byzantine emperor, Constans II. He recognized Theodors Rshtuni’s strong position in Armenia and appointed him general and patriarch in early 642 CE.⁸⁷⁸ Constan II’s efforts in Armenia bore fruit. Armenia experienced second Muslim invasion in summer of 643 CE.⁸⁷⁹ This time the invasion originated from the region of Azerbaijan under command of Habib bin Maslama.⁸⁸⁰ ⁸⁸¹ He divided his army into three battalions. They ransacked three different regions of Armenia. The army, in the end, got repulsed after losing three thousand of its soldiers due to defensive manoeuvres of Theodore Rshtuni.⁸⁸² ⁸⁸³ Therefore, Armenia remained a semi-independent ally of Byzantine Rome for a decade or so.⁸⁸⁴

Mass evacuation of conquered lands

As Medinan Caliphate’s offensive started, developed and spread into Syria, Jazirah, Egypt, and elsewhere, a significant movement of people from one region to another took place.⁸⁸⁵ Initially, during the conquest of Syria, Medinan Caliphate simply allowed those who disliked being subject (ra’iyyah) of Medinan Caliphate, to flee to the country of their choice.⁸⁸⁶ Naturally, Medinan Caliphate did not wish to manage hugely hostile populations.⁸⁸⁷ Initially, they did not include allowance of exodus in their formal peace treaties as a term. It was a tacit understanding. Later, when they occupied Egypt, this arrangement had to be formalized in peace treaty.⁸⁸⁸ The Egyptian public did not have any route to escape except by sea, which could be astronomically expensive.

Such policies were not original Muslim invention. This practice can be traced to Late Romans, Byzantine Romans and Sasanian Iranians as far back as fourth century CE.⁸⁸⁹

Almost all refugees of Arab invasion fled to the lands still under occupation of Byzantine Rome. For example, people of Bālis and Qinnasirīn fled to Arḍ Rūm.⁸⁹⁰ Tribe of Iyād bin Nazīr of Jazirah took the same direction.⁸⁹¹

Apparently, fleeing people had to leave behind their immovable property.⁸⁹² Nothing is known about social and economic status of those who left for Byzantine territories. It can be safely assumed that they were primarily those individuals who were closely connected with Orthodox Church and the Byzantine government, mainly ethnic Greeks and few Arabs, most of them wealthy merchants and craftsmen.⁸⁹³ Territories controlled by Byzantine Rome should have been flooded by refugees as a result of mass exodus.

Economic immigration of Arabs

Another far reaching result of Medinan Caliphate’s conquest of Byzantine Rome’s eastern provinces was movement of Arabs from Arabian Peninsula to the newly acquired areas. Islamic sources mention on numberless occasions that Medinan Caliphate settled Arabs in newly occupied areas. For example, they were settled in Sinjār.⁸⁹⁴ This was, actually, economic immigration on large scale. Probably they were members of those tribes who had not participated in the war and didn’t get booty. The state allotted them the lands abandoned by the fleeing refugees.⁸⁹⁵

Population of Arabia thinned out

Arabia got devoid of population as a result of, first Ridda Wars, then large scale recruitment in army, and later mass immigration. Hejaz must be adversely affected because it was already thinly populated due to its desert like conditions. Only Muslims of Hejaz were expected to participate in the war. Non-Muslims were exempt from military service in lieu of Jizyah. Population of non-Muslims surged as a result. Umar might have seen this situation as a security threat. Baladhuri informs us, “People of Najran [who had retained their Christian faith] increased tremendously during caliphate of Umar. Umar considered them a menace to Islam. They had started usury. He expelled them to Syria and Iraq and granted them permission to clear virgin lands there and be owner of those lands in lieu of their lands in Najran. So many Najranis went there that they made a new township near Kufa and named it al-Najrānīyah”.⁸⁹⁶ Similar arguments might be at work in expulsion of certain Jewish groups to Syria.

Demographic changes across the region

Fleeing of refugees from occupied areas out of fear and migration of Arabs to fill the vacuum were not the only demographic changes that took place during Futuhul Buldan. Medinan Caliphate generated large scale shuffling of populations for political and security reasons as well. This kind of reshuffling was a deliberate effort to change the demography. Many pathways can be traced in historic sources. One was to allure Arab population of newly occupied areas to settle in far off border areas. For example Abu Ubayda settled Arabs of Syrian origin in Bālis.⁸⁹⁷ Another was to settle in coastal cities of Syria those population groups, especially Persians, who would not be pro-Byzantine.⁸⁹⁸

Deporting whole of hostile population to far off localities was not unusual in the Middle East. Once King Maurice ordered thirty thousand Armenian families to be deported to Thrace in 595 CE.⁸⁹⁹

Such state policies and internal and external immigrations made populations of Syria and Mesopotamia more homogenous than before. On the other hand, it made Anatolia less homogenous because of the resettlement of certain refugees.⁹⁰⁰

Changes inside Byzantine Rome

Disgraceful defeat at the hands of people, whom they considered inferior, definitely shook Byzantine Rome to its foundations. However, for the sake of integrity of the remaining country, the ruling circles of Byzantine Rome kept a brave face. They tended to deflect any responsibility from Heraclius or even from ordinary soldiers. They used the folly of Byzantine generals as a scapegoat. They did not admit that Muslims won due to their superior military general ship, tactics, morale, and strategy.⁹⁰¹ An eight century source from Spain writing in Latin, and whose sources are oriental or Byzantine, claims that ‘Saracens, influenced by their leader Muhammad, conquered and devastated Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia more by stealth than by manliness and not so much by open invasions as by persisting in stealthy raids.⁹⁰² ⁹⁰³ This kind of political stance was to boost public moral. The leaders knew the facts. They had to perform now. Muslims did not attack a static and gravely weakened Byzantine Rome. Rather they invaded a country off balance and at a very awkward time of trying to restore and unify its borders and people. It quickly started balancing itself after initial jolt.⁹⁰⁴

Byzantine Rome definitely faced law and order situation inside its boundaries when weakness of the state army became apparent to its citizens. We hear of a chief of un-Arab and un-Islamic name of Qanan, for example, who took some captives in Southern Anatolia and killed the Byzantine general who challenged him.⁹⁰⁵ It might have taken a few decades for the state to settle the refugees and restore law and order.

To reassess their resources and strengths Byzantine Rome re-surveyed lands between late 636 CE and January 641 CE.⁹⁰⁶ The occurrence of census confirms that the government remained functional.⁹⁰⁷

The expenses for the unsuccessful Byzantine defense of the Eastern Provinces are unknown, but they were very substantial, in terms of salaries, stipends, provisions, arms, logistics, and shipping. Of course, the permanent loss of Byzantine tax revenues as a result of the Muslim conquests was enormous. It necessarily resulted in many changes in Byzantine fiscal and administrative strucre.⁹⁰⁸

As a deterrent to further invasions Byzantine Rome prohibited sale of arms and iron to its enemies.⁹⁰⁹

Political thoughts of non-Muslim subjects of Medinan Caliphate

By far whichever areas Medinan Caliphate snatched from Byzantine Rome were predominantly Christian. Christians of ex- Byzantine eastern provinces, who chose not to leave, had to develop coping mechanisms to deal with the new situation. Anastasius of Sinai, a Chalcedonean monk of late seventh century is quoted in the dialogue between Papiscus and Philo to have said:

Do not say that we Christians are today afflicted and enslaved.
This is the greatest thing, that though persecuted and fought by
so many, our faith stands and does not cease, nor is our empire
abolished, nor are our churches closed. But amid the peoples
who dominate and persecute us, we have churches, we erect
crosses, found churches and engage in sacrifices.⁹¹⁰

Anastasius is responding to a taunting Jew who cites total control of ‘Saracens’ over Christians a proof that God didn’t favour them. Anastius takes comfort in two facts. One, that Christian faith still exists and prospers in the lands controlled by Muslims. Second, Byzantine Rome still exists. Worth noting is that Anastasius’s political affiliation is still with Byzantine Rome. Probably he dreams that one day Byzantine Rome will grow strong and reoccupy the areas it lost to Medinan Caliphate.⁹¹¹

Probably Jews living in conquered areas of Medinan Caliphate didn’t have to develop new coping mechanisms. For them it was just a change of masters.⁹¹²

Muslim Arabs extinguish Sasanian Iran

The other world power did extremely poorly in face of Arab invasion as compared to Byzantine Rome. A Christian eyewitness to the Arab Muslim’s conquest of ancient kingdom of Iran summarizes the saga deftly, “Then God brought up against them [Persians] the sons of Ishmael, (banū Ismā’īl) who were [as many] as the sands on the seashore. Their leader was Muhammad. Neither walls nor gates stood up before them, nor did weapon or shields, and they dominated the entire land of the Persians. Now Yazdegerd sent countless troops against them, but the Arabs destroyed all of them and killed Rustam too.” ⁹¹³ ⁹¹⁴

Answer to the question how did it happen requires many pages.

Geography and people of Iran

Sasanian Iran was a large country. It lodged on all those areas which currently accommodate part of Iraq west of Euphrates, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan portion of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, southern half of Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.⁹¹⁵ When a country grows bigger than a certain size, it inevitably becomes multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual. Sasanian Iran was no exception to this formula.

Pahlavi speaking ethnic Iranians made core of the population. They were dominant politically and socially. King belonged to this group.⁹¹⁶ Other ethnicities, anyhow, were not less important. Arabs were abundant in Swad. ⁹¹⁷ Kurds used to live in Zagros Mountains. ⁹¹⁸ Ethnic Armenians predominated north-western parts.⁹¹⁹ Parthians were significant in eastern parts of the country.⁹²⁰ Medes used to live in central areas of the country.⁹²¹ Ethnic Jews (as opposed to Jewish religion) had their presence too.⁹²²

Being multi-ethnic automatically means being multi-lingual. As expected, main language of Iranians was Middle Persian (Pahlavi).⁹²³ It was medium of almost all literary expression.⁹²⁴ However, many other languages were widespread. Parthian, Sogdian, Khwarizimian, Khotanese, Saka and Bactrian all had their share.⁹²⁵

Religions of Iran

An inscription written on the ka’ba-ye Zartosht, near modern Shiraz, by a Zoroastrian high priest Kartir, in 3^rd century CE announces, “Jews, Sramans [Buddhists], Brahmins [Hindus], Nasoreans [Nestorian Christians], Christians [Gnostic Christians], Maktak [Baptisers], and Zandiks [Manichaeans] in the empire were smitten, and destruction of idols and scattering of the stores of the devs [Demons] and god-seats and nests was abandoned.” ⁹²⁶ Sasanian Iran was a multi-religious country.

Zoroastrianism maintained its supreme position as official religion throughout the times of Sasanian dynasty, as is evident by presence of its symbol, a fire alter, on all Sasanian coins.⁹²⁷ However, Sasanian Iran was too vast a country, and open to too many currents of belief, for the state religion ever to obliterate all other creeds.⁹²⁸
By late Sasanian period, religious landscape of Iran started changing dramatically. Christianity, had taken root in Iran centuries ago.⁹²⁹ Initially, they were persecuted by majority Zoroastrians, as is evident from the ka’ba-ye Zartosht inscription, mentioned above. This was the situation up to the reign of usurper Bahram Chubin (Bahrām Chūbīn) when Isho’uahb, the patriarch of Nestorian Church flatly refused to accompany the fleeing king Khosrau II Parves to king Maurice of Byzantine Rome as he was afraid that such behavior on his part could invite wrath of Bahram Chubin and he might prosecute the Christian minority. ⁹³⁰ Christian’s situation changed conclusively during reign of Khosrau II Parves, who came to power with the help of Byzantine Christians. Khosrau was not a friend to Christians by heart but he had to maintain this demeanor publically.⁹³¹ Conversion to Christianity speeded up. Khosrau’s Christian wife Shirin (Shīrīn شِيرِين ) established a monastery. She used to preach the gospel of the Kingdom at the court bravely. None of the Zoroastrians at the court dared to say anything about Christians. On behest of Shirin many nobles of the court had converted to Christianity during of Khusrau parvez’ tenure.⁹³² Khosrau was definitely not very pleased with the situation. He banned conversion of religion from the paternal one, with death penalty for it. ⁹³³ Still, due to swollen numbers of Christians, the king had to admire them. ‘On the great feast of Psalm Sunday, Christians went to the entrance of King’s [of Khosrau parvez] chamber and worshipfully read the Gospel. They received present s from the king, and departed. And no one dared to say anything to them’. ⁹³⁴

The Zoroastrian clergy did not sit idle. They kept trying to impose their religion on Christians, for example Armenians, with failure.⁹³⁵

Due to ongoing tussle of the two religions, and growing power of Christians, Khosrau ultimately had to take the position that “all are physically our servants, but as for spiritual matters, He Who judges souls knows about them.” ⁹³⁶

After Khosrau’s death and with start of Sasanian civil war, the Iranian Christians lost any fear of being persecuted. They grew bold.⁹³⁷ By 7^th century, Christian communities were present in nearly every province of Sasanian Iran, both western and eastern. Many Christians were ethnic Persians.⁹³⁸ Christian presence is confirmed up to Merv, where Elijah, the metropolitan of Merv, ‘converted many people among the Turks and of other nations’.⁹³⁹ ⁹⁴⁰ Fragments of old testament psalms written in Pahlavi are found in Turkmenistan.⁹⁴¹

Politics of Iran

A hint of civil war in Sasanian Iran came when a general by name of Bahram Chubin, appointed by the sitting constitutional king Hormozd in the border areas of Caucasia, got ambitious to wear the crown in 590 CE.⁹⁴² ⁹⁴³ The king did not get enough support by other parts of the army and some nobles of the court actually murdered Hormozd and crowned his son Khosrau II Parvez instead.⁹⁴⁴ As Bahram’s main intention was to be king by himself, he did not recognize Khosrau II Parvez’s legitimacy. Rather he attacked the capital city as head of rebellious army and Khosrau II Parvez had to flee to Qarqisiya, a border town of Byzantine Rome.⁹⁴⁵ ⁹⁴⁶ King Maurice of Byzantine Rome approved Khosrau’s application to grant him soldiers so he could re-claim his throne.⁹⁴⁷ Favours carry price. Khosrau would have to return the occupied Byzantine territories and to treat the Iranian Christians well in case he succeeded.⁹⁴⁸ Khosrau could defeat Bahram and could reclaim his throne but damage had already been done.⁹⁴⁹ Sasanian Iran’s constitution had shattered forever. It happened for the first time in history of Sasanian Iran that a king was crowned by nobles rather than by predecessor king (Khosrau II Parvez after murder of Hormozd). It also happened for the first time in Sasanian Iran’s history that a king was installed by foreign troops rather than by consultation among ruling families (Khosrau II Parvez after defeat of king Bahram).

Khosrau II Parvez proved to be an able ruler and could hold power for twenty eight years.⁹⁵⁰ He could even crush some coup attempts by his generals during his reign.⁹⁵¹ When the king got weak in the wake of defeat at the hands of Heraclius at Nineveh, the renegade generals dethroned and murdered him and crowned his son Qubad II.⁹⁵² ⁹⁵³

This was the start of cascade of events which are generally termed as Sasanian Civil War. Iranian army split into three contending fractions.⁹⁵⁴ None of them was powerful enough to eliminate the other. Iranian masses supported house of Sasan, even if it had weakened.⁹⁵⁵ When general Shahvarāz. proclaimed himself king instead of installing a king of his own choice from house of Sasan, he was killed by ordinary soldiers of his troops when he was attending a guard of honor ceremony in full royal costume.⁹⁵⁶ Under these circumstances the mutually opposing generals were left with only one option. Each of them had to enthrone a member of house of Sasan provided the said member was deemed to fulfill ambitions of the fraction which enthroned him/her. Iran witnessed multiple rulers in a short span of five years, all equally weak and helpless.⁹⁵⁷

Finally came the rule of Yazdegerd III (Yazdekert, Yazkert, son of Kawad, grandson of Khosrau II Parvez.⁹⁵⁸ ⁹⁵⁹ He was a feeble boy of seven years.⁹⁶⁰

First casualty of a civil war is economy. By the time of Arab Muslim’s invasion, Sasanian Iran’s economy had crashed.⁹⁶¹ Central government was unable to maintain the necessary infrastructure needed for economic activities and wealth generation. For example, they had failed to repair the breaches in the irrigation system of Swad from where the leaking water had converted fertile lands into marshes. ⁹⁶² When Arab Muslims conquered Tyswn they couldn’t believe their eyes. The famed town was dirty, full of pests, and non-conducive for their living.⁹⁶³

Muslim Arabs invade Iran

Immediately Umar came to power he decided to open second front.⁹⁶⁴ Army of Medinan Caliphate had not yet established a secure base in Syria; even it had not inflicted the backbone breaking injury on Byzantine Rome in the Battle of Yarmouk, when troops of Medinan Caliphate crossed the Euphrates over a bridge opposite Hira to invade Sasanian Iran in November of 634 CE.⁹⁶⁵ ⁹⁶⁶

Umar had been observing contracting influence of Sasanian Iran in world affairs over the last couple of years after murder of Khosrau II Parvez. He was aware of civil war in Iran which had crippled its economy and government machinery. He had noted incoherent efforts on the Sasanian side, if any, to repulse troops of Khalid bin Walid during his conquest of Iraq. However, he dangerously underestimated defences of Sasanian Iran when he raised a small army of one thousand men in Medina and ordered it to march towards Iran under command of relatively unknown figure of Abu Ubaid bin Mas’ud (Abu ‘Ubaid bin Mas’ūd اَبُو عُبَيد بِن مَسعُود ) of Thaqif tribe.⁹⁶⁷ Though Umar ordered Muthanna, already ruling Hira in Umar’s name, to joint Abu Ubaid with his men, and according to Baladhuri, Abu Ubaid gathered many tribesmen on his way to Iraq, number of this army is still expected to be small.⁹⁶⁸

Again the motive of the army was holy war and plunder, as far as Baladhuri knows.⁹⁶⁹

Initially, this army of Abu Ubaid had a few clashes with Sasanian Iran’s border guards in Iraq.⁹⁷⁰ Queen Būrān (Būrāndukht), daughter of Qubad II was sitting on Iranian throne by this time. (Probably she was regent for Yazdegerd III or there were two kings in Iran simultaneously, which is possible during a civil war). Generals Rustam and Fīruzān were actual custodians of the affairs of the monarchy.⁹⁷¹ Ya’qubi blames that both of them were weak and contemptible.⁹⁷² ⁹⁷³

‘On hearing that the Arabs were massing their forces, the Iranians sent General Rustam Mardānshah as head of four thousand men, armed from head to toe and supported with elephants’.⁹⁷⁴ ⁹⁷⁵ (What camel is to lorry and horse is to armored car in modern warfare, elephant is to tank). The Iranian army cut the Medinan Caliphate’s army to pieces in a few hours. Abu Ubaid got slain on the battle field.⁹⁷⁶ Survivors fled for their lives. Muthanna was one of the survivors, who escaped to Ullais from where he relayed the news to Umar.⁹⁷⁷

This Battle of Jisr, (معركة الجسر) which is also called the Battle of Quss and Battle of Nāṭif is not mentioned by any non-Muslim source.⁹⁷⁸ Muslim sources blame multiple factors for the defeat including havoc of elephants, difference of opinion among Muslims before the battle, inexperience of Abu Ubaid etc. but none makes Umar responsible for it.⁹⁷⁹

The debacle was a surprise to Medinan Caliphate at a time when they had got used to news of victory. All Umar’s plans for Sasanian Iran stood still for at least one year.⁹⁸⁰ Arabs got reluctant to wrangle with Iran.⁹⁸¹ Umar’s main dilemma was how to raise a strong army to bring Iran to its knees. Almost all able bodied men from loyal tribes had already been recruited in the army that was busy in Syria. That was the main reason Umar had sent a miniature army of thousand men to Battle of Jisr. Umar had to extend olive branch towards hostile tribes who had fought Medinan Caliphate during Ridda Wars. Umar had already started working in this direction. One of the first steps Umar took after coming to power was returning the captives of defeated tribes of Ridda Wars, whom Abu Bakr had kept as hostages for guarantee of their tribe’s good behavior.⁹⁸² ⁹⁸³

Despite odds Umar did not lose hope of subjugating Iran. He remained confident of his analysis of Iran’s frailty. News of Byzantine Roman defeat at Yarmouk in August of 636 CE would have boosted moral of Arabs. Umar could re-negotiate the remuneration of military that would attack Iran. Jarir bin Abdullah (Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah جَرِير بِن عَبدُ اللّه ) of Bajila tribe asked for one fourth of the booty in case he and his men participate in the war. Umar agreed.⁹⁸⁴ ⁹⁸⁵ Medinan Caliphate had not yet packed up the recruitment camp which it had established in vicinity of Medina before attack on Syria. Arabs still flocked to this camp from far and near and the caliph used to dispatch them to the war sector of his choice. This time, when a body of Azd came with intent to invade Syria, Umar could redirect them to Iran arousing their interest in the spoils to be taken from the Kisra family.⁹⁸⁶ They accepted the orders hesitantly as Umar left only one option for them.⁹⁸⁷ ⁹⁸⁸ Umar ordered his governor of Basrah Abu Musa Asha’ri to send reinforcement and he sent eight hundred men.⁹⁸⁹ Umar also wrote to Abu Ubayda bin Jirah in Syria to send reinforcement. He sent Qays bin Hubairah al Makshuh of Murād tribe with seven hundred men.⁹⁹⁰ ⁹⁹¹ ⁹⁹² Lately, Ghatafan, Asad, Tamim, Bakr bin Wa’il, Quda’a, Tayy and Abdul Qays all joined the military.⁹⁹³ ⁹⁹⁴ ⁹⁹⁵ Umar definitely had a tough time choosing commander of this army. It was Umar’s stated policy not to appoint a Bedouin over sedentary people.⁹⁹⁶ He had already demoted Khalid bin Walid. He won’t appoint Muthanna as it was not Umar’s policy to appoint a non-companion of the Prophet over men who had accepted Islam during lifetime of the Prophet. Probably, he also mistrusted non-Quraysh. The only time he had appointed a non-Quraysh so far was Abu Ubaid. And that was a small army of one thousand mainly comprising of Abu Ubaid’s own tribe – Thaqif. Ali flatly refused to take the challenge.⁹⁹⁷ At one stage Umar himself desired to lead the campaign but changed his mind on advise of Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib.⁹⁹⁸ At the long last Umar picked Sa’d bin Waqqas (Sa’d bin Abī Waqqāṣ سَعد بِن اَبى وَقّاص ) of Zahrah clan of Quraysh, one of the earliest converts to Islam.⁹⁹⁹

Not much is known about Iranian affairs during time period between the Battle of Jisr and Battle of Qadisiyyah. Most likely they buried their head in the sand after victory of Battle of Bridge. Their infighting was far from over.¹⁰⁰⁰ Iranian Shahanshah remained as powerful as is the king in the game of chess. Coups and counter-coups continued. In the long last they discarded Queen Būrān to give throne to Yazdegerd III. Tabari gives date of this incident January of 635 CE.¹⁰⁰¹ Umar noticed this event tensely. He suspected Iranians might have taken the first step towards national reconciliation.¹⁰⁰²¹⁰⁰³

Yazdegerd might have brought little positive change. Baladhuri mentions at least one Iranian attempt to dislodge Muslim Arabs from Iraq during this phase when Medinan Caliphate army was camping at Diār Hind, near Hira.¹⁰⁰⁴ The attempt ensued in July 636 CE.¹⁰⁰⁵ The Iranians sent Mihrān bin Mihribundādh, a resident of Hamedan at the head of twelve thousand men.¹⁰⁰⁶ They assaulted the Muslim army after crossing the bridge, but got repulsed.¹⁰⁰⁷ ¹⁰⁰⁸

Battle of Qadisiyyah

Epoch-making wars are fought and won/lost long before actual battle field. The battle is merely a drop scene of an epic drama played by both sides in the fields of economy, trade, culture, political organization, military preparedness and so on and so forth. The war that Muslim Arabs and Sasanian Iranians fought at a small village of Qadisiyyah (Qādisiyyah قادِسيَه ), located at the west bank of Euphrates was a short one that finished in less than a week.¹⁰⁰⁹ ¹⁰¹⁰ The aftereffects of the battle shaped political history of Asia for centuries to come. Battle of Qadisiyyah took place in January 638 CE.¹⁰¹¹

The flat area of Sasanian Iran located between lower reaches of Euphrates and Zagros Mountains and separated from Byzantine Rome by the boundary between two countries at Khābūr River is called Swad (Swād سواد ) by Islamic sources. This very fertile plane made up of alluvial gravel and irrigated by a network of canals, was a grain basket for Sasanian Iran.¹⁰¹² Moreover, it accommodated the most important city of Iran, its capital, Tysfwn.¹⁰¹³ Majority population of Swad was ethnic Persian and believed in Zoroastrian religion.

Despite their defeat in Battle of Jisr, Muslim Arabs had continued to raid the regions of Swad between Kaskar in the east and ‘Ain at Tamr in the west from their bases in Iraq.¹⁰¹⁴ ¹⁰¹⁵ According to Baladhuri, by this time the Persians had become emaciated and weak and feeble in Power.¹⁰¹⁶ Anyhow, they could no longer ignore the fact that enemy was knocking at their door. They raised an intimidating army of one twenty thousand men, supported by thirty elephants.¹⁰¹⁷ The army unfurled Dirafsh Kābiyān, the royal banner of Sasanian Iran, meaning common soldier got inspiration from nationalist sentiments.¹⁰¹⁸ They took oath to defending their motherland until they die in shadow of that banner.¹⁰¹⁹ The supreme commander of this gargantuan army was none other than Rustam.¹⁰²⁰ He ordered the army to camp on the eastern bank of the Euphrates opposite Hira while he devises strategy.¹⁰²¹

Army of Medinan Caliphate, which is reported to number between nine and ten thousand, lay camped on the western bank of the Euphrates near Qadisiyyah.¹⁰²² ¹⁰²³ The two armies kept staring at each other for four months, assessing each other’s strength and weakness, examining each other’s patience and guts and negotiating last ditch peace accord.¹⁰²⁴ ¹⁰²⁵ Rustam offered monitory compensation for Arab’s withdrawal from the war. Muslims remained obdurate that they were fighting for faith and not for worldly gains. They insisted on their classical demands: conversion, tribute or war.¹⁰²⁶ Medinan Caliphate utilized this time to transport all the troops from Arabia that were supposed to join their side.¹⁰²⁷ They established line of ration supply from Medina.¹⁰²⁸

The war lasted for four days.¹⁰²⁹ Rustam got slain at the battle field.¹⁰³⁰ No doubt he fought bravely. According to Baladhuri his body was found covered with so many blows and stabs that it was impossible to establish the fatal wound at his autopsy.¹⁰³¹ He left a legacy of martyr on Iranian historical memory. He is the main character of epic Iranian story of Rustam-o-Sohrāb.¹⁰³²

The Iranian forces didn’t perish at Qadisiyyah contrary to the Roman force at Yarmouk. They fled.¹⁰³³ Actually, Muslim strategy to fight against army twelve times bigger than theirs was to target the leaders and dishearten the common soldiers.¹⁰³⁴

Aftermath of Qadisiyyah

Qadisiyyah was a decisive battle according to Islamic sources.¹⁰³⁵ It is true that immediately after Qadisiyyah Sasanian Iran did not fall into the Arab’s cloak the way a fully ripe fruit falls off the tree after a little jolt to its branch. Arab’s took hefty twenty years, full of Wars, to conquer all the areas that once belonged to Sasanian Iran. But it is also true that after Qadisiyyah all the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t put Sasan together again. Qadisiyyah boosted confidence of Arab Muslims, ‘yes, they can do it!’ and it delivered a fatal blow to Iranian’s confidence to defend their country. It proved to be a turning point from where millennia old locally developed Iranian civilization gave way to Arab Islamic civilization.

Iranians were left with no means to protect their Swad and its towns. Muslim Arabs started occupying them one by one.¹⁰³⁶ When city of Bahurasīr surrendered after a short lived resistance of its guards, Sasanians could calculate that Muslims would target Tysfwn which was across Tigris, just opposite Bahurasīr.¹⁰³⁷ ¹⁰³⁸ Sasanians withdrew all the ships and ferry boats in the River Tigris to its eastern bank and burned its bridge to halt Muslim advance.¹⁰³⁹ Sa’d ordered few soldiers to swim across the river and to ride through it on the horseback while Iranian guards were showering arrows on them.¹⁰⁴⁰ When they landed on the other side the Iranians fled calling them ‘jinn’.¹⁰⁴¹ Reaching the other bank of river they compelled owners of ships anchored at the village of Ṣaiyādin, to transport baggage of Muslim army.¹⁰⁴² When Shahanshah Yazdegerd observed the dire situation, he resolved to flee to Hulwan (Ḥulwān حُلوَان) along with principal dignitaries of his kingdom, carrying with him the treasury of the kingdom and his precious but light (khiff) pieces of furniture, private treasury, wives and children. He was suspended in a basket form the wall of his White Palace (Qaṣr ul Abyaḍ قَصَرُ الاَ بيَض ) in Tysfwn to facilitate escape hurriedly.¹⁰⁴³ ¹⁰⁴⁴ Muslims, after crossing the River Tigris, took possession of Tysfwn.¹⁰⁴⁵ ¹⁰⁴⁶

Structure and capabilities of military of Medinan Caliphate.

How come Arab Muslims could defeat professionally trained militaries of, first Byzantine Rome and then Sasanian Iran? Two points need consideration. One, military training was not exhaustive for the soldiers of super powers. Theophanes gives us a glimpse of training levels. In 622 CE, during his campaign against Sasanian Iran, Heraclius halted at the Pass in Taurus Mountains [Gates]. There he recruited new army men and trained them in the art of war. Theophanes describes that, ‘He [Heraclius] divided his army into two battle lines and ordered them to engage each other without bloodshed. He taught them to maintain warlike cries, shouts, and paeans so that in the battle they would not be caught by surprise, but would take courage and march against their foes as into a game. At a later date he again formed two armed lines of battle. The men stood in their armour; there were trumpet calls and phalanxes of shields. After the regiments were well organized, he ordered them to engage each other: there were violent struggles and conflicts between them, and the appearance of warfare. It was like seeing the horrible, fearful spectacle without its danger, or men converging for murder without bloodshed, or the methods of force before force itself. Thus each man got a start from this dangerless slaughter and was more secure thereafter’.¹⁰⁴⁷ This was the total military training to his soldiers before they practically participated in a war.

Two, Arabs had experience of serving in imperial forces of Sasanian Iran and Byzantine Rome during fifth and sixth centuries CE. They had gained skill of military warfare and the use of military hardware.¹⁰⁴⁸ Main military equipment used in the combat was the lancet, the arrow, the shield, the coat of mail and the sword.¹⁰⁴⁹ All these equipment are well documented being used by pre-Islamic Arabs during their tribal warfare.

Battle of Jalula

Muslims had hardly spent a few days in occupation of Tysfwn when they received intelligence that Yazdegerd had amassed a large army at Jalula (Jalūlā’ جَلُولاء ). This army was still getting reinforcements from all over including Hulwan and Jibal (Jibāl جِبال ).¹⁰⁵⁰ ¹⁰⁵¹

Muslims decided preemptive strike before reinforcements make them bigger. Sa’d sent twelve thousand men under command of his nephew Hishām bin ‘Utbah. ¹⁰⁵² ¹⁰⁵³ Persians were led by Khurrazād, brother of Rustam. Persians had left their families and heavy luggage at Khāniqin and had pledged not to flee. They had dug trenches and had thus fortified themselves. The battle was fierce. Muslims drove Persians out of their positions and compelled them to flee. Then Muslims pursued them until darkness prevailed. ¹⁰⁵⁴ ¹⁰⁵⁵ Battle of Jalula proved to be Yarmouk of Iran. Almost whole Sasanian army got routed in the battle.¹⁰⁵⁶ Baladhuri assigns January of 638 CE to this battle, meaning battle of Qadisiyyah, surrender of Tyswn and battle of Jalula were in quick succession.¹⁰⁵⁷

Muslims hurriedly occupied the remaining cities and towns of Swad.¹⁰⁵⁸ Though Iranians were in the midst of civil war when Muslim Arabs invaded them, it appears that the general population was still loyal to their king and the state. Arabs did not find any unsatisfied groups of population in Swad as they had found at Syria or Egypt. They had to resort to violence to subdue the population. Anecdotal stories of execution of a dihqan (dihqān دِهقان ) on charges of treachery have survived to this date.¹⁰⁵⁹ It means the population over which Arabs were going to govern was hostile to them.¹⁰⁶⁰ Sa’d made Hira administrative capital of the newly acquired territories of Medinan Caliphate, dumping centuries old capital of Tysfwn.¹⁰⁶¹

Once power consolidated over Swad, Sa’d ordered Jarir bin Abdullah to advance to Hulwan with three thousand men.¹⁰⁶² ¹⁰⁶³ The force capitulated Hulwan without any resistance.¹⁰⁶⁴

When Shahansah Yazdegerd heard of approaching Muslim army to Hulwan he slipped off to Isfahan.¹⁰⁶⁵ ¹⁰⁶⁶ ¹⁰⁶⁷ It was the starting point of Yazdegerd’s long and arduous journey of internal self-exile, which ultimately culminated in his assassination in 652 CE in Merv.¹⁰⁶⁸ ¹⁰⁶⁹¹⁰⁷⁰ ¹⁰⁷¹

Now, Jarir attempted on Dinavar (Dīnavar دِيناوَر ) with failure, though he could capitulate Qarsāsīn.¹⁰⁷² ¹⁰⁷³

Mass reshuffling of population continues

People who did not wish to be subject of Medinan Caliphate fled from the freshly occupied areas of Sasanian Iran on the pattern of areas snatched from Byzantine Rome.¹⁰⁷⁴ We don’t know where they fled to. There is no evidence that Iranians fled to Byzantine territories during Muslim invasion.¹⁰⁷⁵ Apparently they fled to the areas still under Iranian control.

Similarly, Arabs continued to abandon their homeland and settle on lands evacuated by fleeing refugees.¹⁰⁷⁶

Not only this, people from conquered regions also immigrated to cantonment towns, designed by Medinan Caliphate to lodge its forces, for a better prospective of job. People of Banu ‘Ami, the local Tamim of Khuzestan left their usual dwelling place and started living in Basrah after first invasion on Khuzestan.¹⁰⁷⁷ As the circle of conquest enlarged so the breadth of such reshuffling.

Re-conquest of Iraqi towns

Ya’qubi asserts that just before battle of Qadisiyyah, Sa’d had to send Utba bin Ghazwan (‘Utbah bin Ghazwān عُتبَه بِن غَزوان ) to conquer Ubullah, Maysān, and Abarqubādh.¹⁰⁷⁸ ¹⁰⁷⁹ ¹⁰⁸⁰ Khalid had already conquered this area in summer of 633 CE and had left Suwaid bin Qutba to rule over Ubullah and the surrounds. Our sources do not disclose what happened here between summer of 633 CE and fall of 637 CE. Why did Medinan Caliphate have to re-conquer the area after almost four years is a mystery. Anyhow, according to Tabari the fight for re-conquering Ubullah was trivial. The five hundred strong Sasanian cavalry fled from the town leaving fifteen dead.¹⁰⁸¹ At the same time Umar designated Ubullah as a separate administrative unit with Utba bin Ghazwan its governor.¹⁰⁸²

Founding of cantonment towns

Exact reason of founding of cantonment towns (sin. miṣr pl. amṣār) and lodging of military men along with their families in these towns is not known. Islamic sources give vague explanations. For example, Tysfwn was not conducive to the health of Arabs.¹⁰⁸³ This reason is flawed because a horde of civilian Arabs virtually started living in occupied towns by the time cantonment towns were built, without any ill effect to their health. Actually, Utba bin Ghaqwan had already laid foundation of the first town of this nature, Basrah, in 637 CE before horrors of plague of ‘Amwās in 639 CE.¹⁰⁸⁴ ¹⁰⁸⁵ Spending of precious tax money on building new houses at a time when it was needed for many other important projects, including financing of wars, should have got a pressing reason. One explanation could be better administration of military, as we know troops belonging to different tribes were allotted with specific neighborhoods and their remunerations were paid to the chief of that tribe who was responsible for its distribution among members of his tribe.¹⁰⁸⁶ Another possible explanation could be a need to isolate Arab elites from local subject populations so they could not exploit the miseries of subjects.¹⁰⁸⁷ Further, one can speculate that Umar didn’t want the army to scatter in never ending lands of conquered nations, start agriculture or do some other kind of business.¹⁰⁸⁸

Whatever the reason of founding the cities, it is known that inhabitants of these cities played a significant role in First Arab Civil War. Later on, these cities prospered beyond imagination and became metropolitan centers of Islamic civilization.¹⁰⁸⁹

Details of founding of Kufa in 638 CE by Sa’d bin Waqqas are well preserved and give an interesting insight into sophisticated administrative capabilities of Arab Muslims.¹⁰⁹⁰ Professional town planners served to build it. First of all, they chose a proper site with due celebrations. Then, they built downtown with grand mosque and governor house as its central feature. All neighborhoods and public services, like mosques for the neighborhoods and market places, got special attention. They didn’t forget designing a hostel accommodation for officers of central government and other provincial governments visiting the town for official assignments. Importance of founding of cantonment towns is evident from the fact that each and every aspect of planning and building needed approval from provincial government and then central government.¹⁰⁹¹

Military operating in Syria did not have luxury of any cantonment town. The reason is not known. Medinan Caliphate accommodated its soldiers in Homs in the houses evacuated by the fleeing inhabitants of Syria, initially, after victory.¹⁰⁹² Probably, later, due to epidemic of plague Medinan Caliphate had to spread them in many different towns.

Creation of military districts (amsar)

Later on, in 641 CE, Umar utilized the advantage created by establishment of cantonment towns to further organize whole country into military districts (amṣār pleural of miṣr).¹⁰⁹³ ¹⁰⁹⁴ By doing this Umar could fix responsibility of one specific region on one particular brigade. According to Ya’qubi, the military districts, so created, were seven: Medina, Syria, Jazirah, Kufa, Basrah [there is a missing lacuna in Ya’qubi’s original text here. The editor guesses that he might have written Fustat and probably Yamama or Bahrain or Yemen at this lacuna].¹⁰⁹⁵ At the same time Umar established border military districts (Ajnād, pleural of Jund) on actively hot borders. He made each of Palestine, jazirah, Mosul, and Qinnasrīn a border military district.¹⁰⁹⁶ In practice all border military districts faced Byzantine Rome.¹⁰⁹⁷

A new class emerges

As cantonments got well established and military got further organized a new class emerged in Medinan Caliphate. Tabari calls them ashrāf. (sin. sharīf, pl. ashrāf).¹⁰⁹⁸ Ashrāf were tribal leader responsible military and civilian discipline of their respective tribe. Contrary to Arab traditions of Jāhilyyah they were not tipped by their fellow tribesmen to be a sheykh. They were appointed by the government. They were a kind of middleman between masses of a tribe and the government. Along with dihqan, their non-Muslim counterparts, they were destined to be the skeleton of management of caliphate.¹⁰⁹⁹

Servitude of Khuzestan

The constitution of Sasanian Iran allowed existence of petty kings, sometimes called shah.¹¹⁰⁰ They retained extensive power over the territories they governed, including right to maintain their own army. Actually, the central ruler was a sovereign over shahs, hence called shahanshah – the king of kings.¹¹⁰¹ The shahs were appointed by the shahanshah but the office was hereditary in a sense that the shahanshah had to pick one member of the same family.¹¹⁰² ¹¹⁰³ Many Parthian, Medean and Armenian families are known to holding title of shah for generations.¹¹⁰⁴ Tabari knew seven such families.¹¹⁰⁵ By the time of Arab invasion, three decades of warfare and civil war had already loosened the ties between shahs and the shahanshah.¹¹⁰⁶

With Yazdegerd on the run and the economic powerhouse of Swad in Arab hands, the Sasanian Iran ceased to function as an integral entity. The local chiefs and nobles of Iran, unnerved by the Arab success, began to negotiate separate agreements with the conquerors that would preserve as much of their authority and wealth as possible.¹¹⁰⁷

First case of its class comes from Khuzestan.¹¹⁰⁸ The Shah of Khuzestan was an ethnic Media, scion of Mihrān family by name of Hurmuzan (Hurmuzān هُرمُزان).¹¹⁰⁹ Anonymous Nestorian Priest, writer of the Chronicle of Khuzestan, tells that Hurmuzan had to defend his towns with the help of his own troops. He had blessing of king Yazdegerd but no help came from him or from any other Iranian noble.¹¹¹⁰

The piece of flat land between common course of Euphrates and Tigris and Zagros Mountains accommodated Sasanian province of Khuzestan. At its heart was the mighty Karun River, which begins in Zagros mountains and empties in the Persian Gulf right next to River Tigris.¹¹¹¹ Sasanians had invested much money and labour in the region, restoring and building canals to increase agricultural yields, in particular of cereals, sugarcane, and rice.¹¹¹²

Medinan caliphate decided to open second front in 638 CE against Sasanian Iran after triumph of Qadisiyyah and failure of further progress in Dinavar across Zagros Mountians.¹¹¹³ The forces of Medinan Caliphate that crossed the Iraq-Khuzestan border were drawn from the divisions of Kufa and Basrah. Local Arab tribes, resident of Khuzestan, joined them en masse as they entered Khuzestan.¹¹¹⁴ ¹¹¹⁵ ¹¹¹⁶ ¹¹¹⁷

Hurmuzan’s troops could not cope with the blitz and Medinan Caliphate gained the territory up to river Karun without any difficulty. Hurmuzan hurriedly agreed to accept the river as a new boundary between his territory and Medinan Caliphate. Part of the peace deal reached between Hurmuzan and Utba bin Ghazwan, governor of Basrah, was yearly payment of certain amount to Medinan Caliphate. Hurmuzan’s main aim from the embarrassing deal was to buy time. Karun River located at Sūq Ahvāz and defeated forces of Hurmuzan in their own territory.¹¹¹⁸ ¹¹¹⁹

Hurmuzan again sued for peace. Medinan Caliphate gave him tougher conditions than before. The caliphate made him agree to pay annual tributes. In addition, the caliphate compelled him to give access to inspectors of Medinan Caliphate at Rāmhurmuz, Tustar, Sūs, Jundaysābūr, Bunyān and Mihrijān Qadhaq to monitor tax collection. In return Medinan Caliphate took responsibility to protect Hurmuzan held Khuzestan from any potential raids by Kurd tribes from Fars (Fārs فارس ).¹¹²⁰ ¹¹²¹

Medinan Caliphate wishes a boundary

By this time Medinan Caliphate was in full control of Syria and Swad. Umar felt that the Muslim Arabs had got enough land and money to lead their lives comfortably. He didn’t want risking further lives and energy to conquer the rest of Sasanian Iran. He determined that the natural barrier of Zagros mountains between Medinan Caliphate and Sasanian Iran would serve as the new boundary.¹¹²² Both sides didn’t open any negotiations to formalize the boundary, though.

Third sector against Iran

In addition to the two sectors, mentioned above, through which Medinan Caliphate had invaded Sasanian Iran, actually, there was a third sector as well. It was between Bahrain and Fars across the Persian Gulf.¹¹²³ Contemporary source Sebeos informs us that the sector became active at the time when “[the Arabs] had militarily routed both kingdoms, seizing from Egypt to the Taurus Mountains, from the Western sea to Media and Khuzestan”.¹¹²⁴ Tabari assigns this hostility to 638 CE.¹¹²⁵

“Then the [Arab] King gave an order to assemble boats and many sailors and to navigate southwardly, going east to Pars, to Sagastan, to Sind, to Srman, to the land of Turan and to Makuran as far as the borders of India. The troops swiftly prepared and implemented the command. They burned every country, taking loot and booty. They then turned and made expeditions on the waves of the sea, and reached their own places,” says Sebeos on authority of men who had returned from captivity in Khuzestan and who themselves had been eye-witnesses to the events.¹¹²⁶

Tabari renders these events a low profile. He discloses that when Sa’d became a hero of Medinan Caliphate after his victories against Sasanian Iran, A’la bin Haradhrami, Umar’s governor of Bahrain got envy of him.¹¹²⁷ He mobilized his Abdul Qays tribe into Fars by ships across the Persian Gulf without prior approval from Umar.¹¹²⁸ Tabari’s account of the campaign gives an impression that Fars didn’t have any central figure to organize resistance to the attack. People of Fars had to arrange self-defense groups to tackle the danger.¹¹²⁹ They quickly cut the Muslim intruders off their ships and blocked the road to Basrah so they could not fight their way out. All the Arab leaders of this campaign got killed one by one.¹¹³⁰ A furious Umar, on receiving the news, censured A’la. He put A’la’s function under supervision of Sa’d bin Waqqas and ordered the governor over Basrah, Utba bin Ghazwan, to send a reinforcement to rescue the entrapped soldiers.¹¹³¹ ¹¹³² Utba sent an intimidating force of twelve thousand men, led by Abu Sabrah bin Abi Ruhm of ‘Amir bin Lu’ayy clan of Quraysh.¹¹³³ The army was too big for the disorganized resistance in Fars to handle. They travelled along the coastal road smoothly and escorted the cornered soldiers of A’la back to Basrah from where they dispersed to their home towns.¹¹³⁴ This Basran division was under strict orders not to occupy a single inch of Sasanian territory.¹¹³⁵ However, they left some detachments in Hurmuzan controlled Khuzestan as a security measure.¹¹³⁶

Hurmuzan eliminated and captured

Ethnic Persians living in Khuzestan were not very happy with the situation.¹¹³⁷ Hurmuzan remained hopeful of regaining his lost authority. People of Persian descent from Fars and Jibal promised to join him in his endeavors through correspondence. The rumors of these developments reached the ears of commanders of detachments stationed in Hurmuzan controlled Khuzestan. Umar decided to get rid of Hurmuzan once and for ever. He organized an army from the military divisions of Kufa and Basrah and put it under the command of Abu Sabrah Bin Abi Ruhm.¹¹³⁸ Once the campaign started Umar ordered his governor of Basrah, Abu Musa Ash’ari, who was appointed after dismissal of Mughira bin Shu’ba (Mughīrah bin Shu’bah مُغِيرَه بِن شُعبَه ), to join the campaign personally.¹¹³⁹ The army of Medinan Caliphate captured Rāmhurmuz, Jundaysābūr, and Karka d’Ledan without much resistance.¹¹⁴⁰ ¹¹⁴¹ Hurmuzan, however, could muster troops and hold two key cities in the mountains, Sūs and Tustar.¹¹⁴² He opened negotiations as a delaying tactic. Diplomacy lasted for two years. Finally, when his hopes dashed, he killed the Arab ambassadors to signal all-out war. Arabs overpowered him quickly.¹¹⁴³ ¹¹⁴⁴ The drop scene of this drama was in 641 CE.¹¹⁴⁵ Hurmuzan let himself captured on a condition that only Umar would decide his fate.¹¹⁴⁶ Umar gave him a choice between death and accepting Islam. He chose the latter.¹¹⁴⁷ ¹¹⁴⁸ Umar allowed Hurmuzan to settle in Medina where he became advisor to Umar on Iran affairs.¹¹⁴⁹

Umar changes his policy towards Iran

The rebellion of people of Khuzestan and the difficulty with which it could be suppressed challenged Umar’s political acumen. He was highly suspicious that the Arabs of Iraq might have committed atrocities on Persians of Khuzestan and later on might have covered up their crimes. The enquiry commission Umar set up to investigate the causes of rebellion reported to Umar that the Arabs of Iraq had honored the peace deals with people of Khuzestan in words and spirit. The people of Khuzestan were still politically attached to the Shahanshah who kept instigating them for rebellion. Ahnaf bin Qays (Ahnaf bin Qays احنَف بِن قَيس ) of Tamim tribe, a member of the enquiry commission, could convince Umar that Medinan Caliphate couldn’t expect pacification of its subjects of Persian ethnicity until Yazdegerd was alive.¹¹⁵⁰ ¹¹⁵¹ Umar realized that the war against Sasanian Iran was far from over.

Battle of Nahavand

The year of 642 CE bore the burden of another doughty battle between the waning power of Sasanian Iran and the emerging power of Medinan Caliphate.¹¹⁵² The people of Iran had not stomached the fact that Iran had lost Swad and Khuzestan. Different shahs of remaining parts of Iran under nominal Sasanian rule might be sharing these sentiments with common people. Shahanshah Yazdegerd might be anxious to regain his lost territory, prestige and wealth. Moreover, neither of the sides had opened negotiations for cessation of hostilities and mutual recognition of new borders. Presence of Zagros Mountains was the only hurdle preventing the two sides from clash. Iranians might be assuming, quiet logically, that Arabs will attempt on Iranian plateau after consolidating their power over the newly conquered areas.¹¹⁵³

Iranian plateau that extends from Zagros Mountains in the west and Elburz Mountains and Kopet Dag Mountains in the north to almost Persian Gulf in the south was a rich agricultural land with the exception of two separate deserts, Dasht – e – Lot on its eastern fringes and Dasht – e – Kavir on its northern fringes.¹¹⁵⁴ Arabs must have got all reasons to overrun it at a convenient time and Iran’s noble’s fears were not totally unfounded. They were busy communicating with each other and organizing themselves to face the possible Arab attack.¹¹⁵⁵ “Our land,” they said, “has been wrested from us, and we have been humiliated in our own homeland,” tells Ya’qubi.¹¹⁵⁶ Ethnic Persians and the people of Rayy, Qumis, Hamedan, and Māhain communicated with each other at the behest of Yazdegerd. They raised an army of sixty thousand to hundred thousand men (all imbibed with nationalistic sentiments) with Dirafsh Kābiyān unfurled over them. Yazdegerd appointed Mardanshah Dhul Hajib (Mardānshāh dhu l Ḥājib مَردان شاه ذُوالحاجِب ) as their commander.¹¹⁵⁷ ¹¹⁵⁸ ¹¹⁵⁹ ¹¹⁶⁰ ¹¹⁶¹

Ammar bin Yasir, the newly appointed governor of Kufa, got the intelligence of the military buildup and he relayed it to Umar.¹¹⁶² Obviously, Umar got caught in an onerous situation. This was the time a sizable portion of Medinan Caliphate’s army had perished in the great plague in Syria. Amr bin As had tied up a number of battalions for the siege of Alexandria. Moreover, Medinan Caliphate had to keep garrisons in many still not quiescent cities of Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Jazirah, Iraq, Khuzestan and Swad. To make the things more complicated, almost all men in whom Umar trusted were already deployed either as commanders or as governors. Umar had already dismissed Sa’d, his trusted man in Iraq, to replace him with Ammar bin Yasir. Deliberations started in Medina.

If Umar asks the division of army in Syria to take lead in attack, the meetings in Medina pondered, there was a danger that Byzantine Romans will reoccupy their provinces. If Umar asks Yemenites to give more recruits, the land might be totally devoid of able bodied men and Ethiopians could take advantage. Hesitantly, he ordered the military division in Kufa to assign two thirds of the manpower to this campaign and leave the remaining one third in Kufa to manage the newly acquired territory.¹¹⁶³ He also ordered the military division at Basrah to contribute to this force. They sent troops under command of Abu Musa Asha’ari.¹¹⁶⁴ ¹¹⁶⁵ Appointing commander of this force was another headache. Initially, Umar wished to lead the army personally. This proposal was rejected on the ground that Arabs might prevail over Nejd and other places.¹¹⁶⁶ After all possible considerations, Umar had to abandon his stated policy of not appointing a Bedouin over Muslim army. He appointed Nu’man bin Amr (Nu’mān bin ‘Amr نُعمان بِن عَمرؤ ) of nomadic tribe of Muzainah, a companion of Prophet Muhammad and Umar’s ‘amil of Kaskar, as general of the army.¹¹⁶⁷ ¹¹⁶⁸ ¹¹⁶⁹ Now, Umar had to devise strategy. He sought advice of Hurmuzan if Muslims should attack from Isfahan sector or Azerbaijan sector. He advised to attack from Isfahan side.¹¹⁷⁰

The war theater was highlands of Nahavand (Nahāvand نَهاوَند ) in Jibal province of Sasanian Iran.¹¹⁷¹ ¹¹⁷² The Iranians had fastened themselves in chains in group of five and ten, so they might not flee. The commander of Muslim army shook the standard three times to signal different positions of the army and the war started. The ferocious war continued for the next three days. Commanders of both sides laid dead in the combat. Muslim side carried the day.¹¹⁷³ Iranian army got routed out completely.¹¹⁷⁴

Aftermath of Nahavand

The victory of Nahavand is labeled as ‘the victory of victories’ by Islamic sources.¹¹⁷⁵ it broke backbone of Sasanian Iran. Sasanian Iran got permanently disabled and could never deploy a big army against Medinan Caliphate after it.¹¹⁷⁶ Military observers can easily analyse that the defeat of Sasanian Iran at Nahavand proves beyond doubt that their earlier defeat at Qadisiyyah was not by mere chance. Iranians had lost political organization to defend themselves.

Any of the Sasanian provinces were now open to military pressure from Medinan Caliphate. It was Medinan Caliphate’s choice where to start from. Yazdegerd lost his capability to correspond with different shah’s to organize them in any coherent form to resist Medinan Caliphate. Medinan Caliphate didn’t miss the opportunity to subjugate whole of Jibal province, including Nahavand, Dīran, Hamedan, Māsabadhān, and Sirawān.¹¹⁷⁷ ¹¹⁷⁸

Medinan Caliphate didn’t appoint its own man to govern the newly acquired territories. Instead they installed a puppet of Persian ethnicity by name of Dinar (Dīnār دِينار ) as governor. He was from Sasanian nobility but not from top strata. The governing family of Jibal was Qarin (Qārin قارِن ). Arabs totally neglected it. Apparently, all Persian petty ruling families maintained their ruling status, but they had to be answerable to Dinar whose main job was to collect tax from all of them and to deliver it to Kufa personally.¹¹⁷⁹ In this sense Jibal didn’t achieve a status of full province under Medinan Caliphate. It became a ‘provincially administered territory’. Part of it paid tax to the province of Basrah and part to Kufa.¹¹⁸⁰ Our sources are quiet as to why didn’t Arabs appoint their own man as governor over Jibal directly answerable to central government in Medina. One can assume that the Iranian military got defeated but the population remained belligerent. The nobility got weak but remained inflexible. Appointment of Persian figurehead was a compromise between the two warring parties. He saved the face of Iranian nationalists and served as a loyal tax collector for Arabs without giving them any headache of management.

Appointment of Persian figurehead was mainly to appease Zoroastrians. For Christians of Sasanian Iran it was just a change of masters.¹¹⁸¹

Shahanshah Yazdegerd had arranged the war from his den in Isfahan. After Sasanian defeat of Nahavand he fled to Istakhr (Iṣṭakhr اِصطَخر ).¹¹⁸² Muslim raiding parties tried to pursue him during his flight but of no avail.¹¹⁸³

Pacification of further Sasanian territories

After defeat at Nahavand and installation of a puppet regime in Jibal, demise of Sasanian Iran was writing on the wall. The only question was when and how. Taming further Sasanian territories was a logical inference for Medinan Caliphate from results of Nahavand. Iranians anticipated it well. Umar mobilized all his men, including veterans of Nahavand, reserves of Nahavand and the soldiers left in Basrah and Kufa into battle field.¹¹⁸⁴ He divided his army into corps, each under leadership of a field commander. Each corps had to fight its way in different directions like, Isfahan, Kirman, Tabaristan or Azerbaijan. None of the field commanders was full general.¹¹⁸⁵ Each of them had to fight independently on occasions and on other occasions to support the neighboring corps under command of the neighboring corps’ field commander as the circumstances dictated.¹¹⁸⁶ As the proceeding events proved, their goal was not to bring the rest of Sasanian Iran under direct control of Medinan Caliphate. Neither had they aimed at kicking the ruling petty kings out of power. Their task was to compel the ruling petty king to change his allegiance from Sasanian Iran to Medinan Caliphate and to pay annual tribute. They were not hesitant to replace any petty king who dared to resist with another one who promised obedience. Anyhow, the advancing troops of Medinan Caliphate were not supposed to stick to the guidelines willy-nilly. They could bring any meek population under direct rule of Medinan Caliphate.¹¹⁸⁷ As they were going to penetrate into Sasanian Iran as deep as possible without consolidating power of Medinan Caliphate except entering into contracts of allegiance with the rulers, Umar had fears. Umar suspected they might be attacked from the rear and got trapped in far off places.¹¹⁸⁸

During the next two years or so these contingents reached almost all provinces of Sasanian Iran bordering Jibal. Sources claim that they appointed Arab governors in many of the towns or territories they reached. Analysis of hierarchal standing of these ‘governors’ in Medinan Caliphate and the function they performed undisguised the true nature of these ‘governors’. They were simply representatives of Medinan Caliphate to liaise with the local rulers who had changed allegiance from Sasanian Iran to Medinan Caliphate. Medinan Caliphate didn’t prescribe any rate of tax to all of these areas. They could pay according to their capacity.¹¹⁸⁹

Isfahan

Just to the east of Jibal and neighboring it, in the heart of Iranian Plateau, was located the Sasanian province of Isfahan with its main town Jayy.¹¹⁹⁰ The army of Medinan Caliphate that had participated in Navand, after imposing Dinar over Jibal, took the road connecting Nahavand to Jayy.¹¹⁹¹

The leader of army was Abdullah bin Budhail (‘Abdallah bin Budhail bin Warqā’ عَبدُ اللّه بِن بُذَيل بِن وَرقاء ) of Khuza’ah who captured the city of Jayy in 644 CE.¹¹⁹² ¹¹⁹³ The surrounding smaller towns didn’t even think of resisting.¹¹⁹⁴ Abu Musa Ash’ari commanded his levy during this campaign but his role was merely supporting.¹¹⁹⁵

Yazdegerd had reached Istakhr by this time. Abdullah Bin Budhail pursued him after conquest of Isfahan but of no avail. Abu Musa came to Istakhr and attempted its conquest but did not succeed, and likewise did Uthman bin Abu As (‘Uthmān bin abu ‘Āṣ عُثمان بِن اَبُو عاص ) of Thaqif.¹¹⁹⁶

Elburz Mountains

Just south of Caspian Sea a lofty mountain range stretches from west to east. These Elburz Mountains separate the Iranian plateau from the Caspian Sea. The difficulty to access them can be guessed from the fact that they are home to the highest peak in the Middle East – Mount Damavand.¹¹⁹⁷ The inaccessible mountainous terrain had facilitated crowding of many kinglets in a comparatively small area. To the west, between Hamedan and Caspian Sea was Dastaba.¹¹⁹⁸ On the shores of Caspian, around its southwestern corner used to live Daylam.¹¹⁹⁹ The central part of it was Tabaristan (Ṭabaristān طَبَرِستان ). On the southern edge of the mountains was the principality of Rayy. Towards the eastern end was Gorgan.¹²⁰⁰

When Umar ordered his men, who had occupied Hamedan, to take the road leading to Elburz Mountains, the petty kings of the region were unaware of true intentions of the army. They presumed that they would have to fight for their political survival. The rulers of Daylam, Rayy and Azerbaijan Joined hands to resist the invadors.¹²⁰¹ Yazdagerd was nowhere to be involved. The battle between forces of Medinan Caliphate and combined Iranian forces at Waj Rudh (Wāj al-Rūdh واج الرُوذ ) in Daylam was, anyhow, short lived.¹²⁰² ¹²⁰³ ¹²⁰⁴ Mūṭā, the overall leader of the Iranian army got killed. Other petty kings in the army, like Zinabi (Zīnabī زِينَبى ), started co-operating with Medinan Caliphate.¹²⁰⁵ The Iranian defeat lay all of Elburz Mountains open for Medinan Caliphate. Obviously, Daylam was first to surrender as the war was fought in their area. King of Rayy tried to resist on his own. His resistance got crushed by the help of Zinabi who secured its throne for himself and his generations. Muslims destroyed the city of Rayy to punish the resisting ruler and Zinabi had to rebuild it.¹²⁰⁶ Rest of the rulers of the region submitted to obedience without resistance. Some of them, like ruler of Jīlān, waited for a notice to be served with forces of Medinan Caliphate camped outside his enclave.¹²⁰⁷ ¹²⁰⁸ Others, like ruler of Tabaristan, initiated the process without waiting for the notice and in return got better deals. Medinan Caliphate, for example, guaranteed Tabaristan that its army would never enter into their territory.¹²⁰⁹ Rulers of Dunbāwand, and Qumis set terms of Ṣulḥ without fight.¹²¹⁰, ¹²¹¹, ¹²¹², ¹²¹³

Political changes inside Medinan Caliphate

Medinan Caliphate was not a few thousand soldiers constantly risking their lives in lands unknown to them under command of their officers. It was a cosmos of millions of tillers, grazers, miners, slaves, teachers, traders, merchants, house wives, and off course, retirees. A decade of holy war so far, from the first clashes in Syria in 634 CE to the alignment of Iranian petty kings with Medinan Caliphate by 644 CE, completely remodeled the political portrait of Medinan Caliphate. The flow of wealth from the conquered nations to the triumphant, the prestige earned at the expense of the defeated, and the drastic demographic changes everywhere, collectively modulated new political ideologies within Medinan Caliphate. The changes in political thinking of people were gradual and parallel with the military achievements. Each change surfaced at a specific time during Futuhul Buldan and became pervasive. Now, we have to pause our narrative of Futuhul Buldan for a while, and attend to the political changes that had crept all over Medinan Caliphate.

Caliph at odds with the military

Despite smooth progression of Futuhul Buldan, there was a disagreement between the caliph and the military. From the very beginning the approach of some portions of military towards the spoils of war contrasted with that of the caliph. Apparently the caliph did not express his approach explicitly until he started getting favorable results of the war, and sections of military did not ask for concrete commitments from the caliph at the time of their recruitment. Soon after first conquests, the differences between the caliph and certain quarters of military sprang up. Soldiers expected all booty, including movable and immovable property of the defeated, to be distributed among them as their remuneration, after excluding the twenty percent dues of the central government. The caliph disagreed. He allowed only movable property of the defeated to be disbursed among soldiers after excluding twenty percent dues of the central government. He had other plans for the immovable property.

After triumph of Jalula the soldiers wanted lands to be considered part of booty as they were acquired as a result of war and not by means of any treaty. Umar wrote to Sa’d to “divide the spoils of the war among the troops on horses and camels after taking out usual fifth. And let the lands and cattle in the hands of those who work with them so that it might be used for stipends (‘āta عَطاء ) of the Muslims. If thou divide everything among the troops nothing will be left for those who come after them”.¹²¹⁴ ¹²¹⁵ Hence “Umar left lands of Sawad for those who were still in men’s loins and mothers’ wombs [posterity]. The inhabitants of the lands were made dhimmis. They could not be sold as slaves and they paid jizyah and kharāj”.¹²¹⁶

Similar disputes surfaced at the time of fall of Alyuna. Zubayr demanded that all spoils, including land, should be divided among the participants. He used division of land by the Prophet among participants of the war, after conquest of Khaybar, as a precedent of Sunna (Sunnah سُنّة) of the Prophet, to reinforce his point. Amr knew Umar’s policy and did not dare to challenge it. Amr wrote to Umar, who wrote back saying, “Leave it as it is, so that the descendants of the descendants [ar ḥabal al ḥabalah] may profit by it.¹²¹⁷

Thus Umar made the immovable property and businesses of the defeated an ongoing source of income which was to be distributed to the soldiers, their families and descendants in future as their salary for remaining enrolled in the military register. If Umar would have distributed everything among soldiers they would have become busy in managing the properties and would have absconded the army.¹²¹⁸ Not only this, Umar nationalized certain lands. They were the lands that had already been designated as crown land by Sasanian Iran. Umar added to them those lands which their owners abandoned at the time of fleeing the invading army.¹²¹⁹ Income from these lands was at discretion of central government and probably it used it on projects like infrastructure.

Disagreement between the caliph and some portions of the military about their remunerations continued. Umar had given one fourth of the revenue of Swad to Bajila as he had promised them at the time of their recruitment.¹²²⁰ Three years later, in winter of 641 CE, Umar asked Jarir bin Abdullah, the leader of Bajila “had I not been responsible for what I divide, I would leave to you the share already given; but I see that the Muslims have multiplied, so ye have to restore what ye have taken.”.¹²²¹ Jarir and his tribesmen had to obey Umar. To reconcile with their chief Umar offered Jarir a gift of eight hundred Dirhams. Umar assessed a stipend of two thousand Dirhams yearly for the tribe of Bajila, which was not different from what other tribes got.¹²²²

This was the beginning of the military’s differences from the ruler in Medina. Umar knew how to impose himself and he did. Later caliphs had to struggle with the issue.

Generals started enriching themselves

From early days of Futuhul Buldan certain generals were bent upon enriching themselves. After conquest of Bait-Jabrīn [Eleutheropolis] Amr bin As took an estate for himself and named it ‘Ajlān after name of his freedman.¹²²³ Zubayr marked out two lots for himself in Miṣr and Alexandria when he went there as head of the supporting army.¹²²⁴ ¹²²⁵ He also built a mansion for himself in Miṣr, which remained talk of the town due to its extravagance and which remained in hands of his heirs later.¹²²⁶ Similarly, Sa’d bin Waqqas built a mansion in Kufa with a wooden door and surrounded the mansion with a fence of reeds.¹²²⁷ ¹²²⁸

Such activities on part of generals were not acceptable to Umar. He expected them to be public servants and not public’s masters. Umar sent his auditor general Muhammad bin Maslama (Muḥammad bin Maslamah مُحَمّد بِن مَسلَمَه ) to kufa who set the door and fence made by Sa’d to fire.¹²²⁹

Here we observe clash of interest between ordinary soldiers and the generals. Ordinary soldiers, in line with Arab traditions, considered generals one of them. They expected from them to give themselves the same remunerations and privileges which they gave to the soldiers. Some generals, on the other hand, didn’t consider it fair. They honestly believed they should get better remunerations and perks than the ordinary soldiers because they were instrumental in victories. Umar sided with ordinary soldiers on this matter. Anyhow, all generals did not indulge into such practices. We don’t hear of any such behavior on part of Abu Ubayda bin Jirah, Khalid bin Walid, Abu Musa Asha’ri or Iyad bin Ghanm.

Central government’s usual disciplinary action against unruly generals was to confiscate half of their wealth. Umar confiscated half of the wealth of, among others, Sa’d bin Waqaas and Amr bin As.¹²³⁰

Issue didn’t remain limited to remunerations. Commanders established their own mess separate from that of common soldiers. During his visit to Jerusalem, Bilāl complained to Umar that the commanders used to eat poultry and fine bread, most of the men not receiving it. Umar required the Syrian commanders to guarantee that each Muslim soldier gets two loaves of bread a day and suitable quantity of vinegar and oil.¹²³¹ ¹²³² ¹²³³

Caliph’s tug of war with governors

As the size of Medinan Caliphate increased communications between central government and provincial governments and between central government and generals at borders needed longer time. Centrifugal tendencies started springing up among generals and governors. No instance of outright disobedience to the center is noted by sources up to this juncture of history of Islam. However, examples of clandestine disobedience can be cited. As usual, Umar was eager to nip the evil in the bud and he did whatever was in his power to discourage such behavior. It created a kind of cold war between the caliph and certain generals and governors.

Umar was shocked when Amr invaded Egypt without his prior approval. Actually sending Zubayr would have served two purposes – reinforcement to Amr’s troops and clipping Amr’s ambitions.

Umar had to spy on the governors. After victory of Qadisiyyah Amr bin Ma’dikarib visited Umar. Umar asked him about conduct of Sa’d. He praised about Sa’d. Umar did not believe in him and said ‘as if you agreed to compensate each other with praise’ (Sa’d having commended Amr to Umar in a previous communication).¹²³⁴

Sinful behavior of officials

Medinan Caliphate was a theocracy. It had classified its citizens strictly into religious compartments. Moral behavior of non-Muslims was responsibility of their respective regulating bodies. The central government was responsible for maintaining certain moral standards among the Muslim population. As money poured into Arab Muslim society as a result of Futuhul Buldan, sinful behaviors kicked off among them. Part of the problem stemmed from explosive spread of Islam among Arabs during first decade of Medinan Caliphate. A lot of them were not that strongly bound to it as were the earliest converts. This particularly applies to middle ranking officers, almost all of whom were peripheral to Islamic movement during its nascent days. They indulged into sinful behaviors which were contrary to the criminal code of the country and which were seen as not befitting of an officer of Islamic state by the central government.

Nu’man was son to Adi bin Nadla (‘Adi bin Naḍlah عَدى بِن نَضلَه) who had immigrated to and died in Ethiopia as Muslim. Nu’man came back to Medina via the same boat which brought other Muslims back from Ethiopia. Umar appointed him over Maysān in the district of Basrah. Nu’man composed some verses:

Hasn’t al-Ḥasnnā heard that her husband in Maysān

Is drinking from glasses and Jars?

If I wished, the chief men of the city would sing to me

And dancing-girls pirouette on tiptoe.

If you’re my friend, give me a drink in the largest cup,

Don’t give me the smallest half broken!

Perhaps the commander of the faithful will take it amiss

That we’re drinking together in a tumbledown castle!

On hearing these verses Umar dismissed him from the job. He pleaded with Umar that he did not act anything like that and it was just poetic fantasy but Umar did not restore him.¹²³⁵

Presence of sinful behaviour among middle ranking officers in provinces and stern action taken against them on discovery by central government, rather than provincial governments, indicates a culture of cover up at provincial level and breeding of centrifugal aspirations.

Beginning of corruption in state apparatus

Financial corruption and state machinery go hand in hand.¹²³⁶ There has not a single county ever existed nor will ever exist which is hundred percent free of financial corruption. We can only assess relative transparency in government functioning of a country by comparing it with that of other countries and ranking it.¹²³⁷ Widespread financial corruption in government machinery decreases efficacy of a government. It largely hampers governmental capacity to deliver, to attract capital and to control crime.¹²³⁸

As Muslim Arabs started collecting revenue from the defeated nations, tax collectors saw an opportunity to fill their own pockets. Central government had to take measures to curb the practice.

Abu Hurairah gathered twelve thousand Dirhams while being governor of Bahrain. Umar charged him with stealing money from government coffers. He denied the charges claiming that he earned it by horse farming and shares in different business ventures. Umar was not convinced and he confiscated the money.¹²³⁹

Usual sentence for corruption was confiscation of half of wealth. Umar handed over this punishment to many of his governors including Nafi bin Amr (Nāfi’ bin ‘Amr نافِع بِن عَمرؤ ) of Khuzā’a, his governor over Mecca; and Ya’la bin Munya, his governor over Yemen.¹²⁴⁰ Sometimes the central government had to take such action against middle ranking officers, for example, Nu’man bin Adi ‘āmil over Maysān, because apparently provincial governments were apt to neglect such infractions.¹²⁴¹

The proceeding of court was still fair. We find some instances, for example Abu Bakra, where an officer successfully defended his case and got aquited.¹²⁴² ¹²⁴³

Appearance of politics in Medina

Most devastating side effect of geographic expansion of Medinan Caliphate was emergence of a sense in the capital Medina that whoever will take over from Umar will wield extensive political power. The activities, actions and policies that are used to gain and hold power in a government or to influence a government are called ‘politics’ according to the classical definition of the word in Merriam-Webster English Dictionary.¹²⁴⁴

Once upon a time, at the occasion of Hajj Abdur Rehman bin Awf and others openly discussed with Umar matters in such a way that Umar had to snub their political ambitions.¹²⁴⁵ ¹²⁴⁶

Here we see appearance of politics among those men who had struggled for establishment of Islam in its earliest and weakest phase.

The teamwork among leadership of Medinan Caliphate eroded as a result of appearance of politics. When Umar appointed Mu’awiya as governor of Syria after death of Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, Abu Sufyan did not behave as it was appointment of one of the team members because he was most appropriate for it. Rather he perceived it as a favor to his family at cost of others. “May the tie of relationship be made stronger by thy kind behavior!” wrote Abu Sufyan to Umar in his letter of thanks.¹²⁴⁷ Team is the most potent social organization. A team strives to achieve a well-defined goal, under a clear cut leader, with the help of mutually aiding members. Teams usually build up when many people aspire to achieve a common goal, and they usually dismantle after achievement of the goal.¹²⁴⁸ The team of Quraysh, that worked selflessly under the leadership of Abu Bakr, had started feeling that goals have been achieved. Cracks started appearing in that team.

Cantonments politicized

Phenomenon of ‘politics’ was not confined to environs of Medina. It took the newly established cantonments in its spell. Earliest converts to Islam in Medina were vying for the top job of caliph. Relatively later converts were lobbying for higher military posts, district or provincial governorship, or other higher offices in government service. Ordinary soldiers living in cantonments were pushing for better salary package from the government. To achieve their goal, the soldiers started organizing themselves around ambitious relatively later converts, usually of non-Quraysh background. Governing cantonments became a political quagmire.

Close examination of Kufa, as a typical example, illustrates the patterns emerging in the cantonments. Soon after this beautiful and comfortable city became functional and Sa’d bin Waqqas established himself as governor, the harmony in the city started pulverizing. Complaints against Sa’d started reaching ears of Umar. The grievances of people of Kufa against Sa’d were purely monetary but the formal complaints lodged against him had a religious accent.¹²⁴⁹ One of the complaints was that this earliest convert to Islam didn’t know proper method of ritual prayer (ṣalāt). Umar had to set up a public enquiry against Sa’d in Kufa. Though Umar exonerated Sa’d in the ‘wrong prayer case’, Sa’d could not survive the contentious nature of Kufans.¹²⁵⁰ Umar had to dismiss him in 641 CE.¹²⁵¹
¹²⁵² Naturally, Sa’d felt insulted. He cursed the people of Kufa saying, “May Allah not make them pleased with any commander or any commander pleased with them”.¹²⁵³ The dismissal was sudden. Umar had to give charge of governorship to Abdullah bin Abdullah (‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdallah عَبدَ اللّه بِن عَبدَ اللّه ), the deputy governor, on ad hoc basis until he chooses a new governor.¹²⁵⁴ ¹²⁵⁵ ¹²⁵⁶ After painstaking search, Umar chose Ammar bin Yasir, a very early Meccan convert who had won his freedom from slavery by money of Abu Bakr.¹²⁵⁷ ¹²⁵⁸ This time he appointed Abdullah bin Mas’ud as wazīr, whose actual job appears to monitor Ammar bin Yasir.¹²⁵⁹ ¹²⁶⁰ Soon complaints against Ammar started pouring in Medina. The grievances were again of pure monetary matters but expressed themselves in religious overtone. “Ammar is not a good Muslim,” said one complainant.¹²⁶¹ Though the matter that didn’t translate into formal complaint was that Ammar didn’t favor Kufans unduly over others during award of Jizyah of Jibal.¹²⁶² Hesitantly, Umar dismissed Ammar. obviously, Ammar didn’t feel honored by this treatment and he expressed his sentiments well during his exit interview with Umar.¹²⁶³ Umar gave charge of Kufa to Jubayr bin Mut’im (Jubayr bin Muṭ’im جُبير بِن مُطعِم ) while he looked for another suitable person for the job.¹²⁶⁴ Jubayr had similar problems during the short period he served as acting governor.¹²⁶⁵ Now, Umar brought in Abu Musa Ash’ari from Basrah, giving charge of Basrah to somebody else. Abu Musa quickly became victim of similar injurious complaints. Wary of the situation, Umar asked the people of Kufa whom did they want to be governed by.¹²⁶⁶ In doing so, Umar sacrificed a constitutional principal of Medinan Caliphate – appointing a provincial governor no longer remained a sole prerogative of the caliph. Ironically, people of Kufa refused to respond. Now, Mughira bin Shu’ba, a later convert from Taif, ex-governor of Basrah, current resident of Kufa, approached Umar and applied for the job of governor.¹²⁶⁷ ¹²⁶⁸ Umar appointed him. In doing so, Umar broke another precedent of Medinan Caliphate. Governorship of a province no longer remained a ‘responsibility’ which the caliph would delegate to anybody in his good books. It became a ‘privilege’ which could be contested for. Moreover, Umar bypassed a very important doctrine of Medinan Caliphate in appointment of Mughira. Earliest companions of Prophet no longer had absolute preference over the very late companions in provincial appointments. Actually, Mughira expressed the dilemma of the timing of conversion versus competency clearly while trying to convince Umar for appointing him as governor. Mughira said that piety of a person is for his personal help and competence of a person helps the community.¹²⁶⁹ Umar accepted the reality unwillingly. His heart posited that one day he would find that ideal man who is a combination of piety and competence. Farewelling Mughira to his job Umar said “Let the pious trust you and the wicked fear you.” ¹²⁷⁰ Mughira had a tarnished reputation.¹²⁷¹ Umar’s conviction of finding a pious man for the job of Governor of Kufa persisted. He had made up his mind to bring Sa’d bin Waqqas back to this job. Umar was honest in admitting that management problems of Kufa gave him tension.¹²⁷² Umar kept sacrificing his men one after another but never blamed the soldiers. He kept glorifying people of kufa as “the head of the Arabs”.¹²⁷³ The soldiers in cantonments were pillars of Medinan Caliphate. Umar was not in a position to annoy them.¹²⁷⁴

Not only had the soldiers in cantonments politicized around their ringleaders, the cantonments as a whole started wrestling with each other. The reason was the same as was for frictions between individuals. Again let’s illustrate the point from events in Kufa. Each division of army used to get stipend from those revenues (jizyah) which were collected from the area conquered by that particular division. Obviously, some had conquered richer or larger areas getting more remuneration. Soon after battle of Nahavand divisions of Basrah and Kufa started claims and counterclaims to the right of getting tax of a particular area on the basis that it was conquered by them. Umar had to intervene. He negated the old rule that the body of soldiers which conquered a particular area will benefit from its taxes solely. He divided the newly conquered areas of Sasanian Iran among soldiers of Basrah and Kufa equally.¹²⁷⁵

Kufa was not alone in being turbulent. Other cantonment towns treaded the same path.¹²⁷⁶ The factors that shaped political air in Kufa were working everywhere in the provinces. Results were similar as those of Kufa.

Umar confines companions to Medina

Political conflicts in the center and in the provinces impelled Umar to craft new domestic policies. It is noteworthy that very few people who were among the first Muslims and who used to meet in the study circle at house of Arqam participated in the wars called Futuhul Buldan. During later years of his tenure, Umar banned them from taking part in wars and settling in cantonments. It does not mean that any person who happened to see Prophet Muhammad in state of being Muslim was not allowed to leave Medina or to participate in the wars. Two hundred and twenty companions of the Prophet are reported to have participated, for example, in battle of Qadisiyyah. Out of them one hundred and twenty were veterans of Fathe Mecca and seventy were veterans of Badr.¹²⁷⁷ Similarly, sixty to eighty companions settled in Basrah, and eighty settled in Kufa.¹²⁷⁸ Umar confined those who could be potential candidates of caliphate after him. When Abdur Rehman bin Awf asked permission to participate in war on one occasion, Umar refused him bluntly.¹²⁷⁹ Once Umar answered request of some members of Quraysh to participate in war diplomatically, “you have already been through that with the Messenger of God”.¹²⁸⁰ Explaining his policy of not allowing prominent members of Quraysh to leave Medina, Umar said on one occasion, “Do not go out, lest you disperse the people right and left.”¹²⁸¹

Umar establishes official hierarchy

One of Umar’s actions that had far reaching consequences was creation of a register (dīwān) of payments (‘aṭā’). He entered all those people into it that were entitled to payments by the state. They ranged from Jarir bin Abdullah, the leader of Bajila who participated in Qadisiyyah to Hurmuzan, the Iranian petty king who converted to Islam after his defeat. The register grouped people according to the amount of their stipends from higher to lower.¹²⁸² The amount of stipend paid to anybody was proportional to his services for establishment of Islam.¹²⁸³ This register unintentionally created an official hierarchy of all and sundry in Medinan Caliphate. Descendants of the registrants kept claiming their superiority on basis of senior position of their ancestor in this register.¹²⁸⁴

Umar generated this register during conquests of Syria in 636 CE.¹²⁸⁵ He kept it upgrading as the events unfolded further.¹²⁸⁶

Earliest companions got super rich

Process of allotment of properties to companions of the Prophet had started during the Prophetic times. Abu Bakr, Abdur Rehman bin Awf, Zubayr bin Awwam, Abu Dujānah, Simāk bin Kharashah and others had got lands of Naḍīr in 625 CE.¹²⁸⁷

During caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar earliest Muslims had a stronger claim for newly acquired properties by the state as compared to later Muslims.¹²⁸⁸ Caliphs bestowed them generously. For example, both Abu Bakr and Umar allotted properties to Zubayr bin Awwam, while he was already in possession of a property granted to him by the Prophet.¹²⁸⁹ Enriching of the earliest Muslims, who happened to belong to Quraysh exclusively, partly explains inability of chiefs from other Muslim Arab tribes to lead any faction during First Arab Civil War of succession.

Medinan Caliphate establishes police force

As more Arabs resorted to settled life, their traditional ways of countering crime became obsolete. Security in big cities was far from perfect. Umar continuously responded to changing situation on ground. Islamic sauces credit Umar for establishing police force. Abdullah bin Abbas (‘Abdallah bin ‘Abbās عَبدُ اللّه بِن عَبّاس ) was in charge of Umar’s security forces (Shuraṭ) in Medina.¹²⁹⁰ As we hear of police force only in towns, it can be safely assumed that it was a need of metropolitan areas only.¹²⁹¹

Umar used Ansar for bookkeeping.

As ruling elite got indulged into monetary corruption, central government had to devise means to keep check on them. Group of people who was not part of the ruling elite was the best suited for this purpose. Though Umar was apprehensive in appointing Ansar to position of power, he didn’t mind using them to eye on his Quraysh officials. Designation of Muhammad Bin Maslama as auditor general is mentioned above.¹²⁹² Umar used Ansar for all kind of accounting. His chief census officer and surveyor of lands was Uthman bin Hunayf ( ‘Uthmān bin Ḥunayf عُثمان بِن حُنَيف ) of Ansar.¹²⁹³

Umar styles himself ‘Amir ul Mu’minun’

Few years after coming to power, in 639 CE Umar adopted the title of Amirul Mominun (Amīr ul Mu’minūn اَمِيرُ المُؤمِنُون ). Abu Musa Ash’ari was the first to address him “to the Servant of Allah Umar, commander of the faithful.” Then it became customary.¹²⁹⁴, ¹²⁹⁵, ¹²⁹⁶, ¹²⁹⁷

Tabari tells us the reason why Umar had to adopt this title. Before adoption of title of Amirul Mu’minun, Umar was called caliph to caliph to Messenger of Allah (khalīfat ar-khalīfat ar-Rasūl Allāh خَلِيفَةُ الخَلِيفَةُ الرَسُول اَللّه ). Obviously, this was a long title and Umar pondered if the trend continued the next caliph would be caliph to caliph to caliph to Messenger of Allah, and the title will be longer by one caliph with each new incumbent.¹²⁹⁸, ¹²⁹⁹

Umar used to consult extensively

Like his predecessors, Umar did not govern in isolation. He always involved early Muhajirun in important matters of the state. This kind of advisory could be more instrumental in giving them a sense of being a power behind the power and to maintain consensus among them rather than in discovering novel ideas. The Muhajirun had a sitting place in the mosque in which Umar used to discuss with them the news he received from different regions. One day he said “I know not how to treat the Magians” Abdur Rehman bin ‘Awf rose and said ‘I bear witness that the Prophet said ‘Treat them according to the same law with which ye treat the People of the Book’.¹³⁰⁰ ¹³⁰¹ Umar had made a precedent that he picked advise of only those who were steadfast companions of the Prophet.¹³⁰²

According to Ya’qubi, persons with the greatest influence on Umar were Abdullah bin Abbas, ‘Abdur Rehman bin Awf and Uthman bin Affan.¹³⁰³

Death of Umar

Umar got stabbed on November 2, 644 CE by a poisoned dagger.¹³⁰⁴ ¹³⁰⁵ He died on November 4, 644 CE and was buried on November 7, 644 CE.¹³⁰⁶

Umar owes his death to Futuhul Buldan to some extent. Abu Lulua Fayruz (Abū Lu’lu’ah Fayrūz اَبُو لؤ لؤَه فِيروز ), assassin of Umar, was an Iranian nationalist living in Medina as a slave of Mughira bin Shu’ba.¹³⁰⁷ ¹³⁰⁸ He was of Christian faith.¹³⁰⁹ In Tabari’s report, Abu Lulua managed to slip out of the mosque after murdering Umar, taking advantage of the crowd. A man belonging to the tribe of Tamim chased him, killed him, and recovered the instrument of murder.¹³¹⁰

Whenever big names die violently, it is always assassination. Lone wolf attack is rare. Umar himself suspected a conspiracy after being stabbed.¹³¹¹ Medinan Caliphate did not have legal resources to implicate the conspirators in the murder case. According to the law of land murderer was personally responsible for the crime and no further legal trial was needed as he was already dead. Umar’s family was not satisfied with this scenario. They blamed other Iranian residents of Medina as complicit to murder and wished them to be punished. Finding reluctance of law to act, Umar’s son, Ubaydullah (‘Ubaydallāh bin ‘Umar عُبَيدُ اللّه بِن عُمَر ) took law in his own hands and murdered Hurmuzan, Abu Lulua’s daughter, and Jufaynah, a Christian slave of Sa’d bin Waqqas from Hira.¹³¹² ¹³¹³

Umar’s murder sent shock waves among Muslim Arabs as is evident from Zohair inscription.¹³¹⁴ ¹³¹⁵ History has produced two kinds of rulers up to now. One are those who’s primary aim is to become a ruler, any public betterment by their hands is secondary. Others are those whose primary aim is public betterment, coming to power is secondary affair. Former are numerous and often forgotten after their rule ends. Later are rare and are remembered as a hero generations after generations. Umar belonged to the later genre. An inscription found near and written in 719 CE gives Umar bin Khattab the epithet of al-Faruq (al-Fārūq اَلفارُوق ).¹³¹⁶

Selection of new caliph

Umar was in good health and very active in management of state affairs. His unexpected death plunged the Medinan Caliphate into a constitutional crisis. The Medinan Caliphate had never chalked out a clear-cut formula for replacing a caliph. Previously, the dying caliph had appointed his successor. That time Medinan Caliphate was still in infancy. Now it had emerged as world’s leading power. Earliest Muslims of Meccan origin, who had immigrated along with the Prophet, were front runners for claim to the seat. Umar had already established official hierarchy among Muslims and they were foremost after the widows and kins of the Prophet. Early Medinan Ansars were inferior to them in official hierarchy and none of them thought of contending for the post.¹³¹⁷ Other tribes of Arabia and those members of Quraysh who accepted Islam after Badr were out of question. Caliph of Medinan Caliphate should have been earlier disciple of Prophet Muhammad, anyhow. Still, at least half a dozen people were aspirant to become caliph.

The few days between stabbing and death of Umar were loaded with political hustle and bustle in Medina but the provincial capitals remained mute. Umar was already weary of political maneuvers fashionable in Medina. At his deathbed he said” I have established the amṣār, set up dīwāns, implemented ‘aṭā’ and raided by land and sea. If I perish ….. you will take your own decisions as I have left you on the clear (path). I fear for you ……. a man who deems himself more entitled to rule than his fellow and fights him over it.” ¹³¹⁸

Ibn Ishaq mentions five people being first Muslims. They were Prophet Muhammad, Khadija, Ali, Zayd and Abu Bakr.¹³¹⁹ Then he mentions five more people who converted to Islam by Abu Bakr’s solicitation efforts. They are Uthman, Zubayr, Abdur Rehman bin Awf, Sa’d bin Waqqas and Talha bin Ubaydallah.¹³²⁰ All others converted after them.

Umar was crystal clear that one of them should become the next ruler of Medinan Caliphate because he believed in their prior ranking in the hierarchy of Islam he had officially created.¹³²¹ But he was uncertain about who out of them should be picked.

The Electoral College (shūrā) Umar nominated to select a caliph from its own members included all living persons who had attended Prophet Muhammad’s teaching circle at house of Arqam.¹³²² They included Ali, Uthman, Abdur Rehman bin Awf, Zubayr bin Awwam, Talha bin Ubaydallah and Sa’d bin Waqaas.¹³²³ Abdullah bin Umar (‘Abdallah bin ‘Umar عَبدَ اللّه بِن عُمَر ), Umar’s son was its president wielding power of casting vote in case the college splits into three versus three.¹³²⁴

The decision of the college was not instantaneous. It met in camera for three days.¹³²⁵ The debates there must be acrimonious.¹³²⁶ Finally, Abdur Rehman bin Awf emerged from the marathon session and announced selection of Uthman as the next caliph.¹³²⁷

Seventy four years old Uthman bin Affan (‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān عُثمان بِن عَفّان ) was a successful entrepreneur and financed Islamic movement generously.¹³²⁸ But he had no political acclaims on his curriculum vitae except that he was one of the earliest converts. He was not a man of sword, he didn’t participate in Badr and fled from battle field in ‘Uḥud.¹³²⁹ The Prophet didn’t assign him any expedition. He was not a man of opinion either. He didn’t have honor to sit on consultative committees during the Prophetic times and even after that during the time of first two caliphs. He, actually, doesn’t appear to be among the political aspirants during Umar’s caliphate. Selection of this non-political figure for the top slot of Medinan Caliphate must be a compromise among belligerent contenders to avoid further antagonism.¹³³⁰

Ya’qubi explains that Abdur Rehman withdrew his name from the contenders of the caliphate to play the role of power broker in the meetings of the Electoral College. And that there was a tie between Ali and Uthman. Abdur Rehman dropped Ali and picked Uthman on the grounds that Uthman was willing to accept book of Allah, Sunna of the Prophet and conduct (sīrah) of Abu Bakr and Umar as a guiding principal of his government, while Ali was reluctant to accept the conduct of the preceding two caliphs as a precedent. He considered himself equally able to the two previous caliphs.¹³³¹ ¹³³²

Both Abu Bakr and Umar had maintained that they did not wish to be a ruler, others had imposed this responsibility over them.¹³³³ The situation changed in absolutely opposite direction during meetings of Electoral College, whence everybody browsed his shoulder with others to win the top job.¹³³⁴ Gone were the days when nobody would present himself for leadership out of courtesy for others and people would name somebody other than self for the post. Ali was particularly ambitious during the proceedings. While others contested on basis of their credentials, Ali claimed the caliphate to be his birthright because he was from the clan of the Prophet.¹³³⁵ He lost the hope before the Electoral College met just by calculating how each member would vote and confided it with Abbas that ‘caliphate has slipped out of our hands’ ¹³³⁶ ¹³³⁷ All members accepted the outcome of Electoral College amicably except Ali. He slipped out of the crowd in front of whom the outcome was announced. He was called back to take oath of allegiance to Uthman. He took oath chanting ‘deceit, deceit’.¹³³⁸

Uthman took oath of his office on November 7, 644, after burial of Umar.¹³³⁹

Futuhul Buldan continues

Change of caliph was a local event in Medina. Governors of all far flung provinces of Medinan Caliphate just received the notice of the change and started obeying the new caliph the way they used to obey the previous one. Armies fighting on frontiers did not stop fighting for a single day. Medinan Caliphate’s policy to expand itself continued with full vigour. After assuming power Uthman ordered the commanders in the frontier areas to continue working on instructions given to them by the previous government as “they were chalked out in consultation with ‘us’ ”.¹³⁴⁰

Further thrust in Sasanian Iran

Forces of Medinan Caliphate were engaged in subduing many different kings of Sasanian Iran when Umar died. All empires in history have practiced violence and coercion for their establishment and existence. Yet, since their governing elite is always small in relation to the numbers of their subjects, all empires make use of a range of non-violent strategies to maintain their rule: co-opting the willing, rewarding collaboration, promising protection in return for submission, playing divide and rule, and so on. The Medinan Caliphate was no exception to this. Its army avoided use of sheer force where other methods did the trick during the last phase of Futuhul Buldan.

Kerman

Towards east of Isfahan, up to the western fringes of Dahsht-e-Lut, the Iranian Plateau was arid or semi arid. This stretch of land, which was to the northeast of Fars, constituted the Sasanian Iranian province of Kerman.¹³⁴¹ Kerman was scrotching hot in summer and bitterly cold in the winter. Melting snow was source of water but it had to be carried through specially designed under surface aqueducts called qanat (qanāt قَنات ) or karez for irrigation due to fear of water loss as a result of evaporation. Population was scanty.¹³⁴² Main town in the province was Veh-Ardashi.¹³⁴³

First tussle between troops of Medinan Caliphate and people of Kerman was during the last years of Umar’s tenure when, after success at Jayy in Isfahan, Abdullah bin Budhayl, continued his thrust eastwards and reached up to Ṭabasayn.¹³⁴⁴ ¹³⁴⁵ ¹³⁴⁶

The same year another contingent of Medinan Caliphate traversed into Kerman. Two separate commanders collaborated with each other in this campaign, Suhayl bin Adi (Suhayl bin ‘Adi سُهيل بِن عَدى ) and Abdullah bin Abdullah.¹³⁴⁷ They didn’t achieve anything except killing the local Marzban (Marzbān مَرزبان ) and looting some bactrians and ewes. This army penetrated up to Jīrfat.¹³⁴⁸ ¹³⁴⁹

By early years of Uthman’s reign, kerman had some kind of vessel relations with Medinan Caliphate. Uthman appointed Abdur Rehman bin Ghubays (‘Abd al Rehman bin Ghubays عَبدُ الرحمن بِن غُبيس ) to Kirman. Later Uthman removed Abdur Rehman and sent back Adi bin Suhayl bin Adi (‘Adi bin Suhayl bin ‘Adi بِن عَدى سُهيل بِن عَدى ). In 648 CE Uthman gave governorship of Kirman to Asim bin Amr (‘Āṣim bin Amr عاصِم بِن عمرؤ ), who died there. At the time of Uthman’s death Imran (‘Imrān عِمران ) held authority in Kirman.¹³⁵⁰ ¹³⁵¹

Makran

Arid and economically impoverished province of Makran laid between Kerman in the west and Sind of India in the east.¹³⁵²

Following Umar’s policy to penetrate into Sasanian Iran as far as possible and subjugate its kings, four commanders of Medinan caliphate namely, Suhayl bin Adi, Abdullah bin Abdulah, Hakam bin Amr (Ḥakam bin ‘Amr حَكَم بِن عَمرؤ ) of Taghlib, and Mukhariq bin Shihab (Mukhāriq bin Shihāb مُخارِق بِن شِهاب ) infiltrated into Makran.¹³⁵³ Collaborating with each other, they faced the ruler of Makran whose title was Rasil (Rāsil راسِل ). Men of Medinan Caliphate could get some booty in the form of elephants and they sent twenty percent share to the central government. However, Hakam wrote to Umar about the baldness of the mountains, scarcity of the water, poor quality of agricultural produce, endless distances and the bravery of the people of the province. In nutshell, too big an effort with too little to achieve. Umar halted the operation. Ruler of Sind had sent some troops to support Rasil on his request. Armies of Medinan Caliphate did not cross the river in hot pursuit. Both, the troops of Sind and Medinan Caliphate withdrew from each other. Rasil remained in power. He didn’t enter into any agreement with Medinan Caliphate.¹³⁵⁴, ¹³⁵⁵

Makran was the last province of Sasanian Iran, bordering states of India. Exact boundary between Sasanian Iran and Sind in India is not known. The inscription of Shapur II engraved on ka’ba-ye Zartosht, which claims that Sasanian Iran governed over Makran and Sind is outdated for our purposes. Chachnama, written in early thirteenth century CE, describes a certain king by name of Sahiras Rai ruling over kingdom of Sindh around seventh century. All districts of this kingdom, according to Chachnama were on the east side of River Indus except one. Sīwistān was located on the west side of River Indus and extended to ‘mountains of Rojhan up to the boundary of Makrān’.¹³⁵⁶, ¹³⁵⁷, ¹³⁵⁸ It gives an impression that in first half of seventh century the boundary between Sasanian Iran and Sindh in India were mountain of Sulaiman and Kirthar ranges.

Like Kerman, Makran might have got a political alignment with Medinan Caliphate during Uthman’s reign. We hear that when Uthman took office in 644 CE, he sent Ubaydallah bin Ma’mar (‘Ubaydallāh bin Ma’mar عُبيد اللّه بِن مَعمَر ) of Taym to Makran. Ubaydallah battled unceasingly until he reached the river.¹³⁵⁹, ¹³⁶⁰ Later ‘Uthman appointed Umayr bin Uthman (‘Umayr bin Uthmān bin Sa’d عُمَير بِن عُثمان بِن سَعد ) over Makran. At the time of Uthman’s death Ibn Kindir (Ibn Kindīr al-Qushayri ابنُ الكِندِير القُريشى ) held authority in Makran.¹³⁶¹, ¹³⁶²

Conquest of Fars

Significance of Fars province to Sasanian Iran cannot be undermined.¹³⁶³ It was the heartland of the country. It was cradle of all earlier dynasties of Iran, including Achaemenians and Sasanians. Its people, who used to be called Farsi, became the main ethnicity of Sasanian Iran and their religion, Zoroastrian (Pārsi) became the official religion of the nation. The word Fars later got Anglicized to be Persia.¹³⁶⁴

Fars spread over the southern part of Iranian Plateau, southern portion of Zagros Mountains, and the coastal low lying land up to Persian Gulf. Its terrain composed of mostly ridges intersected by plains. Its mild weather supported all kind of agriculture and economic activity.¹³⁶⁵

By mid-640’s Fars got totally entrapped by areas either directly controlled by Medinan Caliphate like Khuzestan, Bahrain and Oman, or indirectly influenced by it like Isfahan and Kerman. Medinan Caliphate, anyhow, could not engulf Fars. Deep rooted nationalism among its inhabitants explains the impasse. Fars had averted an ill envisaged invasion by A’la bin Hadhrami successively in 638 CE.¹³⁶⁶

When Umar ordered all out invasion on Sasanian Iran after victory of Nahavand, some battalions of Medinan Caliphate reached Fars via land. In 643 CE battalion commanded by Sariya bin Zunaym (Sāriyah bin Zunaym سارِيَه بِن ظُنيم ) of Kinana reached as far interior in Fars as Tawwj, Dārābjird and Fasā¹³⁶⁷, ¹³⁶⁸

We hear campaign of Mujashi bin Mas’ud (Mujāshi bin Mas’ūd مُجاشي بِن مَسعُود ) by the same time when he headed for Sābūr and jur.¹³⁶⁹, ¹³⁷⁰

Anyhow, no concrete result emerged. We don’t hear of any political gains as a result of these campaigns. Either the people of Fars repulsed the attacks or they were slippery enough to dodge the invaders.

Further attempts on Fars came after death of Umar, during reign of Uthman. Uthman bin Abi As of Thaqif, Uthman’s governor over Taif, Bahrain and Oman campaigned against Fars in 647 CE.¹³⁷¹ The army of Medinan Caliphate could capture Sābūr.¹³⁷² It even browsed with Istkhar and Jur but, apparently, no permanent political set up resulted.¹³⁷³, ¹³⁷⁴

In the fall of 649 CE Abdullah bin Amir (‘Abdallah bin ‘Āmir عَبدَ اللّه بِن عامِر ), the newly appointed governor of Basrah mobilized his extensive manpower based in Basrah to launch a major attack at the heartland of the Sasanian Royal family at Fars.¹³⁷⁵, ¹³⁷⁶, ¹³⁷⁷ The army briskly took control of many cities of Fars including Sābūr, Fasā and Darābjird.¹³⁷⁸ When it reached the mountainous bastions of Istakhr and Jur it got stuck.