Politics | History of Islam

The Prophet dies

No other single day is more important in the political history of Islam than the day on which Prophet Muhammad died. And events of no other single day are as censored as the events of that day. ¹ According to Ibn Ishaq, the Prophet did not nominate any successor. ² None of early Islamic sources holds a dissenting opinion from that of Ibn Ishaq. ³, ⁴ Ibn Ishaq’s rendering of the events of death of the Prophet, anyhow, gives an impression to the reader that question of succession was already in the air when he was hopelessly sick. ⁵

Prophet Muhammad’s funeral prayer had still not been offered when Ansar (Anṣār Helper اَنصار ) gathered around Sa’d bin Ubada (Sa’d bin ‘Ubādah سَعد بِن عُباده ) in the Community Hall of Banu Saida (Saqīfah Banū Sā’idāh,سقيفه بنو ساعده ) and Ali bin Abu Talib (‘Alī bin Abu. Ṭālib عَلى بِن ابُو طالِب), Zubayr bin Awwam (Zubayr bin ‘Awwām زُبَير بن عوّام), and Talha bin Ubaydullah (Ṭalḥah bin Ubaydallah طَلحَه بِن عُبَيد اُللّه ) separated themselves in Fatima’s (Fāṭimāh فاطِمَه ) house. Rest of the Muhajirun ( Muhājirūn مُهاجِرُون ) gathered around Abu Bakr. ⁶ ⁷ The only clan of Ansar who gathered around Abu Bakr was Abdul Ashhal (‘Abdu’l Ashhal عبدالاشهل) of Aws under their leader Usaid bin Hudhair (Usayd bin Ḥuḍayr اُسَيد بِن هُضير ).⁸Air of Medina was partisan. Prophet’s family locked their door with the body of the Prophet inside. ⁹

Prophet Muhammad had insisted on the army of Usama bin Zaid (Usāma bin Zaid اُسامَة بِن زَيد ) to leave Medina on the first day of his illness, but they pitched camp one stage outside Medina awaiting outcome of the Prophet’s illness. This army contained many early Muhajirun. When the illness got more serious, the army returned the next day of the illness. ¹⁰ So almost whole population of the town was in Medina on the day of Prophet’s death.

Abu Bakr selected as caliph

On hearing the news that all clans of Aws and Khazraj, except Abdul Ashhal of Aws, were in meeting at the Community Hall of Banu Saida, a group of Muhajirun rushed to them. ¹¹ ¹² They could be many in number, but those who spoke on the occasion were Abu Bakr and Umar bin Khattab. (‘Umar bin Khaṭṭāb عُمَر بِن خَطّاب ).¹³ ¹⁴ The Ansar present there wished to proclaim Sa’d bin Ubada of Saida clan of Khazraj as caliph of the Prophet. ¹⁵¹⁶ At that moment Sa’d was acting not only as a leader of Khazraj but of almost all of Ansar. ¹⁷ As soon as the group of Muhajirun confronted them they changed their stance. They asked for two separate caliphs, one for Muhajirun and the other for Ansar.¹⁸ This development gives a clue to Donner that actually they just wanted ‘home rule’. ¹⁹ The arguments that ensued between supporters of Sa’d bin Ubada and Muhajirun under leadership of Abu Bakr, Umar bin Khattab and Abu Ubayda bin Jirrah (Abu. Ubaydah bin al Jirrāḥ. اَبُو عُبَيده بِن اَلجِراح ) were so heated that, according to Ibn Ishaq, the two could plunge into violence. ²⁰ In any case, violence did not take place. Strength of logic subdued the passions. The most powerful reason floated that day came from the tongue of Abu Bakr, “Arabs will recognize authority only in this clan of Quraysh, they being the best of Arabs in blood and country”. ²¹ Guillame opines that the Ansar could quickly assess that they were not in a position of war and that they shall have to take a subordinate role. ²³ ²⁴

Obviously, Medinan Quraysh had joined hands with the Meccan Quraysh just two and half years ago. They were rich and willing to support a candidate from Quraysh. ²⁵ Point to note is that Abu Bakr did not say that Quraysh should be rulers as the Prophet was born among them. Rather they should rule because other Arabs would respect their superior genealogy. Abu Bakr’s words proved to be predictive. For many centuries to come the caliph was from Quraysh.

The bitterness that aroused in Umar’s mind that day against Ansar, never subsided. It is only Umar who is reported to have used rough language against Sa’d bin Ubada during the debate. ²⁶ Later on, none of Ansar ever got any high office of the government until Umar’s death. None of them became a general or a governor. They could get job in army as ordinary soldiers or at the maximum field commanders. They never got a promotion higher than a middle ranking official in the civil services. ²⁷

The bitterness can be traced on Ansar’s side as well. They took part in Ridda Wars but used to undermine authority of the supreme commander of the force who always happened to be one of the Quraysh. For example, they objected strongly to fight under Khalid bin Walid (Khālid bin Walīd خالِد بِن وَلِيد) against Tulayha. Abu Bakr had to appoint one of them as commander over them instead of Khalid. ²⁸ Umar never divulged his policy of excluding Ansar from high profile jobs publicly. Instead, he used diplomacy to avoid appointing an Ansar, whenever any such situation arose. For instance, when he sent a small army to fight in Battle of Jisr, he appointed Abu Ubaid bin Mas’ud of Thaqif (Thaqīf ثَقِيف ) as its commander. Salit bin Qays (Saliṭ bin Qays سَلِط بِن قَيس ) of Ansar, a veteran of Badr, was in this army. Umar said to him “Had it not been for the fact that thou art too hasty, I would have put thee in chief command. But warfare is a stubborn thing, and only the cautious man is fit for it. ²⁹

After curtailing aspirations of Ansar, the group of Muhajirun aptly presented their own candidate from one of the Quraysh. He was sixty one years old Abu Bakr of Taym clan of Quraysh, a merchant by vocation. ³⁰ All present there diligently committed allegiance to him except Sa’d bin Ubada ³¹ ³²

While seconding Abu Bakr’s candidacy Umar established another principal that dominated Muslim politics throughout the life of Medinan caliphate. He convinced everybody (or at least the Muhajirun who were present there) that Abu Bakr was ‘the best’.³³ Now, sources are quiet about what exactly did Umar mean by this phrase. We are left on our own to compare all those present on that occasion with Abu Bakr and to find out what was ‘the best’ in him. Abu Bakr had impressive curriculum vitae. He associated himself with Islam from the very beginning.³⁴ He financed Islamic movement in Mecca at a time when resources of Muslims were meagre. ³⁵ He used his purse to finance immigration of the Prophet and he paid for the land of the mosque of the Prophet. ³⁶ During later years the Prophet provided Abu Bakr with some financial resources. Abu Bakr got an estate from the lands of Naḍīr in 626 CE. ³⁷ Prophet Muhammad always remained thankful to Banu Hashim (Banū Hāshim بَنُو هاشِم ) and Banu Muttalib (Banu al-Muṭṭalib بَنُو المُطّلِب ) for their support during the boycott. Defending his decision to allocate permanent shares from his fifth of booty of Khaybar to members of Banu Hashim and Banu Muttalib, the Prophet expressed his thankfulness to them vividly. The only person who did not belong to either of these two clans but still got a share was Abu Bakr. ³⁸ Abu Bakr was the most trusted advisor to the Prophet. From Badr to Fathe Mecca (Fathe Makkah, The conquest of Mecca, فَتِح مكّة ) there is not a single occasion of political importance when the Prophet did not seek his opinon. ³⁹ Anyhow, the Prophet did not appoint him a general or a field commander during any of the campaigns. The Prophet used to choose comparatively young men for this kind of job. The only known expedition during which Abu Bakr led a small Muslim battalion was that towards Nejd. ⁴⁰ This campaign had no significance towards propping up Islam as a leading force in Hejaz. None of those present at the Hall of Banu Saida was associated with Islam longer than Abu Bakr and none of them was as steadfast with Islam as was Abu Bakr. Umar established ‘earlier acceptance of Islam and deep commitment to it’ as ‘the best’ in Abu Bakr. ⁴¹

Humans are naturally hierarchical. In theory, Islam considered all its adherents equal. Practically, hierarchy was well entrenched among Muslims at the time of death of Prophet Muhammad. Once Prophet Muhammad sent Mu’adh bin Jabal (Mu’ādh bin Jabal مُعاذ بِن جَبَل) as his messenger to Zur’ah bin Dhi Yazan, a Ḥimyār who had accepted Islam. In his paper of credentials the Prophet introduces Mu’adh as one of the righteous among his immediate companions. ⁴² ⁴³ It means some companions of the Prophet were ‘his immediate’ – his inner circle. And even in that inner circle there was hierarchy, some were ‘righteous’. Umar did not have to argue with those present at the Hall of Banu Saida that Abu Bakr was the most senior in hierarchy. They understood it. This is the only reason, though Abu Bakr had floated the idea that caliph would be only from Quraysh, none of prominent Quraysh contested with Abu Bakr for leadership. It includes those men of Quraysh who were still in Mecca and could have challenged Abu Bakr later on if they wished, like Abu Sufyan (Abū Sufyān اَبُو سُفيان ).⁴⁴

Ibn Ishaq doesn’t report any overt political discord among Muhajirun at the time of selection of first caliph. Though, according to Ibn Ishaq’s rendition of the events, ambitions ran high among the two surviving male relatives of Prophet Muhammad. During the final illness of Prophet Muhammad, Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib (‘Abbās bin ‘Abdul Muṭṭalib عَبّاس بِن عَبدُالمُطَّلِب ), paternal uncle of the Prophet suggested to Ali bin Abu Talib to ask the Prophet “if authority is to be with us, we shall know it, and if it is to be with others we will request him to enjoin the people to treat us well” but Ali refused saying “if it is withheld from us none after him will give it to us”. ⁴⁵

Ya’qubi claims that when the group of Muhajirun returned to downtown Medina, where the mosque of the Prophet stood, the group of people who were present in the house of Fatima, probably mourning the death of the Prophet as his household members, denied taking oath of allegiance with Abu Bakr. Here Ya’qubi gives a list of people who refused to take oath of allegiance, including both Quraysh and Ansar. They were Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, Fadl bin Abbas (Fad.l bin ‘Abbās فَضَل بِن عَبّاس ), Zubayr bin Awwam, Khalid bin Sa’id (Khālid bin Sa’īd خالِد بِن سَعِيد ), Miqdad bin Amr (Miqdād bin Amr مِقداد بِن عَمرؤ ), Salman Farsi (Salmān al Fārsi سَلمان الفارسى ), Abu Dharr Ghifari (Abu Dharr al Ghifari اَبُو ذَرّ الغِفارى ), Ammar bin Yasir (Ammar bin Yasir عَمّار بِن ياسِر ), Bara bin Azib (Barā’ Bin ‘Āzib بَراء بِن عازِب ) and Ubayy bin Ka’b. ⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ Ya’qubi also asserts that Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, Fadl bin Abbas and ‘Utba bin Abu Lahab openly demanded that the khalifa should be one of Banu Hashim. However, Ya’qubi insists that Ali forbade all of them from saying so. ⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ Tabari, who is chronologically three decades after Ya’qubi, also reports such events but in a softer tone. ⁵⁰

Meticulous examination of Islamic sources establishes a diagnosis of difference in opinion among early Muhajirun rather than a row. The group in Fatima’s house expected the caliph to be from Hashim clan of Quraysh rather than from Taym. This group was not in a position to press on their demand due to insufficient support from other clans of Quraysh. ⁵¹ Ya’qubi reports that the majority had accepted Abu Bakr as caliph. ⁵²

The matter settled amicably. Tabari shows Ali, Zubayr, Talha and Abdullah bin Mas’ud (‘Adballah bin Mas’ūd عَبداُللّه بِن مَسعُود ) participating in defence of Medina against intruders under orders of Abu Bakr just few days after his selection. ⁵³ Ya’qubi informs us that the people who refused to take oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr on first day of death of the Prophet, gradually started taking oath, the last being Ali, six months down ‘Abu Bakr’s tenure. ⁵⁴ ⁵⁵ The change of mind among ‘Mensheviks’ of Muhajurun could be due to victories in Ridda Wars which Abu Bakr started securing one after another. Tabari asserts that by the time of death of Fatima, six months after selection of Abu Bakr, Ali had lost the attention of people, which he used to get. Hesitantly, he sought a one on one meeting with Abu Bakr. In this meeting they discussed matter of Prophet Muhammad’s inheritance and Ali’s perception that Hashim clan had a right to caliphate. Abu Bakr didn’t inch back from his position on both of these matters. After that meeting, all of Banu Hashim took oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr. ⁵⁶ Actually, Ya’qubi shows Ali to be in the post of advisor to Abu Bakr as early as beginning of 634 CE when Medinan Caliphate invaded Byzantine Syria. ⁵⁷

Reports of deviating meetings and debates around selection of first caliph tend to strengthen the authenticity of Abu Bakr’s later statement, ‘I took caliphate (khilāfat) because I knew that people were in dispute and I feared that they would be destroyed. ⁵⁸ And contradictions in those reports of meetings and debates strengthen our suspicion that the events of the day the Prophet died are highly censored.

Leader of prayer

Leader of ritual prayer (ṣalāt) definitely gets stamp of seniority in religion among Muslims. ⁵⁹ Though the Prophet used to appoint others to lead a prayer on occasions when he was not physically present, the only occasion when he himself offered prayer under lead of another person was Tabuk (Tabūk تَبُوك ). The Prophet got late while performing ablutions (wuzū) and the Muslims tipped Abdur Rehman bin Awf (‘Abd ar Reḥmān bin ‘Awf عَبد اُلرَحمان بِن عَوف ) to lead the prayer. The Prophet later joined them, giving a nod to Abdur Rehman to continue with the lead. ⁶⁰ Traditions from many different sources mention that Propeht Muhammad ‘ordered’ Abu Bakr to lead the prayer during his final days. ⁶¹ Abu Bakr might have got a token of seniority in religion by this act of the Prophet, he definitely didn’t get emblem of political leadership. ⁶² After Prophet’s death, the Muhajirun didn’t use the honour Abu Bakr earned by leading the prayer during lifetime of the Prophet as an argument that the Prophet had tipped him as potential caliph. ⁶³

Abu Bakr takes oath

On June 8, 632 CE, the next day of bickering in the Hall of Banu Saida, Umar asked everybody present in the Prophet’s mosque to swear fealty to Abu Bark and everybody present did it. In his acceptance speech Abu Bakr said ‘Obey me as long as I obey Allah and His Apostle, and if I disobey them you owe me no obedience’. ⁶⁴ Abu Bakr effectively defined the governing principal of the theocracy he was going to preside over. Obedience to caliph (and state) was not unconditional. It was subject to a condition that the caliph (and the state) would function within limits of religious doctrine.

What Abu Bakr had accepted, was not a glamorous position at that point in time. It was the most difficult job. Muslims were internally divided. Tribes previously loyal to Islamic state of Medina were perplexed. People in many parts of Arabia were discarding the older form of organization – tribal confederation. Rather they were organizing themselves in newer form – religious fraternities. In this scenario Abu Bakr desperately needed to generate support at grass root level for his caliphate. Aisha says “after the death of the Prophet, what befell my father would have softened the firm mountains if it had befallen them. Hypocrisy in Medina exalted itself, and the Arabs apostatized from their faith. By Allah, not a point they disagreed upon, which my father did not cause to disappear as something without which Islam could do [?].” ⁶⁵

Abu Bakr picks deputy

The army of Usama had returned to Medina due to illness of Prophet Muhammad. When it was ready to depart after death of the Prophet, Abu Bakr asked Usama to spare Umar from military duty so he could assist Abu Bakr in running affairs of the state.⁶⁶ Abu Bakr didn’t create office of deputy caliph formally. Still, we don’t hear of a single decision of political significance taken by Abu Bakr in which Umar had not given inputs. Moreover, on many occasions, Umar alone registered his dissent from decisions of Abu Bakr. Furthermore, we don’t hear of any other’s inputs that might have helped Abu Bakr in changing his mind. Umar was effectively deputy to Abu Bakr throughout his rein. Islamic sources knew it. Ya’qubi informs us that the only person who had great influence on Abu Bakr was Umar.⁶⁷ Tabari also writes many traditions expressing this theme. ⁶⁸

Rashidun Caliphate is born

Mainstream Islamic historians and scholars of mid-9^th century gravitate towards the idea that there was a ‘just golden rule’ in the beginning of Islam, followed by a ‘tyranny’. They named that just golden rule, era of rightly guided caliphs – khulafa ur Rāshidūn (خُلَفاءُالراشِدون). Mid-9^th ⁶⁹ century Islamic historians and scholars unanimously believe that the process of revelation had stopped by the death of Prophet Muhammad. ⁷⁰ However, they believe, that somehow Allah was guiding khulafa ur Rāshidūn directly. Baladhuri puts words in Abdullah bin Mus’ud’s mouth, “Allah ordered Abu Bakr to fight with them [apostatizing tribes].” ⁷¹

The debate who should be included in khulafa ur Rāshidūn and who should be excluded finally settled when a highly respected Baghdadi scholar Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 855 CE) agreed that Ali was one of khulafa ur Rāshidūn. He had been excluding Ali from the list in his earlier views. When questioned by his colleagues about his change of heart, he replied that since caliph Umar bin Khattab “was satisfied with the idea of Ali as caliph of the Muslims . . . and since Ali called himself commander of the faithful, who am I to say that he was not?” ⁷²

The final list drawn by mainstream Islamic historians and scholars included the first four caliphs, Abu Bakr (632 – 634 CE), Umar (634 – 644 CE), Uthman (644 – 656 CE) and Ali (656 – 661 CE) as rightly guided caliphs. ⁷³ Small number of Muslim historians and scholars disagreed. For them the rightful caliphate had started with Ali and got interrupted quickly by Ali’s assassination.⁷⁴ ⁷⁵

For most of its life Medina served as capital of Rashidun Caliphate, also called Medinan Caliphate. During the last four years of Medinan Caliphate, Kufa served as its capital. The ruler of Medinan Caliphate held wide ranging powers – all the powers that Prophet Muhammad had. He was the head of the executive branch of government, he was the sole law maker of the country, he was the supreme commander of army, he was the chief justice of the land and he was the final religious authority over Muslims living anywhere in world.

Abu Bakr picks administration

Never a ruler rules all alone. It is always a team work. As a bottom line, it is a derogative of the ruler to appoint government of his choice after attaining power. He strives to appoint his trusted people who usually have been supporting him before his elevation to power. It guarantees smooth functioning of his government. All the governors and generals Abu Bakr appointed during two years and two months of his tenure were members of Quraysh. Some of them had converted to Islam after Fathe Mecca.⁷⁶ The fact gives indirect evidence that in addition to the Quraysh of Medina, who went to the Hall of Banu Saida with him, it were Quraysh residents of Mecca who supported his appointment as caliph.

Inheritance of the Prophet and the case of Fadak

The first legal case Abu Bakr had to judge as chief justice of the country was the inheritance of Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet had four daughters and three sons from Khadija.⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ He had one son from Maria the Coptic (Maria Qibṭiya ماريةُ القبِطيه ), the slave girl gifted to him by Muqawqis ( Māqus مَقُوقَس ) of Egypt.⁷⁹ ⁸⁰ All of Prophet’s children had died in his lifetime except Fatima. ⁸¹ He was also survived by nine of his wives.⁸² They were all heirs to the Prophet’s property. ⁸³

The Prophet had three properties. Agricultural land in Medina, got from Naḍīr; agricultural land in Fadak, got as fay’; and share from Khaybar. He reserved income from the land of Naḍīr for any unforeseen misfortunes, reserved income from Fadak for wayfarers and divided income from Khaybar into three parts. He used one part for provisions to his family and gave left over in alms to needy Muhajirun. He divided the other two parts among Muslims. ⁸⁴

The Prophet, along with his wives, and Ali along with his wife and children, used to live in the Prophet’s mosque.⁸⁵ Abu Bakr had bought its land and the community as a whole had provided labour and material to build it. ⁸⁶ In this sense it was not the Prophet’s personal property. Still, Caliph Abu Bakr allowed his widows to continue living in it without paying rent.

The Prophet used to get cash income from ṣadaqah and jizyah. In addition he used to get his fifth share from the booty. As he did not have any cash saved at the time of his death, it is apparent that he considered all that money state property and spent it into state expenditures, like winning chiefs of tribes towards Islam, giving subsidy to the tribes, propagation of Islam etc. etc.

Dispute about disbursement of Prophet’s income had started during his own lifetime after conquest of Khaybar.⁸⁷ Apparently the dispute lingered on, as Waqidi notes that during his caliphate Umar withheld certain funds from portions of Banu Hashim because they refused to use that money to marry off widows and salvaging indebted from this amount.⁸⁸

Most well-known dispute of Prophet’s estate is not that of Khaybar but it is that of Fadak. And this is the civil suite which Abu Bakr had to decide early during his caliphate. At the time of its surrender, the People of Fadak had given half of their land to the Muslims. The Prophet kept half out of it for himself. ⁸⁹

The widows of the Prophet wished their inheritance from Khaybar and Fadak. (Islamic sources don’t mention lands gained from Naḍīr in any dispute of inheritance). They delegated Uthman bin Affan (‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān عُثمان بِن عَفّان ) as their attorney to plead their case with Abu Bakr. Later, Aisha dropped the civil suit on behalf of everybody saying that they were ṣadaqah lands whose income was used for the benefit of people of Muhammad and should be used for the same purpose by the one who is in authority after the Prophet.⁹⁰ Fatima Bint Muhammad brought her sole claim for Fadak pleading that Prophet Muhammad had assigned it to her. She presented Ali bin Abu Talib, her husband, as her witness. Abu Bakr demanded another witness. So she brought Umm Aiman. Abu Bakr dismissed the case on grounds that either two male witnesses or one male and two female witnesses were required to establish the claim. ⁹¹ Abu Bakr wrote in his judgement that the Prophet wished that the ṣadaqah established by him will continue for the benefit of Muslims after his death. ⁹²

Seemingly, each party involved accepted the ruling. Prophet’s wives continued to get their ration from Khaybar. The rest of the income continued to be spent as ṣadaqah as Waqidi mentions that income generated by Prophet’s property was given to orphans, poor and wayfarers by Abu Bakr, Umar and Ali. ⁹³ ⁹⁴

First thing first

Abu Bakr was determined to demonstrate that he started his political mission from exactly where sudden death of Prophet Muhammad had interrupted it, and that his tenure was a continuation of Prophet Muhammad’s policies. He sent Usama with three thousand men to invade Yibna, as was planned by the Prophet.⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ Usama ambushed Yibna’s residents, killing some people and taking some prisoners. He plundered the town and then burnt it. Not a single Muslim got wounded. Heraculis, the king of Byzantine Rome, who was in Homs that time, got upset at the news that the Bedouins raided from one month’s journey, and left without being hurt. Consequently he strengthened his borders at Balqā’.⁹⁷ ⁹⁸ ⁹⁹ Actullay, Yibna was twenty night’s journey from Medina but Heraclius counted it thirty day’s journey. ¹⁰⁰ This was the level of Heraclius’s knowledge about geography of Arabia. As people had warned Abu Bakr not to send Usama in the wake of apostasy and Waqidi notes that the expedition took place almost one month after death of the Prophet, we can calculate that it would have taken place in July 632 CE. ¹⁰¹

The narration of battle – ambush, no Muslim wounded, Heraclius takes it as Bedouin raid – validates that it was a political gimmick. It was merely a show of power by Abu Bakr. It was his effort to demonstrate that his manifesto was to toe line of action of Prophet Muhammad. It was his endeavour to seal the cracks that had appeared in the Muslim community of Medina after selection of caliph and to establish his authority firmly over them.¹⁰² By the time the military was away from Medina, changes in political climate of Arabia had already convinced Abu Bakr that it was time to shelve Prophet’s northern policy and to attend more pressing issues nearby. During absence of the army of Usama, Abu Bakr had met a tribal delegation confirming that they won’t pay tax though they don’t mind praying ṣalāt.¹⁰³ Simultaneously, the hostile tribes in proximity of Medina started harassing Medinan Caliphate, exploiting the fact that its military was away.¹⁰⁴

Ridda Wars (Ḥurūb ar-Riddah)

Just after death of Prophet Muhammad a big war engulfed whole of Arabia in its flames – a war that killed more people than those killed in all the Prophetic Wars combined.¹⁰⁵ The series of battles, that lasted for almost one year, is called ‘Ridda Wars’(Ḥurūb ur Riddah حُرُوب اُلرِدّه ), or ‘War on Apostasy’ (Fitnah tul Irtidād فِتنَةُ الاِرتِداد ) by Islamic sources.¹⁰⁶ Modern historians consider it a misnomer.¹⁰⁷ They believe the war was not about fighting against apostates (sin. murtadd, pl. murtadīn). Watt rejects the notion of apostasy on logical grounds. He is of opinion that the nature of Arab society during the Prophetic times was such that public declaration meant far more to an Arab. Once anybody converted, his faith was genuine.¹⁰⁸ Apostasy was contrary to Arab’s murūʾah.

Baladhuri, who is the first historian to record the events of Ridda Wars, describes the problem, “When Abu Bakr was proclaimed caliph, certain Arab tribes apostatized from Islam and withheld ṣadaqah. Some of them, however said, ‘We shall observe prayer but not pay zakāt.’” ¹⁰⁹ Even if we take Baladhuri’s statement on face value it is evident that some, not all, of the tribes apostatized but all of rebel tribes refused to pay tax to Abu Bakr.

Let’s examine the issue closely. Explaining start of Ridda War against Kindah tribe, Baladhuri writes that Ziyad bin Labid (Ziyād bin Labīd زياد بِن لَبِيد) was Prophet’s zakāt collector to Haḍaramaut. Abu Bakar extended his tax circle to the tribe of Kindah. He was resolute and sturdy in his manners. He developed a dispute with Kindah over assessment of ṣadaqah. Ash’ath bin Qays ( اَشعَث بِن قَيس ) of ‘Amr bin Mu’āwiyah clan of Kindah approached him to reconsider his assessment of ṣadaqah. Ziyad refused to change his mind. It resulted in general revolt of Kindah against him. The only Kindah clan that did not take part in the revolt was Sakun.¹¹⁰ Here, Baladhuri clearly demonstrates that the party, whom he calls apostates, was willing to pay tax if it was reasonable. The dispute was economical, not religious. As Baladhuri is writing this event in context of apostasy in Yemen, evidently he confuses tax evasion and resistance to tax collectors with apostasy. Actually, all Islamic sources collectively fail to point out a single tribe in Arabia who had been praying ṣalāt and refused to do so after death of Prophet Muhammad.

We don’t know their reasons why some tribes refused to pay tax. As in the above example, some perceived it to be high. It is also possible that some of them didn’t feel obliged to pay tax to Abu Bakr as they had entered into agreement with Prophet Muhammad, not with an invisible state. We know Abu Bakr asked them to renew the contracts and some of them did it on the same terms as they were with Prophet Muhammad without any resistance, for example, people of Najran.¹¹¹ Furthermore, it is also possible that some tribes did not perceive Abu Bakr to be capable of providing them with ‘protection’ that was guaranteed in lieu of paying tax. Lastly, so many tribes against whom forces of Medinan Caliphate fought during the Ridda wars are not heard of paying any tax to Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime. Vivid example is Bakr bin Wa’il. (Bakr bin Wā’il بَكر بِن واءِل ).

Actually, Medinan Caliphate had two goals in mind to launch the Ridda Wars. Firstly it was a campaign to bring those tribes back under government authority who had started thinking of self-rule after election of Abu Bakr. Secondly, after attaining the first goal, to bring all others tribes and polities in Arabia under administration of Medinan Caliphate, and to eliminate all bastions of resistance. Then, why does Baladhuri, and all other Islamic sources, call it war against apostasy? It is because they toe the line of Ibn Ishaq who claims that all and sundry accepted Islam during the last two years of Prophet Muhammad’s life. If Mednian Caliphate had to fight against them under leadership of Abu Bakr, naturally, they had to be shown as apostates.

Tribal affiliation was guiding principal of those who opposed Medinan Caliphate in Ridda wars, though some had started galvanizing around a religion. Caetani, the Italian scholar, classifies the Arab tribes into four categories according to their relations with Prophet Muhammad by the time of his death; (i) tribes that submitted to Prophet Muhammad and converted to Islam (ii) tribes that submitted to Prophet Muhammad and made progress in Islam: Hawazin (Hawāzin هَوازِن ), Amir, Tayy (Ṭāʾī طاءِى ) and Sulaym (iii) tribes which lived on the periphery of the state of Medina which submitted politically to Islam and were euphemistically called Muslim (iv) tribes which kept their independence from Medina, among whom a small minority sought the help of the Prophet against adversaries: Hanifa (Ḥanīfāh حَنِيفَه ), Asad, and the tribes of Oman and Ḥaḍramaut among others.¹¹²

Tribes that supported Abu Bakr in achieving his goals of Ridda Wars seem to include Aslam, Ghifar (Ghifār غِفار ), Muzayna, Ashja’, Juhayna, Ka’b bin Amr, parts of Sulaym (all from Hejaz), parts of Tayy (perhaps only Jadīla and Ghawth clans), parts of Tamim (Tamīm تَمِيم ), and perhaps sections of Asad and Ghatafan (Ghaṭafān غَطَفان), (all from Nejd), and probably Bajila (Bajīlah بَجيله ) and various sections of Yemeni tribal groups that remained loyal to Medinan Caliphate, such as Sakun (Sakūn سَكُون ) of Kindah. Tribes of Northern Hejaz, Syria and Iraq had not participated in Ridda Wars. They included Bali, Udhra (Udhrah عُذ ره ), perhaps parts of Quda’a (Quḍā’a قُضاعه ), such as kalb.¹¹³ Not to mention, Quraysh, Khazraj, Aws and Thaqif were Abu Bakr’s main strength.¹¹⁴

All tribes supporting Abu Bakr fought under command of individuals who belonged to Quraysh. As Quraysh came out triumphant in Ridda Wars they attained position of political elite among Arabs and played a vital role in future extension and management of Islamic empire.¹¹⁵

The defeated and hence conquered tribes like Hanifa and Asad remained in their traditional territory persuing pastoralism, agriculture, artisanry or trade, and played no active part in the management and expansion of Medinan Caliphate. They remained the administered population of Arabia, subject to the Islamic ruling class, to which they paid taxes in return for the regime’s protection against external interference and its services in adjudicating their tribal disputes. As former rebels, they were deemed untrustworthy, and in order to keep them under control, Abu Bakr appears to have taken prisoners from these subjected tribes to hold hostage as a guarantee of the tribe’s continued good behavior.¹¹⁶

Medinan Caliphate did not have funds to pay to its soldiers fighting in the Ridda Wars. Their salary was their booty (ghanīmah).¹¹⁷ Abu Bakr sent his field commander Ikrima bin Abu Jahl (‘Ikrimah bin abu Jahl عِكرِمه بِن اَبُو جهل ) to reinforce his agents Ziyad bin Labid and Muhajir bin Umayah (Muhājir bin Umayah مُهاجِر بِن اُميّه) in Yemen after Ikrima had finished his job in Oman. Ziyad and Muhajir had already reduced the fort of Nujair by the time Ikrima reached. They had to share their booty with Ikrima on Abu Bakr’s request.¹¹⁸

Realignment of Tribes of Nejd and Hejaz

First events of Ridda Wars took place by end of July 632 CE, few weeks after Abu Bakr took the office.¹¹⁹ ¹²⁰ By that time Abu Bakr had decided to get rid of vestigial resistance to Medinan Caliphate in Hejaz and Nejd, and then to subjugate whole of Arabia, before he pursues any northern policy.

The force that went to Hejaz, Nejd and later, Yamama appears to be drawn mainly from Muhajirun of Medina, Quraysh of Mecca, Ansar, and Thaqif.¹²¹

Most of tribes based in Hejaz and Nejd or at least part thereof, had paid tax to Prophet Muhammad during last two years of his lifetime. They were the fundamental groups who refused to pay a damn. During first month of his caliphate Abu Bakr received delegates of Asad, Ghatafan, Hawazin, Tayy and Quda’a in Medina one by one. All of them presented their petition to Abu Bakr to get tax exemption.¹²² All of them were Bedouin. As all of them promised to pray ṣalāt as prescribed, it is evident that they represented only Muslim clans of their respective tribes and that they didn’t apostate in true meanings of the word.¹²³ Many of the leading figures of Medinan Caliphate, cognizant of sinister situation, urged Abu Bakr to yield to their petition. Abu Bakr took a resolute stance against them.¹²⁴ “If they refuse me a hobble [iqāl, the rope worn by the camel], I shall fight them for it,” reiterated Abu Bakr.¹²⁵ Thus Abu Bakr crafted the blueprint for survival of the feeble polity he was presiding over.

Fazara (Fazārah فَزارَه ) clan of Ghatafan and Khuzayma bin Asad were two tribes who had been switching parties during Prophetic times and were still buddy with each other. During last months of Prophet Muhammad’s life, Tulayha bin Khuwailid (Ṭulayḥah bin Khuwailid طُلَيحَه بِن خُوَيلِد ) of Asad bin Khuzaimah had declared himself a prophet.¹²⁶ ¹²⁷ He not only posed tribal but ideological threat to Medinan Caliphate.¹²⁸

First encounter with Ghatafan-Asad tribal confederation was trivial. Kharija bin Hisn (Khārijah bin Ḥiṣn خارِجَه بِن حِصن ), who was brother of Uyayna bin Hisn (‘Uyaynah bin Ḥiṣn عُيَينه بن حِصن) and Manzur bin Zabban (Manẓūr bin Zabbān مَنظُر بِن زَبّان ), both of Fazara clan of Ghatafan showed up near Medina.¹²⁹ Abu Bakr’s field commander Talha bin Ubaydallah of Taym clan of Quraysh chased them away.¹³⁰ ¹³¹ Then Abu Bakr sent his commander in chief, Khalid bin Walid, against Tulayha. Tulayha came with his brothers Hibal (Ḥibāl حِبال ) and Salamah. Uyayna bin Hisn of Fazarah tribe had joined him with seven hundred men.¹³² Khalid’s army included some clans of Asad, though main body of Asad were in Tulayha’s camp.¹³³ Tayy generally supported Tulayha.¹³⁴ Ashja’ clan of Ghatafan was pro-Medinan Caliphate.¹³⁵ In the middle of the fight Uyayna withdrew his men blaming Tulayha to be a false prophet. After routing the enemy, Muslims could capture Uyayina bin Hisn and took him to Medina. Abu Bakr spared his life and set him free. Tulayha fled from the scene but was caught later. He was sent to Medina where he confessed Islam.¹³⁶ ¹³⁷ ¹³⁸ During the same campaign Khalid sent a battalion under Hisham bin As (Hishām bin ‘Āṣ هِشام بِن عاص ), brother of Amr bin As, of Sahm clan against Amir bin Sasa’a (‘Amir bin Ṣa’ṣa’ah عامِر بِن صَصَعه) but they did not resist and professed their belief in Islam. Their leader Qurrah bin Hubairah was arrested and sent to Abu Bakr on charges of reinforcing Tulayha. Qurrah pleaded not guilty, Abu Bakr accepted it.¹³⁹ Kharija bin Hisn was still on the run. Khalid could kill him in an encounter, his companions fled.¹⁴⁰

Tulayha’s and Uyayna’s decisive defeat was a game changer in Hejaz. Many other tribes of Hejaz, like Hawazin, portions of Amir Bin Sasa’a and portions of Sulaym had withheld tax. They were watching the match between Abu Bakr and Tulayha vigilantly. The outcome convinced them to enter into tax agreement with Medinan Caliphate without further defiance.¹⁴¹ ¹⁴² Abu Bakr’s lenient demeanor towards the arrested leaders of Ghatafan, Asad and Amir Bin Sasa’a would have contributed towards alleviating their ambivalence.

Very few clans of Sulaym had rebelled.¹⁴³ After finishing off Ghatafan, Asad and rebel portions of Tayy, Khalid advanced on disobedient sections of Sulaym who had gathered under their leader Amr bin Abdul Uzza (‘Amr bin ‘Abd al ‘Uzza abu Shajarah اَبُو شَجرَه عَمرؤ بِن عَبدُ العُزّئ ). Khalid defeated them and burnt some of them.¹⁴⁴ Amr accepted Islam.¹⁴⁵ All encounters mentioned up to now were small scale scuffles. Baladhuri doesn’t mention any casualty on Muslim side.¹⁴⁶

How did Tamim behave during Ridda Wars is obscure. It is partly due to the reason that main transmitter of Ridda Wars, Sayf bin Umar was from Tamim and he would have covered it up.¹⁴⁷ They were predominantly Christian.¹⁴⁸ Apparently they were indifferent to Medinan Caliphate initially. Later, when Medinan Caliphate defeated Hanifa decisively, they started co-operating with Muslims. Name of a woman of Tamim surfaces up during Ridda Wars. She was Saja Bint Aws (Sajāh. bint Aws Umm Ṣādir سَجاح بِنت اَوس اُمّ صادِر ) from Hanzala (Ḥanẓalah حَنظَله ) clan of Tamim. Her mother was from Taghlib. She used to claim being a kāhin and a Prophetess. She had appointed her own muazin. Few clans of Tamim and Taghlib believed in her, mainly her own relatives. She asked her supporters to invade the town of Ribāb after claiming that the Lord of Heavens had advised her so. Her force got defeated. She then came to Musaylima in Ḥajar and married him, joining her religion with his. After Muslayma’s defeat Saja disappeared into anonymity. Some say she returned to her brothers, others say she accepted Islam and started living in Basrah where she died.¹⁴⁹

Baladhuri is not very sure about any of Khalid’s campaigns against Tamim. According to some reports that reached Baladhuri, Khalid fought with Tamim at Buṭāh and Ba’ūḍah. In other reports it was Dirar bin Azwar (Ḍirār bin Azwar ضِرار بِن اَزوَر ) of Asad who fought against Malik bin Nuwaira (Mālik bin Nuwairah مالِك بِن نُويره ) of Hanzala clan of Tamim. Dirar could capture Malik and brought him to Khalid. Khalid ordered Malik to be beheaded. Malik was Prophet Muhammad’s ‘āmil for collecting ṣadaqah from the Hanzala clan. Baladhuri reports that at the death of the Prophet he withheld the money and asked Hanzala to keep their money. But in any case, at the time of execution he claimed that he had not apostatized.¹⁵⁰ ¹⁵¹

False Prophets

Before we proceed further on events of Ridda Wars let’s acquaint ourselves with the phenomenon of ‘false Prophets.’

Islamic sources have preserved names of at least four people living in Arabia during the Prophetic times and during Abu Bakr’s tenure as caliph, whom they call ‘false Prophets’. Aswad, Tulayha and Saja have already been discussed. The only one left is Musaylima.

Many historians identify the rise of various persons claiming prophet hood at the same time as Prophet Muhammad, a social phenomenon.¹⁵² Al Askar, the Saudi scholar who has studied Musaylima and war of Yamama in detail, calls the seventh century as century of prophets for Arabia.¹⁵³ The social organization of people no longer remained purely tribal by the time of death of Prophet Muhammad. It was an early form of religio-tribal organization.

All the ‘false Prophets’ failed to attract any significant followership except one. He was Musaylima. We shall discuss him briefly below.

War of Yamama

In spring of 633 CE a fierce battle took place on the plains of ‘Aqraba – a battle that was most horrible of all the battles Islamic army had taken part in up to now, including the Prophetic Wars.¹⁵⁴ The size of opponents is said to be forty thousands, the largest an Islamic army had ever faced.¹⁵⁵ The size of Muslims is reported to be four thousands only.¹⁵⁶ The death toll on Muslim side alone could be in tune of seven hundred to seventeen hundred, which makes a hefty forty percent of the whole army.¹⁵⁷ Similar magnitude of loss is estimated on the opposite side – thirty five percent.¹⁵⁸ The war, though considered part of Ridda Wars by Islamic sources, has its own name – the War of Yamama.

As mentioned earlier, Yamama was a geographic and political entity of Arabia on its own in pre-Islamic times.¹⁵⁹ It was located around the mountains which are now called Jabl Tuwayq.¹⁶⁰ Yamama was completely sedentary. Main inhabitant of the region was the tribe of Hanifa, though some clans of Tamim had settled in the regions as well.¹⁶¹ Hanifa were dominant social group and were owners of best and richest resources. Agriculture was main activity in Yamama. Wheat and dates were major crops. Handicrafts and mining industries are also said to be flourishing.¹⁶² Main town in the region and its capital was Ḥajar. ¹⁶³ ¹⁶⁴

It appears that Hanifa were strong under leadership of Hawdha bin Ali and that Prophet Muhammad had contacted them when he was looking for a community for protection just after his visit to Taif.¹⁶⁵ First contact between Islamic state of Medina and Yamama was late spring or early summer of 628 CE just after Peace treaty of Hudaybiah when Prophet Muhammad wrote a letter to Hawdha inviting him to Islam.¹⁶⁶ Baladhuri states that people of Yamama sent a delegate to Medina in response to the letter.¹⁶⁷ Islamic sources are thoroughly contradicting each other about details of this delegation but one thing is sure, no concrete outcome emerged from this ambassadorial exercise. Hawdha was, however, an old man and he soon died around 630 CE.¹⁶⁸ ¹⁶⁹

Musaylima bin Habib (Musaylimah bin Ḥabīb مُسَيلِمه بِن حَبِيب ) of Hanifa better known as Musaylima, the arch liar (Kazzāb) succeeded the late King of Yamama, Hawdha bin Ali and within four years he transformed Hanifa into a single religious and political agglomeration under his leadership.¹⁷⁰ ¹⁷¹ Previously, Hawdha had organized them around tribal affiliations. As we don’t hear of any Sasanian presence in Yamama during Musalyma’s tenure, we can assume that either he had asked them to leave or they had left themselves.¹⁷²

Why did Musaylima succeed Hawdha and how did he transform the region into a powerful polity is not known exactly. Caetani asserts that it was very likely that Musaylima had already achieved renown for his religious ideas during the lifetime of Hawdha and that after Hawdha’s death he had come to power, without any sort of revolution, as the most worthy and popular individual in Yamama.¹⁷³ Baladhuri confirms that Hanifa and others in Yamama followed Musaylima.¹⁷⁴ So, we can see there was formation of a state around religion, a process that appears to be very similar to state formation in Medina.

It is known that Musaylima had proclaimed prophet hood during lifetime of Hawdha. Waqidi reports him to have claimed Prophet hood at the time of Badr.¹⁷⁵ It is also known that Musaylima came to Medina along with delegation of Hanifa which they had sent in response to the letter of the Prophet to Hawdha.¹⁷⁶ According to Ibn Ishaq he did not meet the Prophet.¹⁷⁷

Very little is known about the religion Musaylima carried. Ibn Ishaq tells that he had an imitation of Qurʾan called saj’ which had rhymes like, “Allah has been gracious to the pregnant woman; He has brought forth from her a living being that can move; from her very midst.” He permitted his followers to drink wine and to fornicate and let them dispense with ritual prayer.¹⁷⁸ Baladhuri tells us that Ḥujair was muezzin of Musaylima. He used to call to prayer chanting: I testify that Musaylima claims to be the prophet of Allah.¹⁷⁹ As Musaylima has survived only through agency of Islamic sources, Askar argues that it is difficult to judge Musaylima and his mission objectively from the accounts that are hostile to him.¹⁸⁰

Bitter hostilities between Islamic state of Medina and the religious state of Yamama had erupted during the Prophetic times as soon as boundaries of both came nearer. Prophet Muhammad labeled him ‘the arch liar’ (Kazzāb).¹⁸¹ As Ibn Ishaq mentions this in the same tradition where the Prophet also used similar words for Aswad al Ansi of Yemen, we can safely assume it happened only after Musaylima came to power. Musaylima wrote a letter to Prophet Muhammad saying, “From Musaylima the apostle of Allah to Muhammad the Apostle of Allah. Peace upon you. I have been made partner with you in authority. To us belongs half the land and to Quraysh half, but the Quraysh are a hostile people.” ¹⁸² ¹⁸³ Or in other words let’s recognize each other’s authority over whatever we possess. According to Ibn Ishaq, the Prophet got so enraged to read the letter that he wished he could have beheaded the two heralds who brought the letter if they were not envoys. ¹⁸⁴ Then the Prophet replied, “The land belongs to Allah and He gives it to any of His servants He is pleased with.” ¹⁸⁵ Ibn Ishaq gives the date of this correspondence spring of 632 CE.¹⁸⁶ Musaylima had strengthened his position in Yamama by that time. He cut hands and feet of Habib bin Ziyad (Ḥabīb bin Zyād حَبِيب بِن زياد ) of Najjār clan, the Prophet’s envy to Yamama and sent him back with his fellow envoy Abdullah bin Wahb of Aslam.¹⁸⁷ This event might have taken place just before death of Prophet Muhammad.

The only person from Hanifa who accepted Islam during Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime was Thumama bin Athal (Thumāma bin Athāl ثُمامه بِن اثال ).¹⁸⁸ Askar considers him a leader of semi nomad clans of Hanifa.¹⁸⁹

As there is no clue that Musaylima opposed pre-existing religious believes nor there is any clue that he opposed those who did not believe in his Prophet hood, one can assume that he was simply eager to establish a state in Yamama independent of Medina, Iran or Hira (Ḥīrah حِيرَه ).¹⁹⁰

In the end, Hanifa got defeated at war of Yamama in spring of 633 CE and were ruled by Medinan Caliphate. According to Baladhuri’s report Abu Bakr sent Khalid bin Walid to Yamama a few months down his caliphate when he had already subdued the people of Nejd who had apostatized.¹⁹¹ After getting rid of hostile clans of Ghatafan and Asad and the like, Abu Bakr attacked Yamama with full vigor.

Khalid had three main encounters. In the first one he could capture Mujja’a bin Murara (Mujjā’ah bin Murārah مُجّاعه بِن مُراراه ) and bound him in chains.¹⁹² ¹⁹³ Then Khalid faced Banu Hanifa in the second encounter which was particularly harsh and in which a number of prominent Muslims fell. Ultimately, Banu Hanifa got defeated and their commander Rajjal bin Unfuwa (Rajjāl bin ‘Unfuwah رَجّال بِن عُنفُواه ) got killed.¹⁹⁴ ¹⁹⁵ The surviving troops of Hanifa retreated to Ḥadīqah where, in the final encounter, a lot of them lay dead including Musaylima.¹⁹⁶ ¹⁹⁷ Wahshi bin Harb (Waḥshi bin Ḥarb al Ḥabshi وَحشى بِن حَرب الحَبشى ) was the one who killed Musaylima.¹⁹⁸ ¹⁹⁹

People of Yamama negotiated through mediation of Mujja’a bin Murara the terms of truce (Ṣulḥ صُلح ) which were acceptance of Islam and payment of ṣadaqah.²⁰⁰ They were not treated as ‘people of book’. The first Muslim governor of Yamama was Samurah bin Amr of ‘Anbar clan of Tamim.²⁰¹ ²⁰²

Though defeated physically and converted to Islam socially, Hanifa could not attach with Islam emotionally for a while. They did not participate in Wars in Iraq and Syria. Some of them continued to believe in prophet hood of Musaylima though they had announced conversion to Islam. Abdullah bin Mas’ud, assistant governor of Kufa during Umar’s caliphate, executed a group of Hanifa on charges of believing in prophet hood of Musaylima. ²⁰³ ²⁰⁴ ²⁰⁵ ²⁰⁶ ²⁰⁷ ²⁰⁸

Battle of Yamama was a turning point in Ridda Wars. It was only after this victory of Medinan Caliphate that all Arabs got convinced that Muslims, under Abu Bakr, were invincible and resistance to them started dying out. Arabs got less reluctant to accept Muhammad as Prophet. Muslim army participated only in small battles afterwards in Bahrain, Oman or Yemen to establish authority of Medinan Caliphate over Arabia.

Rebellion of Bahrain

Region of Bahrain had witnessed a mini rebellion against local Muslim leaders after death of Prophet Muhammad. Abu Bakr had to dispatch Khalid bin Walid for Bahrain on request of A’la bin Hadrami (Ā‘lā bin Ḥaḍrami اَعلئ بِن حَضرَمى ) after Khalid finished the business of Yamama. ²⁰⁹ Abu Bakr had appointed A’la bin Hadrami governor over Bahrain after death of Mundhir bin Sawa (Mundhir bin Sāwah مَنذِر بِن ساوَه ).²¹⁰ A’la could not establish his authority from the very beginning.

Mundhir bin Sawa remained the staunchest supporter of Prophet Muhammad in Bahrain.²¹¹ He died after the death of Prophet Muhammad but before the rebellion of the people of Bahrain.²¹² Watt points out that almost simultaneous death of Prophet Muhammad and Mundhir bin Sawa would have given an opportunity to the pro-Sasanian party in the region to establish an independent local principality under patronage of the Sasanians.²¹³ They wished to return the kingship of Bahrain to the family of Mandhir of Hira.²¹⁴ Their candidate for kingship was Gharur bin Mundhir bin Nu’man (Gharūr bin Mundhir bin Nu’mān غُرُور بِن مَنذِر بِن نُعمان ).²¹⁵ ²¹⁶ We do not hear of any personality of Bakr bin Wai’l who converted to Islam during lifetime of Prophet Muhammad. It gives an impression that Bakr bin Wa’il remained royal party and they could organize an uprising when they got the first chance.

Bakr bin Wa’il raised banner of rebellion under their military leader Hutum bin Zubaya (Ḥuṭum bin Ḍubay’ah حُتُم بِن ضُبَيعه ).²¹⁷ Some clans of Abdul Qays ( ‘Abd al Qays عَبدُ القَيس ) joined the rebellion.²¹⁸ Majority of Abdul Qays remained loyal to Islam, along with their leader Jarud (Jāru.d جارُود ), though.²¹⁹ ²²⁰ All rebellious groups joined hands with each other to form an alliance against the Muslims.²²¹ Muslim party had both Arabs and non-Arabs in their folds.²²² After an initial fight A’la besieged himself in the fortress of Juwātha along with his troops.²²³ ²²⁴ Later, on getting a chance, A’la and his men could ambush on enemy at night killing Hutum.²²⁵ Gharur, along with the clans supporting him, retreated to Khaṭṭ.²²⁶ ²²⁷ Muslim party was still not strong enough and had to call for external help.²²⁸ A’la could march upon Gharur killing him, albeit with the help of Khalid bin Walid.²²⁹

Main rebellion of Bahrain ended in 633 CE.²³⁰ Yet, unrest and resistance in Bahrain persisted during Abu Bakr’s reign. Druing pre-Islamic times Kisra had sent Fairuz bin Jushaish (Fairūz bin Jushaish al Muka’bar فَيروز بِن جُشيش المكعبّر), an ethnic Persian, to annihilate Tamim for raiding Kisra’s caravan. He had settled in Bahrain. He fortified himself in Zārah along with his Zoroastrian supporters from town of Qaṭīf and the surroundings. They refused to pay tax. A’la could subdue them only during early years of Umar’s caliphate.²³¹ ²³² The Zoroastrian insurrection must be widespread because A’la had to conquer Sābūn, Ghābah and Dārīn one by one to suppress it.²³³ ²³⁴ This state of affairs is noted by a contemporary Armenian source of Christian belief, Sebeos, who informs us that only after the Arabs had invaded Syria and Iraq did they then penetrate with royal armies into the original borders of the territory of Ishmael.²³⁵ As Sebeos mentions this in context of later Arab invasion on Iran by sea, it is assumed that he is talking about east Arabia.²³⁶ This Zoroastrian refusal to pay tax was the first non-Muslim civil disobedience which Medinan Caliphate faced. It faced many others in later years.

A’la continued to govern over Bahrain until Umar fired him around 638 CE. Then Umar appointed Abu Hurairah of Daus tribe of Yemen as governor.²³⁷ ²³⁸

Disobedience of Oman

Oman’s situation was similar to Bahrain. Islamic State of Medina had established links there but Oman had never sent any tax to Medina. Just after the death of Prophet Muhammad, in fall of 632 CE, Azd tribe of Oman rebelled under their leader Laqit bin Malik (Laqīt bin Mālik dhu-at-Tāj لَقِيت بِن مالِك ذُوالتاج ) and gathered in Dibba.²³⁹ ²⁴⁰ The rebellion was against Julanda (Julāndah جُلاندَه ) brothers who had to take refuge in the mountains. ²⁴¹ Laqit had pre-Islamic enmity against Julanda brothers and lately he had claimed prophethood.²⁴² Abu Bakr asked a local guy by name of Hudhaifa bin Mihsan (Ḥudhaifah bin Miḥṣan حُذَيفه بِن مِحصن ) to sort the matter out.²⁴³ ²⁴⁴ Hudhaifa alone was not powerful enough to eradicate the rebellion. Abu Bakr had to send a reinforcement under his field commander, Ikrima bin Abu Jahl.²⁴⁵ Combined troops of Ikrima, Hudhaifah, Julanda brothers and many other local clans met Laqit in environs of Dabba.²⁴⁶ Laqit got killed by his own companions during the war. Muslim army won the day and sent many captives from Dabba to Abu Bakr. Thus Azds returned to Islam.²⁴⁷ As Abu Bakr did not have to send his Commander in Chief Khalid bin Walid to subdue Oman, we can assume that rebellion was not vigorous. We don’t hear about Julanda brothers anymore. Probably they were weakened enough to resign from active politics. After these skirmishes Oman remained calm.²⁴⁸ Abu Bakr could appoint his man Hudhaifah bin Mihsan as governor of Oman and he served in this position until death of Abu Bakr.²⁴⁹ ²⁵⁰

Unrest at Yemen

Matter of Aswad al Ansi’s power grab in Sana’a was still in limbo when Abu Bakr came to power. Qays bin Hubayra al-Makshuh (Qays bin Hubayrah al-Makshūh قيس بِن هُبيره المَكشُوه ) had already assassinated Aswad but its news reached capital Medina on 23^rd June, 632 CE, almost two weeks after Abu Bakr’s oath taking ceremony.²⁵¹ Death of Aswad did not necessarily clear the way for Medinan Caliphat to assimilate Yemen. Qays bin Hubayra gathered around him all fractions and troops that had supported Aswad and tried to consolidate his own power in Sana’a by expelling Abnā’ out of it.²⁵² He fanned xenophobia against Abnā’, calling them foreigners.²⁵³ Abnā’, Ḥimyār and some other Arab clans who did not support Qays had to look forwards to Abu Bakr for their protection. Situation of Medinan Caliphate was fragile at this time due to disobedience of tribes in Hejaz and Nejd. Abu Bakr wasn’t in any position to send an army. He used local loyal groups to form an alliance against Qays.²⁵⁴ In the long last, Abu Bakr’s appointed governor, Muhajir bin Umayah could arrest Qays after entering Sana’a. Muhajir sent Qays to Medina where he was tried for murder of Dadhawaih (Dādhawaih داذَوِيَه ), the leader of Abnā’.²⁵⁵ ²⁵⁶ ²⁵⁷ The affair of Yemen might have taken a few months to resolve.²⁵⁸

By the time Khalid finished his job in Bahrain, Yemen was ready to provide recruits for war in Iraq, and later Syria.

Ḥaḍaramaut was sandwiched between Yemen and Oman. It manifested rebellious tendencies too. Cases of two tribes are well known. One is Kindah and the other is Mehara.

Beginning of rebellion of Kindah has already been discussed. Baladhuri reports on authority of ‘Abd ar Razzāq that after assuming office, Abu Bakr wrote to both Ziyad bin Labid, Prophet’s zakat collector in Ḥaḍaramaut and Muhajir bin Umayah, Prophets zakat collector in Sana’a, ordering them to work hand in hand in order to secure for him the caliphate and to fight against him who refrains from paying ṣadaqah and that they should get the help of the Beleivers against Unbelievers and of the obedient against the disobedient and transgressors.”²⁵⁹ From this statement of Baladhuri it is apparent that Ziyad and Muhajir had to canvass for the appointment of Abu Bakr, had to reinforce his authority as caliph and had to get help from local Muslims if there was any resistance.

After the dispute started on assessment of ṣadaqah, Kindah tribe raised banner of rebellion under its leader Ash’ath bin Qays. Ziyad party ambushed Ash’ath party at night killing four brothers and a sister of the same family. In retaliation Ash’ath bin Qays inflicted heavy losses on Ziyad party. Ziyad got compelled to write to Abu Bakr for reinforcement. Abu Bakr instructed Muhajir bin abu Ummayah to help.²⁶⁰ ²⁶¹ After a brief encounter in field Ash’ath and his men besieged themselves in the fort of Nujair. Ultimately, when the besieged could no longer hold, Ash’ath surrendered on condition that all his companions would be guaranteed of safety and only he himself would be arrested. After his arrest Ziyad sent him to Medina.²⁶² ²⁶³ He was therefore brought to Abu Bakr who pardoned him and gave his sister to him in marriage.²⁶⁴ ²⁶⁵ ²⁶⁶

Matter of Maharah was the most painless. Some tribes in their neighborhood had gathered at Shiḥr after apostatizing. Ikrima bin Abu Jahl, on his way to Yemen from Oman, overpowered them, killed many of them and got booty from them. Actually, Maharah needed only threat to pay ṣadaqah after other tribes got defeated at Shiḥr.²⁶⁷ ²⁶⁸

Another tussle we hear about is from Khaulān tribe. Abu Bakr directed Ya’la bin Munya (Ya’lā bin Munyah يعلئ بِن منيه ) against Khaulān and they yielded and agreed to pay ṣadaqah after a brief fight.²⁶⁹²⁷⁰ ²⁷¹

When pockets of resistance got eliminated in Yemen and Ḥaḍaramaut, Abu Bakr divided its administration among four men. He assigned the land between Najran and Hejaz to Abu Sufyan. He appointed Muhajir governor of Sana’a. He gave to Ziyad what he already held (Ḥaḍaramaut). He assigned some parts of southern Yemen to Ya’la.²⁷² Since that day Yemen became a permanent part of Islamic civilization. Yemen had a proud tradition of one millennium old civilization at the time Islam reached there. Very little of its long traditions of literature and history became a part of the Islamic worldview beyond the haziest of recollections.²⁷³

Though Yemen was a major supplier of troops to the Arab armies during Futuhul Buldan, Yemenis contributed very little to higher echelon of Medinan Caliphate. Only two men from Yemen stepped into Medinan Caliphate’s top level state apparatus. They were Abu Huraira and Abu Musa Ash’ari – both Prophet’s companions. (Abū Mūsā al-Ash’ari اَبُو موُسئ الاشعَرى )

Tackling of Dumat al jandal

Baladhuri reports that Ukaider bin Abdul Malik (Ukaider bin ‘Abd al Malik اُكيدَ ر بِن عَبدُ المَلِك ), ruler of Dumat al Jandal violated his contract with the Prophet after his death and stopped payments. Later, he had to abandon his place and property and went to Hira where he built a palace. His brother Huraith bin Abdul Malik (Ḥuraith bin ‘Abd ul Malik عَبدُ المَلِك حُريس بِن ) embraced Islam and took possession of his property.²⁷⁴ Baladhuri doesn’t give the reasons why did Ukaider abandon his property.

Abu Bakar later sent Khalid bin Walid from ‘Ain at Tamr in Iraq to kill Udaiker before Kahlid left for Syria.²⁷⁵ This report of Baladhuri gives an impression that Udaiker was still in Hira at the time of his murder.

Attitude of northern tribes

Arab tribes of north were under influence of Christianity. We overhear a few battles between Khalid bin Walid and some tribes of north. Khalid fought against Taghlib bin Wa’il at places of Muḍaiyaḥ and Ḥuṣaid. Their leader was Rabi’ah bin Bujair. Khalid put them to flight and took captives and booty from them. Khalid sent captives to Medina.²⁷⁶ In another encounter Khalid killed Hurqus bin Nu’man (Ḥurqūṣ bin Nu’mān حُرقُوص بِن نُعمان ) of Quḍā’ah clan of Bahra tribe.²⁷⁷

Baladhuri notes these events after subjugation of Hira and when Khalid was on his way to Syriā²⁷⁸ Doner doubts the timings and believes that Khalid cannot be proved to have enough time to fight on his way during his journey. Doner proposes that Baladhuri confuses these events with earlier ones.²⁷⁹ Whatever the timings of these events, the events are non-significant and it appears that the armies of Medinan Caliphate did not clash with northern tribes on a large scale. Tabari reports that Bahrā’, Kalb, Salīḥ, Tanūkh, Lakhm, Judhām, Balqayn, Bali, ‘Amilia and Ghassan (Ghassān غَسّان ) were all under Byzantine Roman’s influence at the time of invasion of Syria by Medinan Caliphate. Romans mobilized them to fight against Medinan Caliphate. They accepted Islam later when attack on Syrian was underway.²⁸⁰

Invasion on Iraq

The area of modern Iraq west to River Euphrates is geographically part of Arabian Peninsula and is called ‘Irāq by Islamic sources. It is a stony plain interspersed with rare sandy stretches. With rain as little as fifteen millimetres in a year, it is mostly arid. It gets extremely hot and dry during summer. The little rain that the area receives comes in winter and spring, helping growth of vegetation and converting the land into steppes rather than pure desert – ideal for grazers. The land nearer to the west bank of river Euphrates, though geographically contiguous with the rest, had availability of water from the river. It had been being cultivated for mellinea.²⁸¹

In pre-Islamic times main residents of Iraq were Arab tribes both sedentary and nomads. Persian presence was prominent in the towns of this region as it had been being governed indirectly by them through their Lakhmid allies for centuries. All Arabs of this region were Nestorian Christians.²⁸²

Unlike Syria, Iraq was a region that had not particularly attracted the attention of Islamic state of Medina created by Prophet Muhammad. There is no evidence to suggest that Prophet Muhammad or the early Muslims had any special ambitions in Iraq, whether rooted in religious tradition or in commercial interest, comparable to their aspirations in Syria.²⁸³ Abu Bakr’s decision to interfere into Iraqi politics by sending forces under Khalid bin Walid, sprang from his desire to complete the process of state consolidation over the tribes of Arabia that had been undertaken during the Ridda Wars, rather than from some specific commercial, religious, or even military interest in Iraq itself.²⁸⁴ The invasion was against Arab tribes. Clashes between Medinan Caliphate’s army and the Iranian border guards, the first of their nature between the two armies, were byproduct of the invasion.²⁸⁵ Baladhuri gives a clear impression that invasion on Iraq was part of Ridda Wars, not part of invasion on Sasanian Iran.²⁸⁶ Shoufani agrees with him. ²⁸⁷ ²⁸⁸

Baladhuri reports that Muthanna bin Haritha (Muthanna bin Ḥārithah مُثَنّئ بِى حارِثه ) of Shayban (Shaybān شعبان ) tribe used to lead insurrections with some of his men against Swad (Sawād سواد ), the region of modern Iraq between Euphrates and Tigris in their lower reaches. Having heard of it, Abu Bakr made inquiries regarding him and learned that this man was of reputation, known origin and with good support. Then Muthanna presented himself before Abu Bakr and said to him, “Caliph of the Prophet of Allah, make me your lieutenant over those of my people who have accepted Islam that I may fight against those foreigners, the Persians”. Abu Bakr wrote him a covenant to the fact. Muthanna went to Khaffān and invited his people to Islam.²⁸⁹ So allure was from both sides.

According to Baladhuri Abu Bakr ordered Khalid to go to Iraq. He also wrote to Muthanna to receive him and obey his orders.²⁹⁰ Muthanna was far needier for Medinan Caliphate’s support then Medinan Caliphate was for his. The combined forces were to be led by Abu Bakr’s general. Previously, Madh’ur bin Adi (Madh’ūr bin ‘Adi مَدهُور بِن عَدى ) of Ijl tribe had written to Abu Bakr presenting his case and the case of his people, asking to be put in charge of the campaign against the Persians. Abu Bakr ordered him to join Khalid and obey him.²⁹¹ Muthanna met Khalid on his arrival at Nibāj.²⁹² ²⁹³ Thence the combined forces of Khalid and Muthanna proceeded to Ubullah.²⁹⁴ ²⁹⁵ Suwaid bin Qutba (Suwaid bin Quṭbah adh-Dhunhli سُويد بِن قطبَه الذُنهلى ) of Bakr bin Wa’il had same designs regarding Ubullah as Muthanna had for Hira.²⁹⁶ He joined the Arab army with a band of his followers.²⁹⁷

The army that appeared on Iraq, hence, consisted of remnants of Khalid’s force from Yamama, mainly Quraysh, Ansar and Thaqif.²⁹⁸ Some of Hawazin, Asad, Tamim, and Bajila of Yemen were in his company as well.²⁹⁹ Ijl, Shayban and Bakr bin Wa’il reinforced them.³⁰⁰ Abdul Qays of Bahrain did not join them. Seemingly they were content with governorship of Bahrain. Nor any of the tribes of other regions newly assimilated in Medinan Caliphate, like Oman or Yamama joined the army. Basically it was a military alliance of north-western tribes with core tribes of Medinan Caliphate resident around Mecca and Medina with some support from Yemen. Scholars doubt if all participants of the army were Muslims. We know northern tribes were Christians and, for example, no explicit record of conversion of Suwaid bin Qutba and Madh’ur bin Adi to Islam is present in sources. Donner calculates the strength of original force of Khalid to be about one thousand. After Iraqi tribes joined them, they could have increased to around two thousand.³⁰¹

Date of Khalid’s debut in Iraq cannot be precisely calculated. We are told that Khalid left for Iraq from Bahrain and he had already sent his first booty from Iraqi campaign to Abu Bakr in Medina before the caliph wrote to the people of Mecca, Taif and the Yemen asking them to join an expedition against Syria.³⁰² As the armies left Medina for Syria in the middle of autumn of 633 CE, we can assume Khalid was already in Iraq by this time. Then tentative date of his departure for Iraq can be later spring to early summer of 633 CE.³⁰³

First encounter took place at Ubullah. The battle was significant. Many of Ubullah residents got killed, a lot of them drowned in Dijlat al-Baṣrah. After subduing small towns in vicinity of Ubullah like Khuraibah, Mar’ah and Madhār, Khalid occupied the whole district and presented it to Suwaid bin Qutba to rule over it saying “We have crushed the Persians in thy district in a way that will humiliate them before thee.”³⁰⁴ ³⁰⁵ ³⁰⁶

From there Khalid left for Hira. After reducing small towns on the way, like Zandaward, Durna and Hurmuzjarad Khalid reached Ullais.³⁰⁷ ³⁰⁸ Here the Muslim Arab army encountered Iranian border guards for the first time. It was their captain Jaban (Jābān جابان ) who got defeated by Muthanna. ³⁰⁹ All clashes with Iranian troops at this juncture of Arab history appear to be with border guards because sources don’t report use of elephant from Sasanian side in these battles, which was essential piece of arsenal of Sasanian Iranian armed forces. By this time Sasanian Iran had plunged into civil war after murder of Khosrau II Parvez in 628 CE. His son, Qubad II (Qubād قُباد) was in power and fractioning nobles used to control his policies.³¹⁰ Nobody would have thought of raising huge army to fight against two thousand horsemen of Khalid who had not crossed into Iranian borders. Before army of Medinan Caliphate could take control of Ullais, it had another encounter with Iranian border guards at the border post of Mujtama’ al Anhār. Captain of Iranians, Azādhbih got defeated.³¹¹ ³¹²

After a brief sojourn at Khaffān Khalid reached Hira.³¹³ ³¹⁴ Initially, on hearing appearance of an army, people of Hirah fortified themselves in the three fortresses they had got. But the maximum they needed to surrender was a show of power. Muslims went around them on horseback in open spaces among their buildings.³¹⁵ They quickly sent their three dignitaries to meet Khalid. They were Abdul Masih bin Amr (‘Abd al Mashīḥ Bin Amr عَبدُ المَسيح بِن عمرؤ) of Azd tribe, Hani bin Qabisa (Hāni bin Qabiṣah هانى بِن قَبيصَه ) of Shayban tribe, and Iyas bin Qabisa (Iyās bin Qabiṣah اِياس بِن قَبيصه ) of Tayy tribe. This Iyas was representative of Khosrau II Parvez over Hira after Nu’man bin Mundhir (Nu’mān bin Mundhir نُعمان بِن مَنذِ ر ). The three men made terms with Khalid stipulating that the people of Hira would pay hundred thousand Dirhams per year, and that they would act as spies for Medinan Caliphate against Iranians and that Khalid won’t destroy any of their churches and citadels.³¹⁶ ³¹⁷ They also agreed not to speak evil of Muslims.³¹⁸ The money so generated was the first to be sent to Medina from Iraq.³¹⁹ Muslim Arabs took control of Hira in 633 CE.³²⁰

After surrender of Hira Muslim army bumped into two different border guards. One were Iranians in Bāniqiya whose captain Farrukhbanda (Farrukhbaundāth فَرّخ بَنده) got killed in the encounter and his troops fled.³²¹ ³²² Then Muslims capitulated Bāniqiya without a fight.³²³ The other were Byzantine Romans in Falālij. Both, Muslims and Romans avoided encounter.³²⁴ ³²⁵ Kaegi suggests that they could be Roman soldiers whom Heraclius had deliberately not withdrew after Roman Byzantine treaty of 628 CE.³²⁶ Or this could be a sortie sent by Romans. After sorting out administrative hitches in Hira, Khalid proceeded to Anbār whose people fortified themselves. Muslims then invested the inhabitants of Anbār and set up some fires in the environs to threaten them. The inhabitants of Anbār made terms with Khalid that satisfied him and he left them in their homes.³²⁷ ³²⁸

Then Khalid advanced to ‘Ayn at Tamr and invested in its fort where a big frontier guard of Persians was stationed. The guard initially fought then they confined themselves to the fort. Khalid besieged them until they sued for peace. Khalid refused to promise them security. He reduced the fort by force, slaughtering and carrying away captives.³²⁹ ³³⁰ ³³¹ Here Hilal bin Aqqa (Hilāl bin ‘Aqqah هِلال بِن عَقّه ) was head of tribe of Namir bin Qāsiṭ in the vicinity of ‘Ayn at Tamr. He gathered an army at ‘Ayn at Tamr and fought against Khalid. He got defeated, killed and crucified.³³²

Settled clans of Taghlib used to live near ‘Ayn at Tamr. Khalid gave them a surprise raid, killing many and enslaving others. He did the same thing to settled clans of Rabi’ah in the district of ‘Ayn at Tamr.³³³ Then Khalid sent small parties to Tikrīt, ‘Ukbarā’ , Baradān, and Mukharrim, up to the bridge near Qaṣr Sābūr.³³⁴ ³³⁵ They all appear to be merely scout parties.

As we look at the account of conquest of Iraq, given by Baladhuri, we can easily see some salient features. First, Arabs of Iraq had no contact with Medinan Caliphate beforehand as we don’t find any Muslim group there awaiting to co-operate with invaders as was in other parts of Arabia. The first reaction of the residents towards the invasion was that of fear, not of joy. No city welcomed the Muslim army with garlands in hands. Some resisted, others initially closed the doors. Second, soft resistance from Arab residents of Iraq points out lack of any effective leadership on their part. Byzantine Romans had withdrawn from the region and Iranians had still not re-occupied it completely. Individual cities and towns of the land had to defend themselves on their own. Four main towns of the region, namely Ullais, Hira, Bāniqiya and Anbār surrendered absolutely without any fight. Those who decided to resist, like Ubullah and ‘Ayn at Tamr, could not give a tough time to the invaders. Casualty on Muslim side in these battles was limited to one or two each. Casualties on opponent side were not numerous either. The only time when opponents got killed in large numbers was campaign of Ubullah. The other times they got killed were the encounters with Iranian border guards. Third, decades of lawlessness and war had damaged the regional economy. It is evident from the fact that Muslims found castles of Mundhir in Hira in ruins. They used their material to build the Grand Mosque of Kufa.³³⁶ Fourth, the conditions of surrender were not uniform for each town. Hurmuzjarad surrendered with promise of security.³³⁷ Ullais surrendered stipulating that they act as spies, guides and helpers of Muslims against Persians.³³⁸ The leader of Bāniqiya, Busbuhra bin Ṣalūba, refused to fight and made terms on hundred thousand Dirhams and one mantle.³³⁹ ³⁴⁰ Baradān and Mukharrim both reduced at promise of security and that they would offer food to Muslims and their animals.³⁴¹ It appears that Khalid, as general on the ground, had freedom to take decisions independently on day to day matters. For example, he refused to do truce with Iranian border guards at ‘Ain at Tamar. But he had to take approval on important decisions from Abu Bakr. For example, he wrote to Abu Bakr for approval of the terms of surrender of Hira and ‘Ain at Tamr.³⁴² Apparently terms of surrender were not pre-determined by this phase of conquests and had to be negotiated on individual case basis. Fifth, Medinan Caliphate had in mind by that time to use Iraq as a springboard to attack Sasanian Iran in case they decide to do so. Condition of surrender of many towns was that its inhabitants will act as spy against Iranians. Mainly, the purpose of whole campaign was to subjugate Arab tribes. Only three towns, Ulais, Hira, and Bāniqiya, entered into any kind of permanent contract (Ṣulḥ) with Medinan Caliphate. ³⁴³

Army of Medinan Caliphate did enslave people. Khalid, took all inhabitants of Khuraibah into captivity, according to Baladhuri.³⁴⁴ When Baladhuri says ‘all,’ naturally, it means all, men, women and children. We don’t know what criteria they used to decide who should be enslaved.

Looting did take place during the raids. Khalid came to know about Sūk Baghdādh [market of Baghdādh] on his way to Anbār. Khalid sent Muthanna, who raided the market and Muslims filled their hands with gold, silver and commodities light to carry. They spent the night in Sailaḥīn and the next day joined Khalid in Anbār.³⁴⁵ ³⁴⁶ Similarly, somebody pointed out to Khalid that there was a market to the north of Anbār in which the people of Kalb, Bakr bin Wa’il and others from Quda’a used to meet. Khalid dispatched Muthanna, who raided it and carried as booty whatever he found. Muthanna slaughtered people and took captives in the process.³⁴⁷

Not a single soul in Iraq converted to Islam as a result of invasion. The whole population kept their religion, which was Nestorian Christianity. As a matter of fact, if we look at the account given by Baladhuri closely, Islam was not even offered to anybody. A provision to convert to Islam to save property, life, family, career or future tax burden was not included in any of the truce agreements signed. Medinan Caliphate wanted its soldiers to get rich from this war so more people could be allured in the business of war.

When Khalid received instructions of Abu Bakr to march towards Syria, in early summer of 634 CE, he left Muthana bin Haritha incharge of Hira.³⁴⁸

Aftermath of Ridda Wars

‘Ayn at Tamar was the last town to surrender in Iraq. It’s surrender symbolized the end of the Ridda Wars. Ridda Wars produced two very significant results.

For the first time in the history of Arabia the whole land united under one state. Arabs achieved sovereignty. The neighboring countries no longer had to take pains of telling the Arabs how to run their country.

Arab polytheism came to an end. All polytheists either died or converted to Islam. Medinan Caliphate didn’t give them option to pay Jizyah. As polytheists were the largest religious group in pre-Islamic Arabia, we may assume that Islam became the religion of majority in Arabia.

Nobody took personal credit of victories in Ridda Wars. Victory was attributed to Allah. Abu Bakr emerged undisputed political leader of Medinan Caliphate. Dissident Muhajirun got convinced that Allah was pleased with Abu Bakr.

Historians have a habit of dividing history into eras. They generally consider end of polytheism in Arabia as end of late antiquity and beginning of medieval ages in the Middle East.³⁴⁹

Improvement in law and order situation

While pushing the borders of Medinan Caliphate outwards, Abu Bakr didn’t neglect the domestic issues. Crummy condition of law and order in Arabia was a basic menace of nomadic zone during pre-Islamic times. One of the early achievements of Abu Bakr was improvement of law and order. He tackled the criminals harshly. Once he punished Iyas bin Abdullah (Iyās bin ‘Abdullah bin Fujā’a اِياس بِن عَبدُ اللّه بِن فُجاعَه) of Sulaym for highway robbery by burning him to death.³⁵⁰ ³⁵¹ It might be this time about which Adi bin Hatim (‘Adi bin Ḥaṭim عَدى بِن حاتِم ) said, “a woman could travel safely from Syria to Mecca.” ³⁵²

Treasury separates from the personal property of the ruler

Abu Bakr made himself busy in financial reforms in the country from day one of his tenure. We know Prophet Muhammad had many sources of income but he did not build his personal house. Neither had he left any cash behind for his heirs. It means he had budgeted a capped amount from his income for use of his wives, which was enough for day to day expenses but not enough for saving. He spent all the remaining income on state affairs. The State exchequer was, anyhow, not officially separate from personal portfolio of the ruler, though the ruler spent money from the state exchequer judiciously. Abu Bakr took steps to clearly demark state exchequer from personal estate of the ruler. He used to draw a fixed salary of three Dirhams per day from state exchequer.³⁵³ (Approximately eleven hundred Dirhams per annum). He, furthermore, did not touch the one fifth of booty that used to pour in Medina periodically.³⁵⁴ He distributed each penny of it equally among the population of Medina including black and red, free and slaves.³⁵⁵

Conquests at a larger scale (Futuhul Buldan فُتوح البُلدان )

Invasion on Iraq was still unaccomplished when Abu Bakr started raising army for another invasion. These invasions, which were temporarily halted by First Arab Civil War, resulted in almost half of Byzantine Rome and all of Sassanian Iran being occupied by Medinan Caliphate. The events of ‘conquests at a larger scale’ started in 634 CE and almost completed by 654 CE.³⁵⁶

Humans have been awe stricken with the magnitude of Arab conquests. Such colossal victories in such a short period had been attained only once in human history before this. That was about one Mellinium ago by Alexander, the king of Macedonia.³⁵⁷ ³⁵⁸ In Sebeos’ words, “the armies of the Ishmaelites unexpectedly moved forth and, in a moment’s time, overthrowing the might of both kings seized from Egypt to this side of the great Euphrates river and to the border of the Armenians, from the shores of the great sea in the West to the court of the Iranian Kingdom, all the cities of Mesopotamia of the Syrians, and Ctesiphon, Veh Artashir, Marand, Hamatan as far as the city of Gandzak, and the great Hart which is located in the district of Atrapatakan.”³⁵⁹

Before we proceed to survey of the invasions and the wars that ensued let’s look at some basic questions around the invasions.

Who were the invaders?

Generally speaking the invaders were Arabic speaking tribes, at least in the beginning of the conquests. Military cadre predominantly consisted of Bedouins but top brass came from sedentary Quraysh.³⁶⁰ We are not sure if all of them were Muslims. Yet, they were predominantly Muslims.

Those people of Arabia who kept their religion and paid Jizyah were exempted from military services, for example, people of Najran.³⁶¹ It is unlikely that non-Muslim Arabs might have participated in the risky business of war in their hordes because they did not face any social pressure to do that.

Still, some non-Muslims participated in the conquests from Muslim side. As Islamic state of Medina during Prophetic times, and later Medinan Caliphate during Ridda Wars, did not tolerate survival of polytheists, they were non-existent by end of 633 CE. Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians managed to survive. Jews became much less important by this time and Christians much more so.³⁶² Out of the three surviving religious groups in Arabia, only Christians participated in conquests. It is evident from Tabari’s description where he shows Namir and Taghlib fighting from Muslim side while they were Christians.³⁶³

Tabari also documents people of Daylām participating in battle of Qadisiyyah from Muslim side without converting to Islam.³⁶⁴ ³⁶⁵ Hoyland argues that all conquering forces throughout history have welcomed extra manpower from any quarter.³⁶⁶ Why would Muslim Arab army have declined such help?

Why did they invade?

Modern historians are divided on political lines about the reasons of conquests. On one extreme is a view that the sole reason of invasion on neighbouring countries was to spread and establish Islam. On the other extreme is another view that Arab tribes did it solely to enrich themselves at the expense of conquered people.³⁶⁷ Arguing in favour of ‘Islam the only motivation’ Donner remarks: ‘It is my conviction that Islam began as a religious movement – not as a social, economic or ‘national’ one.’³⁶⁸ Hoyland differs saying: ‘Yet even a cursory study of religious movements practicing violence, whether Christian (e.g. the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda) or Muslim (al-Qa’ida, etc.) or Buddhist (Burma’s 969 group), makes it clear that one cannot separate religion from socioeconomic issues and identity in such movements. If there were nothing material at stake, one would not need to fight.³⁶⁹

History of Wars is a messy affair. The composition of the opposing sides and reasons for which they are fighting are often diverse and shifting. However, those who wage the Wars and those who document them have a strong interest in portraying the situation as black and white; believers against infidels, good against evil, justice and freedom against tyranny and oppression. ³⁷⁰ Impartial analysis of the surviving accounts of any war points out more than one reasons behind it.

Arab ‘conquests at a larger scale’, referred to as Futuhul Buldan (Futūh al Buldān فُتوح البُلدان ) by Islamic sources, might have multiple causes, all working simultaneously. Easy availability of plunder due to the weakness of the Byzantine Roman and Sasasanid Iranian empires and economic/environmental impoverishment in Arabia were definitely factors.³⁷¹ But the factor that Arabs had gathered around concepts of ummah and jihad ( Jihād جِهاد ) for the sake of ummah cannot be neglected.³⁷² ³⁷³

In face of equivocal results of the debate on the issue, let’s take Baladhuri’s statement on face value: “Abu Bakr invited people of Mecca, Taif, whole of Hejaz and Nejd and Yemen to Jihad arousing their desire in it and in obtaining booty from the Greeks [Byzantine Rome]. Accordingly, people, including those actuated by greed as well as those actuated by the hope of divine remuneration, hastened to Abu Bakr from all quarters, and flocked in Medina.” ³⁷⁴

By the way, fighting for booty alone was not a taboo among Muslims even during Prophetic times. Waqidi shows the Prophet arguing “Abu Wahb, when you come out with us for this battle, perhaps you must bring back Byzantine girls with you” when trying to convince a reluctant follower to participate in Battle of Tabuk, who was apparently not impressed by appeal of Jihad.³⁷⁵

Two points are worth noting here. One, whatever the root cause of Futuhul Buldan, official position of Medinan Caliphate leadership was, anyhow, spread of Islam – export of their revolution. When the two armies encamped opposite each other before Battle of Qadisiyyah and started a round of last ditch peace deal negotiations, Umar bin Khattab, then caliph of Medinan Caliphate, insisted on Sa’d bin Waqqas, the general of Medinan Caliphate, to send a delegate to the Kisra to invite him to Islam, before Muslims kickoff the war.³⁷⁶ Here, we can note that the Islamic delegation presented Islam to Kisra in a fashion that they were securing a ‘no’ answer. First, they built up military on his border before sending the delegation, so he should take invitation to Islam as a threat. Second, the deputation was discourteous to him so he shouldn’t have any option but to decline it.³⁷⁷ Medinan Caliphate had made up its mind to conquer his realm but only after documenting that a notice to convert to Islam was duly served and it was he who rejected the offer.³⁷⁸ ³⁷⁹

Use of religion to justify a war was a norm in the Middle East of seventh century CE. In an official victory bulletin from the field, after defeat of Sasanian Iran in 628 CE, Heraclius claimed that his victory was a certain proof of the truth of Christianity.³⁸⁰ ‘Spread of Islam’ as official reason of Medinan Caliphate for Futuhul Buldan is not surprizing.

Two, war is the most gruesome social invention of humans. It obviously ruins the defeated but ostensibly inflicts on victor as well. Those who have a potential to die in a war can’t buy promise of being rich as an exclusive rationale to participate in it. From the war of Hamoukar, that was fought in Jareerah area of modern northwest Syria around 3500 BC to the war on ISIS, fought in this century, we fail to find a single example where soldiers were fighting solely for the sake of money.³⁸¹ A soldier needs a passion to console himself in the face of death. It can be tribal honour, nationalism, sense of duty or anything above and beyond money. In case of Futuhul Buldan dominant passion among Muslim soldiers was religion. Look at the way Sa’d bin Waqqas encouraged his soldiers before Qadisiyyah. He addressed them with an aim to increase a desire of Jihad in them and told them of what Allah promised His Messenger by way of victory and making the religion triumphant. (iẓhār al-dīn).³⁸² At the same time, no army from the war of Hamoukar to the war against ISIS, has ever fought without remuneration. In case of forces of Medinan Caliphate, the state did not have any money to pay them. They were promised booty as their remuneration.

Medinan Caliphate conquers Syria

Whole chunk of land to the northwest of Arabian Peninsula, extending eastwards from the Mediterranean to the River Euphrates in the north and Iraqi steppe in the south is generally called Syria (Shām شام ) by early Arabic sources. It was also sometimes referred to as Levant.³⁸³ Syria of Arabic sources accommodates modern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Israel.³⁸⁴ Just like now, this region was not a single political entity in pre-Islamic times. Byzantine Rome had created administrative provinces of Palestina III, Palestina I, Palestina II, Arabia, Phoenice Paralia and Phoenice Libanensis out of it.³⁸⁵ Islamic sources divide the region into Palestine, Jordan, Ḥawrān and Syria.³⁸⁶

Topography and people

Syria is a geographic extension of Arabia. The topographical configurations that characterize the Arabian peninsula – that great slab of limestone, lifted up at its western and southern edges to form the stoop coastal ranges of the Hejaz and Yemen, and sloping gradually down toward sea level at the Persian Gulf – are repeated in Syria’s parallel ranges of mountains running along the Mediterranean coast, and in the flatter expanses of the Syrian steppe, sloping gradually downward toward Iraq. Within this basic topographical pattern there is, of course, considerable local variation. The Mediterranean coastal range, which rears up along the central Syrian Littoral to form the towering barrier of Mount Lebanon, is much lower along the northern coast of Syria in the Jabal Ansariyya area and becomes little more than a set of rolling hills in Palestine. In general, however, the mountain folds become lower and less dramatic as one moves inland from the Mediterranean coast, across the Lebanon range, the Anti-Lebanon, the Jabal al-Ruwāq, and so on, until the ridges finally give way to form the essentially level Syrian Steppe. The main exception to this pattern, the massive pyramid known as Mount Hermon that rises out of the southern end of the Anti-Lebanon, does not alter the general picture.³⁸⁷

Though Syria’s topography is a continuation of that of Arabia, however, its landscapes are tempered and made more gentle than Arabia’s by their more northerly location and, particularly, by the proximity of the Mediterranean Sea, whose moist breeze leave rain in quantities unknown to the Arabian Peninsula itself. This gift of moisture is not bestowed equally on all parts of Syria, of course. As the prevailing westerly winds carry the moisture-laden clouds eastward, over the successive chains of mountains and hills, the water is increasingly coaxed out of them, so that by the time they reach the central Syrian steppe there is relatively little moisture left. Thus the coastal ranges receive several months of heavy rainfall, mainly during the winter and spring, whereas the central steppe is favored only with a few centimeters during the course of the year and begins to display, during the driest summer months, the truly desert conditions found farther south in Arabia proper. In areas where rainfall is sufficient, however, it has permitted the cultivation of crops by dry-farming, something virtually unknown in northern and central Arabia (though practiced in limited measure in the Yemen). The green hills of Palestine, the tangled thickets and dense, wooded ravines of Lebanon, the fertile open basins of the Litani, Orontes, and Jordan rivers, carrying the runoff of mountain springs and seasonal rain and snow, all give Syria a general aspect of verdure and moisture unknown to Arabia. It is little wonder that Arabians viewed Syria as a kind of paradise on earth, a land of prosperity and plenty and of blessed relief from the heat and aridity of the peninsula.³⁸⁸ Alexander of Macedonia had introduced Hellenistic culture in Syria. Syria remained dominated by it for more than a millennium under Roman and Byzantine rule.³⁸⁹ This assertion holds particularly true for the towns and cities that ranged up and down the coast and in the fertile, rain-fed districts a short distance inland. These towns, which drew their economic support from the high productivity of Syria’s valleys and cultivated hillsides, received cultural sustenance from a steady flow of intellectual currents and stylistic tastes that pulsated from the West together with more mundane articles of commerce along the arteries of international maritime trade. These urban centers were not only major Syrian cities; they were also great centers of Greco-Roman civilization.³⁹⁰

The Hellenistic impact on Syria was, however, always a bit superficial. It could not make roots to great masses of Syria. Syrians never embraced the Greek tongue to the extent that some other groups – the diverse people of Asia Minor, for example – certainly had. With the exception of city elite, settled Syrians in 600 CE still spoke some form of Aramaic, the language of Jesus and of Palestinian Temlud; and one dialect of this language, Syriac, had become by this time the medium of an extensive and growing Christian literature. ³⁹¹

Third important element of population in Syria was nomads and semi nomad pastoralists. They were the least affected by Hellenism and used to speak Arabic. Culturally they were more akin to the nomadic population of northern Arabia than with the settled communities of Syria. Rigors of life left little room for them to adopt elements of high culture that we call Hellenism (like literature and art).³⁹²

Christianity was almost universally adopted in Syria. Majority of Syrian population, who spoke Aramaic, believed in Monophysite Christianity and so did the Arabic speaking nomads and semi-nomads. Chalcedonian church (Byzantine) was essentially restricted to the Greek-speaking urban elite.³⁹³

A significant element of population in Syria was Jews. They stuck to their Hebrew language. A subgroup of Jews, Samaritans were particularly noticeable. They themselves were divided into two group – Dustān (Dositheans) and Kūshān.³⁹⁴

Presence of Iranians in pre-Islamic Syria has been attested by sources. The inscription of Kartir confirms Zoroastrians’ presence in Antakya and Qayṣariyah in Syria, Tarsus in Cilicia, and in Cappadocia to Balatia and in Armenia, Georgia and Albania and from Balaskan to Alans’ pass.³⁹⁵ Baladhuri verifies presence of significant Iranian population in Roman town of Sinjār.³⁹⁶ Most probably they spoke Pahlavi and retained their Zoroastrian religion.³⁹⁷

Different population groups were not uniformly scattered all over. Syrian steppe was totally dominated by Arabic speaking nomads.³⁹⁸ Greek speaking Chalcedonians were concentrated in towns. Hebrew speaking Monophysites formed major part of populations in towns and settled rural areas.³⁹⁹ Jews diffused all over. Iranians were limited to few towns only.⁴⁰⁰⁴⁰¹

We don’t know exact proportion of each population group. It is guessed that nomads were nearly as ubiquitous (if not as numerous) in many inland districts of Syria as they were in Arabian Peninsula itself.⁴⁰² Arabs formed the principal part of the local population.⁴⁰³ Their presence is verified by sources in as far off cities as Sinjār and Baalbek.⁴⁰⁴ Greek speaking Chalcidonians appear to be medium sized group of population. Probably their numerical strength increased from south to north, away from border of Arabian Peninsula towards border of Anatolia. Jews were definitely a minor group. Iranians were insignificant.⁴⁰⁵

Many nomadic and semi nomadic groups living in Byzantine provinces of Palaestina II, Palaestina III, Arabia, Pheonicia ad Libanum and perhaps northern Syria were under Ghassans.⁴⁰⁶ ⁴⁰⁷

Prewar political situation

By summer of 629 CE the last Sasanian soldier had left Syria in the wake of Heraculis Shahrbaraz treaty of Arabissos.⁴⁰⁸ The Romans had got only five years to reassert their authority on the region. And their difficulties were plenty.

First and foremost, Byzantine Rome was strained by austerity measures. They had difficulty paying army. Evidently, when a group of Arabs duty-bound to defend the desert passages from Arabia into Syria, demanded their subsidies, the paymaster answered, “The emperor pays his soldiers with difficulty; with how much more to such dogs as you!” ⁴⁰⁹ Second, the population of Syria was politically divided. They used religion as proxy to political differences. Being a theocracy, the Byzantine state was bent upon imposing its state religion – Chalcadonian Christianity – on other religious groups. It could be a part of Heraclius’s strategy to reassert government writ on these areas. Jews were particularly under pressure. The Jews had openly joined hands with Iranians during the Sasanid Iranian attack of Last War of Antiquity. Sebeos notes that they had a zeal to make their own homeland.⁴¹⁰ Theophylact Simocatta, Heraclian court historian, expresses contemporary hostility to Jews: “they are a wicked and most untrustworthy race, trouble-loving and tyrannical, utterly forgetful of friendship, jealous and envious, and most implacable in enmity.” ⁴¹¹ Antiochus, a monk of Palestine active in 7^th century, informs us that under pressure from Chalcedonian clergy, Heraclius had ordered a massacre of Jews around Jerusalem and in the mountains of Galille.⁴¹² Presumably it happened in 630 CE.⁴¹³ ⁴¹⁴ Christian (most likely Chalcedonian) petitioners claimed that they feared that if another enemy people came against them, the Jews might side with them against the Christians as the Jews had done when Persians came.⁴¹⁵ ⁴¹⁶

The country had been under Sasanian administration for twenty years in the recent past. A whole generation had grown up during occupation and it might be struggling to familiarize with Byzantine Rome. A number of factions in Syrian populace were antagonist to Heraclius’s efforts of nation building.

The region had its economic woes on top of everything. The region was devastated by plagues from 550 CE onwards. Plagues affected thickly populated towns and agricultural lands more than pastoral lands where contagion thinned out. That is the reason worst affected were coastal towns of Syria and towns of Iraq. Steppe dwellers got abundant. It is evident from the fact that Heraclius could gather only five thousand men while the Turk Kaghan, who came for his help, brought forty thousand men in his 627 CE campaign.⁴¹⁷

Despite all odds, it appears that Byzantine could reassert lose control over the area after retreat of Iranian army. Reports of Battle of Mu’ta suggest that there was Byzantine presence as far south. They swiftly hired Arabs to help guard against incursions by other Arabs.⁴¹⁸ Still they did not have undisputed mastery of the region. Different deals reached between Prophet Muhammad and city administrations of Ayla and Udhruh during campaign of Tabuk suggest that the Byzantine left these towns on their own.⁴¹⁹ ⁴²⁰

A particular problem for Byzantine Rome and a favourable scenario for Medinan Caliphate was that there were no organized local self defence units in Byzantine towns. ⁴²¹ The Byzantine Rome had prohibited possession of arms by civilians.⁴²² The civilian population totally depended on military for defence. Byzantine policy was not to depend upon self-defence by local population, rather it depended upon professionals and highly paid soldiers.⁴²³

Study of Byzantine sources reveals that Romans did not have any solid intelligence reports about Muslim military build-up and their intentions.⁴²⁴ Kaegi argues that Hraculis was in Jerusalem in March 630 CE, just few months after Battle of Mu’ta. He might have heard of military build-up on his southern borders.⁴²⁵ Late Byzantine historians, like Nicephoros (d. 828 CE), confirm this hypothesis.⁴²⁶ Still, no contemporary Christian source reports any preparations against possible Arab attack.⁴²⁷ Either Romans simply lacked ability to draw on adequate resources to meet the challenge or they simply underestimated the challenge.⁴²⁸ ⁴²⁹ Actually, Byzantine government even didn’t warn the population of imminent danger. Writing in 634 CE Sophronius of Jerusalem reports that the attack was ‘unexpected.’ ⁴³⁰ On the other hand, Muslims knew Heraclius well and they could have predicted his moves.

Muslim aspirations on Syria

“The Prophet gave fief of Ḥibra, Bait-‘Ainūn and Masjid Ibrāhīm to Tamim bin Aws and Nu’aim bin Aws, two brothers of Lakhm tribe. When Syria got subdued, those fiefs were given to them”, proclaims Baladhuri.⁴³¹ Talks of conquering Syria were already in air during the Prophetic times and tribes bordering Syria were being enticed to participate. Sudden death of Prophet Muhammad and, later on, Ridda Wars had hindered progress on this front. No surprise that ‘when Abu Bakr was done with the case of those who apostatized, he saw fit to direct his troops against Syria’.⁴³²

Date of attack

Chronology of Futuhul Buldan is the weakest point of our sources.⁴³³ In absence of any universally agreed dates in the sources, modern historians pick up a few dates from the literature, which they deem accurate. Then they schematize all other events of Futuhul Buldan around those dates. Baladhuri gives the date armies left Medina to be April 6, 634 CE.⁴³⁴ Kaegi feels that this date doesn’t fit well with other data and that the attack on Syria could have already been started by late 633 or early 634.⁴³⁵ Tabari gives a little earlier date of March 634 CE.⁴³⁶

Constitution of army

Abu Bakr invited only people of Mecca, Taif, whole of Hejaz and Nejd and Yemen to Jihad.⁴³⁷ He didn’t bother to ask people of Yamama, Bahrain and Oman etc. to participate in the war. He particularly excluded the former apostate tribes and clans from recruitment.⁴³⁸ The army, so raised, had a large number of Yemenis. Modern population estimates demonstrate that the Yemen, despite its relatively small area, still supports a disproportionately large percentage of the population of the Arabian peninsula; four to five million out of an estimated total population of ten to thirteen million.⁴³⁹ Donner uses this argument to support the idea that Yemen might be thickly populated in pre-Islamic times.⁴⁴⁰ Overrepresentation of Yemen in this army might be a reflection of its overall populous status.

The aspirant soldiers gathered in Medina. Abu Bakr organized them in three divisions led by Yazid bin Abu Sufyan (Yazīd bin Abu Sufyān يَزِيد بِن اَبُو سُفيان ), Shurahbil bin Hasana (Shuraḥbīl bin Ḥasanah شُرَحبِيل بِن حَسَنه ) and Amr bin As ( ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ عَمرؤ بِن عاص ).⁴⁴¹ Total strength of the army that ultimately reached borders of Syria was twenty four thousand.⁴⁴² Each participant tribe in the army flew its own banner, while there was one overall banner for each of the divisions.⁴⁴³ The three divisions were to take three different routes and attack at three different sectors. Amr’s division was to attack Palestine, Shurahbil’s to Jordan and Yazid’s to Damascus. They were supposed to liaise with each other when need arose.⁴⁴⁴ Abu Bakr’s commander in chief, Khalid bin Walid had still not finished his job in Iraq by that time. Apparently each soldier arranged his own armaments and transport.

Medinan Caliphate was going to attack most feared super power of the world. Pre-war nervousness was natural. Apparently there was difference of opinion among Abu Bakr and Umar on appointments of commanders. Analysis of Umar’s opposition to Abu Bakr’s decision to appoint Khalid bin Sa’id (Khālid bin Sa’īd خالِد بِن سَعِيد ) as commander of one of the three armies and the reasons given by Umar that he is “a vain-seeking man who tries to make his way through dispute and bigotry,” delineates difference in managerial principals of the two leaders.⁴⁴⁵ Abu Bakr bent upon appointing the same men blindly who were once appointed by the Prophet. Umar wished to base their appointment on merit as well. Khalid bin Sa’id’s failure to contain Aswad’s issue in Yemen might have compelled Umar to make a negative opinion about him.⁴⁴⁶ There was absolutely no difference between the two leaders, anyhow, on avoiding appointment of any non-Quraysh to a position of authority.

The army commanders were not very confident of their success. On his arrival in the first district of Palestine, Amr bin As wrote to Abu Bakr about great number of the enemy, their great armaments, wide extent of their land and enthusiasm of their troops. So Abu Bakr instructed Khalid bin Walid to move to Syria from Iraq and to take supreme command of whole army in Syria. The army accepted this appointment with satisfaction due to Khalid’s proven strategic abilities.⁴⁴⁷

First military encounter – Dāthin

First encounter between army of Medinan Caliphate and that of Byzantine Rome took place at Dāthin ( داثِن ).⁴⁴⁸ Dāthin was a village near Gaza.⁴⁴⁹ The event happened before Khalid bin walid had joined as supreme commander.⁴⁵⁰ Thomas the Presbyter gives the date of Feburary 4, 634 CE.⁴⁵¹ ⁴⁵² Kaegi agrees with it.⁴⁵³ ⁴⁵⁴

Arab division under command of Amr bin As fought against a Roman battalion of three hundred men led by Sergios, a Candidatos.⁴⁵⁵. Muslims were victorious.⁴⁵⁶

Small number of Romans in the battle strengthens the hypothesis that at first Byzantine underestimated Arabs, assuming them to be merely Bedouin raids, the likes of which they had experienced for centuries.⁴⁵⁷

Kaegi points out though Dāthin was a small battle, its psychological impact was great.⁴⁵⁸ Victories in earlier clashes gave psychological moral boost to Muslim Arabs and the reverse to Byzantine.⁴⁵⁹

As soon as the first encounter between the established power and the emerging power took place a new level in historiography of Islam dawned. This is the first event in history of Islam that is reported by a contemporary source.⁴⁶⁰ Interestingly, this source, Thomas the Presbyter, calls the invaders ‘Ṭayyāye. of Mhmt.’ It means from the very onset invaders introduced themselves as Muslims, fighting for religion of Muhammad and not unified Arab tribes fighting for Medinan Caliphate.

As a rule of thumb, when armies move in enemy’s territory, unnecessary violence, murder, rape and looting abound. And as a rule of thumb, the victim party cries foul loudly and the perpetuator party tries to play it down. It is quiet intriguing to read two different descriptions of the war of Dāthin. One is by Thomas the Presbyter, the contemporary Christian source. Another is by Baladhuri, the first Muslim source who described the war in 9^th century:

In the year 945, indiction 7, on Friday, 4 February, at the ninth hour, there
was a battle between the Romans and the Ṭayyāye. of Mḥmt in Palestine
twelve miles east of Gaza. The Romans fled, leaving hind the patrician
Bryrdn, whom the Ṭayyāye killed. Some 4000 poor villagers of
Palestine were killed there, Christians, Jews and Samaritans.
The Ṭayyāye ravaged the whole region. ⁴⁶¹

The first conflict between the Muslims and the enemy took place in Dāthin,
one of the villages of Ghazzah, which lay on the way between the Muslims
and the residence of the Patrician (biṭrīq) of Ghazzah. Here the battle raged
furiously, but at last Allah gave victory to His friends and defeat to His
enemies whom he dispersed. All this took place before the arrival of Khalid Ibn
al Walid in Syria.⁴⁶²

Anyhow, war has never been a pleasant event. Describing a war that was fought a few decades earlier during the reign of Hormizd IV [c. 579 – 590], Sebeos writes: ‘Byzantine departed for Atrpatakan [Azerbaijan]. They ravaged the entire country, putting all men and women to the sword. Taking all the loot, captives, and booty, they returned to their country.⁴⁶³ The Arab Futuhul Buldan was going to be havoc for the Middle East.

First city captured

It is almost impossible to establish with certainty which Syrian city did Medinan Caliphate capture first of all. There is a tie between Boṣra and Ma’āb.⁴⁶⁴ Baladhuri reports that Khalid occupied Boṣra on his way from Iraq to Damascus.⁴⁶⁵ He further reports that ‘Abu Ubayda conquered Ma’āb and finished it with the same conditions as were for Boṣrā, meaning it was conquered after Boṣrā.⁴⁶⁶

Sebeos, writing before Baladhuri, reports a major battle near Rabbath Moab in the earlier part of his version of events.⁴⁶⁷ Later Tabari confirmed that Ma’āb was the first Syrian city taken.⁴⁶⁸ Kaegi agrees with Tabari and calculates the event to have taken place in late 633 CE or early 634 CE.⁴⁶⁹

Whoever the first, both Boṣra and Ma’āb surrendered on exactly the same conditions, according to Baladhuri.⁴⁷⁰ One of them – contract with Boṣra – has survived. ‘At last its [Boṣra’s] people came to terms stipulating that their lives, property and children be safe, and agreeing to pay the poll-tax. According to some reporters, the inhabitants of Boṣra made terms agreeing to pay for each adult one dīnār and one jarīb of wheat. In return they were given security of their lives, property and children’.⁴⁷¹ The contracts, at this stage of invasion, didn’t have any provision of avoiding tax by converting to Islam.

Same contract entered into by two different divisions of Muslim army with two different communities suggest that it was a well-conceived, well-co-ordinated and well planned attack. The attackers were instructed in detail beforehand by their caliph what to do and how to do. It was not merely a plundering campaign, modifiable by local opportunities as they arise.

Agreement of safety of lives and possessions with the defeated party, anyhow, was not a Muslim invention. Such agreements were part of ancient Middle Eastern military traditions and can be traced back to as far as third millennium BC. The dominant model at the time of Arab conquests was Roman/Byzantine deditio in fidem, whereby a community offered its surrender (deditio) in anticipation of a promise from the victors to act in good faith (fides), usually safeguarding the lives, possessions, and laws of the community in return form the fulfillment of certain conditions, all of which was set out in a treaty (Pactum) accompanied by binding oaths. Although the fate of the conquered was now in the hands of the conquerors, there was an expectation of justice and mercy.⁴⁷² “Not only must we show consideration to those whom we have defeated by force,” acknowledges the Roman statesman Cicero, “but we must also receive those who, having laid down their arms, have made recourse to the good faith (fides) of our generals, even though their battering rams have struck against our walls.” ⁴⁷³ This kind of principal was also applied by Sassanid Iran. Emperor Khusrau II urged his generals to “put to the sword all those who offer resistance,” but he also instructed them to “receive in a friendly way those who will submit and keep them in peace and prosperity.” This was in connection with Iranian assault on Eddesa, which after initial resistance, sued for peace and requested for an oath that the Iranians would not destroy their city.⁴⁷⁴ Here Hoyland adds that Arabian terms aman and dhimma equate to the Latin fides, and Muslims Lawyers also employed the Roman/Byzantine categories of voluntary surrender and forced surrender. The point here is not that the Arabs borrowed these concepts from the Roman/Byzantines, but rather that the Arabs belonged to the same world and so shared many of its presuppositions.⁴⁷⁵

Muslims did not occupy many cities of Syria during early phase of the attack. It gives Kaegi an impression that their strategy was to consolidate their power over steppes of Syria and its inhabitants before advancing further.

Battle of Ajnadayn

The site of Battle of Ajnadayn (Ajnādayn اجنادَين ) has been identified about thirty seven kilometer southeast of modern Jerusalem, near Bayt Jibrīn on the Wādī ‘l Samt.⁴⁷⁶ Both Muslim and Christian sources describe a fierce battle at Ajnadayn.⁴⁷⁷ Ya’qubi gives the date of the battle to be July 30, 634 CE.⁴⁷⁸ Apparently, Heraclius was in Homs overseeing integration of his eastern provinces in Byzantine Rome when Muslim attack started.⁴⁷⁹ After initial miscalculation of the Muslim attack as usual nomadic penetration to be tackled by his Arab allies, Heraclius had started realizing factual conditions on the ground. He got compelled to raise a force to defend his territory, despite his economic woes. Kaegi comments that part of Byzantine strategy to counter with enemy in their previous wars was deceit, bribe, promises and false information, hence creation of division among enemy. This time Byzantine failed to use bribery, guile, and emissaries to break up the cohesion of the invading army. They reluctantly joined battle with Muslims.⁴⁸⁰ Actually, Byzantine never took initiative throughout the war in Syria. They merely reacted to Muslim initiatives.⁴⁸¹

‘In this battle about hundred thousand Greeks [Romans] took part’, Baladhuri alleges, ‘majority of whom were massed one after the other by Heraclius (Hiraql هِرقَل ), the rest having come from the neighbouring districts….. against this army, the Muslims fought a violent battle … at last, by Allah’s help, the enemies of Allah were routed and shattered into pieces, a great many being slaughtered’.⁴⁸²

Ajnadayn was definitely a big and decisive war which shattered Byzantine army.⁴⁸³ It created such a panic and fear that both soldiers and civilians escaped to the walled cities of Syria to protect themselves.⁴⁸⁴

Khalid joins the army

The three Muslim army divisions active in Syria joined hands at Boṣra and received the battalion which Khalid bin Walid brought along with him from Iraq. At this occasion they accepted Khalid as their commander in chief.⁴⁸⁵⁴⁸⁶

Fight for Boṣra took place after union of all Muslim forces under command of Khalid bin Walid.⁴⁸⁷ Now they started eying big and prosperous cities of Syria.

As army of Medinan Caliphate started capturing cities one by one, they sent twenty percent of the booty to Medina without delay. Sending part of booty to the sitting king and dividing part of it among soldiers was not a Muslim invention. It was known to the Middle East before Islam. Sebeos mentions, when force of Theodore Rshtuni defeated army of Medinan Caliphate in Armenia in 643 CE, Theodore sent emperor Cosntas gifts from the booty, including one hundred most select hosrses.⁴⁸⁸ Even before that, in Sebeo’s compedium, ‘an Iranian general by name of Vahramn [Bahram] fought against king of the Mazk’ut’during reign of Shahanshah Hormizd IV[ c. 579 – 590]. After his victory Vahhram ‘sent to the Iranian king only an insignificant part of the loot from the very great treasures he captured – the insignia of the [fallen] kingdom and some honored goods. He dispensed all the [rest of the] treasure among his troops according to each one’s merit.’ The King felt betrayed by this action of his general.⁴⁸⁹ Muslims were more disciplined in this regard. They knew exactly how much would be the portion of central government.

Routing of Byzantine Roman army at Ajdnadayn had rendered many areas defenseless. Muslims quickly took control of whole district of Ḥaurān [Auranitis] around Boṣrā.⁴⁹⁰ Then Khalid dispersed small battalions in different directions. They advanced to Palestine and Jordan and occupied their cities and districts. Most of them, like Adhri’āt and ‘Ammān Balqā’ surrendered without fighting.⁴⁹¹ ⁴⁹²

Death of Caliph Abu Bakr

A gloomy event took place in Medina from Medinan Caliphate point of view at the time when Muslim army was busy imposing Caliphate’s administration on up to now occupied districts and towns of Syria. Almost one month after battle of Ajnadayn, Abu Bakr died on August 13, 634 CE.⁴⁹³ Army of Medinan Caliphate in Syria was combating at Yāqūṣaḥ when the news reached them.⁴⁹⁴ ⁴⁹⁵ The exact cause of Abu Bakr’s death is not known but he is reported to suffer from a short illness that lasted twenty days.⁴⁹⁶ ⁴⁹⁷

Abu Bakr, as founder of Medinan Caliphate, proved to be a successful statesman. From the humble beginning of the Caliphate, limited to parts of Hejaz and Yemen at the time of his inauguration, he converted it into a potent state, master of whole Arabia and powerful enough to test its muscle with Byzantine Rome. The careers of Prophet Muhammad and Abu Bakr together form a single phase in the continuing story of the rise of the Islamic state to power in Arabia and beyond. This continuity is marked not only in the process of consolidation itself, but also in the methods employed.⁴⁹⁸

Abdullah bin Mas’ud, an early Meccan Muslim, said in his obituary, “After the death of the Prophet we found ourselves in a state in which we would have perished had not Allah favored us with Abu Bakr.” ⁴⁹⁹

Abu Bakr appoints Umar as caliph

Sources do not record any disputes or difference of opinions in selection of Abu Bakr’s successor. We are informed that Abu Bakr willed for Umar bin Khattab to be his successor and no body objected to it.⁵⁰⁰ Apparently, Abu Bakr’s political appeal was across the board by this time. His decision received a jubilant acceptance.⁵⁰¹ Umar was instrumental in almost all political decisions made by Abu Bakr and knew the reasons behind the decisions. The hand over must have been smooth.

Umar, like Abu Bakr, had impressive curriculum vitae. The last significant convert in Mecca before immigration, he was a man of opinion. He emerged as hawkish advisor to Prophet Muhammad in the aftermath of Badr when he gave his opinion to kill all prisoners of the war.⁵⁰² Since then he managed to register his opinion on each and every matter of political importance until Prophet’s death.⁵⁰³ Apparently, the Prophet gave more weightage to the opinion of Abu Bakr on domestic policy (for example who should be governor over Thaqif), and gave more weightage to opinion of Umar on foreign policy (for example decision of strategic retreat after show of power at Tabuk).⁵⁰⁴

Umar was, in any case, not a man of sword. Though he participated in all the Wars in which Prophet Muhammad participated, the Prophet never gave him charge of an independent campaign except one small campaign against a small group of Hawazin.⁵⁰⁵ No fighting took place even in that campaign.

Fifty three years old Umar of ‘Adi clan of Quraysh, merchant by trade, took oath few days after death of Abu Bakr.⁵⁰⁶ ⁵⁰⁷ Muslim army fighting on northern front of the country digested the news of death of Abu Bakr and appointment of Umar with integrity. Province of Yemen complied quietly. Even provinces of Yamama, Bahrain or Oman, who had not contributed to the war by supplying manpower, and where governors of Medinan Caliphate were managing the affairs without presence of supporting garrisons at their disposal, accepted appointment of Umar without hesitance. Abu Bakr had succeeded in bringing internal political stability in the country. Probably, people were generally happy with news of early successes against Byzantine Rome and incoming booty. They wanted uninterrupted continuation of policy of war.

First surrender of Damascus

Change of Caliph at Medina did not bring lull to the war for a single day. After consolidating occupation of newly acquired cities and their surrounding rural areas, Muslim armies converged on Damascus and laid siege to it.⁵⁰⁸ ⁵⁰⁹ ⁵¹⁰ The siege lingered on for four months.⁵¹¹ Damascus, eventually, surrendered to Muslim army on March 10, 635 CE.⁵¹²

Interestingly, after reaching the environs of Damascus with an intention to lay siege, the Muslim army gathered at a place called Thanīyat. There Khalid unfurled the banner and the army stood underneath it for one hour. This was the same black banner, called ‘Uqāb, which the Prophet had used. The ceremony lived in political memory of later Muslims and the place was still called Thanīyat al ‘Uqāb at the time of Baladhuri’s writing.⁵¹³

Defeat at Ajnadayn and then surrender of Damuscus should have been quiet shocking to Heraclius. ‘On hearing the news of defeat and further advance of Muslim army into Syria, Heraclius fled to Antakya’ states Baladhuri.⁵¹⁴ ⁵¹⁵

Umar demotes Khalid bin Walid

One of the first acts of Umar after assuming office was demotion of commander in Chief, Khalid bin Walid, to field commander.⁵¹⁶ He appointed Abu Ubayda bin Jirah in his place. Abu Ubayda of Fihr clan of Quraysh was tipped by Abu Bakr to be supreme commander of army that was camping in Jurf near Medina awaiting orders to march towards Syria. But he apologized to take this responsibility and rather wished to participate in the war as a common soldier.⁵¹⁷ Why did Abu Ubayda not accept the job that time and why did he accept the same job when Umar asked him is not clear.

The army received these orders in the midst of the siege of Damascus.⁵¹⁸ Abu Ubayda received his appointment orders through the same letter which demoted Khalid. He did not disclose it immediately fearing drop of moral of the army and of Khalid.⁵¹⁹ Umar did not write his reasons for demotion of Khalid. It has led to a plethora of opinions among later historians.

No doubt, Khalid was a master military tactician. His generalship had become synonymous with success. Khalid’s legendary march from ‘Ain at Tamr to Boṣra across the desert with a battalion of army remained alive in Arab political memory for generations to come. ‘Khalid made his camels to drink as much water as they could before he embarked onto desert and he thrust spears in their lips to keep their mouths closed so they may not loose water’ says Baladhuri, ‘on the way his men slaughtered camels one by one to drink water from their bellies’.⁵²⁰

But this brilliant general was notorious for disobeying civilian authority.⁵²¹ It is also known that Khalid was not in good books of Umar. Umar had criticized him previously for commission of war crimes.⁵²² He had also criticized him bitterly for his behavior which was unbecoming of a Muslim general.⁵²³ Umar was also disgusted the way field commanders on Syrian front had asked for Khalid’s appointment as commander-in-chief. Umar wished to nip the idea in the bud that a human and not Allah secured victories.⁵²⁴ We shall never know which of these potential reasons for demotion worked.⁵²⁵ ⁵²⁶ ⁵²⁷

First surrender of Homs

After conquering Damascus Abu Ubayda concentrated on management of territory subdued so far. He appointed Yazid bin Abu Sufyan his lieutenant in province of Damascus, Amr bin As over Palestine and Shurahbil over Jordan.⁵²⁸ ⁵²⁹ Abu Ubayda, then, advanced on Homs. On his way he passed through Baalbek whose inhabitants agreed to capitulate.⁵³⁰ ⁵³¹ ⁵³² ⁵³³ Homs was taken the same year in which Damascus surrendered, 635 CE.⁵³⁴

According to the pact inhabitants of Homs surrendered one fourth part of St. John’s church so it could be converted into mosque.⁵³⁵ Building a grand mosque as a symbol of Muslim presence in any town Medinan Caliphate captured was a tradition that can be traced back to Prophet Muhammad himself. This policy continued during conquest of Iran, as well, when Sa’d bin Waqqas built mosque in Tyswn after its conquest.⁵³⁶

Abu Ubayda appointed Ubada bin Samit (‘Ubādah bin Ṣāmit عُبَيده بِن صامِت) of Ansar lieutenant governor over Homs.⁵³⁷ This was the first and the only appointment of an Ansar over a position of authority during the tenure of first two caliphs, albeit a middle ranking one, and of temporary nature.⁵³⁸ ⁵³⁹

Medinan Caliphate captures city after city

Muslim scheme of overpowering city after city continued temporarily. They occupied Baldah, Jabalah, Ḥamāh, and Shaizar in the north.⁵⁴⁰ ⁵⁴¹ They also held Gaza (temporarily), Sabasṭiyah, Nāblus, Ludd, Yibna, ‘Amwās and Bayt Jibrīn in Palestine.⁵⁴² ⁵⁴³

Battle of Yarmouk

Climax of Medinan Caliphate’s invasion of Byzantine Rome, according to both Muslim and Christian sources, was Battle of Yarmouk (Yarmūk يَرموك ). It was a battle in the fullest sense of the term.⁵⁴⁴ The war was fought in August 636 CE.⁵⁴⁵

The worst case scenario Heraclius would have imagined was presenting his Eastern Provinces to Muslim Arabs like a cake in a plate. He was not sitting idle in Antakya recognizing surrender of his city after city. He was busy organizing a big army to get rid of Arab Muslims once and for ever. Exact strength of the army he could amass is not known but by all accounts it was huge.⁵⁴⁶ He appointed an Armenian by name of Vahān supreme commander of this army ⁵⁴⁷ and sent his brother Theodore as lieutenant general.⁵⁴⁸ Heraclius shunned from leading the army himself. He was still ruler of a super power extending in Asia, Europe and Africa. Maintaining grip on power was his first priority. Probably, he didn’t intend to take any blame on his person in case of defeat. Still more likely, he didn’t want to risk his life.

When tensions of the war broke Muslims strategically evacuated Damascus and Homs returning the inhabitant Jizyah they had collected from them.⁵⁴⁹ Probably they didn’t want a big hostile population on their rear and wished the supply line of Byzantine Romans to elongate by few hundred kilometers. Ultimately the two armies drew battle line along River Yarmouk, a tributary to River Jordan that runs east to west along border of modern Jordan and Syria.⁵⁵⁰

Battle of Yarmouk was a series of clashes that started about five kilometers northeast of modern Nawā in Syria and ended at the confluence of Yermouk River with Wādī ul Ruqqād.⁵⁵¹ Byzantine defeat was profound. Loss of life on Byzantine side was collosal.⁵⁵² They fled pell-mell. Muslims chased Byzantine soldiers, many of whom were Armenians, up to as far north as Marj al Ṣuffar.⁵⁵³ ⁵⁵⁴ Vahān either died at the battle field or retired in disgrace, as Eutychius of Alexandria claimed, to a monastery at Sinai.⁵⁵⁵ ⁵⁵⁶

Stories of valour of victorious Arab soldiers outlived the war. “Among war of Yarmouk was a soldier by the name of Ḥubāsh bin Qays”, writes Baladhuri, “who lost his leg without knowing and after war started looking for it”.⁵⁵⁷ And those of the defeated did not even crop up as if none of them were brave.

Heraclius accepted his defeat in Syria resignedly. According to Baladhuri, on receiving news of defeat at Yermouk, Heraclius fled from Antakya to Constantinople. As he passed through Darb [a pass of Taurus Mountains] he said ‘Peace unto thee, O Syria, and what an excellent country this is for the enemy!” ⁵⁵⁸

News of Byzantine defeat spread to far off corners of the world. Frankish historian Fredegarius, writing around 658 CE elaborates that “Muslims were two hundred thousand. Army of Heraclius was smitten by ‘Sword of the Lord’ and fifty two thousand Romans were slain”.⁵⁵⁹ ⁵⁶⁰

Soon after, people with political acumen started realizing that Battle of Yarmouk was a turning point in world history. A late 7^th century Christian observer testifies to the importance of the battle by labeling it ‘the first and fearful and incurable all of the Roman [Byzantine] army, I mean the bloodshed at Gabitha [Jābiya] and Yarmouk’.⁵⁶¹ ⁵⁶² Yarmouk proved to be a historic watershed. It was the starting point of pushing Hellenistic civilization out of Asia and Africa and spread of another civilization in its place, which was destined to be known as Islamic civilization.

Aftermath of Yarmouk

By end of August 636 CE Byzantine Rome had lost capacity to defend Syria. Its towns and rural areas were on Muslim’s mercy. Arab Muslims could capitulate any of them at the timing of their own choosing.

The chronology of events following battle of Yarmouk is guessed by Kaegi.⁵⁶³ Medinan Caliphate recaptured Damascus in late 636 CE or early 637 CE; followed by Baalbek and nearby Wādī Biqā’ and Qinnasrīn.⁵⁶⁴ ⁵⁶⁵ Homs surrendered sometimes in 637; Jerusalem yielded to Muslims also sometimes in 637 CE; so did Gaza, at the end of June or in early July 637; the first surrender of ‘Asqalān may have taken place in the summer of 637;⁵⁶⁶ ⁵⁶⁷

In late 637 CE the Byzantine Rome and Medinan Caliphate had consented to a truce at Qinnasrīn. At the end of that truce, in 638 CE, the Muslims occupied the remaining parts of northern Syria including Antakya , Cyrrhus, Niqābulus, Shaizar, Aleppo, Manbij ‘Arājin and Bālis without encountering further resistance.⁵⁶⁸ ⁵⁶⁹ ⁵⁷⁰

Medinan Caliphate also took all cities of Jordan without any resistance including Tabariyyā, Baisān, Afīq, Sūsiyah, Jerash, Bait-Rās, Qadas, Jaulān, Arandal, and Sājūr.⁵⁷¹ ⁵⁷²

Some of the cities had calculated that resisting Muslim army was pointless. They welcomed Muslim Army with music and songs of peace in a hope to get better deal, for example, Homs and Shaizar.⁵⁷³ Others still tried to hold on in a hope that Heraclius might send reinforcement by sea route, for example, Antakya.⁵⁷⁴ Actually, resistance from some of the towns was fierce.

Army of Medinan Caliphate was not merciful to those who showed resistance. Combatant prisoners of war were executed except if they wished to accept Islam. The story of sixty martyrs of Gaza, preserved in manuscripts of Vatican Museum, is a typical example.⁵⁷⁵ Execution of prisoners of war was a norm in pre-Islamic Middle East. Once Khosrau II Pervez ordered about his Byzantine prisoners of war that the multitude of arrested horsemen and elephant-riders be stripped, their hands be tied upon their shoulders, and they be trampled under the elephants’ hooves.⁵⁷⁶

Army of Medinan Caliphate had to post garrisons only at dangerous towns, (probably where they expected resent). They simply appointed ‘amils at all other conquered towns.⁵⁷⁷ ⁵⁷⁸

Muslim takeover of Jerusalem

Muslim takeover of Jerusalem by autumn of 637 CE was the most symbolic event during war in Syria and needs special mention.⁵⁷⁹

Jerusalem had been a sacred city for the Jews for centuries. (See photo). Lately, it had become focus of Christian religious tourism after the Byzantine Roman king Constantine had built landmark churches on the spots traditionally believed to be associated with the birth and crucifixion of Jesus Christ.⁵⁸⁰

Jerusalem was already a bone of contention between Jews and the Christians before Arab Muslim attack. Antiochus Strategos, who is eyewitness to sack of Jerusalem by a Sasanian Iranian army in summer of 614 CE, informs us that after a successful siege of the town for twenty one days Iranian army could break the city wall and enter the city. They resorted to indiscriminate massacre of civilian population. When they got fatigued of murdering people, they terminated the massacre. The hiding masses, exhausted with hunger, returned to the town to be arrested. Iranians locked them up in a reservoir outside the town. That time the Jews of the town bought those poor Christians from the invaders and slew them.⁵⁸¹ Antiochus doesn’t implicate the Jews of the town in any other crime but his account generates suspicion that Jews were in collaboration with the invading army. Sebeos divulges further details, slightly differing from Antiochus. He says that there was infighting between the Jews and Christians of the town prior to the attack. Christians outnumbered Jews. They killed many of the Jews, remaining escaped to the Iranian army by jumping over the walls of the city. They helped the Sasanian Iranians in capturing the town. They, afterwards, participated in three day massacre of Christians.⁵⁸² ⁵⁸³

It appears that killing innocent Christians was a local affair of Iran-Jew alliance. It was not official policy of Sasanian Iran. Antiochus’s account doesn’t disclose any brutalities committed by Shahanshah Khusrou II Pervez on the civilian captives of war.⁵⁸⁴ Sebeos and anonymous chronicle of Khuzestan both agree that Khusrou himself reconstructed the destroyed churches and restored the Christian prisoners to their town.⁵⁸⁵ ⁵⁸⁶

The animosity between Jews and Christians of Jerusalem, anyhow, continued. Jerusalem used to house Holy Cross. Christians believed it to be the original cross on which Jesus Christ was crucified.⁵⁸⁷ Iranians had carried away the Holy Cross after fall of Jerusalem to their capital, probably as a war trophy.⁵⁸⁸ After their defeat at the hands of Byzantine Rome in the last war of antiquity, they returned the Holy Cross.⁵⁸⁹

Heraclius had chosen to use religion to unify this shattered region and he used city of Jerusalem to boost his personal image. In 630 CE Heraclius converted return of Holy Cross of Jesus to Jerusalem into a political event. He entered the city with the Holy Cross with pomp and celebration.⁵⁹⁰ He not only restored the Holy Cross to the city but also put the vessels of the churches back, which were temporarily removed to Constantinople to save them from Iranians.⁵⁹¹ Then Heraclius reserved Jerusalem for Christians and banned entry of the Jews into it, lest they might attempt to rebuild the third temple.⁵⁹²

This was the political milieu of Jerusalem – Christians claiming it to be the most sacred place on earth and Jews trying to reclaim it for themselves – when army of Medinan Caliphate under leadership of Amr bin As laid siege to Jerusalem.⁵⁹³ People of Jerusalem adhered to policy of maximum resistance but their position became precarious when a big army under command of Abu Ubayda reached and relieved Amr of his duties.⁵⁹⁴ Christians of the town hastily shipped the Holy Cross to Constantinople by sea for safekeeping.⁵⁹⁵ Then people of Jerusalem and the Byzantine Roman garrison there surrendered within two to three days without fighting.⁵⁹⁶

Sebeos narrates the events in Jerusalem after its surrender to Muslims. “Now I shall speak about the plot of the Jewish rebels, who, finding support from the Hagarenes for a short time, planned to [re]build the temple of Solomon. Locating the place called the holy of the holies, they constructed [the temple] with a pedestal, to serve as their place of prayer. But the Ishmaelites envied [the Jews], expelled them from the place, and named the same building their own place of prayer. [The Jews] built a temple for their worship, elsewhere. It was then that they came up with an evil plan; they wanted to fill Jerusalem with blood from end to end, and to exterminate all the Christians of Jerusalem…… they just slaughtered two pigs ….. and put them [in the Muslim] place of prayer. Then many [Muslims] entered the place and saw the evil, and they spread a lament throughout the city. The Jews told the prince [lieutenant governor] that the Christians had desecrated their place of prayer. The prince issued an order and all the Christians were gathered together. Just as they wanted to put them to the sword, [a] man came and addressed them: ‘why shed so much blood in vain? Order all the Jews to assemble and I shall point out the guilty ones.” As soon as they were all assembled and [the man] walked among them, he recognized the three men. Seizing them, [The Arabs] tried them with great severity until they disclosed the plot. [The Arab prince] ordered that six of the principals involved in the plot be killed. He permitted the other [Jews] to return to their places”.⁵⁹⁷

By early 638 CE, few months after capitulation of Jerusalem, Umar had to come to Jerusalem on state visit.⁵⁹⁸ On his way to Jerusalem, Umar first halted in Jābiyah.⁵⁹⁹ Purpose of Umar’s visit is not clearly mentioned in sources. Kaegi feels it could be to dispose off conquered properties and to reorganize Muslim administrative structure in Syria.⁶⁰⁰ Umar definitely performed some administrative tasks in Jābiyah.⁶⁰¹ However, this explanation is far from complete. If it was merely administrative visit, why did he decide to go to Jerusalem, which was not an administrative hub? Moreover, Medinan Caliphate conquered many countries during Umar’s tenure, including Sasanian Iran. Why Umar not had to go there as well? Ya’qubi emphasizes that Abu Ubayda wrote to Umar that the siege of Jerusalem was taking long and that the inhabitants have asked the caliph himself to make a peace agreement with them. So Abu Ubayda prepared that documents of the truce and Umar departed for Syria.⁶⁰² Again this reason of visit is doubtful. Many cities in the region, for example Damascus, had prolonged sieges. No body called the caliph to negotiate the truce. Why only Jerusalem?⁶⁰³ Something else emerges as a cause of Umar’s visit as we analyse his activities in Jerusalem. A Muslim eyewitness of the events, who accompanied Umar to Jerusalem, has survived through annals of Tabari. He states, “He [Umar] set out from al-Jābiyah, leaving it behind until he came to Jerusalem. He then went on and entered the masjid. Then he went on toward the miḥrāb Dāwūd, while we were with him; he entered it, recited the prostration of David, [Quran 38: 21 – 25] and prostrated himself, and we prostrated ourselves with him.” ⁶⁰⁴ Scholars interpret ‘masjid’ in this passage as the Temple Mound.⁶⁰⁵ The meaning of miḥrāb Dāwūd is still debated without any definite outcome. Anyhow, it could be a place very near to the Temple Mound, or who knows, on Temple Mound itself.⁶⁰⁶ Clearly, Umar’s purpose was to lay a Muslim claim to the site of Temple Mound and to broadcast to the public at large Muslim’s staunch belief in Prophet hood of David.

Islamic and Jewish sources agree with Seobos that after a shot lived honeymoon between Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem they broke up.⁶⁰⁷ That must be the time Umar ordered building a mosque at Temple Mound.⁶⁰⁸ In an anecdote preserved in Pratun Spirituale of John Moschus, Sophronius, the Chalcedonian Christian Patriarch of Jerusalem, who had surrendered the town to Muslim Arabs, says to one of the skilled marble-worker working on construction of the mosque, “the godless Saracens entered the holy city of Christ our Lord, Jerusalem, with the permission of God and in punishment for our negligence, which is considerable, and immediately proceeded in haste to the place which is called the Capitol. They took with them men, some by force, others by their own will, in order to clean that place and to build that cursed thing, intended for their prayer and which they call a mosque (midzgitha).” ⁶⁰⁹ As we know Sophronius had died by 639 CE, presumably the construction of mosque had started by that time.⁶¹⁰

Arculf was a Gaul bishop. He visited Jerusalem in 670’s.⁶¹¹ In his travelogue he confirms that a mosque was built exactly on ruins of temple: ‘in that famous place where once stood the magnificently constructed Temple, near the eastern wall, the Saracens now frequent a rectangular house of prayer (orationis domus) which they have built in a crude manner, constructing it from raised planks and large beams over some remains of ruins. This house can, as it is said, accommodate at least 3000 people.’ ⁶¹² Umar deliberately kept the rock on the back of the mosque so it could not intervene between the mosque and ka’ba.⁶¹³ ⁶¹⁴ The mosque was called Aqṣā ( اَقصئ ).⁶¹⁵

Byzantine provinces buy Temporary Truce

Learning from hopeless defeats of Byzantine Romans in Syria, eastern Byzantine provinces, still under Byzantine rule hastened to purchase expensive truces from Medinan Caliphate. Egypt took initiative in 636 CE at the time when Medinan Caliphate occupied Palestine after Battle of Yermouk. Its Byzantine governor, Cyrus, agreed to pay one million and two hundred thousand Dirhams annually for three years in case Medinan Caliphate doesn’t attack Egypt.⁶¹⁶ ⁶¹⁷ Jazirah followed. Its Byzantine governor, Jogn Kataias agreed at Qinnasrīn in 637 CE to pay one million Dirhams annually provided the army of Medinan Caliphate doesn’t cross Euphrates to invade Jazirah.⁶¹⁸ ⁶¹⁹

Truces were signed with Muslim upper hand. Such truces made good strategic sense for Medinan Calipahte at this juncture of war. Medinan Caliphate had quadrupled its area in the last five years. It needed lull in the war to established proper authority in newly conquered areas. Payment of money, attached with truce agreements was extra benefit.

When Heraclius came to know about these truces he raged with anger. He replaced Cyrus of Egypt with Manuel with immediate effect. Egyptians didn’t pay anything and the truce stood null and void.⁶²⁰ Jazirah paid only one year’s amercement before Heraclius could find replacement of Kataias in the form of general Ptolemaios.⁶²¹

Kaegi proposes that Heraclius’s anger stemmed from expense of the truce which would have deprived the central government of revenue, would increase prestige of Muslims and enhance their capability to recruit more army.⁶²²

Completion of conquest of Syria

Byzantine Rome lost its control over Avars and Slavs in Europe at the same time when it lost Syria.⁶²³ Heraclius’s position must be bleak. Between 638 CE and 639 CE he ordered evacuation of all Byzantine Roman fortifications northwest of Antakya to create an empty zone or no man land between his country and Medinan Caliphate.⁶²⁴ Medinan Caliphate complemented Heraclius’s efforts by destroying some fortifications in the area.⁶²⁵ ⁶²⁶

Meanwhile, when the Byzantine were regrouping in Anatolia, the Muslim Arabs completed their conquest of Byzantine Syria by occupying the coastal cities, including Qayṣariyah (640 CE), followed by Beirut, Gabala and Ladhiqiyyah. ⁶²⁷ ⁶²⁸ Somewhere during this time Muslims took Yāfa, Rafaḥ, Ṭarṭūs, Acre, Tyre, Ṣaffūriyah, Sidon, ‘Irqah, and Jubail Step by step.⁶²⁹ ⁶³⁰

Many coastal towns surrendered without resistance but some offered stiff resistance.⁶³¹ A dim hope of getting reinforcement through sea route from Byzantine Rome explains their resistance. In the last Muslims got control of all the passes of Taurus Mountains.⁶³²

We can enumerate so many towns of Syria, which fell into Muslim hands after Battle of Yarmouk quiet easily. Generally speaking, their resistance was not fierce after Battle of Yermouk. Hoyland points out that the lenient conditions of terms could be one reason.⁶³³ The people of the region had experienced deceit after entering into a peace contract in near past. For example, people of Niṣībayn once rose against Khosrau II Pervez. Khosrau’s general Nakhorgan promised safety. People of the city believed in him and opened the gates. Nakhorgan then changed his mind and killed nobles of the city.⁶³⁴ ⁶³⁵ When Syrians observed the invading Muslims keeping their promise after writing of a contract, they molded towards surrendering

Conditions of submission

Whichever town Muslim army acquired in Syria, the commander of Muslim army entered into a contract (Ṣulḥ) with the local dignitaries. Many of these contracts have survived. All slightly vary from each other underscoring local conditions. Foundation of all is laid on the same principals. The contract written between Abu Ubayda and Baalbek city is preserved by Baladhuri in almost original form. It mentions that there were Romans (Greek), Persians and Arabs in the city. All of them got the same terms. They were allowed to keep their lives, houses, churches and businesses including pastures and mills, in lieu of payment of Jizyah and Kharāj. Their merchants were allowed to do business in all of Islamic state. If anyone of them decided to accept Islam, he would have the same rights as any other Muslim.⁶³⁶

Salient features of this contract are that all and sundry among the submitting people are encouraged to continue with their usual commercial activities. They are encouraged to take advantage of opportunities created by elimination of borders between large areas. They have to pay taxes as they would have to pay to any other government. Medinan Caliphate won’t interfere in their personal lives, especially with their religion. They are free to practice any religion they like. However, they can reduce their tax burden by converting to Islam. Medinan Caliphate will provide protection of life and property to their community in lieu of the taxes, like any other government. Medinan Caliphate will use its own military for this purpose. They are not obliged to take military job.

Medinan Caliphate had forced Arab polytheists to convert to Islam. They had only two options after their defeat. Either convert to Islam or die. Its attitude during Futuhul Buldan was entirely different. During initial one or two years of Futuhul Buldan, when Medinan Caliphate was not economically healthy, they encouraged the defeated communities to keep their religions and pay more taxes. After success in Battle of Yarmouk, Medinan Caliphate started offering tax incentives for conversion to Islam. They didn’t force anybody to convert to Islam. They left it to individual’s discretion.

The inhabitants of conquered towns didn’t have peace of mind, anyhow. They had accepted rule of Medinan Caliphate as a last choice. Some of them, for example Qinnasrīn and Antakya challenged the new rulers with civil disobedience immediately army of Medinan Caliphate left the city after signing the contract.⁶³⁷ The army of Medinan Caliphate had to return to bring them back into ambit of the contract. Muslims were not bent on bloodshed. Whenever a town underwent civil disobedience and it was re-conquered, for example Ṭabaraiyah, its inhabitants were not punished like combatants.⁶³⁸ They were given the same terms of contract again.

New borders at Tauras mountains

Byzantine Empire shrank to the Taurus mountain zone on the south-eastern edge of Cappadocia, and to Cyprus in the Mediterranean as a result of Futuhul Buldan.⁶³⁹ Iconium and Caesarea in Cappadocia became border towns of Byzantine Rome whereas Aleppo and Antakya became border towns of Medinan Caliphate.⁶⁴⁰ ⁶⁴¹

Apparently, Heraclius and Umar both wished, at least temporarily, to create a frontier along the passes of the Taurus and Antitaurus. This frontier became a new barrier for civilian and military movement.⁶⁴² Subsequently most willful contacts of a non-military kind between the Caliphate and Byzantine passed by sea, not through the land frontiers, despite occasional famous embassies to Damascus. ⁶⁴³

Halt of Muslim invasion at Taurus Mountains by 639 CE cannot be explained solely by geography. People of Central Anatolia did not have any resident Arabs among them. Neither did the population have serious religious divisions. Medinan Caliphate had difficulty finding a portion of population willing to cooperate with them. They were left with only military choice, and, they could not devise any solid military strategy to advance forward.⁶⁴⁴

Muslim army didn’t cross Euphrates in the east leaving Byzantine possession there, honouring the Qinasrīn truce.⁶⁴⁵

Heraclius was busy mending his political image. He hastily erected his image on a pillar near Qinnasrīn. Probably the border between two countries passed by this place by that time and the fleeing refugees used this route. Eutychius of Alexandria tells an interesting story by which an Arab accidentally damaged one eye of the image. Heraclius got so touchy that he wrote to Abu Ubayda for compensation. Abu Ubayda compensated with apology.⁶⁴⁶

Role of ethnicities in Syria

It is practically impossible for a small army, like twenty four thousand Arabs, to conquer and keep occupying a thickly populated country, like Syria, which has its own army of hundreds of thousands available to defend, unless a portion of the population has soft corner for the invaders.

It appears Arab residents of Syria were ambivalent when Medinan Caliphate’s attack started. They sided with Byzantine Rome but their resistance to the invading Arabs was not stiff. Cultural commonality with the invaders might explain it. Jabalah bin Aiham, the last Ghassan king, joined rank and file of Byzantine Rome in the beginning of Battle of Yarmouk.⁶⁴⁷ Exactly in the midst of the battle he switched sides citing his kinship with Ansar as an excuse.⁶⁴⁸ It might be a pre-pondered scheme that Muslim Arabs chose Yarmouk as battlefield by retreating from already occupied areas. Yarmouk was in vicinity of Jābyah, the town of Ghassans. Adhri’āt, where Qaynuqā’ had taken refuge, was in their rear.

Attitude of invaders towards Arab residents of Syria was reciprocally different from that towards Greek speaking urban dwellers. During his official visit to Jābiyah in 638 CE, Umar negotiated with Jabalah bin Aiham to convert to Islam. Jabalah rather opted to keep his religion and pay ṣadaqah. Umar insisted on paying Jizyah in case he keeps his religion. He refused and left to Byzantine Rome along with thirty thousand of his supporters. Ubada bin Samit, Leutinent governor of Homs, gently reproved Umar saying ‘if thou hadst accepted ṣadaqah from him and treated him in a friendly way, he would have become Muslim.’ ⁶⁴⁹ The incident proves that Muslims used to go out of their way to convince the Syrian Arabs to convert to Islam, and Syrian Arabs expected to be treated differently. Actually, Umar did not close the matter as settled. In summer of 642 CE he sent ‘Umair bin Sa’d of Ansar as along with an army across the border to Byzantine Rome to appeal to Jabalah through the blood relationship between them, to return to the land of Muslims with an understanding that he would keep his faith and would pay ṣadaqah. Jabalah rejected the offer.⁶⁵⁰

On the same note, the invading armies got their earliest converts to Islam only from Arab tribes. For example, at the time of surrender of Qinnasrīn, many clans of Tanūkh tribe, residents of satellite town of Qinnasrīn converted to Islam. Some of them, like Saliḥ Clan, remained Christians.⁶⁵¹ None of the Greek, Persian or Jew population of the town converted at this occasion.

Jews were definitely happy on Muslim invasion.⁶⁵² They co-operated with invading Muslim armies as much as they could. Samaritan Jews provided spying services to the Muslims and they paid them accordingly.⁶⁵³ They might have even joined the Muslim armies planning to attack further lands. John of Nikiu mentions presence of a Jew among Muslim army that invaded Egypt.⁶⁵⁴

The Syriac speaking Monophysites were under hostile pressure from central government of Byzantine Rome.⁶⁵⁵ Though they did not back invaders actively, their resistance was soft. At some places, we hear, a member of clergy helped Muslims in reducing the town while the remaining population of the town was not in that mood. When siege of Damascus lingered on during the first attempt on the town, it was the bishop of Damascus who communicated with Khalid and opened the gate of city covertly when the city was busy in a feast.⁶⁵⁶ As Greek speaking Chalcedonians were bitterly opposed to Muslim occupation of the town, he was definitely not Chalcedonian. He might be a Monophysite.

It is on record that Monophysite and other Christian dissident clergy limited itself to verbal laments against invading Muslims. They did not encourage their communicants to resist the Muslims to death. Christians, generally, did not see this war as a war of survival for Christian religion.⁶⁵⁷

Some historians believe that Christian sectarian differences were not a cause of the failure of Byzantine resistance, or in any case, they surely were not the primary cause.⁶⁵⁸ Even if we totally reject the idea that anti-Chalcedonian communities of Syria, and later Egypt, did not actively support Muslim invaders, still it is likely that prolonged persecution at the hands of the Chalcedonian authorities in the late sixth and early seventh centuries had alienated anti-Chalecedonians and made them more amenable to accommodation with Arab rule, once the initial period of fighting and uncertainty had ended and it had become clear that the Arabs were going to leave people to practice their own faith in peace as long as they paid jizyah.⁶⁵⁹

The great plague

Muslim army in Syria had hardly finished thrashing Byzantine Romans, when in 639 CE, it faced another enemy. This enemy was far more scowling than the Byzantine army and it killed more Arabs than Byzantine Roman army could. It was the great plague, which lasted for almost one year.⁶⁶⁰ Plague of ‘Amwās – co called because it started from town of ‘Amwās – killed at least twenty five thousand soldiers of Medinan Caliphate. This figure was apart from those who suffered from the debilitating effects of the disease but did not die.⁶⁶¹ ⁶⁶²

Most probably Arabs had no immunity against the disease which was almost endemic in the area. According to conservative estimates the epidemic killed about 40% of Muslim army within a few months.⁶⁶³ The Plague of ‘Amwās might have prevented Arab Muslims to build a cantonment town in Syria parallel to those they built in Iraq and Egypt.

The pestilence perished almost whole leadership of army of Medinan Caliphate in Syria. Most notable death was that of commander in chief and Umar’s right hand man, Abu Ubayda, who died at a young age of fifty eight.⁶⁶⁴ Other notables who vanished were field commander Shurahbil bin Hasana at the age of sixty nine, and field commander Yazid bin Abu Sufyan.⁶⁶⁵ Two noteworthy survivors were Amr bin As and Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan (Mu’āwiyāh bin Abū Sufyān مُعاوِيَه بِن اَبُو سُفيان ). Apparently the plague was most devastating in and around Damascus where most of the people died.⁶⁶⁶ Mu’awiya survived as he was busy in campaign of coastal areas. Amr survived because he was leading his army towards Egypt.⁶⁶⁷

Arabs knew conventionally that spreading out to isolate from each other controls the contageons.⁶⁶⁸ Their reluctance to do that in this case might be due to their fear of Byzantine re-emergence.⁶⁶⁹

Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan’s climb to prominence

Unpredictable deaths of governors and commanders one after another created a crisis of provincial leadership of Medinan Caliphate in Syria. A new provincial governor would hardly take charge of his office when he would die.⁶⁷⁰ The last significant death was that of governor Yazid bin Abu Sufyan by the end of 639 CE.⁶⁷¹ It paved the way for appointment of his brother Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan as governor of Syria and commander in chief of Medinan Caliphate’s army in Syria by Umar.⁶⁷²

Future events proved that Mu’awiya’s appointment as governor of Syria had far reaching consequences to Medinan Caliphate than any other appointment of a governor. Mu’awiya was a young and energetic man at the time of his appointment.⁶⁷³ Born in an august family of Abu Sufyan, Mu’awiya grew up in environment of business and politics. Though Mu’awiya had participated in the Battle of Khandaq from the side of Meccan polytheists as an ordinary soldier, he came to prominence in the history of Islam for the first time when he married divorcee of Umar just after Hudaybiah.⁶⁷⁴ He was one of those chiefs who got hundred camels at the time of Jiranah.⁶⁷⁵ He joined the army of Medinan Caliphate as a soldier and participated in war of Yamama under Khalid bin Walid in this capacity.⁶⁷⁶ Medinan Caliphate, then, transferred his services to the Syrian sector. He proved himself an outstanding warrior and his superiors, especially his brother Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, started giving him solo campaigns confidently.⁶⁷⁷ He didn’t disappoint his superiors and demonstrated his military and administrative talent during those campaigns, which were mostly against coastal towns of Syria.⁶⁷⁸

Tacit truce with Byzantine Rome at Taurus border

War between Medinan Caliphate and Byzantine Rome in Syria didn’t end with a formal peace treaty and mutual recognition of new borderline. Heraclius and Umar exchanged diplomatic notes but they did not progress beyond token contacts.⁶⁷⁹ None of them was serious about formal ceasefire The Taurus frontier between Byzantine Rome and Medinan Caliphate remained unstable, suspicious, and hostile.⁶⁸⁰ Umar sent an expedition as late as 641 CE under leadership of Maysara bin Masquq (Maysara bin Masqūq ميسره بِن مَسقُوق ) of ‘Abs tribe against Byzantine Rome territory (arḍ al Rūm, Asia Minor).⁶⁸¹ According to Ya’qubi it was the first operation of its kind across Taurus into Anatolia.⁶⁸² The expedition reached up to Zandah facing Byzantine Roman troops and their Arab allies (musta’ribah ‘Arab) of Ghassan, Tanūkh and Lyād tribes.⁶⁸³ ⁶⁸⁴ Apparently the expedition could not gain anything except safety of their own lives.

Umar sent a second campaign, after the above mentioned one, under the leadership of Habib bin Maslama (Ḥabīb bin Maslamah حَبِيب بِن مَسلَمه ) of Fihr clan.⁶⁸⁵ ⁶⁸⁶ Again no achievements of this campaign are noted. This was the last campaign against Byzantine territory during Umar’s caliphate.⁶⁸⁷ Target and purpose of both these campaigns are not clearly understood as Umar had already expressed his wish to make the Taurus mountains line of control and both Constantinople and Medina had taken measures to create a no man’s land there.

Medinan Caliphate kept high level of fortification and military alert in the border areas as they anticipated Byzantine Rome’s counter attack.⁶⁸⁸

Jizyah was humiliating tax

Tax is twin of state. It took birth the same day when state was born. Population of Syria must have been paying taxes to the precursors of Medinan Caliphate. They might still be willing to pay taxes. However, they perceived Jizyah imposed on non-Muslims (virtually over whole population), as a tax of pejorative character.

Jabalah rejected payment of kharāj or Jizyah on grounds that he was Arab and these taxes were for peasants (‘ulūj).⁶⁸⁹ Banu Taghlib bin Wa’il were Christian Arabs. Medinan Caliphate wished to levy Jizyah on them. They fled to far off lands. Pleading to Umar on their behalf Nu’mān bin Zur’ah said, “I plead in Allah’s name for Banu Taghlib. They are body of Arabs too proud to pay Jizyah, but severe in warfare. Let not thy enemy, therefore, be enriched by them to thy advantage’.⁶⁹⁰ On convincing power of economic argument that they would still pay tax to government of far off lands and would deprive Medinan Caliphate of revenues, Umar called them back. This time Umar ‘doubled the ṣadaqah laid on them’ meaning their tax rate was not cut but its name was changed.⁶⁹¹ Probably this kind of arrangement was made with many Christian Arabs because later Zuhri noted that none of the ‘people of book’ pay ṣadaqah except Christian Arabs and they pay twice what the Muslims pay.⁶⁹²

Jazirah falls to Medinan Caliphate

The area between upper reaches of rivers Euphrates and Tigris, currently located in northern Syria and south-eastern Turkey, is called Jazirah (Jazirah جَزِيره ) by Islamic sources.⁶⁹³ It corresponds to the Byzantine Roman provinces of Osrhoene and Mesopotamia in sixth century CE. ⁶⁹⁴ River Khābour, a small tributary to River Euphrates used to make the border between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran here. (Not to be confused with Khabur Tigris).⁶⁹⁵

Christianization of the population was complete in Jazirah. Like Syria, the population was a mixture of Greek speaking town dwellers and Arabic speaking tribes scattered in rural areas. Ethnic Persians had their presence, as had Jews.⁶⁹⁶

By the beginning of 639 CE Jazirah protruded into Medinan Caliphate, separating its Syria and Swad territories, and thus important communication route. This area provided an access between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran in case they decided to collaborate with each other. Armenia, located to the north of Jazirah was main recruiting ground for Byzantine Roman military. If occupied by Arab Muslims, they could threaten Armenia easily. Last, but not the least, Jazirah was fertile agricultural region. Arabs had all reasons to occupy it and Byzantine Romans had all reasons to hold it.⁶⁹⁷

Heraclius could smell the danger and sent military reinforcements to Jazirah in 638 – 9 CE neglecting defence of Egypt that was exposed to aggression by any time.⁶⁹⁸

Just when plague of ‘Amwās was over, Umar asked Iyad bin Ghanm (‘Iyād. bin Ghanm عياض بِن غَنم ) of Fihr clan of Quraysh to march on Jazirah in 639 CE.⁶⁹⁹ ⁷⁰⁰ His military strength was five thousand men.⁷⁰¹ The Byzantine Medinan truce prevented any Arab Muslim attack on Jarzirah during 638 CE.⁷⁰² At the annulment of the truce of Qinnasrīn in 639 CE Iyad bin Ghanm’s troops crossed Euphrates and penetrated into Jazirah the way knife penetrates melon.⁷⁰³ City after city the army capitulated. Starting from Raqqah, to Ruha, Diyarbakir, ‘Ain al Wardah, Dniṣar, Mardīn, whole region of Ṭūr ‘Abdīn, Niṣībayn, Daras, Khāūr, Sinjār, and Qarqisiya, the army reached up to Mosul in the northeast and Hīt in the southeast, until they shook hands with their colleagues active in Swad.⁷⁰⁴ ⁷⁰⁵ Very few towns, like Tella, Daras and ‘Ain al Wardah had courage to resist the invading amry.⁷⁰⁶ ⁷⁰⁷ The occupation of Jazirah completed in 640 CE at a time when some coastal towns of Syria, for example Qayṣariyah, were still resisting Muslim army. ⁷⁰⁸

Heraclius didn’t concede defeat aptly. He sent Byzantine Generals Dawit’ (David), Urṭaya, and Titus, who made an abortive campaign in Jazirah in the year of 640 CE.⁷⁰⁹ Loss of Mesopotamia deprived the Byzantine Romans of Arab recruiting grounds for their armies. They had to look around for new sources. Medinan Caliphate could practically prevent Byzantine from helping the collapsing Sasanian Iran as they had done in 590-1 CE and in 628-30 CE.⁷¹⁰

Medinan Caliphate occupies Egypt

The Byzantine Rome’s province of Aegyptus, Miṣr of Islamic sources, was located at confluence of Africa with Asia.⁷¹¹ Separated from Arabia by the Red Sea, the land was an alluvial plane. Life giving River Nile traversed it from south to north, its sluggish waters making a wide delta before emptying in the Mediterranean.⁷¹² At the eve of Islamic invasion, the water of Nile was already fully utilized by digging of canals.⁷¹³ The network of canals had generated a fertile agricultural plane that was able to produce grain in excess to the local need. Egypt was net exporter of grain in Byzantine Rome. It exported three hundred million bushels of grain to Constantinople.⁷¹⁴ To the south of this rich and relatively safe land was the state of Nubia. To its southwest were vast wastelands of Great Sahara desert where Blames nomads used to live.⁷¹⁵

Like Syria, Alexander of Macedonia had introduced Hellenic civilization to Egypt. However, like Syria, it was limited to town dwellers that, by the way, spoke Greek and practiced Chalcedonies principals of Christianity. They were main supporters of Byzantine Roman king, Heraclius. The vast majority of population, who concentrated mainly in rural areas, called themselves Egyptians (Qibtī of Arabic sources) to distinguish Greek speaking Romans. They spoke their own language called Coptic. They had their own Christian Church – Coptic Church – a variation of Monophysite sect.⁷¹⁶

The last war of antiquity disturbed the relative peace of Egypt when Iranians occupied Egypt briefly from 617 to 619 CE.⁷¹⁷ After departure of Iranians, Byzantine Rome reasserted its sovereignty over Egypt. Heraclius’s strategy to assimilate Egypt in Byzantine Rome was the same as in Syria – unifying the population around Chalcedonian Church. His governor in Egypt, Cyrus, had to resort to ruthless persecution of Monophysites in attempt to meet the goal. This action of Cyrus had alienated the Monophysite population of Egypt from central government.⁷¹⁸

Not only this, the economic difficulties which Byzantine Rome was facing at that time were apparent in Egypt as well. They were devising means of reducing expenses on salary of soldiers. One suggestion was to reduce number of soldiers.⁷¹⁹ Uncertainty of job definitely doesn’t boost morale of a soldier. Defeats of Byzantine Rome in Syria must have demoralized Byzantine army in Egypt further.⁷²⁰

After the Arab invasion started in Syria, Heraclius was clearly aware of vulnerability of Egypt. He knew Arab invasion on Egypt was just a matter of time. What he didn’t know was how to tackle the issue. Heraclius had asked certain John of Barqa (modern northeast Libya) to defend Egypt against Arabs.⁷²¹ We don’t have any hint if John acted on the instructions. There is evidence that pre-emptive defence arrangements were made by the patriarch of Alexandria at local level when Arab Muslim attack was imminent. He deployed army and scaled the entrances and the exits of the land and built walls along all the banks of the Nile in all regions.⁷²²

Planning of attack

During Umar’s official visit to Syria in spring of 638 CE, Amr bin As met him and asked his permission to conquer Egypt. Amr argued ‘if we conquer it, it will be strength for the Muslims, for it is among the richest of lands and the least capable of fighting.’⁷²³ Kaegi guesses that Amr bin As, being in Gazza area at the time of war of Dāthin, would have become familiar with Byzantine weakness in Egypt.⁷²⁴ In any case, Amr apparently failed to convince Umar because Jazirah was at Umar’s mind. He returned to supervise the siege of Qaiṣariyah.⁷²⁵ After sudden death of Abu Ubayda, when Yazid bin Abu Sufyan came to power in Syria, Amr did not ask anybody’s permission, lifted the siege of Qaiṣariyah and led his army of thirty five hundred men to Egypt.⁷²⁶ All his army belonged to ‘Akk tribe of Yemen.⁷²⁷ Umar got seriously unhappy on disobedience of Amr.⁷²⁸ First he instructed Amr to halt the operation if he had still not reached the land of Egypt. Amr neglected the orders.⁷²⁹ Then Umar quickly raised a huge army of twelve thousand men in Hejaz and dispatched it to Egypt under command of Zubayr bin Awwam. ⁷³⁰ On the surface, this act of Umar was to reinforce Caliphate’s army in Egypt, but under the surface it could be to counter Amr’s attempt to gain power for himself in Egypt. Sudden attack on Egypt shattered Medinan Caliphate’s ambitions to push Heraclius’s army further north of Taurus Mountains in Cappadocia.⁷³¹

Date of attack

Exact date of Medinan Caliphate’s invasion on Egypt is controversial. An inscription from Alexandria, written in 698 CE gives the date of invasion to be 633 CE.⁷³² Such an early date doesn’t fit into any scheme. Baladhuri gives the date of start of invasion January of 640 CE.⁷³³ Even this doesn’t fit with events well. Ya’qubi informs that Amr had conquered Alexandria and other districts of Egypt by 641 CE.⁷³⁴ From here modern historians believe that the invasion might have started in winter of 639 CE.⁷³⁵ If winter of 639 CE is the date of invasion, that was the time when Iyad was engaged in Jazirah.

Execution of attack

John of Nikiu, a Coptic priest and resident of small delta town of Nikiu in Egypt, is an eyewitness of Arab invasion to Egypt. He gives a vivid account.⁷³⁶ ⁷³⁷ John of Nikiu informs us that Theodore was commander in-chief of Roman army in Egypt by that time.⁷³⁸ Amr’s army proceeded straight to Fājūm and occupied it.⁷³⁹ ⁷⁴⁰ ⁷⁴¹ Islamic sources differ from John of Nikiu. Both Baladhuri and Ya’qubi assert that the first town Amr encountered was Faramā’.⁷⁴² ⁷⁴³ Defeat of Faramā’ was not a quickie. It took full three months for Amr to defeat the town. ⁷⁴⁴

Then Amr laid siege to the castle of Alyuna (Alyūnah اَليُونَه ).⁷⁴⁵ ⁷⁴⁶ ⁷⁴⁷ It was the siege of Alyuna during which reinforcement under command of Zubayr bin Awwam reached and joined Amr. ⁷⁴⁸ The resistance was fierce and the conquest was slow.⁷⁴⁹ Army of Amr bin As could conquer the castle of Alyuna only by summer of 640 CE.⁷⁵⁰ ⁷⁵¹

Surrender of Alyuna was heartbreak for Byzantine army present in Egypt. They had taken all measures to protect the castle and had dug moats before arrival of enemy.⁷⁵² The news created panic in Egypt. Soldiers and civilians started fleeing towards Alexandria after fall of Alyuna.⁷⁵³ ⁷⁵⁴ Amr dispatched small contingents in different directions in Egypt to subjugate the rest of villages of the country, before tackling Alexandria. ⁷⁵⁵ Certain villages of Egypt resisted and Amr carried away their inhabitants as prisoners. They were sent to Medina.⁷⁵⁶ Majority of villages didn’t find power to resist and simply applied for terms.⁷⁵⁷ Whole of Egypt came under Muslim control except Alexandria and its surroundings.⁷⁵⁸

Amr used violence as a strategy of war to generate fear in civilian as well as military circles. Here is description by John of Nikiu of Arab’s taking of his native city, Nakiu, “Amr and the Muslim army, on horseback, proceeded by land till they came to the city of Kebrias …. and on this occasion he attacked the general Domentianus. But when the latter learnt of the approach of the Muslim troops, he embarked on a ship and fled and abandoned the army and their fleet. And he sought to enter the small canal which Heraclius had dug during his reign. But finding it closed he returned and entered the city of Alexandria. Now when the soldiers saw their commander had taken flight, they cast away their arms and threw themselves into the river in the presence of their enemies. And the Muslim troops slaughtered them with the sword in the river, and none escaped save one man only, named Zechariah, a doughty man and a warrior. And when the crews of the ships [in River Nile] saw the flight of the troops, they too took to flight and returned to their own country. And thereupon the Muslims made their entry into Nikiu and took possession, and finding no soldiers, they proceeded to put to the sword all whom they found in the streets and in the churches, men, women and infants, and they showed mercy to none.⁷⁵⁹ ⁷⁶⁰ Probably, Amr wanted to create terror among those who had taken refuge in Alexandria and surroundings.

The terms of truce were the same usual. People will pay Jizyah and Kharāj. Those who wish to convert to Islam will be exempt from these taxes.⁷⁶¹

Amr’s strategy of violence bore fruit. Soon Population of Lower Egypt divided into two parties. Of these, one sided with Theodore, but the other wished to join the Muslims. And straightway the one party rose against the other, and they plundered their possessions and burnt their city.⁷⁶² There was also violence between ‘Blue’ and ‘Green’ ⁷⁶³

Death of Heraclius

Egypt was yet in a state of limbo, with Muslim Arabs being master of southern parts and Byzantine Romans sticking to Alexandria and its surroundings, when the residents of Alexandria heard the dismal news. Heraclius died at the age of sixty six years after a short febrile illness on February 11, 641 CE, after thirty one years of reign.⁷⁶⁴ ⁷⁶⁵ ⁷⁶⁶ ⁷⁶⁷ Anonymous author of Khuzestan Chronicle shows Heraclius grief-stricken at his deathbed due to seizure of Egypt, Thebes, and Africa by his enemies despite their excellent defenses and that by then they were in a position to march to his capital.⁷⁶⁸

Sudden death of the king left Byzantine Rome with political instability at a critical time when they were facing threat of extinction at the hands of Arabs.⁷⁶⁹ Family feud among his children over the throne was natural. It got complicated when clergy and generals started fishing in troubled waters for their own sake.⁷⁷⁰

Initially, Heraclius’s son Constantine (Constantine III) sat on the throne. He died of hematemesis due to poisoning by Martina after ruling for only hundred days, and without leaving any political impact, in May 641 CE.⁷⁷¹ Constantine’s death paved way to power for Martina (Heraclius’s second wife whom he had married after death of his first wife and who happened to be his Father’s brother’s daughter and the Christian clergy considered it incestuous relation) and her son Heracleonas.⁷⁷² Clergy was not willing to accept Heracleonas as king.⁷⁷³ They considered the king born out of illegitimate marriage.⁷⁷⁴ Byzantine Rome got divided into two political parties. One, that favoured Martina and her son and also favoured accommodation with the Arabs. Other, that favoured Heraclius’s eleven years old grandson from Constantine III, Constans (Constans II, Qusṭunṭīn قُسطُنطِين) to be a king, represented by a senior general named Valentine, who advocated a more hawkish policy towards Arabs.⁷⁷⁵ ⁷⁷⁶

Among scenes of rioting, Valentine entered Constantinople in September 641 CE and deposed Martina and her son.⁷⁷⁷ General Valentinus crowned young Constans, and using latter’s tender age as a pretext, Valentinus sought to usurp the de facto military and political powers of the imperial office for himself.⁷⁷⁸ As Hawkish party had come to power, General Valentine sent his troops to fight the Arabs.⁷⁷⁹

Usurpation of power by general Valentinus offended popular opinion. He was arrested and brought before Constans. The young emperor magnanimously accepted his plea that he had only acted out of a desire to save the empire from the Arabs and appointed him head of the imperial guard.⁷⁸⁰ Byzantine internal instability continued. In early 642 CE General Valentinus tried an abortive coup. It was only after hanging of General Valentinus by an angry mob when Constans became secure and brought political stability to the empire.⁷⁸¹ This event took place after Muslim Arabs had snatched Egypt and were beginning invasion of Barqa (Cyrenaica).⁷⁸²

The fall of Alexandria

After fall of Alyuna and most of the Egyptian lands, there were still people in Egypt who believed they could defeat the invading army. The Romans and the Copts who lived to the south of Egypt decided to fight with Amr before he makes any attempt on Alexandria. Some residents of far off villages also joined the army. The two forces met at Kariūn. Amr was victorious.⁷⁸³ ⁷⁸⁴ Theodore fled to Alexandria after this defeat.⁷⁸⁵

Alexandria was the most defendable city in Egypt. It was protected by strong walls, and the water of the Nile surrounded it. ⁷⁸⁶ All people of Egypt, who did not want to be administrated by the Muslim Arabs, had fled to it and had fortified themselves in it.⁷⁸⁷ Amr advanced and laid siege to Alexandria.⁷⁸⁸ All its inhabitants were ready to resist him except the Copts who were double minded. The Copts asked for some time to cogitate but Amr refused. The siege prolonged for three months.⁷⁸⁹ After three months of siege Muqawqis of the town offered peace deal. At that time Heraclius was still alive and was at the helm of affairs. He didn’t approve Muqawqis’s proposal.⁷⁹⁰ Heraclius was confident of providing reinforcements to the besieged town via sea route which was still open. Heraclius’s sudden death at this juncture changed the schema. Like everywhere else in Byzantine Rome, the war of succession divided the Roman population of Alexandria bitterly.⁷⁹¹ As Byzantine Rome remained in a state of flux due to disputes of succession, commander in chief General Valentine was unable to commit any troops to Egypt.⁷⁹² When things started settling in Constantinople, the Roman King sent troops to Alexandria, closed the gates of the city and announced to Umar his readiness for war.⁷⁹³ Muslims were aware of divisions among the population of Alexandria. They got boldened by it.⁷⁹⁴ Still, they did not try to recruit the dissidents as fifth columnists. They distrusted them.⁷⁹⁵ Apparently, the central government of Byzantine Rome failed to send enough reinforcements to the town to repel the besieging Medinan Caliphate army. Disppointed, people of Alexandria sent Cyrus for truce, who was re-appointed by Constans [Heraclius younger].⁷⁹⁶ The Roman soldiers in Alexandria left for Cyprus under general Theodore and Muslims entered the city without effort.⁷⁹⁷ Amr took whatever was present in the town but he did not take any captives or kill anybody.⁷⁹⁸ The town must have fallen to Muslim Arabs by the end of September 642 CE.⁷⁹⁹

Amr returned to Alyuna along with Muslim cavalry. Medinan Caliphate kept Alyuna as its administrative head quarter in Egypt.⁸⁰⁰

The Coptic population of Egypt had not seen invading Arabs as their saviors. Neither Arabs saw them as their allies.⁸⁰¹ However, Coptics were apt to accommodate with Arab rule. After Arab occupation of Alexandria Abba Benjamin, the patriarch of Coptics, returned to the city in the thirteenth year after his flight from Romans.⁸⁰² ⁸⁰³

Conquest of the Maghreb

Medinan Caliphate’s intrusion in Africa westwards continued after subjugation of Egypt. A flat coastal road connected Alexandria to the town of Barqa.⁸⁰⁴ Whole region surrounding this road, sandwiched between desert to the south and the Mediterranean to the north, was called Barqa by Islamic sources.⁸⁰⁵ ⁸⁰⁶ Barqa was dominated by the mountain range known as the Jabal Akhdar and attracted enough rainfall to provide a fertile hinterland for agricultural settlements.⁸⁰⁷ Officially Barqa was a province of Byzantine Rome.⁸⁰⁸ After establishing administrative mechanisms in Egypt, Amr invaded Barqa in 642 CE and conquered the area up to the town of Barqa. Once Egypt subjugated, Berqa neither had defenses nor any hope of reinforcement from emperor Constans of Byzantine Rome. Its conquest was an easy affair.⁸⁰⁹ Inhabitants of Barqa were the most docile of all the conquered lands, according to Baladhuri. They kept paying their Kharāj without demand notice from the governor of Egypt.⁸¹⁰

During his adventures in Barqa Amr came across Berber nomads.⁸¹¹ To the south of coast of Barqa, in the pre-desert land, there lived warlike Berber tribe of Luwātah. They could never be controlled properly by Byzantine Romans. Amr continued the same policy of keeping them semi-independent.⁸¹² Hoyland thinks that Baladhuri’s statement that “Amr compelled Luwātah to sell their children and wives in order to pay the jizyah” is an allusion of vibrant slave trade.⁸¹³ ⁸¹⁴

Medinan Caliphate got defeated near Sub-Saharan Africa

The rule is fittest to survive, not the mightiest to survive. Hare lives in the same jungle where lion lives. Vivid case illustration is Medinan Caliphate’s defeat at the hands of Nubians in 642 CE.⁸¹⁵ To the south of Egypt, between Aswan in modern Egypt and Wadi Halfa in North Sudan, there lived a small country. Its name was Nūba.⁸¹⁶ Whole region was fully christianized.⁸¹⁷

Boldened by his successes in Egypt and Barqa, Amr sent a detachment of cavalry under command of Uqba bin Nafi )Uqbah bin Nāfi’ عُقبَه بِن نافِع ) of Fihr clan of Quraysh to Nūba.⁸¹⁸ The fight was unexpectedly fierce and Medinan Caliphate’s defeat was solid.⁸¹⁹ Baladhuri gives the superior military skills of Nubians as cause of defeat. “Nubians were master of arrow throwing. Their aim never missed. They aimed at eyes. Arabs lost 150 eyes in the raid. Arabs were used to sword warfare”, he asserts.⁸²⁰

Amr was reluctant to digest the defeat.⁸²¹ It was only his successor, Abdullah bin Sa’d, governor of Egypt who made formal truce agreement with Nūba, with boundary demarcation, around 650 CE during the Caliphate of Uthman.⁸²² An Auxilary bilateral trade agreement (muwāda’ah) was also signed, according to which, Nūba would trade slaves with Medinan Caliphate in return for food.⁸²³

Southward thrust of Medinan Caliphate halted in Africa

Resilience of Nūba, no doubt, halted Medinan Caliphate’s advance into Sub-Saharan Africa via an overland route. ⁸²⁴ Relations between Ethiopia (Axum) and Medinan Caliphate were not at their best. We get a clue to it from Ibn Ishaq that in 630 CE there was a suspicion of attack from Ethiopia and Prophet Muhammad had to take defensive measures.⁸²⁵ We again hear that Umar sent a naval campaign against Ethiopia on hearing rumours of invasion in 641 CE.⁸²⁶ Ethiopia (Axum) had already passed its prime.⁸²⁷ In the past Ethiopia had invaded Yemen. Arab Muslims had all reasons to capture Ethiopia but they did not throw a single arrow in that direction. Halt of Arab Muslim offensive by Nūba spared life of Axum. By this time Medinan Caliphate had naval capacity. ⁸²⁸ Sea route was open to them, but Umar was reluctant to use navy in wars.⁸²⁹

Fustat established

After the ill-fated expedition of Nūba, army of Medinan Caliphate got busy in establishing a cantonment town for themselves to administrate the newly acquired territory. They selected Giza but Umar did not approve it. He did not want the river a hurdle between Medina and the cantonment. The site of cantonment town of Fustat (Fusṭāṭ فُسطاط ) was thus selected on the right bank of Nile just near Alyuna.⁸³⁰ Fustat is derived from Latin Fossatum, meaning a place surrounded by defensive ditch.⁸³¹

Further extension in the Maghreb

Disappointed by defeat in Nūba Amr decided to expand eastwards. In 643 CE he marched along the coast of Mediterranean up to the town of Tripoli (Ṭarābulus طَرابُلَس ) and conquered it and its surrounding districts.⁸³² ⁸³³ ⁸³⁴ He wished to continue further east to conquer the Byzantine Roman province of Ifriqyia )upper half of modern Tunis (but Umar forbade him harshly saying ‘it is widely dispersed and no one shall raid it as long I remain alive.’ Umar did not see any revenue advantage there.⁸³⁵

Restrained by Umar in his eastwards march, Amr sent his field commander Busr bin Artat (Busr bin Abi Arṭāt بُسر بِن اَبِي أرطاة ) to south to occupy Waddān and its surrounding Fazzān in modern southern Libya, up to Zawīlah.⁸³⁶ ⁸³⁷ None of these cities and regions had power to resist the invading army as we don’t hear of any fierce battles there.

Amr appointed Uqba bin Nafi as lieutenant governor over Barqa, Tripoli, and Fazzān combined together in one region, which he called al-Maghrib.⁸³⁸ Medinan Caliphate didn’t have any intention to create enormously big provinces. Neither had it aspired to create numerous provinces. Generally, the area at the border of Arabian Peninsula became a main province after its conquest. The farther areas, adjacent to the main one, became a ‘provincially administered territory’ attached to it.⁸³⁹

Medinan Caliphate eyes on Armenia

The highlands jammed between south-eastern portion of Taurus Mountains and the Black Sea used to be called Armenia. Its western boundary was arbitrarily high reaches of river Euphrates and its tributary Yesilimak River in modern eastern Turkey. In the east lesser Caucasus Mountains and Zanagur range separated it from Azerbaijan.⁸⁴⁰ ⁸⁴¹ ⁸⁴² Jurzān with its main town Tbilisi (Tiflīs) was a part of Armenia.⁸⁴³ It had a dry and hot summer but a short and cold winter with a lot of snow.

Armenians had developed a strong sense of nationalism by seventh century CE. Many of them used to live in countries and territories beyond limit of historic Armenia. Even they shared the nationalist feelings with their country fellows living in Armenia proper.⁸⁴⁴ All Armenians were Christians. Even those Armenians living in regions other than Armenia itself were Christians. In line with their strong nationalistic affiliations, they had their own Armenian Church.⁸⁴⁵ Being mainly pastureland, core trade of Armenians was military service. Armenia was main recruiting ground for both Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran.⁸⁴⁶

Pre Islamic political state

The tiny nation of Armenia abode at the confluence of three major powers, Byzantine Rome to their southwest, Sasanian Iran to their southeast and Khazar Empire to their northwest. This very fact became their biggest nightmare. After dissolution of kingdom of Armenia in 428 CE, the area became a main conflicting point between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran, with Turks (including Khazars) in the north trying to contribute proportional to their stature. And the very fact that Armenia was highland with rugged terrain became their nature’s gift. Nobody could subjugate them completely.⁸⁴⁷ By the end of 6^th century CE, Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran had divided Armenia among themselves on paper.⁸⁴⁸ Byzantine Sasanian borders ran just east of Erzurum, then south along the Gunek River, then south along the River Batman, then east along the Tigris to just beyond Hasankeyf, and then south in Mesopotamia along the Khabour river to the Euphrates at Busayrah.⁸⁴⁹ ⁸⁵⁰ ⁸⁵¹ ⁸⁵² Armenians, being independent minded martial race, proved difficult for both Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran to control. Once emperor Maurice wrote to Khosrau II Parvez about Armenian Princes: ‘there is a crooked and disobedient people which dwells between us and causes trouble. Come now, I shall assemble mine and send them to Thrace. Assemble yours and have them taken east. Should they die, [our] enemies will be the one dying, should they kill others it will be our enemies who perish, and we shall live in peace. But should they remain in their own country, we shall have not rest’. ⁸⁵³ Sebeos preserves a brave attempt on the part of Armenians to snatch independence during reign of Khosrau II Parvez, which was crushed by joint forces of Byzantine Rome and Iran.⁸⁵⁴ Sebeos asserts that they would have succeeded in gaining independence provided Huns (Western Turks) would not have threatened them, due to which they were compelled to compromise.⁸⁵⁵

Byzantine Romans used their brand of religion as an ideological weapon to subjugate other nations. In case of Armenia they failed bitterly. Once Emperor Maurice issued an order for Armenians to accept Chalcedonian Christianity but few Armenians joined it.⁸⁵⁶ Wrangling of both, state and non-state actors, continued in Armenia even after truce of 628 CE between Sasanian Iran and Byzantine Rome.⁸⁵⁷ Muslim conquest of Syria, Palestine and Jazirah had diverted attention of Byzantine Roman central government from Armenia. Heraclius’s attempts to unify Armenian Church with his own Monothelite church, and crisis of succession after Heraclius’s death had created local turbulence in Armenia which had encouraged naxaras, or Armenian lords, to engage into strife among themselves. They and their powerful and proud families were on the way to independence.⁸⁵⁸ ⁸⁵⁹ Control of Byzantine Rome over its Armenia remained loose after truce of 628 CE and apparently Sasanian Iran was in no position to play any role in Iranian Armenia after its defeat at Qadisiyyah.

First Medinan Caliphate attack

The Medinan Caliphate’s reason to eye on Armenia might not be booty as its timber was difficult to export out in a cost-effective manner.⁸⁶⁰ Medinan Caliphate was struggling with Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran simultaneously. Desire to cut off their supply of new recruits was the main incentive.

Unlike Syria, inhabitants of Armenia were armed. Byzantine Rome never imposed its prohibition against possession, sale or purchase of weapons by private individuals in its Armenian territories. The terrain, the remoteness of the area, together with local traditions, probably hindered any such enforcement.⁸⁶¹ Anyhow, the contentiousness of Armenians had made it impossible for them to organize an effective defense against Medinan Caliphate. Their ecclesiastical disagreements concerning Chalcedonism and Monotheletism and their internal division and strive were fundamental local impetus favouring Medinan Caliphate.⁸⁶² ⁸⁶³

The first Armenian raid by Medinan Caliphate was in late fall of 640 CE⁸⁶⁴ It originated from Jazirah under command of Iyad bin Ghanm.⁸⁶⁵ Kaegi guesses that Iyad’s army might be five thousand strong.⁸⁶⁶ That was the time when Amr’s army had held all of lower Egypt and Heraclius was still in shock of potential loss of whole of Egypt. The news of the raid might have increased his sorrows as he was ethnic Armenian.⁸⁶⁷ As no attempt can be traced on part of Iyad to leave permanent garrisons inside Armenia during this campaign, it appears that the purpose of the assault was to prevent Armenian raids on Jazirah.⁸⁶⁸ ⁸⁶⁹

During this invasion Iyad bin Ghanm could not penetrate further than Bidlis and khilāṭ, though he could enrich himself and his men by plundering Armenian towns and countryside.⁸⁷⁰ ⁸⁷¹ ⁸⁷² ⁸⁷³ By 639 CE Theodore Rshtuni, an Armenian prince, had emerged stronger than others and had united the eastern and western parts of Armenia. There is no evidence that he organized any serious resistance to this raid.⁸⁷⁴ ⁸⁷⁵ Though nothing material could be gained by this invasion, Medinan Caliphate had laid its teeth on Armenia. ⁸⁷⁶ ⁸⁷⁷

The unhindered penetration of Iyad in Armenia and his unscathed return was an eye opener for the new Byzantine emperor, Constans II. He recognized Theodors Rshtuni’s strong position in Armenia and appointed him general and patriarch in early 642 CE.⁸⁷⁸ Constan II’s efforts in Armenia bore fruit. Armenia experienced second Muslim invasion in summer of 643 CE.⁸⁷⁹ This time the invasion originated from the region of Azerbaijan under command of Habib bin Maslama.⁸⁸⁰ ⁸⁸¹ He divided his army into three battalions. They ransacked three different regions of Armenia. The army, in the end, got repulsed after losing three thousand of its soldiers due to defensive manoeuvres of Theodore Rshtuni.⁸⁸² ⁸⁸³ Therefore, Armenia remained a semi-independent ally of Byzantine Rome for a decade or so.⁸⁸⁴

Mass evacuation of conquered lands

As Medinan Caliphate’s offensive started, developed and spread into Syria, Jazirah, Egypt, and elsewhere, a significant movement of people from one region to another took place.⁸⁸⁵ Initially, during the conquest of Syria, Medinan Caliphate simply allowed those who disliked being subject (ra’iyyah) of Medinan Caliphate, to flee to the country of their choice.⁸⁸⁶ Naturally, Medinan Caliphate did not wish to manage hugely hostile populations.⁸⁸⁷ Initially, they did not include allowance of exodus in their formal peace treaties as a term. It was a tacit understanding. Later, when they occupied Egypt, this arrangement had to be formalized in peace treaty.⁸⁸⁸ The Egyptian public did not have any route to escape except by sea, which could be astronomically expensive.

Such policies were not original Muslim invention. This practice can be traced to Late Romans, Byzantine Romans and Sasanian Iranians as far back as fourth century CE.⁸⁸⁹

Almost all refugees of Arab invasion fled to the lands still under occupation of Byzantine Rome. For example, people of Bālis and Qinnasirīn fled to Arḍ Rūm.⁸⁹⁰ Tribe of Iyād bin Nazīr of Jazirah took the same direction.⁸⁹¹

Apparently, fleeing people had to leave behind their immovable property.⁸⁹² Nothing is known about social and economic status of those who left for Byzantine territories. It can be safely assumed that they were primarily those individuals who were closely connected with Orthodox Church and the Byzantine government, mainly ethnic Greeks and few Arabs, most of them wealthy merchants and craftsmen.⁸⁹³ Territories controlled by Byzantine Rome should have been flooded by refugees as a result of mass exodus.

Economic immigration of Arabs

Another far reaching result of Medinan Caliphate’s conquest of Byzantine Rome’s eastern provinces was movement of Arabs from Arabian Peninsula to the newly acquired areas. Islamic sources mention on numberless occasions that Medinan Caliphate settled Arabs in newly occupied areas. For example, they were settled in Sinjār.⁸⁹⁴ This was, actually, economic immigration on large scale. Probably they were members of those tribes who had not participated in the war and didn’t get booty. The state allotted them the lands abandoned by the fleeing refugees.⁸⁹⁵

Population of Arabia thinned out

Arabia got devoid of population as a result of, first Ridda Wars, then large scale recruitment in army, and later mass immigration. Hejaz must be adversely affected because it was already thinly populated due to its desert like conditions. Only Muslims of Hejaz were expected to participate in the war. Non-Muslims were exempt from military service in lieu of Jizyah. Population of non-Muslims surged as a result. Umar might have seen this situation as a security threat. Baladhuri informs us, “People of Najran [who had retained their Christian faith] increased tremendously during caliphate of Umar. Umar considered them a menace to Islam. They had started usury. He expelled them to Syria and Iraq and granted them permission to clear virgin lands there and be owner of those lands in lieu of their lands in Najran. So many Najranis went there that they made a new township near Kufa and named it al-Najrānīyah”.⁸⁹⁶ Similar arguments might be at work in expulsion of certain Jewish groups to Syria.

Demographic changes across the region

Fleeing of refugees from occupied areas out of fear and migration of Arabs to fill the vacuum were not the only demographic changes that took place during Futuhul Buldan. Medinan Caliphate generated large scale shuffling of populations for political and security reasons as well. This kind of reshuffling was a deliberate effort to change the demography. Many pathways can be traced in historic sources. One was to allure Arab population of newly occupied areas to settle in far off border areas. For example Abu Ubayda settled Arabs of Syrian origin in Bālis.⁸⁹⁷ Another was to settle in coastal cities of Syria those population groups, especially Persians, who would not be pro-Byzantine.⁸⁹⁸

Deporting whole of hostile population to far off localities was not unusual in the Middle East. Once King Maurice ordered thirty thousand Armenian families to be deported to Thrace in 595 CE.⁸⁹⁹

Such state policies and internal and external immigrations made populations of Syria and Mesopotamia more homogenous than before. On the other hand, it made Anatolia less homogenous because of the resettlement of certain refugees.⁹⁰⁰

Changes inside Byzantine Rome

Disgraceful defeat at the hands of people, whom they considered inferior, definitely shook Byzantine Rome to its foundations. However, for the sake of integrity of the remaining country, the ruling circles of Byzantine Rome kept a brave face. They tended to deflect any responsibility from Heraclius or even from ordinary soldiers. They used the folly of Byzantine generals as a scapegoat. They did not admit that Muslims won due to their superior military general ship, tactics, morale, and strategy.⁹⁰¹ An eight century source from Spain writing in Latin, and whose sources are oriental or Byzantine, claims that ‘Saracens, influenced by their leader Muhammad, conquered and devastated Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia more by stealth than by manliness and not so much by open invasions as by persisting in stealthy raids.⁹⁰² ⁹⁰³ This kind of political stance was to boost public moral. The leaders knew the facts. They had to perform now. Muslims did not attack a static and gravely weakened Byzantine Rome. Rather they invaded a country off balance and at a very awkward time of trying to restore and unify its borders and people. It quickly started balancing itself after initial jolt.⁹⁰⁴

Byzantine Rome definitely faced law and order situation inside its boundaries when weakness of the state army became apparent to its citizens. We hear of a chief of un-Arab and un-Islamic name of Qanan, for example, who took some captives in Southern Anatolia and killed the Byzantine general who challenged him.⁹⁰⁵ It might have taken a few decades for the state to settle the refugees and restore law and order.

To reassess their resources and strengths Byzantine Rome re-surveyed lands between late 636 CE and January 641 CE.⁹⁰⁶ The occurrence of census confirms that the government remained functional.⁹⁰⁷

The expenses for the unsuccessful Byzantine defense of the Eastern Provinces are unknown, but they were very substantial, in terms of salaries, stipends, provisions, arms, logistics, and shipping. Of course, the permanent loss of Byzantine tax revenues as a result of the Muslim conquests was enormous. It necessarily resulted in many changes in Byzantine fiscal and administrative strucre.⁹⁰⁸

As a deterrent to further invasions Byzantine Rome prohibited sale of arms and iron to its enemies.⁹⁰⁹

Political thoughts of non-Muslim subjects of Medinan Caliphate

By far whichever areas Medinan Caliphate snatched from Byzantine Rome were predominantly Christian. Christians of ex- Byzantine eastern provinces, who chose not to leave, had to develop coping mechanisms to deal with the new situation. Anastasius of Sinai, a Chalcedonean monk of late seventh century is quoted in the dialogue between Papiscus and Philo to have said:

Do not say that we Christians are today afflicted and enslaved.
This is the greatest thing, that though persecuted and fought by
so many, our faith stands and does not cease, nor is our empire
abolished, nor are our churches closed. But amid the peoples
who dominate and persecute us, we have churches, we erect
crosses, found churches and engage in sacrifices.⁹¹⁰

Anastasius is responding to a taunting Jew who cites total control of ‘Saracens’ over Christians a proof that God didn’t favour them. Anastius takes comfort in two facts. One, that Christian faith still exists and prospers in the lands controlled by Muslims. Second, Byzantine Rome still exists. Worth noting is that Anastasius’s political affiliation is still with Byzantine Rome. Probably he dreams that one day Byzantine Rome will grow strong and reoccupy the areas it lost to Medinan Caliphate.⁹¹¹

Probably Jews living in conquered areas of Medinan Caliphate didn’t have to develop new coping mechanisms. For them it was just a change of masters.⁹¹²

Muslim Arabs extinguish Sasanian Iran

The other world power did extremely poorly in face of Arab invasion as compared to Byzantine Rome. A Christian eyewitness to the Arab Muslim’s conquest of ancient kingdom of Iran summarizes the saga deftly, “Then God brought up against them [Persians] the sons of Ishmael, (banū Ismā’īl) who were [as many] as the sands on the seashore. Their leader was Muhammad. Neither walls nor gates stood up before them, nor did weapon or shields, and they dominated the entire land of the Persians. Now Yazdegerd sent countless troops against them, but the Arabs destroyed all of them and killed Rustam too.” ⁹¹³ ⁹¹⁴

Answer to the question how did it happen requires many pages.

Geography and people of Iran

Sasanian Iran was a large country. It lodged on all those areas which currently accommodate part of Iraq west of Euphrates, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan portion of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, southern half of Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.⁹¹⁵ When a country grows bigger than a certain size, it inevitably becomes multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual. Sasanian Iran was no exception to this formula.

Pahlavi speaking ethnic Iranians made core of the population. They were dominant politically and socially. King belonged to this group.⁹¹⁶ Other ethnicities, anyhow, were not less important. Arabs were abundant in Swad. ⁹¹⁷ Kurds used to live in Zagros Mountains. ⁹¹⁸ Ethnic Armenians predominated north-western parts.⁹¹⁹ Parthians were significant in eastern parts of the country.⁹²⁰ Medes used to live in central areas of the country.⁹²¹ Ethnic Jews (as opposed to Jewish religion) had their presence too.⁹²²

Being multi-ethnic automatically means being multi-lingual. As expected, main language of Iranians was Middle Persian (Pahlavi).⁹²³ It was medium of almost all literary expression.⁹²⁴ However, many other languages were widespread. Parthian, Sogdian, Khwarizimian, Khotanese, Saka and Bactrian all had their share.⁹²⁵

Religions of Iran

An inscription written on the ka’ba-ye Zartosht, near modern Shiraz, by a Zoroastrian high priest Kartir, in 3^rd century CE announces, “Jews, Sramans [Buddhists], Brahmins [Hindus], Nasoreans [Nestorian Christians], Christians [Gnostic Christians], Maktak [Baptisers], and Zandiks [Manichaeans] in the empire were smitten, and destruction of idols and scattering of the stores of the devs [Demons] and god-seats and nests was abandoned.” ⁹²⁶ Sasanian Iran was a multi-religious country.

Zoroastrianism maintained its supreme position as official religion throughout the times of Sasanian dynasty, as is evident by presence of its symbol, a fire alter, on all Sasanian coins.⁹²⁷ However, Sasanian Iran was too vast a country, and open to too many currents of belief, for the state religion ever to obliterate all other creeds.⁹²⁸
By late Sasanian period, religious landscape of Iran started changing dramatically. Christianity, had taken root in Iran centuries ago.⁹²⁹ Initially, they were persecuted by majority Zoroastrians, as is evident from the ka’ba-ye Zartosht inscription, mentioned above. This was the situation up to the reign of usurper Bahram Chubin (Bahrām Chūbīn) when Isho’uahb, the patriarch of Nestorian Church flatly refused to accompany the fleeing king Khosrau II Parves to king Maurice of Byzantine Rome as he was afraid that such behavior on his part could invite wrath of Bahram Chubin and he might prosecute the Christian minority. ⁹³⁰ Christian’s situation changed conclusively during reign of Khosrau II Parves, who came to power with the help of Byzantine Christians. Khosrau was not a friend to Christians by heart but he had to maintain this demeanor publically.⁹³¹ Conversion to Christianity speeded up. Khosrau’s Christian wife Shirin (Shīrīn شِيرِين ) established a monastery. She used to preach the gospel of the Kingdom at the court bravely. None of the Zoroastrians at the court dared to say anything about Christians. On behest of Shirin many nobles of the court had converted to Christianity during of Khusrau parvez’ tenure.⁹³² Khosrau was definitely not very pleased with the situation. He banned conversion of religion from the paternal one, with death penalty for it. ⁹³³ Still, due to swollen numbers of Christians, the king had to admire them. ‘On the great feast of Psalm Sunday, Christians went to the entrance of King’s [of Khosrau parvez] chamber and worshipfully read the Gospel. They received present s from the king, and departed. And no one dared to say anything to them’. ⁹³⁴

The Zoroastrian clergy did not sit idle. They kept trying to impose their religion on Christians, for example Armenians, with failure.⁹³⁵

Due to ongoing tussle of the two religions, and growing power of Christians, Khosrau ultimately had to take the position that “all are physically our servants, but as for spiritual matters, He Who judges souls knows about them.” ⁹³⁶

After Khosrau’s death and with start of Sasanian civil war, the Iranian Christians lost any fear of being persecuted. They grew bold.⁹³⁷ By 7^th century, Christian communities were present in nearly every province of Sasanian Iran, both western and eastern. Many Christians were ethnic Persians.⁹³⁸ Christian presence is confirmed up to Merv, where Elijah, the metropolitan of Merv, ‘converted many people among the Turks and of other nations’.⁹³⁹ ⁹⁴⁰ Fragments of old testament psalms written in Pahlavi are found in Turkmenistan.⁹⁴¹

Politics of Iran

A hint of civil war in Sasanian Iran came when a general by name of Bahram Chubin, appointed by the sitting constitutional king Hormozd in the border areas of Caucasia, got ambitious to wear the crown in 590 CE.⁹⁴² ⁹⁴³ The king did not get enough support by other parts of the army and some nobles of the court actually murdered Hormozd and crowned his son Khosrau II Parvez instead.⁹⁴⁴ As Bahram’s main intention was to be king by himself, he did not recognize Khosrau II Parvez’s legitimacy. Rather he attacked the capital city as head of rebellious army and Khosrau II Parvez had to flee to Qarqisiya, a border town of Byzantine Rome.⁹⁴⁵ ⁹⁴⁶ King Maurice of Byzantine Rome approved Khosrau’s application to grant him soldiers so he could re-claim his throne.⁹⁴⁷ Favours carry price. Khosrau would have to return the occupied Byzantine territories and to treat the Iranian Christians well in case he succeeded.⁹⁴⁸ Khosrau could defeat Bahram and could reclaim his throne but damage had already been done.⁹⁴⁹ Sasanian Iran’s constitution had shattered forever. It happened for the first time in history of Sasanian Iran that a king was crowned by nobles rather than by predecessor king (Khosrau II Parvez after murder of Hormozd). It also happened for the first time in Sasanian Iran’s history that a king was installed by foreign troops rather than by consultation among ruling families (Khosrau II Parvez after defeat of king Bahram).

Khosrau II Parvez proved to be an able ruler and could hold power for twenty eight years.⁹⁵⁰ He could even crush some coup attempts by his generals during his reign.⁹⁵¹ When the king got weak in the wake of defeat at the hands of Heraclius at Nineveh, the renegade generals dethroned and murdered him and crowned his son Qubad II.⁹⁵² ⁹⁵³

This was the start of cascade of events which are generally termed as Sasanian Civil War. Iranian army split into three contending fractions.⁹⁵⁴ None of them was powerful enough to eliminate the other. Iranian masses supported house of Sasan, even if it had weakened.⁹⁵⁵ When general Shahvarāz. proclaimed himself king instead of installing a king of his own choice from house of Sasan, he was killed by ordinary soldiers of his troops when he was attending a guard of honor ceremony in full royal costume.⁹⁵⁶ Under these circumstances the mutually opposing generals were left with only one option. Each of them had to enthrone a member of house of Sasan provided the said member was deemed to fulfill ambitions of the fraction which enthroned him/her. Iran witnessed multiple rulers in a short span of five years, all equally weak and helpless.⁹⁵⁷

Finally came the rule of Yazdegerd III (Yazdekert, Yazkert, son of Kawad, grandson of Khosrau II Parvez.⁹⁵⁸ ⁹⁵⁹ He was a feeble boy of seven years.⁹⁶⁰

First casualty of a civil war is economy. By the time of Arab Muslim’s invasion, Sasanian Iran’s economy had crashed.⁹⁶¹ Central government was unable to maintain the necessary infrastructure needed for economic activities and wealth generation. For example, they had failed to repair the breaches in the irrigation system of Swad from where the leaking water had converted fertile lands into marshes. ⁹⁶² When Arab Muslims conquered Tyswn they couldn’t believe their eyes. The famed town was dirty, full of pests, and non-conducive for their living.⁹⁶³

Muslim Arabs invade Iran

Immediately Umar came to power he decided to open second front.⁹⁶⁴ Army of Medinan Caliphate had not yet established a secure base in Syria; even it had not inflicted the backbone breaking injury on Byzantine Rome in the Battle of Yarmouk, when troops of Medinan Caliphate crossed the Euphrates over a bridge opposite Hira to invade Sasanian Iran in November of 634 CE.⁹⁶⁵ ⁹⁶⁶

Umar had been observing contracting influence of Sasanian Iran in world affairs over the last couple of years after murder of Khosrau II Parvez. He was aware of civil war in Iran which had crippled its economy and government machinery. He had noted incoherent efforts on the Sasanian side, if any, to repulse troops of Khalid bin Walid during his conquest of Iraq. However, he dangerously underestimated defences of Sasanian Iran when he raised a small army of one thousand men in Medina and ordered it to march towards Iran under command of relatively unknown figure of Abu Ubaid bin Mas’ud (Abu ‘Ubaid bin Mas’ūd اَبُو عُبَيد بِن مَسعُود ) of Thaqif tribe.⁹⁶⁷ Though Umar ordered Muthanna, already ruling Hira in Umar’s name, to joint Abu Ubaid with his men, and according to Baladhuri, Abu Ubaid gathered many tribesmen on his way to Iraq, number of this army is still expected to be small.⁹⁶⁸

Again the motive of the army was holy war and plunder, as far as Baladhuri knows.⁹⁶⁹

Initially, this army of Abu Ubaid had a few clashes with Sasanian Iran’s border guards in Iraq.⁹⁷⁰ Queen Būrān (Būrāndukht), daughter of Qubad II was sitting on Iranian throne by this time. (Probably she was regent for Yazdegerd III or there were two kings in Iran simultaneously, which is possible during a civil war). Generals Rustam and Fīruzān were actual custodians of the affairs of the monarchy.⁹⁷¹ Ya’qubi blames that both of them were weak and contemptible.⁹⁷² ⁹⁷³

‘On hearing that the Arabs were massing their forces, the Iranians sent General Rustam Mardānshah as head of four thousand men, armed from head to toe and supported with elephants’.⁹⁷⁴ ⁹⁷⁵ (What camel is to lorry and horse is to armored car in modern warfare, elephant is to tank). The Iranian army cut the Medinan Caliphate’s army to pieces in a few hours. Abu Ubaid got slain on the battle field.⁹⁷⁶ Survivors fled for their lives. Muthanna was one of the survivors, who escaped to Ullais from where he relayed the news to Umar.⁹⁷⁷

This Battle of Jisr, (معركة الجسر) which is also called the Battle of Quss and Battle of Nāṭif is not mentioned by any non-Muslim source.⁹⁷⁸ Muslim sources blame multiple factors for the defeat including havoc of elephants, difference of opinion among Muslims before the battle, inexperience of Abu Ubaid etc. but none makes Umar responsible for it.⁹⁷⁹

The debacle was a surprise to Medinan Caliphate at a time when they had got used to news of victory. All Umar’s plans for Sasanian Iran stood still for at least one year.⁹⁸⁰ Arabs got reluctant to wrangle with Iran.⁹⁸¹ Umar’s main dilemma was how to raise a strong army to bring Iran to its knees. Almost all able bodied men from loyal tribes had already been recruited in the army that was busy in Syria. That was the main reason Umar had sent a miniature army of thousand men to Battle of Jisr. Umar had to extend olive branch towards hostile tribes who had fought Medinan Caliphate during Ridda Wars. Umar had already started working in this direction. One of the first steps Umar took after coming to power was returning the captives of defeated tribes of Ridda Wars, whom Abu Bakr had kept as hostages for guarantee of their tribe’s good behavior.⁹⁸² ⁹⁸³

Despite odds Umar did not lose hope of subjugating Iran. He remained confident of his analysis of Iran’s frailty. News of Byzantine Roman defeat at Yarmouk in August of 636 CE would have boosted moral of Arabs. Umar could re-negotiate the remuneration of military that would attack Iran. Jarir bin Abdullah (Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah جَرِير بِن عَبدُ اللّه ) of Bajila tribe asked for one fourth of the booty in case he and his men participate in the war. Umar agreed.⁹⁸⁴ ⁹⁸⁵ Medinan Caliphate had not yet packed up the recruitment camp which it had established in vicinity of Medina before attack on Syria. Arabs still flocked to this camp from far and near and the caliph used to dispatch them to the war sector of his choice. This time, when a body of Azd came with intent to invade Syria, Umar could redirect them to Iran arousing their interest in the spoils to be taken from the Kisra family.⁹⁸⁶ They accepted the orders hesitantly as Umar left only one option for them.⁹⁸⁷ ⁹⁸⁸ Umar ordered his governor of Basrah Abu Musa Asha’ri to send reinforcement and he sent eight hundred men.⁹⁸⁹ Umar also wrote to Abu Ubayda bin Jirah in Syria to send reinforcement. He sent Qays bin Hubairah al Makshuh of Murād tribe with seven hundred men.⁹⁹⁰ ⁹⁹¹ ⁹⁹² Lately, Ghatafan, Asad, Tamim, Bakr bin Wa’il, Quda’a, Tayy and Abdul Qays all joined the military.⁹⁹³ ⁹⁹⁴ ⁹⁹⁵ Umar definitely had a tough time choosing commander of this army. It was Umar’s stated policy not to appoint a Bedouin over sedentary people.⁹⁹⁶ He had already demoted Khalid bin Walid. He won’t appoint Muthanna as it was not Umar’s policy to appoint a non-companion of the Prophet over men who had accepted Islam during lifetime of the Prophet. Probably, he also mistrusted non-Quraysh. The only time he had appointed a non-Quraysh so far was Abu Ubaid. And that was a small army of one thousand mainly comprising of Abu Ubaid’s own tribe – Thaqif. Ali flatly refused to take the challenge.⁹⁹⁷ At one stage Umar himself desired to lead the campaign but changed his mind on advise of Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib.⁹⁹⁸ At the long last Umar picked Sa’d bin Waqqas (Sa’d bin Abī Waqqāṣ سَعد بِن اَبى وَقّاص ) of Zahrah clan of Quraysh, one of the earliest converts to Islam.⁹⁹⁹

Not much is known about Iranian affairs during time period between the Battle of Jisr and Battle of Qadisiyyah. Most likely they buried their head in the sand after victory of Battle of Bridge. Their infighting was far from over.¹⁰⁰⁰ Iranian Shahanshah remained as powerful as is the king in the game of chess. Coups and counter-coups continued. In the long last they discarded Queen Būrān to give throne to Yazdegerd III. Tabari gives date of this incident January of 635 CE.¹⁰⁰¹ Umar noticed this event tensely. He suspected Iranians might have taken the first step towards national reconciliation.¹⁰⁰²¹⁰⁰³

Yazdegerd might have brought little positive change. Baladhuri mentions at least one Iranian attempt to dislodge Muslim Arabs from Iraq during this phase when Medinan Caliphate army was camping at Diār Hind, near Hira.¹⁰⁰⁴ The attempt ensued in July 636 CE.¹⁰⁰⁵ The Iranians sent Mihrān bin Mihribundādh, a resident of Hamedan at the head of twelve thousand men.¹⁰⁰⁶ They assaulted the Muslim army after crossing the bridge, but got repulsed.¹⁰⁰⁷ ¹⁰⁰⁸

Battle of Qadisiyyah

Epoch-making wars are fought and won/lost long before actual battle field. The battle is merely a drop scene of an epic drama played by both sides in the fields of economy, trade, culture, political organization, military preparedness and so on and so forth. The war that Muslim Arabs and Sasanian Iranians fought at a small village of Qadisiyyah (Qādisiyyah قادِسيَه ), located at the west bank of Euphrates was a short one that finished in less than a week.¹⁰⁰⁹ ¹⁰¹⁰ The aftereffects of the battle shaped political history of Asia for centuries to come. Battle of Qadisiyyah took place in January 638 CE.¹⁰¹¹

The flat area of Sasanian Iran located between lower reaches of Euphrates and Zagros Mountains and separated from Byzantine Rome by the boundary between two countries at Khābūr River is called Swad (Swād سواد ) by Islamic sources. This very fertile plane made up of alluvial gravel and irrigated by a network of canals, was a grain basket for Sasanian Iran.¹⁰¹² Moreover, it accommodated the most important city of Iran, its capital, Tysfwn.¹⁰¹³ Majority population of Swad was ethnic Persian and believed in Zoroastrian religion.

Despite their defeat in Battle of Jisr, Muslim Arabs had continued to raid the regions of Swad between Kaskar in the east and ‘Ain at Tamr in the west from their bases in Iraq.¹⁰¹⁴ ¹⁰¹⁵ According to Baladhuri, by this time the Persians had become emaciated and weak and feeble in Power.¹⁰¹⁶ Anyhow, they could no longer ignore the fact that enemy was knocking at their door. They raised an intimidating army of one twenty thousand men, supported by thirty elephants.¹⁰¹⁷ The army unfurled Dirafsh Kābiyān, the royal banner of Sasanian Iran, meaning common soldier got inspiration from nationalist sentiments.¹⁰¹⁸ They took oath to defending their motherland until they die in shadow of that banner.¹⁰¹⁹ The supreme commander of this gargantuan army was none other than Rustam.¹⁰²⁰ He ordered the army to camp on the eastern bank of the Euphrates opposite Hira while he devises strategy.¹⁰²¹

Army of Medinan Caliphate, which is reported to number between nine and ten thousand, lay camped on the western bank of the Euphrates near Qadisiyyah.¹⁰²² ¹⁰²³ The two armies kept staring at each other for four months, assessing each other’s strength and weakness, examining each other’s patience and guts and negotiating last ditch peace accord.¹⁰²⁴ ¹⁰²⁵ Rustam offered monitory compensation for Arab’s withdrawal from the war. Muslims remained obdurate that they were fighting for faith and not for worldly gains. They insisted on their classical demands: conversion, tribute or war.¹⁰²⁶ Medinan Caliphate utilized this time to transport all the troops from Arabia that were supposed to join their side.¹⁰²⁷ They established line of ration supply from Medina.¹⁰²⁸

The war lasted for four days.¹⁰²⁹ Rustam got slain at the battle field.¹⁰³⁰ No doubt he fought bravely. According to Baladhuri his body was found covered with so many blows and stabs that it was impossible to establish the fatal wound at his autopsy.¹⁰³¹ He left a legacy of martyr on Iranian historical memory. He is the main character of epic Iranian story of Rustam-o-Sohrāb.¹⁰³²

The Iranian forces didn’t perish at Qadisiyyah contrary to the Roman force at Yarmouk. They fled.¹⁰³³ Actually, Muslim strategy to fight against army twelve times bigger than theirs was to target the leaders and dishearten the common soldiers.¹⁰³⁴

Aftermath of Qadisiyyah

Qadisiyyah was a decisive battle according to Islamic sources.¹⁰³⁵ It is true that immediately after Qadisiyyah Sasanian Iran did not fall into the Arab’s cloak the way a fully ripe fruit falls off the tree after a little jolt to its branch. Arab’s took hefty twenty years, full of Wars, to conquer all the areas that once belonged to Sasanian Iran. But it is also true that after Qadisiyyah all the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t put Sasan together again. Qadisiyyah boosted confidence of Arab Muslims, ‘yes, they can do it!’ and it delivered a fatal blow to Iranian’s confidence to defend their country. It proved to be a turning point from where millennia old locally developed Iranian civilization gave way to Arab Islamic civilization.

Iranians were left with no means to protect their Swad and its towns. Muslim Arabs started occupying them one by one.¹⁰³⁶ When city of Bahurasīr surrendered after a short lived resistance of its guards, Sasanians could calculate that Muslims would target Tysfwn which was across Tigris, just opposite Bahurasīr.¹⁰³⁷ ¹⁰³⁸ Sasanians withdrew all the ships and ferry boats in the River Tigris to its eastern bank and burned its bridge to halt Muslim advance.¹⁰³⁹ Sa’d ordered few soldiers to swim across the river and to ride through it on the horseback while Iranian guards were showering arrows on them.¹⁰⁴⁰ When they landed on the other side the Iranians fled calling them ‘jinn’.¹⁰⁴¹ Reaching the other bank of river they compelled owners of ships anchored at the village of Ṣaiyādin, to transport baggage of Muslim army.¹⁰⁴² When Shahanshah Yazdegerd observed the dire situation, he resolved to flee to Hulwan (Ḥulwān حُلوَان) along with principal dignitaries of his kingdom, carrying with him the treasury of the kingdom and his precious but light (khiff) pieces of furniture, private treasury, wives and children. He was suspended in a basket form the wall of his White Palace (Qaṣr ul Abyaḍ قَصَرُ الاَ بيَض ) in Tysfwn to facilitate escape hurriedly.¹⁰⁴³ ¹⁰⁴⁴ Muslims, after crossing the River Tigris, took possession of Tysfwn.¹⁰⁴⁵ ¹⁰⁴⁶

Structure and capabilities of military of Medinan Caliphate.

How come Arab Muslims could defeat professionally trained militaries of, first Byzantine Rome and then Sasanian Iran? Two points need consideration. One, military training was not exhaustive for the soldiers of super powers. Theophanes gives us a glimpse of training levels. In 622 CE, during his campaign against Sasanian Iran, Heraclius halted at the Pass in Taurus Mountains [Gates]. There he recruited new army men and trained them in the art of war. Theophanes describes that, ‘He [Heraclius] divided his army into two battle lines and ordered them to engage each other without bloodshed. He taught them to maintain warlike cries, shouts, and paeans so that in the battle they would not be caught by surprise, but would take courage and march against their foes as into a game. At a later date he again formed two armed lines of battle. The men stood in their armour; there were trumpet calls and phalanxes of shields. After the regiments were well organized, he ordered them to engage each other: there were violent struggles and conflicts between them, and the appearance of warfare. It was like seeing the horrible, fearful spectacle without its danger, or men converging for murder without bloodshed, or the methods of force before force itself. Thus each man got a start from this dangerless slaughter and was more secure thereafter’.¹⁰⁴⁷ This was the total military training to his soldiers before they practically participated in a war.

Two, Arabs had experience of serving in imperial forces of Sasanian Iran and Byzantine Rome during fifth and sixth centuries CE. They had gained skill of military warfare and the use of military hardware.¹⁰⁴⁸ Main military equipment used in the combat was the lancet, the arrow, the shield, the coat of mail and the sword.¹⁰⁴⁹ All these equipment are well documented being used by pre-Islamic Arabs during their tribal warfare.

Battle of Jalula

Muslims had hardly spent a few days in occupation of Tysfwn when they received intelligence that Yazdegerd had amassed a large army at Jalula (Jalūlā’ جَلُولاء ). This army was still getting reinforcements from all over including Hulwan and Jibal (Jibāl جِبال ).¹⁰⁵⁰ ¹⁰⁵¹

Muslims decided preemptive strike before reinforcements make them bigger. Sa’d sent twelve thousand men under command of his nephew Hishām bin ‘Utbah. ¹⁰⁵² ¹⁰⁵³ Persians were led by Khurrazād, brother of Rustam. Persians had left their families and heavy luggage at Khāniqin and had pledged not to flee. They had dug trenches and had thus fortified themselves. The battle was fierce. Muslims drove Persians out of their positions and compelled them to flee. Then Muslims pursued them until darkness prevailed. ¹⁰⁵⁴ ¹⁰⁵⁵ Battle of Jalula proved to be Yarmouk of Iran. Almost whole Sasanian army got routed in the battle.¹⁰⁵⁶ Baladhuri assigns January of 638 CE to this battle, meaning battle of Qadisiyyah, surrender of Tyswn and battle of Jalula were in quick succession.¹⁰⁵⁷

Muslims hurriedly occupied the remaining cities and towns of Swad.¹⁰⁵⁸ Though Iranians were in the midst of civil war when Muslim Arabs invaded them, it appears that the general population was still loyal to their king and the state. Arabs did not find any unsatisfied groups of population in Swad as they had found at Syria or Egypt. They had to resort to violence to subdue the population. Anecdotal stories of execution of a dihqan (dihqān دِهقان ) on charges of treachery have survived to this date.¹⁰⁵⁹ It means the population over which Arabs were going to govern was hostile to them.¹⁰⁶⁰ Sa’d made Hira administrative capital of the newly acquired territories of Medinan Caliphate, dumping centuries old capital of Tysfwn.¹⁰⁶¹

Once power consolidated over Swad, Sa’d ordered Jarir bin Abdullah to advance to Hulwan with three thousand men.¹⁰⁶² ¹⁰⁶³ The force capitulated Hulwan without any resistance.¹⁰⁶⁴

When Shahansah Yazdegerd heard of approaching Muslim army to Hulwan he slipped off to Isfahan.¹⁰⁶⁵ ¹⁰⁶⁶ ¹⁰⁶⁷ It was the starting point of Yazdegerd’s long and arduous journey of internal self-exile, which ultimately culminated in his assassination in 652 CE in Merv.¹⁰⁶⁸ ¹⁰⁶⁹¹⁰⁷⁰ ¹⁰⁷¹

Now, Jarir attempted on Dinavar (Dīnavar دِيناوَر ) with failure, though he could capitulate Qarsāsīn.¹⁰⁷² ¹⁰⁷³

Mass reshuffling of population continues

People who did not wish to be subject of Medinan Caliphate fled from the freshly occupied areas of Sasanian Iran on the pattern of areas snatched from Byzantine Rome.¹⁰⁷⁴ We don’t know where they fled to. There is no evidence that Iranians fled to Byzantine territories during Muslim invasion.¹⁰⁷⁵ Apparently they fled to the areas still under Iranian control.

Similarly, Arabs continued to abandon their homeland and settle on lands evacuated by fleeing refugees.¹⁰⁷⁶

Not only this, people from conquered regions also immigrated to cantonment towns, designed by Medinan Caliphate to lodge its forces, for a better prospective of job. People of Banu ‘Ami, the local Tamim of Khuzestan left their usual dwelling place and started living in Basrah after first invasion on Khuzestan.¹⁰⁷⁷ As the circle of conquest enlarged so the breadth of such reshuffling.

Re-conquest of Iraqi towns

Ya’qubi asserts that just before battle of Qadisiyyah, Sa’d had to send Utba bin Ghazwan (‘Utbah bin Ghazwān عُتبَه بِن غَزوان ) to conquer Ubullah, Maysān, and Abarqubādh.¹⁰⁷⁸ ¹⁰⁷⁹ ¹⁰⁸⁰ Khalid had already conquered this area in summer of 633 CE and had left Suwaid bin Qutba to rule over Ubullah and the surrounds. Our sources do not disclose what happened here between summer of 633 CE and fall of 637 CE. Why did Medinan Caliphate have to re-conquer the area after almost four years is a mystery. Anyhow, according to Tabari the fight for re-conquering Ubullah was trivial. The five hundred strong Sasanian cavalry fled from the town leaving fifteen dead.¹⁰⁸¹ At the same time Umar designated Ubullah as a separate administrative unit with Utba bin Ghazwan its governor.¹⁰⁸²

Founding of cantonment towns

Exact reason of founding of cantonment towns (sin. miṣr pl. amṣār) and lodging of military men along with their families in these towns is not known. Islamic sources give vague explanations. For example, Tysfwn was not conducive to the health of Arabs.¹⁰⁸³ This reason is flawed because a horde of civilian Arabs virtually started living in occupied towns by the time cantonment towns were built, without any ill effect to their health. Actually, Utba bin Ghaqwan had already laid foundation of the first town of this nature, Basrah, in 637 CE before horrors of plague of ‘Amwās in 639 CE.¹⁰⁸⁴ ¹⁰⁸⁵ Spending of precious tax money on building new houses at a time when it was needed for many other important projects, including financing of wars, should have got a pressing reason. One explanation could be better administration of military, as we know troops belonging to different tribes were allotted with specific neighborhoods and their remunerations were paid to the chief of that tribe who was responsible for its distribution among members of his tribe.¹⁰⁸⁶ Another possible explanation could be a need to isolate Arab elites from local subject populations so they could not exploit the miseries of subjects.¹⁰⁸⁷ Further, one can speculate that Umar didn’t want the army to scatter in never ending lands of conquered nations, start agriculture or do some other kind of business.¹⁰⁸⁸

Whatever the reason of founding the cities, it is known that inhabitants of these cities played a significant role in First Arab Civil War. Later on, these cities prospered beyond imagination and became metropolitan centers of Islamic civilization.¹⁰⁸⁹

Details of founding of Kufa in 638 CE by Sa’d bin Waqqas are well preserved and give an interesting insight into sophisticated administrative capabilities of Arab Muslims.¹⁰⁹⁰ Professional town planners served to build it. First of all, they chose a proper site with due celebrations. Then, they built downtown with grand mosque and governor house as its central feature. All neighborhoods and public services, like mosques for the neighborhoods and market places, got special attention. They didn’t forget designing a hostel accommodation for officers of central government and other provincial governments visiting the town for official assignments. Importance of founding of cantonment towns is evident from the fact that each and every aspect of planning and building needed approval from provincial government and then central government.¹⁰⁹¹

Military operating in Syria did not have luxury of any cantonment town. The reason is not known. Medinan Caliphate accommodated its soldiers in Homs in the houses evacuated by the fleeing inhabitants of Syria, initially, after victory.¹⁰⁹² Probably, later, due to epidemic of plague Medinan Caliphate had to spread them in many different towns.

Creation of military districts (amsar)

Later on, in 641 CE, Umar utilized the advantage created by establishment of cantonment towns to further organize whole country into military districts (amṣār pleural of miṣr).¹⁰⁹³ ¹⁰⁹⁴ By doing this Umar could fix responsibility of one specific region on one particular brigade. According to Ya’qubi, the military districts, so created, were seven: Medina, Syria, Jazirah, Kufa, Basrah [there is a missing lacuna in Ya’qubi’s original text here. The editor guesses that he might have written Fustat and probably Yamama or Bahrain or Yemen at this lacuna].¹⁰⁹⁵ At the same time Umar established border military districts (Ajnād, pleural of Jund) on actively hot borders. He made each of Palestine, jazirah, Mosul, and Qinnasrīn a border military district.¹⁰⁹⁶ In practice all border military districts faced Byzantine Rome.¹⁰⁹⁷

A new class emerges

As cantonments got well established and military got further organized a new class emerged in Medinan Caliphate. Tabari calls them ashrāf. (sin. sharīf, pl. ashrāf).¹⁰⁹⁸ Ashrāf were tribal leader responsible military and civilian discipline of their respective tribe. Contrary to Arab traditions of Jāhilyyah they were not tipped by their fellow tribesmen to be a sheykh. They were appointed by the government. They were a kind of middleman between masses of a tribe and the government. Along with dihqan, their non-Muslim counterparts, they were destined to be the skeleton of management of caliphate.¹⁰⁹⁹

Servitude of Khuzestan

The constitution of Sasanian Iran allowed existence of petty kings, sometimes called shah.¹¹⁰⁰ They retained extensive power over the territories they governed, including right to maintain their own army. Actually, the central ruler was a sovereign over shahs, hence called shahanshah – the king of kings.¹¹⁰¹ The shahs were appointed by the shahanshah but the office was hereditary in a sense that the shahanshah had to pick one member of the same family.¹¹⁰² ¹¹⁰³ Many Parthian, Medean and Armenian families are known to holding title of shah for generations.¹¹⁰⁴ Tabari knew seven such families.¹¹⁰⁵ By the time of Arab invasion, three decades of warfare and civil war had already loosened the ties between shahs and the shahanshah.¹¹⁰⁶

With Yazdegerd on the run and the economic powerhouse of Swad in Arab hands, the Sasanian Iran ceased to function as an integral entity. The local chiefs and nobles of Iran, unnerved by the Arab success, began to negotiate separate agreements with the conquerors that would preserve as much of their authority and wealth as possible.¹¹⁰⁷

First case of its class comes from Khuzestan.¹¹⁰⁸ The Shah of Khuzestan was an ethnic Media, scion of Mihrān family by name of Hurmuzan (Hurmuzān هُرمُزان).¹¹⁰⁹ Anonymous Nestorian Priest, writer of the Chronicle of Khuzestan, tells that Hurmuzan had to defend his towns with the help of his own troops. He had blessing of king Yazdegerd but no help came from him or from any other Iranian noble.¹¹¹⁰

The piece of flat land between common course of Euphrates and Tigris and Zagros Mountains accommodated Sasanian province of Khuzestan. At its heart was the mighty Karun River, which begins in Zagros mountains and empties in the Persian Gulf right next to River Tigris.¹¹¹¹ Sasanians had invested much money and labour in the region, restoring and building canals to increase agricultural yields, in particular of cereals, sugarcane, and rice.¹¹¹²

Medinan caliphate decided to open second front in 638 CE against Sasanian Iran after triumph of Qadisiyyah and failure of further progress in Dinavar across Zagros Mountians.¹¹¹³ The forces of Medinan Caliphate that crossed the Iraq-Khuzestan border were drawn from the divisions of Kufa and Basrah. Local Arab tribes, resident of Khuzestan, joined them en masse as they entered Khuzestan.¹¹¹⁴ ¹¹¹⁵ ¹¹¹⁶ ¹¹¹⁷

Hurmuzan’s troops could not cope with the blitz and Medinan Caliphate gained the territory up to river Karun without any difficulty. Hurmuzan hurriedly agreed to accept the river as a new boundary between his territory and Medinan Caliphate. Part of the peace deal reached between Hurmuzan and Utba bin Ghazwan, governor of Basrah, was yearly payment of certain amount to Medinan Caliphate. Hurmuzan’s main aim from the embarrassing deal was to buy time. Karun River located at Sūq Ahvāz and defeated forces of Hurmuzan in their own territory.¹¹¹⁸ ¹¹¹⁹

Hurmuzan again sued for peace. Medinan Caliphate gave him tougher conditions than before. The caliphate made him agree to pay annual tributes. In addition, the caliphate compelled him to give access to inspectors of Medinan Caliphate at Rāmhurmuz, Tustar, Sūs, Jundaysābūr, Bunyān and Mihrijān Qadhaq to monitor tax collection. In return Medinan Caliphate took responsibility to protect Hurmuzan held Khuzestan from any potential raids by Kurd tribes from Fars (Fārs فارس ).¹¹²⁰ ¹¹²¹

Medinan Caliphate wishes a boundary

By this time Medinan Caliphate was in full control of Syria and Swad. Umar felt that the Muslim Arabs had got enough land and money to lead their lives comfortably. He didn’t want risking further lives and energy to conquer the rest of Sasanian Iran. He determined that the natural barrier of Zagros mountains between Medinan Caliphate and Sasanian Iran would serve as the new boundary.¹¹²² Both sides didn’t open any negotiations to formalize the boundary, though.

Third sector against Iran

In addition to the two sectors, mentioned above, through which Medinan Caliphate had invaded Sasanian Iran, actually, there was a third sector as well. It was between Bahrain and Fars across the Persian Gulf.¹¹²³ Contemporary source Sebeos informs us that the sector became active at the time when “[the Arabs] had militarily routed both kingdoms, seizing from Egypt to the Taurus Mountains, from the Western sea to Media and Khuzestan”.¹¹²⁴ Tabari assigns this hostility to 638 CE.¹¹²⁵

“Then the [Arab] King gave an order to assemble boats and many sailors and to navigate southwardly, going east to Pars, to Sagastan, to Sind, to Srman, to the land of Turan and to Makuran as far as the borders of India. The troops swiftly prepared and implemented the command. They burned every country, taking loot and booty. They then turned and made expeditions on the waves of the sea, and reached their own places,” says Sebeos on authority of men who had returned from captivity in Khuzestan and who themselves had been eye-witnesses to the events.¹¹²⁶

Tabari renders these events a low profile. He discloses that when Sa’d became a hero of Medinan Caliphate after his victories against Sasanian Iran, A’la bin Haradhrami, Umar’s governor of Bahrain got envy of him.¹¹²⁷ He mobilized his Abdul Qays tribe into Fars by ships across the Persian Gulf without prior approval from Umar.¹¹²⁸ Tabari’s account of the campaign gives an impression that Fars didn’t have any central figure to organize resistance to the attack. People of Fars had to arrange self-defense groups to tackle the danger.¹¹²⁹ They quickly cut the Muslim intruders off their ships and blocked the road to Basrah so they could not fight their way out. All the Arab leaders of this campaign got killed one by one.¹¹³⁰ A furious Umar, on receiving the news, censured A’la. He put A’la’s function under supervision of Sa’d bin Waqqas and ordered the governor over Basrah, Utba bin Ghazwan, to send a reinforcement to rescue the entrapped soldiers.¹¹³¹ ¹¹³² Utba sent an intimidating force of twelve thousand men, led by Abu Sabrah bin Abi Ruhm of ‘Amir bin Lu’ayy clan of Quraysh.¹¹³³ The army was too big for the disorganized resistance in Fars to handle. They travelled along the coastal road smoothly and escorted the cornered soldiers of A’la back to Basrah from where they dispersed to their home towns.¹¹³⁴ This Basran division was under strict orders not to occupy a single inch of Sasanian territory.¹¹³⁵ However, they left some detachments in Hurmuzan controlled Khuzestan as a security measure.¹¹³⁶

Hurmuzan eliminated and captured

Ethnic Persians living in Khuzestan were not very happy with the situation.¹¹³⁷ Hurmuzan remained hopeful of regaining his lost authority. People of Persian descent from Fars and Jibal promised to join him in his endeavors through correspondence. The rumors of these developments reached the ears of commanders of detachments stationed in Hurmuzan controlled Khuzestan. Umar decided to get rid of Hurmuzan once and for ever. He organized an army from the military divisions of Kufa and Basrah and put it under the command of Abu Sabrah Bin Abi Ruhm.¹¹³⁸ Once the campaign started Umar ordered his governor of Basrah, Abu Musa Ash’ari, who was appointed after dismissal of Mughira bin Shu’ba (Mughīrah bin Shu’bah مُغِيرَه بِن شُعبَه ), to join the campaign personally.¹¹³⁹ The army of Medinan Caliphate captured Rāmhurmuz, Jundaysābūr, and Karka d’Ledan without much resistance.¹¹⁴⁰ ¹¹⁴¹ Hurmuzan, however, could muster troops and hold two key cities in the mountains, Sūs and Tustar.¹¹⁴² He opened negotiations as a delaying tactic. Diplomacy lasted for two years. Finally, when his hopes dashed, he killed the Arab ambassadors to signal all-out war. Arabs overpowered him quickly.¹¹⁴³ ¹¹⁴⁴ The drop scene of this drama was in 641 CE.¹¹⁴⁵ Hurmuzan let himself captured on a condition that only Umar would decide his fate.¹¹⁴⁶ Umar gave him a choice between death and accepting Islam. He chose the latter.¹¹⁴⁷ ¹¹⁴⁸ Umar allowed Hurmuzan to settle in Medina where he became advisor to Umar on Iran affairs.¹¹⁴⁹

Umar changes his policy towards Iran

The rebellion of people of Khuzestan and the difficulty with which it could be suppressed challenged Umar’s political acumen. He was highly suspicious that the Arabs of Iraq might have committed atrocities on Persians of Khuzestan and later on might have covered up their crimes. The enquiry commission Umar set up to investigate the causes of rebellion reported to Umar that the Arabs of Iraq had honored the peace deals with people of Khuzestan in words and spirit. The people of Khuzestan were still politically attached to the Shahanshah who kept instigating them for rebellion. Ahnaf bin Qays (Ahnaf bin Qays احنَف بِن قَيس ) of Tamim tribe, a member of the enquiry commission, could convince Umar that Medinan Caliphate couldn’t expect pacification of its subjects of Persian ethnicity until Yazdegerd was alive.¹¹⁵⁰ ¹¹⁵¹ Umar realized that the war against Sasanian Iran was far from over.

Battle of Nahavand

The year of 642 CE bore the burden of another doughty battle between the waning power of Sasanian Iran and the emerging power of Medinan Caliphate.¹¹⁵² The people of Iran had not stomached the fact that Iran had lost Swad and Khuzestan. Different shahs of remaining parts of Iran under nominal Sasanian rule might be sharing these sentiments with common people. Shahanshah Yazdegerd might be anxious to regain his lost territory, prestige and wealth. Moreover, neither of the sides had opened negotiations for cessation of hostilities and mutual recognition of new borders. Presence of Zagros Mountains was the only hurdle preventing the two sides from clash. Iranians might be assuming, quiet logically, that Arabs will attempt on Iranian plateau after consolidating their power over the newly conquered areas.¹¹⁵³

Iranian plateau that extends from Zagros Mountains in the west and Elburz Mountains and Kopet Dag Mountains in the north to almost Persian Gulf in the south was a rich agricultural land with the exception of two separate deserts, Dasht – e – Lot on its eastern fringes and Dasht – e – Kavir on its northern fringes.¹¹⁵⁴ Arabs must have got all reasons to overrun it at a convenient time and Iran’s noble’s fears were not totally unfounded. They were busy communicating with each other and organizing themselves to face the possible Arab attack.¹¹⁵⁵ “Our land,” they said, “has been wrested from us, and we have been humiliated in our own homeland,” tells Ya’qubi.¹¹⁵⁶ Ethnic Persians and the people of Rayy, Qumis, Hamedan, and Māhain communicated with each other at the behest of Yazdegerd. They raised an army of sixty thousand to hundred thousand men (all imbibed with nationalistic sentiments) with Dirafsh Kābiyān unfurled over them. Yazdegerd appointed Mardanshah Dhul Hajib (Mardānshāh dhu l Ḥājib مَردان شاه ذُوالحاجِب ) as their commander.¹¹⁵⁷ ¹¹⁵⁸ ¹¹⁵⁹ ¹¹⁶⁰ ¹¹⁶¹

Ammar bin Yasir, the newly appointed governor of Kufa, got the intelligence of the military buildup and he relayed it to Umar.¹¹⁶² Obviously, Umar got caught in an onerous situation. This was the time a sizable portion of Medinan Caliphate’s army had perished in the great plague in Syria. Amr bin As had tied up a number of battalions for the siege of Alexandria. Moreover, Medinan Caliphate had to keep garrisons in many still not quiescent cities of Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Jazirah, Iraq, Khuzestan and Swad. To make the things more complicated, almost all men in whom Umar trusted were already deployed either as commanders or as governors. Umar had already dismissed Sa’d, his trusted man in Iraq, to replace him with Ammar bin Yasir. Deliberations started in Medina.

If Umar asks the division of army in Syria to take lead in attack, the meetings in Medina pondered, there was a danger that Byzantine Romans will reoccupy their provinces. If Umar asks Yemenites to give more recruits, the land might be totally devoid of able bodied men and Ethiopians could take advantage. Hesitantly, he ordered the military division in Kufa to assign two thirds of the manpower to this campaign and leave the remaining one third in Kufa to manage the newly acquired territory.¹¹⁶³ He also ordered the military division at Basrah to contribute to this force. They sent troops under command of Abu Musa Asha’ari.¹¹⁶⁴ ¹¹⁶⁵ Appointing commander of this force was another headache. Initially, Umar wished to lead the army personally. This proposal was rejected on the ground that Arabs might prevail over Nejd and other places.¹¹⁶⁶ After all possible considerations, Umar had to abandon his stated policy of not appointing a Bedouin over Muslim army. He appointed Nu’man bin Amr (Nu’mān bin ‘Amr نُعمان بِن عَمرؤ ) of nomadic tribe of Muzainah, a companion of Prophet Muhammad and Umar’s ‘amil of Kaskar, as general of the army.¹¹⁶⁷ ¹¹⁶⁸ ¹¹⁶⁹ Now, Umar had to devise strategy. He sought advice of Hurmuzan if Muslims should attack from Isfahan sector or Azerbaijan sector. He advised to attack from Isfahan side.¹¹⁷⁰

The war theater was highlands of Nahavand (Nahāvand نَهاوَند ) in Jibal province of Sasanian Iran.¹¹⁷¹ ¹¹⁷² The Iranians had fastened themselves in chains in group of five and ten, so they might not flee. The commander of Muslim army shook the standard three times to signal different positions of the army and the war started. The ferocious war continued for the next three days. Commanders of both sides laid dead in the combat. Muslim side carried the day.¹¹⁷³ Iranian army got routed out completely.¹¹⁷⁴

Aftermath of Nahavand

The victory of Nahavand is labeled as ‘the victory of victories’ by Islamic sources.¹¹⁷⁵ it broke backbone of Sasanian Iran. Sasanian Iran got permanently disabled and could never deploy a big army against Medinan Caliphate after it.¹¹⁷⁶ Military observers can easily analyse that the defeat of Sasanian Iran at Nahavand proves beyond doubt that their earlier defeat at Qadisiyyah was not by mere chance. Iranians had lost political organization to defend themselves.

Any of the Sasanian provinces were now open to military pressure from Medinan Caliphate. It was Medinan Caliphate’s choice where to start from. Yazdegerd lost his capability to correspond with different shah’s to organize them in any coherent form to resist Medinan Caliphate. Medinan Caliphate didn’t miss the opportunity to subjugate whole of Jibal province, including Nahavand, Dīran, Hamedan, Māsabadhān, and Sirawān.¹¹⁷⁷ ¹¹⁷⁸

Medinan Caliphate didn’t appoint its own man to govern the newly acquired territories. Instead they installed a puppet of Persian ethnicity by name of Dinar (Dīnār دِينار ) as governor. He was from Sasanian nobility but not from top strata. The governing family of Jibal was Qarin (Qārin قارِن ). Arabs totally neglected it. Apparently, all Persian petty ruling families maintained their ruling status, but they had to be answerable to Dinar whose main job was to collect tax from all of them and to deliver it to Kufa personally.¹¹⁷⁹ In this sense Jibal didn’t achieve a status of full province under Medinan Caliphate. It became a ‘provincially administered territory’. Part of it paid tax to the province of Basrah and part to Kufa.¹¹⁸⁰ Our sources are quiet as to why didn’t Arabs appoint their own man as governor over Jibal directly answerable to central government in Medina. One can assume that the Iranian military got defeated but the population remained belligerent. The nobility got weak but remained inflexible. Appointment of Persian figurehead was a compromise between the two warring parties. He saved the face of Iranian nationalists and served as a loyal tax collector for Arabs without giving them any headache of management.

Appointment of Persian figurehead was mainly to appease Zoroastrians. For Christians of Sasanian Iran it was just a change of masters.¹¹⁸¹

Shahanshah Yazdegerd had arranged the war from his den in Isfahan. After Sasanian defeat of Nahavand he fled to Istakhr (Iṣṭakhr اِصطَخر ).¹¹⁸² Muslim raiding parties tried to pursue him during his flight but of no avail.¹¹⁸³

Pacification of further Sasanian territories

After defeat at Nahavand and installation of a puppet regime in Jibal, demise of Sasanian Iran was writing on the wall. The only question was when and how. Taming further Sasanian territories was a logical inference for Medinan Caliphate from results of Nahavand. Iranians anticipated it well. Umar mobilized all his men, including veterans of Nahavand, reserves of Nahavand and the soldiers left in Basrah and Kufa into battle field.¹¹⁸⁴ He divided his army into corps, each under leadership of a field commander. Each corps had to fight its way in different directions like, Isfahan, Kirman, Tabaristan or Azerbaijan. None of the field commanders was full general.¹¹⁸⁵ Each of them had to fight independently on occasions and on other occasions to support the neighboring corps under command of the neighboring corps’ field commander as the circumstances dictated.¹¹⁸⁶ As the proceeding events proved, their goal was not to bring the rest of Sasanian Iran under direct control of Medinan Caliphate. Neither had they aimed at kicking the ruling petty kings out of power. Their task was to compel the ruling petty king to change his allegiance from Sasanian Iran to Medinan Caliphate and to pay annual tribute. They were not hesitant to replace any petty king who dared to resist with another one who promised obedience. Anyhow, the advancing troops of Medinan Caliphate were not supposed to stick to the guidelines willy-nilly. They could bring any meek population under direct rule of Medinan Caliphate.¹¹⁸⁷ As they were going to penetrate into Sasanian Iran as deep as possible without consolidating power of Medinan Caliphate except entering into contracts of allegiance with the rulers, Umar had fears. Umar suspected they might be attacked from the rear and got trapped in far off places.¹¹⁸⁸

During the next two years or so these contingents reached almost all provinces of Sasanian Iran bordering Jibal. Sources claim that they appointed Arab governors in many of the towns or territories they reached. Analysis of hierarchal standing of these ‘governors’ in Medinan Caliphate and the function they performed undisguised the true nature of these ‘governors’. They were simply representatives of Medinan Caliphate to liaise with the local rulers who had changed allegiance from Sasanian Iran to Medinan Caliphate. Medinan Caliphate didn’t prescribe any rate of tax to all of these areas. They could pay according to their capacity.¹¹⁸⁹

Isfahan

Just to the east of Jibal and neighboring it, in the heart of Iranian Plateau, was located the Sasanian province of Isfahan with its main town Jayy.¹¹⁹⁰ The army of Medinan Caliphate that had participated in Navand, after imposing Dinar over Jibal, took the road connecting Nahavand to Jayy.¹¹⁹¹

The leader of army was Abdullah bin Budhail (‘Abdallah bin Budhail bin Warqā’ عَبدُ اللّه بِن بُذَيل بِن وَرقاء ) of Khuza’ah who captured the city of Jayy in 644 CE.¹¹⁹² ¹¹⁹³ The surrounding smaller towns didn’t even think of resisting.¹¹⁹⁴ Abu Musa Ash’ari commanded his levy during this campaign but his role was merely supporting.¹¹⁹⁵

Yazdegerd had reached Istakhr by this time. Abdullah Bin Budhail pursued him after conquest of Isfahan but of no avail. Abu Musa came to Istakhr and attempted its conquest but did not succeed, and likewise did Uthman bin Abu As (‘Uthmān bin abu ‘Āṣ عُثمان بِن اَبُو عاص ) of Thaqif.¹¹⁹⁶

Elburz Mountains

Just south of Caspian Sea a lofty mountain range stretches from west to east. These Elburz Mountains separate the Iranian plateau from the Caspian Sea. The difficulty to access them can be guessed from the fact that they are home to the highest peak in the Middle East – Mount Damavand.¹¹⁹⁷ The inaccessible mountainous terrain had facilitated crowding of many kinglets in a comparatively small area. To the west, between Hamedan and Caspian Sea was Dastaba.¹¹⁹⁸ On the shores of Caspian, around its southwestern corner used to live Daylam.¹¹⁹⁹ The central part of it was Tabaristan (Ṭabaristān طَبَرِستان ). On the southern edge of the mountains was the principality of Rayy. Towards the eastern end was Gorgan.¹²⁰⁰

When Umar ordered his men, who had occupied Hamedan, to take the road leading to Elburz Mountains, the petty kings of the region were unaware of true intentions of the army. They presumed that they would have to fight for their political survival. The rulers of Daylam, Rayy and Azerbaijan Joined hands to resist the invadors.¹²⁰¹ Yazdagerd was nowhere to be involved. The battle between forces of Medinan Caliphate and combined Iranian forces at Waj Rudh (Wāj al-Rūdh واج الرُوذ ) in Daylam was, anyhow, short lived.¹²⁰² ¹²⁰³ ¹²⁰⁴ Mūṭā, the overall leader of the Iranian army got killed. Other petty kings in the army, like Zinabi (Zīnabī زِينَبى ), started co-operating with Medinan Caliphate.¹²⁰⁵ The Iranian defeat lay all of Elburz Mountains open for Medinan Caliphate. Obviously, Daylam was first to surrender as the war was fought in their area. King of Rayy tried to resist on his own. His resistance got crushed by the help of Zinabi who secured its throne for himself and his generations. Muslims destroyed the city of Rayy to punish the resisting ruler and Zinabi had to rebuild it.¹²⁰⁶ Rest of the rulers of the region submitted to obedience without resistance. Some of them, like ruler of Jīlān, waited for a notice to be served with forces of Medinan Caliphate camped outside his enclave.¹²⁰⁷ ¹²⁰⁸ Others, like ruler of Tabaristan, initiated the process without waiting for the notice and in return got better deals. Medinan Caliphate, for example, guaranteed Tabaristan that its army would never enter into their territory.¹²⁰⁹ Rulers of Dunbāwand, and Qumis set terms of Ṣulḥ without fight.¹²¹⁰, ¹²¹¹, ¹²¹², ¹²¹³

Political changes inside Medinan Caliphate

Medinan Caliphate was not a few thousand soldiers constantly risking their lives in lands unknown to them under command of their officers. It was a cosmos of millions of tillers, grazers, miners, slaves, teachers, traders, merchants, house wives, and off course, retirees. A decade of holy war so far, from the first clashes in Syria in 634 CE to the alignment of Iranian petty kings with Medinan Caliphate by 644 CE, completely remodeled the political portrait of Medinan Caliphate. The flow of wealth from the conquered nations to the triumphant, the prestige earned at the expense of the defeated, and the drastic demographic changes everywhere, collectively modulated new political ideologies within Medinan Caliphate. The changes in political thinking of people were gradual and parallel with the military achievements. Each change surfaced at a specific time during Futuhul Buldan and became pervasive. Now, we have to pause our narrative of Futuhul Buldan for a while, and attend to the political changes that had crept all over Medinan Caliphate.

Caliph at odds with the military

Despite smooth progression of Futuhul Buldan, there was a disagreement between the caliph and the military. From the very beginning the approach of some portions of military towards the spoils of war contrasted with that of the caliph. Apparently the caliph did not express his approach explicitly until he started getting favorable results of the war, and sections of military did not ask for concrete commitments from the caliph at the time of their recruitment. Soon after first conquests, the differences between the caliph and certain quarters of military sprang up. Soldiers expected all booty, including movable and immovable property of the defeated, to be distributed among them as their remuneration, after excluding the twenty percent dues of the central government. The caliph disagreed. He allowed only movable property of the defeated to be disbursed among soldiers after excluding twenty percent dues of the central government. He had other plans for the immovable property.

After triumph of Jalula the soldiers wanted lands to be considered part of booty as they were acquired as a result of war and not by means of any treaty. Umar wrote to Sa’d to “divide the spoils of the war among the troops on horses and camels after taking out usual fifth. And let the lands and cattle in the hands of those who work with them so that it might be used for stipends (‘āta عَطاء ) of the Muslims. If thou divide everything among the troops nothing will be left for those who come after them”.¹²¹⁴ ¹²¹⁵ Hence “Umar left lands of Sawad for those who were still in men’s loins and mothers’ wombs [posterity]. The inhabitants of the lands were made dhimmis. They could not be sold as slaves and they paid jizyah and kharāj”.¹²¹⁶

Similar disputes surfaced at the time of fall of Alyuna. Zubayr demanded that all spoils, including land, should be divided among the participants. He used division of land by the Prophet among participants of the war, after conquest of Khaybar, as a precedent of Sunna (Sunnah سُنّة) of the Prophet, to reinforce his point. Amr knew Umar’s policy and did not dare to challenge it. Amr wrote to Umar, who wrote back saying, “Leave it as it is, so that the descendants of the descendants [ar ḥabal al ḥabalah] may profit by it.¹²¹⁷

Thus Umar made the immovable property and businesses of the defeated an ongoing source of income which was to be distributed to the soldiers, their families and descendants in future as their salary for remaining enrolled in the military register. If Umar would have distributed everything among soldiers they would have become busy in managing the properties and would have absconded the army.¹²¹⁸ Not only this, Umar nationalized certain lands. They were the lands that had already been designated as crown land by Sasanian Iran. Umar added to them those lands which their owners abandoned at the time of fleeing the invading army.¹²¹⁹ Income from these lands was at discretion of central government and probably it used it on projects like infrastructure.

Disagreement between the caliph and some portions of the military about their remunerations continued. Umar had given one fourth of the revenue of Swad to Bajila as he had promised them at the time of their recruitment.¹²²⁰ Three years later, in winter of 641 CE, Umar asked Jarir bin Abdullah, the leader of Bajila “had I not been responsible for what I divide, I would leave to you the share already given; but I see that the Muslims have multiplied, so ye have to restore what ye have taken.”.¹²²¹ Jarir and his tribesmen had to obey Umar. To reconcile with their chief Umar offered Jarir a gift of eight hundred Dirhams. Umar assessed a stipend of two thousand Dirhams yearly for the tribe of Bajila, which was not different from what other tribes got.¹²²²

This was the beginning of the military’s differences from the ruler in Medina. Umar knew how to impose himself and he did. Later caliphs had to struggle with the issue.

Generals started enriching themselves

From early days of Futuhul Buldan certain generals were bent upon enriching themselves. After conquest of Bait-Jabrīn [Eleutheropolis] Amr bin As took an estate for himself and named it ‘Ajlān after name of his freedman.¹²²³ Zubayr marked out two lots for himself in Miṣr and Alexandria when he went there as head of the supporting army.¹²²⁴ ¹²²⁵ He also built a mansion for himself in Miṣr, which remained talk of the town due to its extravagance and which remained in hands of his heirs later.¹²²⁶ Similarly, Sa’d bin Waqqas built a mansion in Kufa with a wooden door and surrounded the mansion with a fence of reeds.¹²²⁷ ¹²²⁸

Such activities on part of generals were not acceptable to Umar. He expected them to be public servants and not public’s masters. Umar sent his auditor general Muhammad bin Maslama (Muḥammad bin Maslamah مُحَمّد بِن مَسلَمَه ) to kufa who set the door and fence made by Sa’d to fire.¹²²⁹

Here we observe clash of interest between ordinary soldiers and the generals. Ordinary soldiers, in line with Arab traditions, considered generals one of them. They expected from them to give themselves the same remunerations and privileges which they gave to the soldiers. Some generals, on the other hand, didn’t consider it fair. They honestly believed they should get better remunerations and perks than the ordinary soldiers because they were instrumental in victories. Umar sided with ordinary soldiers on this matter. Anyhow, all generals did not indulge into such practices. We don’t hear of any such behavior on part of Abu Ubayda bin Jirah, Khalid bin Walid, Abu Musa Asha’ri or Iyad bin Ghanm.

Central government’s usual disciplinary action against unruly generals was to confiscate half of their wealth. Umar confiscated half of the wealth of, among others, Sa’d bin Waqaas and Amr bin As.¹²³⁰

Issue didn’t remain limited to remunerations. Commanders established their own mess separate from that of common soldiers. During his visit to Jerusalem, Bilāl complained to Umar that the commanders used to eat poultry and fine bread, most of the men not receiving it. Umar required the Syrian commanders to guarantee that each Muslim soldier gets two loaves of bread a day and suitable quantity of vinegar and oil.¹²³¹ ¹²³² ¹²³³

Caliph’s tug of war with governors

As the size of Medinan Caliphate increased communications between central government and provincial governments and between central government and generals at borders needed longer time. Centrifugal tendencies started springing up among generals and governors. No instance of outright disobedience to the center is noted by sources up to this juncture of history of Islam. However, examples of clandestine disobedience can be cited. As usual, Umar was eager to nip the evil in the bud and he did whatever was in his power to discourage such behavior. It created a kind of cold war between the caliph and certain generals and governors.

Umar was shocked when Amr invaded Egypt without his prior approval. Actually sending Zubayr would have served two purposes – reinforcement to Amr’s troops and clipping Amr’s ambitions.

Umar had to spy on the governors. After victory of Qadisiyyah Amr bin Ma’dikarib visited Umar. Umar asked him about conduct of Sa’d. He praised about Sa’d. Umar did not believe in him and said ‘as if you agreed to compensate each other with praise’ (Sa’d having commended Amr to Umar in a previous communication).¹²³⁴

Sinful behavior of officials

Medinan Caliphate was a theocracy. It had classified its citizens strictly into religious compartments. Moral behavior of non-Muslims was responsibility of their respective regulating bodies. The central government was responsible for maintaining certain moral standards among the Muslim population. As money poured into Arab Muslim society as a result of Futuhul Buldan, sinful behaviors kicked off among them. Part of the problem stemmed from explosive spread of Islam among Arabs during first decade of Medinan Caliphate. A lot of them were not that strongly bound to it as were the earliest converts. This particularly applies to middle ranking officers, almost all of whom were peripheral to Islamic movement during its nascent days. They indulged into sinful behaviors which were contrary to the criminal code of the country and which were seen as not befitting of an officer of Islamic state by the central government.

Nu’man was son to Adi bin Nadla (‘Adi bin Naḍlah عَدى بِن نَضلَه) who had immigrated to and died in Ethiopia as Muslim. Nu’man came back to Medina via the same boat which brought other Muslims back from Ethiopia. Umar appointed him over Maysān in the district of Basrah. Nu’man composed some verses:

Hasn’t al-Ḥasnnā heard that her husband in Maysān

Is drinking from glasses and Jars?

If I wished, the chief men of the city would sing to me

And dancing-girls pirouette on tiptoe.

If you’re my friend, give me a drink in the largest cup,

Don’t give me the smallest half broken!

Perhaps the commander of the faithful will take it amiss

That we’re drinking together in a tumbledown castle!

On hearing these verses Umar dismissed him from the job. He pleaded with Umar that he did not act anything like that and it was just poetic fantasy but Umar did not restore him.¹²³⁵

Presence of sinful behaviour among middle ranking officers in provinces and stern action taken against them on discovery by central government, rather than provincial governments, indicates a culture of cover up at provincial level and breeding of centrifugal aspirations.

Beginning of corruption in state apparatus

Financial corruption and state machinery go hand in hand.¹²³⁶ There has not a single county ever existed nor will ever exist which is hundred percent free of financial corruption. We can only assess relative transparency in government functioning of a country by comparing it with that of other countries and ranking it.¹²³⁷ Widespread financial corruption in government machinery decreases efficacy of a government. It largely hampers governmental capacity to deliver, to attract capital and to control crime.¹²³⁸

As Muslim Arabs started collecting revenue from the defeated nations, tax collectors saw an opportunity to fill their own pockets. Central government had to take measures to curb the practice.

Abu Hurairah gathered twelve thousand Dirhams while being governor of Bahrain. Umar charged him with stealing money from government coffers. He denied the charges claiming that he earned it by horse farming and shares in different business ventures. Umar was not convinced and he confiscated the money.¹²³⁹

Usual sentence for corruption was confiscation of half of wealth. Umar handed over this punishment to many of his governors including Nafi bin Amr (Nāfi’ bin ‘Amr نافِع بِن عَمرؤ ) of Khuzā’a, his governor over Mecca; and Ya’la bin Munya, his governor over Yemen.¹²⁴⁰ Sometimes the central government had to take such action against middle ranking officers, for example, Nu’man bin Adi ‘āmil over Maysān, because apparently provincial governments were apt to neglect such infractions.¹²⁴¹

The proceeding of court was still fair. We find some instances, for example Abu Bakra, where an officer successfully defended his case and got aquited.¹²⁴² ¹²⁴³

Appearance of politics in Medina

Most devastating side effect of geographic expansion of Medinan Caliphate was emergence of a sense in the capital Medina that whoever will take over from Umar will wield extensive political power. The activities, actions and policies that are used to gain and hold power in a government or to influence a government are called ‘politics’ according to the classical definition of the word in Merriam-Webster English Dictionary.¹²⁴⁴

Once upon a time, at the occasion of Hajj Abdur Rehman bin Awf and others openly discussed with Umar matters in such a way that Umar had to snub their political ambitions.¹²⁴⁵ ¹²⁴⁶

Here we see appearance of politics among those men who had struggled for establishment of Islam in its earliest and weakest phase.

The teamwork among leadership of Medinan Caliphate eroded as a result of appearance of politics. When Umar appointed Mu’awiya as governor of Syria after death of Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, Abu Sufyan did not behave as it was appointment of one of the team members because he was most appropriate for it. Rather he perceived it as a favor to his family at cost of others. “May the tie of relationship be made stronger by thy kind behavior!” wrote Abu Sufyan to Umar in his letter of thanks.¹²⁴⁷ Team is the most potent social organization. A team strives to achieve a well-defined goal, under a clear cut leader, with the help of mutually aiding members. Teams usually build up when many people aspire to achieve a common goal, and they usually dismantle after achievement of the goal.¹²⁴⁸ The team of Quraysh, that worked selflessly under the leadership of Abu Bakr, had started feeling that goals have been achieved. Cracks started appearing in that team.

Cantonments politicized

Phenomenon of ‘politics’ was not confined to environs of Medina. It took the newly established cantonments in its spell. Earliest converts to Islam in Medina were vying for the top job of caliph. Relatively later converts were lobbying for higher military posts, district or provincial governorship, or other higher offices in government service. Ordinary soldiers living in cantonments were pushing for better salary package from the government. To achieve their goal, the soldiers started organizing themselves around ambitious relatively later converts, usually of non-Quraysh background. Governing cantonments became a political quagmire.

Close examination of Kufa, as a typical example, illustrates the patterns emerging in the cantonments. Soon after this beautiful and comfortable city became functional and Sa’d bin Waqqas established himself as governor, the harmony in the city started pulverizing. Complaints against Sa’d started reaching ears of Umar. The grievances of people of Kufa against Sa’d were purely monetary but the formal complaints lodged against him had a religious accent.¹²⁴⁹ One of the complaints was that this earliest convert to Islam didn’t know proper method of ritual prayer (ṣalāt). Umar had to set up a public enquiry against Sa’d in Kufa. Though Umar exonerated Sa’d in the ‘wrong prayer case’, Sa’d could not survive the contentious nature of Kufans.¹²⁵⁰ Umar had to dismiss him in 641 CE.¹²⁵¹
¹²⁵² Naturally, Sa’d felt insulted. He cursed the people of Kufa saying, “May Allah not make them pleased with any commander or any commander pleased with them”.¹²⁵³ The dismissal was sudden. Umar had to give charge of governorship to Abdullah bin Abdullah (‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdallah عَبدَ اللّه بِن عَبدَ اللّه ), the deputy governor, on ad hoc basis until he chooses a new governor.¹²⁵⁴ ¹²⁵⁵ ¹²⁵⁶ After painstaking search, Umar chose Ammar bin Yasir, a very early Meccan convert who had won his freedom from slavery by money of Abu Bakr.¹²⁵⁷ ¹²⁵⁸ This time he appointed Abdullah bin Mas’ud as wazīr, whose actual job appears to monitor Ammar bin Yasir.¹²⁵⁹ ¹²⁶⁰ Soon complaints against Ammar started pouring in Medina. The grievances were again of pure monetary matters but expressed themselves in religious overtone. “Ammar is not a good Muslim,” said one complainant.¹²⁶¹ Though the matter that didn’t translate into formal complaint was that Ammar didn’t favor Kufans unduly over others during award of Jizyah of Jibal.¹²⁶² Hesitantly, Umar dismissed Ammar. obviously, Ammar didn’t feel honored by this treatment and he expressed his sentiments well during his exit interview with Umar.¹²⁶³ Umar gave charge of Kufa to Jubayr bin Mut’im (Jubayr bin Muṭ’im جُبير بِن مُطعِم ) while he looked for another suitable person for the job.¹²⁶⁴ Jubayr had similar problems during the short period he served as acting governor.¹²⁶⁵ Now, Umar brought in Abu Musa Ash’ari from Basrah, giving charge of Basrah to somebody else. Abu Musa quickly became victim of similar injurious complaints. Wary of the situation, Umar asked the people of Kufa whom did they want to be governed by.¹²⁶⁶ In doing so, Umar sacrificed a constitutional principal of Medinan Caliphate – appointing a provincial governor no longer remained a sole prerogative of the caliph. Ironically, people of Kufa refused to respond. Now, Mughira bin Shu’ba, a later convert from Taif, ex-governor of Basrah, current resident of Kufa, approached Umar and applied for the job of governor.¹²⁶⁷ ¹²⁶⁸ Umar appointed him. In doing so, Umar broke another precedent of Medinan Caliphate. Governorship of a province no longer remained a ‘responsibility’ which the caliph would delegate to anybody in his good books. It became a ‘privilege’ which could be contested for. Moreover, Umar bypassed a very important doctrine of Medinan Caliphate in appointment of Mughira. Earliest companions of Prophet no longer had absolute preference over the very late companions in provincial appointments. Actually, Mughira expressed the dilemma of the timing of conversion versus competency clearly while trying to convince Umar for appointing him as governor. Mughira said that piety of a person is for his personal help and competence of a person helps the community.¹²⁶⁹ Umar accepted the reality unwillingly. His heart posited that one day he would find that ideal man who is a combination of piety and competence. Farewelling Mughira to his job Umar said “Let the pious trust you and the wicked fear you.” ¹²⁷⁰ Mughira had a tarnished reputation.¹²⁷¹ Umar’s conviction of finding a pious man for the job of Governor of Kufa persisted. He had made up his mind to bring Sa’d bin Waqqas back to this job. Umar was honest in admitting that management problems of Kufa gave him tension.¹²⁷² Umar kept sacrificing his men one after another but never blamed the soldiers. He kept glorifying people of kufa as “the head of the Arabs”.¹²⁷³ The soldiers in cantonments were pillars of Medinan Caliphate. Umar was not in a position to annoy them.¹²⁷⁴

Not only had the soldiers in cantonments politicized around their ringleaders, the cantonments as a whole started wrestling with each other. The reason was the same as was for frictions between individuals. Again let’s illustrate the point from events in Kufa. Each division of army used to get stipend from those revenues (jizyah) which were collected from the area conquered by that particular division. Obviously, some had conquered richer or larger areas getting more remuneration. Soon after battle of Nahavand divisions of Basrah and Kufa started claims and counterclaims to the right of getting tax of a particular area on the basis that it was conquered by them. Umar had to intervene. He negated the old rule that the body of soldiers which conquered a particular area will benefit from its taxes solely. He divided the newly conquered areas of Sasanian Iran among soldiers of Basrah and Kufa equally.¹²⁷⁵

Kufa was not alone in being turbulent. Other cantonment towns treaded the same path.¹²⁷⁶ The factors that shaped political air in Kufa were working everywhere in the provinces. Results were similar as those of Kufa.

Umar confines companions to Medina

Political conflicts in the center and in the provinces impelled Umar to craft new domestic policies. It is noteworthy that very few people who were among the first Muslims and who used to meet in the study circle at house of Arqam participated in the wars called Futuhul Buldan. During later years of his tenure, Umar banned them from taking part in wars and settling in cantonments. It does not mean that any person who happened to see Prophet Muhammad in state of being Muslim was not allowed to leave Medina or to participate in the wars. Two hundred and twenty companions of the Prophet are reported to have participated, for example, in battle of Qadisiyyah. Out of them one hundred and twenty were veterans of Fathe Mecca and seventy were veterans of Badr.¹²⁷⁷ Similarly, sixty to eighty companions settled in Basrah, and eighty settled in Kufa.¹²⁷⁸ Umar confined those who could be potential candidates of caliphate after him. When Abdur Rehman bin Awf asked permission to participate in war on one occasion, Umar refused him bluntly.¹²⁷⁹ Once Umar answered request of some members of Quraysh to participate in war diplomatically, “you have already been through that with the Messenger of God”.¹²⁸⁰ Explaining his policy of not allowing prominent members of Quraysh to leave Medina, Umar said on one occasion, “Do not go out, lest you disperse the people right and left.”¹²⁸¹

Umar establishes official hierarchy

One of Umar’s actions that had far reaching consequences was creation of a register (dīwān) of payments (‘aṭā’). He entered all those people into it that were entitled to payments by the state. They ranged from Jarir bin Abdullah, the leader of Bajila who participated in Qadisiyyah to Hurmuzan, the Iranian petty king who converted to Islam after his defeat. The register grouped people according to the amount of their stipends from higher to lower.¹²⁸² The amount of stipend paid to anybody was proportional to his services for establishment of Islam.¹²⁸³ This register unintentionally created an official hierarchy of all and sundry in Medinan Caliphate. Descendants of the registrants kept claiming their superiority on basis of senior position of their ancestor in this register.¹²⁸⁴

Umar generated this register during conquests of Syria in 636 CE.¹²⁸⁵ He kept it upgrading as the events unfolded further.¹²⁸⁶

Earliest companions got super rich

Process of allotment of properties to companions of the Prophet had started during the Prophetic times. Abu Bakr, Abdur Rehman bin Awf, Zubayr bin Awwam, Abu Dujānah, Simāk bin Kharashah and others had got lands of Naḍīr in 625 CE.¹²⁸⁷

During caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar earliest Muslims had a stronger claim for newly acquired properties by the state as compared to later Muslims.¹²⁸⁸ Caliphs bestowed them generously. For example, both Abu Bakr and Umar allotted properties to Zubayr bin Awwam, while he was already in possession of a property granted to him by the Prophet.¹²⁸⁹ Enriching of the earliest Muslims, who happened to belong to Quraysh exclusively, partly explains inability of chiefs from other Muslim Arab tribes to lead any faction during First Arab Civil War of succession.

Medinan Caliphate establishes police force

As more Arabs resorted to settled life, their traditional ways of countering crime became obsolete. Security in big cities was far from perfect. Umar continuously responded to changing situation on ground. Islamic sauces credit Umar for establishing police force. Abdullah bin Abbas (‘Abdallah bin ‘Abbās عَبدُ اللّه بِن عَبّاس ) was in charge of Umar’s security forces (Shuraṭ) in Medina.¹²⁹⁰ As we hear of police force only in towns, it can be safely assumed that it was a need of metropolitan areas only.¹²⁹¹

Umar used Ansar for bookkeeping.

As ruling elite got indulged into monetary corruption, central government had to devise means to keep check on them. Group of people who was not part of the ruling elite was the best suited for this purpose. Though Umar was apprehensive in appointing Ansar to position of power, he didn’t mind using them to eye on his Quraysh officials. Designation of Muhammad Bin Maslama as auditor general is mentioned above.¹²⁹² Umar used Ansar for all kind of accounting. His chief census officer and surveyor of lands was Uthman bin Hunayf ( ‘Uthmān bin Ḥunayf عُثمان بِن حُنَيف ) of Ansar.¹²⁹³

Umar styles himself ‘Amir ul Mu’minun’

Few years after coming to power, in 639 CE Umar adopted the title of Amirul Mominun (Amīr ul Mu’minūn اَمِيرُ المُؤمِنُون ). Abu Musa Ash’ari was the first to address him “to the Servant of Allah Umar, commander of the faithful.” Then it became customary.¹²⁹⁴, ¹²⁹⁵, ¹²⁹⁶, ¹²⁹⁷

Tabari tells us the reason why Umar had to adopt this title. Before adoption of title of Amirul Mu’minun, Umar was called caliph to caliph to Messenger of Allah (khalīfat ar-khalīfat ar-Rasūl Allāh خَلِيفَةُ الخَلِيفَةُ الرَسُول اَللّه ). Obviously, this was a long title and Umar pondered if the trend continued the next caliph would be caliph to caliph to caliph to Messenger of Allah, and the title will be longer by one caliph with each new incumbent.¹²⁹⁸, ¹²⁹⁹

Umar used to consult extensively

Like his predecessors, Umar did not govern in isolation. He always involved early Muhajirun in important matters of the state. This kind of advisory could be more instrumental in giving them a sense of being a power behind the power and to maintain consensus among them rather than in discovering novel ideas. The Muhajirun had a sitting place in the mosque in which Umar used to discuss with them the news he received from different regions. One day he said “I know not how to treat the Magians” Abdur Rehman bin ‘Awf rose and said ‘I bear witness that the Prophet said ‘Treat them according to the same law with which ye treat the People of the Book’.¹³⁰⁰ ¹³⁰¹ Umar had made a precedent that he picked advise of only those who were steadfast companions of the Prophet.¹³⁰²

According to Ya’qubi, persons with the greatest influence on Umar were Abdullah bin Abbas, ‘Abdur Rehman bin Awf and Uthman bin Affan.¹³⁰³

Death of Umar

Umar got stabbed on November 2, 644 CE by a poisoned dagger.¹³⁰⁴ ¹³⁰⁵ He died on November 4, 644 CE and was buried on November 7, 644 CE.¹³⁰⁶

Umar owes his death to Futuhul Buldan to some extent. Abu Lulua Fayruz (Abū Lu’lu’ah Fayrūz اَبُو لؤ لؤَه فِيروز ), assassin of Umar, was an Iranian nationalist living in Medina as a slave of Mughira bin Shu’ba.¹³⁰⁷ ¹³⁰⁸ He was of Christian faith.¹³⁰⁹ In Tabari’s report, Abu Lulua managed to slip out of the mosque after murdering Umar, taking advantage of the crowd. A man belonging to the tribe of Tamim chased him, killed him, and recovered the instrument of murder.¹³¹⁰

Whenever big names die violently, it is always assassination. Lone wolf attack is rare. Umar himself suspected a conspiracy after being stabbed.¹³¹¹ Medinan Caliphate did not have legal resources to implicate the conspirators in the murder case. According to the law of land murderer was personally responsible for the crime and no further legal trial was needed as he was already dead. Umar’s family was not satisfied with this scenario. They blamed other Iranian residents of Medina as complicit to murder and wished them to be punished. Finding reluctance of law to act, Umar’s son, Ubaydullah (‘Ubaydallāh bin ‘Umar عُبَيدُ اللّه بِن عُمَر ) took law in his own hands and murdered Hurmuzan, Abu Lulua’s daughter, and Jufaynah, a Christian slave of Sa’d bin Waqqas from Hira.¹³¹² ¹³¹³

Umar’s murder sent shock waves among Muslim Arabs as is evident from Zohair inscription.¹³¹⁴ ¹³¹⁵ History has produced two kinds of rulers up to now. One are those who’s primary aim is to become a ruler, any public betterment by their hands is secondary. Others are those whose primary aim is public betterment, coming to power is secondary affair. Former are numerous and often forgotten after their rule ends. Later are rare and are remembered as a hero generations after generations. Umar belonged to the later genre. An inscription found near and written in 719 CE gives Umar bin Khattab the epithet of al-Faruq (al-Fārūq اَلفارُوق ).¹³¹⁶

Selection of new caliph

Umar was in good health and very active in management of state affairs. His unexpected death plunged the Medinan Caliphate into a constitutional crisis. The Medinan Caliphate had never chalked out a clear-cut formula for replacing a caliph. Previously, the dying caliph had appointed his successor. That time Medinan Caliphate was still in infancy. Now it had emerged as world’s leading power. Earliest Muslims of Meccan origin, who had immigrated along with the Prophet, were front runners for claim to the seat. Umar had already established official hierarchy among Muslims and they were foremost after the widows and kins of the Prophet. Early Medinan Ansars were inferior to them in official hierarchy and none of them thought of contending for the post.¹³¹⁷ Other tribes of Arabia and those members of Quraysh who accepted Islam after Badr were out of question. Caliph of Medinan Caliphate should have been earlier disciple of Prophet Muhammad, anyhow. Still, at least half a dozen people were aspirant to become caliph.

The few days between stabbing and death of Umar were loaded with political hustle and bustle in Medina but the provincial capitals remained mute. Umar was already weary of political maneuvers fashionable in Medina. At his deathbed he said” I have established the amṣār, set up dīwāns, implemented ‘aṭā’ and raided by land and sea. If I perish ….. you will take your own decisions as I have left you on the clear (path). I fear for you ……. a man who deems himself more entitled to rule than his fellow and fights him over it.” ¹³¹⁸

Ibn Ishaq mentions five people being first Muslims. They were Prophet Muhammad, Khadija, Ali, Zayd and Abu Bakr.¹³¹⁹ Then he mentions five more people who converted to Islam by Abu Bakr’s solicitation efforts. They are Uthman, Zubayr, Abdur Rehman bin Awf, Sa’d bin Waqqas and Talha bin Ubaydallah.¹³²⁰ All others converted after them.

Umar was crystal clear that one of them should become the next ruler of Medinan Caliphate because he believed in their prior ranking in the hierarchy of Islam he had officially created.¹³²¹ But he was uncertain about who out of them should be picked.

The Electoral College (shūrā) Umar nominated to select a caliph from its own members included all living persons who had attended Prophet Muhammad’s teaching circle at house of Arqam.¹³²² They included Ali, Uthman, Abdur Rehman bin Awf, Zubayr bin Awwam, Talha bin Ubaydallah and Sa’d bin Waqaas.¹³²³ Abdullah bin Umar (‘Abdallah bin ‘Umar عَبدَ اللّه بِن عُمَر ), Umar’s son was its president wielding power of casting vote in case the college splits into three versus three.¹³²⁴

The decision of the college was not instantaneous. It met in camera for three days.¹³²⁵ The debates there must be acrimonious.¹³²⁶ Finally, Abdur Rehman bin Awf emerged from the marathon session and announced selection of Uthman as the next caliph.¹³²⁷

Seventy four years old Uthman bin Affan (‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān عُثمان بِن عَفّان ) was a successful entrepreneur and financed Islamic movement generously.¹³²⁸ But he had no political acclaims on his curriculum vitae except that he was one of the earliest converts. He was not a man of sword, he didn’t participate in Badr and fled from battle field in ‘Uḥud.¹³²⁹ The Prophet didn’t assign him any expedition. He was not a man of opinion either. He didn’t have honor to sit on consultative committees during the Prophetic times and even after that during the time of first two caliphs. He, actually, doesn’t appear to be among the political aspirants during Umar’s caliphate. Selection of this non-political figure for the top slot of Medinan Caliphate must be a compromise among belligerent contenders to avoid further antagonism.¹³³⁰

Ya’qubi explains that Abdur Rehman withdrew his name from the contenders of the caliphate to play the role of power broker in the meetings of the Electoral College. And that there was a tie between Ali and Uthman. Abdur Rehman dropped Ali and picked Uthman on the grounds that Uthman was willing to accept book of Allah, Sunna of the Prophet and conduct (sīrah) of Abu Bakr and Umar as a guiding principal of his government, while Ali was reluctant to accept the conduct of the preceding two caliphs as a precedent. He considered himself equally able to the two previous caliphs.¹³³¹ ¹³³²

Both Abu Bakr and Umar had maintained that they did not wish to be a ruler, others had imposed this responsibility over them.¹³³³ The situation changed in absolutely opposite direction during meetings of Electoral College, whence everybody browsed his shoulder with others to win the top job.¹³³⁴ Gone were the days when nobody would present himself for leadership out of courtesy for others and people would name somebody other than self for the post. Ali was particularly ambitious during the proceedings. While others contested on basis of their credentials, Ali claimed the caliphate to be his birthright because he was from the clan of the Prophet.¹³³⁵ He lost the hope before the Electoral College met just by calculating how each member would vote and confided it with Abbas that ‘caliphate has slipped out of our hands’ ¹³³⁶ ¹³³⁷ All members accepted the outcome of Electoral College amicably except Ali. He slipped out of the crowd in front of whom the outcome was announced. He was called back to take oath of allegiance to Uthman. He took oath chanting ‘deceit, deceit’.¹³³⁸

Uthman took oath of his office on November 7, 644, after burial of Umar.¹³³⁹

Futuhul Buldan continues

Change of caliph was a local event in Medina. Governors of all far flung provinces of Medinan Caliphate just received the notice of the change and started obeying the new caliph the way they used to obey the previous one. Armies fighting on frontiers did not stop fighting for a single day. Medinan Caliphate’s policy to expand itself continued with full vigour. After assuming power Uthman ordered the commanders in the frontier areas to continue working on instructions given to them by the previous government as “they were chalked out in consultation with ‘us’ ”.¹³⁴⁰

Further thrust in Sasanian Iran

Forces of Medinan Caliphate were engaged in subduing many different kings of Sasanian Iran when Umar died. All empires in history have practiced violence and coercion for their establishment and existence. Yet, since their governing elite is always small in relation to the numbers of their subjects, all empires make use of a range of non-violent strategies to maintain their rule: co-opting the willing, rewarding collaboration, promising protection in return for submission, playing divide and rule, and so on. The Medinan Caliphate was no exception to this. Its army avoided use of sheer force where other methods did the trick during the last phase of Futuhul Buldan.

Kerman

Towards east of Isfahan, up to the western fringes of Dahsht-e-Lut, the Iranian Plateau was arid or semi arid. This stretch of land, which was to the northeast of Fars, constituted the Sasanian Iranian province of Kerman.¹³⁴¹ Kerman was scrotching hot in summer and bitterly cold in the winter. Melting snow was source of water but it had to be carried through specially designed under surface aqueducts called qanat (qanāt قَنات ) or karez for irrigation due to fear of water loss as a result of evaporation. Population was scanty.¹³⁴² Main town in the province was Veh-Ardashi.¹³⁴³

First tussle between troops of Medinan Caliphate and people of Kerman was during the last years of Umar’s tenure when, after success at Jayy in Isfahan, Abdullah bin Budhayl, continued his thrust eastwards and reached up to Ṭabasayn.¹³⁴⁴ ¹³⁴⁵ ¹³⁴⁶

The same year another contingent of Medinan Caliphate traversed into Kerman. Two separate commanders collaborated with each other in this campaign, Suhayl bin Adi (Suhayl bin ‘Adi سُهيل بِن عَدى ) and Abdullah bin Abdullah.¹³⁴⁷ They didn’t achieve anything except killing the local Marzban (Marzbān مَرزبان ) and looting some bactrians and ewes. This army penetrated up to Jīrfat.¹³⁴⁸ ¹³⁴⁹

By early years of Uthman’s reign, kerman had some kind of vessel relations with Medinan Caliphate. Uthman appointed Abdur Rehman bin Ghubays (‘Abd al Rehman bin Ghubays عَبدُ الرحمن بِن غُبيس ) to Kirman. Later Uthman removed Abdur Rehman and sent back Adi bin Suhayl bin Adi (‘Adi bin Suhayl bin ‘Adi بِن عَدى سُهيل بِن عَدى ). In 648 CE Uthman gave governorship of Kirman to Asim bin Amr (‘Āṣim bin Amr عاصِم بِن عمرؤ ), who died there. At the time of Uthman’s death Imran (‘Imrān عِمران ) held authority in Kirman.¹³⁵⁰ ¹³⁵¹

Makran

Arid and economically impoverished province of Makran laid between Kerman in the west and Sind of India in the east.¹³⁵²

Following Umar’s policy to penetrate into Sasanian Iran as far as possible and subjugate its kings, four commanders of Medinan caliphate namely, Suhayl bin Adi, Abdullah bin Abdulah, Hakam bin Amr (Ḥakam bin ‘Amr حَكَم بِن عَمرؤ ) of Taghlib, and Mukhariq bin Shihab (Mukhāriq bin Shihāb مُخارِق بِن شِهاب ) infiltrated into Makran.¹³⁵³ Collaborating with each other, they faced the ruler of Makran whose title was Rasil (Rāsil راسِل ). Men of Medinan Caliphate could get some booty in the form of elephants and they sent twenty percent share to the central government. However, Hakam wrote to Umar about the baldness of the mountains, scarcity of the water, poor quality of agricultural produce, endless distances and the bravery of the people of the province. In nutshell, too big an effort with too little to achieve. Umar halted the operation. Ruler of Sind had sent some troops to support Rasil on his request. Armies of Medinan Caliphate did not cross the river in hot pursuit. Both, the troops of Sind and Medinan Caliphate withdrew from each other. Rasil remained in power. He didn’t enter into any agreement with Medinan Caliphate.¹³⁵⁴, ¹³⁵⁵

Makran was the last province of Sasanian Iran, bordering states of India. Exact boundary between Sasanian Iran and Sind in India is not known. The inscription of Shapur II engraved on ka’ba-ye Zartosht, which claims that Sasanian Iran governed over Makran and Sind is outdated for our purposes. Chachnama, written in early thirteenth century CE, describes a certain king by name of Sahiras Rai ruling over kingdom of Sindh around seventh century. All districts of this kingdom, according to Chachnama were on the east side of River Indus except one. Sīwistān was located on the west side of River Indus and extended to ‘mountains of Rojhan up to the boundary of Makrān’.¹³⁵⁶, ¹³⁵⁷, ¹³⁵⁸ It gives an impression that in first half of seventh century the boundary between Sasanian Iran and Sindh in India were mountain of Sulaiman and Kirthar ranges.

Like Kerman, Makran might have got a political alignment with Medinan Caliphate during Uthman’s reign. We hear that when Uthman took office in 644 CE, he sent Ubaydallah bin Ma’mar (‘Ubaydallāh bin Ma’mar عُبيد اللّه بِن مَعمَر ) of Taym to Makran. Ubaydallah battled unceasingly until he reached the river.¹³⁵⁹, ¹³⁶⁰ Later ‘Uthman appointed Umayr bin Uthman (‘Umayr bin Uthmān bin Sa’d عُمَير بِن عُثمان بِن سَعد ) over Makran. At the time of Uthman’s death Ibn Kindir (Ibn Kindīr al-Qushayri ابنُ الكِندِير القُريشى ) held authority in Makran.¹³⁶¹, ¹³⁶²

Conquest of Fars

Significance of Fars province to Sasanian Iran cannot be undermined.¹³⁶³ It was the heartland of the country. It was cradle of all earlier dynasties of Iran, including Achaemenians and Sasanians. Its people, who used to be called Farsi, became the main ethnicity of Sasanian Iran and their religion, Zoroastrian (Pārsi) became the official religion of the nation. The word Fars later got Anglicized to be Persia.¹³⁶⁴

Fars spread over the southern part of Iranian Plateau, southern portion of Zagros Mountains, and the coastal low lying land up to Persian Gulf. Its terrain composed of mostly ridges intersected by plains. Its mild weather supported all kind of agriculture and economic activity.¹³⁶⁵

By mid-640’s Fars got totally entrapped by areas either directly controlled by Medinan Caliphate like Khuzestan, Bahrain and Oman, or indirectly influenced by it like Isfahan and Kerman. Medinan Caliphate, anyhow, could not engulf Fars. Deep rooted nationalism among its inhabitants explains the impasse. Fars had averted an ill envisaged invasion by A’la bin Hadhrami successively in 638 CE.¹³⁶⁶

When Umar ordered all out invasion on Sasanian Iran after victory of Nahavand, some battalions of Medinan Caliphate reached Fars via land. In 643 CE battalion commanded by Sariya bin Zunaym (Sāriyah bin Zunaym سارِيَه بِن ظُنيم ) of Kinana reached as far interior in Fars as Tawwj, Dārābjird and Fasā¹³⁶⁷, ¹³⁶⁸

We hear campaign of Mujashi bin Mas’ud (Mujāshi bin Mas’ūd مُجاشي بِن مَسعُود ) by the same time when he headed for Sābūr and jur.¹³⁶⁹, ¹³⁷⁰

Anyhow, no concrete result emerged. We don’t hear of any political gains as a result of these campaigns. Either the people of Fars repulsed the attacks or they were slippery enough to dodge the invaders.

Further attempts on Fars came after death of Umar, during reign of Uthman. Uthman bin Abi As of Thaqif, Uthman’s governor over Taif, Bahrain and Oman campaigned against Fars in 647 CE.¹³⁷¹ The army of Medinan Caliphate could capture Sābūr.¹³⁷² It even browsed with Istkhar and Jur but, apparently, no permanent political set up resulted.¹³⁷³, ¹³⁷⁴

In the fall of 649 CE Abdullah bin Amir (‘Abdallah bin ‘Āmir عَبدَ اللّه بِن عامِر ), the newly appointed governor of Basrah mobilized his extensive manpower based in Basrah to launch a major attack at the heartland of the Sasanian Royal family at Fars.¹³⁷⁵, ¹³⁷⁶, ¹³⁷⁷ The army briskly took control of many cities of Fars including Sābūr, Fasā and Darābjird.¹³⁷⁸ When it reached the mountainous bastions of Istakhr and Jur it got stuck.¹³⁷⁹, ¹³⁸⁰ Istakhr was descendent of legendary Iranian city of Persepolis which was visited by Alexander of Macedonia about a millennium ago.¹³⁸¹ It was the original hometown of house of Sasan and remained their capital during their early days.¹³⁸² The defendants of the town had audacity to confront the enemy.¹³⁸³

Death of Yazdegerd

Stiff resistance offered by Iranians in Fars further strengthened the resolve of the leadership of Medinan Caliphate that physical elimination of Yazdegerd was a must for security of their country and for further eastward expansion. They started sending raiding parties to hunt down Yazdegerd.

After first attacks of Muslim army on Fars Yazdegerd had fled from Istkhr to Kerman.¹³⁸⁴ In 650 CE Abdullah bin Amir sent an expedition party to capture him. This army, a good luck for Yazdegerd, got caught by a snow storm and nearly annihilated. A few of them survived.¹³⁸⁵ Character of Yazdegerd appears to be stubborn and arrogant. He used to develop enmity quickly with each of the marzban who gave him refuge. One day Yazdegerd was sitting in Karman when its marzban came in; Yazdegerd felt too haughty to speak to him, and the marzban ordered that he be driven out, saying, “Not only art thou unworthy of a kingdom but even of a governorship of a village; and if Allah had seen any good in thee, he would not have put thee in such condition!”. Yazdegerd left for Sistan whose king showed regard for him and exalted him. After a few days Yazdegerd asked for kharāj which made the king change his attitude towards him. Seeing that, Yazdegerd left for Khurasan.¹³⁸⁶ When Yazdegerd reached the boundary of town of Merv its sutrup [marzban] Mahawia (Māhawaih مَهاوِيَه ) received him with pomp and honor.¹³⁸⁷, ¹³⁸⁸

Hoyland insists that whole of Khurasan was still not totally under Muslim control when a Muslim army marched all the way to Merv to catch Yazdegerd where he was holed.¹³⁸⁹ This Muslim raiding party didn’t have to finish their job. Yazdegerd himself and his Iranian marzabans were enough for it.

Ahnaf bin Qays started his laborious journey into Khurasan from Quhistan (Quhistān قُهِستان). He passed by Ṭabasayn. On reaching Herat he assured its goodwill. Then, he continued his march straight to Merv. He quickly dispatched small levies to the towns of Naysābūr and Sarakhs to assure passivity on their part. After preliminary measures Ahnaf intimidated Yazdegard out of Merv al Rudh (Merv al Rūdh مَرو الرُوذ) into Balkh. There he coerced Yazdegerd into a battle – his first and the last. After a brief encounter Yazdegerd hurried across the River Murghāb into the country of the Turks along with his Persian nobles and entourage.¹³⁹⁰ ¹³⁹¹ This thrashing of Yazdegerd initiated the cascade of events which culminated into his murder.¹³⁹², ¹³⁹³, ¹³⁹⁴, ¹³⁹⁵

Yazdegerd died in mysterious circumstances in 652 CE. Soebos informs us, without explaining much, that after initial skirmish with Arab raiding party, in which Yardgard’s troops were routed, he escaped to T’etals, [Turks] who had promised to help him. At the very moment the Iranian prince of Marat [identified as Khurrazad by Hoyland and Pourshariati. Khurrazad was commander of Iranian force that fought Medinan Caliphate at Jalula] deserted Yarzdgard to join the Arabs. The T’etal troops seized Yazdegerd and killed him.¹³⁹⁶

Hoyland stresses that Khurrazad, the prince of Jibal [Media], after the death of his brother Rustam in Qadisiyyah, had headed eastward, intending to join the Persian nobles fighting against Arabs. There was a disagreement between Khurrazad and the Shahanshah. The Shahanshah wished to go to the Turks or the Chinese to plead for supports against the Arabs, while Khurrazad was adamant that he should not abandon his own people and that it would be a dangerous move to enter foreign lands in such a position of weakness. Ultimately Khurrazad decided to make some sort of deal with the Arabs to buy themselves time.¹³⁹⁷, ¹³⁹⁸

With ignominious murder of Yazdegerd, died the four twenty six years old Sasanian Iran.¹³⁹⁹ The news spread all over. Princes and nobles of Iran, who up to now have been resisting Arab invaders in a hope of comeback, started co-operating with them.¹⁴⁰⁰, ¹⁴⁰¹

The remnants of Sasanians

Yazdegerd’s son, Fairuz (Fairūz فَيروز ) did not lose hope. He escaped to the Turks, who gave him a woman to marry and to settle there.¹⁴⁰² Later, during First Arab Civil War (656 – 660 CE) he made some progress in east Iran. Chinese emperor Gaozong (650 – 705 CE) helped him establishing an enclave called ‘Persian Command Area”. He could even mint his own coins. However, in 663 CE Arabs resumed their eastward advance, forcing the young prince to retreat and take refuge in the Chinese capital, Chang’an (modern Xi’an). There he set up a Persian court in exile. The court came to a dead end after his death. He is commemorated by a statue inscribed with the legend: “Peroz, king of Persia, grand general of the right courageous guard and commander-in-chief of Persia.” ¹⁴⁰³

Arab Muslims annihilate Sasanian Iran

Death of Yazdagerd removed the last hurdle between invading armies of Medinan Caliphate and vestiges of Sasanian Iran. Soldiers of Medinan Caliphate reached far off corners of Sasanian Empire to claim the lands in Medinan Caliphate’s name and impose tributes over them, even if the amount of the tribute was just a token. Not a single non-Muslim source has survived to narrate the events of eastern Iran. We totally reckon on Islamic sources for it.

Sistan aligned

There was a land called Sākastan. Later, during pre-Islamic times it became Sījistan. Then Sījistan moulded into Sistan (Sīstān سِيستان ).¹⁴⁰⁴ This was the land that roughly coincided with modern Sistan of Iran, the upper Baluchistan of Pakistan and lower and central Afghanistan.¹⁴⁰⁵ Sistan, bisected by Helmand River, accommodated far off towns like Zaranj, Kandahar and Kabul.¹⁴⁰⁶ By far, Sistan was the largest province of Sasanian Iran. Actually, it was bigger than Khurasan.¹⁴⁰⁷

Whole of Sistan had difficult terrain, rugged mountains, deep valleys and numberless springs.¹⁴⁰⁸ The contours explain presence of so many varied identities in the region.¹⁴⁰⁹

Not a single soldier of Medinan Caliphate had reached Sistan by the time of Umar’s death in the fall of 644 CE. Uthman was the first caliph who dared to send troops to this far-flung land. Abdullah bin Amir didn’t face any hurdles in sending his troops used in Fars to make inroads into Sistan in 650’s.¹⁴¹⁰ The commander of this army is said to be Abdullah bin Umayr (‘Abdallāh bin ‘Umayr عَبدَ اللّه بِن عُمَير ) of Layth clan of Kinana tribe.¹⁴¹¹ Conquest of Zajrang, in any case, produced adversity for the conquerers.¹⁴¹² Then the army proceeded to Kandhar. Thence the army of Abdullah bin Umayr continued its march up to Kabul and captured it.¹⁴¹³, ¹⁴¹⁴, ¹⁴¹⁵, ¹⁴¹⁶

The political settlements reached in Sistan appear to be of permanent nature. We keep hearing that Uthman maintained a governor in the region. Initially he was Abdullah bin Amir, then Asim bin Amr ( ‘Āṣim bin ‘Amr عاصِم بِن عَمرؤ ), followed by Imran bin Fasil (‘Imrān bin Faṣīl al Burjumi عِمران بِن فَصِيل البُجُمى ) and Umayr bin Ahmar (‘Umayr bin Aḥmar عُمَير بِن احمَر ). Abdur Rehman bin Samura (‘Abd al-Rehman bin Samurah عَبدُ الرحمن بِن سَمره ), who belonged to the clan of Ḥabīb bin ‘Abd Shams, held authority over Sistan by the time of Uthman’s death.¹⁴¹⁷, ¹⁴¹⁸

To the east of Kabul was the city of Purushapura across the mountain passes.¹⁴¹⁹ Xuanzang, a Chinese Buddhist pilgrim who visited the region in 630 CE, doesn’t describe any Sasanian influence over this town.¹⁴²⁰ It means, the boundary between Sasanian Iran and the Indian states was Spīn Ghar (Safaid koh) mountain range, roughly the same as it is between modern Afghanistan and Pakistan. The forces of Medinan Caliphate didn’t cross into any area pertaining to India. Neither they climbed up the towering Hindu Kush mountains that sweep across north of Kabul. Kabul remained the farthest post of Medinan Caliphate in Sistan.

People of Sistan practiced Buddhism predominantly.¹⁴²¹ Invading Muslims accepted them as ‘people of book’ like they had done previously with Zoroastrians. Their Idols remained intact.

Handling of Khurasan

All geographic area of Sasanian Iran east of Jibal is loosely called Khurasan by Islamic sources.¹⁴²² Literally the word means ‘sun rise’ in Pahlavi, and was simply the eastern part of the empire. Its boundary started somewhere from Gorgan and Qumis in the west, and ended somewhere Tukharistan in the east.¹⁴²³ It encompassed all the highlands to the northeast of Kavir Desert in modern Iran, including Kopetdag mountain range, the Parapmiscus mountains of modern Afghanistan, and extended over the arid steppe of modern Turkmenistan. Natural boundaries of Hindu Kush to the south, Pamir in the west and Altai Mountain and Karakam desert separated Khurasan from areas further east which traditionally remained under China’s domain. To the southeast of it was equally vast Sistan province. To the south was Kerman.¹⁴²⁴

Touching militarily such a vast and varied landscape harbouring plentiful cultures and voluminous political entities needed audacity.¹⁴²⁵ Initial squabble with Khurasan had started during the last years of Umar’s reign when the battalions of Medinan Caliphate, which were engaged in Elburz region, advanced further in Khuraasan. The results were unpromising from Medinan Caliphate point of view.¹⁴²⁶

During Uthman’s reign Khurasan endured two separate attacks of Medinan Caliphpate. In 650 CE when Medinan Caliphate had occupied much of Fars and still maneuvering to capture Yazdegerd, Uthman ordered his governor over Basrah Abdullah bin Amir to assail Khurasan with full force. Abdullah sent a vanguard of an army that tried on Qumis (Qūmis قُومِس ). They got co-operation of a local dihqan whom they appointed tax collector, the office being transferable to his progeny hereditarily. This army then marched to Naysābūr and besieged the town. Here Abdullah himself joined the men. The town surrendered in 651 CE on terms of paying Jizyah. Nearby towns of Abarshahr and Tous followed the suit.¹⁴²⁷, ¹⁴²⁸

Now it was turn of far flung districts. Abdullah divided his army into three battalions, each to invade in different directions. The battalion that marched on Herat got an easy success. People of Herat just agreed to pay Jizyah on receiving a demand notice from Arabs. Būshanj and Bādhghīs surrounding Herat met the same fate.¹⁴²⁹, ¹⁴³⁰

The Battalion that marched onto Merv al Rudh could capitulate it. It continued to conquer Ṭālaqān, Fāriyāb and Ṭukhāristan until they reached Oxux.¹⁴³¹, ¹⁴³²

The third battalion successfully subjugated Sarakhs.¹⁴³³

Ya’qubi further claims that the forces of Abdullah bin Amir clashed with Turks and Daylamites but doesn’t give vivid details.¹⁴³⁴

The same time when Uthman ordered Abdullah bin Amir to invade Khurasan, he gave similar instructions to his governor over Kufa Sa’id bin As (Sa’īd bin al ‘Āṣ سَعِيد بِن العاص ).¹⁴³⁵, ¹⁴³⁶ Sa’id started his campaign from camping at Qumis. This town was already under influence of Medinan Caliphate after entering into a treaty with it at the end of Battle of Nahavand. Its treaty was recently reestablished by the forces of Abdullah bin Amir. He didn’t find any grounds to push the town further to the wall. He then proceeded to Tabaristan. The Ispahbadh of Tabaristan had made peace with Medinan Caliphate during reign of Umar on the understanding that army of Medinan Caliphate would not attack his domain in return for a certain tribute (māl) to be paid by him. Sa’id bin As didn’t mind attacking him in 651 CE. Then this column of Medinan Army reached Gorgan (Jurjān جُرجان ) and concluded a treaty with it requiring two hundred thousand Dirhams. Then Sa’id marched to Ṭamīsah. Its inhabitants fought so fiercely that Sa’īd had to organize prayer of fear (ṣalāt al khawf). When the town surrendered, Sa’id seized all of their property and killed everybody. Last, the troops ended up in Nāmiyah which is not a city but a desert.¹⁴³⁷, ¹⁴³⁸, ¹⁴³⁹

Sa’id’s campaign appears to be a disaster for Medinan Caliphate. The reason could be Sa’id’s apparent deceits. He attacked Tabaristan despite an existing treaty of non-aggression between people of that land and Medinan Caliphate. He also killed all the inhabitants of Ṭamīsah, though they had surrendered on promise of life. Worst reaction came from people of Gorgan. When Sa’id’s army left, they closed off the road that led from Qumis to Khurasan. Only daring caravans could pass by this road that were ready to take the risk of death. The road never opened for the next half century. Medinan Caliphate had to use the road starting from Fars and passing through Kirman to travel to Khurasan.¹⁴⁴⁰

The last skirmish with Khurasan was the adventure of Ahnaf, mentioned above. According to Tabari, after this campaign all communities between Naysābūr and Tukharistan (Ṭukhāristān طُخارِستان ), which were previously managed by a Sasanian Shahanshah, raced to enter into friendly treaties with Medinan Caliphate.¹⁴⁴¹

Worth noting is that Islamic sources do not record leaving of any garrisons in Khurasan during campaign of Abdullah bin Amir, Sa’id bin As or Ahnaf, meaning Medinan Caliphate didn’t take over direct control of Khurasan. Anyhow, they left representative officials to ensure continuation of treaties. Abdullah bin Amir divided the vast land of Khurasan into four quarters with one official for each.¹⁴⁴²

Buddhism was popular religion in this part of the world.¹⁴⁴³ This religion had royal backing in china and in numerous minor polities in Central Asia by this time. In 7^th century the ruling dynasty of Tibetan empire had adopted Budhism.¹⁴⁴⁴ Reason of Medinan Caliphate’s assaults on this region was to align it politically. Spread of Islam was definitely not their agenda here. They didn’t even mention religion in their treaties. Full penetration into Khurasan might have taken a few years and many of events mentioned above might have taken place after death of Yazdederd Repetition of story of attack, besiege and surrender of the same town time and again by Islamic sources reflects their confusion about situation on ground, which was a tug of war between Medinan Caliphate and the communities of Khurasan. They wished to remain independent. Medinan Caliphate wished them to be nominally attached to Medinan Caliphate.

Rebellions in Sasanian Iran

Summing up the story of Medinan Caliphate’s conquest of Sasanian Iran, Tabari narrates, “The Persians handed over the treasures to the Muslims, entered into agreement with them and gradually returned to their lands and wealth in as good a state as they had been at the time of the Sasanian emperors. It was as if they were [still] under their rule except for the fact that the Muslims were more worthy of their confidence and acted more justly towards them.¹⁴⁴⁵

Tabari’s story highlights the fact that most of the ex-Sasanian provinces, annexed by Medinan Caliphate after battle of Nahavand, retained their original wealth and local rulers. Only central government changed for them. Anyhow, the story further emphasizes that they didn’t break up into fully sovereign political entities. They still had to pay annual tax to Medinan Caliphate, though it might be a token money.

The change of power in eastern Sasanian Iran, no doubt, didn’t change their political mindset. They never let officials collect taxes from them in routine during lifetime of Medinan Caliphate. Sources continue to record rebellions in these provinces. Some of the rebellions flared up immediately the army of Medinan Caliphate left an area. Others flared up at a later time when situation got ripe for it.

“In that year the Medes rebelled from Ishmaelite service and killed the Ishmaelite king’s Prince of taxation”, asserts Sebeos. “They [the rebels] took refuge in the strongholds of the land of Medes, the deep forests, the chasms, rocky places, the troublesome deep valleys which are by the Gaz River and Marat’s mountain. …. . for they were unable to bear the bitter and harsh service and the weight of the tax which had been imposed on them. Each year 365 sacks of money were taken from them. From those who could not pay they took a man for each dram and eliminated the cavalry and the principality of the land. For such reasons they placed their lives in the balance and one out of two thought it better either to die, or to be freed from that wicked service. They started to assemble the remaining people into an army and to organize by brigades so that perhaps they might escape the dragon’s teeth and the bitter breath of the beast. ….. . Many [Arabs] lost their lives at the strongholds, falling headlong into the deep valleys. Many were pierced by arrows in the rough thorn patches, [arrows] shot by brave manly warriors. [The Arabs] fled the place heading north towards the people who dwell by the Caspian Gates.¹⁴⁴⁶ Sebeos doesn’t elaborate which year he is talking about. It should be somewhere after Battle of Nahavand when Medinan Caliphate had captured Jibal. Islamic sources do report rebellion in Jibal at this juncture. According to Tabari, Hamedan and its chief Khusrawwunūm had agreed to the terms of Medinan Caliphate after Iranian defeat at Nahavand. As soon as the troops of Medinan Caliphate returned from the area they reneged.¹⁴⁴⁷ “So Nu’aym bin Muqarrin went forth with his [army] in formation”, Tabari reports. “He went down [ the mountain road of] Thaniyyat al-Asal. ….. Fayruzān, [the fleeing Iranian field commander of Battle of Nahavand] had reached [the road], which was crowded with beasts of burden carrying honey and other things, so he was hemmed in by them until he dismounted. Then he had gone up the mountain….. was pursued and taken. When they stopped at Kinkiwar, some of the Muslim animals were stolen, so it was given the name Qaṣt al Luṣūs. Then Nu’aym went down the mountain road and stopped at the town of Hamadhān. But they had already fortified, ….. so he besieged [the Hamdhānīs], taking the area between there and Jarmīdhān. [the Muslims] took control of the whole area of Hamadhān. When the inhabitants of the town realized this, they sued for peace [with the request] that he treat them and those who had [originally] complied [with his demand to surrender without fighting] exactly alike. This he did and accepted tribute from them for their protection.¹⁴⁴⁸, ¹⁴⁴⁹

Note the tone of two historic sources. One is hostile to Medinan Caliphate, other is its supporter. By this kind of reporting we can simply know that rebellions did take place but they were wobbly. None of them forced Medinan Caliphate to pack up and scamper.¹⁴⁵⁰

Similar to Jibal was the story of the province of Isfahan. When forces of Abdullah bin Budhayl, with the help of auxiliary forces of Abu Musa Ash’ari overcame Isfahan in 644 CE, the people only waited until Arab garrisons were out of sight. They rebelled with their full capacity. Abu Musa had to overpower them again and had to impose the same conditions which they had agreed to earlier.¹⁴⁵¹

In 653 CE, just after return of troops of Medinan Caliphate from Khurasan, one person by name of Qarin (Qārin قارِن ) rebelled. He gathered forty thousand people from Bādhīs, Herat and Quhistan. Arabs defeated him by night attack and killed him.¹⁴⁵²

Many a times the rebellions were not full-scaled. They were simply sabotage activities carried out in difficult to access areas. Persians and Kurds of Khuzestan joined hands to hide in mountainous areas of Bayrūdh in summer of 644 CE. Their combined efforts blocked the smooth running of the traffic on Basrah to Fars road, threatening supplies to the army of Medinan Caliphate active in different sectors in Iran. Abu Musa Ash’ari, the then governor of Busrah, had to mobilize his soldiers on foot to tackle the miscreants. They took time and effort to eradicate the miscreants.¹⁴⁵³, ¹⁴⁵⁴

The narratives of assault, surrender, agreement and then rebellion give an impression that Medinan Caliphate was fighting all alone and not a single soul from eastern Iran joined hands with the invading Arabs. This is far from truth. Actually, from the very beginning of the attack forces of Medinan Caliphate could win some local people to their side who fought along with them and shared the fruit of victory with them. For example, an Iranian leader by name of Muka’bir fought from Muslim side against his fellow countrymen in Fars.¹⁴⁵⁵

Fall of Istakhr

After resisting armies of Medinan Caliphate for many years, ultimately, the cities of Istakhr and Jur surrendered in mid-650’s to Abdullah bin Amir.¹⁴⁵⁶ News of death of Yazdegerd might have demoralized the defendants. Muslim rage was serious. They had lost a lot of lives to achieve success. Moreover, they did not want any Sasanian led comeback. Theophilus of Edessa states that they put to sword about forty thousand inhabitants of the town of Istakhr including many elite Sasanians.¹⁴⁵⁷

The defeat of Iranians in Istakhr was not final. People of whole Fars rebelled under their leader Shahrak soon after. Uthman bin Abi As had to beat them again. Shahrak got killed.¹⁴⁵⁸ Hostilities of general public of Fars against Medinan Caliphate continued. Once Fars burst into rebellion when Ubaydallah bin Ma’mar was lieutenant governor there. The rebels killed Ubaydallah at the gate of the city. Uthman bin Abi As had to bring troops from Basrah to crush the rebellion.¹⁴⁵⁹

Azerbaijan becomes realm of Medinan Caliphate

The lowlands of Kura River constrained between lesser and greater Caucasus Mountains were known as Azerbaijan to Arabic sources.¹⁴⁶⁰ Local Azerbaijani population shared this relatively small land with a number of other ethnicities. Kurds used to live in Arran (Arrān اَرّان ), a region north of Azerbaijan proper.¹⁴⁶¹, ¹⁴⁶² Armenians were abundant in the highlands of Azerbaijan.¹⁴⁶³ Azerbaijan was totally Christian, and being governed by local rulers under aegis of Sasanian Iran.¹⁴⁶⁴, ¹⁴⁶⁵ The population appears to be conciliatory because we don’t hear of any political turmoil in the region in pre-Islamic times.

Initially, troops of Medinan Caliphate touched Azerbaijan in 643 CE after victory of Nahavand.¹⁴⁶⁶ It was part of Umar’s strategy to bring all areas of Sasanian Iran under influence of Medinan Caliphate. He sent two field commanders by name of Bukayr and Utba bin Farqad (‘Utbah bin Farqad عُتبَه بِن فَرقَد ).¹⁴⁶⁷ Utba’s battalion engaged with Bahrām bin Farrukhzādādh [unidentified petty ruler] and defeated him.¹⁴⁶⁸ Then, after a trivial fight, Bukayr captured Jarmīdhah bin Farrukhzādh (Isfandiyādh), who was fleeing from Waj Rudh.¹⁴⁶⁹ Muslim party used Jarmīdhah’s good offices to convince the people of Azerbaijan that resisting was useless.¹⁴⁷⁰ Umar, actually, got surprised by the swift victory.¹⁴⁷¹ He appointed Utba lieutenant governor over Azerbaijan.¹⁴⁷²

After assuring submission of Azerbaijan, forces of Medinan Caliphate advanced further north and Bukayr besieged Bab (Bāb با ب ).¹⁴⁷³, ¹⁴⁷⁴ Its ruler was Shahrbaraz, an ethnic Persian from a well-known family. He agreed to provide Medinan Caliphate with soldiers in time of war and to pay monetary tributes during peace years.¹⁴⁷⁵ Now, Bukayr marched on Mūqān. The town accepted the terms.¹⁴⁷⁶, ¹⁴⁷⁷

To the north of Azerbaijan was the abode of Turks. They were warlike people. Shahanshah Khosrao Anūshīrvān had to build a wall at the northern boundary of Azerbaijan, whose one end started from Caspian sea.¹⁴⁷⁸ The purpose of the wall was to protect Azerbaijan from Turkish raids. Somewhere between 630’s and 650’s a particular ethnicity of Turks had established themselves in lower Volga region. They were called Khazars. They seem to have begun as a group within the Turk confederation, which was at that time coming under severe pressure from the recently established Tang dynasty in China. The Khazar’s territory stretched from modern Ukraine to western Kazakhstan.¹⁴⁷⁹ Khazar elite had picked Judaism as their religion.¹⁴⁸⁰

Umar didn’t mind checking Khazar defenses. Surāqah had died after the success of Mūqān and Abdur Rehman bin Rabi’a (‘Abd al Rehman bin Rabī’ah رَبِيعَه عَبدُ الرحمن بِن ) had replaced him. Umar ordered Abdur Rehman to raid on Khazars.¹⁴⁸¹, ¹⁴⁸² Shahrbaraz, the friendly ruler of Bāb, warned Abdur Rehman bin Rabi’a to avoid areas of Khazars. But Abdur Rehman played the warning down saying that he had men who had accompanied the Prophet and they would be victorious. He raided Balanjar, reached as far north as Bayḍa, and returned without any casualty.¹⁴⁸³, ¹⁴⁸⁴ Encouraged by his initial success, Abdur Rehman raided the area once more and survived again. Turks [Khazars] did not attack him. They rather fortified themselves and allowed Abdur Rehman to depart with booty.¹⁴⁸⁵ He continued to raid the Turks during Uthman’s reign. Once, during such a raid, the Turks retaliated, charged Abdur Rehman’s guerrillas, and defeated them.¹⁴⁸⁶ ‘Abdur Rehman laid his life in the battle.¹⁴⁸⁷

It appears that the defeat of Abdur Rehman destabilized Medinan Caliphate’s control over Azerbaijan. The area became independent temporarily.

Six thousand strong army of Kufan division of Medinan Caliphate entered again into Azerbaijan in 650 CE.¹⁴⁸⁸ Immediate reason of attack, described by Islamic sources, is a dispute among two generals, Habib bin Maslama and Salman bin Rabi’a (Salmān bin Rabī’ah سَلمان بِن رَبِيعَه ), operating in Armenia, on distribution of booty. Uthman disengaged them by sending Salman and his Kufan division of army to Azerbaijan.¹⁴⁸⁹ Salman could easily subjugate Shirvān. Its king made peace with him. He, then, marched on until he reached the land of Masqaṭ, Lakz, Shābirān and Filān.¹⁴⁹⁰, ¹⁴⁹¹

After plundering and capitulating much of Azerbaijan, Salman penetrated into Arran.¹⁴⁹² Arran, though a geographic entity on its own merit, was part of the Khazar empire.¹⁴⁹³ Salman marched until he came to Baylaqān. Its people came out of the town to meet him and made peace with him. He, then, marched on until he reached Bardha’a and its people again made peace with him on terms of a given sum.¹⁴⁹⁴, ¹⁴⁹⁵ Everything didn’t go the way Salman was expecting. City of Bab closed its doors on Salman. Desperately, Salman’s army crossed river Balanjar near town of Balanjar. Here Khaqan (Khāqān خاقان ) of Khazars was anxiously waiting for him with his troops. He met him on the banks of river Balanjar. Khazars mowed down the invading Arab army instantaneously. Four thousands of them, including Salman himself, died chanting “Allah is great”.¹⁴⁹⁶, ¹⁴⁹⁷, ¹⁴⁹⁸

We don’t know if Uthman had assigned Salman to invade further north of Azerbaijan or it was his quest of booty that took him to Arran. Whatever the case, the line between Azerbaijan and Arran became boundary between Medinan Caliphate and the Khazar empire. Khazars were too strong to pay Jizyah.¹⁴⁹⁹

Raids on Anatolia

Umar was not interested in extending border of Medinan Caliphate across Taurus Mountains on Syrian front. His death in fall of 644 CE changed the approach of Medinan Caliphate towards this region.¹⁵⁰⁰, ¹⁵⁰¹

Raid on ‘Ammūriyah in Byzantine province of Phrygian in 645 CE heralded the beginning of Muslim Arab’s expeditionary campaigns onto the Anatolian Plateau with strategic as well as predatory aims.¹⁵⁰², ¹⁵⁰³, ¹⁵⁰⁴

One year later, in summer of 646 CE, Mu’awiya sent Yazid bin Hurr (Yazīd bin Ḥurr يَزِيد بِن حُرّ )of ‘Abs tribe to raid Anatolian Plateau again without any concrete gains.¹⁵⁰⁵ By this time Byzantine resistance had hardened. They had got valuable time to re-organize themselves. Constans II could fortify cities and strongholds to develop a coherent resistance.¹⁵⁰⁶ The raiding party found whole area between Antakiya and Tarsūs vacant, adding to their logistic difficulties.¹⁵⁰⁷, ¹⁵⁰⁸

Then the raids became Muwaya’s ritual. Uthman had allowed Mu’awiya to carry out these attacks without taking any specific interest in them.¹⁵⁰⁹

Mu’awiya’s offensive campaigns against the Byzantine Rome resulted in no permanent Muslim conquests in Anatolia (Asia Minor) between 645 CE and until his death in 680 CE. There were almost annual Muslim raids, sometimes in the winter, sometimes in the summer, in fact sometimes raids during both seasons in the same year – even penetrations up to a thousand kilometers deep into Anatolia. Many of these raids started from the Syrian base of Homs while others jumped off from Antakiya still further north. These raids at a minimum contributed to the prestige of Mu’awiya, but they also enriched Muslims, attracted more tribesmen to participate, and seriously harmed their Byzantine opponents, who suffered devastation of territory, loss of property and human lives and captives, and diminution of commerce and agriculture. The total Muslim casualties probably remained relatively modest. These operations also kept the Byzantine off balance by diverting their attention to defense and removing any hope of embarking on major offensive strategic policies against Muslim Syria.¹⁵¹⁰

The border between Medinan Caliphate and Byzantine Rome remained hot due to these raids. Syrian towns of Medinan Caliphate remained under threat of Byzantine surprise attack. Uthman had to ask Mu’awiya to further reinforce the coastal towns, give fiefs to the Arab soldiers to permanently settle them there and to allot the vacant houses to Arab soldiers, build mosques in those towns, enlarge those mosques that were already built.¹⁵¹¹

Byzantine Rome attempts on Alexandria

Byzantine Rome didn’t lose hope of re-establishing itself to at least those towns where a substantial number of Greeks still resided. In 646 CE the Greeks living in Alexandria wrote to Constans, telling him how humiliating the condition of Romans was, and how they had to pay Jizyah and what a few number of Muslims was in the town.¹⁵¹², ¹⁵¹³

Constans sent a Roman eunuch by name of Manuel (Manuwil) with three hundred ships full of fighters. On reaching Alexandria he quickly killed the Muslim garrison, only few could escape, and took control of the city. Amr bin As, Uthman’s governor of Egypt, swiftly marched with his fifteen thousand men from Fustat. After a fierce battle in open, the Byzantine Romans fled and besieged themselves in the fort of Alexandria. Amr broke the wall with the help of ballistae and re-took the town. Manuel got killed.¹⁵¹⁴

Medinan Caliphate restored the previous contract with the inhabitants without further punishing them.¹⁵¹⁵ Few Greeks decided to leave for Roman territories.¹⁵¹⁶

Uthman had to take measures to strengthen defenses of the town. He ordered stationing of strong cavalry guard in Alexandria, assigning them abundant of subsistence allowance and changing the personnel once in every six months.¹⁵¹⁷

Further developments in Africa/Maghreb

Caliph Umar had halted further expansion westwards in North Africa¹⁵¹⁸ Uthman, toeing Umar’s policies blindly in early years of his tenure, was reluctant to recommence the offensive.¹⁵¹⁹

It could be a conscious or unconscious result of Arab raids on Anatolia that Byzantine government got paralysed in its ability to defend its extremely exposed positions in North Arfica.¹⁵²⁰ Weak defenses would have encouraged Medinan Caliphate to resume attacks in North Africa. Uthman took others in Medina in confidence to undo Umar’s policy, raised a considerable army and sent it to Egypt to reinforce troops of newly appointed governor there, Abdullah bin Sa’d (‘Abdallah bin Sa’d عَبدُ اللّه بِن سَعد ), in 648 CE.¹⁵²¹, ¹⁵²², ¹⁵²³ Tabari gives the numbers of troops that left Medina to be ten thousand. He informs they consisted of both Ansar, Muhajirun and Quraysh of Mecca.¹⁵²⁴ This was the last time an army of Medinan Caliphate left the capital for Futuhul Buldan

The army of Abdullah bin Sa’d plundered as far as the extremities of Ifriqiyah (Ifrīqiyah اِفرِيقِيَه ).¹⁵²⁵, ¹⁵²⁶, ¹⁵²⁷ Byzantine Roman patrician of the area was Jurjir (Jurjīr جُرجِير ).¹⁵²⁸, ¹⁵²⁹

Jurjir might have got a semi-independent status by then because Theophanes the Confessor insists that he had rebelled in 647 CE, and according to Baladhuri his domain stretched from Tripoli to Ṭanjan.¹⁵³⁰, ¹⁵³¹ Jurjir came to contest the invading Arabs with a host of troops. After a combat Jurjir’s army broke up and got repulsed up to Subayṭila. Jurjir got killed in action.¹⁵³², ¹⁵³³ Arab Muslims carried away large booty and cattle. Leaders of the defeated Berbers collected three hundred Qinṭār of gold and paid to the Arabs to leave their land. In addition, the party of Patrician had to pay twenty five million Dirhams.¹⁵³⁴, ¹⁵³⁵, ¹⁵³⁶

The army returned from Ifriqiyah without establishing any administrative structure there.¹⁵³⁷ Their aim was clear cut grab and go. Baladhuri apologises that the reason for not establishing any administrative structure was the rural nature of the region. There was no central town.¹⁵³⁸

After the Arab army withdrew Byzantine emperor sent a legate demanding similar amount as they had paid to the Arabs. People of Ifriqiyah were willing to pay Byzantine the same amount they used to pay. As a result of disagreement the people of Ifriqiyah came into open revolt.¹⁵³⁹ Kaegi guesses the revolt remained unsuccessful.¹⁵⁴⁰ Hoyland believes it was successful and they gained independence from Byzantine Rome.¹⁵⁴¹

Conquest of Cyprus

Medinan caliphate had developed its navy during Umar’s reign. Part of invasion on Sasanian Iran was by sea.¹⁵⁴² Umar also sent a small expedition of twenty ships under leadership of Alqama bin Mujazziz (‘Alqamah bin Mujazziz عَلقَمَه بِن مُجَزِّز ) of Mudlij tribe against Ethiopia. The expedition was a disaster and all men got killed. That time Umar vowed not to ever send anyone off by sea.¹⁵⁴³

Mu’awiya had been asking Umar to engage Byzantine Romans in sea to defend the newly possessed coastal towns of Syria which were under constant threat by superior Byzantine Roman navy. Umar did not permit it. Later, when Uthman became caliph he allowed Mu’awiya a naval campaign.¹⁵⁴⁴, ¹⁵⁴⁵ The ease with which the Byzantine navy was able to sail into the harbour of Alexandria in 646 CE and retake the city might have made Medinan Caliphate realize that the Arabs needed a strong navy to safeguard their gains. Moreover, if they were ever to capture Constantinople, an assault by sea would be a crucial accompaniment to a land attack.¹⁵⁴⁶

Cyprus was the main island in the Mediterranean used by the Byzantine navy as a spring board to invade or protect their possessions in Asia and Africa.¹⁵⁴⁷ Any naval strength gained by Medinan Caliphate could have gone unnoticed by Byzantine Rome unless it startled them by attacking their main interest in the Mediterranean – Cyprus.

In summer of 649 CE a formidable fleet of seventeen hundred ships of Medinan Caliphate cruised out of harbor of Acre under leadership of Mu’awiya and sailed in the Mediterranean sea.¹⁵⁴⁸, ¹⁵⁴⁹, ¹⁵⁵⁰ A small fleet sent by the then governor of Egypt ‘Abdullah bin Sa’d joined the expedition.¹⁵⁵¹ Mu’awiya demanded capitulation after landing in Cyprus without embarking any fight. The Urkūn of Cyprus had no choice but to consider him. They agreed to pay seventy two thousand Dirhams annually.¹⁵⁵², ¹⁵⁵³, ¹⁵⁵⁴ Cyprus was not a province of Byzantine Rome by this time because Baladhuri informs us that they were already paying similar amount to the Byzantine king. Now, they had to pay two tributes.¹⁵⁵⁵ As Medinan Caliphate did not intend to permanently occupy the island, Mu’awiya did not promise them protection in lieu of their tribute, rather he kept the rate low. Neither had he expected them to participate in sea expeditions from Muslim side. Furthermore, Muslims made upon them compulsory to keep Muslims informed about any movement of Byzantine Rome navy.¹⁵⁵⁶, ¹⁵⁵⁷

Mu’awiya’s fleet had to return to Cyprus again in 653 CE. This time it was a force of five hundred ships. One year ago, in 652 CE, the people of Cyprus had offered their ships to Byzantine Rome to be used in an expedition. Mu’awiya considered it breach of contract. This time not only twelve hundred marines got out of ships on the ground but they also plundered, slaughtered and took captives. Mu’awiya erected a cantonment city and left a permanent garrison of men from Baalbek there.¹⁵⁵⁸, ¹⁵⁵⁹ Mu’awiya constructed a mosque in the cantonment as a symbol of Muslim presence on the Island.¹⁵⁶⁰ All this was to assure loyalty from people of Cyprus. He still didn’t make the Island a formal part of Medinan Caliphate and resorted to the previous contract with them.¹⁵⁶¹

Cyprus, though small by any measure, was important for Mu’awiya’s plans to invade Constantinople one day. His show of power at Cyprus might be a warning signal to Byzantine Romans that he was on his way via sea.

Subjugation of Armenia

Armenia was in a limbo since Medinan Caliphate’s unsuccessful attack of 643 CE.¹⁵⁶² This semi-independent land never looked forward to Sasanian Iran after their defeat at Qadisiyyah as the later was fast disintegrating into nonexistent. Being a Christian nation, its natural ally was Byzantine Rome in the face of rise of Medinan Caliphate which had already eyed it.¹⁵⁶³

After its defeat of 643 CE, Medinan Caliphate didn’t attend to Armenia for a while. Its forces were busy elsewhere. The Armenians didn’t take full advantage of Arab indifference towards their country over these years. Armenian princes kept fighting with each other for supremacy. Emperor Constans kept favouring one over another in a hope to impose some kind of central authority over Armenia.¹⁵⁶⁴

In 650 CE, after getting some military relief in Iran, Uthman decided to try the defences of Armenia.¹⁵⁶⁵ He ordered Mu’awiya, his governor over Syria, to send his forces under command of young Habib bin Maslamah of Fihr clan of Quraysh, a veteran of Syrian Roman Wars, to Armenia.¹⁵⁶⁶, ¹⁵⁶⁷ Habib marched with his eight thousand troops, which mainly belonged to the Syrian and Jazirah divisions, to strike Erzurum.¹⁵⁶⁸ The city surrendered after little resistance. Some of its inhabitants agreed to pay Jizyah, others left for Anatolia. Habib wintered in Erzurum. It gave Armenians enough time to collect soldiers from as far as Lān, Afkāz, and Samandar. Uthman also utilized this time to organize and send a reinforcement of twenty six hundred soldiers from Syrian and Kufan divisions.¹⁵⁶⁹, ¹⁵⁷⁰

The force of Habib now marched on Dabil plundering and enforcing Jizyah on small towns and villages on the way. The city of Dabil tried to defend itself by throwing projectiles on invaders but gave way when the invaders started breaking the city walls with the help of mangonels. Patrician of Dabil, by the name of Mauriyān ar Rūmi, got killed in encounter. The inhabitants of the town agreed to pay Jizyah.¹⁵⁷¹, ¹⁵⁷²

This army continued its triumphant march up to Tbilisi in Jurzān, capitulating all towns and villages on the way until Caucasian Mountains halted them.¹⁵⁷³, ¹⁵⁷⁴ Some of the cities in Jurzān might have belonged to powerful Khazars.¹⁵⁷⁵

This time army of Medinan Caliphate penetrated deep into Armenia. Theodore Rshtuni is nowhere in the picture giving hard time to the invader. However, Habib’s army failed to establish any permanent political set up which could be favourable to Medinan Caliphate. Realizing comparative weakness of the Armenians, anyhow, emperor Constans II sued for truce in Armenia by the end of 650 CE.¹⁵⁷⁶ His envoy Procopios signed a three years truce in Damascus with Mu’awiya on promise of payment of money determined by Mu’awiya.¹⁵⁷⁷, ¹⁵⁷⁸

The three years truce didn’t settle the political impasse in Armenia. The warring princes anticipated big political changes at the expiry of the truce. The conspiracies and counter conspiracies had already reached their culmination when the truce expired in 653 CE.¹⁵⁷⁹ That time Theodore Rshtuni, the strongest of Armenian princes, didn’t see it unethical to get support from Medinan Caliphate.¹⁵⁸⁰ The terms Theodore Rshtuni set with Mu’awiya in Damascus are significant. Medinan Caliphate allowed Theodore Rshtuni to maintain a fifteen thousand strong cavalry. He was not expected to help Damascus militarily in wars. Medinan Caliphate agreed not to station any military in Armenia but promised to help Armenia militarily in case of Byzantine invasion. Armenia was not required to pay any tax for three years after which it could pay according to its capacity.¹⁵⁸¹ The terms effectively granted Armenia independence under tutelage of Medinan Caliphate.¹⁵⁸² Medinan Caliphate was not bent upon collecting big tax revenues from Armenia. Its aim was to prevent this martial race from serving Byzantine army.

Emperor Constans II had not written off Armenia. He raised a huge army of hundred thousand men and marched towards Armenia to demolish Theodore-Arab deal. Mu’awiya aptly sent him a diplomatic note, “Armenia is mine, so do not go there. But should you go, I will deal with you in such a way that you will be unable to flee.” Constans didn’t heed to it until he reached Erzurum.¹⁵⁸³ From there he mobilized all elements of Armenia who had opposed Theodore-Arab deal. Seeing the peril, Theodore fortified himself and asked his supporters to do the same in their own territories.¹⁵⁸⁴ Something unusual might have happened at this juncture because Constans left his main body of army at Erzurum and took only twenty thousand troops to the Area of Ararat and to Dabil where he appointed Mushegh, the lord of Mamikoneans, the new commander of the Armenian Army.¹⁵⁸⁵ Then Constans left Dabil hurriedly for Constantinople. After harsh winter of Armenia was over, Medinan Caliphate sent seven thousand men, who with the help of Theodore, chased away all the Roman troops which Constans had stationed there.¹⁵⁸⁶ Now the field was clear for Theodore. He made an official visit to Damascus, where Mu’awiya reiterated the deal and recognized him sole ruler of Armenia.¹⁵⁸⁷ Medinan Caliphate was least interested into propping up Theodore at cost of Arab soldiers. Its aim was to ensure Byzantine Rome off Armenia. It didn’t want paramountcy of Byzantine Rome over troubled waters of Armenia, where they could fish any time. Theodore failed to extend his rule all over Armenia and anti-Theodore princes entered into a mutual peace agreement whereby they divided Armenia among themselves and started collecting tax in their respective jurisdictions.¹⁵⁸⁸ Once again Theodore got compelled to invite Arab troops into Armenia.¹⁵⁸⁹ This was the final subjugation of Armenia to Medinan Caliphate. It lost its semi-independent status and became a ‘provincially administered territory’ of Medinan Caliphate. Arab army chased away all pro-Byzantine elements. Mushegh, the lord of Mamikonean, the man appointed by Constans, switched over to Arab side. And all Armenian princes raced with each other to get better favor from Medinan Caliphate. Arab army shifted many Arminian princes and their families to Damascus as hostages for future good behavior of Armenians. It included Theodore himself.¹⁵⁹⁰, ¹⁵⁹¹, ¹⁵⁹², ¹⁵⁹³

Analyzing the Medinan Caliphate’s assimilation of Armenia, Kaegi comments that the conquest resulted from political and ethnic turbulence inside Armenia rather than military success of Arab Muslims.¹⁵⁹⁴ Armenian population generally did not convert to Islam or become assimilated to Islamic and Arab civilization.¹⁵⁹⁵ Its peripheral location and impulse to local autonomy might have contributed to the lack of assimilation. Yet, the desire to remain distinctively Armenian and maintain independent church was the most important reasons for non-assimilation. When the Muslims later pressured for conversion and for the imposition of higher taxes, the Armenians united in revolt. And one may doubt that Muslims initially placed any high priority on converting Armenians, who were able to continue to play their long-lived role of exploiting their situation on the edges of two larger empires to benefit themselves.¹⁵⁹⁶

As Medinan Caliphate sent its diplomatic note to Constans in 653 CE in Derzene, Kaegi guesses that the final boundary between Medinan Caliphate and Byzantine Rome in region of Armenia passed between Derzene and Erzurum, with Derzen on the Byzantine side of the border and Erzurum on the Caliphate side of the border.¹⁵⁹⁷, ¹⁵⁹⁸, ¹⁵⁹⁹ ‘Uthman amalgamated Armenia with Azerbaijan to create one administrative unit.¹⁶⁰⁰

Why did Arab Muslims succeed

At this juncture we may conveniently halt our narrative of Futuhul Buldan and attend to something else. All the victories achieved by Medinan Caliphate in the 630’s took place within a relatively short distance of the Syrian Desert: Palestine and Syria on the west side, Iraq to the east, and the Jazirah to the north. In the 640’s however, it extended significantly the radius of its attacks, proceeding westward to Egypt, eastward into Iran, and northward into the Caucasus. The latter proved hard going for the Arabs, since they were not accustomed to such mountainous terrain, but in Egypt and Iran they were able to subdue the key cities and assume overall control of all of their territories. This was a stunning achievement and it inevitably raises the question of why the Arab conquests were so successful. For contemporary observers the answer was simple: God had decreed it, whether as a way of punishing people for their sins (as many Christian leaders said) or as a way of rewarding the Arabs for their adherence to the true faith (as the conquerors said).¹⁶⁰¹, ¹⁶⁰²

The notion that only God confers victory or defeat in a war pre-existed debut of Medinan Caliphate in the Middle East. And that God rewards the pious by victory and punishes the sinful by defeat was offshoot of this notion.

Strategos, a Greek eyewitness of sack of Jerusalem in 614 CE on hands of Iranians opines that Jerusalem fell to the Persians because of the sins of the Christian people of the city.¹⁶⁰³ Mentioning the same event Sebeos maintains that Byzantine were [destroyed] before the Persians by Divine power for they shed the innocent blood of Maurice the emperor and his sons, and God left no hidden place that he did not indicate this to them.¹⁶⁰⁴ On the same lines, addressing his soldiers at the occasion of Shahrbaraz’s invasion on Constantinople, Heraclius talks to Shahrbaraz as if he were present in the gathering, “ God did not give the victory to you because of your piety, but because of our impiety. Our sins did it, not your bravery…… it was God who established it [Byzantine Rome], and no one is capable of destroying it except to fulfill the God’s will.¹⁶⁰⁵

Contemporary analysts of Arab Muslim’s triumph continued to think over these lines, only God’s favorites changed. “Now the triumph of the sons of Ishmael, who prevailed over and subjected those two strong kingdoms, was from God. But God did not yet let them rule Constantinople, because victory is His,” declares anonymous Christian chronicler of Khuzestan.¹⁶⁰⁶ Actually, contemporary Christian sources are unanimous in this regards. John of Nikiu, after defeat of Byzantine Romans at the hands of Arab Muslims at Alyuna in Egypt writes, ‘thus God punished them [Romans] because they had not honoured the redemptive passion of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave His life for those who believe in Him. Yea, it was for this reason that God made them turn their back upon them [i.e. Muslims].¹⁶⁰⁷ At another place he states, ‘It is because of our sins that He has suffered them [Muslims] to deal thus with us.¹⁶⁰⁸ Sasanian Iranian defeat was so profound that none of their intellectuals got any chance of explaining their defeat. They simply seized to exist.

Muslim Arabs on their part, not only believed that granting a victory or defeat is a function of God, but they also believed that their victory was pre-determined. Before battle of Qadisiyyah Sa’d addressed the army and stirred up their desire of jihad by telling them of what Allah promised his Messenger by way of victory and making the religion triumphant (iẓhār al dīn).¹⁶⁰⁹ From the very beginning of Futuhul Buldan Islamic sources maintain that Allah was beneficent on Muslims in giving them victory because they were His chosen people. In description of Battle of Dāthin, the first encounter between Medinan Caliphate and Byzantine Rome, Baladhuri states, “at last Allah gave victory to His friends and defeat to His enemies whom He dispersed”.¹⁶¹⁰

This kind of Muslim Arab’s explanation of events reached the ears of contemporary Christians as well. Sebeos reports an account of the alleged original Muslim demands on the Byzantines before their conquests of Byzantine Palestine and adjacent territory commenced: “God gave this land [the land of Israel] to our Father Abraham and to his posterity after him. We are the children of Abraham. You have possessed our land long enough. Cede it to us peacefully, and we shall not invade your territory. If not, we shall take back from you with usurious interest what you have seized.” ¹⁶¹¹

As time passed and new political set ups became a fact of life, historians started seeking physical explanations of the events.

Tabari, writing in first decade of tenth century CE, presents the possible reasons of Muslim Arab success in Futuhul Buldan in the form of a dialogue between caliph Umar and Hurmuzan, the defeated leader of Khuzestan. Hurmuzan says to Umar, in Tabari’s version, “in the days before Islam, God left things between us and you as they were, so we had the upper hand over you, since He was neither with us nor with you. But when He took your side, you gained the upper hand over us.” Umar answers to Hurmuzan, “you only succeeded in defeating us in the days before Islam because you were united, whereas we were divided.” ¹⁶¹²

Ibn Khaldun (Ibn Khaldūn ابِن خَلدُ ون ) was the first human to explain historical events purely on the basis of material reasons.¹⁶¹³ Since Ibn Khaldun up to Patricia Crone hundreds of historians have used their imaginative power to discover material causes of Medinan Caliphate’s success.¹⁶¹⁴ Hardly any of them agrees in toto with other. As far as material causes of success of Medinan Caliphate are concerned there are as many theories as are tongues.

One point needs to be emphasized here. Internal weakness of Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran has been mentioned above. Medinan Caliphate attempted on Khazars, Turks of Farghana, and Nubians, but failed because they were not internally weak. Anyhow, one wonders why Khazars, Turks of Farghana or Nubians didn’t shatter Sasanian Iran or Byzantine Rome. Actually Khazars, who were steppe dwellers like Arabs, used to raid Sasanian Iran from time to time.¹⁶¹⁵ Just before Battle of Qadisiyyah they made a full-fledged invasion on Sasanian Iran taking advantage of their civil war, still they were repelled.¹⁶¹⁶ Hence, internal weakness of Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran doesn’t explain success of Medinan Caliphate totally. Unconditional obedience to their leaders, both military and civilian, and their firm belief in pre-determination of their victory has something to do with their extensive victory.

There is evidence that marginalized parts of populations in conquered countries co-operated with Arab invaders. For example, Jews of Jordan and Palestine acted as spies and guides for Muslims during the first phase of Futuhul Buldan.¹⁶¹⁷ Anyhow, mainstream populations didn’t welcome Arab Muslim conquerors. After surveying all early non-Muslim sources thoroughly, Hoyland concludes that it is not correct that the local populations welcomed Arab invasions. It was only later Christian authors who gave positive assessment of the Arab invasions. They were working with hindsight and with intention to integrating themselves with later Muslim authorities.¹⁶¹⁸

As a matter of fact, mainstream populations, particularly Greeks and Persians remained hostile to Muslim rulers throughout life of Medinan Caliphate. Once, during caliphate of Uthman, for example, Greek population of Tripoli in Maghreb conspired to get rid of Muslim rule. Mu’awiya, the governor of Syria for Uthman had to send his commander, Sufyan bin Mujib (Sufyān bin Mujīb سُفيان بِن مُجِيب ) of Azd tribe who laid siege to the rebellious town. Finding the situation hopeless, the inhabitants wrote to the Byzantine King to send them ships to evacuate them. He did so and the inhabitants escaped to Rome.¹⁶¹⁹

Aftermath of Futuhul Buldan

Conquest of immense hunk of land by Medinan Caliphate during Futhuhul Buldan is an influential event in word history. Not only a new empire rose on the ruins of one and a half superpowers, a new religion spread over all continents.

Wherever forces of Medinan Caliphate reached they introduced people to Islam. They offered non-Muslims to convert to Islam, though this offer was a formality. Religion, no doubt, is a personal belief system, which each and every individual adopts according to personal comfort level. However, religion is also a collective belief system of society as a whole. Whichever religion a community believes in, considers it sacred. A great number of members of a given society have to be convinced before a community starts changing its religion. It doesn’t work that way if a band of armed people knock at the gates of a community and give them a call to change their religion, they would convene a meeting and decide to change religion by show of hands. Arab Muslim invaders knew it. They offered Islam but didn’t insist on it. Yet, people from Asia and Africa up to Europe knew that Islam is born and is available for anybody to adopt it. It is not exclusive to any particular nation or ethnic group. Not only this, Muslims started living among non-Muslims in all continents, advertising their religious beliefs and practices. A tombstone of certain ‘Urwah bin Thābit, who died in May 650 CE, was reused in construction of a church in Famagusta, Cyprus. This was seen by Aboul Hassan Aly El Herewy and described by Schefer in 1881.¹⁶²⁰ Aboul Hassan reports that he could read complete sura Ikhlās (Quran: 112) on it. If real, this was a definite piece of proof that Muslims lived and died in Europe by 650 CE and that they used chapters of the Qur’an on their tombstones. Unfortunately nobody took photograph of this tombstone and now its whereabouts are unknown.

Futuhul Buldan inspired the conquerors as much as it depressed the conquered. None of the conqueror had any doubts that the unprecedented conquests were Allah’s reward for obeying His Prophet, Muhammad. Qur’an and Sunna of Prophet Muhammad attained an unchallengeable status in the social thinking and in constitution of the country. Any social change or modification of law pertaining to Muslims had to be subject to Qur’an and Sunna of Prophet Muhammad. Earliest companions of Prophet Muhammad gained special reverence. Generally, Arab Muslims no longer thought of any political setup without an early companion of the Prophet being at the top.

A movement towards conversion to Islam started among conquered nations simultaneously with arrival of army of Medinan Caliphate in their land. “Hāḍir Qinnasrīn was a suburb of Qinnasrīn,” informs Baladhuri, “Tanūkh Arab tribe had settled here since its immigration to Syria. Initially, they were tent dwellers, gradually they built houses. When Muslim army reached there during conquest of Syria, Abu Ubayda summoned them to Islam. Some accepted it, but Saliḥ remained Christian,” ¹⁶²¹

As soon as Muslim army arrived on the scene in Egypt people started converting to Islam. ‘Some Egyptians ‘apostatized from the Christian faith and embraced the faith of the beast,’ are the words of John of Nikiu.¹⁶²²

Conversion to Islam started in Iran from the time of Qadisiyyah. Baladhuri notes conversion of whole battalion of four thousand men of Iranian army to Islam after Iranian defeat at Qadisiyyah. They even participated in the Battle of Jalula from the side of Medinan Caliphate. Arabs were inexperienced in accepting people of other races in the fold of Islam by that time. They allotted them Zuhrah clan of Quraysh to confederate with.¹⁶²³

The trend continued as army of Medinan Caliphate penetrated deep in Sasanian Iran. “Some nobles of Isfahan held estates in Jafarabād in the district of Thaimarah ‘l Kubra, in Bihjā Warsān and in Mārabin. When Jayy reduced, they agreed to pay the kharāj; and because they distained to pay jizyah they became Muslim”.¹⁶²⁴

A number of people in Ifriqiyah [Berbers] accepted Islam, and became steadfast in it, when army of Medinan Caliphate campaigned there in 648 CE.¹⁶²⁵

Definitely, events of conversion to Islam among conquered nations are anecdotal. There was no mass conversion yet. Reasons of early converts to change their religion are not exactly known. Fascination by teachings of Islam cannot be their reason as the conquered populations didn’t have a chance to mingle with Muslims and know about their religion. Mostly, tax advantage as in case of converts from Isfahan, or siding with a potentially winning army to enrich themselves as in case of converts of Qadisiyyah, can be observed.

Conversion to Islam was not a private affair. It needed documentation with the government. Generally speaking, Medinan Caliphate expected the new converts to recruit in military and haste to the borders for participation in Futuhul Buldan. Conversion only for sake of avoiding tax was not acceptable. Someone came from Swad to Umar and requested that kharāj on his lands should be abolished as he had accepted Islam. Umar refused saying that the land was occupied by force.¹⁶²⁶

In line with its official stance that Futuhul Buldan was for spread of Islam, Medinan Caliphate had devised a financial scheme by which any leader of community living in ex-Sasanian Iran could enter into ‘aṭā’ register and receive annual stipends on conversion to Islam. Umar was of view that by winning noblemen to Islam he could win over others.¹⁶²⁷ Many prominent people of Swad took advantage of the scheme.¹⁶²⁸

Wars of Futuhul Buldan changed lives of thousands of people forever. Khabbāb bin Aratt belonged to the tribe of Tamim. A blacksmith and sword maker by trade, he was taken in captivity during jāhiliyyah and sold into slavery in Mecca. He was one of the first Muslims and is said to have been tortured by the Meccans after his conversion. He immigrated to Medina along with other Muslims and participated in the battles of early Islam. He earned large sum of money in Futuhul Buldan and died in Kufa in 658 CE as a rich man.¹⁶²⁹ An unnamed Persian woman accompanied her husband in Battle of Jalula. Defeat and death was destiny of her husband. Afraid and alone, she hid herself behind a pile of blankets in a tent. A soldier of Medinan Caliphate entered the tent with intention to search for booty. He stumbled upon her. Her youthful beauty mesmerized him instantly. He caught her and reported to the superintendent of booty with a request to grant her to him in booty. Usual way was to pool booty and then divide blindly. The superintendent approved soldier’s application. She bore him a child later.¹⁶³⁰ Rūsbih bin Buzurgumihr was a resident of Hamedan. He was an arms dealer. To his misfortune, he sold armaments to Byzantine Rome during the Last War of Antiquity. The Sasanian government got enraged and threatened him. He didn’t know what to do with his life until Sa’d appeared on Swad. Sa’d hired him as a builder of the citadel and the grand mosque of Kufā Rūsbih embraced Islam and started getting stipend in addition to his earnings from the business of builder.¹⁶³¹

Prodegious success of Muslim Arabs in Futuhul Buldan has always been a source of pride to later generations of Muslims, particularly Arabs. The Farsi translator of Chachnama introduces the family whom he has dedicated his translation in these words: ‘to this great and noble family which is by descent and lineage an Arabian family, because in former years, the conquest of Khurasan and Ajam had been completed by their noble grandfather, the great Amir, the glory of the chief men of Arabia, the administrator of religious affairs, the supporter of mankind, the pride of the children of Quraysh, Abu Musa Ash’ari’.¹⁶³²

Muslim population of Medinan Caliphate

It is very difficult to estimate pre-modern populations as the data collected by census surveys performed under auspices of the then governments is mostly lost.¹⁶³³ A census of cantonments of Kufa and Basrah by the end of Medinan Caliphate by the superintendent of the military register revealed that they contained forty thousand and sixty thousand fighting men respectively.¹⁶³⁴ From this kind of data Hoyland suggests that the combined military force of Medinan Caliphate from all cantonments could be in the tune of two fifty thousand.¹⁶³⁵ Total number of people entered in the tax register of Swad, who used to pay kharāj was five fifty thousand.¹⁶³⁶ From such a data Hoyland suggests that the total population of Medinan Caliphate could be in the tune of twenty five to thirty million conquered residents.¹⁶³⁷ Using these figures Hoylland guesses that the population of Arab elite among all subjects of Medinan Caliphate was 1%.¹⁶³⁸, ¹⁶³⁹

Political changes inside Medinan Caliphate

Another decade of geographical extension of influence of Medinan Caliphate during Uthmans’s tenure, paired with further availability of wealth to Arab elite and continued internal immigration accelerated the political changes inside Medinan Caliphate. Most of the issues had raised their heads during Umar’s reign. Now they turned chaotic

Issue of remunerations of a general

The resentment among generals on wages which first appeared during Umar’s tenure increased further during Uthman’s caliphate. They were not content with the same remuneration which a common soldier got. When Abdullah bin Sa’d, governor of Egypt, invaded Ifriqiyah successfully and sent the twenty percent of the booty to Medina, Uthman had to sanction some amount out of this twenty percent as personal share of ‘Abdullah bin Sa’d. The move didn’t get along smoothly with common soldiers and Uthman got compelled to withdraw his decision later.¹⁶⁴⁰

‘Uthman vs. governors

When Uthman came to power he affirmed all the existing governors, military commanders and lower ranking officials into their offices.¹⁶⁴¹ He intended to assure that his government was a continuation of that of Umar. Soon Uthman visualized that his difficulties in governing the country were the same as those of Umar. There was a tug of war between the caliph and the governors. To fix the issues, sometimes Uthman had to change a governor.

By that time, population drifts had changed the demography of Medinan Caliphate markedly. Provinces from where Medinan Caliphate drew its initial strength, like Yemen, Hejaz or Bahrain had dropped into background. Provinces where most of the Arabs had settled and which generated most of the revenue of the country, like Basrah, Kufa, Syria and Egypt had marched to foreground. Uthman never had to reshuffle his governors of first kind of provinces. It was the later kind of provinces that gave him all the headaches.

Amr bin As, governor of Egypt was first to lose his job in 646 CE just after he successfully re-took Alexandria from the Byzantine.¹⁶⁴² Uthman suspected him of pocketing the revenue money.¹⁶⁴³

Sa’d bin Waqqas got dismissed in 647 CE.¹⁶⁴⁴, ¹⁶⁴⁵ The reason was his incapability to handle the partisan politics of Kufa and getting involved in dubious financial deals with public treasury.¹⁶⁴⁶

Abu Musa Ash’ari lost his job as governor of Basrah in 650 CE.¹⁶⁴⁷ Probably, people of Basrah expected Abu Musa to organize more stipend for them by downsizing other provinces’ share. He said about his successor to Basrans, “He will pour money on you profusely.” ¹⁶⁴⁸

Whenever a person is dismissed in disgrace publicly, as opposed to being compelled to resign on health or family excuse, he is expected to be agitated. Among the three dismissals mentioned above, Amr expressed his reservations by blaming his successor as a man who is ‘strong in matters pertaining to himself, weak in matters pertaining to Allah.” ¹⁶⁴⁹ Sa’d talked to his successor later, “either thou hast become intelligent after me, or I have become foolish after thee.”¹⁶⁵⁰ While talking to residents of Basrah after his dismissal, Abu Musa Ash’ari commented about his successor, “a young man with many paternal and maternal aunts and grandmothers among the Quraysh has come to you.” ¹⁶⁵¹

Umar had disposed off many of his governors on such charges. He was prudent to replace them with somebody who was at par with the outgoing person in Islamic ranking. He also made sure that the replacement to this most authoritative position in the country after the caliph didn’t have any links with his clan. He kept the clan based politics of pre-Islamic Mecca at bay and promoted the new concept of seniority in Islam.

Ironically, almost all governors dismissed by Uthman had seniority in Islam and almost all governors appointed by Uthman were late entrants into Islam. Not only this, they belonged to the Caliph’s clan, ‘Abd as Shams. Moreover, they were henchmen of Uthman.

Abdullah bin Sa’d who replaced Amr in Egypt was Uthman’s foster brother.¹⁶⁵² Moreover he owed his life to Uthman. He got pardoned at the time of Fathe Mecca from death penalty judged against him by Prophet Muhammad only on Uthman’s mercy plea.¹⁶⁵³, ¹⁶⁵⁴

Walid bin Uqba, replacement of Sa’d bin Waqqas in Kufa was Uthman’s foster brother from his mother’s side.¹⁶⁵⁵ ¹⁶⁵⁶ Umar had given him job of ‘āmil responsible for taxes of Rabī’ah in Jazirah. He held the same post until his appointment as governor of Kufa.¹⁶⁵⁷

Abdullah bin Amir who replaced Abu Musa Ash’ari in Busrah was Uthman’s cousin from his mother’s side.¹⁶⁵⁸

Reshuffling of governors definitely produced political ripples in Medinan Caliphate. Center lost services of experienced men who were appointed by the previous caliph on merit. The person of the caliph got isolated as the dismissed governors took the dismissal as insult and distanced themselves from the caliph. Moreover, public sympathies were with the dismissed governors as they were early companions of the Prophet and the newly appointed governors, though competent, had joined Islam after Fathe Mecca.

Islamic sources give Uthman’s loyalty to his clan as the only reason behind his choice of his clansmen as governors.¹⁶⁵⁹ Our modern understanding of history is to find reasons behind the reasons. Uthman might not be a clan chauvinist. Arab Muslim society was still organized around tribal affiliations. Uthman might have expected better loyalty from his governors, if they were from his own clan. It appears more logical in a milieu where Ali, Uthman’s main political rival, was demanding caliphate on the basis of being a member of the Prophet’s clan. Actually, Othman’s clansmen never let him down as governors. They served him loyally and did not create those troubles which other governors have had been producing, like pocketing tax money. Posting of governors from caliph’s clan in all key provinces definitely fanned clan based politics of pre-Islamic Mecca, which was dormant for three decades.

Cantonments further politicized

State facilitated concentration of Arab elite populations in cantonment towns, their officially recognized segregation on tribal lines, and quick accumulation of wealth among them, all had triggered the process of politicization in cantonment towns during Umar’s era. This process became unmanageable during Uthman’s tenure. Let’s scrutinize further developments, again taking example of Kufa, to grasp the phenomenon.

The practice of destabilizing a governor by framing him in different kind of charges continued in Kufa. Mughira bin Shu’ba was governor of Kufa at the time of Umar’s death. Umar had already made a decision in principal to remove him from office and reinstate Sa’d bin Waqqas during his lifetime. Uthman, acting on decision taken by the previous government, appointed Sa’d as governor of Kufa on assuming the office. Sa’d could not last for more than a year. Similar conspiracies which he had faced previously hounded him again. He had to leave his post when kufa split into two antagonizing groups, one favoring Sa’d and other bitterly opposing him.¹⁶⁶⁰

Problems in Kufa were accumulating. Kufa grew threefold from its initial population of twenty thousand families in 638 CE to sixty thousand families during Medinan Caliphate.¹⁶⁶¹ Later immigrants, who chose to live with their relatives initially, could not assimilate into earlier inhabitants seamlessly. The earlier were called Ahl al Ayam (Ahl al Ayām اهلالايّام ).¹⁶⁶² The latecomers were called Rwadif (Rwādif رَوادِف ).¹⁶⁶³

Ahl al Ayam mainly consisted of those tribes who sided with Medinan Caliphate during the Ridda Wars or soon joined its forces during Abu Bakr’s reign. Quraysh, Thaqif, Aws, Khazraj, Hawazin, Asad, Azd, and Madhlij etc. belonged to the category of Ahl al Ayam. Rwadif included, among others, Tamim, Abdul Qays, Hanifa, Azd ‘Umān etc.¹⁶⁶⁴ Naturally, rwadif were social outcast because they had joined Islamic movement late. Anyhow, this was not the only reason for them being social outcast. They were far inferior to Ahl al Ayam in financial position.¹⁶⁶⁵ Tabari divulges that Rwadif were the first to respond to the Umar’s appeal for jihad for Nihavand.¹⁶⁶⁶ Alh al Ayam were content with their wealth. Rwadif were money hungry. All the Wars after Nahavand didn’t accrue that much wealth for the Arab elite as had the previous conquests done. There are many reasons for it. Prices of movable property, like cattle, ornaments, armaments etc., which Arab armies used to capture from the enemy and sell to get their remunerations, had dropped due to their oversupply from earlier wars.¹⁶⁶⁷ Total amount of booty they could gather decreased as well. Presumably, wealthy people of Sasanian Iran had adjusted to Futuhul Buldan by successfully hiding their treasures. The provinces of Sasanian Iran that succumbed to invasion of Medinan Caliphate after Nahavand were not the richest. Finally, almost all of the conquests after Nahavand resulted in restoration of wealth and power of locals with nominal annual tax to be paid to Medinan Caliphate. The end result was that Rwadif could not match in wealth with Ahl al Ayam, despite participating in Jihad. Their frustration reflected in local politics.¹⁶⁶⁸

Medinan caliphate had undertaken to spoon-feed the Arab population. Instead of procuring wealth by tapping economic opportunities, kufans were more inclined towards pressurizing the government to increase their social assistance. Rwadif might be especially zealous towards it. Upon taking oath of the office, and before Uthman sent Sa’d to Kufa as governor, he raised the stipends of everybody by hundred Dirhams, including Kufans, to appease the population and to gain popularity.¹⁶⁶⁹ ¹⁶⁷⁰ It didn’t work out very well. Expectations of kufans, especially of Rwadif further heightened as a result.¹⁶⁷¹

A new phenomenon, which cantonments had hardly seen during Umar’s time, was coming of age of a whole new generation. Arab soldiers had started capturing slaves by the onset of Futuhul Buldan in 634 CE. Slaves made a substantial population of cantonments, probably majority. Women slaves had been bearing children to their Arab masters. By late 650’s this generation was adult and ready for job/marriage market. Technically speaking they were Muslims due to their Father’s religion. Yet they might have got some influence from their mothers who had retained their original religions. This generation, obviously, behaved differently from the generation of pure Arab men and women.

Sa’d’s successor, Walid bin Uqba ( Walīd bin ‘Uqbah وَلِيد بِن عُقبَه ) fell prey to scandal of alcohol drinking just after managing the town for five years.¹⁶⁷² He knew that Sa’d’s lavish living had attracted public criticism. Walid didn’t put a gate to the governor house. Instead, he used a curtain hanging on the entrance to the house for privacy.¹⁶⁷³ He mingled with people more vigorously.¹⁶⁷⁴ He quickly assessed the economic gap between different population groups and started paying more to the poorer sections.¹⁶⁷⁵ The policy didn’t work well. Obviously Ahl al Ayam were not very happy with him.¹⁶⁷⁶ They brought up a trumped up charge of alcohol drinking against him.¹⁶⁷⁷, ¹⁶⁷⁸ ‘Uthman had to dismiss him.¹⁶⁷⁹

Walid’s successor, Sa’id bin As (Sa’īd bin ‘Āṣ سَعِيد بِن عاص ) had uphill task.¹⁶⁸⁰ He tried to be diplomatic. He allowed all and sundry, including rawadif and weaker populace of the town, to see him in his office during office hours. In afterhours he started seeing and mingling with Ahl al Ayam at the governor house by invitation only.¹⁶⁸¹ The policy might have worked for a while. Sa’id could handle the town for the next five years.

The political calm in Kufa once again got disturbed in reaction to a decision made by the central government. Uthman introduced a financial scheme by which any citizen of the country could swap his property in Hejaz with the nationalized lands in Swad.¹⁶⁸² Obviously, lands in Hejaz were less valuable as compared to those of Swad. Hejazi lands were mainly rain and flood dependent. Lands of Swad were canal irrigated. People who took advantage of the scheme were mostly Quraysh, though some Yemenites were also beneficiary.¹⁶⁸³ This scheme definitely enriched Quraysh further but decreased the revenues of central government. It produced a public outcry in cantonments. Soldiers had expected to be owners of these lands at the time of their conquest. They withdrew their wishes only on reassurance and arguments of Umar that these lands would be used for nation building.¹⁶⁸⁴ Kufa burst into resentment. Anti Quraysh sentiments surfaced among Ahl al Ayam. They confronted Governor Sa’id on his face during his evening sessions on this issue. Hegemony of Quraysh became a talk of town in public gatherings.¹⁶⁸⁵ The air of dissent grew so strong that the governor of Kufa had to exile ten ringleaders of the dissidents to Syria in collaboration with Uthman in August of 653 CE. All of them belonging to Ahl al Ayam and belonged to the new generation.¹⁶⁸⁶ None of them had participated in Qadisiyyah. Most known out of them was Malik bin Harith al-Ashtar (Mālik bin Ḥārith Al- Ashtar مالِك بِن حارِث الاشتَر ) of Nakah’ clan of Madhīj.¹⁶⁸⁷ Friction between Ahl al Ayam and the Quraysh over ownership of wealth and right to govern the country was root cause of dissent albeit arguments of the parties maintained religious tone. Impressing on the dissidents superiority of Quraysh Mu’awiya said, “Abu Sufyan was the noblest among Quraysh, save that what Allah did for his Prophet. [Meaning, Abu Sufyan belonged to the same tribe to which Prophet Muhammad belonged and he was the noblest in his tribe with the only exception that Allah made Prophet Muhammad nobler than him]. I believe if people were sons of Abu Sufyan, they would all be prudent and resolute men’. To this Ṣa’ṣa’ah, one of the dissidents replied, “you lie! They are sons to a better man than Abu Sufyan – one whom Allah created by his own hand, ‘into whom He breathed his spirit. [Qur’an 32:8] Before whom He commanded the angels to bow down. Among (the people) are the pious and the sinners, the stupid and the clever.” [Meaning every kind of people are there in Quraysh as well as others].¹⁶⁸⁸ ¹⁶⁸⁹

By end of 653 CE the cantonments had a profusion of contradictions. Intertribal rivalry, haves vs. have not’s, Rwadif vs. Ahl al Ayam, Ahl al Ayam vs. Quraysh, and slaves vs. nobles etc. etc. That is the reason, despite presence of dissent, the dissidents failed to agree on a common leader. Once Abdullah bin Abbas commented on this political situation, “Kufa is a garrison town. There are indeed Arab tribal leaders there, but they do not have the support of many of the people. What is more, some of them are ambitious for authority that they cannot attain. This being so, they stir up troubles against the one who has attained it until they break his power and [they] corrupt one another.” ¹⁶⁹⁰ Members of Electoral College, being the earliest companions of the Prophet, retained wider appeal among common Arab Muslims. Petty leaders of the cantonments, even those Alh al Ayam whose fight was against Quraysh hegemony, had to look towards one of them to provide leadership to their respective faction at national level. Their anti Quraysh rhetoric changed into anti Umayyad rhetoric.¹⁶⁹¹

By the way, Kufa is only an exemplar of the situation. Other cantonments were not lagging behind.

Capital Medina split into overt political parties

Election of Uthman to the seat of caliph by the Electoral College in November of 644 CE had permanently shattered the political harmony in Medina. Whispers that had begun in Medina during Umar’s era amplified into rants during the meetings of Electoral College. The college could not reach a unanimous decision. After his election, Uthman, being politically naïve, didn’t show usual reconciliatory gestures towards other contenders, which is customary in democratic process. Resultantly, other five members of the college, who should have become swords and shields for Uthman, distanced themselves from him. Uthman failed to galvanize a dedicated team from the beginning.

Ali had got severely irked by the decision of the Electoral College. He dubbed it as a ‘deceit’.¹⁶⁹² Contrary to previous governments of Abu Bakr and Umar, he did not sit on any advisory committee during Uthman’s tenure. He had ardent supporters in Medina. They started acting as a vocal opposition to the government. This was the birth of first formal political party in Medinan Caliphate. From the very beginning of Uthman’s tenure, Ya’qubi asserts, people started siding with Ali and speaking disparagingly of Uthman. Their argument was that Ali was more suitable candidate for caliphate than Uthman on the grounds that he had accepted Islam earlier than Uthman and he was from the Prophet’s family. Some people named to be the members of this camp were Miqdad bin Amr, Abu Dharr and Abdullah bin Mas’ud.¹⁶⁹³

Shi’a Ali (Shi’ah ‘Ali, Party of Ali (شيعة على, as they were called, aimed at criticizing Uthman on each and every possible occasion to gain political points.¹⁶⁹⁴ They started it on day one of Uthman’s caliphate even when he had not taken a single administrative, legal or military decision to provide any substrate for criticism. After taking oath of caliphate when Uthman led the evening prayer he went along with a candle and put it in such a way in the mosque that it was ahead of the worshipers. Miqdad bin Amr was quick to comment “what is this innovation?” (bid’ah).¹⁶⁹⁵

Ruler of Medinan Caliphate was primus inter pares, in line with pre-Islamic Arab traditions. The Caliph was prone to criticism from his subjects anytime, anywhere and anyway. Both Abu Bakr and Umar had been target of undue criticism but they knew how to handle it. Uthman, on the other hand, didn’t know how to cope with it. Islamic sources attribute this failure on part of Uthman to his personality. He is described to be a shy person who got a loss for words when he faced criticism.¹⁶⁹⁶ Uthman himself admitted it on the very first day of his tenure when he sat on pulpit to take his oath. Shi’a Ali criticized him for sitting exactly at the same place where the Prophet used to sit on the pulpit. He could not explain himself wittingly. Rather he said “Abu Bakr and Umar used to prepare speech for such an occasion, but you are in greater need of a just ruler than of one who can make fine speeches. If you live long enough, the speech will come to you.” ¹⁶⁹⁷, ¹⁶⁹⁸, ¹⁶⁹⁹

Criticism to Uthman, as to any other ruler on earth, gravitated towards three possible spheres – neglect of constitution of the land (religion); nepotism; and financial corruption.

Neglect of constitution of the land: Uthman ordered a woman from Juhayna to be stoned to death for crime of adultery because she bore a child six months after her marriage. After she was stoned, Ali bin Abu Talib objected that Uthman didn’t consider his bearing and his weaning are thirty months. [Quran 46:15].¹⁷⁰⁰

Nepotism: Hakam bin Abi As (Ḥakam bin Abi ‘l Āṣ حَكَم بِن اَبِى العاص ) was brother to Affan bin Abi As (‘Affān bin Abi’l Āṣ عَفّان بِن اَبى العاص ), Uthman’s father.¹⁷⁰¹, ¹⁷⁰² Prophet Muhammad had exiled him to Taif after Fathe Mecca because he used to mock Islam during his time of ignorance.¹⁷⁰³ Uthman and his clansmen of Banu Umayya had been appealing to Abu Bakr and Umar to annul this judgment but they kept declining it. When Uthman became caliph he repealed the sentence. Hakam came straight to Medina and apparently Uthman gave him decent clothes to put on. This event took place in 645 CE during first year of Uthman’s reign and his opponents picked it as an exampler.¹⁷⁰⁴ It is said that out of the money Uthman got from defeat of Jurjir in Ifriqiyah in 648 CE, he gave one fifth to Marwan bin Hakam (Marwān bin Ḥakam مَروان بِن حَكَم ) when he married Uthman’s daughter.¹⁷⁰⁵

Financial corruption: Ya’qubi reports from ‘Abd al Rehman bin Yasār [one of Ya’qubi’s sources, otherwise unidentified personality] that he saw “how the Muslim’s alms-collector in charge of the market of Medina, when evening came, took the alms to Uthman and Uthman told him, “hand them to al Ḥakam bin Abi’l ‘Āṣ” Whenever Uthman granted a present to a member of his family, he would give it as a loan (qarḍ) from the treasury. [The alms-collector] tried to put him off (yudāfi’uhu) saying to him, “it will come to pass, and we shall give it to you, God willing!” But Uthman persisted and said: ‘you are only our treasurer! If we give you something, take it; and if we say nothing to you [about paying], shut up!” The alms-collector said: ‘you lie, by Allah! I am neither your treasurer nor your family’s; I am the Muslim’s treasurer!” On Friday, while Uthman was delivering the sermon, the alms-collector brought the key [of the treasury] and said: ‘People! Uthman has claimed that I am his treasurer and his family’s; but I am only the Muslim’s treasurer. Here are the Keys of your treasury!” – and he threw them down. ‘Uthman took them and handed them to Zayd bin Thābit.¹⁷⁰⁶, ¹⁷⁰⁷

Criticism to Uthman that had started as anecdotal incidences soon transformed into an organized smear campaign of Shi’a Ali. Since Uthman didn’t have capacity to justify his actions promptly and with verbosity, criticism to him became fashionable in the capital. Ali himself was prudent enough not to mock the sitting caliph directly but whenever Shi’a Ali criticized Uthman, he demonstrated his approval by keeping quiet.

Islamic sources, like Ya’qubi, paint Ali as a watchful sage who fixed the blunders committed by Uthman in a timely fashion.¹⁷⁰⁸ A detailed analysis of Ya’qubi’s writings, on the other hand, produces entirely different picture of Ali’s activities during Uthman’s tenure. He was in league with opposition to Uthman. Uthman charged Burayr bin Junāda, better known as Abu Dhar al Ghifari, with defaming him by claiming that Uthman had changed and altered the practices (Sunna) of Allah’s Messenger and those of Au Bakr and Umar and exiled him from Medina.¹⁷⁰⁹ ¹⁷¹⁰ ¹⁷¹¹ ¹⁷¹² Ali, his sons Hasan (Ḥasan حَسَن ) and Husayn (Ḥusayn حُسَين ), and his nephew Abdullah bin ja’far (‘Abdallah bin Ja’far عَبدُ اللّه بِن جَعفَر ) saw him off as a gesture of support.¹⁷¹³ ¹⁷¹⁴

Medinan political parties open branches in cantonments

Some other senior figures of Medinan Caliphate, who were part and parcel of the Electoral College that Umar had nominated, were not far behind Ali in political activities. Umar had banned travel of prominent members of Quraysh outside Medina. They needed to produce a valid reason and an itinerary to get a permit to travel outside Medina. Quraysh disliked this restriction. One of the first acts of Uthman, when he came to power, was to lift the travel ban.¹⁷¹⁵ Uthman didn’t believe in state restrictions on individual liberties. Defending his decision to depart from the policy of his predecessor in this regard, Uthman claimed that “Islam had matured and that Quraysh wish to usurp Allah’s wealth for their own benefit to the exclusion of His [other] servants”. ¹⁷¹⁶ He was confident that Muslims living in cantonments were mature enough to recognize Quraysh’s money greed and won’t get mesmerized by them. However, Uthman was utterly wrong in his reading. When allowed to travel freely across the country, prominent members of Quraysh bought properties in cantonments.¹⁷¹⁷ Once they got a foothold in conquered lands (al Buldān), they were in a position to build personality cults. People reverend them for being earliest Muslims and companions of the Prophet. This was particularly true for marginalized people of obscure backgrounds. They attached themselves exclusively to different personalities of Quraysh to gain precedence in Islam by virtue of them.¹⁷¹⁸ Soon personality based factions sprang up in cantonments.¹⁷¹⁹ Pull was from both sides. Prominent members of Quraysh aroused their hopes that they would gain precedence in Islam by entering into their faction.¹⁷²⁰ The ‘politics around personalities’ that was limited to Medina during Umar’s time now took root in cantonments. Different factions in cantonments openly wished that its leader (ṣāhib) should be the next ruler.¹⁷²¹

Tabari is the only narrator to this development. While narrating it, he is courteous enough not to mention names of Quraysh dignitaries involved and leaves the matter to the speculation of the reader. However, at another place, he does mention that Zubayr bin Awwam had a clout in Kufa, Talha bin Ubaydallah in Basrah, and Ali in Fustat.¹⁷²²

Modern historians are convinced that an individual has a very superficial role in changing stream of history. Write quotation , Argues Gibbs. True, one individual cannot be that influential to stir a historical stream by his whim. Historical streams always have socio-economical origins. Once established, the historical streams push up one or a few individuals on top of others, who become leaders of that particular stream. That individual assumes the role of organizer for the stream and during the course, attains power to modify its path. Who can separate Cuban Revolution from Fidel Castro, or American Civil War from Abraham Lincoln? From its advent to present day, Islam had many political movements which were rooted in social and economic ground. Once the movement surfaced a leader, the story of that individual became story of the movement.

Change in consistency of advisory committee to the caliph

Consultation had been a significant administrative tool in Medinan Caliphate. Uthman’s predecessors took advice of only early Meccan converts on political matters. Occasionally they took advice of others but that was only on technical matters. For example, Hurmuzan as Umar’s advisor on Iran matters. From the inauguration of Uthman’s tenure either earliest Quraysh converts to Islam opted out of advisory committee voluntary or Uthman himself kicked them out. We don’t hear either of Abdur Rehman bin Awf, Talha, Zubayr or Sa’d bin Waqqas advising Uthman on any matter of political gist. Uthman had to look towards others for getting advice. Late Meccan converts, notably Uthman’s clansmen sneaked into the advisory committee. Most notable names among Uthman’s advisors are Abu Syfyan and Marwan bin Hakam bin Abi As, Uthman’s paternal first cousine.¹⁷²³ This development, no doubt, isolated the caliph further from other Quraysh clans.

Caliph neglected sinful behavior of elite

Uthman deviated away from a very fundamental policy of Umar. He didn’t believe that caliph and government were responsible for eyeing sinful behavior of citizens.¹⁷²⁴ He probably believed that it was a matter between man and God. He expressed clearly that caliph’s duty is only up to making sure that common people fulfill their religious duties [farai’d.].¹⁷²⁵¹⁷²⁶¹⁷²⁷¹⁷²⁸¹⁷²⁹ After conquest of Syria Wahshi had settled there. During Uthman’s tenure some journalists of the time wished to interview Wahshi regarding his role in killing of Hamza and Musaylima. The journalists knew that they could easily find him at his house in Syria on any evening because he would be drunk that time.¹⁷³⁰ Despite being an open secret, it appears that Uthman didn’t open a criminal investigation against Wahshi.

Uthman also strongly believed that after serving a sentence, a culprit got completely rehabilitated from his criminal record. He could be reinstated as if he had not committed any crime. Uthman assigned Walid bin Uqba, his disgraced governor of kufa, as ṣadaqah collector from tribes of Kalb and Balqayn.¹⁷³¹

Ruler’s personality definitely moulds the behavior of common people. Absence of government’s watchful eye on sinful behavior encouraged such behavior. There is always a bunch of people in each society and in every era who behave well out of fear of punishment. Tabari reports that sinful behavior increased during Uthman’s twelve years. “First forbidden thing to appear in Medina was the flight of pigeons and shooting clay pallets” insists Tabari.¹⁷³² He further stresses that “Drunkenness began to occur among the people [during Uthman’s era]. Uthman dispatched a petrol armed with staffs to make the round among them, and thus he prevented [such behavior] among them. Afterwards [drunkenness] intensified, and Uthman publicly proclaimed the divinely prescribed punishments and protested to the people about [their behavior]”.¹⁷³³

Arab society changed fast from that of pre-Islam (jāhiliyah) where tradition kept a check on unethical behaviors, to Islam where law of the country was supposed to check such behaviors. Government laxity on such matters, indeed, reduced authority of government in the eyes of masses.

Deterioration of criminal justice system

Whenever people of a country fall into conflicting fractions, the criminal justice system of that country fails to deliver. Uthman’s tenure saw deteriorating situation of criminal justice in Medinan Caliphate. Defeated communities were responsible for maintaining their own criminal justice. Caliph was overall responsible for maintaining criminal justice among Arab Muslims. It was duty of governors in the provinces as assignee of the caliph.

A magician from Kufa, by name of Baṭrawi, came to the grand mosque of Kufa in presence of governor Walid. People gathered around him in the mosque courtyard. He would stick (something) into a camel’s anus and extract (it) from its mouth and would perform wonders. Junab bin Ka’b of Azd tribe stuck off his head with a sword saying, “Revive yourself if you are truthful!” Walid wanted to strike off head of Junab but ‘Azd rose up saying, “you shall not kill our kinsman!”. Wlid jailed him. Abu Sinān, the jailer released him without Walid’s permission, as the jailer thought it was not appropriate religiously to jail this person and what will he answer to Allah. Walid arrested Abu Sinān and gave him two hundred lashes.¹⁷³⁴ The magician appears to be from poorer sections of society, probably Rwadif. He did not have powerful’s support. He was totally dependent upon state to protect his life. Azd, on the other hand were Ahl al Ayam. They not only used their higher social status to fail the state justice system, they also sacralized the crime dubbing the behavior of the slain contrary to teachings of religion.¹⁷³⁵

Actually, law and order situation started deteriorating from day one of Uthman’s caliphate. Ubaydallh bin Umar had murdered Hurmuzan in revenge of conspiring assassination of Umar.¹⁷³⁶ Umar had wished on his deathbed that Ubaydallh should have been dealt according to the law of the country and awarded with death panelty.¹⁷³⁷ Uthman withheld punishing Ubaydallah bin Umar for murder of Hurmuzan with death penalty.¹⁷³⁸ Rather he allowed Ubaydallah to leave Medina to settle in Kufa.¹⁷³⁹ Uthman paid blood money from public exchequer.¹⁷⁴⁰ We don’t know what were limitations of Uthman in punishing the culprit. Uthman defended his decision by stating that as a caliph he was the guardian (wali) of all Muslims, including Hurmuzan. So he had a legal right to pardon the killer and leave the matter to Allah and his Messenger.¹⁷⁴¹ Miqdad objected that Uthman was not guardian of Muslims, it was Allah. Uthman did not have any legal authority to infringe on rights of Hurmuzan to life.¹⁷⁴² Uthman dismissed Miqdad’s objection by simply saying, I and you don’t see the things the same way.¹⁷⁴³ Here, we can see again that the murderer belonged to high social status. The slain was from lower social status.

Limitations of Uthman

A big limitation for Uthman was his oath which demanded from him toeing policy of his processors in toto. It made difficult for him to apply his own judgment in light of changed realities on ground, even for minor things. For example, Initially Uthman ordered tithes to be collected from Banu Taghlib on their gold and silver. But he had to withdraw his own orders when people informed him that Umar had ordered double ṣadaqah from them.¹⁷⁴⁴ In face of growing troubles in the country he was presiding over, Uthman didn’t attempt sweeping reforms or far reaching changes in Medinan Caliphate on lines of Umar’r reforms.

Umar knew how to impose himself on people. Uthman was naïve in this matter. He had difficulty in convincing people generally that they had to obey the authority. In 647 CE Uthman enlarged the Sacred Mosque in Mecca and added to it. He bought houses from one group of people, but others refused to sell. So he had their houses pulled down over them, and he placed the funds in the treasury. When they shouted at Uthman, he ordered that they be imprisoned, saying: ‘it was only my forbearance that emboldened you against me. Umar did the same thing, but you did not cry out.” ¹⁷⁴⁵

Battle of Masts

After synopsis of political ambience of Medinan Caliphate, now let’s divert our attention to the last episode of Futuhul Buldan. Medinan Caliphate’s experience of finishing off Sasanian Iran was positive. It gave them a much needed sigh of relief. Within few years of murder of Yazdegerd all areas pertaining to the defunct Sasanian Iran attached themselves to Medinan Caliphate. Medinan Caliphate’s fear of invasion from their eastern border dissipated. Now they yearned to finish Byzantine Rome so they could keep clear of any possible attack on their western boundaries. They developed a contingency plan to decimate Byzantine Rome similar to the one they used for Sasanian Iran. They wished to detain emperor Constans II in a hope that all areas of Byzantine Rome would automatically plummet after it.

Byzantine Rome was, anyhow, different from Sasanian Iran geographically. Unlike Sasanian Iran, whose capital Tysfwn did not have natural barrier against Arabs and was nearer to them, Byzantine capital was at least one thousand Kilometer away from the northern tip of Syrian Desert. Moreover, it was separated from them by steep Taurus Mountains. Arabs used to send expedition every summer through them into Anatolia but it had to be withdrawn in winter losing any gains of summer.¹⁷⁴⁶ They pondered on other ways to reach Constantinople.

After the 648 CE campaign of Maghreb, Uthman instructed some of his troops operating there to sail to Spain (Undulus) under command of Abdullah bin Nafi bin Abdul Qays (‘Abdallāh bin Nāfi’ bin Abd al Qays عَبدَ اللّه لابِن نافِع بِن عَبدُ القَيس ) of Fihr clan and Abdullah bin Nafi bin Husayn (‘Abdallāh bin Nāfi’ bin Ḥuṣayn عَبدَ اللَه بِن نافِع بِن حُسَين ) of Fihr clan. The aim was to reach Constantinople by land from the other side. Barbers of Maghreb had joined this army nimbly. The army landed at Ifranjah and established a base camp.¹⁷⁴⁷ ¹⁷⁴⁸ The army could not achieve anything further than that. Arabs maintained this base camp in good order until the time of Hisham.¹⁷⁴⁹

Failing to achieve the target by land invasion only, Medinan Caliphate envisaged an amphibious assault on Constantinople. Precedents of conjoined land and sea attack on Constantinople were present in the near past.¹⁷⁵⁰ Mu’awiya had got increasingly confident in naval warfare after its experimental launching in 649 CE on Cyprus. Navy of Medinan Caliphate had clashed with the navy of Byzantine Rome at least once, in 653 CE, in open sea.¹⁷⁵¹ Though navy of Medinan Caliphate got defeated in this adventure, according to Sebeos, the impact on Byzantine Rome was pessimistic.¹⁷⁵²

The first major land and sea expedition against Constantinople, initiated in summer of 654 CE.¹⁷⁵³ Mu’awiya had taken personal pains to prepare for the attack. Hoyland discovers after studying the contemporary papyri that he recruited a crew of thousands of carpenters, caulkers, blacksmiths, and oremen to build ships in the ports of Syria and in Alexandria.¹⁷⁵⁴ According to Sebeos, Mu’awiya collected troops from as far as Iran, Kherson, and Egypt for this attack.¹⁷⁵⁵

“If you want to spend your life in peace,” Mu’awiya wrote to Constans, “abandon that foolish faith which you learned from childhood. Deny that Jesus and turn to the great God whom I worship, the God of our Father Abraham.” ¹⁷⁵⁶ Naturally, Constans II disregarded the demand.

A humongous navy of three hundred giant war ships with one thousand sailors abroad each, well equipped with war engines, shooting machines, rock-hurling machines, archers and slingers, and five thousand light boats, each carrying hundred fighters sailed across Mediterranean towards Constantinople.¹⁷⁵⁷ Medinan Caliphate appointed ‘Abdullah bin Sa’d, governor of Egypt, as its commander.¹⁷⁵⁸ Mu’awiya himself marched with military by land to camp at Chalcedon, which lay opposite to Constantinople across Basforus.¹⁷⁵⁹ ¹⁷⁶⁰ On receiving Uthman’s notice of war, which the army at Chalcedon had delivered to him, a nervous Constans rushed to the Church to beg for help from God.¹⁷⁶¹ Constantinople had no means to defend itself. Nature became its savior. A six days long hurricane destroyed all the Medinan Caliphat’s navy near Chalcedon. Not a single sailor survived.¹⁷⁶² The camping army at Chalcedon, heartbroken, fled back at night.¹⁷⁶³ ¹⁷⁶⁴

This was the last military adventure carried out by Medinan Caliphate against a foreign land. Hoyland guesses that fiasco of the Battle of Masts would have tarnished reputation of Caliph Uthman somewhat and could have been immediate cause of rebellion against him.¹⁷⁶⁵ ¹⁷⁶⁶ ¹⁷⁶⁷

Downfall of Medinan Caliphate

There is a Farsi proverb, each rise has its fall (her urūj ra zawāl ast). In case of Medinan Calphate the rise was dramatic and the fall was swift. During first few years of Uthman’s government the supra-structure of Medinan Caliphate looked solid but its foundations had started eroding. The social processes which had started during era of Umar and which were all unfavourable from Medinan Caliphate’s point of view, intensified strikingly. By the end of 653 CE Medinan Caliphate was on downhill path and it was apparent to the Arab Muslim elites.¹⁷⁶⁸

Rebellion against Uthman

Just within two decades after death of Prophet Muhammad, hundreds of thousands had accepted Islam as their religion. Majority of them were spread over cantonments away from Medina. Their participation in politics of the country had become conspicuous by middle of the seventh century CE. Who should be the supreme ruler of Medinan Caliphate was no longer a local issue of Medina to be dealt with by the earliest companions of Prophet Muhammad. Provinces became dominant role players in the country. General deterioration of governance escalated the process further.

All the new political, economic and social streams in Medina and in the cantonments, mentioned above, converged to one common point. A rebellion sprang up against the sitting caliph. None of the non-Muslim sources mentions it. They were not aware of politics in Medina. Out of early Muslim sources only Ya’qubi and Tabari deal with it. Ya’qubi narrates it briefly and with overt favor for Ali. Tabari narrates it in detail and tries to be impartial. Rebellions always result from widespread discontent at grass root level. Anyhow, before a rebellion explodes, there is usually an individual who provides the ideological ammunition for the rebels. Typical example is that of Rousseau for the French Revolution.¹⁷⁶⁹ In case of first rebellion in Medinan Caliphate, the individual who provided ideological ground was enigmatic figure of Abdulla bin Saba (‘Abdullah bin Sabā’ عَبدَ اللّه بِن سَباء ).¹⁷⁷⁰ ¹⁷⁷¹ He hailed from Sana’a in Yemen. Abdullah bin Saba converted to Islam from Judaism as late as the era of Caliph Uthman. He concocted two doctrines. One, that Prophet Muhammad will resurrect (raj’ah). “If Jesus can resurrect, why not Prophet Muhammad”, he argued, “Prophet Muhammad has more right to it than Jesus”. He used verses of the Qur’an to support his thesis. Second, that about one thousand Prophets had their executor (waṣī). And Prophet Muhammad’s executor (waṣī) is Ali. He continued, “as Prophet Muhammad is the seal of all Prophets, Ali is the seal of all executors”.¹⁷⁷² ¹⁷⁷³ He became a firebrand preacher of rebellion against Uthman. He initiated from Hejaz. Finding the ground unfertile for his ideas there, he moved to Basrah, and then to Kufa where people used to heed him and get convinced of his arguments. Then he travelled to Syria where he could not impress a single person. Finally, he ended up in Egypt, where he got abundance of like-minded audience. Referring to Uthman he used to say, “who could be more wrong than the one who has not carried out the testament of Prophet Muhammad, who attacks his waṣī and who has usurped the power over the community?”¹⁷⁷⁴ The question is why people got convinced of arguments which were coming from mouth of a new Muslim, while those stalwarts of religion were still alive who had converted to Islam within the secretive phase of its inception and had the longest experience of living with and learning from Prophet Muhammad. Logic is to the reason what beauty is to the eye. In other words, logic is simply a process of appreciating beauty of an argument. Passions play an important part in an individual’s acceptance or rejection of an argument. Passions against ruling Quraysh were rampant in the cantonments. Religious sentiments of people prevented them from talking against the sitting caliph who was a Quraysh, but a senior companion of the Prophet. They were hitherto blaming the governors for their plight. Teachings of Ibn Saba provided them with a religious argument against the sitting caliph. They successfully diverted the general anti-Quraysh sentiments in cantonments into sentiments against only one clan of Quraysh – Umayyads. By sparing other clans of Quraysh they also provided a bridge between rebellious sentiments in cantonments and clan based politics in Medina.¹⁷⁷⁵ Umar’s stipends register had generated hieratically ranking groups among Muslims. Members of each group stood equal to each other in status, though. All companions of the Prophet who immigrated from Mecca to Medina, for example, fell in one group. All of them were equal in status. After appearance of ibn Saba Muslims started making comparison between members of the same hierarchal group. Umar was superior to Uthman, they concluded.¹⁷⁷⁶

The dissidents in cantonments started organizing themselves in underground groups (majālis).¹⁷⁷⁷ They successfully weaved a communication network spread over all major towns of the country. They used private couriers instead of government run post system (barīd) to avoid being traced.¹⁷⁷⁸ Within a few months there were well organized groups of dissidents functioning in Basrah, Kufa, Fustat and Medina, each one with its own designated leader. None of them was strong enough to dislodge the sitting caliph single handed, though they obtained a capacity to attempt a combined effort through precise communication.¹⁷⁷⁹ ¹⁷⁸⁰

First flame of revolt flickered in the Mediterranean, far from Medina. All protocols broke down among the few remaining marines who were returning by sea after the disastrous hurricane of Battle of Masts. Two young marines by names of Muhammad bin Abi Hudhayfa (Muḥammad bin Abi Ḥudhayfah مُحَمّد بِن اَبى هُذَيفَه ) and Muhammad bin Abu Bakr (Muḥammad bin Abi Bakr مُحَمّد بِن اَبى بَكر ) announced open rebellion, not only against the leader of the campaign, Abdullah bin Sa’d, but also against Uthman.¹⁷⁸¹ ¹⁷⁸² Now, Muhammad bin Abi Hudhayfa was from Umayyah clan of Quraysh and was a paternal cousin of Uthman.¹⁷⁸³ Uthman brought him up after his Father’s death at the battle of Yamama, but Uthman refused to appoint him to any office. He left for Egypt to look for livelihood and there became active in the revolt against Uthman.¹⁷⁸⁴ Muhammad bin Abu Bakr was a son of Caliph Abu Bakr whose mother had married Ali after death of Abu Bakr and Ali considered him his own son.¹⁷⁸⁵

The wishes of rebellion against the caliph could materialize only when some members of Quraysh known to be Shi’a Ali, residents of Fustat, joined hands with the Sabaiyyah of the town.¹⁷⁸⁶

Uthman became aware of the menace when politically active dissidents from cantonments started frequenting Medina in the form of processions to protest against the policies of the central government and to confront the caliph directly.¹⁷⁸⁷ They still came unarmed and Uthman entertained them well trying to convince them of the good deeds his government had done.¹⁷⁸⁸ During the meetings between the caliph and the rebels, which took place in the mosque of the Prophet, Uthman answered all the allegations leveled against him one by one in front of people.¹⁷⁸⁹ Here two points are worth noting. Uthman informed the gatherings that it was Prophet Muhammad himself who had brought Hakam bin Abi As back from Taif after exiling him.¹⁷⁹⁰ And whatever he gave to his relatives was his own money. He had distributed his inheritance during his life and had included, in addition to his own children, children of his near relatives as equals in his inheritance.¹⁷⁹¹ Uthman’s reassurances didn’t play the trick and endless sequence of delegates after delegates pouring in Medina continued to harass Uthman.

Uthman, at the long last, lost any hope to win over the rebels by explanations. He decided to meet with Ali, the leader of opposition in Medina, in later half of 654 CE.¹⁷⁹² Uthman might be interested in exploring possibility of Ali’s aid in containing the crisis. Ali’s vision was different. He brought two points to the table. He said that the majority of Medina was with him. Secondly, the modus operandi of selection of a caliph had always been wrong. Close relatives of Prophet Muhammad had first priority to be nominated as caliph.¹⁷⁹³ Obviously, both points were contrary to the doctrines which Medinan Caliphate had upheld up to now. Selection of a caliph had never been dependent upon majority vote in Medina. It was decided by the inner circle of companions of Prophet. And while selecting a caliph, they didn’t look at his biological relations with the Prophet, rather they looked at his spiritual relations with the Prophet. The meeting didn’t bear any fruit. Both were poles apart in their political outlook. Both separated from each other arguing. Ali blaming Uthman that it was duty of the imam (imām, leader, اِمام) to guide the people on right path. Uthman blaming Ali that it was duty of the subjects, inclusive of Ali, to obey the Imam.¹⁷⁹⁴

After failed meeting with Ali, Uthman took his case directly to the public of Medina. He warned them of siding with his opponents, who according to Uthman, were presenting to them fantasies but hiding from them hateful realities. He further claimed that his policies had not changed from those of Umar. People used to accept them from Umar because “ Umar used to trample them under his feet, smote them with his hand, and subdued them with his tongue.” Same things were unacceptable to them from Uthman because “He lets you tread on his shoulders, restrains his hand and tongue from you.” He claimed that he had achieved as much for Medinan Caliphate as his processors had. Medinan Caliphate had surplus budget at the moment and its leader could spend it the way he deemed necessary, Uthman argued. Uthman further made them clear that he had his own supporters and allies including his kinsmen. By the end of Uthman’s speech Marwan bin Hakam, Uthman’s right hand man stood up and threatened if people of Medina didn’t comply, sword would decide between the government and the people. Uthman harshly rebuked him saying “leave the matter between me and my associates, did anybody ask you to speak?” ¹⁷⁹⁵ Medinans didn’t change their minds.

Disappointed from all venues, Uthman convened a conference of governors of rebellious provinces in June 655 CE. ¹⁷⁹⁶ Agenda of the conference was to chalk out a strategy to tackle the impasse. Mu’awiya, Abdullah bin Sa’d, Sa’id bin As and Abdullah bin Amir attended it. He also invited important ex-governor Amr bin As to participate.¹⁷⁹⁷ The meeting remained inconclusive. The suggestions tabled included winning back the rebels by increasing stipends of the soldiers, sending rebellious soldiers to jihad to divert their attention from the government, arresting ring leaders of the rebels to break their cells, instructing all the governors to manage their provinces more carefully etc.¹⁷⁹⁸ None of them sounded practical to Uthman. One suggestion that pinched Uthman the most was tabled by Amr bin As. He suggested Uthman’s resignation.¹⁷⁹⁹ Actually, Uthman was conscious of his ripe age. He always considered it a constitutional right of the sitting caliph to nominate his heir, the way his processors had done. He was not clan chauvinist in this regard. He wished to name Abdur Rehman bin Awf for the job.¹⁸⁰⁰ Abdur Rehman’s death in 654 CE shattered Uthman’s plans. Apparently Uthman did not find anybody else worthy of the office.¹⁸⁰¹

The meeting practically could do nothing except accepting the status quo. Uthman categorically rejected any notion of use of force against the rebels.¹⁸⁰² Failure of the meeting of governors to chalk out solid strategy to tackle the problem convinced the people of political acumen, like Mu’awiya, that the days of Uthman’s government were numbered. Common people in Hejaz started pondering over the possible successor of Uthman.¹⁸⁰³

On the sidelines of the conference of governors, Mu’awiya met with Talha, Zubayr and Ali. He reminded them that Muslims decide about successor of a caliph by extensive consultation. While picking up a successor they not only consider his earlier conversion to Islam as a virtue, they also look at his capability of judgment (ijtihād). Ali and Zubayr were not amused by his comments.¹⁸⁰⁴ Mu’awiya also brought to their attention that none of them had yet condemned the activities of the rebels. Rather, according to Mu’awiya, they were indirectly inspiring people to long for their government.¹⁸⁰⁵ ¹⁸⁰⁶ ¹⁸⁰⁷

Kufa became the first provincial capital to chase Uthman’s appointed governor away. When Sa’id bin As went back to Kufa after attending the governor’s meeting, rebels of Kufa, under their leader Malik bin Harith Al-Ashtar, didn’t allow him entrance into the town. A freedman of the governor got killed during the scuffle between the entourage of the governor and the rebels. The governor had to flee to Medina for his life.¹⁸⁰⁸ ¹⁸⁰⁹ Sa’id bin As appraised Uthman that Kufans had still not revolted against Uthman and they would be content if a non-Quraysh, Abu Musa Ash’ari, is appointed over them. Uthman dammed the flood for a while by quickly appointing Abu Musa Ash’ari over them as governor.¹⁸¹⁰ Abu Musa asked the Kufans to reiterate their loyalty to Uthman before he took management of Kufa in his hands.¹⁸¹¹

Seeing the situation degrading from bad to worst in the cantonment cities, Uthman appealed to the citizens of all cantonments directly in second half of 655 CE.¹⁸¹² He wrote an open letter to all of them. He promised to them that he would yield to all their demands if they calm down. Among other things in the letter, Uthman also stressed that neither he, nor his household had ever claimed any rights more than what common citizens of the country had.¹⁸¹³ ‘Olive branch’ tactic of Uthman failed to pacify the cantonments. From point of view of rebels it was too little, too late.

Despite many months of political agitation in the provinces, the rebels couldn’t convince whole populations of cantonments to rise in disobedience. They, then, decided a long march on capital Medina to topple the government.¹⁸¹⁴ They left the cantonment towns in small batches with proclaimed intention to perform lesser pilgrimage, probably due to fear of not being obstructed by governors of the cantonments.¹⁸¹⁵ First batch left Fustat in January 656 CE.¹⁸¹⁶ Muhammad bin Abi Hudhayfa decided to stay behind in Fistat.¹⁸¹⁷ Abdullah bin Sa’d left for Medina to discuss the latest developments with Uthman. Muhammad Bin Abi Hudhayfa didn’t lose this opportunity to seize power in Egypt. Arab elites of Egypt submitted to his authority. Muhammad Bin Abi Hudhayfa fended Abdullah off Egypt on his return and he had to take residence in Palestine.¹⁸¹⁸ ¹⁸¹⁹

By April 656 CE some two to three thousand rebels had been camping at three different spots about three night’s distance from Medina.¹⁸²⁰ Abdullah bin Saba, Muhammad bin Abu Bakr and Malik bin Harith al-Ashtar were some of prominent names among them.¹⁸²¹ ¹⁸²² Uthman felt threatened by the intelligence reports that they were all armed.¹⁸²³ He didn’t want them to reach Medina. He opened dialogue with them through messengers. Among the names of messengers mentioned by sources are Ali, Amr bin As, Talha and Zubayr.¹⁸²⁴ ¹⁸²⁵ Egyptian rebels were more radical.¹⁸²⁶ Uthman might have chosen Amr and Ali because of their potential influence on the Egyptian rebels. Rebels also sent envoys to Medina who met with widows of the Prophet and Ali, Talha and Zubayr. They informed that they merely intended to compel Uthman to remove his governors.¹⁸²⁷ By efforts of the messengers, Uthman and the rebels entered into an agreement by which Medinan Caliphate would suspend stipend payments to all Medinans except those who were bonafide companions of Prophet Muhammad. The government recognized point of view of rebels that the lands which generate money for stipend should serve only those who fought for them.¹⁸²⁸ ¹⁸²⁹ The rebels gave an impression that they were satisfied with the deal and started returning. Uthman and his handful Medinan supporters sighed a relief for postponing the trouble.

To their surprise, on one fine morning of May 656 CE, all the rebels descended on Medina.¹⁸³⁰ “Uthman has written to his governor in Egypt secretly that the Egyptian rebels should be put to death on reaching back,” they blamed, “and we have caught Uthman’s postman on the way.” Uthman asked them to either support their claim with two reliable eyewitnesses or by taking an oath.¹⁸³¹ They were not in mood to debate. Their demand was simple. Uthman should resign there and then. Uthman had made up his mind not to resign under threats. “I am not one to remove a robe that Allah has placed upon me,” he said.¹⁸³²

A desperate Uthman requested Mu’awiya to rescue him. Mu’awiya dispatched a formidable army of twelve thousand men to support Uthman but ordered them not to cross into Hejaz from Syria until Mu’awiya finishes his facts finding mission to Medina.¹⁸³³ ¹⁸³⁴

During his meeting with Mu’awiya Uthman raised panic to hurry otherwise the rebels would kill him.¹⁸³⁵ Mu’awiya went back to Syria never to return with the army.¹⁸³⁶ Uthman’s right hand man, Marwan bin Hakam tried to convince Muhajirun, for example Aisha, to use their influence over the rebels to defuse the situation but in vein.¹⁸³⁷ ¹⁸³⁸

The rebels expropriated the public treasury located in the capital.¹⁸³⁹ ¹⁸⁴⁰ For the next thirty days, Uthman kept leading the prayer in the mosque of the Prophet as a token of authority.¹⁸⁴¹ People of Medina kept following him in the mosque. None of the members of Electoral College living in Medina joined the rebels openly.

After turmoil of a few weeks news started circulating in Medina that some of Uthman’s loyals had left cantonments for Medina to protect him.¹⁸⁴² Frustrated by delay in resignation of caliph and fearful of potential help to Uthman, on occasion of a Friday congregation, the rebels started pelting stones on Uthman and his supporters. They dispersed the congregation and banned any kind of public assembly in Medina in future.¹⁸⁴³ Uthman had got unconscious by the assault. People took him to his residence. Medina plunged into an air of fear. People bolted themselves inside their walled enclosures. The rebels sieged Uthman at his house.¹⁸⁴⁴ ¹⁸⁴⁵

Caliph Uthman murdered

When Uthman gained consciousness at his residence he found himself abandoned. Ansar of Medina had distanced themselves from the official establishment of Medinan Caliphate from the times of Abu Bakr. Prominent Muhajirun, like Talha, Zubayr or Aisha were not in a mood to side with the caliph.¹⁸⁴⁶ Only members of Umayyah clan and his personal slaves remained on his bedside.¹⁸⁴⁷ Ali, Talha and Zubayr visited him to enquire about his health.¹⁸⁴⁸ Each of them also sent one of their sons, Hasan bin Ali, Abdullah bin Zubayr (‘Abdallah bin Zubayr عَبدُ اللّه بِن زُبَير ) and Muhammad bin Talha (Muḥammad bin Talhah مُحَمّد بِن طَلحَه ) to guard the gate of his residence as a token of solidarity with him.¹⁸⁴⁹ None of them did anything more than that. ¹⁸⁵⁰

Egyptian band of rebels surrounded Uthman’s residence for the next ten days. They waited if Uthman provides them with any excuse to kill him. The excuse came when one of Uthman’s supporters killed Niyar (Niyār نِيار ), an Aslam and local resident of Medina, by pelting a stone on him from the residence’s rooftop. A handful of rebels entered the residence forcefully. They not only killed the caliph but also some of his companions from Banu Umayyah and his slaves who were determined to protect him. The unruly gang didn’t shun from disgracing the pages of Qur’an that Uthman was reciting at that time by kicking them in the air, looting everything in the residence and molesting Naila (Na’ilah ناءِلَه ), Uthman’s young wife. “What a big buttocks she has!” they exclaimed after groping her.¹⁸⁵¹ ¹⁸⁵² ¹⁸⁵³ ¹⁸⁵⁴

As an angry mob of people murdered Uthman, it was difficult to determine whose blow proved fatal. Ya’qubi charge sheets seven men, Muhammad bin Abu Bakr, Muhammad bin Abi Hudhayfa, Amr bin Hazm (‘Amr bin Ḥazm عَمَرؤ بِن حَزم ), Kinana bin Bishr (Kinānah bin Bishr كِنانَه بِن بِشر ), Amr bin Hamiq (‘Amr bin Ḥamiq عَمرؤ بِن حَمِق ), Abdur Rehman bin Udays (‘Abd al Rehman bin ‘Udays عَبدُ الرِحمان بِن عُدَ يس ) and Sudan bin Hurmran (Sūdān bin Ḥurmrān سُودان بِن حُرمان ).¹⁸⁵⁵ ¹⁸⁵⁶ We know Amr bin Hazm was Uthman’s neighbor and he provided his house for the rebels to break open into Uthman’s residence. His role was nothing more.¹⁸⁵⁷ We further know that Muhammad bin Abi Hudhayfa was in Egypt at the time of murder.¹⁸⁵⁸ These two people can be considered abettor to murder but not murderers.

Tabari states that it was Muhammad bin Abu Bakr who started assault on person of Uthman by grabbing his beard and piercing his forehead with a broad iron-tipped arrow.¹⁸⁵⁹ Then Tabari presents a scene in which a number of people including Kinana bin Bishr, Amr bin Hamiq, Abdur Rehman bin Udays and Sudan bin Hurmran used different weapons to make sure that Uthman was dead.¹⁸⁶⁰ ¹⁸⁶¹ ¹⁸⁶²

Uthman died on June 17, 656 CE.¹⁸⁶³

Sympathy with Uthman

Murder of beleaguered Uthman raised a wave of sympathy for him among Arab elites throughout the country. Actually, support for Uthman had not collapsed to zero in the cantonments. Out of sixty thousand households of Kufa, for example, only six hundred to one thousand ventured out to rebel against him. Remaining ninety eight percent population was either Uthman’s supporter or at least neutral.¹⁸⁶⁴

Murder was the most heinous crime in the eyes of Arabs. As news of murder spread to far off districts of Medinan Caliphate, the silent majority expected that whoever becomes the next caliph should punish the culprits according to the law of the country. This might be the time when a certain Qays etched on a rock in Tayma “I am Qays, the scribe of Abū Kutayr. Curse of Allah on [those] who murdered ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān and [those who] have led to the killing without mercy”.¹⁸⁶⁵ Qays not only curses those who murdered Uthman but also those who led to the murder. Political rivals of the next government were all set to cash this wave of sympathy The rebels had killed Uthman in Medina which was declared Ḥaram by the Prophet. Further, they killed him during the sacred month of Dhu ‘l Hajjah. Uthman’s sympathisers were apt to point it out as an outrageous sin.¹⁸⁶⁶ Common people might have been hoping that the people who physically murdered the caliph should be brought to the book. The political opponents of the next government, contrary to this, counted everybody who participated in the long march to Medina as culprit.¹⁸⁶⁷ It was definitely a canny position to hound the next caliph.¹⁸⁶⁸

Trumpets of civil war

Violent death of caliph Uthman unleashed the political turmoil that was looming over Medinan Caliphate for a few years but was restrained by a regard for the sitting caliph. The events of the next five years, usually referred to as First Arab Civil War (Fitnatal ‘Ūlā) plunged Medinan Caliphate in a bloody war that was free for anybody to participate.¹⁸⁶⁹ Historians might be divided on reasons of Futuhul Buldan between religion or worldly wealth but none of them is divided on reasons of First Arab Civil War. All are unanimously clear that the war had nothing to do with spread of Islam. It was all about re-distribution of wealth generated by Futuhul Buldan and about which of the Companions would supervise its distribution.¹⁸⁷⁰ They say uneasy lies the head that wears the crown. Yet, there has never been scarcity of heads who wish to wear the crown. Managing fellow humans is such a pleasant excitement that men sacrifice their family, their wealth and even their life for it. In case of Medinan Caliphate, it was understandable that whoever would govern the country after Uthman, would not only have sweeping powers over humans living a vast land extending from Tripoli in the west to Merv in the east and from Bab in the north to Aden in the south, but he would also have access to exorbitant amount of cash, property, and other resources. And who that lucky one would be, sword would decide. No arguments would be strong enough to settle the dispute. The winner of this gory war, that would be fought in the field of battle, in the domain of propaganda, and in the arena of religious portending, won’t be the one who is more pious or who has been closer to the Prophet of Islam, but the one who is more pragmatic, who is closer to resources.

Sebeos, who is the first to give us a glimpse of this war narrates, “Then God sent discord into the army of the sons of Ishmael. Their unity dissolved, they clashed with each other and divided into four parts. One part was in the Indian area. Another was that army which held Asorestan and the northern areas. Another was the one in Egypt and in the T’etal region. Another was in the Tachik area and at the place called Askarawn. They began fighting with each other and destroyed each other with endless killings. Now the troops who were in Egypt united with those in the Tachik area and they killed their king and took the multitude of treasures as loot. They enthroned another king and returned to their places. Now when their prince Mu’awiya, who was in Asorestan and was second to their king, saw what had happened, he united his troops and he too went to the desert. He killed the king whom they enthroned, battling with and severely destroying the troops in the Tachik area. He then returned to Asorestan in triumph. Now the army which was in Egypt united with the Byzantine emperor, made peace and was incorporated. The multitude of the troops, some fifteen thousand people, believed in Christ and were baptized. But the bloodshed of countless multitudes increased and intensified among the Ishmaelite armies. They engaged in frantic battles and killed each other. Nor were they able to stop even somewhat from wielding swords, taking captives and intense battles on land and sea, until Mu’awiya grew strong and conquered all of them. He subdued them, ruled as king over the property of the sons of Ishmael and made peace with everyone”.¹⁸⁷¹

Let’s sort out details.

Selection of Ali as caliph and birth of ‘ Uthman party’

Five days after murder of Uthman, Ali took oath of the office of caliph on June 23, 656 CE.¹⁸⁷²

Uthman had died without prescribing any mechanism to select a caliph after him. Medina was in a state of mayhem. The Egyptian rebels held position of kingmaker and they were in cahoots with Ali.¹⁸⁷³ Earliest converts, who were members of the Electoral College that chose Uthman twelve years ago, namely Talha, Zubayr, Sa’d and Ali did not sit together in a meeting to choose the next leader from among themselves. We are not sure whether they wished to do so either. Ansar, who felt to be sidelined by the first three caliphs, had openly sided with Ali.¹⁸⁷⁴ The rebels seated Ali on pulpit of caliphate.¹⁸⁷⁵ The Ansar were apt to accept him as caliph.¹⁸⁷⁶ Here point to note is that none of the rebels tried to snatch the caliphate for himself. Neither any of Ansar claimed it for one of them. Prominent members of tribes other than Quraysh, for example, Asad were present in Medina.¹⁸⁷⁷ None of them demanded the top post. The principal that caliph will be from one of the Quraysh and those who converted to Islam earlier will be given priority survived murder of Uthman. Almost all the rebels returned to their homes after Ali’s oath taking.¹⁸⁷⁸

None of Muhajirun made a speech in the inauguration ceremony of Ali¹⁸⁷⁹ It was addressed by a multitude of Ansar, all applauding Ali, one after another.¹⁸⁸⁰

It was an assumption in the population of Medina that whoever would take oath of Caliph after murder of Uthman would be suspected of being accomplice in the crime. Abdullah bin Abbas, a Shi’a Ali, had warned Ali of this hazard. Ali didn’t pay heed and thus he was suspected of Uthman’s murder.¹⁸⁸¹ ¹⁸⁸²

Three prominent men of Banu Umayyah fled from Medina to Mecca after murder of Uthman and before anybody took oath of caliphate. They were Marwan bin Hakam, Sa’id bin As, and Walid bin Uqba.¹⁸⁸³ ¹⁸⁸⁴ Once in safety of their hometown, they refused to recognize Ali as caliph.¹⁸⁸⁵ ¹⁸⁸⁶ ¹⁸⁸⁷ ¹⁸⁸⁸ ¹⁸⁸⁹ ¹⁸⁹⁰ ¹⁸⁹¹ ¹⁸⁹² ¹⁸⁹³ ¹⁸⁹⁴ They demanded from Ali to register a case against murderers of Uthman and bring them to justice to prove that he was a genuine guardian of each and every Muslim, before he could expect an oath of allegiance from them.¹⁸⁹⁵ This was birth of another political party, known later as Shi’a Uthman (Shi’a Uthmān شِيعَه عَثمان ) or simply Uthmaniyah (Uthmāniyah عُثمانِيَه ).¹⁸⁹⁶

Membership of Shi’a Ali or Shi’a Uthman was not a permanent affair during First Arab Civil War. People used to turn coat easily. For example, Qa’qa bin Amr (Qa’qā’ bin ‘Amr قَعقاء بِن عَمرؤ ) of Tamim, the commander of Kufan military garrison was pro Uthman. He even organized a force to protect Uthman from murder.¹⁸⁹⁷ When Ali camped at Dhu Qar he changed side to Ali and participated in Battle of Camel from his side.¹⁸⁹⁸

Worth noting is that prominent members of Uthman party were not merely power seekers. Some of them were afraid that Ali would confiscate their wealth on a charge of corruption during Uthman’s era.¹⁸⁹⁹

In his speech of acceptance, Ali pledged his agenda to run the government according to the Book of Allah and Sunna of His Messenger.¹⁹⁰⁰ He shifted away from the tradition of Medinan Caliphate that sitting caliph was further obliged to follow the precedents set by his predecessor caliphs. This was his old stance he took during celebrations of the Electoral College that picked Uthman as caliph.¹⁹⁰¹ He further made it clear that he won’t mind if anybody doesn’t join his camp because he disagrees with his agenda, a veiled hint towards Shi’a Uthman.¹⁹⁰² The speech might have given emotional consolence to Shi’a Ali but it might have left a wider audience perplexed how was he going to fix the pressing problems of lawlessness in the country, political dissent among Muslims, and uneven distribution of wealth in the society.¹⁹⁰³ He did not touch any of them in his inaugural speech.

Ali in awkward situation

Ali was a man of sword. His martial career started at Battle of Badr where he was the first respondent of the dual challenge extended by Utba bin Rabi’a (‘Utbah bin Rabī’ah عُتبَه بِن رَبِيعَه ).¹⁹⁰⁴ However, we don’t hear of any big campaigns lead by Ali during the Prophetic times. His campaigns against banu Bakr, Fuls, and then in Yemen were minor engagements by any standard.¹⁹⁰⁵ ¹⁹⁰⁶ He did not serve as a political advisor to Prophet Muhammad. The only time when we hear the Prophet sought his opinion was his family matter of event of ifk.¹⁹⁰⁷ Probably he was too young to participate in such advisory meetings during the Prophetic times. Or maybe the Prophet did not see his presence necessary as clan of banu Hashim was represented by the Prophet himself. Later on, during Medinan Caliphate, he served as advisor to Abu Bakr and then to Umar.¹⁹⁰⁸ He was head to head with Uthman from the beginning of latter’s caliphate. That explains why Uthman never consulted him on any matter.¹⁹⁰⁹ Ali did not get a chance to serve as a governor or a general under any of previous three caliphs. By looking at Ali’s curriculum vitae it becomes apparent that he did not have extensive managerial experience. It became his weakest point immediately after his ascent to power.¹⁹¹⁰

With little managerial experience in his credentials Ali took reins of a country in his hands that was in shambles. The public exchequer of Medina had been looted by the rebels and caliph didn’t have a single penny to run his administration. Central government faced the task of re-asserting its authority over provinces. Ali had come to power after remaining twelve years in opposition and his supporters had high expectations from him in terms of personal benefits like governorship of provinces. Ali was primus inter pares like his predecessor and anybody could criticize him at any time, at any place and in any way. Precedent of organizing opposition to the sitting caliph was already present in the country, this time Ali was going to face it. Last but not the least, Muhajirun of Medina demanded of him immediate arrest of murderers of Uthman and their execution.¹⁹¹¹ ¹⁹¹² Ali responded that he was not in a position to do that as the rebels were ruling over Quraysh and not vice versa at that particular point in time. He insisted that investigations into murder cannot be started before people of cantonments calm down and come to their senses.¹⁹¹³ Ali’s reluctance to even denounce the murder encouraged the Shi’a Uthman to blame him as an accomplice to the murder.¹⁹¹⁴

First shot of civil war

When the rebels gave Uthman a choice between death and abdication, the later chose death. Explaining his decision he said, “by Allah, I would rather be brought out and beheaded than remove a shirt [of the caliphate] that Allah has placed upon me. [In that case] I would be abandoning Muhammad’s community to civil war.” ¹⁹¹⁵ Uthman’s death removed the last hurdle from the path to civil war. The first step towards any civil war is a sustained disobedience towards the government by one faction. This step was accomplished by Mu’awiya within weeks of Ali being sworn in. The first decree Ali could issue was dismissal of all provincial governors appointed by Uthman, except Abu Musa Ash’ari, (who was governor of Kufa).¹⁹¹⁶ It could be his attempt to re-enforce authority of central government over provinces. All obeyed except Mu’awiya.

Mu’awiya had been governing Syria for the last sixteen years. He was one of the longest serving governors of the country.¹⁹¹⁷ Arab settlers of Syria consisted of earliest recruits of Medinan Caliphate. They had more reverence for Quraysh as compared to Arab settlers of other areas.¹⁹¹⁸ ¹⁹¹⁹ Anti Quraysh sentiments never got ripe in Syria. Mu’awiya had another special advantage over other governors of Medinan Caliphate. All new provinces of Medinan Caliphate had cantonments. Governors had to struggle to keep the residents of cantonments satisfied. Mu’awiya’s province didn’t have any cantonment. It relieved him of headache of managing a community of privileged class and reduced any chances of complaints against him with central government. He withstood Umar’s scrutiny on his governors successfully. When Uthman came to power he, being his distant cousin, bestowed Mu’awiya with further benevolence. During Umar’s time Jazirah was a province in its own right. Uthman amalgamated Jazirah and all the frontier districts with Byzantine Rome into Syria and gave its charge to Mu’awiya.¹⁹²⁰ Later on, he did the same with the province of ‘Urdun (Jordan).¹⁹²¹ ¹⁹²² He not only had hands on experience of management, he was a recent war veteran. From War of Yamama to assault on Constantinople a lot of campaigns were on his credentials. In nutshell, Mu’awiya had curriculum vitae that was superior to that of Ali and others in the field. His only setback was that he did not associate himself with Islam until Fathe Mecca and he was conscious of his setbacks.¹⁹²³ He knew his name was far down in the hierarchy of Medinan Caliphate as compared to Ali and others.¹⁹²⁴ He didn’t demand that he should have been proclaimed caliph instead of Ali. He simply said that obedience to any sitting caliph was a constitutional duty of the subjects only if the caliph himself withheld the constitution. By neglecting murder case of Uthman, Ali had not abided by the constitution of the land. (By that time Ali had already announced that he didn’t have power to punish the culprits).¹⁹²⁵

Ali asked Sahl bin Hunayf (Sahl bin Ḥunayf سَهل بِن حُنَيف) of Ansar to proceed to Syria and take over governorship from Mu’awiya.¹⁹²⁶ When he reached Tabuk, at the border between Hejaz and Syria, the horsemen of Syria turned him back.¹⁹²⁷ Ali sent to Mu’awiya a show cause notice for disobeying. After weeks of wait a messenger of Mu’awiya appeared in Medina on August 28, 656. When Ali opened the letter it was a blank scroll meant to ridicule Ali.¹⁹²⁸

Shi’a Ali in Medina were perplexed. Either the central government had to leave the matters as they were or use force against Mu’awiya to remove him. It essentially meant use of force against a Muslim and possibility of killing him in the process.¹⁹²⁹ Ali vowed to use force.¹⁹³⁰ Something that Ali’s processor avoided at all costs was at the long last a reality.¹⁹³¹

August 28, 656 CE was the date when First Arab Civil War formally started. And this was the date when the great schism of Shi’a and Sunni among Muslims was born. ¹⁹³²

Ali fails to make a government of national unity

After dismissing existing governors, Ali had to replace them. Shi’a Ali had been blaming Uthman of nepotism. Now, all eyes were fixed on Ali whom he appoints governors. This time milieu was not that the aspiring candidates would wait for someone to propose their name. They were themselves presenting their names and to some extent manipulating the caliph for their appointment. For example, Malik bin Harith al-Ashtar, the Kufan rebel who had chased Uthman’s governor away and was now in Medina in regards to the killing of Uthman, took allegiance on the condition that he will be in charge of securing the oath of allegiance of the people of Kufa.¹⁹³³ Here request is hidden. It was usually a governor of cantonment who took pledge of allegiance form its people for the caliph. When the list of governors was out, many people might have got disappointed. Ali nominated two members of his own clan, Banu Hashim, on key posts. He appointed Qutham bin Abbas ( Qutham bin ‘Abbās قُثَم بِن عَبّاس ), son of Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, over Mecca and Ubaydallah bin Abbas, Qutham’s brother, over Yemen. He gave, for the first time in history of Medinan Caliphate, ample representation to Ansar. Qays bin Sa’d bin Ubada (Qays bin Sa’d bin ‘Ubādah قَيس بِن سَعد بِن عُباده ) got governorship of Egypt; and Uthman bin Hunayf Ansari got governorship of Basrah.¹⁹³⁴ ¹⁹³⁵ ¹⁹³⁶ He didn’t give representation of any Muhajirun clans in his government except his own clan. Lack of managerial experience led Ali to the recipe of isolation.

At that time Ali’s government was fragile. The rebels who had risen against the government of Uthman were unanimous in one thing – getting rid of Uthman. They were bitterly divided over who should take over after Uthman. Rebels from Egypt predominantly favored Ali. There were groups in Kufan rebels who favored Zubayr and there were groups in Basrah who favored Talha.¹⁹³⁷ Differences among rebels had compelled them to camp separately three nights away from Medina when they started their long march.¹⁹³⁸ Failure to nominate Zubayr or Talha for any governorship proved an expensive political mistake on Ali’s part. Both these members of Electoral College had clear cut political ambitions and some support in the cantonments.

This must be the time when Mughira bin Shu’ba advised Ali to give Talha governorship over Yemen and Zubayr over Bahrain (two insignificant provinces) and to confirm Mu’awiya in his current post. He further advised that once things fall into line with Ali, he can do with them what he liked. Ali snubbed him rudely.¹⁹³⁹ Probably Ali didn’t wish to be perceived naïve accepting suggestions of men from outer circle (and of dubious reputation). But in doing so, he definitely lost support of a skilled politician.¹⁹⁴⁰

Country divides into three factions

Murder of Uthman and Ali’s reluctance to punish the murderers soon became a burning issue in the country. Military and civilian Arab elite of the country divided into three factions. One faction demanded quick justice for Uthman and won’t accept Ali as a legitimate ruler until he acts in this direction. The other faction considered Uthman’s murder a justified homicide. They lined behind Ali and expected from him to sideline the murder case. Both factions wrote verses and propaganda material in their favor.

Look at the verses composed by Hassan bin Thabit (Ḥassān bin Thābit حَسّان بِن ثابِت ):

We are well-pleased with the Syrians as they made haste [to aid us]

And with the amīr [Mu’awiya] and [our] brothers

Verily I will be among them, whether they are absent or present.

So long as I live and am called Ḥassān

Very soon you will hear in their lands

“Allah is most great! Vengeance for ‘Uthmān!”

Would that I knew, would that the birds would inform me

What went on between Ali and ibn ‘Affān.¹⁹⁴¹

Now another kind of verses composed by Fadl bin Abbas.

Do you seek a vengeance to which you have no right

What is Ibn Dhakwān al Ṣafūri next to ‘Amr?

Just as the ass’s foal claims descent from her mother

and forgets her Father when she vies with those possessing rightful pride

Verily the best of men after Muḥammad is

The executor of the Chosen Prophet in the sight of Allah

The first who prayed, the twin of His Prophet

And the first to strike down the sinners at Badr.¹⁹⁴² ¹⁹⁴³

Yet, there was a third faction, probably the biggest. They were neutrals. They took the position of wait and see and are usually referred to as Ma’shar al-Mu’tazilah.¹⁹⁴⁴ ¹⁹⁴⁵ They were willing to be governed by anybody who succeeds in providing an effective government. Sympathizers of Uthman in Kufa, Basrah and Fustat were open to any leader who wished to use this as a slogan. Syria, anyhow, didn’t divide into factions. It remained united, sympathizer of Uthman and loyal to Mu’awiya.¹⁹⁴⁶

Ali didn’t have any force in Medina to send along with his nominated governors to take over. He had to bank upon anti-Uthman elements in provincial capitals. Ali’s failure to denounce murder of Uthman gave Sabaiyyah a clear hint. All of them shifted their political weight to Ali’s side.

Banners of civil war unfurl – Battle of Camel

During the last month of 656 CE environs of Basrah witnessed a gloomy scene from Medinan Caliphate’s point of view. Those swords that have been being unsheathed against non-Muslims in the name of Islam up to now, clashed with each other. ‘Either I join Ali and fight those two men and the Mother of the Faithful or else I disobey the Commander of the Faithful. What a sorry state of affairs!’ says a pious Muslim, Ṭāriq bin Shihab of Bajila tribe on the eve of Battle of Camel.¹⁹⁴⁷

Talha and Zubayr had given allegiance to Ali half heartidly.¹⁹⁴⁸ Now, they were expecting the new government to compensate them by giving a government position.¹⁹⁴⁹ When Ali announced the final list of his governors, Talha and Zubayr both rejected it on grounds that they were sidelined.¹⁹⁵⁰ ¹⁹⁵¹ Both these gentlemen knew that residents of Medina were generally in favor of Ali. They sneaked out to Mecca on excuse of lesser pilgrimage.¹⁹⁵² Mecca was beaming with opposition to Ali. It had always remained a powerhouse of Umayyads since Fathe Mecca.¹⁹⁵³ The three founding members of Shi’a Uthman were already there. When Ali’s newly nominated governor Uthman bin Hunayf, reached Basrah, Uthman’s governor there Abdullah bin Amir gave him the charge of the province quietly and left the place. Instead of reporting back to Ali he retired to Mecca.¹⁹⁵⁴ Ya’la bin Munya, Uthman’s governor over Yemen, did the same thing when Ubaydallah bin Abbas, Ali’s nominee reached Sana’a. On top of that he brought four hundred thousand Dinars from the public treasury. This money was collected by taxes and was awaiting transfer to the central government and other provincial expenses.¹⁹⁵⁵ Ali’s designated governor to Mecca, Qutham bin Abbas, had still not taken charge of his office. The governor of Mecca from Uthman’s era sided with Umayyads.¹⁹⁵⁶ When Talha and Zubayr reached Mecca, in addition to meeting with Shi’a Uthman bubbling with anger there, they also met an unexpected supporter –Aisha (‘Āʾishah عاأِشَه).¹⁹⁵⁷

Aisha had left Medina when rebels reached there. She was not in good terms with Uthman because the later had decreased her stipend and had put her on the same footing as other widows of the Prophet were.¹⁹⁵⁸ She looked forward to returning Medina on expectation that her clansman Talha would be elected new caliph. She changed her mind on hearing news of Ali’s nomination.¹⁹⁵⁹ Aisha’s dislike for Ali was not a secret.¹⁹⁶⁰ Early Islamic sources trace it to the incident of ifk (ḥādithah tal ifk حادِثةَ الِافك ).¹⁹⁶¹ During that incident, according to Waqidi, the Prophet had asked opinion of Ali and the later had advised him to divorce Aisha and get a new wife.¹⁹⁶² Whatever the reason of Aisha’s reservations with Ali, she joined hands with Talha and Zubayr instantaneously. Stated official aim of the ‘Mecca Alliance’ was to ‘mend the situation of Muhammad’s community’ and the means to achieve the aim was to bring the culprits of Uthman’s murder to justice.¹⁹⁶³

Talha and Zubayr were both rich.¹⁹⁶⁴ They had got resources to fund a military campaign. Further funds came from the tax money of Yemen brought by Ya’la bin Munya.¹⁹⁶⁵ ‘Abdullah bin ‘Amir also contributed lavishly out of his own pocket.¹⁹⁶⁶ The ‘Meccan Alliance’ was aware that a big majority of cantonment of Basrah, which had predominantly Hejazi and Nejdi tribesmen, had opposed Ali.¹⁹⁶⁷ They raised an army of Meccans, came in full rebellion against Ali, and proceeded straight to Basrah.¹⁹⁶⁸

This army didn’t appoint anybody overall commander. Aisha took up duty of maintaining discipline.¹⁹⁶⁹ This army reached the town of Basra unopposed.¹⁹⁷⁰ Ya’qubi states that the army of ‘Meccan Alliance’ entered the town of Basrah simply by negotiating with Uthman bin Hunayf, Ali’s governor there. Tabari presents a scene of street fighting with pro Ali faction under command of Uthman bin Hunayf, Uthman bin Hunayf’s expulsion from the town and execution of those deemed to have rebelled against Uthman, before the army of ‘Meccan Alliance’ could settle in the city.¹⁹⁷¹ The pro Ali faction of the town was apt to protest that the people who got killed by the ‘Mecca Alliance’ being dubbed as Uthman’s killers were actually rebels and not murderers of Uthman.¹⁹⁷² ¹⁹⁷³ Next, the ‘Mecca Alliance’ quickly clutched the provincial public treasury.¹⁹⁷⁴ By October 21, 656 CE they were in full control of the town.¹⁹⁷⁵ None of them proclaimed to be caliph. Probably their aim was to take up management of a revenue generating province and its capital. From there they wished to extend their circle of influence. They had not proceeded to Medina from Mecca to persuade Ali to step down. Their alliance building meeting pondered that Medina was a difficult target.¹⁹⁷⁶ ¹⁹⁷⁷

Ali found himself in a difficult situation. Mu’awiya had captured the province of Syria and Talha and Zubayr had captured province of Basrah. Mecca had already showed its political opinion, which was not in favor of Ali. Ali’s appointed governor to Egypt Qays bin Sa’d had reached Egypt by dodging Mu’awiya’s security guards appointed at Aylah.¹⁹⁷⁸ However, on reaching Egypt he found unexpected scene. Uthman’s sympathizers had grown strong and had gathered at Kharbita to oppose him. Sabaiyyah was willing to obey him only on a condition that Ali assures he won’t execute the murderers of Uthman.¹⁹⁷⁹ ¹⁹⁸⁰ Ali had to bring provinces back to the ambit of central government, otherwise he would have remained caliph of Medina and its environs.

Ali had already resolved to use force rather than diplomacy to bring disobedients under his authority.¹⁹⁸¹ He decided to tackle the ‘Meccan Alliance’ first before he takes any action against Mu’awiya. Ali, after analyzing the situation on ground, degraded status of Medina to a provincial capital and appointed Tamim bin ‘Abd Amr of Najjār clan of Ansar as its governor.¹⁹⁸² This was the last day Medina ever served as a capital of any country. Neither had it ever acted so in eight hundred years of its existence before Islam.¹⁹⁸³ Axis of all political, economic and social activities of the country shifted northwards.

Ali left Medina with a force of four hundred mounted men belonging to Ansar, on October 25, 656 CE , four days after ‘Mecca Alliance’ occupied Basrah.¹⁹⁸⁴ ¹⁹⁸⁵ His aim was to dislodge the ‘Mecca Alliance’. ‘To set things right is what we are after, so that the community may revert to being brothers,’ Ali explained.¹⁹⁸⁶ Ali was particularly bitter against Talha and Zubayr because they had withdrawn their allegiance to Ali as caliph after giving it – a first in Medinan Caliphate.¹⁹⁸⁷ ¹⁹⁸⁸ Probably Ali had never imagined that anybody could do it. This could be the reason he left Mu’awiya on his own for now and decided to confront ‘Mecca Alliance.¹⁹⁸⁹ On the way to Basrah Ali picked up all the possible support he had in the country. Asad and Tayy joined him halfway to swell the number of his army to one thousand. The army camped at Dhu Qar without entering the town of Kufa.¹⁹⁹⁰ ¹⁹⁹¹ Ali had an impression that Kufans will join him in their hordes as its majority were Yemenis, who generally supported Ali.¹⁹⁹² ¹⁹⁹³ Ali had been once governor of Yemen for Prophet Muhammad.¹⁹⁹⁴ Ali sent his son Hasan along with Ammar bin Yasir to recruit inhabitants of Kufa.¹⁹⁹⁵ Ali had confirmed Uthman’s governor over Kufa, Abu Musa Ash’ari in his position. He tried to play neutral in the dispute and discouraged the Kufan masses to join Ali’s army.¹⁹⁹⁶ ¹⁹⁹⁷ ¹⁹⁹⁸ According to Ya’qubi, Hasan could hardly get six hundred soldiers to make a total strength of Ali’s army to be sixteen hundred.¹⁹⁹⁹ Tabari differs widely. He claims that nine thousand people of Kufa joined Ali’s forces.²⁰⁰⁰ People of Abdul Qays, who were Shi’a Ali in Basra, left the town to join Ali’s forces in Dhu Qar.²⁰⁰¹ Lastly, Ali’s governor over Basrah, Uthman bin Hunayf, whom ‘Meccan Alliance’ had chased away, joined Ali with a few companions.²⁰⁰² In addition, Ali’s camp had thousands of non-Arabs and non-Muslims.²⁰⁰³ Tabari informs that Zuṭṭ and Sayābijah Joined Ali’s side.²⁰⁰⁴ Final strength of army that marched towards Basrah with Ali was twenty thousand.²⁰⁰⁵ ²⁰⁰⁶

‘Meccan Alliance’ decided to come out of the town to confront Ali at Khurayba.²⁰⁰⁷ Their strength is said to be thirty thousand.²⁰⁰⁸ There is no doubt that Muslim Arab society was still tribal and each tribe of both armies carried its own flag.²⁰⁰⁹ Each of the participating tribe had taken bet on one of the armies.²⁰¹⁰ However, explaining whole conflict on the basis of tribal rivalry alone, would be oversimplification. Many important factors, like new religion of Islam, new place of abode, and new economic conditions, had crept into Arab society since pre-Islamic times. All of them had become important for the people and reflected in their decision making. According to Tabari some tribes were completely divided between the two armies.²⁰¹¹

The battle, that took place on the sands of Khurayba on December 24, 656 CE, is called Battle of Camel in annals of history.²⁰¹² It was as ferocious as could be Yermouk or Qadisiyyah.²⁰¹³ Tabari admits that both of them hated each other from the bottom of their hearts.²⁰¹⁴ Death toll on both sides in a short span of four hours was thirty thousand.²⁰¹⁵

Ali carried the day. Talha got killed on battlefield.²⁰¹⁶ Zubayr got killed by a Bedouin of Tamim when escaping from the battle, about eight kilometers away from the battlefield.²⁰¹⁷ ²⁰¹⁸ Aisha got captured.²⁰¹⁹ Ali didn’t treat the defeated army as that of a non-Muslim foe or a foreign country. He didn’t kill the wounded survivors of the war. He didn’t open case of high treason against the survivors. He absorbed them in his camp by forgiving them.²⁰²⁰ Most of the army of ‘Meccan Alliance’ perished in the battle. Some remnants of ‘Meccan Alliance’ fled to the surrounding towns.²⁰²¹ ²⁰²²

After entering Basrah triumphantly, Ali captured the remaining part of the public treasury. He paid his soldiers from the booty of the war (captured movable property of his opponents) and from the public treasury.²⁰²³ He strictly forbade his soldiers from disgracing any woman of the town.²⁰²⁴ The neutral faction in great political divide, living in Basrah did not have any problem in accepting Ali as their caliph. Prominent among them were Ahnaf bin Qays and Ziyad bin Abihi / Abu Sufyan (Ziyād bin Abīhi /Abu Sufyān اَبُو سُفيان/ زِياد بِن اَبيه ). Basrans took allegiance to Ali.²⁰²⁵ ²⁰²⁶ Ali not only gained control over cantonment of Basrah but over whole province of Basrah up to Khurasan. ²⁰²⁷ He appointed Abdullah bin Abbas governor over the vast province of Basrah.²⁰²⁸ ²⁰²⁹

Participation of Aisha in political affairs of Medinan Caliphate is unique for a woman. Criticism on her active participation in politics from this angle started before she departed to Basrah with army. Umm Salama, widow of Prophet Muhammad, refused flatly to side with her saying “religions’ pillar is not raised up by women. The praiseworthy things about women consist of their lowering the eyes, casting down the extremities, and dragging the trains of their garments. God has relieved me and you of this thing. What would you say if Allah’s Messenger encountered you on the outskirts of the deserts having ripped off the veil which he imposed on you?” ²⁰³⁰ Abdullah bin Abbas, who escorted her back to Medina, entered into the house she was staying in Kufa without her permission. It angered Aisha. Ibn Abbas said in return, “This is not your house; your house is the one in which God’s messenger left you, and in which the Qur’an ordered you to stay. [Quran 33:33]”.²⁰³¹ This kind of criticism continued later when Sa’d bin Waqqas commenting on her actions said, “May Allah forgive the Mother of Faithful”.²⁰³² She herself was doubtful whether she should behave like that and actually, she wished to go back from middle of journey to Basrah.²⁰³³ Talha and Zubayr kept her convincing that her actions were right.²⁰³⁴ ²⁰³⁵ ²⁰³⁶ ²⁰³⁷ ²⁰³⁸

‘Meccan Alliance’ was not founded on any sincere political principal. It was an alliance of mutual benefit. They used to quarrel over who would lead the prayer in the grand mosque of Basrah.²⁰³⁹ Tabari suspects that they would have fought a war between themselves if they would have won Battle of Camel.²⁰⁴⁰ Sa’id bin As departed from them on their way to Basrah due to disagreement over caliphate. Both Zubayr and Talha were candidates for Caliphate and Sa’id wanted Uthman’s son.²⁰⁴¹

Aftermath of Battle of Camel

Battle of Camel, apparently, once more united almost whole of Medinan Caliphate under one central government except the amalgamated provinces of Syria, Jordan and Jazirah, which remained in the grip of Mu’awiya. The institution of caliph emerged to be strong physically. Ali had a free hand to implement his agenda and had achieved enough resources to carry it out. However, the country Ali was going to preside over remained bitterly divided on political matters. Shi’a Uthman maintained their political stance. Shi’a Ali disliked them as before. A large group of neutrals didn’t perceive Ali’s government as stable. They kept the attitude of wait and see.²⁰⁴²

Caliph’s position on ideological front, as well, remained bleak. Islam had well established among Arab elites by this time. Thousands of people were called Qurra (Qurrā’ قُرّاء ) as they were full time Qur’an readers.²⁰⁴³ Islam had become principal ideological expression of political motives. Though Ali had established his authority over the rebellious alliance by sword, he still had to emphasize that his subjects should obey him due to his spiritual authority, which Islam had bestowed in him as a caliph to Prophet Muhammad. Ali’s official political position was that he was on right way of religion (ḥaq) while those who opposed him were on wrong way of religion.(buṭl).²⁰⁴⁴ Giving purely religious dimensions to social, economic, and constitutional issues of the time didn’t favor Ali in the long run. This policy generated schismatic religious debates. Instead of uniting all Muslims behind the religious authority of Prophet’s caliph, the debates in turn, produced further divisions. As Ali sank further and further in religious controversies, the basic principal of Medinan Caliphate that a caliph is supreme religious authority got eroded. A group of pious people could challenge caliph’s monopoly over religious rulings (fatwa فَتوئ). Just after Battle of Camel, pious men in Ali’s own camp started asking Ali how would he explain his call to fight against and kill people of ‘Meccan Alliance’ on the grounds that they had abandoned true path of Islam and then to forbid his soldiers from capturing their property, which should have been done in case they had really abandoned Islam.²⁰⁴⁵ Ali’s regime remained bogged in religious debates throughout its life. His supporters kept splitting away from him citing religious differences as cause.

Ali takes Kufa as capital of Medinan Caliphate

In January 657 CE, about six months after taking oath as caliph, Ali entered city of Kufa triumphantly to establish himself there as the forth caliph of Medinan Caliphate.²⁰⁴⁶ Tabari notes that Ali granted Abu Musa Ash’ari security of life and he retired to ‘Urḍ.²⁰⁴⁷ ²⁰⁴⁸ This development closed the doors of governorship of Kufa on al-Ashtar or any non-Quraysh. Ali’s government didn’t accommodate Ahl al Ayam in senior government posts.

This cantonment was epicenter of discord. People were not only divided into three main political views, Shi’a Ali, Shi’a Uthman and neutral, there were many petty political groups hankering for power. Ali’s decision to use Kufa as capital of Medinan Caliphate didn’t bring stability to the central government. It actually increased impediments for Ali.

Mu’awiya attains leadership of Shi’a Uthman

Mu’awiya had got totally convinced during the governor’s conference convened by Uthman that selection of a new caliph was at the corner. Since then he started passing orders in his domain without consulting Uthman but claiming that the orders were from the caliph.²⁰⁴⁹ On Ali’s assumption of power, he abandoned even that formality after sending a blank scroll to him.²⁰⁵⁰ He might be content with the status quo if Ali could have allowed him to govern his provinces under Ali’s name.²⁰⁵¹ Ali was not in a mood to pretend, even for a single day, that everybody was obedient to the caliph while it was not true. He was a man of sword. He had shunned Mu’awiya’s veiled threat that the later had got sixty thousand warriors when Mu’awiya’s envoy saw Ali on August 28, 656 CE.²⁰⁵² Success in the Battle of Camel boosted Ali’s confidence. “You will be paid more when you conquer Syria,” he assured his soldiers while paying them for participating in Battle of Camel.²⁰⁵³

Mu’awiya knew one thing. Ali might be a man of sword, he was not a man of management. Ali’s own Shi’a held similar opinion about him.²⁰⁵⁴ On the other hand, Mu’awiya was confident of his capacities as manager. Once boosting in the governor’s conference convened by Uthman to ponder over the issue of rebellion, Mu’awiya had said that his province had no rebellion. Other governors should take his administration as a template.²⁰⁵⁵ Members of his camp held similar opinion about him.²⁰⁵⁶ Mu’awiya calculated that one day Ali will definitely admit his incapacity to manage the mess called Medinan Caliphate. He started promoting himself as an alternate leader for the country. In doing so he made sure that he avoids pitch battles. They say you don’t show your biceps to your foe if you have got tiny ones. This strategy saved his formidable reputation that he had got sixty thousand soldiers and spared him of any blame of shedding blood of fellow Muslims.

Elimination of two champions of Uthman’s cause at the Battle of Camel was a blessing in disguise for Mu’awiya. Now, the Shi’a Uthman living in Kufa, Basrah, Egypt and elsewhere looked forward to Mu’awiya as alternate leader. Mu’awiya also started canvassing them.²⁰⁵⁷

Prominent members of Shi’a Uthman, living in Medinan Caliphate started defecting into areas administrated by Mu’awiya. One of them was Marwan bin Hakam. This founding member of Uthman party moved to Medina after participating in the Battle of Camel. From there, after a while, he went to Syria.²⁰⁵⁸ ²⁰⁵⁹ ²⁰⁶⁰

Mu’awiya started soliciting prominent names of Quraysh towards his side. Amr bin As had taken up residence in Palestine when he was sure that the rebels would kill Uthman and blame for his murder would extend beyond those who would kill him physically.²⁰⁶¹ Mu’awiya invited Amr bin As to join him.²⁰⁶² ²⁰⁶³ After many celebrations, in which Ya’qubi notes that Amr weighed worldly gains against gains of afterword, he decided to join Mu’awiya’s camp.²⁰⁶⁴ Mu’awiya promised Amr to help him regaining governorship of Egypt provided the later becomes answerable to Mu’awiya and not to Ali. The deal got sealed.²⁰⁶⁵ Both knew that Mu’awiya was junior to Ali in ranking and any attempt from him to claim caliphate won’t attract hearts and minds of Arabs.²⁰⁶⁶ Both were also aware that defeating Ali in battle field was not a child’s play. He had established his reputation in the Battle of Camel.²⁰⁶⁷ After examining the situation astutely they decided to make the issue of justice to Uthman’s murder as a focal point of their strategy.²⁰⁶⁸ It might make their opposition to Ali justifiable in eyes of fellow Arabs. Moreover, this was Ali’s weakest point and he didn’t have any readymade solution to it. He had come to power with their help.²⁰⁶⁹

After finalizing this matter, Mu’awiya contacted Sa’d bin Waqas in Medina.²⁰⁷⁰ Mu’awiya didn’t ask him to join his camp, as he was aware of Sa’d’s senior ranking in Islam. He asked him to champion issue of murder of Uthman as, apart from Ali, he was the only surviving member of the Electoral College that had selected Uthman.²⁰⁷¹ Trying to convince Sa’d, Mu’awiya argued that Talha and Zubayr had raised this issue in their capacity as members of the Electoral College. And now, when they were dead, it was incumbent on Sa’d to take up their role.²⁰⁷² Sa’d answered to Mu’awiya that all people who had served on the Electoral College had equal right to be chosen as caliph in Umar’s vision. None of them had any seniority over other. They had selected Uthman unanimously. Now, if Ali is selected, how can any other claim seniority over Ali? Furthermore, Sa’d didn’t endorse the way Talha and Zubayr opposed Ali.²⁰⁷³ Sa’d’s answer might have delighted Mu’awiya. He probably wanted to make sure that the most senior surviving Companion of Prophet Muhammad doesn’t have any political ambitions. The fact that Sa’d had not yet taken allegiance to Ali would have generated suspense in Mu’awiya.²⁰⁷⁴ ²⁰⁷⁵

Concern about losing everything

The First Arab Civil War had distressed many neutral Arab leaders. Jarir bin Abdullah was lieutenant governor of Hamedan for Uthman. When Ali dismissed him, Jarir reached Mu’awiya and asked the Syrians in Muyawiah’s presence ‘such a fierce battle has taken place in Basrah that if a scourge like it is repeated, there will be no survival of Islam. Therefore fear people of Syria, and view Ali and Mu’awiya charitably (wa-raw fī Ali wa-Mu’āwiyah khayran). Look to yourselves, and let no one be more attentive to yourselves than you’.²⁰⁷⁶ Fear of losing revenue generating non-Muslim population of Medinan Caliphate was on head of everybody. ‘Meccan Alliance’ had blocked the bridge over river to stop any traffic from Basrah to ex-Sasanian provinces to censure the news of war from them.²⁰⁷⁷

Ali’s ambassador to ‘Meccan Alliance’ just before start of combat says, “Don’t lay either us or yourselves open to disaster, lest it throw us all down. I swear to Allah, I say this and call you to it in a state of fear that this won’t end until Almighty and Glorious Allah has taken what He wants from this community whose provisions [matā’] are diminishing with these events. The damage that has occurred from this affair is incalculable.” ²⁰⁷⁸

Ali and Mu’awiya fight proxy war in Egypt

Mu’awiya was nervous that Ali’s primary purpose of choosing Kufa as capital was to organize expedited attack on Syria.²⁰⁷⁹ Mu’awiya, being a provincial governor, was militarily weak. He knew challenging Ali’s authority in open battlefield would be an arduous task. What scared him more was the fact that Ali’s loyal Qays bin Sa’d held Egypt. In case Ali attacks him from Iraq, Qays would complement it from the rear.

When Qays bin Sa’d reached Fustat in August 656 CE after deceiving horsemen at Alyah, with an escort of seven men, he did not have any difficulty to take charge of the province from Muhammad bin Abi Hudhayfa. ²⁰⁸⁰ ²⁰⁸¹ Soon after he found himself in trouble. Like everywhere else Egypt had divided into three factions, Shi’a Uthman, Shi’a Ali and the neutrals. Shi’a Uthman were passionately antagonist to accept Ali’s nominated governor until there was some progress on Uthman’s revenge. Sabaiyyah, on the other hand, demanded from Qays an assurance that Ali wouldn’t execute their members in charges of Uthman’s murder before they give any kind of allegiance.²⁰⁸² Qays was a person of exceptional managerial skills.²⁰⁸³ He could control the situation by pacifying both parties.²⁰⁸⁴ He entered into agreement with Shi’a Uthman that he would keep paying their stipends even if they don’t accept Ali as caliph and in return they would postpone their demand of justice temporarily.²⁰⁸⁵ Sources don’t express what kind of assurances did he give to Sabaiyyah

A stable Egypt in hands of Ali was a threat to Mu’awiya’s life. Initially, Mu’awiya tried to win Qays over by offering him governorship of Kufa and Basrah and appointment of his nominee over Hejaz until he lives.²⁰⁸⁶ (Mu’awiya had started giving an impression that he would be the next caliph and would be in a position to distribute governorships to his favorites). Qays rejected the proposal politely.²⁰⁸⁷ Now, Mu’awiya utilized his superlative diplomatic capabilities. He spread rumors everywhere in Syria that Qays had entered into a secret deal with Mu’awiya. Part of the deal was not to touch Shi’a Uthman of Egypt. Ali, who didn’t have even a fraction of political skills Mu’awiya possessed, got trapped in the contrivance. When his spies in Syria picked the intelligence, Ali impatiently ordered Qays to attack the Uthman sympathizers in Egypt to test his loyalty. Innocent Qays wrote back that he did not have capacity to fight against ten thousand strong party. Ali took the answer as a proof of Qays’s disloyalty and immediately dismissed him. Ali, in panic, asked Muhammad bin Abu Bakr to hasten to Egypt to take control.²⁰⁸⁸ ²⁰⁸⁹ Thus, Ali dismissed Qays on February 21, 657 CE just before battle of Siffin, taking pressure away from Mu’awiya’s back. ²⁰⁹⁰

Moreover, in doing so, Ali rewarded a person with governorship of an important province, who had earned notoriety in murder of Uthman. Just before battle of Camel, Ali had denounced murder of Uthman for the first time. Delivering a speech to his army, standing on a makeshift podium of sacks, he had announced that no murderer of Uthman had any place in his army.²⁰⁹¹ After this lip service, he didn’t purge reputed murderers of Uthman from his rank and file. Masses might have given Ali advantage of doubt. They could have understood his limitations before the war. Now, he had favored one of them with governorship of the most important province. Actions speak louder than words. This appointment would have sent a signal throughout Arab community that Ali was not serious in investigating the murder of his predecessor and that his official position that he doesn’t have power to fight against the accused was a false excuse. It would have further strengthened hands of Mu’awiya who had based his opposition to Ali on one demand only – justice for murder of Uthman.

Ali challenges Mu’awiya’s defiance

Ali knew his military superiority over Mu’awiya and decided to hunt him down. Mu’awiya knew that this day would inevitably come and was prepared for it with all Syrians cemented with him.²⁰⁹²

Ali marched out of Kufa with a host of Ansar and a number of Muhajirun.²⁰⁹³ Whole division of Kufa was with him.²⁰⁹⁴ A group of soldiers from Basrah joined him.²⁰⁹⁵ ²⁰⁹⁶ On the way, he picked the non-Muslim tribes of Taghlib and Namir bin Qāsit.²⁰⁹⁷ ²⁰⁹⁸ Hired slaves made a big contingent of Ali’s army.²⁰⁹⁹ Total number of fighters in his army might be in tune of seventy thousand.²¹⁰⁰ individual tribes carried their own banners as usual for Medinan Caliphate.²¹⁰¹ However, by this time, merely tribal affiliations do not explain all political alignments.²¹⁰² Consistency of Mu’awiya’s army might not be fundamentally different from that of Ali. A contingent of Shi’a Uthman had joined Mu’awiya from Iraq.²¹⁰³ Amr bin As was present in Mu’awiya’s camp.²¹⁰⁴ We don’t know how Ali and Mu’awiya paid to their soldiers who fought in Siffin probably all of them were on payroll of their respective territories.

Second battle of civil war – Siffin

The two armies came face to face at Siffin (S.iffīn صِفِّين ) and camped near banks of Euphrates in May of 657 CE.²¹⁰⁵ ²¹⁰⁶ ²¹⁰⁷ It was a hajj season but none of them bothered to leave for Mecca.²¹⁰⁸ ²¹⁰⁹ The armies laid camped opposite to each other for a month or so without a pitched battle. Each day a few brave people challenged each other, fought a few rounds and returned to their camps.²¹¹⁰ Then they agreed to observe the traditional truce during the sacred month of Muharram, and utilize this time negotiating any possible way to avoid war. Combat re-started in July 657 CE and lasted for forty days.²¹¹¹ Again, the war didn’t intensify more than a series of lethargic skirmishes.²¹¹² Welhhausen has pointed out that all surviving accounts of this war have come from mouths of those who favored Ali and were part of his army. Exaggeration in Ali’s favor is expected.²¹¹³ ²¹¹⁴ A prominent Muslim who died in Siffin was Ammar bin Yasir. He fought from Ali’s side.²¹¹⁵ The battle remained indecisive. No army could annihilate the other. Theophane the Confessor insists that Mu’awiya’s faction could keep control over water and Ali’s force remained comparatively thirsty losing their ability to fight.²¹¹⁶ ²¹¹⁷ All Islamic sources report internal discord in Ali’s camp.²¹¹⁸ Huge representation of ‘neutral party’ in Ali’s forces explains internal discords, failure of all-out attack on Mu’awiya’s men and threats to Ali of rebellion in case he fails to agree with arbitration.²¹¹⁹ No surprise Ali’s huge army couldn’t bring Mu’awiya’s puny squad to its knees. Ya’qubi insists that Ali’s side had an upper hand when Mu’awiya asked to take arbitration on the matter as a trick to avoid defeat. (Arabic: ḥukūmā other sources name the arbitration, taḥkīm).²¹²⁰ Arranging one man as arbitrator and abiding by his ruling was a pre-Islamic Arab tradition. This time there was a difference. The parties won’t agree to a neutral man whose decision would be binding. Each antagonizing party would appoint its own man as arbitrator.²¹²¹ And the arbitrators would decide in light of Qur’an, not according to Arab traditions.²¹²² ²¹²³ How could two men, representing two adversaries, award one verdict? The process of arbitration was flawed from onset. Actually, it was face saving recognition of the fact that war was a stalemate and status quo would prevail. Ali returned to Kufa and Mu’awiya headed to Damascus.²¹²⁴ Siffin was a turning point in First Arab Civil War. Citizens of Medinan Caliphate realized that Caliph Ali can’t oust Mu’awiya by force and that Mu’awiya had hidden tricks in his sleeves. Mu’awiya gained equal footing with Ali.

Advent of a new grouping – Khariji

Time is ripe to introduce ourselves to the phenomenon of ‘socio-political group’. Every human being associates himself with a social group. It gives him a group identity. Family name, neighbourhood, ethnicity, religion, sect, economic class, nationality, race, political ideology, all play a role to constitute a social group. Anyhow, based on social circumstances, one of these identifying factors takes precedent over others. The same individual, when asked, may introduce himself as Qandhari, Afridi, Pathan, Afghan, Shiite, or Muslim, depending upon who asked it. The rationale behind social grouping is poorly understood. It could primarily be a psychological pleasure which one feels by mingling with individuals of similar taste and culture. However, once a social group grows big and achieves recognizable identity, it strives for collective political favours and demands special economic quotas. Big social groups transform into political group. Socio-political grouping is human universal. When demise of one socio-political group is in sight, for example, White Americans, another social group pops in, for example Hispanic Americans.²¹²⁵

Early Muslims were divided on tribal lines. Establishment of state loosened tribal affiliations. Tribe was no longer needed for protection of life, property and honour. Expansion of state further downgraded tribe. Individual members of a tribe scattered so widely in the country that tribe ceased to function as an effective socio-political group. The emerging social identities among Muslim were based upon religion – religious sects.

By the time of Siffin a new socio-political group arose in Medinan Caliphate. It was Khariji (Khārijī خارِجِي ; sin. Khārijī, pl. Khwārij).²¹²⁶ ²¹²⁷ Obviously, Khariji is not a self-designation. As the name indicates they were considered ‘outsiders’ by mainstream Muslims.²¹²⁸ Apparently, Khariji was not a single well defined group. Many Khariji groups sprang up during the last years of Medinan Caliphate.²¹²⁹ One thing was common among all Khariji groups. They did not buy the argument that birth of Prophet Muhammad among Quraysh had granted them a right to be caliph.²¹³⁰ Any meritorious Muslim could be caliph to Prophet Muhammad, in their vision.²¹³¹ None of the Quraysh joined any of Khariji. All were Ahl al Ayam.

This particular group of Khariji’s, that split itself away from Ali’s camp at Siffin is called Hururyah (Ḥurūryah حُرورِيَه ). ²¹³² They argued that Ali had lost his right to be caliph of Prophet Muhammad. By subjecting himself to the decision of arbiters, he had recognized in principal that either of him or Mu’awiya could be a caliph. In case arbitrators decide in favour of Mu’awiya, where would stand Ali’s claim that he had Divine right to be a caliph.²¹³³

Their religio-political logo was ‘“judgment belongs to Allah alone.” (lā ḥukma illā Li-llāh) (Qur’an 6:57. 12:40).²¹³⁴ Only Allah can be arbitrator. The only guide to Allah’s judgment is Qur’an. Does Qur’an prescribe that a caliph should be from Quraysh? Extending the same argument they said if Qur’an doesn’t prescribe something, who is a caliph to impose it. On this basis they bitterly opposed stoning of adulterers and flogging of alcohol drinkers.²¹³⁵ Khariji was the first religion based socio-political group among Muslims. Muir labels them religious fanatics.²¹³⁶

Their paradigm, that mainstream Muslims have diverged from actual tenants of Islam and that the actual tenants of Islam should be re-discovered and practiced, has sustained its existence throughout history of Islam. It has been, and still is, basis of many religio-political movements in Islam.

Hururyah Khariji’s drew their leadership from a number of tribes. Abdullah bin Wahb (‘Abdallāh bin Wahb al Rāsibī عَبدُ الله بِن وَهَب الراسِبِي ) was from Bajila. Abdullah bin Abi Awfa (‘Abdullah bin Abi Awfā عَبدُ اللَّه بِن اَبِي أوفئ ) was from Yashkur. Shabath bin Rabi’a (Shabath bin Ribī’ah شَبَث بِن رَبِيعَه ) was from Tamim.²¹³⁷ ²¹³⁸ The movement actually divided families on religio-political lines. Adi bin Hatim of Tayy tribe remained Shi’a Ali while his son Tarafa bin Adi (Ṭarafah bin ‘Adi طَرَفَه بِن عَدِى ) became khariji.²¹³⁹

Hururyah Khariji’s are said to number between eight thousand to twelve thousand.²¹⁴⁰

Ali did not have any objection to using Qur’an as a guide. His viewpoint was that it would be finally a human being who would take decisions according to Qur’an and his fellow humans will have to depend upon his judgment.²¹⁴¹ Political motive of Khariji was clear. They rejected process of arbitration. They didn’t want either Ali or Mu’awiya as ruler. Ruler could be any Muslim, including Ahl al Ayam. Instead of bringing forward their candidate for caliphate, they kept chanting “judgment belongs to Allah alone.” Ali rejected this slogan dubbing it “A true saying by which falsehood has been intended!” ²¹⁴² Actually, they chose their own leader, ‘Abdullah bin Wahb, a non Quraysh, extremely pious Muslim.²¹⁴³ As Abdullah bin Wahb did not declare himself caliph, either there was a lack of consensus among Khariji over candidate of caliph or they perceived themselves too weak at this stage to express their true intentions.

Khariji did not return to Kufa along with Ali after Siffin. They chose a village by name of Harura (Ḥarūrā’ حَرُوراء) near Kufa to make their abode.²¹⁴⁴ ²¹⁴⁵ Ali convinced them back to Kufa with a promise to keep the doors of dialogue open to them.²¹⁴⁶ Sooner or later the dialogue broke up and they stood firm on their political slogan, “judgment belongs to Allah alone.” An irritated Ali responded, ok “it is Allah’s judgment about you what I await!”.²¹⁴⁷
Khariji’s left Kufa to disperse into rural areas around it.²¹⁴⁸ Their ideology started spreading and they got disciples from Basrah.²¹⁴⁹ They resorted to terrorist attacks in all of Swad to bring Ali’s government to its knees. Probably their income was from looting the villagers.

Mu’awiya wins Egypt

Mu’awiya knew what would be the verdict of arbitrators. He didn’t wait for it. He wished Egypt to be out of Ali’s hands as soon as possible. Any government in Egypt was acceptable to him that would not be hostile to him. He knew Ali would again attempt on him militarily because the later had a misconception that he was at the verge of victory in Siffin when he got tricked by Mu’awiya in arbitration.²¹⁵⁰

Egypt was the province that had brought Ali to power. Later on this province proved his real nightmare. His appointee there, Muhammad bin Abu Bakr, couldn’t handle the turbulent province well.²¹⁵¹ In keeping with the instructions of Ali, he attacked Shi’a ‘Uthman concentrated at kharbita but they defended themselves well.²¹⁵²

Mu’awiya quickly assured Shi’a Uthman of his support.²¹⁵³ Main source of resistance to Muhammad bin Abu Bakr were the Yemeni soldiers.²¹⁵⁴ Ali got an idea to replace him with a man from Yemen, Malik bin Harith al-Ashtar, in a hope to win the loyalty of Yemeni troops.²¹⁵⁵ Mu’awiya was keenly observing the direction of wind. He took two actions simultaneously. One, he foiled the attempt of al Ashtar to reach Fustat and take charge of the province. Al Ashtar stayed in a bed and breakfast at Iylia on his way to Fustat. The owner of the facility gave him a honey based drink mixed with poison in his breakfast. Ashtar died at the spot.²¹⁵⁶ Second, he provided Amr bin As with a cavalry to intrude into Egypt.²¹⁵⁷ local Shi’a Uthman from Egypt joined Amr.²¹⁵⁸ ²¹⁵⁹ His total strength after Shi’a Uthman joined him was six thousand men.²¹⁶⁰ He issued death warrants to Muhammad bin Abu Bakr for murder of Uthman.²¹⁶¹ Muhammad came out of Fustat to meet the invaders with four thousand men.²¹⁶² After a sham encounter his troops, mainly Yemeni, desserted.²¹⁶³ ²¹⁶⁴ He had to hide himself in a ruined house from where one of Amr’s soldiers dragged him out. He killed him, put his corpse in a donkey skin and set it on fire.²¹⁶⁵ Amr didn’t have any difficulty in declaring himself governor of Egypt and Maghreb in the name of Mu’awiya in July 658 CE.²¹⁶⁶ Egypt was larger than amalgamated province of Syria in terms of production and revenue.²¹⁶⁷

Damascus plunged into jubilation on the news, while Kufa submerged into bereavement.²¹⁶⁸ ²¹⁶⁹

Mu’awiya enters into Truce with Byzantine Rome

Byzantine Rome was playing on back foot since Futuhul Buldan started. They never had a moment of relief to reflect on themselves. Now, taking advantage of lull at his eastern borders, emperor Constans decided to flex his muscle. The weakest in his neighborhood were Slavs. He carried out a successful campaign against them in 658 CE.²¹⁷⁰ Mu’awiya was vigilant. He rushed to conclude an expensive truce agreement with Emperor Constans in the fall of 658 CE. Mu’awiya had to pay ten thousand Dirhams, one horse and one slave per day to the Byzantine Rome in return of their promise not to muddle with Mu’awiya militarily.²¹⁷¹ ²¹⁷²

Verdict of Arbitrators – no solution

Ali wished to appoint Abdullah bin Abbas, a Shi’a Ali, as his arbitrator.²¹⁷³ Under pressure from members of ‘neutral party’, like Ash’ath bin Qays, he had to appoint Abu Musa Ash’ari, a known neutral, as an arbitrator representing his side. Mu’awiya had appointed his partisan Amr bin As.²¹⁷⁴ After preliminary meetings of the two sides they wrote a mutually binding document detailing the rules the arbitraries were supposed to follow. The two arbitrators would base their decision only on Qur’an and won’t go out of it, otherwise their judgment would be null and void.²¹⁷⁵ ²¹⁷⁶ The two arbitrators had their first meeting in Dumat al Jandal in August 658 CE along with 400 supporters on each side.²¹⁷⁷ ²¹⁷⁸ After six months of comprehensive deliberations the arbitrators announced their verdict in February 659 CE.²¹⁷⁹ The decision astounded everybody present who had travelled from far and wide to hear the verdict. Abu Musa Ash’ari first came to pulpit and announced that his client, Ali would step down to give Muslims a chance to select a new caliph. Then came Amr who announced that his client Mu’awiya would remain firmly fixed to his position.²¹⁸⁰ Public started ranting foulplay.²¹⁸¹ Actually, neutral party had taken a keen interest in the arbitration process.²¹⁸² They expected both arbitrators would dismiss their respective clients to pave the way for selection of a new caliph. The audience ended up in quarrelling with each other with whips and pulling each other’s hair and the two arbitrators ended up exchanging hot words.²¹⁸³ ²¹⁸⁴

The Khariji’s present on this occasion were particularly upset. They proclaimed “the arbitrators had committed unbelief (Kufr – my idea).²¹⁸⁵ Arbitration was a formality. It is true that people, mainly the Neutrals and the Kharijis, were anxiously waiting for the verdict, but it was highly unlikely that Ali and Muwiyah intended to lose power as a result of arbitration.

We don’t know who paid the arbitrators for their work.

Aftermath of Arbitration

Tabari observes that after arbitration Mu’awiya’s strength increased day by day and Ali’s position weakened continuously.²¹⁸⁶ Mu’awiya didn’t waste any time in declaring himself caliph. He gathered his Arab allies including Amr bin As in the ceremony. He pledged to work according to the Book of Allah and Sunna.²¹⁸⁷ He still did not take up all prerogatives of a caliph. He called himself Amīr, not Amīr ul Mu’minūn.²¹⁸⁸

Ali rejected the arbitration. His argument was that each of the arbitrator had followed his own political inclinations rather than getting any guidance from [the book of] Allah. They differed widely so the decision was not binding on him.²¹⁸⁹ Ali’s refusal to step down as his arbitrator had suggested, tarnished his political image. The Kharijis had already floated the idea that Ali had lost his argument of Divine right to govern the country by accepting arbitration. Now, citizens of Medinan Caliphate might have perceived Ali sticking to power just for the sake of power. Shi’a Ali was only one group among his own subjects. A lot of others were Shi’a Uthman and Kharijis. Still many others were Neutrals. They asked him pinching question of ‘why did he agree to arbitrator if he was not going to abide by his decision?’²¹⁹⁰ Probably, this was the time when ‘Neutral Party’ started throwing its weight towards Mu’awiya’s pan of the scale. Ali’s support got limited to Shi’a Ali.

Ali on downhill path

Ali had not struck the fantasy of dislodging Mu’awiya militarily out of his mind. He ordered his army to prepare for an attack.²¹⁹¹ Khariji terrorists had played havoc in rural areas of Swad by this time. Ali kept neglecting them. His main focus was to get rid of Mu’awiya. He designed his three point formula about the Kharijis.²¹⁹²

Incidentally, kharijis killed Abdullah bin Khabbab (‘Abdallah bin Khabbāb عَبدُ اللّه بِن خَبّاب ) of Tamim tribe, a prominent partisan of Ali, along with his pregnant wife in an ambush.²¹⁹³ The incident filled people’s heart with horror all over the district.²¹⁹⁴ Ali got compelled to shelve attack on Mu’awiya for now and take notice of deteriorating law and order situation in his own domain.²¹⁹⁵ He sent Abdullah bin Abbas to negotiate surrender with Kharijis as a last ditch effort before all-out war on them.²¹⁹⁶ Two thousand of them surrendered under amnesty from prosecution, four thousand remained adamant.²¹⁹⁷ ²¹⁹⁸ Ali’s forces surrounded them around canal of Naharawan (Nahrawān نَهَروان ) and killed each of them without mercy.²¹⁹⁹ ²²⁰⁰ Only ten or so out of them would have survived.²²⁰¹ Loss of life in Ali’s forces was just ten souls.²²⁰² This operation, known as Battle of Nahrawan in annals of history, took place in summer of 659 CE.²²⁰³ Ali paid to his army from the booty.²²⁰⁴

Ali had gathered this army to invade Syria according to his original plans. When he ordered them to march towards Syria after operation of Naharawan, they started making excuses like they were tired, their armaments were blunt or broken etc. Ali gave them a grace period to take a rest in the camp before further march. Soldiers started disappearing overnight. The whole camp vanished under the nose of Ali. He had to return to Kufa empty handed.²²⁰⁵

This was the time Ali realized that he could not dislodge Mu’awiya by use of blunt force and that he didn’t possess any other means except blunt force. In other words, he got convinced that the country would have two rulers. Heartbroken, he started cursing (Tabarrah) on Mu’awiya and his associates in his Qunūt during ritual prayer (ṣalāt). Mu’awiya responded by tit for tat.²²⁰⁶ ²²⁰⁷

The only time soldiers fought with their full vigor for Ali was Battle of Camel. He had difficulty in convincing them to participate in Siffin.²²⁰⁸ He could not even march against Mu’awiya the second time. The question is why army was reluctant to fight. Exact answer is not known. Clue comes from the payment of army after Battle of Camel. The soldiers got disappointed when each of them got five hundred Dirhams.²²⁰⁹ It was peanuts as compared to the remuneration of Qadisiyyah. Each cavalry man had got fourteen thousand Dirhams and each infantryman got seventy one hundred Dirhams from the booty of Qadisiyyah.²²¹⁰ A big portion of soldier’s remuneration used to come from booty. Ali had forbidden taking booty from his opposing forces, except few things his soldiers could grab on the battle field. His opponents were Muslims. State used to pay stipends to all registered soldiers irrespective of war or peace. Ali expected them to fight on ruler’s order in lieu of stipends.²²¹¹ None of them flatly refused to fight. They used to express their reluctance by disappearing from the scene whenever called to fight.

Islam remained ideological umbrella for politics

During First Arab Civil War reference to pre-Islamic and early Islamic tribal politics became a common occurrence. When Ali asked for allegiance from Walid bin ‘Uqba, he refused on grounds that Ali had killed his Father off battle filed after Badr.²²¹² Ali was apt to point out that ancestors of Mu’awiya had opposed Islam as much as they could.²²¹³ Similarly, Mu’awiya never got tired of praising the nobility of his ancestors during pre-Islamic times.²²¹⁴ Such references were not limited to the leaders of the conflicting factions. Almost everybody got involved in it.²²¹⁵

Despite references to pre Islamic and early Islamic politics, we don’t hear anybody taking pride in his pre-Islamic religion. All antagonizing parties were unanimous that they were ignorant (jāhil) before Islam and Prophet Muhammad guided them to the path of truth (ḥaq).²²¹⁶ All political arguments stemmed from the religion of Islam.

The political arguments before murder of Uthman were mainly around factual position of Sunna of Prophet Muhammad about different matters. For example, arguments of Uthman with Ali.²²¹⁷ Later on, during caliphate of Ali, political arguments were around interpretation and understanding of Qur’an. For example, arguments between Ali and Kharajis.²²¹⁸

The reason for any person to die in the First Arab Civil War from any side never became money or loyalty to the leader he was fighting for. It always remained to get favor from Allah. When Kharijis faced Ali’s forces at Naharvan they shouted out, “prepare to meet the Lord, hasten, hasten to paradise.” ²²¹⁹ Ammar bin Yasir declared before his death in Siffin, “Oh Allah, you know that, if I knew that Your pleasure was that I should put the point of my sword against my breast and then lean on it until it came out of my back, I would do so. But today I do not know of any deed more pleasing to You than jihad against those evildoers (fāsiqīn). If I did not know of any deed more pleasing to You, I would do it”.²²²⁰

Medinan Caliphate totally disorganized

Indiscipline in military was not the only trouble Medinan Caliphate had during Ali’s tenure. Matters of civil bureaucracy were in jeopardy. Chronic monetary corruption at middle level officials kept harming the economy. Ya’qubi notes that Ali had to reprimand Ash’ath bin Qays, lieutenant governor over Azerbaijan, Yazid bin Qays (Yazīd bin Qays يَزِد بِن قَيس ), Lieutenant governor over Isfahan, Rayy and Hamedan, Nu’man bin Ajlan (Nu’mān bin al ‘Ajlān نُعمان بِن عَجلان ), Governor of Bahrah, Ziyad bin Abihi / Abu Sufyan, lieutenant governor over Fars, and Abdullah bin Abbas, governor of Basrah at different occasions during his tenure for embezzling public money.²²²¹

Law and order situation didn’t improve either. People got wearier when many different bands, called collectively Khariji, started petty crimes like looting property, highway robbery and sometimes even murder.²²²²

General deterioration of governance had a negative impact on propagation and conservation of Islam. Many events of apostasy are documented during First Arab Civil War. Seoboes mentions conversion of thousands of Muslims in Egypt to Christianity during this period.²²²³ Both Ya’qubi and Tabari document apostasy of certain Bakr bin Wa’il who had reverted to their original religion of Christianity. One of these apostates cited his reason for apostasy that Islam fails to prevents its adherents from fighting among themselves.²²²⁴ ²²²⁵

Attitude of Defeated nations

Astonishingly, the defeated nations remained mainly pliant during whole of Arab Civil War. Initially, Arab elite wished that the jizyah paying defeated nations shouldn’t know about their discord.²²²⁶ Later on, the news of dissonance spread slowly by word of mouth throughout the country. Naturally, the defeated nations would have been apt to take advantage of this situation. The first district to stop paying tax was Nishapur in Khurasan.²²²⁷ Merv followed the suit. It happened just after Battle of Siffin in 657 CE. Ali sent a small force under Ja’da bin Hubayra (Ja’dah bin Hubayrah جَعدَه بِن هُبَيرَه ) that besieged Nishapur. The town swiftly returned to its previous tax treaty. Merv didn’t need any action. Threat of besiege was enough for them.²²²⁸ ²²²⁹ Then Fars and Kirman tried their luck. Ali sent Ziyad bin Abihi / Abu Sufyan with four thousand soldiers. They didn’t have to fight. Ziyad utilized time honored technique of divide and rule to re-assert authority of Medinan Caliphate over them.²²³⁰ It appears that the defeated districts were in political isolation from each other. They didn’t have means to communicate and organize any co-ordinated uprising. Probably, they didn’t have serious appetite for uprising. The taxes they were paying were within their capacity. One wonders, the same soldiers of Medinan Caliphate who were reluctant to fight against Mu’awiya were happy to march to far off places to suppress any potential uprising.

A brand new phenomenon occurred in Medinan Caliphate during the tenure of Ali. For the first time in history of Islam, Muslims joined hands with non-Muslims to fight against a Muslim government. According to the details a power mongering splinter group of three hundred Kufan Arabs belonging to the Najiyah clan under leadership of Khirrit bin Rashid (Khirrīt bin Rāshid خِرِّط بِن رَاشِد ) left Kufa. They proceeded straight to Khuzestan. There a number of non-Muslims (ulūj) were weary of paying taxes. They joined them instantly. Some local Kurds, a lot of Banu Najiyah and Abdul Qays joined them as well. Whole of Khuzestan burnt in flames of rebellion. Ali had to send Ma’qil bin Qays (Ma’qil bin Qays al Riyāḥi مَعقِل بِن قَيس الرِياحِى ), his superintendent of Police, to the province. He successfully killed Khirrit and his supporters. According to the government policy, he pardoned Muslims and took all non-Muslims captive.²²³¹ We don’t hear of any tax disobedience from non-Muslims in the provinces of Swad, Jazirah, Syria, or Egypt, during First Arab Civil War. They all had one thing in common. They were managed directly by Arab elites.

Mu’awiya provided safe haven for Ali’s fugitives

Mu’awiya was bent upon creating all possible hurdles for Ali to manage his territories. One of them was open invitation to law fugitives of Ali’s side to escape. An event will illustrate the situation.

After defeating rebellion of Khuzestan, Medinan Caliphate had taken non-Muslim combatants into captivity.²²³² Masqala bin Hubayra (Maṣqalah bin Hubaryrah مَصقَلَه بِن هُبَيرَه ) of Shayban tribe was Ali’s ‘āmil over Jur district in Fars. He felt pity on the slaves and bought their freedom for one million Dirhams from Ali. He freed the slaves immediately after, but he could pay only five hundred thousand Dirhams out of his pocket. Ali knew that Masqala was nearly bankrupt. He demanded money to be paid urgently. Masqalah fled to Basrah where Abdullah bin Abbas asked him to raise money from the districts under his command. Masqalah could pop up only two hundred thousand more. He wished that Ali’s government should write off the remaining debt as Uthman’s government would have done in this situation. When pressed further Masqalah absconded to Mu’awiya. Mu’awiya accepted him with fervor.²²³³ ²²³⁴

Charisma of Mu’awiya was such that Ali was always suspicious of loyalty of his supporters. He was doubtful whom to trust and whom not. Just before Battle of Siffin he doubted Khalid bin Mu’ammar (Khālid bin Mu’ammar خالِد بِن مُعَمّر ), one of his field commanders from the tribe of Taym, that he might have joined hands with Mu’awiya secretly. He raised the matter with his tribe in his presence. They all reassured his loyality.²²³⁵

Mu’awiya keeps teasing Ali

By this time Mu’awiya’s political slogan of revenge of Uthman’s blood must have lost popular appeal.²²³⁶ All known murderers were already dead. He might be inclined towards peace with Ali. After his army’s refusal to fight against Mu’awiya, Ali had accepted peaceful co-existence with Mu’awiya mentally. However, he didn’t declare it formally. Mu’awiya lodged a harassment campaign against Medinan Caliphate. Probably, his aim was to bring Medinan Caliphate on negotiating table. From summer of 659 CE to the end of 660 CE, in almost eighteen months, Mu’awiya sent a lot of teasers to irritate Ali.

Mu’awiya knew of presence of Shi’a Uthman in Basrah.²²³⁷ He sent Abdullah bin Amr bin Hadhrami (‘Abdullah bin ‘Amr ibn Ḥadhrami عَبُد اللّه بِن عَمرؤ بِن حَضرَمِى ), his intelligence operator to Basrah.²²³⁸ That time Abdullah bin Abbas was away from the town for a meeting with Ali, leaving behind Ziyad bin Abihi /Abu Sufyan as acting governor.²²³⁹ Abdullah bin Amr could make significant following among Tamim.²²⁴⁰ Ziyad got so afraid that he shifted away from the governor house taking public treasury with him. He took a lodging, with the treasury on his side, in the mosque of Huddan (Ḥuddān حُدّان ) clan of Azd who had undertaken to protect him and the treasury.²²⁴¹ Ziyad informed Ali that majority of people of the town appear to be supporting Abdullah bin Amr.²²⁴² Ali got upset and sent A’yan bin Dibay’a (A’yan bin D.ubay’ah اَعيَن بِن ضُبَيعَه ) of Tamim to counter the efforts of Abdullah.²²⁴³ The supporters of Abdullah bin Amr managed to kill A’yan.²²⁴⁴ Next, Ali sent Jariya bin Qudama (Jāriyah bin Qudāmah al Sa’di السَعدِى جارِيَه بِن قُدامَه ) [of Tamim] with fifty men of Tamim.²²⁴⁵ ²²⁴⁶ Jariya could break some men of Abdullah away from him.²²⁴⁷ He, then, locked Abdullah along with his staunch supporters in a house and burnt them alive.²²⁴⁸

Painful death of his man in Basrah might have pinched Mu’awiya. He, afterwards, made a policy to send a squadron in the areas held by Ali with instructions to withdraw when Ali mobilizes his forces to tackle. Mu’awiya had gained mastery of such tactics by his endeavors against the Byzantine. Each time Ali startled in panic, over reacted by sending a bigger army to halt the perceived invasion, and consoled himself on news of withdrawal.

Penetration of Mu’awiya’s men into ‘Ayn al Tamr, Quṭquṭāna and Anbār produced desired results for him.²²⁴⁹ ²²⁵⁰ Emboldened by the success of the pilot project, Mu’awiya extended circle of such attacks to Hejaz.²²⁵¹ During such raids the Mu’awiya’s party would interrogate the villagers and nomads, kill those found to be Shi’a Ali, loot their property and vanish in the desert on approach of guards belonging to Medinan Caliphate. The last of such campaigns was quiet extensive. Mu’awiya knew Hejaz, Yemen and other parts of Arabia were devoid of fighting men. In the fall of 660 CE Mu’awiya sent a bigger force of three thousand men under command of Busr bin Abi Artat (Busr bin Abī Arṭāt بُسر بِن اَبِى اَرطاة ) of ‘Amir bin Lu’ayy clan of Quraysh. This time the army marched up to Medina without any resistance, harassing the Bedouins on the way. Ali’s governor over Medina, Abu Ayyub (Abū Ayyūb اَبُو اَيّوب ) of Ansar, withdrew in horror. The army found the city in shambles. The army forced the civilians of Medina into allegiance to Mu’awiya, who were otherwise Shi’a Ali. Busr demolished few houses in Medina, as a show of power, before proceeding to Mecca. Mu’awiya had ordered Busr beforehand to avoid harming anybody in Mecca.²²⁵² ²²⁵³ ²²⁵⁴

Bypassing Mecca, Busr took the road to Yemen. Ubaydallah bin Abbas was still governing Yemen in Ali’s name. When news reached Ali that Busr had created havoc in Medina and now was on his way to Yemen he organized an army of four thousand under command of Jariya bin Qudama. By that time Ubaydallah bin Abbas took to heels, leaving his two miner sons behind. Busr killed both of them by slaughtering.²²⁵⁵ First Arab Civil War was a guerre sans merci.²²⁵⁶ Busr was terrorizing civilians of towns of Yeman, like Najran and Sana’a when Jariya reached with his army. Busr raced back to Syria, burning everything he came across on the way.²²⁵⁷ Inhabitants of Yemen paid the price. Initially Busr killed a large number of Shi’a Ali and then Jariya killed a lot of Shi’a Uthman.²²⁵⁸

Purpose of these sorties was not to dislodge Ali from power but to keep Medinan Caliphate insecure.

Ali recognizes Mu’awiya caliph in his territories

Mu’awiya’s teasing tactics finally exhausted Ali. He had to pay his soldiers fifty Dirhams per person each time he sent them out.²²⁵⁹ The constant threat was preventing him from attending more pressing issues, like deteriorating law and order situation in his country and financial health of his government. Pressed from all sides, Ali had a grudging acceptance of Mu’awiya. He entered into a truce agreement with Mu’awiya. Both sides agreed on no aggression policy, recognition of borders and acceptance of each other’s government.²²⁶⁰

Assassination of Ali

On January 26, 661 CE, when Ali entered the grand mosque of Kufa to offer morning prayer his assassin was hiding in the doorway.²²⁶¹ ²²⁶² He was Abdur Rehman bin Muljam (‘Abd ar Rehmān bin Muljam عَبدُ الرَحمن بِن مُلجَم ) of Murad tribe. He injured Ali on his head and Ali fell down. Two days later Ali succumbed to his injuries.²²⁶³ ²²⁶⁴ ‘Abd ar Rehman bin Muljam was arrested and tightened with fetter on the spot. Soon after, he served the death sentence for the murder. ²²⁶⁵ Law of Medinan Caliphate considered murderer the sole responsible for the crime. Accomplice of murder were not interrogated.²²⁶⁶

Islamic sources depict murder of Ali as part of a wider conspiracy masterminded and executed by Kharijis. They construe that they were three people in all who were at throats of Mu’awiya, Ali, and Amr. Both Mu’awiya and Amr survived the attempts on their lives miraculously on the same day when Ali got fatally wounded.²²⁶⁷

We know that Kharijis had resorted to terrorism. We also know that Battle of Naharawan had not eradicated them from root. It is plausible that they would have planned to carry out this act of sabotage at three different capital towns simultaneously. But is it the only possibility? How come only Ali paid the price and other two escaped unhurt? How come Khariji’s, who were active only in and around Kufa, could execute such a sophisticated operation in far off foreign cities of Damascus and Fustat? Who financed the scheme?

A contemporary Christian source, Sebeos, writing in 660’s, doesn’t believe in any conspiracy theories. He tells us “He [Mu’awiya] killed the king whom they had enthroned [in place of Uthman]’.²²⁶⁸ We know Mu’awiya had physically eliminated his political opponents in the past. He was the master mind behind cold blooded murder of Malik bin Harith al-Ashtar.²²⁶⁹ We also know that he was prime beneficiary of Ali’s death. Could Mu’awiya really do that? Did Sebeos blame Mu’awiya in flow of speech or really he meant it? Were there any speculating stories circulating in masses at the time of murder which later got lost?²²⁷⁰ Riddles of Ali’s murder are still unsolved.

Ali has survived in history of Islam due to other reasons than his governance. He was the only ruler of Medinan Caliphate who had personally led an army in a big war like Battle of Camel while in office.²²⁷¹ A piece of poetry written about him by one of his Khariji enemies and preserved by Tabari gives him honoraria of Ḥaydar – the lion hearted.

You upon whom be blessings, we have struck Ḥaydar

Abu Ḥasan with a blow to the head and he was split apart.

We have removed kingship from his concerns,

With the blow of a sword, since he waxed high and mighty.²²⁷²

Ali is mainly known for his religious eminence. Ya’qubi puts in mouth of Abu Dharr that Ali was trustee (waṣi) of the Prophet and heir to his knowledge.²²⁷³ At another occasion Ya’qubi puts in mouth of Abu Dharr Ghifari that Ali was walī Allah.²²⁷⁴ ²²⁷⁵

Both Tabari and Ya’qubi allocate full chapters to discuss the caliphate of Ali. However, in the eyes of contemporary non-Muslims it was non-existent.²²⁷⁶

Aftermath of civil war

First Arab Civil War virtually finished with the assassination of Ali, though few events were pending. First Arab Civil War had a profound impact on Muslim society and religion. It facilitated the rise of three distinct groups among Muslims. One was the mainstream group, Sunni Muslims, who based their religious beliefs not only on teachings of Qur’an but also on Sunna of the Prophet as available to them. The other was minority Shi’a Muslims, who believed in Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet but emphasized that Ali was heir to the knowledge of the Prophet. The third group was purist Muslims. Though technically part of Sunni Islam, they always emphasized of purging out those practices which they deemed were later innovations (bid’ah). No doubt these sects matured and formalized during later decades and centuries, their origin can be traced in political thoughts of those five bloody years which First Arab Civil War covers.

First Arab Civil War was a test for strength of nascent religion of Islam. Each of the warring groups hired non-Muslims to fight for them but none gave them any leadership position. They maintained it as a fight among Muslims and disallowed it to become a fight among everybody irrespective of religion. On top of that, they restricted public expression of their differences within bounds of Islam. Islam successfully survived the onslaught of First Arab Civil War.

First Arab Civil War had an embarrassing effect on religio-political psyche of later Muslim generations. They tend to downplay that a fierce war was fought between dignitaries of Islam. Ammar bin Yasir got killed in Battle of Siffin fighting from Ali’s side. Both Ya’qubi and Tabari fail to give the name of his killer. Tabari gives only a hint that later on, people blamed Amr bin As of killing Ammar, but Mu’awiya quickly tackled the situation by saying, “nay! They were his own people who dragged him into the war.”²²⁷⁷ Talha bin Ubaydallh died fighting against Ali in the Battle of Camel. Ya’qubi gives a funny story about his death. According to his version Marwan bin Hakam killed Talha and then claimed that he had killed one of the murderers of Uthman.²²⁷⁸ Tabari produces similar story.²²⁷⁹ One wonders that Marwan traveled to Basrah from Mecca along with Talha and others of ‘Meccan Alliance’ to take vengeance of Uthman. During the battle he killed his own soldier. He didn’t apologize that it was an identification mistake, rather he boosted about it. None of his commanders court marshaled him. After the war Ali didn’t even interrogate him for the murder. Ali rather missed a golden chance to physically eliminate one of his opponents and permitted him to go back to Medina and reappear against him at Siffin. Amazing!

End of Medinan Caliphate

28^th January 661 CE, the date of death of Ali, the last Rashidun caliph, triggered the sirens of final disintegration of Medinan Calphate.²²⁸⁰ Election of thirty six years old Hasan bin Ali (Ḥasan bin ‘Ali حَسَن بِن عَلى ), the first born of Ali, was a local affair of Kufa.²²⁸¹ ²²⁸²

We don’t hear of any attempt from his camp to get allegiance from any of the governors of the provinces, except in Hejaz, where Jariya forced people into allegiance.²²⁸³ Neither they attempted to get blessing of the prominent names for Hasan’s caliphate. Sa’d bin Waqqas, the only surviving member of the Electoral College was living in Medina, for example. Nobody bothered to approach him and get a kind of ‘go ahead’ for the new caliph. Shi’a Ali of Kufa had confirmed Hasan in the office without any wider consultation. Ali was fully aware of Hasan’s nomination when he laid on his death bed.²²⁸⁴ Generally, citizens of Medinan Caliphate adopted the attitude of wait and see.

Medinan Caliphate had forty thousand registered soldiers just in cantonment of Kufa by this time.²²⁸⁵ Soldiers registered in Basrah and stationed in other far flung places were extra. However, their capacity to fight on orders of caliph was doubtful. The very first political decision Hasan took was to re-recognize authority of Mu’awiya over the territories he was already governing. ‘I want peace’ was his slogan.²²⁸⁶ He rather wished to bring back order and discipline in the remaining territories of Medinan Caliphate.²²⁸⁷ He demoted Qays bin Sa’d, the hawkish Shi’a Ali and the commander of Kufan army from Ali’s time.²²⁸⁸ Instead, he called Abdullah bin Abbas from Mecca to take charge of the Kufan army.²²⁸⁹ ²²⁹⁰

Die hard Shi’a Ali of Kufa abhorred Hasan’s plans. They wished that Hasan’s first step should be sending a notice of war to Mu’awiya.²²⁹¹ They suspected Mu’awiya’s hand in murder of Ali. They were already writing propaganda poetry regarding this. Here is a peace of poetry written by Abu Aswad al Duali, qāḍi of Basrah and a known Shi’a Ali:

Indeed, say to Mu’āwiyah bin Harb

And may those who goat not rejoice:

“Do you afflict us in the month of fasting

With the loss of the best of all men?”

You have killed the best of those who ride mounts

And put the saddle upon them, the best of those who sail the seas.²²⁹²

Differences of opinion between Qays bin Sa’d, the demoted commander of army, and Hasan increased to irreparable extent.²²⁹³ One day, an unidentified person attempted on life of Hasan. The stab wound proved to be non-fatal.²²⁹⁴ Compelled by circumstances, Hasan ordered twelve thousand of his soldiers to march out of Kufa and camp near Tswyn with an intention to prepare for attacking Mu’awiya. Mu’awiya was not inattentive about the developments in Kufa. He swiftly moved into the territory of Medinan Caliphate with his Syrian army and camped at Maskin to counter any untoward commotion.²²⁹⁵ ²²⁹⁶

All of a sudden a rumor spread in Hasan’s army camp in Tyswn that Qays bin Sa’d had got murdered. (Who can know people behind this rumor !). The disillusioned soldiers plundered Hasan’s pavilion. They even quarreled to get the carpet underneath Hasan. Hasan had to flee to the White Palace for his life. This incidence disheartened Hasan totally. He realized government was getting out of his grasp.²²⁹⁷ ²²⁹⁸

It was apparent to Shi’a Ali that Hasan was not in a position and mood to fight against Mu’awiya’s force that had intruded inside Medinan Caliphate. A race started in Hasan’s camp to contact Mu’awiya and get a deal from him at the best possible terms. First was Abdullah bin Abbas who got indemnity against any future prosecution and confiscation of his property.²²⁹⁹ Hasan was the next. He got concession to transfer five million Dirhams from Kufa’s public treasury into his account. In addition, he won revenue of Dārābjird (district of eastern Fars) as his ongoing pension.²³⁰⁰ ²³⁰¹ Initially, the twelve thousand troops camping at Tyswn wowed to continue their fight under Qays bin Sa’d without any leader, but they quickly changed their standpoint. Each of them got immunity against any future prosecution and confiscation of property.²³⁰² ²³⁰³ Hassan, along with his brother Husayn and his paternal cousin Abdullah bin Ja’far left for Kufa. After his stab wound healed, the three departed to Medina after an emotional farewell at the grand mosque of Kufa.²³⁰⁴ ²³⁰⁵

Mu’awiya entered Kufa triumphantly. All and sundry accepted him the new caliph.

July 25, 661 CE is the date of death of Medinan Caliphate.²³⁰⁶ ²³⁰⁷ This is the date on which Hasan signed the deal to transfer power to Mu’awiya. Medinan caliphate lived for twenty nine years one month and seventeen days. A new kind of caliphate arose on its ruins. That was Damascus Caliphate.

Causes of demise of Medinan Caliphate

Medinan Caliphate was short lived as compared to many other political entities in history. Sasanian Iran, for example, survived for four hundred and thirty years.²³⁰⁸ Byzantine Rome flourished even longer. It lasted for almost eleven hundred years.²³⁰⁹ Medinan Caliphate utilized only three decades out of history to surge and crash. What hasted its demise?

Non-Muslim sources on Medinan Caliphate are too brief to shed any light on reasons of its crash. Muslim sources, on the other hand, are pre-occupied with events and personalities. They have no craving for analysis. Modern historians, anyway, have their own theorem. They wish to dig out reasons behind the reasons. A host of historians have written on the question, nothing final.

Here, few observations are worth noting.

Medinan Caliphate couldn’t chalk out a workable constitution for the state. Particularly, guidelines about selection of a new ruler after death of previous one were ambiguous. Furthermore, any legal arrangements for abdication of incompetent ruler were non-existent. Resultantly, the country suffered from chronic political instability and plunged into a political crisis each time a ruler died. Ad-hocism often took precedent over any other statute. Absence of hard and fast rules for selection of a ruler encouraged many people at upper echelons of the government to try to grab the power by hook or by crook. Absence of hard and fast rules for appointments also enhanced hopes of many people at upper levels that they could bag superior jobs with proper efforts. The country divided into so many antagonizing fractions. Each of them striving its best to hinder development of a workable constitution, lest it may damage its interests

The laws and rules of Medinan Caliphate had to be in line with the Qur’an and the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad. The generation who received guidance from the Prophet himself survived throughout the years of Medinan Caliphate. This generation knew exactly what the Sunna was. The rulers found it hard to introduce any modification which was not practiced by the Prophet. Let’s take an example. Three out of four rulers of Medinan Caliphate got murdered – a whooping 75% violent fatality among them. Early Islamic sources suggest that Prophet Muhammad used to mingle with people freely in the mosque. The timings of his routine in the mosque were publicly known. He didn’t hire full time personal guards. Abu Bakr didn’t make any change around security issue of a ruler of Medinan Caliphate. He didn’t wish to be perceived deviant from the practice of the Prophet. It worked out well during his reign. Arabs constituted core of the population of Medina at that time. Visitor to the town were Arabs as well. Arabs had their own strict tribal traditions and values around murder. Demography of Medina changed significantly during Umar’s reign. Big chunk of Arab population left the town to participate in Jihad. Number of non-Arab slaves swelled. Arabs reduced to a visible minority. Visitors to the town were as much non Arabs as were Arabs. There was a palpable need to enhance security around caliph, whose decisions affected fate of thousands of people, sometimes in a negative way. Umar did not pay any attention to the issue of caliph’s security during his sweeping reforms.²³¹⁰ He kept mingling with people freely in the mosque in pursuance of Sunna of Prophet Muhammad and Abu Bakr. His routine was precisely known to people. He created police of the town (Shurṭ) but they were rarely hired for security of dignitaries.²³¹¹ He paid the price of neglecting issue of security by his own life. Then came Uthman. Nobody in his government attended to security of the ruler, despite murder of his processor due to lack of it. Rebels could easily stone him to near death when he mingled people freely in the mosque. Later they killed him. He did not have any official security guards at that time. The only people who tried to save him were his personal friends and servants. Ali’s story is not much different. The only piece of information his assailant knew was that he doesn’t use bodyguards while coming to mosque.²³¹² Hasan got stabbed within a few months after coming to power.²³¹³ It is his good luck that he survived. The first thing Mu’awiya did after attaining the title of Amīr ul Mu’minun was to introduce maqsūrah in the mosque. This was a separate enclosure for the dignitaries. He also introduced presence of guard near him during public prayers. He also made night guard available at his residence.²³¹⁴ Here we see a classical case where rulers of Medinan Caliphate didn’t even mention about deviating from norm of Prophet Muhammad out of fear that their subjects might find a point to criticize them. Rulers who came after them were bold to take such decision.

Social, economic and political changes in society of Medinan Caliphate evolved briskly. The state remained sluggish in legal and administrative reforms matching with social changes. Let’s take an example. Caliph’s authority in Medinan Caliphate did not stem from any military force at his disposal or any monetary supremacy over others. It stemmed from his spiritual power. Initially, when people were newly attached to Islam and were enthusiastic, it worked very well. All of military was in Khalid bin Walid’s favor, only Umar was not. Umar’s decision prevailed, and he did not have to explain his reasons of demoting him to anybody.²³¹⁵ It is known whenever a person attaches to a new religion he is excited about it.²³¹⁶ Things changed drastically when attachment to a new religion became a ‘routine’ for many citizens of the country. By end of Uthman’s tenure people could easily blame Uthman of not following the Sunna of the Prophet to justify their disobedience to him. While writing to Yazid bin Asad (Yazīd bin Asad bin Kurz يَزِد بِن اَسَد بِن كُرز ) and to the Syrians for military aid, Uthman stresses his rightful claims upon them, and mentions that it is Almighty Allah’s commandment to obey the caliphs.²³¹⁷ By mid of his term, when things were going from bad to worse for him, Uthman should have created an army in Medina at his personal disposal to put force in his orders. He kept using his spiritual status to beg people in obedience. Orders of Umar’s time deteriorated into requests during Uthman’s time and further degenerated into pleas during Ali’s time. Here is a piece of speech, Ali once delivered to encourage the garrisons of Kufa and Basrah to fight under his orders. “People! The beginning of your decline was the disappearance from among you of the people of intellect and judgment, those who tell the truth when they speak and who do what they say. I have called on you again and again, in secret and in public, by day and by night, but my call has only increased you in flight. Exhortation is of no use with you, nor is the summons to right guidance and wisdom. By Allah, I know well what would settle things for you, but therein would be my ruin. So give me a little time; for, by Allah, there has come to you one who will make you grieve and afflict you, but whom Allah will afflict by you. To the humiliation of Islam and destruction of religion, the Son of Abu Sufyan summons the base and wicked and they answer, while I summon you and you do not accept and take fright”.²³¹⁸

The caliph of Medinan Caliphate was primus inter pares. Constant crude criticism hounded the caliph. Explaining his each smallest action and decision exhausted the creative energy of caliph, which could have been used on planning and reforms.

The story of Medinan caliphate can be summed up in a few words. It was born with a doctrine that the one with undisputed record of serving Islam will rule the country but gave way to another doctrine that whoever could manipulate will rule the country. It was born with a doctrine that the most competent man picked from a pool of leaders will serve as a ruler. It died with a doctrine that the one born to a ruler has first right to rule. Medinan Caliphate was a crude democracy. It gave way to ordered governance.²³¹⁹

Shoemaker, Stephen J. “the Death of a Prophet: the End of Muhammad’s life and the Beginning of Islam. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania press, 2011. See also: Madelung Wilferd. The Succession to Muhammad: a Study of the Early Caliphate. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 681.
In a tradition narrated by Abdullah bin Abbas and preserved by Zuhri, during his final ailment once the Prophet had asked his prominent companions to draw near him so he could write a kitāb for them lest they go astray after he dies. But ‘Umar said, “The Messenger of Allah has been overtaken by pain, and you all have the Qur’an. That kitāb is sufficient for us”. The household of the Prophet started disagreeing among themselves. Some took the position of ‘Umar, others wished to follow what the Prophet had said. Ultimately the Prophet said, “Leave, all of you!” Later on Ibn ‘Abbas used to say that it was a disaster! (Ma’mar ibn Rashīd The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 116). As the tradition comes from the mouth of forefather of caliph at the time of writing of tradition, and as the Abbasid caliphs claimed their right to govern through kinship of the Prophet and as it blames only ‘Umar for interference who is otherwise not shown by any other tradition to be inside Prophet’s house during his final illness, the authenticity of the tradition remains dubious.
Ya’qubi, the earliest extant Shi’ite historian, notes an incident according to which, on March 16, 632 CE, on his way back from Mecca after farewell pilgrimage, Prophet Muhammad “came to a place in the lowland of al-Juḥfa called Ghadīr Khumm. He stood to deliver an address, took the hand of ‘Ali bin Abu T.ālib, and said, “Am I not close to the believers than they are to themselves?” They said, “Yes, that is so, Messenger of Allah!” He said, “To whomever I am protector (maulā), ‘Ali is protector. O Allah! Be the friend of whoever helps him, and be the enemy of whoever treats him as enemy.” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 730, 731). We don’t find its parallel in any other Islamic historians, neither in Ya’qūbī’s predecessors nor in his contemporaries. Even if this event is true, the language used here doesn’t clearly establish that the Prophet had nominated ‘Ali as his caliph.
See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 678 – 683.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 683.
The Prophet had appointed ‘Ali tax collector to Najran. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 649). He met the Prophet in that capacity during the pilgrimage of farewell when the Prophet was still in iḥrām to discuss some important matters. He had travelled from Najran for this meeting. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 650). Few weeks later he was present in Medina during the illness of Prophet. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 678). Islamic sources don’t know under which circumstances and for what reasons did he return to Medina from Najran. Generally, they report that all tax collectors of Prophet Muhammad had to leave Yemen under pressure from Aswad (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 160.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 683.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 683.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 680.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685.
Differences between Ansar and Muhajirun were present during last years of the Prophet. He was aware of them. Such differences could have hindered the Prophet from naming his caliph. In a tradition of Zuhri, Preserved by Ibn Ishaq, when the Prophet was at his deathbed he asked the Muhajirun to behave kindly with Ansar, ‘for other men increase but they, in the nature of things, cannot grow more numerous’. He admitted that they were his constant comfort and support. He asked to treat their good men well and forgive those of them who were remiss. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 680).
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685, 686.
Tabari shows Abu Ubaida talking on this occasion as well. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 7).
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685.
Caliph is Anglicization of Khalīfah of Arabic. The word simply means deputy. Tabari uses this word in this sense for people other than rulers. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 50. Pre-Islamic root of this word is evident from the pre-Islamic inscriptions. (see above).
Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 168.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 686.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 82.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685 – 687.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 680.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685, footnote 2. ²²Tabari reports two points. One, Usayd bin Ḥuḍair of Aws, who had already supported Abu Bakr, warned his fellow tribesmen that if they allow Khazraj to dominate, they will never be able to get any share in the government from them. Second, a big group of Aslam reached Medina, which filled the streets of Medina. They started taking oath with Abu Bakr without any preconditions. ‘Umar later on admitted that Aslam were a decisive factor that day. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 8).
At least one of the Ansar present in the saqifa, who changed his mind and supported Abu Bakr’s candidacy was Bashīr bin Sa’d, father of Nu’mān bin Bashīr. He requested Ansar to support Abu Bakr. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 7,8. Nu’mān bin Bashīr later became high ranking government officer during Mu’awiya’s reign.
‘Attāb bin Asīd, the governor of Mecca was the first of all governors to announce support to Abu Bakr. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 160.
See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 686.
Sa’d bin ‘Ubādāh and Usayd bin Ḥuḍayr both got portions of land of Khaybar when Umar expelled Jews from there. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 353, 354). The only reason they got the land was that Umar gave lands of Khaybar to all those who had participated in Ḥudaybiyah and Khaybar. (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 45. Sa’d bin Ubādāh died soon afterwards in 637 CE. Usayd is reported to have died in 641 CE (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),177
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 751. Check out Ansar’s behaviour before war of Yamama vis a vis Khalid: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 136.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 401. Saliṭ Bin Qays was a veteran of Badr. See: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 82.
Abu Bakr was sixty three at the time of his death: (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763). For Abu Bakr’s clan and his vocation in Mecca see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 115.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 686.
Sa’d bin Ubada never took oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr. He broke away from the rest of Muslims. He stopped attending the daily prayer and congregate prayer with them. He performed hajj all alone. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 10).
“By Allah! I (Umar) would rather have come forward and have had my head struck off – if that were no sin – than rule over people of whom Abu Bakr was one,” said Umar. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 686).
Ibn Ishaq considers Abu Bakr one of the earliest Muslims. See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 115.
For Abu Bakr’s financial contributions see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144.
For expenses at the time of immigration see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 224. For expenses of the mosque see: Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 19.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 186. AND Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 34,35.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 342.
For details on all these occasions see: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. London: Routledge, 2011.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 355.
‘Umar did not claim that Abu Bakr was the most pious of all who were present. As a matter of fact piety cannot be measured. Neither Umar seconded Abu Bakr on the grounds that he was father in law to Prophet Muhammad. Actually, the Prophet had many fathers in law including Abu Sufyan, many Jews and ‘Umar himself.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 107.
Mu’ādh bin Jabal was from Khazraj. He returned from Yemen during caliphate of Abu Bakr. He participated in war in Syria. There he died in plague in 639 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),97
Abu Sufyan was the most influential resident of Mecca. Though ‘Attāb bin Asīd was Governor of Mecca by this time, Abu Sufyan was power behind the power. Ya’qubi tells that Abu Sufyan did not give allegiance to Abu Bakr, rather he offered it to Ali. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 746). Tabari gives similar tradition about Abu Sufyan (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 196). As Meccan Quraysh recruited themselves in the war of Riddah that followed immediately after, including Mu’awiya Bin Abu Sufyan, it is unlikely that there was any opposition to Abu Bakr in Mecca.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 682. See also: Ma’mar ibn Rashīd The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muh.ammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 114.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 744.
Khālid bin Sa’īd was from ‘Abd Shams clan of Quraysh. He immigrated to Ethiopia and returned from there after Peace Treaty of Hudaybiah. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 526). The Prophets gave him a small campaign to subdue some clans in vicinity of Mecca after Fathe Mecca. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 429). Then he appointed him tax collector in Yemen. (see above, Muslims in Mecca, footnote 634). He was chased away from Yemen by rebels of Aswad. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 156); Miqdād bin ‘Amr of Kinda tribe was originally from Yemen. He used to live in Mecca where he was ally to Zuhra clan of Quraysh. He accepted Islam while in Mecca and participated in Badr. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 281, 293, 487, 767).; First and last mention of Abu Dharr Ghifāri in Ibn Ishaq’s monograph is regarding practice of brothering in early days of immigration to Medina. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 234). Waqidi doesn’t mention him at all in any of the maghāzi. It gives an impression that he converted to Islam at the time of immigration and probably returned to his tribe; ‘Ammār bin Yāsir was a born slave in Mecca. Polythiests killed his mother for accepting Islam. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145). He won his freedom due to effort and funds of Abu Bakr. He immigrated to Medina where he participated in construction of the mosque of the Prophet and many prophetic wars including the last one, Tabuk. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 229, 607. AND Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 14, 29, 43, 70, 75., 76, 78, 162, 194, 195, 199, 213, 423, 433, 492, 511, 522); Barā’ Bin ʾĀzib was inconspicuous figure from Khazraj; ‘Ubayy bin Ka’b was an inconspicuous figure from Khazraj, see: (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 425).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 744.
Faḍl bin ‘Abbās died in Palestine in 639 CE. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 780).
See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 183 – 196.
This group didn’t have any candidate as strong as Abu Bakr was. ‘Abbās bin ‘Abdul Muṭṭalib was a very late entrant into Islam. On which grounds could he oppose Abu Bakr? Ali was only twenty eight years old by this time. (Ali is reported to be sixty three at the time of his death. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 880). Forty was the minimum age required in Qurayshite traditions to be a voter on matters of political importance. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53 AND Muhammad bin ‘Abdullah Al – Azraqi. “Kitab Akhbar Makka wa ma ja’a fiha min al-athar” in Die Chroniken der stadt Mekka, Vol I. Ed. Ferdinend Wustenfeld. (Leipzig: F. A. Grockhaus, 1858; reprint Beirut), 64). Issue of age was already hot in Medina. When the Prophet appointed Usāma bin Zaid as commander of the last expedition few weeks ago ‘Ayyāsh bin Abī Rabī’a of Makhzum clan of Quraysh protested that the Prophet had appointed a youth over the first Muhajjirun (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 547). Issue of age was, anyhow, not an absolute hindrance to be a leader in pre-Islamic Arab traditions. We sometimes find people of young age leading tribes and armies. For example, Malik bin ‘Awf, the leader of Hawazin at Hunayn was thirty years old. His strength was in his money, not wisdom, according to Waqidi. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 435). In any case, both ‘Abbās and Ali didn’t look appealing to the majority of early Muhajirun as a candidate of caliph. Muir categorically rejects the notion that there was any difference of opinion among Muhajirun at the occasion of selection of first caliph. He insists that there is nothing during lifetime of the Prophet which could suggest Ali’s rift with any of other companions. Muir suggests that Umar projected Ali as a candidate for caliphate at the time of his death. Even at that time Ali’s inclusion in the list of possible caliphs was due to his companionship to Prophet Muhammad rather than due to his marriage with Fatima. In Muir’s opinion traditions of Ali’s candidature for caliphate at the time of death of Prophet Muhammad on the basis of Divine right have been invented by Alids. See: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 5, 6.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 744.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 46.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),747.
There are reports that Umar physically manhandled Ali or Zubayr to compel them for allegiance to Abu Bakr. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 747). Such reports are unconvincing. How could Umar manhandle Ali who was otherwise younger and is reported to be a man of sword? Umar might have exerted social pressure on them to compel them into compliance.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 196, 197.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 756.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 380.
The privilege to lead the prayer was so important to the early Muslims that we hear, Amr bin As had serious arguments with Abu Ubayda bin Jirrah during the campaign of Dhāt al Salāsil during Prophetic times about who out of them was the leader of army. When both agreed that Amr bin al As was the leader of the army, he automatically became the leader in prayers (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 379).
Mus’ab bin ‘Umayr used to lead prayers in Medina when Prophet Muhammad had still not immigrated. See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 199). For leading of prayer by Abdur Rahman Bin Awf see: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 496.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 681,682. See also: Ma’mar ibn Rashīd The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muh.ammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 111, 112.
Leading prayers in lifetime of the Prophet could have generated jealousy of others. Zuhri’s tradition preserved by Ibn Ishaq informs us that Aisha was afraid for her father that people would never like a man who occupied the apostle’s place, and would blame him for every misfortune that occurred. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 681).
It was not the first occasion that the Prophet had asked Abu Bakr to lead the prayer. He had led the prayers at the camp that was established in Medina to accommodate those who were flocking in Medina to participate in Battle of Tabuk. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 488).
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 680. See also: Ma’mar ibn Rashīd The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muh.ammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 115, 16.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 144.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 548.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763.
For example, during Ridda Wars two chiefs of Tamim asked Abu Bakr to appoint them to collect tax from Bahrain. They guaranteed that their tribes would not repudiate Islam in return. Abu Bakr wrote an agreement regarding this. Middleman of the treaty was Talha bin Ubaydallah. The parties decided to appoint Umar as witness to the agreement. When the document reached Umar he looked at it and rejected the treaty without witnessing it. Talha angrily asked Abu Bakr, “Are you the commander or is ‘Umar?” Abu Bakr replied, “’Umar is, except that obedience is owed to me.” See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 98.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 134.
Ya’qubi reports that when Prophet Muhammad finished his Fairwell Pilgrimage he received this revelation: Today I have perfected your religion for you, and I have completed My blessing upon you, and I have approved Islam for your religion. [Qur’an 5:3]. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 730). After this event Ya’qubi doesn’t report any further revealations.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),143.
Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abi Ya’la’, Tabaqat al-Hanabilah Ed. M. Hamid al-Fiqi (Cairo: Matba’at al-sunna al-Muhammadiya, 1952), Vol I, P 243, 393.
For dates of governance of Rashidun Caliphs see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 98
Citation needed
Citation needed
For example, Ikrima Bin Abu Jahl.
Earlier historians record the names of all children of Prophet Muhammad but Ya’qubi is the first one to give their exact sequence. See Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 614.
Arabs usually called a person by his kunya only on formal occasions. Kunya was derived from the name of first born male, even if he had died. Muslims used to call the Prophet formally ‘Messenger of Allah’ – Rasūl Allah. It were only Jews who called him by his kunya – Abu ‘l Qāsim. The first time we hear Jews calling the Prophet ‘Abu ‘l Qāsim’ was the invasion to Naḍīr, after Battle of Uḥud. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 178). The last time the Prophet was called by his Kunya was at time of Mu’ta. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 372).
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 339.
On a lighter note, the name of son of Maria the Coptic was Ibrāhīm. He was baby sit by a male by name of Barā’ Bin Aws (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 339).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 734.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 695, 696.
Powers, D. S. Muhammad is not the father of any of your men: the making of the last prophet. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 37.
Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 19.
See details: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 343.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011),343
Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 50. See also: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011),348
Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 51.
Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 52.
Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 53.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 187
Ali did not overturn the decision of Abu Bakr’s court during former’s caliphate and continued to use income from Fadak as ṣadaqah as his predecessors Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman had done. It was Mu’awiya Bin Abu Sufyan who no longer kept it as a government run charity and allotted it to Marwān bin Ḥakam to keep it as private property. ‘Umar bin Abdul ‘Azīz, Marwān’s grandson, got it in inheritance. When he came to power, he announced that private use of Fadak was in violation of Prophet Muhammad’s wishes and restored it to its previous use as government run ṣadaqah. (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 54).
Somewhere down the road, probably at the time when Mu’awiya allotted Fadak to Marwān, descendants of Fātima bint Muhammad became particularly touchy about the way it was used. Matter got such a political dimension that ultimately caliph Ma’mūn ur Rashīd gave it back to Muhammad bin Yaḥya and Muhammad bin Abdullah, two descendants of Fātima bint Muhammad in 825 CE. Writing reasons of his decision Ma’mūn mentioned that there was no disagreement among the relatives of the Prophet that the Prophet had assigned Fadak to Fātima as ṣadaqah and that they have not ceased to lay claim on it. (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 55). He did not write categorically that he was overriding the decision given by the court of Abu Bakr. He also didn’t write in his decision that there was consensus among all groups of Muslims about use of this land. When Mutawakkil came to power he restored Fadak to its previous condition – a government run charity. (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 56.)
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 548.
Yibna ( يِبنئ ) of Arab sources is Jabneh or Jabneel of Biblical times. (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), 553). It is Yavne in modern Israel.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 549.
Homs is located in modern eastern Syria, see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 92. It is Ḥimṣ ( حِمص ) of Arabic sources and Emesa of Greek sources, See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 174. Also see: Capt. C. R. Condor, R.E, and Capt. H. H. Kitchener, The Survery of Western Palestine: Memories on Topography, Archaeology, Manners and Customs, eds. Walter Besant and Edward Henry Palmer, (London, The Committee of Palestine Exploration Fund, 1881), P 119 Vol 4).
These days Balqā’ is a region consisting of eastern plateau of Jordan valley, just to the northwest of Amman.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 549.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 548, 550. According to Tabari the expedition left Medina in the last week of June 632 CE. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 38.
William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 9, 10, 11).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 40.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 46.
Death toll on Muslim side just in the war of Yamama was between seven hundred and seventeen hundred. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 140).
For the length of the war see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 38. For the name of the war see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 143.
For the discussion on this point see: Elias S. Shoufani , Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 1 – 9. See also: Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),106.
Montromery W. Watt Muhammad at Mecca Oxford University Press London 1953 (repr. 1965) 152.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 143.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 153. Ibn Ishaq also mentions Ziyād bin Labi.d’s name as zkāt collector. See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
For renewal of contract with people of Najran see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 102.
Leonard Caetani, Studi di Storia Orientale, (Milano University, 1911), 346 – 49. See also: Elias S. Shoufani , Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 10 – 47.
Elias S. Shoufani , Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 71 – 106.
For Quraysh and Thaqif see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 41.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 88. Donner names thaqif as junior partners to Quraysh in the political combo
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 89.
For use of word ghaīmah in this sense see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 190
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 155
For the date see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 38). See also: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 548, 550.
Many historians, including Muir, have observed that the traditions pertaining to Ridda Wars are curt, obscure and disconnected. See: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 18.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 144, 145, 146, 147. See also: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 88.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 69.
For their promise to pray ṣalāt see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 69.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 69.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 45.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 144, 145, 146, 147.
Tabari gives the date of Tulayha’s claim to prophethood to be April 632 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 164, 166)
Tabari notes that Common people of Tayy and Asad and all Ghatafan except clan of Ashja’supported Tulayha. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 144.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 145.
Tabari shows Abu Bakr to be personally commanding the troops in field. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 51).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 145.
For Asad’s overwhelming support to Tulayha see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 166. For some clans of Asad joining Khalid’s army see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 145.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 146.
After accepting Islam Tulayha took residence with the tribe of Kalb. From there he once went for ‘Umrah. Abu Bakr just neglected him when he was on his way to Mecca. Tulayha needed job. He visited Umar during his reign. Umar taunted him being a false prophet. Then he allowed him to participate in the war of Qadisiyyah. He participated in war of Nahavand as well from Muslim side. He took retirement in Kufa. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),146. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 74). He was supporter of Uthman during First Arab Civil War (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 28
Islamic sources don’t mention if Uyaina bin Hisn accepted Islam or not. See: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),146.) After Abu Bakr spared his life, he probably took retirement from politics and disappeared in anonymity.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 147.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 148.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 67.
Hawazin remained ambivalent, they withheld the ṣadaqah but didn’t fight against Medinan Caliphate. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42
Hawazin remained ambivalent, they withheld the ṣadaqah but didn’t fight against Medinan Caliphate. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 148.
Umar never forgave Amr from heart. He used to insult and physically beat him during his reign. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 148).
Tabari denotes a few casualties. For example of two casualties see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 63.
Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 139.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq. The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013). 629.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 151. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 753.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 149, 150.
For genealogy of Mālik bin Nuwairah see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 151.
See, for example: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 20.
Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 97.
For date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 137. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 753. See also: Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 88.
For the figure of forty thousand see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 106.
Shihab al-Din Ahmad bin ‘Ali ibn Hujr al-Asqalani, Al-Isaba fi Tamiz al-Sahaba, ed. Muhammad al-Bijawi, (Cairo: Dar Nazhat Misr, 1970), 20. None of earlier Islamic sources have given the strength of forces of Medinan Caliphate. Though Asqalani is very late source, his estimate appears to be reasonable as similar number of men participated in other combats of Ridda Wars. Asqalani died in Cairo in 1449 CE.
For the figure see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 140.
Death toll of war of Yamama on Musaylima’s side is estimated to be fourteen thousand. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 128.)
Yamamah is the region between Bahrain and Mecca. For location of Yamama in ancient geographic sources, see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 506, vol I.
Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 11.
Hasan bin Ahmad al-Hmdani, Kitab sifat jazirat al-‘Arab, ed. Muhammad bin ‘Ali al-Akwa, (Riyadh, Dar al-Yamama 1974), 307 -8.
Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al Muqaddisi, Ahsan al-Taqsim fi al-Ma’rifat al-Aqalim, ed. M.J.de Goeje (leiden 1836 – 1906). For archaeological evidence see: J. Schiettecatte (dir.), Preliminary Report. Fifth season of the Saudi-French Mission in al-Kharj, 5 January-5 February 2016, P90 – 101.
Hasan bin ‘Abd Allah Al Isfahani Lughdah, Bilad al-‘Arab, ed. Hamad al-Jasir et al. (Riyadh, Dar al Yamama 1968), 357.
Hajar’s ruins still exist near modern Riyadh that need archaeological investigation. (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 20). See also: Hamad al-Jasir, Medinat al-Riyadh Abra Atwar al-Tarikh, (Riyadh, Dar al Yamama 1966), 9). Hajar was situated at a crossroad of trade routes between Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain and Mecca (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 21).
For Prophet Muhammad’s contact with Hanifa see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq. The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013). 194.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 636. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.
Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 89,90.
Hawdha led his fraction in war of Nuta which is estimated to be fought before 579 CE. By the time of his death he was ruling Yamama for at least half a century.
Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),89,90. Few tribes other than Hanifa, for example, clans of Rabi’a were in league with Musaylima: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),753.
For Musaylima’s full name and tribal affiliation see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 636. Baladhuri gives Musaylima’s actual name to be Thumāmah bin Kabīr bin Ḥabīb. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.
Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),127.
Leone Caetani, studi di Storia Orientale, (Milano University 1911), P 26, vol III.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 42.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 636. See also: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.
Ibn Isahq gives a vague hint in this tradition of his, which has only one source – a shaykh of Hanifa – that Musaylima accepted Islam but immediately after returning to Yamama he apostatized. Modern scholars doubt this assertion of Ibn Ishaq. Askar, the Saudi scholar, who is main biographer of Musaylima, argues that the very fact that Musaylimah could muster up forty thousand men to fight for his religion proves that he was consistently working in one direction for years. (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 99). The story of his acceptance of Islam and quick apostasy could be an attempt to fit war of Yamama in broader frame of Ridda Wars.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 636.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 138.
Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 91.
Ibn Ishaq the life of Muhammad Tr. And ed. A. Guillaume Oxford University Press Karachi 2013; 13th Impression. 648.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
Baladhuri gives clearer wording. According to him Musaylima said, “Half of the land belongs to Quraysh and half to Ḥanīfāh. But Quraysh do not act equitably.” (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133).
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133. See also: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 140.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 676.
Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 95.
Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 89,90.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
Baladhuri reports that this Mujjā’ah bin Murārah was one of the delegates sent to the Prophet by Hawdha bin Ali and he had not accepted Islam. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
This Rajjāl was one of the delegates sent by Haudha bin Ali to Medina. Baladhuri blames that he accepted Islam initially but later apostatized. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
Exact location of the last encounter of war of Yamama was ‘Ubād. It came to be known as Ḥadīqah al Maut. Caliph Ma’mūn ur Rashīd built a mosque (jami’ah masjid) at the site to commemorate the dead. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 141). Modern village of ‘Uyayna in Saudi Arabia about 30 km from Riadh preserves some graves claimed to be of those who fell in the war.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
Later on many Muslims claimed credit of killing Musaylima (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135) but Tabari gives full credit of killing Musaylima to Waḥshi. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 116.). Askar is confident that it was Waḥshi who killed him. (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),116).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 137.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 137.
Probably Samurah bin ‘Amr was from Tamim, the arch rivals of Hanifa. ‘Anbar is a clan of Tamim. The only time Samurah is mentioned again in Islamic sources is when he participated in Qadisiyyah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),223). In any case, his governorship over Yamama was short lived. Soon Medinan Caliphate derecognized status of yamama as separate administrative unit and conjoined it with administrative unit of Bahrain. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),7
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.
One among the executed was ‘Ubādah bin Ḥārith bin Nauwāḥah of ʾĀmir clan of Ḥanīfāh. He was the envoy through whom Mysaylima had conveyd to the Prophet that half of the land belongs to Quraysh and half to Hanifa. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133).
When Umar got compelled to recruite tribes who had opposed Medinan Caliphate in Ridda Wars to fight in Battle of Nahavand, he allowed Hanifa to do so. Still he didn’t allow them to combat in the field. He kept them among reserves. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 18, 19.)
Battle of Yamama and its leader Muslayma occupied Arab political conscious for long. Proverbs using name of Muslayma continued to circulate among Arabs for centuries. For examples of proverbs see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 138.
The war changed demography of Yamama. Tamim became majority in Yamama after Ridda Wars as Medinan Caliphate settled them preferably into vacant villages of Hanifa (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),37). Iranian population stayed in Yamama even after Ridda Wars as Tabari notes that an Iranian from Yamama was sent to Hormuz the Sassanid petty king with a letter (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),56).
The present Saudi ruling family belongs to Hanifa (Fahd A. Al-Simari, in The kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhi.m Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010)565.)
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128, 129, 137.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 124.
Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 131.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 636. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 132.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 137.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 636. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 137.
Gharūr bin Mundhir bin Nu’mān’s actual name was Mundhir. Gharūr was his nick name. He belonged to Rabi’ah, (common ancestor of all rebellious tribes – my note). See: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128.
Actual name of Ḥuṭum bin Ḍubay’ah was Shuraiḥ Bin Ḍubay’ah. Ḥuṭum was his nickname. He belonged to Qays bin Tha’labah clan of Bakr bin Wa’il. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127. See also: Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 132.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 636. See also: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
There was a doubt in the minds of Abdul Qays if a prophet can die? (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 135).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
Juwātha ( جُواثَه ) of Arabic sources is the village of Kilabiyah 12 Km from Hofuf in modern eastern Saudi Arabia.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127, 128.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128.
Khaṭṭ is unidentified place.
Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 136.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128, 129.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128, 129.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 130.
Qaṭīf ( قَطِيف ) of Arabic sources is the village of Qatif north of modern Dammam in Saudi Arabia.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 130.
Dārīn is a small neighbourhood of modern Qatif. Sābūn and Ghābah are unidentified places.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 39.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 124).
For Abu Hurairah’s somewhat uncritical biography see: Helga Hemgesberg, Abū Huraira, der Gefahrte des Propheten, Frankfurt/Main, 1965. AND for his alleged role in Hadith transmission see: Juynboll, G. H. A., The Authenticity of the Traditional Literature. Discussions in Modern Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1969) , 190 – 206.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 116.
Dibba in modern United Arab Emirates / Oman: see: Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 152.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 152.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 116, 117.
Baladhuri informs that Hudhaifa bin Mihsan was from Makhzūm (See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 116, 117) but Tabari identifies him a local Ḥimyār. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 152). Casey-Vine Paula believes he was from Bāriq clan of Azd. (Casey-Vine, Oman in History, (Oman: Immel Pub., 1995) 37 ).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 153.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 154.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 116, 117.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 117, 118.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 117.
This H.udhaifah was later transferred to Yemen. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 117).
For the date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 162.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 165, 166, 167.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 166.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 165, 166, 167.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),162.
Abu Bakr aquited Qays of murder charges and ordered him to join Muslim army in Syria. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 162).
Muhājir bin Umayah bin Mughīrah was of Makhzum clan of Quraysh. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 175).
Tabari informs that Abu Bakr sent Muhajir bin Abi Umayyah agaist Qays bin Makshuh after his first raid towards Rabadhah, which was in July 632 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 53). Muhajir might have reached Sa’na by August 632 CE.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157.
For appointment of zyad bin Labid as tax collector by the prophet and his tribal affiliations see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648. For appointment of Muhajir bin Umayyah as tax collector by Prophet Muhammad see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
Actually Muhājir had already advised Ziyād to accommodate the Kindah’s demands, it was Ziyād who refused to adjust. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 154.
For possible ruins of fort of Nujair near Tarim in Yemen see: Frya Stark, A Winter in Arabia: A journey through Yemen (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002), chapter IV
Ash’ath had to pay a ransom of four hundred Dirhams each for all his seventy companions who were set free at the time of Ash’ath’s arrest. He borrowed a loan from merchants of Medina to raise the fund. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157, 158).
Ash’ath got engaged with sister of Abu Bakr during lifetime of Prophet Muhammad. The marriage was withheld on condition that he should come to Medina second time to take his wife. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 188.
Ash’ath took residence in Medina during Abu Bakr’s reign (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 155). Umar allowed him to join the army that had invaded Iran. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 413). After the war he made Kufa his abode where he became partisan of Ali during the First Arab Civil War. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 801). Ali promoted him to the rank of lieutenant governor of Armenia and Azerbaijan. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 321). He received Ali’s reprimand for monetary embezzlement during his service as governor. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),860). It is he who is reputed to have created dispute in Ali’s army during Siffin. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),839, 840). After Ali’s caliphate was over he retired in Kufa where he died during caliphate of Mu’awiya. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 155).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 118.
Shiḥr ( شِحر ) of Arabic sources is Shihr in modern Yemen. See: Claire Hardy-Guilbert and Sterenn Le Maguer “Chihr de L’encens (Yemen),” Arabian Archaeology and Epigraphy, 21 (1) (2010): 47
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157.
We hear about another civil disobedience of Khaulān during Umar’s time, which was again defused by Ya’la bin Munyah without resistance on Khaulān’s part. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 152).
Ya’la bin Munyah was a local Yemenese guy. Munyah is his mother’s name. While father’s name is also known, he was better known by his mother’s name. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 152)
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 35.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 96.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 96.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 169.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 170
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 170.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 120, 121.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 76, 77, 132
For pre-oil geography of the region see: A Handbook of Mesopotamia (Great Britain Admiralty and the War Office, 1918. See also: Fuat Sezgin et. al. Texts and Studies on the Historical Geography and Topography of Iraq (Frankfurt: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang University, 1993) Vol 83. AND Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 157).
Jerome Labourt, Le Christianisme dans l’empire perse sous la dynastie sassanide (Paris: V. Lecoffre, 1904), 306, 314 – 317, 326 – 329. See also: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 169.
Fred McGraw. Donner, “Mecca’s food Supplies and Muhammad’s Boycott,” Jounral of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. Vol 20, No 3 (Oct, 1977), 255
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 177.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 89.
Baladhuri narrates that Abu Bakr saw fit to direct his troops against Syria when he was done with Ridda Wars. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165)
Elias S. Shoufani , Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 147).
Empty
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 387.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 387.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 387.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388).
Nibāj is unidentified location.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.
Ubullah ( أبُّلَه ) of Arabic sources is Apologos in Greek sources. See: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179. It was the main port of the region for ships from China and from less distant places. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 168. After Medinan Caliphate found Basrah, Ubullah got absorbed in it and ceased to exist. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 66.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.
Presence of Ansar among the army gets proof from Bashīr bin Sa’d of Ansar who fought against Farrukhbundadh, the Iranian border guard at Bāniqiya. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392).
Presence of Hawazin is apparent from the name of Shuraiḥ Bin ʾĀmir of Sa’d bin Bakr clan of Hawazin whom Khalid left with a garrison in Khuraibah. See: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.; Ḍirār bin Azwar of Asad wrote a verse on capitulation of Bāniqiya. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 393, 394); presence of Tamim in the army is confirmed by Ḥanẓalah bin ar Rabi’ al kātib who faced Jadan, the Iranian border guard (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394).; Jarīr bin ‘Abdallah of Bajilah tribe showd up at Bāniqiya for show of power. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392, 393).
For details of consistency of army see: (Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 178, 179.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179). T.abari gives the number of troops Khalid took with him to Syria from Hira was five hundred to eight hundred. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),109). He further tells us that Khalid left half of his amry in Hira. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 112). These statistics help us in calculating his total strength
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 129. AND Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179). 178).
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179). 178.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388, 389. For detail of Iraqi campaign from Donner’s point of view see: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179 – 190.
Khalid’s words give a clue that Swaid and his Bakr bin Wa’il didn’t accompany Khalid’s army anymore.
Dijlat al Baṣrah ( دِجلَةُ البصرَه ) of Arabic sources is the united course of Tigris and Euphrates before they empty into the Persian Gulf. It is also called Dijlat al-‘Aura. In Pahalvi sources it is referred to as Arvand Rūd. These days its Arabic name is Shatt al-Arab. For its description in ancient geography see: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 745, vol III; Madhār was a town on route between Kufa and Basrah along a tributary of Tigris. It lies about 320 km southeast of Kufa and 65 km from Basrah; Khuraibah and Mar’ah are unidentified locations.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 389.
For location of Ḥīrah see above. Ḥīrah got absorbed in Kufa during Umar’s caliphate. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 2.; Zandaward was near Wāsit, as Hajjāj bin Yousuf used its iron doors in building Wāsit. Wāsit was midway between Basrah and Kufa at the bank of Tigris, hence its name. See: Ibn Battutah, the Travels of Ibn Batutah. (London: Picador, 2002), 59, 303. Ruins of Wāsit are said to be present about 54 km from Kut along Um Adejail Road and are in state of neglect; Durna, Hurmuzjarad, and Ullais are unidentified locations.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390, 394.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),405. AND Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. (New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 173,174, 175.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390
Mujtama’ al Anhār is unidentified place.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390.
Khaffān was home town of Muthanna bin Harith, see above. Its exact location is not known.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390.
This ‘Abd al Masīḥ was an aged man. He talked to Khalid jokingly on the occasion. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391). It gives a clue that atmosphere of the meeting was genial. Interestingly, excavations of the ruins of Hira in 2011 season have produced an inscription bearing the name of ‘Abd al Masīḥ (Nas.ir al-Ka’bi, “Report on the excavations on H.i.ra in 2010 – 2011,” Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies 12 (2012), 60 – 68.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392.
Bāniqiya is unidentified location.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392, 393.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394.
Falālij is pleural of Fallujah. It is modern Fallujah, about 69 km from Baghdad on the west bank of Euphrates. For its description in ancient geography see: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 908, Vol III.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 155.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394, 395.
Anbār ( انبار ) of Arabic sources, Peroz-Shapur of Pahalvi sources, and Pirisabora of Greek sources, was a city on the Euphrates about 45 Km west of modern Baghdad. See: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 257,2 58, Vol. I. Also see: Le Strange, Guy (1905) the lands of the Eastern Caliphate: Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia, from the Moslem Conquest to the Time of Timur. New York: Barnes &Noble inc. Ruins of Anbār are located near modern Ramadi in Iraq on left bank of Euphrates; Anbār was so named because the Persian granaries were in it and the friends of Sasanian protégés Nu’mān, used to get their subsistence allowance from it. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394, 395.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 396.
One of these captives was Yasār, the grandfather of Ibn Ishaq, our main source on life of Prophet Muhammad. See (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 396).
‘Ain at Tamr was a small town on the edge of the desert between Anbār and kufa. See: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 759, Vol III. It is modern village of Ayn al-Tamr about 80 km to the west of Karbala.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 398.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 399.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 400
Tikrīt of Arabic sources is modern Tikrit on the west bank of River Tigris about 140 km north west of Baghdad; ‘Ukbarā’ of Arabic sources is Vuzurg-Shapur of Pahalvi sources. Ruins of ‘Ukbarā’ are Tel Akbar, located between villages of Shabab and Mansuriya on the western bank of Tigris. They used to be on the east bank of the river until it changed its path; Baradān was on east bank of Tigris near Samara. See: Guy Le Strange, The lands of the Eastern Caliphate: Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia, from the Moslem Conquest to the Time of Timur. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2010), P 32 chapter II; Mukharrim was a small village. Later on it got absorbed in Baghdad and became one of its neighborhoods; Exact location of bridge near Qaṣr Sābūr is unidentified. Richards guesses that it could be on Jalūla River, northeast of Baghdad See: Athir, The Annals of the Saljuq Turks: Selections from al-Kamil fi.l-Ta’rikh of ‘Izz al Di.n al-Athir Trans and ed. D. S. Richards, (London: 2002), Routledge P 64, footnote 103.
For reuse of material from ruins of the palace see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 444. According to this tradition of Baladhuri Muslims gave the residents of Hira a tax cut as a price of using their material.
For surrender of Hurmuzjarad with promise of security see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 389.
For conditions of surrender of Ullais see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390.
For conditions of surrender of Bāniqiya see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392, 393.
Arabic word used for mantle is ṭailasān. It was a Persian apparel of dark wool. Khalid sent the mantle to Abu Bakr who gifted it to Husain bin Ali. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 393).
For conditions of surrender of Baradān and Mukharrim see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 399.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 398.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 400), 393
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394.
Baghdādh was a small town of Persian character in Pre-Islamic times. For its existence during Medinan Caliphate see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 116. Later on, ‘Abbāsids built their capital at this site, called Madīnat al Salām. The new city kept the flavor of old town and the old name survived. My words See: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), 235. At the time of Baladhuri’s writing, the market on which Khalid’s army plundered was called Sūq at ‘Atīq [the old market] and lay near Qarn aṣ Ṣarāt, the point where Ṣarāt canal disembogued to the Tigris. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 395
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 169. For the date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 400. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 109.
See: Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Aomar Boum, A Concise History of the Middle East, (Avalon Publishing, 2015), 53. AND Robert Hoyland, ‘Early Islam as a Late Antique Religion’, in The Oxfored Handbook of Late antiquity, ed. Scott F. Johnson, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2012) 1053 – 1077
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 149. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 758, 759.
Burning a criminal to death was not a norm in Arab society at the time. At his deathbed, Abu Bark is reported to be repentant of his action. He admits that he should have killed him by a swift method. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763).
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 639.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),762.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),763.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 758, 762. The Arabic words used are aswad wa ahmar.
Chris Wickham Framing the Early Middle Age: Europe and the Mediterranean 400 – 800 (New York: Oxford University press, 2006) 130. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 38.
Diodorus Siculus, Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes. Ed. Francis R. Walton, Trans. C. H. Oldfather (London: Cambridge, 1933 – 1967). Also see: Diodorus Siculus, The Library, Books 16 – 20: Pillip II, Alexander the Great, and the Successors, ed. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019)
The romance about Alexander’s vicotries had lingered on among the nations conquered by him by the time of Futuhul Buldan. See: Ciancaglini, Claudia A. “The Syriac Version of the Alexander Romance.” Le Museon. 114 (1 – 2) (2001): 121 – 140 AND Emeri Van Donzel and Andrea Schmidt (2010). Gog and Magog in Early Syriac and Islamic sources: Sallam’s Quest fo Alexander’s Wall. (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 3,4.
Henry L. Rosenfeld, “The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State Formation in the Arabian Desert.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 95 (1965): 75 – 86 and 174 – 194. See also: Talal Asad, “The Beduin as a Military Froce: Notes on Some Aspects of Power Relations between Nomads and Sedentaries in Historical Perspective.” In The Desert and the Swon – Nomads in the Wider Society. ed. Cynthis Nelson, Berkeley: Institute of International studies, 1973.
People of Najran didn’t participate in Futuhul Buldan as they were exempt. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 101.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 58.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 204. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 58.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 127.
Daylam was the highlands of modern Gīlān.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 58.
For ‘motivated by Islam’ view see: Howard-Johnston, witness to a World Crisis (Oxford, 2010) 464 AND Henri Pirenne Muhammad and Charlemagne (English tans.; London, 1939) 150 – 151. For ‘motivated by greed’ view see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 21, 62.
Fred M. Donner Muhammad and the Believers: at the origin of Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) Introduction xii.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), introduction 5.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), introduction 4.
For these factors working behind the Arab conquests see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 62.
For unification of Arab tribes as a basic factor behind Arab conquests see: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 56, 57, 295.
Lately scholars are implicating non-traditional factors into the conquests, for example compulsions created by environmental changes. For this concept see: J. Haldon, “The Resources of Late Antiquity,” in Robinson ed., New Cambridge History of Islam 1 22 – 25.). For further discussion on the topic see: John Joseph Saunders, “The Nomads as Empire Builder: A comparison of the Arab and Mongol Conquests,” 79 – 103.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 431).486
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 413.
See details of delegation: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 413.
The purpose of invitation was not to convert them but, as Tabari reports words of Umar, ‘Allah will render this invitation a cause of weakness and defeat for them’. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 29.
One may argue that Islamic sources writing in 9th century would have injected story of deputation to Kisra in the war events to justify a war in eyes of their 9th century readers, which was otherwise waged only for booty. The traditions about the delegation to Kisra appear to be genuine on the basis that use of religion as an excuse for war and violence was already prevalent in the Middle East when Arabs appeared on the scene. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 63). When a band of Christians attacked a Jewish synagogue in the city of Callinicum [modern northern Syria] in 388 CE, the emperor thought of applying Roman law and punish the culprits, but Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, dissuaded him, pointing out that the pious should not have to defer to the impious. (Thomas Sizgorich, violence and Belief in late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 81). Similarly, when in 620’s the emperor Heraclius wished to rally his troops to fight the Sasanian Iran, he emphasized that “death in battle opens the way to eternal life” and so urged them to sacrifice themselves to God for the sake of their compatriots and “to seize the martyr’s crown.” (J. Howard-Johnston, “The Official History of Heraclius’ Persian Campaigns,” in The Roman and Byzantine Army in the East, ed. E. Dabrowa, (Krakow: Uniwersytet Jagiellonskiego, 1994), 85.)
Chronicon Paschale, ed. L. Dindorf (Bonn: Impensis ed. Webebi, 1832) 1: 729 lines 6-8) (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 210).
For details of evidence for war of Hamoukar see: Clemens Reichel, “Hamoukar 2005 – 2010: Revisiting the Origins of Urbanism in Syria,” The Oriental Institute News and Notes 211 (Fall 2011): 4. For details of war on ISIS see: Dana J. H. Pttard and Wes J. Bryant, Hunting on Caliphate, (New York: Post Hill Press, 2019)
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 771.
Ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Rūmi al-Yāqūt, Irshād al-Ari.b ilāma’rifat al-Adi.b: Mu’jam al-Buldān, (Beirut: Sār al Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2001) P 488, vol II)
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775, Footnote 973.
Georgius Cyprius, Le Synekdemos d’Hierokles et l’Opuscule Geographique de Georges de Chypre, ed. and trans. Ernst Honigmann. (Brussels: Editions de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et slaves, 1939).
Baladhuri mentions these regions through his depiction of conquest of Syria: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, New York: Columbia University, 1916.
For geography of Syria see: Geography of modern Syria: Eugen Wirth, Syrien: Eine Geographische Landeskunde, Band 4-5, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 301. See also: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 91.
For example, Abu Bakr promises to Muslims that Syria will provide them plenty to eat: Ibn Asākir ta’ri.kh madi.nat Dimashq, I. ed. S.alāh. al-Di.n al-Munajjid. Damascus: Al-Majma’ al-‘Illmi. Al-‘Arabi,. 1951) (Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 92
For study of urban life in pre-Islamic Syria see: Arnold Hugh Martin Jones, The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) 226 – 294.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 92.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 94.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 94, 95
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 94, 95.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 244.
Erich F. Schmidt Persepolis III, (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1970), 34 – 49. AND W. B. Henning, The Inscription of Naqs-i-Rustam, (London: Lund Humphries, 1957), Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum series part III, vol. II, Portfolio II. AND Philip Huyse, Die dreisprachige Inschrift Sābuhrs I. an der Ka’ba-i-Zardust (SKZ), (London, 1999) Corpus. Inscriptionum Iranicarum III Vol. I, Text I, p 6 – 7.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 277.
Kaegi suggests that Persians living in Syria might not be Iranian immigrants who had permanently settled in Syria, rather they might represent those soldiers who were not withdrawn by Iran after Roman-Iran peace deal of 628 CE or they might be those soldiers who avoided going back to home country because of their support to short lived king Shaharbaraz. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 153). Kaegi’s interpretation is unlikely to be true as presence of Iranian element in Syria and beyond is documented long before events of 628 CE.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 95.
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citation needed
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Alexander Alexandrovich Vasiliev, “Notes on Some Episodes concerning the Relations between the Arabs and the Byzantine Empire from the Fourth to the Sixth Century,” Dumbarton Oaks papers Vol 9/10 (1956) 309. Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University.
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 95.
For presence of Arabs in Sinjār see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 277. For presence of Arabs in Ba’lbakk see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 199.
For example, there were only ninety eight Persian families in Sinjār. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 277
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 95) 43.
The Syriac sources use the term ‘ ‘Arabi’ for the semi nomads and ‘ Tāyyi’ for full nomads, a world derived from the North Arabian tribe of Tayy. (Judah B. Segal, Edessa: ‘The Blessed City’, (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias, 2001), 22).
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 72,73.
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 36 anuus mundi 6123. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 41. AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 90.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 96.
Theophylact Simocatta, The History of Theophylact Simocata, 5.7.9, Tans. Michael and Mary Whitby (Oxford: Claredon, 1986) 142.
Antiochus, Expugnationis Hierosolymae A.D. 615; recensiones arabicae, trans. Gerard Garittle, (Louvain, Secretariat du Corpus SCO, 1973), 149, 50.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 117.
Chalcedonians celebrated the event by fasting. (Antiochus, Expugnationis Hierosolymae A.D. 615; recensiones arabicae, trans. Gerard Garittle, (Louvain, Secretariat du Corpus SCO, 1973), 149, 50).
Antiochus, Expugnationis Hierosolymae A.D. 615; recensiones arabicae, trans. Gerard Garittle, (Louvain, Secretariat du Corpus SCO, 1973), 149, 50.
Kaegi points out that the petitioners might be referring to Muslims. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 117).
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 94.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 73.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 39.
Udhruh in modern Jordan, about 12 km east of Petra. See: (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), 384. Also see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 39.
citation needed
Priscus, Historici Graeci Minores (volume I), ed. Ludovicus Dindorfius, (Leipzig, B. B. Teubneri, 1870) 306. Also see: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 260.
Procopius, Secret History of Procopius, trans. Richard Atwater, (New York: Pascal Covici Publishers, 1927).
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 60.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 74,75. For date of Heraclius’ visit to Jerusalem see: Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517.
Nicephorus, Short History, ed. C. Mango (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1992) 68, 69.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 75.
For discussion see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 79.
Actually, raids of Arab nomads to the settled areas of Syria were a usual occurrence from 610 CE onwards. Theophilus of Edessa (d. 785 CE) records a raid in which ‘a band of Arabs came out of Arabia into the regions of Syria; They pillaged and laid waste many lands, committed many massacres of men and burned without compassion or pity.’ (Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronile and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam, trans. R. G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 63 – 64). A monk of Mar Saba monastery in the Judean desert tells us that two months after the sack of Jerusalem by the Persians in 614 CE, the monks were still unwilling to return to their monasteries in the desert … for fear of Saracenes. (Epistola ad Eustathium,” Patrologia Graeca 89, Ed. J. P. Migne (Paris: Imprimerie Catholique, 1865) col. 1424. Under these circumstances it is very likely that Byzantine Roman government considered news of Tabuk or Mu’ta another nomadic raid.
Sophronius Epistola Synodica, Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus, ed. J. P. Migne, (Paris 1857 – 1866), Vol 87. III, 3197D – 3200A. Also see: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 69 AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 75).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 198.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165
Tabari apologises that the events of Futuhul Buldan were so fast that later people got confused about their exact dates and sequence. Albercht points out that the primary theme of Futūh literature of early Islamic traditionalists was to document conquests of countries for jurisprudence purposes. Annalistic style and caliphal arrangement were secondary themes which offshoot from the primary theme. (Albrecht North, The Early Arabic Historical Tradition: A Source Critical Study, Princeton, 1994, Second adition with Lawrence I. Conard, translated by Michael Bonner 39 – 48). Same applies to early Christian sources whose main goal was to document church history.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),165.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 674.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 74.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),165.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 191.
P.G.N. Peppelenbosch, “Nomadism on the Arabian Peninsula: A General Appraisal,” Tijdschr Voor Economische en Socicale Geografie., 59, (1968), 341.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 12.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165, 167.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167.
For the difference at the time of appointments and for the argument of Umar see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),166
Ya’qubi asserts that Umar opposed appointment of Khalid bin Said on basis that he had initially not taken oath to Abu Bakr. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 756.). One wonders, why would Abu Bakr, who is said to be well versed with the tribal politics, be bent on appointing his adversary and would desist from it only on others advice!
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),167, 213.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 168. Ghazzah ( غَزّه ) of Arabic sources is Gaza in modern Gaza strip of Palestine (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),168.
Thomas the Presbyter, Chronica minora II. Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium. Vol 3 (Scriptores Syri) Ed. Ernest Walter Brooks. (Paris: Peeters Publishers, 1940) 147 – 48.
Thomas the Presbyter was a Syriac Orthodox priest from Mesopotamia (Jazirah) who wrote the Syriac Chronicle of 640. It records events up to 640 CE. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 42, 43).
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67.
It could be this event that triggered Amr to request Abu Bakr appointment of Khalid.
For commander of Arab force see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),213. For other details see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 37 annus mundi 6124. AND Nathanael G. Bonwetsch (ed.), “Doctrina Lacobi nuper baptizati”, in Abhandlungen der Koiglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenchaften zu Gottingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse: n.F., Band 12, Nro. 3. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1910) Reprint: Liechtestein: Kraus, 1970. 86. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 86, 93
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 168.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 270.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 95.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 167.
Hoyland has recognized this description of Thomas the Presbyter to be war of Dāthin as the description tells the site of battle twelve miles east of Gaza and Baladhuri informs that war of Dāthin took place near Gaza. Hoyland considers Thomas the Presbyter a contemporary source. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 42, 43.
Thomas the Presbyter, Chronica minora II. Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium. Vol 3 (Scriptores Syri) Ed. Ernest Walter Brooks. (Paris: Peeters Publishers, 1940) 147 – 48.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167, 168.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 16.
Boṣrā ( بَوصرئ ) of Arabic sources is Nova Trajana Bostra of Greek sources, and is Busra in modern southern Syria; Ma’āb ( مَعاب ) of Arabic sources is Rabbath Moab of Armenian sources (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985),124), Areopolis of Greek sources (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), and modern Rabba in Jordan, 15 Km north of Karak (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 43).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 110. Theophane agrees with Balādhuri: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 37 annus mundi 6125.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),173.
Sebeos, The Armenian History, Trans. Robert. Thomson (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,1999), 96 – 97. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 108.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 262.
Paul J. Burton, friendship and Empire: Roman diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353 – 146 BC (Cabridge; Cambridge University Press, 2011), 118.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 63.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 262.
For location of the war see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 126. Bayt Jibrīn of Arabic sources is Eleutheropolis of Greek sources (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), Its ruins can be seen in Beit Gurvin in modern Israel.
For example: Fredegarius, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, ed. Bruno Krusch. (Hanover, 1886) 153. AND Theiphilis of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s chronicle, trans. Robert G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University press, 2011), 93 – 94.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 758. Tabari agrees with him: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 128). Kaegi doesn’t differ either: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67. Baladhuri gives the year of Ajnādayn to be 634 CE but gives three different dates for it: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175.
Heraclius was overseeing integration personally: (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985.),116.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 269.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 262.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 174.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 100.
Tabari’s notation that “The Romans fortified themselves in every place.”: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),172. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 100, 101.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
Khalid brought a total of eight hundred men from Iraq. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 169).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 143.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985.) 14, 15.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 193.
Adhri’āt ( اذرِيعات ) of Arabic sources is Adraa of Greek sources and Daraa in modern south western Syria; ‘Ammān Balqā’ of Arabic sources is Philadelphia of Greek sources, modern Amman in Jordan. (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), 391.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175. Ya’qubi gives the date to be August 22, 634: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763. Theophanes gives the year of 634 CE: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 37 annus mundi 6125. See also: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 130.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175.
Yāqūṣah is a valley about 150 Km south of Damascus, to the east of Sea of Galilee in Quneitra region of south western Syria. One of the modern villages located in this valley is Meitsar. Here Romans and Muslim Arabs had a skirmish in which some Romans died and the remaining took refuge in Syrian towns. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175). It was apparently an attempt to halt a column of Medinan Army from advancing towards Damascus.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),762, 763.
Abu Bakr was sixty three years of age at the time of his death. He was buried in the house of Aisha where Prophet Muhammad laid buried. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763).
Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 87.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 143
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 762.
Two traditions are worth noting here: One, when Uthman finished writing Abu Bakr’s will, Abu Bakr advised Umar that there are people who love him and there are who hate him. He further advised that Umar shouldn’t be afraid of the situation as truth has been being opposed from ages and often err persists. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 762). Second, when Abdur Rahman Bin Awf visited Abu Bakr during his illness and asked about his health, Abu Bakr replied “I have appointed a successor this morning; and now you have increased my malady over what it was by the fact that when you saw that I had appointed a man from among you, each of you woke up with his nose swollen, each seeking it for himself.” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 762). The two traditions confirm that aspirants of caliphate were present at the time of death of Abu Bakr, similar to the situation at the time of death of Prophet Muhammad but nobody had courage to express it publicly.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 54.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. London: Routledge, 2011.
For Abu Bakr’s advice about Thaqif see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 616. For ‘Umar’s advice at Tabuk see: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011). 499.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011). 355.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 764.
Umar was sixty three years old at the time of his death. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),793. For Umar’s clan affiliation see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 764. Umar was a merchant and earned sufficiently to look after his family. He became full time politician later [probably after assumption of power]. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 204).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 190.
Damishq ( دَمِشق ) of Arabic sources, Damascus of Greek source, modern day Damascus in Syria. See: Ross Burns, Damascus: A history, (New York: Routledge, 2005).
Just before laying siege to Damascus, Medinan caliphate’s forces engaged with Byzantine Roman troops in an open battleground at Fiḥl. The battle is said to be fierce with victory in Muslim hands. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 177). Again it appears an attempt of Byzantine Rome to block Medinan Caliphate’s army from reaching Damascus. Tabari dates this event to January 635 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 160). For sequential dating of the events surrounding first surrender of Damascus see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113. Fiḥl ( فِحل ) of Arabic sources is Pella of Greek sources: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113. Ruins of the town still stand at modern Tabqet Fahel in Jordan, about12 km to the east of Jordan River and about fifty km southwest of Irbid in Jordan.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 190.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 186. Ya’qūbī gives this date to be August 21, 635. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),766.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 172
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175. Christian sources dub it as a strategic retreat.
Antakya is located in modern southern Turkey. It is Anṭākiyah ( اَنطاكِيَه ) of Arabic sources, and Antioch of Greek sources. (Downey Glanville, Ancient Antioch, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
See details on this topic: Khalil ‘Athamina, “ The Appointment and Dismissal of Khalid ibn al-Walid from the Supreme Command: A study of the Political Strategy of Early Muslim Caliphs in Syria,” Arabica 41 (1994): 253 – 72.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165, 166.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 186.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 115.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 170.
Once Khalid bin Walid disobeyed civilian authority of Prophet Muhammad. Prophet Muhammad had sent him to Jadhīmah clan of Kinanah after Fathe Mecca to preach Islam to them with strict instructions not to fight with anybody. Khalid killed some of them. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 561). According to Waqidi it were Sulaym in Khalid’s contingent who had previous enmity with Jadhīmah and killed them with zest (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 431). Khalid, anyhow, remained in good books of the Prophet. He appointed him a field commander at Hunayn, and later to Dumat al Jandal and Najran. Actually, it was after the event of Jadhīmah that the Prophet asked not to curse Khalid and named him ‘the sword of Allah’ (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 433). He again disobeyed Abu Bakr’s civilian authority during war of Yamama. He did not execute all adult males of Banu Hanifa, as ordered by Abu Bakr. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 131. Al askari apologises that khalid believed that as a general commander of the force he had right to conduct his job according to the circumstances and not according the view about Banu Hanifa at Medina. That is the reason he signed peace treaty, making an excuse that he received Abu Bakr’s instructions late. (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),120). See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 99
Once Khalid had burnt some prisinors of war belonging to Sulaym during Ridda Wars. When this news reached Abu Bakr he endorsed actions of Khalid saying ‘sword of Allah’ has unleashed. Umar objected to ethics of this action. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 148).
During the Ridda Wars, Khalid had executed Malik bin Nuwairah of Hanzalah clan of Tamim on charges of apostatizing. (see above). An eye witness to the execution, Abu Qaṭadah of Ansar reported to Umar that Hanzalah had actually laid their arms and had made azān. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 149, 150.). Abu Qaṭadah further maintained that Khalid killed Malik because the former was pleased to see the later’s beautiful wife who had accompanied the later to negotiations. Khalid executed Malik under false excuse to marry his widow. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 755). Umar complained to Abu Bakr that thou hast sent a man who kills Muslims and tortures by fire. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 149, 150.). Abu Bakr sent Khalid a mellow show cause notice. Khalid replied that he had been doing both right and wrong but had been delivering results. Abu Bakr totally neglected plea of Mutammin, brother of Malik to investigate the matter further. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 755). Instead, he paid blood money for Malik bin Nuwayrah from government account. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 102). Actually, Umar condoled the death of Malik with his brother Mutammim bin Nuwairah during his caliphate. He was apologetic to Mutammin for death of his brother at the hands of a general of Medinan Caliphate. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 150.
Tabari reports Umar saying that he had dismissed Khalid not because of suspicion but because people venerated him excessively and he (Umar) was afraid that they would put their trust in him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 179). Umar remained sleepless for a number of nights anxiously awaiting the news of Yarmouk’s outcome. He understood the war was test of his decision of sacking Khalid from rank of commander in chief. As soon as he received news of victory he fell in prostration. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 767, 768).
Baladhuri, who is the first historian to shed light on Khalid’s demotion blames that the time Khalid bin Walid had ruled a part of Jazirah on Umar’s behalf, he daubed himself with alcohol in a public bath at ʾĀmid [Diyārbakr]. According to Baladhuri this was the reason of his demotion. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 278). Baladhuri himself admits that the report is unconfirmed. Actually, report appears to be baseless as Khalid was appointed lieutenant governor after his demotion and reconciliation with ‘Umar. Ya’qūbī guesses that ‘Umar’ dismissed Kahlid due to some kind of personal grudge against him. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),766).
Khalid bin Walid absorbed this disgrace calmly. Umar had sent Bilāl who stripped Khalid of his turban and Abu Ubaida confiscated half of his wealth as part of his punishment. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 766). Khalid continued to serve as a field commander under Abu Ubaida. He participated in campaign of Homs under orders of Abu Ubaida. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 200). He also participated in Battle of Yarmouk. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 91. When Umar came to Syria on official visit, he met Khalid. The two men reconciled and Umar appointed him lieutenant governor over Edessa, Ḥarrān, Raqqa, Tell Mawzan, and ʾĀmid. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),775). Anyhow, he did not reinstall Khalid on his previous position. Probably, Khalid was not glad at his new position and he asked Umar after one year to relieve him of his duty. He took retirement in Homs where he died in 642 CE. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 270) Khalid designated Umar as executor of his estate (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 270) as a gesture that he still confided in Umar. Khalid was Umar’s first maternal cousin. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),766). Umar, Ḥafṣah and Umar’s family lamented him and wept a great deal over him. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),790). His tomb was in Homs at the time of Waqidi’s writing. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 434).
Khalid’s son, ‘Abd ar Raḥmān bin Khālid continued to serve in Medinan Caliphate’s army (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193). He later served as lieutenant governor of Jazirah under Mu’awiya Bin Abu Sufyan. He sided with Mu’awiya during First Arab Civil War and participated in Siffin. He died in 666. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 245). After his death the family sank into anonymity.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 201
Islamic sources use the word ‘amīr’ for governor. They have not coined any terminology for ‘lieutenant governor’. However, when we look at the process of appointment and chain of command for men like Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, we can realize that actually they were subordinate to governor. Unlike governor, they did not have power to invade foreign countries on their own. Their appointment, though, at least during reign of Umar, was subject to approval from the central government.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 198.
The inhabitants of Homs initially resisted, then besieged themselves in the city. Later they agreed to pay jizyah. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 200. See also: Theophanes Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes confessor, ed. Cyril Mango and Roger Scot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 98 AND Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 63. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), Homs 47.
Since Jizyah of Homs was one hundred and seventy thousand dinars yearly, (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 200) presumably the population of Homs was one seventy thousands.
Baalbek is located in modern western Lebanon; It is Ba’labakk ( بَعَلبَك ) of Arabic sources, and Heliopolis of Greek sources. (Michel Alour, History of Baalbek, (Beirut: American Press, 1944).
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 201.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 449.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 201.
‘Ubādah bin Ṣāmit was among those Medinites who took oath of allegiance with Prophet Muhammad at ‘Aqabah.
Soon Umar replaced ‘Ubādah bin Ṣāmit with Iyad Bin Ghanm when he returned successfully from campaigns of Jazirah and Armenia. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 275.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 201, 204.
Baldah is unidentified town; Jabalah is well known in history but its exact location is not known; Ḥamāh, of Arabic sources is Epiphania of Greek sources. It is Hama about 45 Km north of Homs in modern Syria; Shaizar of Arabic sources is Larissa of Greek sources. It is village of Shaizar, about 30 km northwest of Hama in modern Syria.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 213.
Sabasṭiyah is about 10 km northwest of Nablus in Modern Palestine; Nābulus of Arabic sources is Neapolis of Greek sources, Nablus in modern Palestine (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890); Ludd of Arabic sources is Lydda of Greek sources. It is village of Lod about 15 km southeast of Tel Aviv in modern Israel. (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890); For Yibna: see above; ‘Amwās of Arabic sources is Emmaus of Greek sources, many archaeological sites compete to claim the town.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916). See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),66 AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67. Kaegi gives last day of the war to be 20th August 636 CE because an eyewitness to this event has noted this date. (A. Palmer, with contributions from S. P. Brock and R. G. Hoylnad, The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles Including Two Seventh-Century Syriac Apocalyptic Texts, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993) 2, 3. Tabari gives the date of last day of the war to be 26 August 634 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),87.
Tabari gives the figure of one hundred and sixty thousand. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 87.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 45. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 119. Bāhān of Ya’qūbī (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 767. Baanes of Theophanes the confessor: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 38 annus mundi 6126.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67. See also Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 84. Theophane the confessor tells he was not Heraclius’s brother Theodore. He was Sakellarios Theodore, Heraclius’s general: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 38 annus mundi 6126.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 211.
Citation needed
For location of the war and its field plan see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113, 114.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 767). See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 46
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),104, 132, 134). See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 197.
Marj al Ṣuffar of Arabic sources is Melitene of Greek sources. It is Malatya in modern Turkey (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 238).
Tabari reports him being killed. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),134. Eutychius reports his retirement to Sinai. See: Eutychius, (Annales) Das Annalenwerk des Eutychios von Alexandrien; ausgewahlte Geschichten und Legenden Kompiliert von Sa’i.d ibn Bat.ri.q um 935 AD, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium ed. and trans. M. Breydy, (Louvain: L. Durbecq, 1985).
Eutychius of Alexandria is a late historian (d. ca. 940 CE). He was a Melkite Patriarch of Alexandria. His Arabic name is Sa’id ibn Batriq and he is the first Christian writer in Arabic.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 210.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 210.
Fredegarius, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, ed. Bruno Krusch. (Hanover: Hahn, 1886) 153, 4). Kaegi comments that ‘sword of the Lord’ is translation of Saif Allah, and that the figures given by Fredegarius are exaggerated. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125).
The loss of life on Roman side could be actually high or at least, exagerated rumours of high losses spread everywhwere. Khuzestan Chronicle written in 660’s reports the Roman casualty to be hundred thousand. (Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 80. Theophanes the confessor, writing in 815 CE gives the figure to be eighty thousand: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 38 annus mundi 6126.
Anastasius the Sinaite, Opera. Sermones due in constitutionem hominis secundum imaginem Dei necnon Opuscula adversus Monothelates, Corpus Christianorum Series Gracea 12. ed. Karl-Heinz Uthemann Uthemann). . (Brepols-Turnhout: Leuven University Press, 1985), 60.
Jābiya disappeared from the face of earth by mid of eight century CE. It didn’t leave any trace. Exact location is unknown.
For dates of capture of individual towns mentioned in this section see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146.
For Qinnasrīn see: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 211, 223.
Wādī Biqā’ is known as Beqaa Valley in Modern Lebanon; Qinnasrīn of Arabic sources is Chalkis of Greek sources. It is modern village of al-Eis about 30 Km southwest of Aleppo in Syria (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 92).
For capture of Jerusalem see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) 193. For capture of Ascalon see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),790.
Jerusalem is also called Iliya in Arabic sources. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 768 . AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 166. It was the name of the Roman city built on the ruins of the Jewish city destroyed in the wake of Jewish revolt of 132 – 135 CE. The same Arabic souces call it with another name of Bayt al Maqdis. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 768. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),144. Word Bayt al-Maqdis is derived from Hebrew Bayt ha-Miqdāsh, referring to the Jewish temple, literally meaning house of sanctuary. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), foot note 936); ‘Asqalān of Arabic sources is Ascalon of Greek sources, and Ashkelon about 50 km south of Tel Aviv in modern Israel.
For truce see below.
For surrender of Antakia see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 211, 227. For surrender of Niqābulus see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 230. For surrender of Shaizar see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 202. For surrender of Allepo see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 226, 231. For surrender of Manbij see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 231. For surrender of Bālis see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232
Currhus of Arabic sources is Hagioupolis of Greek sources. (Abdul Massih, Benech, Gelin, “First results on the city planning of Cyrrhus (Syria),” ArcheoSciences, revue d’archeometrie, 33 (suppl.) (2009), 201 – 203). Its ruins are present at Khoros on the bank of River Nahr iI Fren about 20 km from Syrian town of A’zaz at the Syrian Turkish border; Niqābulus of Arabic sources is Nicopholis of Greek soruces. It is village of Islahiye in modern Turkey east of Omnaniye; Allepo is located in modern northeast Syria. It is H.alab ( حَلَب ) of Arabic sources, and Beroea of Greek sources; Manbij of Arabic sources is Hierapolis of Greek sources. (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), 36, 39, 42, 500. Northeast of Aleppo about 30 km to the west of River Euphrates in modern Syria); ‘Arājin is unidentified location. Bālis of Arabic sources is Barbalissos of Greek sources. It’s ruins are located at Qala’at Balis south of Maskanah in modern Syria near modern Maskanah
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179, 193, 231.
Ṭabariyyā of Arabic sources is Tiberias on western shores of Sea of Galilee in modern Israel. (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890); Baisān of Arabic soruces is Scythopolis of Greek sources. Beit She’an in modern northern Israel; Afīq of Arabic sources is modern village of Afik near eastern shores of Sea of Galilee in modern Syria; Sūsiyah of Arabic sources is Susiya in modern Palestine; Jerash of Arabic sources is Gerasa of Greek sources. It is Jerash in modern Jordan (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890),; Bait-Rās of Arabic sources is Capitolias of Greek sources. It is village of Beit Ras few km north to Irbid in modern Jordan; Qadas of Arabic sources is Cydessa of Greek sources (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890),. It is Kedesh in modern Israel near border with Labenon about 10 km north of Safed; Jaulān of Arabic sources is Sahem el Golan in modern Syria; Arandal is unidentified location; Sājūr is village of Sajur in modern northern Israel in Galilee region.
For welcome of army of Medinan Caliphate in Homs, see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 202, 211. For Shaizar see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 202.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 227.
For detailed story see: Hippolyte Delehaye, “Passio Sanctorum Seaginta Martyrum,” Analecta Bollandiana 23 (1904), 287 – 307.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 31
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 231.
Islamic sources use the word ‘āmil to designate the distric level government official. They don’t clearly describe his duties. By looking at different tradtions preserved for them, one can assume that ‘āmil was a liaison officer between the conquered community and the provincial government. He assessed tax on them, collected it for the provincial government, communicated government policies to them and maintained law and order among them. He was answerable to the provincial governor.
For the date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214. Also see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164. AND Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 64.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 56).
Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 50, 51, 96, 97, 98.
Archaeological investigations have confirmed siege of Jerusalem. Archaeologists have found traces of a burnt wall and seventh century Sasanian coins nearby. (Doron Ben-Ami, Yana Tchekhanovets, and Gabriela Bijovsky, “New Archaeological and Numismatic Evidence for the Persian Destruction of Jerusalem in 614,” Israel Exploration Journal Vol. 60. No. 2 (2010) 204 – 222. Archaeological investigations have further confirmed the messacre. Excavation of Jerusalem has yielded hundreds of human skeletons. Their analysis indicates that the deceased were relatively young compared with those in contemporary cemeteries, and that women outnumberd men. All this suggests that the deceased met sudden death (Gideon Avni, “The Persian Conquest of Jerusalem (614 C.E.): An Archaeological Assessment,” Bulletin of the American School of Oriental Research 257 (2010), 36.
Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 98. See also: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 56.
All accounts of siege, fall and messacre of Jerusalem at the hand of Sasanian Iranians agree that the Iranians destroyed the holy churches of the Christians by burning them down. (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 50, 51, 96, 97, 98. AND Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 54, 55, 56. AND Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517. Archaeological survey of holy churches of Jerusalem, contrary to it, doesn’t find any evidence of destruction by burning. See: Gideon Avni, “The Persian Conquest of Jerusalem (614 C.E.): An Archaeological Assessment,” Bulletin of the American School of Oriental Research 257 40 – 45.
For details see: Jan Willen Drijvers, Helena Augusta: The Mother of Constantine the Great and the Legend of her Finding of the True Cross (Leiden: Brill, 1992). Also see: Jan Willen Drijvers, “Helena Augusta: Cross and Myth. Some new Reflections,” Mellennium (Yearbook on the Culture and History of the First Millennium C.E. 8 (2011): 125 – 174.
Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517.
Citation needed
Anastasius the Persian, Acta Martyris Anastasii Persae, ed. Hermann Usener. (Bonn: Prgram-Utrecht, 1894), 12. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 12).
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115, 116, 117.
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 30, annus mundi 6120.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 768.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 213.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 117.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214. See also: . Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 125, 126.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985),131, 132, 133.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214. Ya’qūbi gives the date of Umar’s visit to Jerusalem to be August 637. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),775).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146. See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),103.
He unsuccessfully negotiated with Jabalah in Jābiyah. He had one on one meetings with Amr bin As and Khalid bin Walid. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 209).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775. Tabari also gives similar account. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 191.
The contract of people of Jerusalem with Muslims was not different from that with people of other towns of Syria. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 194.
Heribert Busse, ‘Omar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam5 (1984) 83.
See: Heribert Busse, ‘Omar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam5 (1984) 83 79 – 83. Also see: Heribert Husse ‘Omar’s image as the Conqueror of Jerrusalem,’ Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1986) 165 – 66 for discussion of its location.
Salman ben Yeruḥim, a Jew writing in ca. 950 CE, in his Judaeo-Arabic commentary of Psalm 30 agrees with Seboes’ story. He writes “The Temple remained with Byzantium for 500 or so years and Israel were unable to enter Jerusalem; whoever did so and was found out, suffered death. Then when the Romans left it, by the grace of the God of Israel, and the kingdom of Ishmael was victorious, Israel was given leave to enter and take up residence and the courtyards of the house of God were handed over to them and they were praying there for a time.” (Jacob Mann, The Jews in Egypt and Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs, (New York: Cornell University Library Press, 2009) Vol. I P 46. The same source gives a reason why Muslims evicted Jews from their place of worship. “Then news of them went up to the Ishmaelite king, how they were engaging in shameful and riotous behavior, wine-drinking and drunkensess, and calumny; so he banished them to one of the gates.” (Jacob Mann, The Jews in Egypt and Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs, (New York: Cornell University Library Press, 2009) Vol. I P 47
Umar himself ordered construction of the mosque. See: Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriach of the Syrians, ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, (Long Branch, N. J.: Sources of the Armenian Traditions, 2013) 126.
John Moskhi, Leimonarion, edition with research and glossary, ed. Ilia Abuladze (Tbilisi: Necniereba, 1960) P 100 – 102, anecdote number 19).
Chrisotopher Von Schonborn, Sophrone de Jerusalem: vie monastique et confession dogmatique (Paris: Beauchesne editeur, 1972) 97, n. 136. AND Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 64.
Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 220, 221.
Adomnan, De Locis Sanctis, in Itinera et alia geographica (Corpus Christianorum series Latina 175), tans. and ed. Ludwig Bieler, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1965), P 186 n. 1.1.14. See also: John Wilkinson, Jerusalem Pilgrims before the Crusades (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1977) Adomnan, the holy places.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),196.
Just as a passing remark, an early 9th Century CE Christian source Theophanes the Confessor alleges that Umar was wearing filthy garments of camel hair during his meeting with Sophronius, the Chalcedonian Partiach of Jersusalem. The Patriach got so emberrased that he offered him a clean lion cloth and overgarment. Umar refused to accept them initially, and on Sophronius’s insistence accepted them for a short time while his own garments got washed. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 39, annus mundi 6127.
Aqṣā means farther, its opposite is adnā. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 38 annus mundi 6126.
Theophanes gives the figure of one twenty thousand Dinars. Dirhams are converted at a rate of ten Dirhams per Dinar for the convenience of the reader.
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 39, 40 annus mundi 6128.
Theophanes gives a figure of hundred thousand Nomisma. Dirhams are converted at a rate of ten Dirhams per Nomisma for the convenience of the reader
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 38 annus mundi 6126.
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 39, 40 annus mundi 6128.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 167, 168.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257.
Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriach of the Syrians, ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, (Long Branch, N. J.: Sources of the Armenian Traditions, 2013) 125. Actually, Michael writes that Heraclius started robbing the Chirstians in the area from Antioch to Constantiniple. Kaegi takes its meaning that Heraclius destroyed the towns of the area. See: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 244. For Arabic sources on this issue see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 253. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 182 See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146).
Muslims destroyed for example Arabissus and Mar’ash. For destruction of Arabissus see: Baladhuri 156 – 7. For destruction of Mar’ash see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 295. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 244.
Arabissos is the village of Yarpuz to the east of Osmaniye in modern southern Turkey; Mar’ash of Arabic sources is Germanicia Caesarea of Byzantine sources, Kahramanmaras in modern southern Turkey.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 203, 216, 217, 219. See also Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146.
The mass of land which accommodates most of the Asian part of modern Turkey. It is bound in the north by Black Sea, in the south by the Mediterranean, to the east by Armenian Highlands, in the west by Aegean Sea. Sea of Marmara forms a connection between the Black Sea and Aegean sea through narrow Bosporus and Dardanells straits; Qayṣariyah ( قَيصَرِيَه ) of Arabic sources is Caesarea Maritima of Greek sources. It is Caesarea in modern Israel about 40 km south of Haifa (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890); Bayrūt of Arabic sourcses is Berytus of Greek sources. It is Beirut in modern Lebanon; Gabala of Arabic sources is Jableh in modern Syria about 30 km south of Latakia; Ladhiqiyyah of Arabic sources is Loadicea at Mare of Greek sources. It is Latakia in modern northwestern Syria (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890)
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179, 194, 205, 213.
Yāfah of Arabic sources is Jaffa of later times, now a neighbourhood of Tel Aviv-Yafo in modern Israel; Rafaḥ of Arabic sources is Rafah in Gaza strip of modern Palestine; Ṭarṭūs ( طَرطُوس ) of Arabic sources is Antradus of Greek sources. It is Tortosa of Crusaders and Tartus in modern northeastern Syria; Acre of Arabic sources is Antiochenes of Greek sources. It is Acre in modern Israel about 25 km north of Haifa; Tyre of Arabic sources is Tyrrus of Greek sources. It is Tyre/Sūr in modern southern Labenon; Ṣaffūriyah is unidentified place; Sidon of Arabic sources is Sidon/ Ṣayda about 40 km south of Beirut in modern Labenon; ‘Irqah, is unidentified place; Jubail of Arabic is Byblus of Greek sources. It is Byblos/Jbeil in modern Labenon about 40 km north of Beirut.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 166.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018). See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),244.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 47.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 22.
Niṣībayn ( نِصِيبَين ) of Arabic sources is Nisibis of Greek sources. It is Nusaybin in modern Southeastern Turkey.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 199
For Qinnasrīn see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),223. For Anṭākiyah see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 227.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240).
Iconium is Konya in modern south central Turkey. See: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240). Caeserea in Cappadocia is Qaiṣariyah of Arabic sources and Kayseri in modern central Turkey. See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 242. For Umar’s wish to establish Taurus as boreder see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 243.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232. See also: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160.
Eutychius, (Annales) Das Annalenwerk des Eutychios von Alexandrien; ausgewahlte Geschichten und Legenden Kompiliert von Sa’īd ibn Baṭrīq um 935 AD, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium ed. and trans. M. Breydy, (Louvain: L. Durbecq, 1985). See also (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 166.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),767.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 208, 209.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 209. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),776.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 210.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 223.
See dialogues of Doctina Jacobi: Nathanael G. Bonwetsch (ed.), “Doctrina Lacobi nuper baptizati”, in Abhandlungen der Koiglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenchaften zu Gottingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse: n.F., Band 12, Nro. 3. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1910) Reprint: Liechtestein: Kraus, 1970. 1 – 91.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 244.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 189.
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 186, 187.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 165.
J. Moorhead, “The Monophsite Response to the Arab Invasions,” Byzantion 51 (1981) 579 – 91.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 97
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780. For the numbers killed in Plague also see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),159.
For the name of the plague see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215. For the reason of the name see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), P780, footnote 1001.
citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
For Shuraḥbīl bin Ḥassana see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780. For Yazīd bin Abu Sufyan see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219.
Abu Ubaida had instructed Amr bin As to capture the sea-coast of the province of the Jordan after he relieved him of duty of besieging Jarusalem. Initially Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan had gone as a reinforcement to Amb bin As. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),97, 98.
Balādhuri says that Heraclius was in Constantinople by this time and was still instigating the Greek population of the region. See: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215, 269 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 216, 780. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 40, annus mundi 6129.
citation needed
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 257)240, 311
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 594.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 166.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 180
For details of messages see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 27,28.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 256.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 254. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788. See also: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 244.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 254.
Zandah is unidentified.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.
Ḥabīb bin Maslama started his military carreer as a soldier when he participated in first siege of Damascus. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 172). Later, he participated in Battle of Yarmouk. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 208. After Battle of Yermouk he got role of battalion leader in small campaings, like attack and surrender of Qīnnasrin. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232.). After completion of capture of northern Syria, Medinan Caliphate transferred his services to the campaign in Jazirah where he also led small campaigns, like campaign against Malaṭyah, under supervision of Iyad bin Ghanm. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 289
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 166
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 768.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 284.
For doubling the s.adaqah see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 284.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 285.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 147.
Georgius Cyprius, Le Synekdemos d’Hierokles et l’Opuscule Geographique de Georges de Chypre, ed. and trans. Ernst Honigmann. (Brussels: Editions de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et slaves, 1939) 63 – 64. See also: Louis Dillemann, Haute Mesopotamie orientale et pays adjacents. Contribution a la geographie historique de la region, du V siècle avent l’ere chretienne au VI siècle de cette ere (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1962).
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 150.
citations needed
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 150.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 158.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 269, 227 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
‘Iyāḍ bin Ghanm was son of Abu Ubaida’s paternal first cousin. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 72.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 270.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146.
For the date see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 40, annus mundi 6130. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67. Ya’qubi informs that this army conquered Jazirah without any difficulty: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.)
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 269, 276, 277, 279 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160.
Raqqa of Arabic sources is Callinicum of Greek sources. It is Ar Raqqa in modern Syria; Urfā al-Rhua or simply Ruha of Arabic sources is Edessa of Greek sources. It is Sanliurfa in Modern Southeastern Turky; Diyarbakir of Arabic sources is Amida of Greek sources. It is Diyarbakir in modern Southeastern Turkey; ‘Ain al Wardah of Arabic sources is modern Ras al Ayn/Sari Kani in notheastrn Syria; Dniṣar of Arabic sources is Monokarton of Greek sources. It is Kiziltepe in modern Southeastern Turkey; Mardīn of Arabic sources is Izala of Greek sources. It is Mardin in modern Southeastern Turkey; the region of Ṭūr ‘Abdīn of Arabic sources consisted of hilly region of eastern half of Mardin province of modern Turkey; For location of Niṣībayn see above; Daras of Arabic sources is Anastasiopolis of Greek sources. It is the village of Oguz about 40 Km southeast of Batman, in modern Southeastern Turkey; Khābūr of Arabic soruces is Peroz-Shapur of Pahalvi sources. It is modern Faysh Khabur in northwestern Iraq; Sinjār of Arabic sources is Singara of Greek sources. It is village of sinjar in modern northeastern Iraq; Qarqisiya of Arabic sources is Circesium of Greek sources, modern Busayra in eastern Syria; Mosul in modern Iraq; Hīt of Arabic sources is Heet in northeast of Ramadi in modern Iraq.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 276, 277. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160.
Tella is unidentified location.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67, 160.
Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriach of the Syrians, ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, (Long Branch, N. J.: Sources of the Armenian Traditions, 2013)
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 175.
For the name Miṣr see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346.
citation needed
citation needed
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 68.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 68.
citation needed
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 54. See also: R. Altheim-Stiehl, “The Sasanians in Egypt – Some evidence of Historical Interest,” Bulletin de la Societe d’Archeologie Copte 31 (1992), PP 87 – 96. AND Touraj Daryaee, Middle Persian Papyri from the Sasanian Occupation of Egypt in the Seventh Century (1), (Fullerton: California State University, 2003), 1 – 7 AND Patrick Sanger, “The Administration of Sasanian Egypt: New Masters and Byzantine Continuity,” Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies 51 (2011): 653 – 665. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 69.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 184.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 190. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 91.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 276.
Nikephoros, Nikephoros Patriach of Constantinople short history ed. and trans. Cyril Mango (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1990). Paragraph 23.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 106.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),776.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 96.
Amr bin As had laid siege to Qaisariya, the provincial capital of Palestine. He had taken a leave of absence to see Umar. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 213.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335. For events of Arab invasion on Egypt from Muslim point of view see also: Ibn ‘Abd al Hakam. Ibn Abd al Hakam died in 870 CE at Fustat.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),776.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 337.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),776, 777.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 336. Ya’qūbī gives the figure of four thousand which sounds more realistic. Moreover, Ya’qubi asserts that Umar sent this army at the request of Amr when he failed to subjugate Alyunah after prolonged siege. Furthermore, Ya’qubi shows Zubayr bin Awwam as one of many among the army, which is also reasonable, because we don’t hear Zubayr’s meritious deeds in Egypt beyond conquest of Alyunah. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777. John of Nikiu agrees with both assertions of Ya’qubi. The number of reinforcement was four thousand and that Umar sent it on Amr’s request. See: John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),
The twelve thousand men Umar sent to Egypt were waiting in Medina for Umar’s orders to assault on Antakiya. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 336).
Steffan Timm, Das christlich-koptiche Agypten in arabischer Zeit 5, Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 1991), 2146).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 336.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),786.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 184. Hoyland expands it to the winter of 639/640 CE. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 70.
For dating of John of Nikiu see: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 153 AND John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), introduction.
Nikiu was a small town two thirds between Alexandria and Alyūnah.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 178.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 180.
Hoylland agrees with John of Nikiu. He argues that Amr might be mindful of logistics of supplies. He occupied an oasis before advancing in towns. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 70.
Fājūm of John of Nikiu is modern Faiym, an oasis about 100 km Southwest of Cairo.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 336. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.
Farama of Arabic sources is Pelusium of Greek sources. It was located few km away from the Mediterranean on the eastern edge of the Nile delta; its ruins (modern tel el Farama) are about 25 km east of Suez Canal.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 336.
Alyūnah is Babylon of John of Nikiu (John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 182; Umm Dunayn of Ya’qubi (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777); Bāb al Yūn of Tabari (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 163); Fusṭāṭ ( فُسطاط ) of later Islamic sources (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 336); and modern day Cairo area. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 70).
Ruins of Fusṭāṭ are located between the center of present day Cairo and Ma’adi, its posh neighbourhood to the south. Ramnants from the past are a Roman fortress (Babylon), a number of Christian churches including the oldest existing church in the world (al-Mo’allaqa), a synagogue (Ben Ezra), a Coptic monastery (Mar Girgis), large numbers of villa’s and aqueducts and the mosque of Amr Bin As. It is partly excavated, partly submerged in the rising ground water and partly covered by debris of the pottery kilns that were active in later centuries. The cite has been evacuated and fenced to protect it. South east of ruins of Fusṭāṭ are Fatmid tombs called ‘the seven sisters’ (Seba Binaat). Between Seba Binaat and Fustat are unfinished building project, including four-lane motorway, and another set of ruins contemporary with later phases of Fusṭāṭ. After starting in 7th century, Fusṭāṭ was slowly abandoned as the center of power moved north, first to city around the mosque of Ibn Tulun and later to the citadel of the walled city of Salah al Din.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 337.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 338
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 338
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 73.
citation
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 338
I forgot
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 341, 342
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 340
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 340, 341
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 342
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 188.
I forgot
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 339
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 188.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 188.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 184, 185.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
citation
citation
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 108
citation
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134.
citation
citation
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134, 135.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134, 135.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 135.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 74.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 196, 97, 98. AND Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134. See also: AND Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66. Kaegi gives date of November 641 CE for this incident. See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67, 184.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134. see also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 137. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 42 annus mundi 6136. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67, 184.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346.
Location of Kariūn is unkown. Probably it was a small place outside the city walls of Alexandria.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 189.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 52.
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346, 347. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 191.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 199.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 340.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 184.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 189.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 193, 194.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 200. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 344.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 347.
For this date see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),75. Baladhuri gives the year to be 642 CE. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346. Ya’qubi asserts that Alexandria had fallen to Medinan Caliphate by end of 641 CE. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 786.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 347.
Muslims released the Coptic political dissidents from the jails but they manhandled them before their release. See: John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 187
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 200.
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Barqa of Arabic sources is Cyrene of Greek sources. The city no longer exists. Some archaeologists believe it was located at Marj in between Benghazi and Bayda in modern Libya. Others believe it could be Tolmeita about 110 km east of Benghazi at Ad Diriyah.
Greek sources called it Cyrenaica as well as Pentapolis of Greek sources; for Pentapolis see: John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 60.
Medeterrenean is Baḥr al-Sha’m of Arabic sources. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 27
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79. For agricultural value of the land see: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 352.
Citation needed
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 352.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353, 354.
Ya’qūbī ‘s statement that the inhabitants of Barqa were allowed to sell their children to pay Jiziyah is actually about Berber tribes of this region, made more clear in Baladhuri’s rendition. Caetani points out that it is reference to the slave trade between tribes of Berbers and Medinan Caliphate, whose price was fixed. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789 AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353, 354. AND Leone Caetani, studi di Storia Orientale, (Milano University 1911), P 533, vol IV.
For date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
Nobadia of Greek sourcse, Nubia of later Arabic sources. See: Geoff Emberling, Nubia: Ancient Kingdoms of Arfica. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 76.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 379 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 380 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 380.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 380.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 379, 380. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 802. For date see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 77.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 379, 380. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 802.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 78.
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 177.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 78.
A’la bin Hadhrami had already used navay (see below).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 177.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 355. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789.
Ya’qubi puts this event in 642 CE, before defeat of Nūbia. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789.
Tripoli is located in modern northwestern Libya. It is Ṭarābulus ( طرابُلُس ) of Arabic sources and Tripoli of Greek sources. Surrounding districts of Ṭarābulus are modern Tripolitania.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 355. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789 AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353.
Waddān of Arabic sources is Waddan in modern Libya; Fazzān of Arabic sources is Fezzan in modern southern Lybia; Zawīlah of Arabic sources is Zawilah in modern southern Libya.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353.
Citation needed
Georgius Cyprius, Le Synekdemos d’Hierokles et l’Opuscule Geographique de Georges de Chypre, ed. and trans. Ernst Honigmann. (Brussels: Editions de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et slaves, 1939), 39, 64 – 6. See also: Ernst Honigmann, Ostgrenze des byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071. (Brussels: Editions de L’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales, 1935), 16 – 37.
Modern Black Sea in English and Baḥr al Aswad of Arabic used to be Ṭarabazundah in early Islamic sources. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 307.
Islamic sources of 9th century confuse the whole caucacus region with Armenia. See for example: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 305. It is due to the fact that Arab conqueres put the whole Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgea under one administrative unit. See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 181.
Jurzān of Arabic sources is modern Georgia; Tbilisi is located in modern Georgia. It is Tiflīs ( تِفلِيس ) of Arabic sources, see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 35 – 37, 125, vol II.
Peter Charanis, Studies on the Demograpy of the Byzantine Empire: Collected studies, (London: Variorum, 1972.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 51, 52.
For rectuitment of Armenians in military of Byzantine Rome see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 54, 55. AND N. H. Baynes, “The Military Operations of Emperor Heraclius,” United Services Magazine N.S. 46 (1913) 526 – 33, 659 – 66. AND Kaegi, “Two Studies in the Continuity of Byzantine and Late Roman Military Institutions,” Byzantine Forschungen 8 (1982) 87 – 113; For recruitment of Armenians in military of Sasanian Iran see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193.
George A Bournoutain, A concise Hiostory of the Armenian People: from Ancient times to the present. Costa mesa, CA: Mazda publishers, 2003. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 88.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 45.
To get an idea of Khosrou II Pervez’s advancements in Armenia see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian. New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985. See also: H. Hubschmann, “Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen,” Indogermanische Forschungen 16 (1904) 197 – 490. AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 191.
Byzantine Arminia was divided into provinces of Armenia I, II, III and IV. See: H. Hubschmann, “Armeniens vor und wahrend der Araberzeit,” Zeitschrift fur Armenische Philologie 2 (1904) 50 – 71. See also: Moses of Chorene, Geographie de Moise de Corene d’apres Ptolenee, ed. and trans. P. Arsene Soukry (Venice: Imprimerie Armenienne, 1881), 36 – 46. AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 191.
Erzurum is located in modern eastern Turkey. It is Qalīqalah of Arabic sources, Theodosiopolis of Greek sources, and Karin of Armenian sources; River Gunek, also known as Gunek Sur is a small tributary to River Murat. Old name of River Murat was River Murad. It is Arsanias of Greek sources. See: H. M. Government, A Handbook of Mesopotamia Vol. IV prepared Intelligence Division: On behalf of the Admiralty and the War Office, 1917 AND Le strange;
River Batman is Nymphios of Greek sources; Hasankeyf is located in modern southeastern Turkey. It is Ḥiṣn Kayfah of Arabic sources, and Kiphas of Greek sources; Khabour is a tributary of Euphrates. Its name in Arabic sources is Khābūr. Needs not to be confused with Khabour Tigris, which is a tributary to Tigris; Busayrah is located at the confluence of Khabour river and Euphrates in modern northwestern Syria.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 45.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 47, 48.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 47, 48.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 51, 52.
Armenians were religiously divided and central government had substantial opposition there. La Narratio de rebus Armeniae, ed. Gerard Garitte (Louvian: L. Durbecq, 1952) 43-47, 258 – 350.
Cyril Leo Toumanoff, “The Heraclids and the Arsacids,” Revue des etudes armeniennes 19 (1985): 431 – 4; See also: Walter, Kaegi E., Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 189.
Heraclius summoned and personally attended a synod at Thodoriopolis (Erzurum) in 633 CE to unify the Armenian Church with his Monothelite one. See: Gerard Garittle, La Narratio de rebus Armeniae, (Louvain, L. Durbecq, 1952), 43, 302 – 11.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 181.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 184.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 183.
For religious divisions in Armenia at that time see: C. Toumanoff, Studies in Christian Caucasian History (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1963) 476 – 7. See also: Karekin Sarkissian, The Council of Chalcedon and the Armenian Church (London: Society for Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1965),
Hoyland gives date of October 640 CE for this attack. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 89. Kaegi thinks it could be late summer of 640 CE. See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193. Balādhuri considers it to be December 640 CE. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 275. According to Sebeos it was November of 640 CE. See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 192.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193.
For Armenian ethnicity of Heraclius see: Dickran Kouymjian, “Ethnic Origins and the ‘Armenian’ Policy of Heraclius,” Revue des etudes armeniennes 17 (1983) 635 – 42. AND Henri Gregoire, “An Armenian Dynasty on the Byzantine Throne,” Armenia Quarterly 1.1 (1946). 6 – 17.
Citation needed
For details of this raid see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 128, 129, 130.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 192.
Baladhuri tells that Iyad reached up to khilāṭ but Seboes says he went up to region of Ararat and Dabil. See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 129. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 275.
Badlis of Arabic sources is Baghesh of Armenian sources. It is Bitlis located just to the west of shores of Van Lake in modern eastern Turkey; khilāt of Arabic sources is Xelat of Armenian sources, modern Ahlat on western shores of Van Lake in Eastern Turkey.
Ararat in modern Armenia about 50 Km south east of Yerevan; Dabil of Arabic soursed is Dwin of Armenian sources. It is the village of Dvin located 30 km south of Yerevan in modern Armenia. Dabil was the main town of Armenia. See: Sergey Vardanyan, The Capitals of Armenia (Yerevan: Apolon, 19995), 109 – 121.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 190,191, 193.
Theodore Rshtuni of Sebeos. See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130.; Pasagnathes, the Patrician of Armenians of Theophanes the Confessor. See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 44, annus mundi 6143.
After raid on Armenia Iyad Bin Ghanm returned to Homs via Raqqa where Umar appointed him governor over Jazirah. Iyad died immediately after, in 641 CE. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 275 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 780).
After death of Iyad, Sa’īd bin ‘Āmir bin Ḥidhyam became governor of Jazirah. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 278.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 194.
For date see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 89. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),790. AND Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 143. Also see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 184, 196.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),790. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 196.
Azerbaijan of Arabic sources is Atropatene of Arnenian sources, Āṭrpātakāna of Pahalvi sources.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 141, 142, 143.
Taylor came across an inscription near Batman Su (Nympheos) in modern Turkey. The inscription was dim and the only thing Taylor could figure out was that it was certain thing built ba a certain ‘Uthmān in 643 CE (20 AH). (J. G. Taylor, “Travels in Kurdistan, with notices of the Sources of the Eastern and Western Tigris, and Ancient Ruins in their Neighbourhood”, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 35 (1865): 25. No other details of the inscription are available. Anyhow, this inscription verifies Arab presence in Armenia in 643 CE.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 90
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164.
For use of word ra’iyyah see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),148
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 165.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 340.
Ammianus Marcellinus, The Roman history of Ammianus Marcellinus During the Reigns of the Emperors Constantius, Julias, Jovianus, Valentinian, and Valens. Ed and Trans. Charles D. Younge (London: Henry G Bohn, 1862), 25.7.9-13.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 173.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 175.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 277.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 271, 276, 277.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 102.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232.
A. Elad, “The Coastal Cities of Palestine,” Jerusalem Cathedra 2 (1982).) See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 264.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 79
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 244.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 206.
Mozarabe, Cronica Mozarabe de 754: continuation isidoriana hispana, ed. Jose Eduardo Lopez Pereira, (Leon: Centro de Estudios e investigacion San Isidoro, 2009). 8 (28 – 9).
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Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992
Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronile and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam, trans. R. G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 109.
On basis of names provided in the source Kaegi calculates that census took place between late 636 and January 641 CE. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257.
Michael Hendy, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 256.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 250.
Papiscus and Philo, Dialogue between a Christian and a Jew, ed Arthur Cushman McGiffert, New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1889
For discussion see: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 78 – 87.
Citation
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 78.
The ‘Khuzistan chronicle’ was written in East Syriac language by an anonymous Nestorian Christian in ca. 660’s CE living somewhere in eastern provinces of Sasanian Iran. The author is widely believed to be contemporary to early Arab conquests and eyewitness to some of the events of conquest of Iran. (Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), Introduction: xi AND Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 182. AND Sebastian P. Brock, “Syriac Historical Writing: A Survey of the main Sources,” Journal of the Iraq Academy, Suriac Corporation 5 (1979 – 180), 25. The original manuscript, which was housed in library of Chaldean monastery in Mousel, Iraq, is missing since taking of the town by ISIS in 2014. (Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), Introduction: xi)
For its boundaries see: ‘Ali bin Husayn al-Mas’udi, Kitab al-Tanbih wa l Ishraf, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Netherlands: Brill, 2013).
Soebos presents them as separate ethnic group. See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 135.
Citation needed
Citation needed
Seboes was an Armenian and whole of his ‘history’ is based on a divide between ethnic Iranians and Armenians: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985.
Sebeos mentions them as separate ethnic entity: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 135.
For Medes as separate ethnic entity see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 135.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 84. See also: Geo Widengren. ‘The status of the Jews in the Sasanian Empire’, Acta Iranica I, (1961), 117 – 162.
Citation needed
Citation needed
Tafazzoli, Ahmad and A. L. Khromov, “Sasanian Iran: Intellectual life,” in B. A. Litvinsky (ed.), History of Civilization of Central Asia III: The Crossroads of Civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. (Delhi: Motilal Barsidass, 1999), 79 – 102.
Erich F. Schmidt Persepolis III, (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1970), 34 – 49. AND W. B. Henning, The Inscription of Naqs-i-Rustam, (London: Lund Humphries, 1957), Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum series part III, vol. II, Portfolio II. AND Philip Huyse, Die dreisprachige Inschrift Sābuhrs I. an der Ka’ba-i-Zardust (SKZ), (London, 1999) Corpus. Inscriptionum Iranicarum III Vol. I, Text I, p 6 – 7.
Citation needed
Mary Boyce, Zoroastrians: Their Religious beliefs and Practices, (London: Routledge, 1979), 115.
Acts of the Apostles of the New Testament describe acceptance of Christianity among Persians. See: Acts 2:9.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 8.
Citation needed
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 42.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 42.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 42, 43.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 148.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 148.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 66.
Ahmad Tafazzoli and A. L. Khromov. Sasanian Iran: intellectual life, (Unesco: Silk road project), P 95 , vol II.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 90.
Merv al Shījan (the greater Marw) of Arabic sources is Antiochia in Margiana of Greek sources. This town was one of the capitals of Khurasan, on the River Murghāb. see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 112, vol. V. Its ruins are located about forty Kilometer to the west of Mary in modern Turkmenistan where Murghab river forms a delta and disappears in marshes. Merv got extinct in 1788/89. However it had lost its significance after messacre in the city at the hands of Mongol horde in 1221. (Fredrik T. Hiebert, Kakamyrat Gurbansāhedow and Hubert Schmidt, A Central Asian Village at the Dawn of Civilization, excavations at Anau (University of Pennsylvania) 2003:3. See also: V A Zhukosky, Razvalinii starogo Merva (St Petersburg, 1894).
Mark Dickens, “The Syriac Bible in Central Asia” in The Christian Herigate of Iraq: Collected papers from the Christianity in Iraq I-V Seminar days, eds. Erica C. D. Humter (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, 2009), 105 for bibliography: 92 – 120
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 4.
All dates of important events of Sasanian history are calculated by a formula. Sasanian kings used to mint their coins every year with number of years they had already reigned inscribed on them. Date of coronation of king Yazdegerd III is definitely known to be June 16, 632. This is calculated as the start date and inauguration of Yazdegerdi calendar. (W. Hartner, “Old Iranian Calendars,” in Coambridge History of Iran, ed. Ilya Gershevitch(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), P 714 – 92, vol. II). From this point in time year of important events of Sasanian history can be calculated retrospectively. Tabari gives date of Yazdegerd’s cornonation 632 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 40). Regents might have ruled in Yazdegerd’s name initially. This assertion gets stong when we hear from Tabari that Yazdagerd’s reign lasted for twenty years. Out of these four were in peace and quiet and sixteen in fatigue due to the ruthless warfare of the Arabs against him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 90).
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 4.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 6.
Qarqisiya of Arabic sources; Circesium of Greek sources: Busayrah, located at junction of Euphrates and Khabur rive in modern Syria.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 8.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 8.
For defeat of Bahram see: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 8 – 10.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 66.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 12 – 14.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 62 – 64.
Qubād II of Pahlvi sources is sometimes referred to as Shroviah (شىرويه) by Arabic sources. This was his nick name. On his coins he is Qabād or Kavadh II (H. M. Malek, “The coinage of the Sasanian King Kavadh II (A.D. 628),” Numismatic Chronicle 155 (1995), 119 – 120.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 74.
Political picture of Sasanian Iran was so blurred during the civil war that even contemporary and near contemporary sources fail to agree upon names and sequence of rulers during this period.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115.
Arabic sources tell him son of Shaharyār. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 222.
All sources agree that he was a child and it is confirmed by analysis of his coins which show his beardless face. (Susan Tyler-Smith, “Coinage in the Name of Yezdgerd III (A.D. 632 – 651) and the Arab Conquest of Iran,” The Nuministic Chronicle 160 (2000): 135 – 150.) His exact age at the time of coronation is not certain. Dinawari gives age of Yazdegerd at the time of coronation to be sixteen. (Dīnawari, Al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl P 119). Tabari places it at seven. Check it as at one place he gives the age of 21 Seven appears to be nearer to reality as he was twenty eight at the time of his death in 651 CE. See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115.
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 454, 455.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 437.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 401.
Balādhuri gives the date of Battle of Jisr (Bridge) November of 634 CE. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 404. However, like all other dates of history of early Islam this date is highly contested. Hoyland guesses it to be Autumn of 637 CE. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 52. Tabari gives a date of October 634 CE. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),190. Parvaneh gives very early date of 630 CE. See: Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. (New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 217.
For location of the bridge see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 403.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 401.
For gathering of tribesmen on the way to Iraq see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 401.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 401.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 401.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 769. See also: Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. (New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 218.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),769.
Tabari shows Fīruzān to be head of the rival group to Rustam. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 189.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 403.
Rustam was called Dhu ‘l Ḥājib by the Arabs as he tied up his eyebrows to lift them above his eyes because of his pride. He was nicknamed Bahman – meaning potent, endowed with great means – by Anūshirwān (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 403). Rustam was from either Rayy or Hamedan (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410).
Rustam was called Dhu ‘l Ḥājib by the Arabs as he tied up his eyebrows to lift them above his eyes because of his pride. He was nicknamed Bahman – meaning potent, endowed with great means – by Anūshirwān (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 403). Rustam was from either Rayy or Hamedan (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 404.
For different names of the battle see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 403.
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 405.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 405.
For Umar’s return of captives see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 765.
Umar argued “I am loathe to see the taking of captives become an established practice (sunna) [to be used] against the Arabs. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 765.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 405.
The final contract was that Bajilah would get one third of the spoils after the fifth has been taken out. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 406).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 405.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 405.
Previously Medinan Caliphate used to give the intenders of Jihad a chance to choose under which commander and under which division they would fight. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 108).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410, 411.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 411.
This Qays bin Hubairah al Makshuh was leader of Ridda in Yemen. He did not participate in war in Syria. Rather he was allowed by Abu Bakr merely to settle there. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 178). He was allowed to participate in war on Iran as policiy of Medinan caliphate towards defeated tribes of Ridda Wars had changed.
By the way, Qays’s contingent reached when war was over. They were paid their remuneration in form of their share in booty. Umar had to be tactful, asking Sa’d to pay their share if they had arrived before burial of those who were killed in the war. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 411).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 203 AND (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 13.
Islamic sources don’t mention any of the tribes of Oman or Yamama joining the forces of Medinan Caliphate.
Umar made very sure than none of former apostates gets any position of authority in the army. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 18.
After Qadisiyyah ‘Utba bin Ghazwān, governor of Basra, went to see Umar leaving Mujāshi’ bin Mas’ūd of Sulaym in charge of Basrah and Mughira bin Shu’ba commanding the army. After ‘Utba’s departure people of Maysān rebelled under their leader Faylakān. Mughira defeated them and reported to Umar. Umar said to ‘Utba, “have nomads been given authority over settled people?” Mughira was from Thaqif, a resident of Taif and Mujāshi was a Bedouin of Sulaym. For Mujāshi’s tribal affiliation see: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 490). ‘Utba died on his way back to Basrah. So ‘Umar appointed Mughirah bin Shu’ba governor of Basrah. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 773.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 409.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 409. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 770.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 409. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 770.
Tabari reports infighting between Rustam and Fayruzān groups during this time. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 189.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 224.
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Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),405). For location of Diar Hind see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 2163 vol.II.
For date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 408.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 405.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 405, 407.
Common Arabs awaited the forthcoming war nervously. Tabari tells that the Arabs between ‘Udhayb and ‘Adan Abyan (‘Adan Abyan is ‘Adan of Yemen), between Ubullah and Aylah (modern port of Aqba) were expecting a battle between Medinan Caliphate and Sasanian Iran in near future. They understood that the very existence of their newly found state depended upon the outcome of war. In every town they were attentively listening to [information about] it. They were so preoccupied with the outcome of the war that they postponed their daily important decisions until outcome of the war was known. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 147).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 415.
Qādisiyyah was just southwest of modern village of Hillah in Iraq. The site is on the west bank of River Ateeq which was pathway of Euphrates that time. For its location in ancient sources see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),23, 24. Qādisiyyah was not a big town but was a well defended cantonment for Iranian army. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 23.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 411. Hoyland gives date of Qadisiyah 6 January 638. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),52. kaegi gives a date of 637 CE . See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 259. Nasir al-Ka’bi gueses it to have taken place in 636 CE. See: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 78.
For use of Swād in this sense see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 387. For some canals of the area see: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 416, 429.
For location and Geography of Tysfwn see above: Pre-Islam, politics
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 407, 408.
Kaskar was a town on the east bank of Tigris. It turned into a ghost town after Ḥajjāj bin Yousuf built Wāsit on the west Bank of Tigris opposite Kaskar. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 29 foot note 119. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),180 footnote 617. Exact locations of both Kaskar and Wāsit are not known. Wāsit replaced Kaskar.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 408.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410.
Dirafsh Kābiyān of Arabic is Dirafsh-i-Kāwiyāni of Pahalvi. It was the royal standard of the Sassanians. See Joseph wiesehofer, Ancient Persia, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410. According to Tabari, it was made up of skin of tiger and was 12 cubits wide and 80 cubits long. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 188
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 415
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410.
Ya’qūbī gives the number of troops to be eighty thousand. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),770.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 409, 410, 413.
Muthanna, the Muslim field commander, had died in 636 CE of injuries sustained in the Battle of Bridge that failed to heal. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 409. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),14.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 411, 412.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 409.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 772.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 415. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 772.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 415.
For the national epic see: Ferdowsi, Shahnameh: The Epic of the Persian Kings, ed and trans. Ahmad Sadri, (Newyork: Quantuck Lane Press, 2013). Hoyland believes that the main character of the national epic is the same Rustam who died at Qadisiyyah. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 52
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 418.
Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. (New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 233. Tabari informs that immediately Rustam got killed, Iranians lost heart. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 124
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 415.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 416, 417.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 417.
Bahurasīr of Arabic sources is Veh-Ardashir of Pahalvi sources and Seleucia of Greek sources. For location of Baharasīr in ancient sources see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 13.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 418.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 418, 419.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 418.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 418, 419.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 418.
Ḥulwān of Arabic sources is the village of Sarpol Zahab in modern Iran. It was summer resort of Sasanians located at the foothills of Zagros Mountains. For location of Ḥulwān in sources see: Yakut vol ii, P 312. Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 506, vol I.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 417, 418. See also: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 80.
Tysfwn lost its glory for ever. According to Khuzistan Chronicle, when Isho.’yahb, the chief preist of Nastorian church saw Madain ruined by the Arabs and its gates carried off to Kufa, and those who remained inside it were consumed by hunger, went to reside in Beyt-Garmai in the village of Karkā (Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 82).
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 13, 14
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), introduction 4, 94.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 439.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 420.
Jalūla’ was a twon about seventy miles east of the town of Sāmarrā on the route from Baghdad to Ḥulwān. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 156, Vol. II. Currently it is the village of Jalawla in modern Iraq, at the bank of river Sirwan; Jibāl of Arabic sources is Medes of Greek sources, and Media of Pahalvi sources. For its name in Arabic sources see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), P 480, footnote. It was a province of Sasanian Iran consisting of the mountaneous area to the northeast of Tigris between Isfahan and Hamedan. Actually Arabic word Jibāl simply means ‘the mountains’. For ancient records of Jibāl see Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 15, Vol. II.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 420.
Strength of army of Medinan Caliphate had increased as compared to Qadisiyyah, probably due to help from Syrian contingent.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 420.
Khāniqin of Arabic sources is the village of Khanaqin in modern Iraq. For its location in ancient sources see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), p 393, vol II.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 39.
For the date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 419.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 421, 422.
For such summery executions see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 421. Interestingly one of dahqan was spared on promise of not to kill any of Arabs, (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 421.
Tabari reports that only those communities in Sawd followed the peace treaty who were initially subjugated by force. All others once violated the treaty and had to be brought back to it. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 48.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 421
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 469.
Up to now Hāshim bin ‘Uthbah was the commander of border guards at the newly drawn line of control. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 469.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 469.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 421, 469. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),781.
Iṣbaphān of Arabic is Spahān of Pahalvi sources. It is modern Isfahan in Iran. Arabic sources don’t refer to the town of Isfahan. They rather refer to the area surrounding the town. It was a province of Sasanian Iran.
No source gives date of flight of Yazdegered from Hulwan. According to Baladhuri this incident took place in 640 CE. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 471). But on P 469 he asserets that Jarir had already governed Hulwan for a while and Ammar bin Yasir had attained governorship of kufa in 640 CE when Ammar ordered Jarir to leave Hulwan and help Abu Musa [in Tustar].
All sources agree that Yazdegerd escaped with his treasury from Hulwan and that he ended up in Merv with the same treasury. Tracing true itinerary of his journey is knotty, as the sources differ widely from each other about the provinces of Sasanian Iran he sojourned in and the sequence of his stay. Lately there are calls for tracing the exact path of Yazdegerd’s flight by studying the sequence and spots of the coins he issued wherever he sojourned. See: Robert Gobl, Sasanian Numismatics, (Braunschweig: Klinkhardt & Braunschweig, 1971) 54.
Merv mentioned here is Merv al Rūdh of Arabic sources. (Not to be confused with Merv al Shījan mentioned above). Merv al Rūdh is Marw-i-kuchik of Farsi sources. It was located about 150 miles south of Merv al Shījan on River Murghab, where Murghab River leaves the mountains of Gharjistan and enters the steppe of Karakum Desert. Its site is is identified as Bala Murghab in modern Afghanistan. Modern settlement of Maruchak or Mave-i-Kuchik is actually former suburbs of Maw al Rūdh which were called Qas-i-Ihnaf. For its location in ancient sources see: See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 112, Vol. V.
Ya’qubi shows one thousand cavalrymen, one thousand crack troops (Jabbār), and one thousand men of special valor (ṣannāja) along with him while slipping off. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),781). Ya’qubi also shows that the ruler (ṣāhib) of Ṭabaristan met him and invited him to come to Rayy. He cited impregnability of his country as a reason to choose Rayy. Yazdegerd declined the offer.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),781.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 469) (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 469.
Dinavar is sometimes referred to as Mah al-Kufa in Arabic sources. Ruins of Dinavar are located in Dinavar district in modern Iran, northwest of Kermanshah; Qarsāsīn is now extint without any traces. For its location in ancient sources see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 68, Vol. IV.
For example, Jarir bin Abdallah allowed people of Hulwan to flee after capture of the twon. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 469.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 156.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 462.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 119.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 770.
‘Uthbah bin Ghazwān was one of the earliest converts to Islam. He was from a small tribe of Qays but he used to live in Mecca as confederate of Nawfal clan of Quraysh. He immigrated to Ethiopia, returned to Mecca and then immigrated to Medina. He participated in all major battles of Islamic State of Medina.
Maysān was an administrative district of Sasanian Iran. Probably it was around Amarah in modern Iraq in the district of Tigris; Abarqubādh of Arabic sources is Abar-Kawad of Phhalvi sources. It was a sub district of Maysān.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 168.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 172
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 435, 437.
For detailed discussion on date of founding of Basrah see: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), p 98, footnote 245. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 410, 411 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 161, 162.
Ubulla got engulfed by Basrah. Baṣrah ( بَصرَه ) of Arabic sources still survives as Basrah in modern Iraq.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 70, 77.
Umar was worried of any possible excess committed by his troops on conquered populations. After victoty of Qadisiyyah he ordered his generals to write a clause in the peace treaties that ‘We are not responsible to you for the excesses committed by the troops without authorization.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),161).
Tabari enumerates this as one reason of founding of cantonments. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 49.
kufa gave rise to Baghdad, founded in 762 CE; Fustat was annexed by Cairo after 970 CE; Qinnasrin was replaced by Aleppo in the 9th and 10th century. (Gabriel Martine-Gros, in the origins of Islam in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhi.m Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 113). Their population increased tremendously after their inception because prisinors of war from later conquests flocked into these towns and people from all over immigrated to provide services to the newly wealthy Arab elites. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 83).
For date of founding of Kufa see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 434, 437 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 779.
For details see: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916),100. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 434, 435, 436, 438 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 781, 787
For details see: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916),100. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 434, 435, 436, 438 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 781, 787
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 784.
Earlier Islamic sources use the term of miṣr interchangeably for cantonment town and military district. Later Islamic sources use the term miṣr for the cantonment city and jund for the military district.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 784.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 786.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p 786, footnote 1033.
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Tabari uses the word ‘king’ for Rustam, Hurmuz, and Hurmuzān. All of them were actually not fully sovereign kings. They were petty kings – shah. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 66, 91, 138.
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Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 114, 115, 140.
Citation needed
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 67.
Khūzestān of Pahalvi sources is Ahvāz of Arabic sources. It was a province of Sasanian Iran. Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 280, Vol. II. Not to be confused by city of Ahvāz. It was Beyt-Hozāye of East Syriac. See: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 94.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 140).
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 96.
Karun River of modern Iran is referred to as River Dujayl in Islamic sources. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 118.
For example of canals in Khuzestan see: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 96. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 83.
For date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 114.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),115, 116, 118, 119.
The immediate reason of attack, according to Tabari, was Hurmuzān’s provocating raids on Muslim held district of Maysān in southern Iraq. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 115.
The Arab tribes resident of Khuzestan who participated in the campaign were Tamim and Bakr bin Wa’il. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 115.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 121.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 118
Sūq Ahvāz of Arabic sources is Hormizd-Artaxshīr of Pahalvi sources. It is town of Ahvaz in modern south eastern Iran; For location of bridge see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 118, 122.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 124.
Rāmhurmuz of Arabic sources is Ramhormoz, about 100 km east of Ahvaz in modern south western Iran; Tustar of Arabic sources is Shushtar of Farsi. It is Shooshtar in modern southeastern Iran. It used to be the largest town of Khuzestan. See: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), P 95, foot note 241. For its entry in ancient records see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 29, Vol. II; Sūs of Arabic sources is Shūsh of Farsi. It is village of Shush in modern esastern Iran, about 250 km east of Tigris River between Karkheh and Dez Rivers in soughern Zagros Mountains. See: William K. Loftus, Travels and Researches in Chaldaea and Susiana, Travels and Reserches in Chaldaea and Susiana: With an Account of Excavations at Warka, The “Erech” of Nimrod, and Shush, “Shushan the Palace” of Esther, in 1849 – 52, Robert Carter & Brothers, 1857; Jundaysābūr of Arabic sources is Be.t Lapet of East Syriac and Gondishapur of Pahalvi. Its ruins are in a state of neglect fourteen kilometer south of Dezful in modern Iran; Bunyān is unknown locality; Mihrijān Qadhaq is unknown location.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 126, 127
Fārs of Arabic sources was Pārs of Pahalavi. It was a province of Sasanian Iran.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 127.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 131.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 127.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)127,128.
For resistance against the attack see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 128.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 128, 129.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 130.
citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 130.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 130.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 131.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 141.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),132, 133, 134.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 96. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 134.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 94. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),134, 136.
Karka d’Ledan was a sister city of Sūs. It is extinct. See: D. T. Pott, The archaeology of Elam New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 421
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 94 – 96.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 102 – 104. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),135, 136.
A Dutch scientist, D. L. Graadt Van Roggen has spotted the ‘outlet of the water’ which Tabari describes though which Muslims entered the city of Tustar. See D. L. Graadt van Roggen, Memoires publies sous la direction de M. J. de Morgan. Tome VII. Recherches archeologiques, deuxieme serie, Paris 1905, 177. See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 227.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 150. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 83.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 104. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 137.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 139, 140.
Umar wanted to execute him on charges of murdering the Arab ambassadors. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),139.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),140. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 472.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 141.
Aḥnaf bin Qays was from tribe of Tamim and a resident of Basrah: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 119, 124, 141. His actual name was Ḍaḥḥaq bin Qias (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 485
Sebeo gives it a date of 642 CE. (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134). Balādhuri, Ya’qubi and Tabri agree with him (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 475. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 179). See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 85.
Tabari has preserved Iranian arguments on the war of Nahavand, which Tabai claims to have been obtained from an eyewitness. He writes, “The Persians said to one another, “This man, Muḥammad, who has brought this religion to the Arabs, never wanted to undertake anything against us. Then, after his death, they were ruled by Abu Bakr, who did not undertake anything against the Persians either, except one campaign during which he attacked us. For the rest he concentrated on military maneuvers in that part of the Sawād bordering on Arab territory. Then, after Abu Bakr, the Arabs were ruled by ‘Umar. His rule has lasted for some time and he has become so powerful that he could grapple with you and conquer the Sawād and al-Ahvāz little by little. Now he has trampled these territories underfoot, but he will not be satisfied until he has attacked the people of Fārs and the monarchy in the very heart of their country. If you do not rush upon him now, he will certainly launch an offensive against you, after he has destroyed the seat of your monarchy and invaded the heartland of your royal family. The crisis will not be over until you have expelled the last of ‘Umar’s warriors from your country and razed their two garrisons. After that you will have to keep ‘Umar occupied with [defending] his own country and security.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 193, 194). Giving the immediate reason for the war Tabari writes that defeat of Hurmuzan and unscathed escape of A’la’s militia from Fars rang the danger bell in Fars. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 189, 160).
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 471 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 189, 160.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
Ya’qubi adds Iṣbahān to the list of areas which contributed to the war. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
According to Tabari, the Iranian force comprised of troops from all over Sasanian Iran, including Khurasan, Fars, Sistan, Azerbaijan and Jibal. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 193).
Tabari names the commander of Iranian forces to be Fayruzān. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 193. Parvaneh identifies Mardānshāh as Firūzān. (Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. (New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 241.
Rayy of Arabic sources is Rhages and Arsacia of Greek sources. It still exists as a suburb of modern Tehran in Iran (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),67). For its record in ancient geography see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 203, Vol. IV; Qūmis of Arabic sources is Hecacompylos of Greek sources. It is modern village of shahr e Qumis/ sadr darwāzah in Semnan provice of Iran. The city lost its importance after widespread descrution by an earthquake in 856 CE. For its record in ancient geography see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 203, Vol. IV; Hamadhān of Arabic sources is Hangmetana of Pahalvi sources. It is Hamedan in modern Iran. Hamadhān was main town of the province of Jibāl; Arabic sources refer combination of two towns as Māhain. One of them is Dīnavar, the other is Nahāvand.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 471.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 471.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 478.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 478.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 471). Here Balādhuri doesn’t figure out clearly who these ‘Arabs’ would be. Obvious hint is towards those tribes who’s loyality was suspected, like Banu Hanifa.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 471, 472 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 179.
Nu’mān was son of ‘Amr but he is more commonly known as Nu’mān bin Muqarrin. Actually Muqarrin was his grandfather. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 479.
For location of Kaskar see above.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 472.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 473.
Nahāvand of Arabic sources is Laodicea of Greek sources. It is Ladhiqiyya of early Islamic sources, modern Nahavand in eastern Iran. It was located in Jibāl province. (Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. (New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 241).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 473, 475.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 216.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 475. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 213.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 182.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 476, 478. For taking of Hamedan see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),210. See also: Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. (New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 243.
Dīran is unidentified location; Māsabadhān was a district in western Jibāl (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890),132; Sirawān was the main town of Māsabadhān district. (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890),132.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 211, 212, 215.
Citation needed
Stephan Gero, “Only a Change of Masters? The Christians of Iran and the Muslim conquest,” Transition Periods in Iranian History. Actes du Symposium de Fribourg-en-Breisgau (22 – 24 mai 1985) [Studia Iranica, book 5, 1987] 43 – 8.
Iṣṭakhar of Arabic sources is Stakhr of Pahalvi. It was located on the River Pulvar in Fārs province. The district of whole northern part of Fārs was called Iṣṭakhar on its town’s name. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 21, Vol. 1I. Iṣṭakhar was a descendent of ancient Persepolis. Ruins of Iṣṭakhar can be seen five km north of those of Persepolis (Takht I Jamshayd) and about sixty km northeast of modern Shiraz.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 490.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 1, 2.
General Nu,mān bin Muqarrim had died in Nahavand. Umar didn’t want to generate another powerful general cum politician at a time when he could tackle the situation with the help of middle ranking leaders.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),3, 4
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 79
Citation needed
Jayy of Arabic sources is Gabai/Gay of Pahalvi sources. Increasing population of town of Isfahan engulfed Jayy which was originally 3 km south of Yahudiah, the precursor of modern city of Isfahan in Iran.
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 485. See also: Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 247.
citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 485.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 485. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 9.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 490) Hoyland describes Is.t.akhr as mountain stronghold and difficult to defeat. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 85.
Citation needed
Probably it was a region.
Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890). Islamic sources claim that people of Daylam were of Arab ethnicity who had settled here during Sasanian period. Though they are themselves doubtful about the claim. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 24.
Citations
Citations
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 22.
The war was so short lived that Umar got surprised when he received the news of victory almost simultaneously with the news that the enemy had enmassed troops. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 22.
Exact location of the Battle of Wāj al-Rūdh is not known. It was fought somewhere between modern towns of Qazvin and Hemedan in Iran. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 341, Vol. V.
Exact location of the Battle of Wāj al-Rūdh is not known. It was fought somewhere between modern towns of Qazvin and Hemedan in Iran. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 341, Vol. V.
For conquest of Rayy see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 790, 799. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 25.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),30, 31.
Jīlān of Arabic sources is also called Gilān. It was the easternmost coastal region of Caspean Sea. The highlands to its south were Daylam. Guy
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 28,29.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),27, 28.
For the campaign of Elburz mountains see: Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 243, 249, 250, 251, 253. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 67.
Some of these events might have taken place after November 644 CE because according to Tabari the Muslim army was engaged in siege of Rayy when Umar got murdered. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 21.
Dambāwand was the great Mount Damavand that dominated Ṭabaristān and a small town, modern Damavand, to the south of mountain, carried the same name: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 475, Vol. II.; Qūmis of Arabic sources is Hecatompylos of Greek sources, Komis of Pahalvi, and Saddarvazeh of Farsi. It is modern Qumis in northern Iran, about 300 km east of Tahran. The ancient city died in an earthquaqe in 856 CE – Hansman, J. “The Problem of Qūmis”. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1968) 111 – 139.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 422.
Stipends (‘atā) was to be given to many non-combatant Muslims, including prominent new converts.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 423.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 337, 343.
Wellhausen points out if agricultural land would have been devided among soldiers they would have dispersed into countryside and the military effectiveness of Islamic forces would have been destroyed. See: Wellhausen, J. The Arab Kingdom and its fall. Trans. Margaret Graham Weir, (Calcutta: University of Calcata, 1927) 29 – 31, 43 – 44
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 154, 155.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 424.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 424.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 424, 425.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 213.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 338.
Miṣr was old Cairo.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 337.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 438.
When Sa’d built the mansion everybody in Kufa criticized him saying Sa’d has built a palace. This could be the reason it did not become his personal property. It became a governor’s official residence. All governors of Kufa after him resided in this governor house. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 120. Ali converted it into official residence of caliph when he moved the capital of the country to Kufa. Ali used to live in Governor’s house in Kufa. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 98). Worth noting is that ‘Utbah bin Ghazwān built Basrah almost simultaneously with kufa and on the same pattern. He didn’t assign himself a special living quarters in Basrah as other governors had done. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 131).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 438.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 790.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 776
Actually Umar was shocked to see his commanders wearing silk and brocades at the time of his meeting with them in Jābiyah. He rebuked them bitterly. Later, he accepted their apology that they were wearing weapons as well. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 188, 189). Point to note is that Umar snubbed them but didn’t forbid them.
It was during this trip that Umar asked Bilāl to call Azān. All missed the Prophet at this occasion. People were moved by the weeping of others so every body cried. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 104, 105. Bilāl bin Ribāh passed away in 641 CE. He was buried in Damascus. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 176
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 439.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 529.
Financial corruption is abuse of entrusted powers for private gain.
See www.transpancy.org for the latest ranking of countries on corruption.
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 126
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 790.
For action against Nu’mān bin ‘Adi see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 790.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 790.
Abu Bakrah was among those who conquered Ubullah second time under leadership of ‘Utbah bin Ghazwān. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 169
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11 ed., v.s “Politics”.
Citation needed.
For Umar’s further comments about political ambitions of his colleagues see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 217.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 217.
They felt that Sa’d did not distribute money equally among them and did not give them further chances of participating in campaigns. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 191.
For Sa’d’s exoneration in ‘wrong prayer case’ see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 438, 439.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 438, 439 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Muir suspects that jealousy towards Quraysh on the part of Yemeni tribes could be behind the character assassination campaign against Sa’d bin Waqqas in Kufa when first differences arose. (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 180.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 438, 439. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 192.
‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdallah was from Asad. He was a confederate of Banu Ḥublā [of Khazraj], and had accepted Islam during lifetime of Prophet Muhammad. His official designation was that of Ansar. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 4. Umar quickly relieved him of his duties as ad hoc governor and sent him to fight in Isfahan under command of Abdullah bin Budhail. From there he proceeded to fight in Kerman under the command of Suhayl bin ‘Adi. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 8).
After transferring ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdallah, Umar also appointed Ziyād bin Ḥanẓalah of Kalb, a confederate of Banu ‘Abd bin Quṣayy as ad hoc governor of Kufa for a while. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 3).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Citation needed
For appointment of ‘Abdallah bin Mas’ūd as wizi.r see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 5.
‘Abdallah bin Mas’ūd was a slave from Hudhayl [editor says he was not slave, it could be his father]. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),16). He continued to serve in his capacity as wazi.r until reign of Uthman. He developed differences with Uthman on matter of codification of Qur’an. He resigned from his job and took retirement in Medina. He died there in 653 CE and got buried in Buqay’ . (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 99.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 440 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 43.
Many a times the government transfers a personale to save his face. Umar had such option available but he didn’t use it. He wished to show the people of Kufa that their complaints were genuine and were heard.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 440. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Tabari tells that Mughirah personally asked for the office. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 14)
Mughīrah bin Shu’bah had accepted Islam when he killed certain people and their next of kin were thirsty of his blood. Prophet Muhammad granted him political asylum on condition that he accepts Islam. He participated in Tabūk. He was a resident of Medina when Prophet Muhammad died. Anyhow, he did not take any interest in jihad in Syria. He even did not voluntarily join the army that left Medina under command of Sa’d bin Waqqas to fight in Qadisiyyah. Later on, Umar sent him to fight along with other four hundred men from Medina when Sa’d bin Waqqas asked for urgent reinforcements. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 135). He got a chance to be governor of Basrah after sudden death of Utba bin Ghizwan. Soon Umar replaced him with Abu Mūsa al ‘Ash’ari due to Mughīrah’s bad reputation and transfered him to border to participate in the Battle of Nahavand. After Nahavand he settled in Kufa.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787). AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 50.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 51. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 440.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 440. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 50
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 448.
Muir observes that Umar had given a bane to his successor by not trying to clip powers of cantonements. (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 200.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 43, 44
Citations needed
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 772.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775, 779.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 791.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 791.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 791.
For details of groups according to their seniority see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 200, 201, 202, 203. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 140
When Ṣafwān bin Umayyah and Suhayl bin ‘Amr objected to lesser amount of ‘atā’ they received despite their higher nobility, Umar answered that he had given atā’ according to seniority in Islam and not according to ancestral nobility. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 200). Explaining his vision of placement of different people in the merit list of the register, Umar said, “The eligibility to stipend is according to our ranks [as derived] from Allah’s book, and our allotments from the Messenger of Allah. [it is] a man’s achievement in Islam, his precedence in Islam, his usefulness in Islam, and his need [to Muslims that counts]. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 118)
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 199
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 217.
Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 34, 35, 38, 39.
Citation needed
Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 21, 29, 49.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 793.
For presence of police in Kufa see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 63.
For official designation of Muhammad bin Maslamah and his duties see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 190.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 423, 426.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 780.
Some traditionalists believe that it was Mughira bin Shu’ba who coined the term. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 780. It is more likely as Mughira needed to butter the caliph more than Abu Mussa. Mughira was the first to apply for a job of authority by himself after manipulating events in Kufa around 643 CE. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 787. Generally, people used to suggest others for job of authority during caliphate of Umar.
Baladhuri shows Umar being called by title of Amīr ul Mu’minūn by the time of Battle of Jisr, in 634 CE, few months after he came to power. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 404). This early use of this title might be retrospective.
When a person is in position of authority, flatterers are not rare. Somebody called Umar ‘Caliph of Allah’. Umar rejected the proposal disgustingly. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 114.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 114.
We shouldn’t overlook that the title of the ruler was still lengthy. It was ‘Abdallah, Amīr ul Mu’minūn. People abbreviated it as Ami.r ul Mu’minūn.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 424.
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Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 423.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 793
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 793. See also: Anthony, Sean W. “Dionysius of Tell Mah.re.’s Syriac Account of the Assassination of ‘Umar b. al-Khattab,” JNES 69 (2010): 209 – 24
The only surviving fragmant of Ibn Ishaq’s Futuhul Buldan deals with murder of Umar and the appointment of Electoral College. See: Nabia Abbott, studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, I: Historical Texts (Chicago: 1957), 80 – 99.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),93, 94. Theophane the confessor gives the date of November 5, 645: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 42, annus mundi 6137.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 793.
Tabari gives Fayrūz’s full name as Abu Lu’lu’ah Fayrūz. He further tells that originally he hailed from Nahavand. The Byzantine had taken him prisionr during the last Byzantine Sasanian war. He was already a slave when he got captured by Muslims and became a slave of Mughirah bin Shu’bah. The news of Iranian defeat at Nahavand broke him thoroughly. When he saw young captives pouring in Medina he caressed his head, burst into tears and wailed, “ ‘Umar has consumed my liver.”. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 216.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 89. Theophane the Confessor reports that the assassin had converted to Islam: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 42, annus mundi 6137.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 163, 164.). Y’qubi reports that it was ‘Ubaidallh bin ‘Umar himself who murdered Abu Lu’lu’ah. See Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 795.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 92.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 795. For Jufaynah see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 161.
The Tamimi Bedouin had handed over the instrument of murder to ‘Ubaidallah bin ‘Umar, who kept the instrument with him until ‘Umar died. Abd ar Rahmān bin Abu Bakr had told him that he had seen Abu Lu’lu’ah with Hurmuzān and Jufaynah along with the dagger. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 163, 164.
The inscription written by certain Zohair about death of Umar is located at Qa al Mud Tadil (near al Hijr) in Saudi Arabia, dating Umar’s death at 24 AH. The official year of his death is 23 AH. The researchers explain that he died on the last day of 23 AH but was buried on first day of 24 AH. The inscription was described by A I Ghabban “the inscription of Zuhayr, the oldest Islamic inscription (24 AH. AD 644-645), the rise of the Arabic script and the nature of the early Islamic state”, Arabian Archaeology and epigraphy, 19, (2008): 210 – 237.
Umar’s was sixty three at the time of his death. He got buried besides Abu Bakr. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),793, 795.
M. Kawatoko, “Archaeological Survey of Najran and Madinah 2002”, At.lāl: Journal of Saudi Arabian Archaeology, 2005, volume 18, P 51 Plate 8.11 (C). AND Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Rah.mān Rāshad al-Thenyian, Nuqūsh al-Qarn al-Hijri. Al-Awwal Al-Mu’rakhat al-‘Arabiyyah al-Saudia, 2015, Riyad, pp 101 – 102, Plate 16 (a)
For details of contestants see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 785.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 793.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 155 for Khadija, 114 for ali and zayd, 115 for Abu Bakr.
Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 115.
Umar himself was the last convert in Meccan phase of Islam and did not fit at a higher level in the heirchary he wrote.
He excluded Sa’īd bin Zayd from it because of his kinship relations with Umar. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 794.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 794.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),146, 147.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 794.
Tabari reports that the College met first time when Umar was still alive. Umar could overhear their high pitched voices. The dying Umar got so depressed by behavior of his colleagues that he asked them to postpone the College meetings until he dies. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),145, 146.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 796.
Uthman was eighty six at time of his death. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 820. Uthman was a successful entrepreneur. See: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 257. Uthman financed Islamic movement generously. See: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 486.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 136.
Umar left Uthman bin Affan in his place in Medina during his visit to Syria. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775. It is a proof of Uthman’s non-political stature in the eyes of Umar.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 796.
Tabari informs us that Abdur Rahman not only observed the mood in the Electoral College during its meetings, but also consulted widely with notables of Medina. He was convinced that a majority of notables in Medina favoured Uthman over Ali. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),149, 164).
For Abu Bakr’s views see above. For Umar’s views see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 765.
Out of all Talha was away from Medina. He could not contest in the Electoral College. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),149).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 149, 150.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 147.
This is the last entry of Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib in history of Islam. He died in 653 CE at the age of eighty eight. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 99.)
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),160, 161
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 796.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 6
Kirmān of Arabic sources. It coinsides more or less with modern Iranian province of Kerman.
Citation needed
Veh-Ardashi of Pahalvi sources is modern Kerman in Iran. Wikepedia
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 74.
Tabari baskets this campaign in the events pertaining to 23 AH, 343/644 CE: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 74.
Arab sources frequently use dual form to mention the two cities which were located in Qūhistan. Both were two hundred miles apart. Al- Ṭamr was in the west of Qūhistan, Al ‘Unnāb was in the southwest of Qūhistan. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 20, Vol. IV.
citation needed.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 73.
Jīrfat of Arabic sources is also spelled as Jīruft. It is modern Jiroft located about 225 km south of Kerman. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 198, Vol. II.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 34, 35, 36.
Citation needed.
Makrān of Arabic souces is also spelled as Mukrān, see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 179 – 80, Vol. V. It coinsides with more or less Baluchistan provinces of modern Iran and Pakistan.
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 77, 78
Tabari doesn’t name the river. It is guessed that it could be River Indus. Alternatively it could be River Dasht which flows into Indian Ocean near the border between Iran and Pakistan.
‘Ali bin Muhammad al-Kūfi., The Chachnamah, an Ancient History of Sind. Trans. Mirza Kalichbeg Fredunbeg (Hyderabad: Commissioner’s Press, 1900).
Sīwastān is Shehwan, about 130 km northwest of Hyderabad in modern Pakistan, on the West bank of River Indus.
For ka’ba-ye Zartosht see above
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 34
The river in this passage reamians unidentified. Probably it is River Dasht which flows into Indian Ocean near the border between Iran and Pakistan. Alternatively, it could be River Indus.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 35.
‘Umayr bin ‘Uthman bin Sa’d was in Khurasan before this appointment
For Fārs see above.
Citation needed
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 127.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),65, 71, 72.
Tawwaj was a commercial town in Fārs on or near River Shāpūr only 40 miles from Gulf coast. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 56 – 57, Vol. II. It no longer exists. Its exact site is unknown; Dārābjird of Arabic sources is Darb-Gerd of Pahalvi sources. Dārābjird was the easternmost district of Fārs, the chief town had the same name. The ruins of Dārābjird are present near Darab in southern Iran; Fasā of Arabic sources is Pashiya of Pahalvi sources. It is Fasa in modern Southern Iran. Fasā was the district surrounding town of Fasā and it was less than 60 miles west of the town of Dārābjird. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 446, Vol. III, and P 260 – 61, Vol. IV.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 65.
Sābūr of Arabic sources is Bīshāpur of Pahlavi sources. The district surrounding the town consisting of the basin of the upper reches of River Shāpūr carried the same name. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 167 – 68, Vol. III. Its ruins are in Islamabad about 140 km to the west of Shiraz in modern Iran; Jur of Arabic sources is Ardashīr Khurrah of Pahalvi sources. The town and its surroundings was one of the five districts of Fārs. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 146, Vol. I. Also known as Gor, its ruins can be seen about 3 km from Firuzabad south of Shiraz.
For date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 800.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 800.
For the details of the campaign see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 67.
This was a naval campaign. It originated from Oman and Bahraian. The ships anchored at Khuzestan. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 37
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 803.
Citation needed.
For date of attack see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),803. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 68. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 85.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 803.
For details of the campaign see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 67.
Hoyland describes Jur as mountain stronghold. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 85.
See above
Citation needed
Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronile and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam, trans. R. G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 123 – 124
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 490.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 490.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 491.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 80. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 491.
According to Tabari’s account below, Yazdegered was in Merv al Rūdh when Ahnaf reached there.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),87). (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 157.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 53, 54.
For tribal affiliation of Ahnaf bin Qays see above
Tabari erroneously identifies this expedition to the last year of Umar’s caliphate. He gives it a date of 643 CE. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), foot note 327, 53, 74. At another place he describes the same campaign in the year of 652 CE, where he paints it as an expedition sent by Abdallah bin Amir to quell a rebellion in the area. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 111.
Balkh is reputed to be ancient town of Bactra which was hometown of Zoroaster. See: W W Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India 2nd Edition, Cambridge 1951 P 114 f
For georgraphy of Qūhistan/ kohistan see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), P 74, foot note 327.
Ahnaf approached from southwest. The dual form, Ṭabasayn, is not infrequently used for one of the two towns called Ṭabas, Ṭabas al-Tamr and Ṭabas al-‘Unnāb. The two are about 200 miles apart, Al- Ṭamr in the west, Al-‘Unnāb in the southwest of Qūhistān. Assuming he could march through the Great Desert, more or less as the crow flies, Ahnaf would have passed through Ṭabas al Ṭamr on his way from Isfahan to Herat. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 20, Vol. IV. ; Herāt of Arabic sources is Herat in present day Afghanistan. The town sits on River Hari. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 396 – 97, Vol. V.; Naysābūr of Arabic sources is Neeshapur of Pahalvi sources. It is Neyshabur in modern Iran. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 112, Vol. V.; Sarakhs of Arabic sources is Serakhs in modern Turkmenistan. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), 208 – 9, Vol. III; Balkh of Arabic sources is Balkh in modern Afghanistan, 20 km to the west of Mazari sharif. For geography of Balkh see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 479 – 80, Vol. I.
For date see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 157. Sebeos gives further details here.
Balādhuri adds some details. He informs us that the Turk prince Nizak Ṭarkhān met Yazdegerd with presents and entertained him bountifully for one month. Differences between the two men developed when Nizak asked for hand of Yazdegerd’s daughter [probably to guarantee future good behaviour of Yazdegerd after his comeback] which Yazdegerd rejected disgustingly. At the same time Yazdegerd asked Māhawiah to give him account of the taxes he had collected. Both Nizak and Māhawiah realized that Yazdegerd’s behaviour was not befitting of that of a runaway fugitive. They had offered him to restore him to his throne but he demanded favours. So both agreed to put Yazdegerd to death. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 491). Yazdegerd still had a little troops left with the help of whom he fought with the Turks but got defeated at a place called Junābidh, [unidentified location], his troops routed. He fled to the city of Merv but the city refused to open its gates for him. Resigned, he took refuge in a miller’s house on the bank of River Mirghāb. The miller killed Yardagard at instructions of Māhawaih and threw his body in the river. Baladhuri asserts that before death Yazdegerd pleaded to his killer to let him go to the Arabs for safety. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 492.) .
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 86.
Tabari documents this scenario in detail. He states that Yazdegerd was still in Mrev when he wrote to the ruler of Turks (khāqān), asking for reinforcements and to the ruler of Soghdia [may be taken in the wider sense to cover the area between the rivers Oxus and Jaxartes, of which Bukhārā and Samarqand were the chief towns, or more narrowly the district around Samarqand. [See Yāqūt, Mu’jam, III, 409 – 10] for the same reason. His two envoys to the ruler of the Turks and and ruler of Soghdia departed, and he wrote also to the ruler of China asking for assistance. Ahnaf and his commandos were waiting for reinforcements from Kufa. When the reinforcement arrived, they compelled Yazdegerd out of Merv for the last battle. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 54). The rulers of Turks and Ghūrak [Soghdia] were not interested in giving Yazdejerd any kind of assistance until he gets really defeated and crosses River Murghāb to their territory. When it happened, they offered help but just as an obligatory attequate. Yazdegerd crossed the Murghāb River back along with troops of Farghānah [the province of Farghānah streteched for more than 200 mils along the upper stream of the River Jaxartes. [See Yāqūt Mu’jam, IV 253] and Soghdia. Commandos of Ahnaf were handful. They resorted to harassment tactics against the Turk forces. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 56) After a lengthy hide and seek the Turks abandoned Yazdegerd and returned to their land. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 58). This was the exact time when dispute erupted in Sasanian camp. Yezdegerd intended to join the ruler of the Turks or to go to China. Persians considered it a bad idea, going to a people in their own contry, abandoning his own land and people. The Persians doubted the loyality of the Turk ruler. They suggested to Yazdegerd to sue for peace with the Muslims. Yazdegerd refused to agree with arguments of the Persians. In return they abandoned him and did not allow him to take the national treasures (athqāl) of Persia to the land of Turks. The Persians contacted the Muslims for truce and informed them of the development. Yazdegerd crossed the river to reach Farghānāh and to the Turks. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 59). That was the time when, somehow, instead of reaching the Turks unscathed Yazdegerd had to take refuge in a mill on Murghāb River. His own countrymen found him and killed him. They threw his body in the river. He was seeking to reach Kirman. Muslims and ‘polytheists’ both looted his personal possessions. When Ahnaf heard the news he tried to catch Yazdegerd’s family and dependents. They ran to the rule of Turks crossing the river. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 60)
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 157. Actually Seboes gives figure of 542 years.
For Pourshariati’s calculation of Yazdegerd’s pathway of flight from Tyswn to Merv see: Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran. New York; Tauris & Co, 2008. 244, 257.
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Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 493.
Denis Twitchett and Howard J. Wechsler, “Kao-tsung (reign 649 – 83) and the empress Wu: The inheritor and the usurper,” in The Cambridge History of China, Vol III, Part 1, Ed. Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 172), 280. AND Touraj Daryaee, Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall of an Empire, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2009) 37 – 38.
Citation needed
Citation needed
Zaranj of Arabic sources is Zranka of Pahalvi sources. It was capital city of Sījistān. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 138, Vol. III. It is Zarjang in modern south western Afghanistan, about 450 km to the south west of Kandahar; Qandhār of Arabic sources is Kandahar in modern south eastern Afghanistan. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 402 – 3, vol. IV.; Kabul of Arabic sources is Kapul of Pahalvi sources. It is Kabul in modern northeastern Afghanistan. (For Kabul to be part of Sistan and not Khurasan, See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 6.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 6, 75.
Citation for geography.
Tabari says Sījistān had numerous communities. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 76. Turks are reported to be living in Sistan. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 76
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 803.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 34
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 803. See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 75.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 6.
Details of the war are obscure in Tabri’s description.
Details of the war are obscure in Tabri’s description.
For Arab conquest of Sistan see: Clifford Edmund Bosworth, Si.stān under the Arabs, From the Islamic Conquests to the Rise of the Saffarids (30 – 250/651 – 864), (Rome: Istituto Iraliano Per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1968).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 34, 35, 36.
‘Umayr was probably in Khurasan before this appointment.
Purushapura of Xuanzang is Peshawar in Modern northwestern Pakistan.
Xuanzang, Buddhist Records of the Western World, Tranlated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629), Tans. Samuel Beal (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1969).
Xuanzang, Buddhist Records of the Western World, Tranlated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629), Tans. Samuel Beal (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1969).
Khurāsān of Arabic sources is Xorāsān of Armenian sources.
Tukhāristān of Arabic sources is Bactria of Greek sources and Bakhtar of Farsi sources. It forms the northeastern extremity of modern Afghanistan. Its boundaries are Hindu Kush Mountains to the south, Pamir plateau to the west, Tian Shan Mountains to the north with Amu Darya flowing westwards in its center. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 23, Vol. IV; For location of Gorgan and Qumis see above.
Citations needed
One of special ethnic groups residing mainly in Herāt was Hayāṭilah. Humphreys identifies them as Hephthalites or ‘white Huns’ the nomads from central Asia who had settled around Herat. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), P 91, footnote 161.
Citations for Gurgan
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 804.
Abrashahr was main town of the region. It was a near neighbor of Naysābur. During Abbasid period Abrashahr got engulfed by ever growing Naysābur. Actually, the military of Abdullah had besieged Arbashahr. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 91.; Tous of Arabic sources is Susia of Greek sources. It is Tous about 40 km north of Mashhad in modern Iran.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 804, 805.
Būshanj of Arabic sources is Pushang of Farsi. It is Ghourian, about 70 km to the west of Herat in modern Afghanistan; Bādhghīs of Arabic sources is the district of Badghis, to the north east of Herat in modern Afghanistan, bordering Turkmenistan
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 804, 805.
Ṭālaqān of Arabic sources is Taleqa on the bank of Khanabad River in modern Afghanistan, about 240 km east of Mazari Sharif; Fāriyāb of Arabic sources is Faryab district in northern Afghanistan bordering the northern part of Baghdisand; Oxys is Nahr Balkh of early Arabic soruces. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 805. It is also referred to as Jayḥun in other Arabic sources. Farsi sources call it Amu Darya.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 805.
Arabic al Daylam- the people of highlands of Northwest Iran. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),805, 806.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 804.
Sa’īd bin ‘Āṣ was from ‘Abd Shams clan. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 134.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 41.42, 43.
For treaty of Tabaristan with Medinan Caliphate during ‘Umar’s reign see above.
Jurjān of Arabic sources is Gorgan in modern Iran about 30 km from the south western corner of Caspean Sea; Ṭamīsah of Arabic sources is also known as Ṭamīs. It is situated between Ṭabaristan and Jurjān. It is a city on the seashore [of Caspean] at the boundaries of Jurjān. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42. There was a protective wall at Tammisa.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 44.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 54
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 805, 806.
Citation needed
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 14.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 59.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 173, 174, 175
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 19.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 3 19, 20.
Literal meaing of Qaṣr al Luṣūṣ is ‘the stronghold of thieves’.
Medinan Caliphate couldn’t win hearts and minds of people of Jibāl and Hamadhān for a while. Medinan Caliphate had to re-establish its authority over the town in 644 CE when Abdallah bin Budayl bin Warqā’ of Khuza’a Conquered Hamadhān again on his way to Isfahan. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 790. Probably, the fragile agreement imposed on them by Abdullah bin Budayl didn’t last long. In 645 CE, Mughira bin Shu’ba had to conquer Hamedan again. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 799
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 486.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 108, 109.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 79
Bayrūdh was a town in northwet of Khozestan, north of Suq Ahwaz. See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 526, vol I. See also Le Strange
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 69
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 490. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 803. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 85, 86.
Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronile and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam, trans. R. G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 123 – 124.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 68.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 35, 36.
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 319
Arrān of Arabic sources is Albania of Greek sources. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 256). It is Aghvank of Armenian sources, and Ardhan/ Ādurbādagān of some Pahalvi sources. It is roughly Dagestan in modern Russia.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 36.
Ya’qūbi mentions different kings ruling over Azerbaijan. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 807.
For Christianity of people of Azerbaijan see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985)
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 31.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 31.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 31.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 32.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 37.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 32.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 32.
Bāb of Arabic sources is bāb al abwāb of Pehalvi sources: See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 203 – 6, Vol. I. It is modern Darband on the west coast of the Caspian.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 35.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 37.
Mūqān is village of Mughan about 5 Km to the south west of Blasuvar in modern Azerbaijan. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 225, Vol. V
See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 303, Vol. I. Tabari mentions ‘rampart’. Smith suggests that Tabari is talking about this wall. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),38, 41.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 20.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 14.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 37.
This ‘Abd al Rahmān bin Rabī’ah was from Bahila tribe. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 9
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 39.
For location of Balanjar see: See Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 489 – 90, Vol. I. Balanjar no longer exists. Its exact location is not known to modern historians. Archaeologists guess that it might be at the banks of Sulak River (Reka Sulak) in modern Dagestan of Russia; Bayḍa is unidentified place. Tabari tells that it was two hundred Parasangs from Balanjar. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 39.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 40.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 40.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 95.
For date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),807. For the strength and their kufan origin see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 310 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 807.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 310. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 807. Salmān bin Rabi.’ah was from Bahila tribe. He was brother of slain commander ‘Abd al Rahmān bin Raī’ah. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 9 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 40
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 807.
Shirvān is the village of Shirvan about 120 Km south west of Baku in modern Azerbaijan; Masqaṭ is an unidentified location; Lakz is the country of the Lezgins people in southern Daghestan in modern Russia; Shābirān is unidentified location; Filān is unidentified location.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 319.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 305.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 305.
Baylaqān of Arabic sources is Baylagan in modern Azerbaijan, south of Caucasus. It is reputed to have been founded by the Sasanid Qubad; Bardha’a of Arabic sources is Partav of Armenian sources, Barda in modern Azerbaijan, It was the capital of Arrān.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 319 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 807.
River Balanjaar is unidentified. Most probably it is modern Sulak River: Wikepedia
Tomb of Salmān was still present in Balanjar at the time Baladhuri wrote. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 320.
Khazar rule over lower Russian steppe lasted some three centuries (ca. 650 – 969), making them a particularly long-lived example of a steppe empire. The reason for their longevity was their evolution into a highly successful trans-Eurasian trade hub connecting northern forest zones with the Byzantine and Islamic Empires. Moreover, the regime had reinforced its own distinctiveness and independence by converting to Judaism. The Khazars, in short, remained a formidable power and presented the Arabs with a serious challenge on their northern flank, especially in the period 708 – 37 CE, when the two sides came together as equals and battled each other for supremacy of Caucasia. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 20, 21).
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 246.
Empty
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 255. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 246.
Kaegi gives the names of commanders to be Abu’l A’war al-Sulami and Wahb bin ‘Umayr (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 246). But Ya’qubi gives name of Mu’awiya. Kaegi gives the date of 644 (23 AH), against the important Byzantine Phrygian city of Amorion. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 246).
‘Ammūriyah of Arabic sources is Amorium of Greek sources. Its ruins are located thirteen km to the east of modern Turkish city of Emirdag in Afyonkarahisar province.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 255.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 246, 7.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 255.
Heraclius had already removed men from these frontier forts and shattered them. So, when Muslism made their raids, they found them vacant. In certain areas Romans would make ambush by using empty forts and take by surprise those of the Caliphate army who were held back or cut off. Thus the leaders of the summer and winter campaigns, on entering the Roman lands, would leave heavy troops in these forts until their return. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 253.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 809.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 246. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 809.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 166
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 347
Date of event is given by Ya’qubi. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),799. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 351. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 12.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 348, 349.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 348, 349 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 799.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 348, 349.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 350.
See above.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 247.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 247.
For the date see Baladhuri: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 356. Here baladhuri himself is confused and says other possible years are 649 CE or 650 CE. Hoyland gives it an earlier date of summer of 647 CE. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 80. Tabari agrees with Hoyland. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 18. Theophane the Confessor is on the same page. See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 43 annus mundi 6139.
For details of this campaign see also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 80, 81.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 23.
Chronicle of 741, number 24: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 618. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 356.
Ifrīqiyah of Arabic sources is modern Tunis and eastern Algeria. It was Roman-Byzantine province of Africa Proconsularis.
Ibn al Kalbi claims that in pre Islamic times Ifrīqiyah was subdued by Ifriqis bin Qays bin Ṣaifi al Ḥimyari. He killed Jurir [Gregory] its king and said about Berbers, “How barbarous they are.” Hence the names of Africa and Berbers. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 361).
Jurjīr of Ya’qūbī. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 802. Gregory of Chronicle of 741: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 618. Ajall of Tabari. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 19.
Patrician is Baṭāriqah of Arabic sources. It is Patricii of Latin. This was an honorary title revived by Constantine for his closest associates. It gained greater meaning when it was added to the nomenclature of the supreme military commander, a magister utriusque militia in 514 CE. See Jones, A. H. M. The Later Roman Empire 284 – 602 ( London: Basil Blackwell ltc., 1964 reprint: Baltimore: Jonhs Hopins University Press, 1986), 106, 176, 178, 192, 609.
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 42, annus mundi 6138 AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 357.
Ṭanjan of Arabic sources is Tangier in modern Morocco.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 802.
Subayṭila of Arabic sources is modern Sbeitla in west central Tunisia.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 357). Tabari reports that each leader paid three hundered Qinṭārs and hence the total money collected was 2,250,000 dinars. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 23.
One quintal was equal to twelve hundred Dnars; and in Berber language it equaled to one thousand Mithqāls of gold.
The figure is given in Dinars. Dirhams are converted at a rate of ten Dirhams per Dinar for convenience of reading.
The figure is given in Dinars. Dirhams are converted at a rate of ten Dirhams per Dinar for convenience of reading.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 357.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 23, 24
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 184.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 80.
See above.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 788 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 177
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236. See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 166.
Umar was at the verge of accepting Mu’awiya’s proposals when Amr bin As warned Umar of dangers of naval warfare, particularly possible drowning of whole fleet. Actually, when Mu’awiya continued insisting on naval expedition, Umar gave him a concealed threat of dismissal. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 27. Arabs generally shared Umar’s fears of sea. When Mu’awiya strated recruiting for navy, Uthman specifically instructed him not to conscript anybody into navy. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 28, 29.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 90, 91.
Cyprus is Qubrus of Arabic sources. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 30.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236. See also: Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronile and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam, trans. R. G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 131 – 34.
For date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 235. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 184, 248. Ya’qūbi gives an early date of 648 CE: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 802. Theophanes the Confessor agrees with the date of attack to be 649 CE. See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 43, annus mundi 6140.
For the number of ships see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 43, annus mundi 6140.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 31.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236.
Theophanes the Confessor informs that Mu’awiya heard of cubicularis Kakorizos, the chamberlain of Emperor Constans, might move against him with a big force. He quickly decided to sale away to Arados [Arwad in modern Syria]. See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 43, annus mundi 6140). That might be the reason he didn’t land into Cyprus.
Urkūn of Arabic is Archon of Greek – semi independent ruler.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236.
Tabari believes that Muslims allowed the people of Cyprus keep paying tax to the Byzantine but compelled them to get approval from Medinan Calphate before installing anyone as their patriarch. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 31)
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236.
A contemporary inscription records mass enslavement of ilanders by Arab Muslims during the raid. See: Jean Des Gagniers, Rene Ginouves and Tam Tinh Tran, Soloi: Dix campagnes de fouilles (1964 – 1974), Volume premier (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l’University Laval, 1985 – 1989), 115 – 125.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 236.
For Armenia byzantine alliance at this time see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 305 AND Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 134.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 138, 139, 140.
For date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 807. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 196. Baladhuri gives an earlier year of 646 CE for this invasion. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 311. Theophanes the Confessor gives 653 CE to this campaign of Ḥabīb: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 44, annus mindi 6145.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 309, 310.
Ḥabīb bin Maslamah must be still young as his age is stated to be thirty five at the time of his death in 662 CE: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 320.)
For other names of the city see above.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 309, 310 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 807.
Lān is unidentified location; Afkāz of Arabic sources is Abkhazia region in modern northwestern Georgia; Samandar of Arabic sources is modern Tarki in Dagestan. See: Alan Kevin Brook, The Jews of Khazaria (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2018. In 650’s it was under control of Khazars. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 310.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 312, 313, 314.
For other names of Dabil see above.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 318. See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 807.
Uthman transferred Ḥabīb after his triumphs in Armenia to Syrian Roman border. He was a Shi’a Uthman and participated in Siffin from Mu’awiya’s side. After active military service he took retirement in Homs. He died in Damascus in 662 CE. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 320.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 305.
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 44, annus mundi 6142. Theophanes the Confessor notes the truce was for only two years and assigns 652 CE to it. For Theodore Rshtuni’s alignment with Mu’awiya, see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 44, annus mundi 6143.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 144, 145. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 185, 194.
In line with the terms of the truce Mu’awiya received Gregory, son of Theodore, brother of Heraclius, as hostage. (Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 44, annus mundi 6142).
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 185.
Hoyland thinks news of death of Yazdegerd would have disheartened him. (Robert G Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 90). It is very unlikely as Theodore Rshtuni was in Byzantine camp. Why should he have bothered about death of Yazdegerd?
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 158, 159. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 196.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 197.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 160.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 162, 163.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 162, 163.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 167.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 168.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 172.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 173.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 175, 176, 177. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 197.
Theodore Rshtunik died in captivity. Arabs were generous enough to let his body returned to Armenia to be buried in his ancestral graveyard. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 176, 177. Kaegi guesses this event to have taken place in 655 CE. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 185).
Neres, the chief priest [Kat’oghikos] of Armenia, who had fled to Constantinople during Arab invasion, returned to Armenia six years after the death of Theodore. People of Armenia received him with joy and restored him on his previous position. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 178.
Medinan Caliphate had trampled Armenia, but failed to win hearts and minds of people. Byzantine Rome was always ready to take advantage of the situation in Armenia. In the year Neres returned to Armenia, people of Armenia revolted against Arab hedgemoney. Emperor Constans quickly appointed Harazasp, the lord of Mamikoneans as Curopalate. (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 180). In retaliation Medinan Caliphate killed one thousand seven hundred and seventy five Armenian hostages they were holding as a guarantee of obedient behavior on the part of Armenians. They left only twenty two hostages alive for future bargain. They included three sons and one brother of Hamazasp, whom they freed in return for arrest of Hamazasp. (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 181.). This event would have taken place by 660 CE because immediately after that Seobeos describes first Arab civil war.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 198.
See: Robert W. Thomson, “Muhammad and the origin of Islam in Armenian Literary Traditions,” in Armenian Studies in Memoriam Haig Berberian, ed. D. Kouymjian, (Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1986), 829 – 858.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 198, 9.
Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 195.
For Constans presence in Drezene while receiving the diplomatic note see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 160).
Derzene is village of Tercan in Erzincan province of modern Turkey on the bank of Tuzla Stream.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 321
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) 93
Empty
Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 503 – 512.
Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 503 – 512.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 99.
Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 108.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 187.
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 195.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 772.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167, 168.
Sebeos hist. c. 30 (96 Macler, 124 Bedrosian). Kaegi believes Seboes might be reproducing comtemporary Muslim apologetic arguments to justify the conquests. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 214).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),138, 139.
Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, Trans. Franz Rosenthal, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).
For Particia Crone’s theories of explaination see: Patricia Cron and Michael cook, Hagarism: The Making of Islamic World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 305.
Citation needed
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 244.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 97.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 194, 195.
Charles Schefer, “Aboul Hassan Aly el Herewy, Indications sur les lieux de pelerinage (exraits),” in Arcchives de l’Oreint Latin Tome 1 ed, Comte Riant, (Paris: Societe de l’Orient Latin, 188) 590
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 223
John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 182. Not only this, some of them joined Muslim armies in arms. See: John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 201.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 440, 441, 442.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 487, 488.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 19.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 426
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 785
For some of their names see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 785
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 160.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 42
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 75
‘Ali bin Muhammad al-Kūfī, The Chachnamah, an Ancient History of Sind. Trans. Mirza Kalichbeg Fredunbeg (Hyderabad: Commissioner’s Press, 1900), preface.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 158.
For statistics of Kufa see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 122. For statistics of Basrah see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 121
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 95.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 428.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 158.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 158
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 19, 20, 157.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 5, 19.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),799, 800.
When he started living in Medina after the sack, once Uthman tounted him with the fact that his replacement in Egypt was generating more revenue than him. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 799, 800. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 24).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 440 See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 801.
Sa’d bin Waqqas had lost his job in 642 CE during Umar’s tenure but Umar had decided in principal to hand Kufan governorship to him before his death. Uthman carried out Umar’s decision.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 5, 16.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 803.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 803.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),799, 800.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 440.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 440.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 350. Officially he belonged to ‘Āmir bin Lu’ayy clan of Quraysh but he was milk brother to Uthman. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),175.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011). 421.
Abdullah bin Sa’d was working in tax department of Egypt under Amr bin As’s governorship. When friction between Uthman and Amr deepened over financial matters, Uthman stripped Amr of control over tax revenues (Kharāj) of Egypt and appointed Abdullah bin Sa’d the chief fiscal officer independent of Amr. The two men were bitterly at odds. Abdullah wrote to Uthman that Amr had refused to turn over the tax revenues. Amr wrote to Uthman that Abdullah had used the stratagem of war against him. Uthman dismissed Amr and appointed Abdullah over both the tax revenue and the army. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 24).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 800.
Father of Walīd bin ‘Uqba was prisoner of war in Badr. He was going to be executed when he shouted ‘who will care for my little children? Hell fire, said the Prophet. Then he got executed. See: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011). 42. See also: Ma‘mar ibn Rāshid. The Expeditions. Ed. Joseph E. Lowry, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015). 41. AND William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 207
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 17
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),803. ‘Abdallah was from ‘Abd Shams clan and was the son of Uthman’s maternal uncle. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 34.
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 5, 16.
Initial population of Kufa was twenty thousand. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 436. For later increase in its population see above.
Those who participated in the earliest wars of Futuhul Buldan and Qadisiyyah . See for the name: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 56
For the word see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 77.
Citation needed
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 200.
Citation needed
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 95.
The gift was the same across the board. It amounted to five percent riase for financially weak Arabs who used to get two thousand Dirhams as annual stipend. It was less valuable for richer Arabs and probably meaningless for the richest.
Muir observes that Uthman’s increase in stipends at his ascention gave promise of extravagance during his government. (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 198.
For total years of service of Walīd bin ‘Uqba see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 17.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 17
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 50
All people who brought case against him were from Alh al Ayam. They were Jarīr bin ‘Abdallah, ‘Adī bin Ḥātim, Ḥudhayfa bin Yamān and Ash’ath bin Qays (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 801.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 801.
The case was politically motivated. According to Tabari the residents of Kufa bitterly divided into two groups over this case. Ordinary folks (‘ammah) were on Walīd’s side. Elite (khāṣṣah) were against him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 54.
Ya’qūbi taunts that ‘Uthman did not punish ‘Uqba because he was his brother. ‘Ali had to take law in his hand to punish him. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 801). Tabari’s narration is quiet opposite. He discloses that a trail did take place. Evidence against Uqba did not implicate him in the crime beyond reasonable doubt. The accusors could not produce a single eyewitness who had seen him drinking alcohol. The two witnesses they produced could state to the maximum that they had seen alcohol draining from his beard. Uthman still flogged him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 54).
Sa’īd bin ‘Āṣ’s father got killed in Badr fighting against Muslims. (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 208. Uthman raised the orphan. When he grew adult he immigrated to Syria and lived with Mu’awiya. There he earned a reputation of being a man of opinion. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 56, 57.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 120
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),59, 60). See also: Leone Caetani, Annali Dell’islam, Milan: Ulrico Hoepli, 1905 – 1707), P 360 – 62, Vol. VII; and M. Hinds, “Kufan Political Alignments” international Journal of Middle East Studies. 2 (1971).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 60
See above.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),61, 63, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121.
For their names see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 125.
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 122
Muir opines that partly the soldiers in cantonments were conscious that success of Islam was due to their arms and partly they believed that in their eyes, in the spirit of faith, all Muslims, especially of Arab blood stood on equal grounds. (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 199)
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 53, 54.
The Qurayshi clan of ‘Abd Shams further contracted to the descendents of Umayyah during Uthman’s tenure as most influencial men during Uthman’s era belonged to the narrower group.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),160, 161
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),797, 798.
Tabari uses the world Shi’ah in sence of a faction, not lovers. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 142; Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 55.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 797.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 797.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 797.
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Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 816.
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Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 799.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 799.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), P 802. See footnote 1117.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 808.
Zayd bin Thābit was from Ansar. He remained loyal to Uthman citation.
See, for example, above mentioned event of stoning a woman to death.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 813.
Ya’qūbi. doesn’t give the detail of difference between Uthman and Abu Dharr. Tabari divulges that Abu Dharr pressed on Uthman to bring a legislation to compel the rich citizens to give away their amassed wealth in alms to the poor. Uthman took a position that it was not his government’s policy to interfere into personal lives of people except where they don’t fulfill prescribed religious duties (farāiḍ). Distribution of accumulated wealth in alms should be voluntary. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65, 67).
For Abu Dhar’s real name and epithet see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 234.
Abu Dhar had participated in wars against Byzantine Rome in Syria. There he developed his thoughts on political economy.
For the details of the farewell see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 814.
Abu Dhar al-Ghifari constructed his home and a mosque in Rabadha during his exile in 651 to 652 CE. The great mosque of al Rabadha, which according to Muslim chronicles was destroyed in an earthquack in 735 CE (biographer of Muhammad ibn Ka’b describes his death in that mosque due to earthquack), has been excavated by Sa’d bin Abdulaziz al Rashid. (Sa’d bin Abdulaziz Al-Rashid, “The discovery of Al-Rabadha,” in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhi.m Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 433 – 439, Abu Dharr died in Rhabada in 653 CE in state of exile. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 100)
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 223, 224.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 223.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 225.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 224.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 224.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 224.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 224.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 816.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 816.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65, 67.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65, 67.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65, 67.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65, 67.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65, 67.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 139.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 801
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 225
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 226
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 80.
Tabari reports that ultimately governor Walīd could execute the killers and it furthered the anti Quraysh sentiments among ahl al Ayam. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),46, 47, 48.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 795.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 795.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 798.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 798.
Citation needed
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),798.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 798.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 798.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 286.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 800.
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 127.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 19, 22.
Ifranjah is unclear location. Humphreys guesses it could be ‘Franks’ or it could be a local population who accepted Islam. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 22, Footnote 37.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 23
In 626 CE an alliance of Sasanian Iran, Huns of the west (Avars), Bulgars, Sklavinians and Gepids attacked Constantinople. Iranian general Shahrbaraz attacked Chalcedon [by land] while Avars approached Constantinople from Thrace. They brought dug out boats through Danube and filled the Goden Horn with them. The forces besieged the city for ten day by land and sea. They got defeted by “God’s power and cooperation and intercession of His immaculate virgin Mother.” Avars withdrew to their country. Shahrbazar wintered at Chalcedon. (Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982),22, 23 annus mindi 6117)
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 144, 145.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 144, 145. This battle impelled Constants II to sign three years truce with Mu’awiyah on Mu’awiyah’s terms regarding Armenia. (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 144, 145.).
For the date see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 103). Kaegi assigns 655 CE to this event. See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 185, 248. See also: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 169). AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 45 annus mundi 6146. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 71
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 106. See also: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985),169.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 169.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 168.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 169.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 72.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 169 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 94.
Chalcedon is ancient town of Bithynia. Currently absorbed by Kadikoy neighbourhood of Istanbul in modern Turkey.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 170.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 170.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 171.
Sebeos doesn’t mention clash of Pheonox which took place in open sea between the fleet of Medinan Caliphate and about five hundered ships brought by Byzantine Rome as a first engagement of Battle of Masts. Emperor Constans commanded the Byzantine navy personally. The Byzantine fleet got defeated. It was only after this defeat that Constans II escaped on a boat to reach Constantinople and started praying to God. The battle of Pheonix is mentioned by Tabari (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 74, 75) and Theophane the Confessor: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 45, annus mundi 6146).
Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 103.
Mention of hurricaine is totally abscent in Muslim sources. It reaches us only through non-Muslim sources, like Sebeos. Apparently Umayyads, during whose tenure events of Futuhul Buldan were primarily written, didn’t wish it to be mentioned. Its absence in Muslim sources is telltale. It gives us an indirect clue that the natural disaster was being used against legitimacy of Uthman as a caliph.
Blackout is a well known technique in journalism to keep masses unaware of a development. As blackout is not possible without government advisory, it also gives us an indirect clue that government departments kept a keen eye on what was being published by Muslim writers during Umayyad period. We would not have been able to know about the hurricaine provided Christian sources would not have recorded it for the sake of posterity. It gives us another clue, as important as the previous ones, that non-Muslims were left on their own in the field of intellectual persuits.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 816.
For the date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 816.
Sometimes he is referred to as ibn Sawdā’ Because he was a son of a black woman. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),145.
He is enigmatic because Tabari is the only among early traditionalist who mentions him.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 145, 146.
The verse of the Qur’an ‘Abdallah bin Sabā’ used to advance his arguments was: 28:85. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 146.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 146.
Muir summarizes the causes of rebellion against Uthman into two mutually interwoven denouements. Clash of interest between Quraysh and other Arab tribes and mutual jealousy of clans of Quraysh. (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 199
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 225.
For the word of majālis see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 164.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 133.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 147.
Some senior citizens of Medina, form example Ammar bin Yasir, joined them. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),147, 148).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75, 76, 77.
Muḥammad bin Abi Ḥudayfah was a young man because ‘Abdallah bin Sa’d called him ‘foolish boy’. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75, 76.; Muḥammad bin Abu Bakr was a young man of twenty one years. He was three years old at the time of Abu Bakr’s death, see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 134
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),175, 176.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 227.
Asmā’ Bint ‘Umays, the mother of Muḥammad bin Abu Bakr, was wife of Ja’far bin Abu Ṭalib. Later she married to Abu Bakr. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 141; Lamenting on death of Muḥammad bin Abu Bakr, Ali said “Truly he was a son to me, and a brother to my children and nephews. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),850.; Tabari reports that Muḥammad bin AbuBakr had bold manners due to which Uthman had always been contemptuous of him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 228
Follower of Ibn Sabā’ were called Sabā’iyyah. For the name al-Sabā’iyyah see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 154.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 817, 818.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 155.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),155, 156,157, 158.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 157.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 157, 158.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),141, 142, 143.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),141, 142, 143.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),141, 142, 143.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 143, 144.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 136.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 136, 137, 138, 139, 149, 150.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 136, 137, 149, 150.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 136, 137, 149, 150.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 809.
Abdul Rahman bin Awf died in 654 CE. He was 75. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 99).
When Uthman’s supporters urged him to use force against the rebels Uthman disagreed with them. He said that force could be used only against those who violate a Divine commandment [ḥadd] or commit disbelief [kufr]. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 155, 159. He reiterated his stance when rebels returned to Medina and gave him a choice between death or abdication. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 198.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 150.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 151, 152.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 152.
Empty
Concerned about the safety of Uthman in Medina, Mu’awiya also offered to Uthman to settle in Syria. Uthman preferred to die in Medina near the proximity of the Propeht. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 153).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 138, 139.
The ten prominent dissidents, who had been exiled by Othman previously, had reached the town secretly by this time to lead the riots. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 133).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 138, 139.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 140
For date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 148.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 148.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 154.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 159, 160.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 172.
He was stating in private that the true intention of Egyptian rebels was not to perform ‘Umrah but to first compel Uthman to abdicate, and if he refuses, to kill him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 172).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 199, 200.
After hearing death of Uthman and nomination of Ali in his place, Abdullah bin Sa’d fled for his life and took refuge with Mu’awiya in Damascus. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),176). He participated in the battle of Siffin from Mu’awiya’s side. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 15.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 159, 160.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 172.
Abdullah bin Saba, did not play a prominent role in events at Medina that led to the murder of Uthmn and selection of Ali. However, he remained staunch supporter of Ali and participated in Battle of Camel from his side. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),105. He disappears from historical sources after Battle of Camel.
For Uthman being threatened see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 817, 818.
For Amr’s embassy see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 817, 818. For Ali’s embassy see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 173, 174. For Talha and Zubayr see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161, 162.
All messengers complied with Uthman’s request. No body wanted to be singled out as sympathizer of the rebels.
For Egyptions being more radical see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 184.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 168.
After the agreement Uthman told the Medinites during a Friday sermen that he who possesses a field must go out to his field, and he who possesses milking animal may milk it because no body would get stipend. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),168).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 162
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 818 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 162, 168, 169. See also: M. Hind “The Murder of the Caliph ‘Uthman,” international Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (1972).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 189.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819 AND ‘Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 185.
Tabari states that Uthman had written to all governors of cantonment towns for help but only Mu’awiya’s efforts advanced the preliminary planning phase. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),163).
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 321. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819.
Tabari reports that Aisha tried to convince her brother Muḥammad bin Abu Bakr to abandon his intentions but he refused. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),208)
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819.
Tabari mentions this event along with actual murder of Uthman. He states that the treasury was located in Uthman’s residence. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 216.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 166.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 207.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 163, 165.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819, 820 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 166.
After barring Uthman from the mosque, Ghāfiqi, one of the rebels led the prayer. All rebels attended prayer behind him. That was the time Medinese dispersed and remained indoors. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 166).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819.
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 166.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161, 207.
William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 228, 230.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 206, 216, 218.
For accidental killing of Niyār see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990) 200.
Banu Umayyah decided to defend Uthman by force when rebels broke into his house. Uthman didn’t allow them to do so. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 200).
Marwan got seriously injured in the skirmishes. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 201, 202.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 820
‘Amr bin Ḥazm was from Najjār clan of Ansar. He fought in some of the Prophet’s battles and was appointed by the prophet over the people of Najran; Kināna bin Bishr was from Tujīb clan. For his clan affiliation see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 219; ‘Amr bin Ḥamiq was of Khuzā’ Tribe; ‘Abd al Raḥmān bin ‘Udays was of Balawi clan; Sūdān bin Ḥurmrān was from Sakūn clan of Murād. For his tribal affiliation see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 215, 219). He had participated in the battle of Qadisiyyah.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 200, 219.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 172.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),190, 205, 215, 218, 219.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),205, 206, 216, 219.
Uthman kept reciting Qur’an as a form of worship during his besiege. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 211)
The rebels and Ansar of Medina didn’t allow family of Uthman to bury him in Baqi’ the usual Muslim graveyard of Medina. When the dead body started decaying, his family took it to a place in Medina known as Ḥashsh Kawkab at night to dispose him off in earth. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 820. For Ansar not allowing Uthman’s burial in Baqi’ on the ground that it was a Muslim graveyard, see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 248). Ḥashsh Kawkab was the burial ground of Jews of Medina. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 246). No formal funeral took place, nobody prayed over the dead formally. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 820). Later on, when Mu’awiya became caliph, he ordered the Ḥashsh Kawkab to be razed and transferred the body of Uthman to Baqi’. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 246).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 820 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 199. AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 45 annus mundi 6147.
For some prominent names who kept supporting Uthman in Kufa, Basrah, and in Medina see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),164, 165, 166, 185, 186.
F. Imbert, “Califes, Frinces et Poetes Dans Les Graffiti du Debut de l’Islam”, Romano-Arabica 2015 volume 15 pp 65 – 66 and P 75 (fig. 3). The discover gueses this inscription to be written in 656 CE.
See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 38, 57.
See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 38, 57.
Tabari states that all killers of Uthman met a violent death ultimately. Their killing started minutes after the murder. A freedman of Uthman killed Sūdān bin Ḥumrān on the spot. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 216). The vengeance continued. The last one to be identified and proceucuted as killer of Uthman was ‘Umayr bin Ḍābi’. He got caught when Ḥajjāj bin Yousuf, the Umayyad governor of Kufa, ordered conscription [against Khariji] in Kufa and ‘Umayr had to produce his CV. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 233
For the name see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),36).
Leaders of Medinan Caliphate with foresight had been afraid that one day the conquerors will fight with each other for re-distribution of wealth. When Umar saw the booty of Julala heaped in the courtyard of the Prophet’s mosque, laden with rubies and chrysalides peridotites and other gems he burst into tears. Abdur Raman bin Awf, who was guard on the booty, asked him the reason of crying on this auspicious occasion. He said “by Allah, He never gave this to any people without that giving rise to mutual envy and hatred. I pray Allah that they won’t quarrel over it; otherwise fighting will be their lot.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),46).
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 181. 182. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 128
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 821.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5. Few of Ansar, like Muhammad bin Maslamah and H.assān bin Thābit, remained neutral in the dispute: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 6).
According to Tabari Malik al-Ashtar played a major role in assuring that prominent members of Muhajirun pay allegiance to Ali: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5, 12, 14.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 15
See the names of people who spoke on this occasion: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
For contents of their speeches see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823, 824.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 238.
Actually, many prominent Quraysh left the town when the rebels beseiged Uthman in his house. Their purpose was to clear their name from the murder trail which was going to take place in future history books. The list includes Aisha, Amr bin As, Sa’d bin Waqqas, Zubayr bin Awwam and Talha bin Ubaydallah. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 12. Some of the Ansar, who were not opposed to Uthman also left the town. The list includes Maslamah bin Muhammad, Ḥassān bin Thābit, and Zayd bin Thābit.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 12
Walīd bin ‘Uqba participated in Siffin from Mu’awiya’s side. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 15. Then he disappeared in anonymity.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
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Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),822, 823.
For the name Shi’a Uthman see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 479. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),150. For the name ‘Uthmāniyyah. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 187.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 207, 256
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 98
The three founder members of Uthman party asked Ali to let them keep their wealth, Ali refused it: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
See above.
For Ali’s statement see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
A section of Arab elites had amassed astronomical wealth. They were the one who took a risk of attacking superpowers at a time when outcome of war was uncertain. The amount of booty they could gather was more than what others could gather after them. Two factors helped them growing rich further. One, all military personels were tax excempt. Second, the traditional norm of voluntarily sharing the wealth with poor fellows had dwindled due to urbanization and availabity of stipends for many poor from government side. Problem of unequal wealth distribution among Arab elites was first noticed during Umar’s tenure. Umar is on the record that he wished to snatch wealth from the rich and give it to the poor. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 141). Umar’s wish never materialized. We don’t know what were Umar’s limitations in this regard. We do know Uthman considered any such legislation against the constitution of the county – Islam. He stressed that any such transfer of money should be on voluntary basis. (See above)
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011). 35, 36
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011). 482,528.
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Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 210
Ali advised Umar to nationalize the land of Swad for later generations: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 423. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),782.
Tabari asserts that Ali’s criticism on Uthman was so relentless that Uthman decided to conduct affairs without him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 236).
We don’t know exactly how Ali earned his livelihood before immigration. He might be a poor person at the time of his immigration and marriage to Fatima. Anyhow, as time passed he no longer remained poor. We hear that he was beneficiary of estates which state used to allot to its leading citizens time and on. Both Prophet Muhammad and Umar bestowed him estates. (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 21). 29). One of his estates were in Yanbū (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 22
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 18.
Though none of Muhajirun of Medina had shown up at the oath taking ceremony of the new caliph.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 18.
Ali’s opponents could point out that it was only Ali out of all members of Electoral College who did not leave the town at the time of murder of Uthman. Mu’awiya blamed, later on, in a letter to Qays bin Sa’d that Ali secretly urged the rebels to kill Uthman (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 181).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 190.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 824.
Only Ya’la bin Munya of Yemen had served longer than him. Abu Bakr appointed Ya’la on a part of Yemen after Ridda Wars and he continued to govern it until his dismissal at the hands of Ali (see above and below).
William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 256.
As a matter of fact sources don’t report any clash of interest among fighters of Syria from start of Futuhul Buldan to the end of it. The participants of Qadisiyyah, who later settled in Kufa and Basrah, started quarrelling with each other for leadership immediately after Qadisiyyah. Sa’d bin Waqqas had to cast lots to choose leader of prayer when they quarreled with each other on this issue so rabidly that Sa’d feared that they would use swords. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 126). Not only this, they had criticized Sa’d’s behavior during the battle. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 141. On the same line, when Amr ordered his men to attack on Egypt, one of soldiers from Yemen said “we are not made of stone or iron.” Amr said, “Shut up, you dog,” that man retorted “in that case you are the upper dog” [commander of dogs]. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 174.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 287.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 72, 73, 74.
This was not an isolated case of amalgamation of provinces. Medinan Caliphate didn’t need many governors responsible directly to the caliph. It incorporated all newly conquered and newly subjugated areas of Sasanian Iran into Basrah and Kufa. It also amalgamated Maghreb in Egypt.
Actually, those who had converted to Islam after Fathe Mecca were recognized as a distinct entity. They were called Muhājirat al-Fath. ( Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 133) and ahl al-fath. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 200
The ten dissident exiles raised this issue with Mu’awiya during their debates with him. He agreed with them that others surpass him in standing in Islam. That time he boosted about his capabilities and claimed that Umar would have dismissed him if he didn’t see any capability in him. He appraised them that he is not the one who brings any innovations into Islam. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 123, 124.
See above.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 26, 43.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 27.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 30, 31.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 32.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 32.
Probably Ali had not anticipated this scenario. He might have had a wrong perception that, just like in cases of his predecessors, provinces would follow the suit once Medina takes oath with a caliph.
Ali had his supporters from the beginning of Uthman’s caliphate. Their basic argument was that Ali was better suited to caliphate as compared to Uthman. Uthman, on his part, had not encouraged anybody to counter Ali. Now, two groups evolved in Muslim community who strived to quash each other.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 824.
For Qays bin Sa’d’s tribal affiliation see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 176. Qays had honor to be a companion of the Prophet and he held banner of Ansar. during Prophetic times. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 183. Qays was son of Sa’d bin ‘Ubādah who had demanded caliphate for Ansar after death of prophet Muhammad.
Ansar used to get minor jobs, for example ad hoc governor of a minor province but they never got governorship of a major province. Uthaman gave governorship of Jazirah to ‘Umair bin Sa’d of Ansar after coming to power for a few months while he was amalgamating Jazirah with Syria. He worked under Mu’awiya for this job. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 287.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160.
For different sites of their camps see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160, 161.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161, 162.
‘Amr was first born of Uthman. Khkwān seems to be a son of Walīd bin ‘Uqbah from a Jewish woman from Ṣaffūriyyah, a village near Nazereth. The point is that a person with such a dubious descent could hardly claim to be the avenger of his lineage.
See for their name: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 91.
It was not merely apathy towards the political process on their part. They deliberately kept themselves aloof of any dispute. They used to call themselves ‘those who have removed themselves from the conflict’. They adopted a policy of wait and see. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 91.
Ali’s envoy to Mu’awiya and Mu’awiya’s envoy to Ali both agree that there was no political discord in Syria. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 30, 31.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 48
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5, 12, 14.
Zubayr wished governorship of Kufa and Talha wished governorship of Basrah: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825.
Ali had tactfully refused Talha and Zubayr any governorship. He first promised to Talha governorship of Yemen and to Zubayr governorship of Yamama and Bahrain. Then he took back their commissions citing their manifest greed as a cause. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825, 826.
Governor of Mecca had always been a scion of Umayyad family. After long tenure of Aṭṭāb bin Asīd, ended by his death, Uthman appointed Khālid bin ‘Āṣ, another Umayyad on the post. He was still governing Mecca at the time of Uthman’s death. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 238). Mecca did not produce a single dissident to rebel against Uthman. Uthman appointed Abdullah bin Abbas leader of pilgrimage for the last pilgrimage during his caliphate because he was afraid that the pilgrims from cantonments might harass his governor of Mecca Khālid bin ‘Āṣ in case Uthman gives him authority over pilgrimage. In that case, Uthman feared bloodshed in the sanctuary. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 238).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 40.
Citation needed
‘Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 39
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825, 826. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 238.
See: The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muh.ammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 110.
The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muh.ammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 94.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 211
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826, 829.
Citation needed
Ya’qubi asserts that Ya’la joined the army with his funds on the way to Basrah. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 827.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 43.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 827.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826, 827, 828.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),63, 64,65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72.
See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 77.
They killed a total of six hundred men in retaliation of murder of Uthman. None of Uthman’s rebels survived in Basrah except one person who escaped to his tribe. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 97.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
For date see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 76.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 43.
After consolidating grip on Basrah Aisha wrote a letter to people of Kufa warning them not to harbor Uthman’s rebels among themselves. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 75).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 27
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 27
Kharbitā was a town in Nile Delta near Alexandria. For its location in ancient sources see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 416, Vol. II. It is now extinct.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 32.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
Actually, when Ali abandoned Medina as capital of Caliphate, whole Hejaz became a backyard of Medinan Caliphate. All Medina retained during later years was its law school. Mecca, inflamed again by the uprising of ‘Abdallah bin Zubayr, had only one raison d’etre left, pilgrimage. Hejaz remained part of the country because caliphs had to go for pilgrimage. Mansur (754 – 75) did it five times and was fortunate enough to die and get buried there. Harun al-Rashid (786 – 809) did it nine times. (Julien Loiseau, in Arabia and the Holy Cities in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhi.m Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 409).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 81.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 82.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 52, 86.
Talha and Zubayr maintained that they were not bound by the allegiance because they had given it under pressure. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),45, 57).
Otherwise, it is also possible that Ali perceived ‘Meccan Alliance’ a softer target, Mu’awiya’ had already communicated to him that he had got sixty thousand fighting soldiers. Mywrods For Mu’awiya’h’s communication see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 31.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
For location of Dhū Qār see above.
See: M. Hinds, “Kufan Political Alignments” international Journal of Middle East Studies. 2 (1971).
Muir observes that inhabitants of Kufa were predominantly Yemeni Arabs and those of Basrah were predominantly north Arabians. William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 125.
Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī. The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011). 531.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
Tabari claims that Ali had nominated ‘Umārah bin Shihāb as his governor over Kufa to replace Abu Musa at the time he fired all the governors, but a band of Uthman’s sympathizers blocked his entry into the town and hence the town remained in Abu Musa’s hands. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),26, 28).
Abu Musa was of opinion that the question who should rule Medinan Caliphate should be resolved amicably inside Medina by the companions of the Prophet. They should not pull the non-companions into the dispute and should not fight with each other for it. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),87, 88). He was ‘neutral party’.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 93.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 96.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 832.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 121
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 121
Empty
Khurayba literally means little ruin. It is said to be ruins of old Sasanian city of Marzpān near town of Basrah. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), P 829, footnote.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 121
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 142.
Tabari mentions tribes of Quraysh, Kinanah, Asad, Tamim, Ribab, Muzaynah, Abdul Qays, Bakr bin Wa’il Taghlib, Madhhij Bajilah and Azd who came from Kufa to join Ali’s camp (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 114. Abdul Qays defected to Ali before war. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 120). Tribes of Hawazin, Sulaym, Amir, Ghatafan, factions of Bakr bin Wa’il, Azd, Quda’a, Ghassan, Najiyah, Dabbah, some other Yamani tribes took part from Meccan Alliance’s side. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),120, 130, 135,136).
Yamani tribes fought from both sides. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),134. Tribes of Rabi’ah, Mudār, and Yaman also fought from both sides. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 133
For date and place and name of the battle see: (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 829.
For ferocity of the battle see: (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 829.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 136.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 831.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 829.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 830.
Tabari paints it as a planned event of Tamim rather than accident. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 112.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 127.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 831.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 160
The reputed tombs of both Talha and Zubayr still exist in Basrah
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 165.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166
Ziyād bin Abu Sufyān was one of those who re-conquered Ubullah under command of Utba bin Ghazwan. He was fourteen years old at that time. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 172
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 832.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 102.
We don’t know why he did not re-appoint his previous governor ‘Uthmān bin Ḥunayf
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 831.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 827.
Citation needed
Probably Zubayr wished to make his case strong in eyes of common Muslims by demonstrating that he was brother in law of the Prophet through Aisha. Isn’t it he was facing son in law of the Prophet.
Actually, people also criticized Zubayr on inciting Aisha for such an action. Aḥnaf bin Qays commented about Zubayr: Never I have seen anything like this. He brought the wife of Allah’s Messenger, driving her on, and ripped from her the veil (ordained) by Allah’s Messenger. Yet he concealed his own wife in his house” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),830).
After being captured in the Battle of Camel Aisha was at Ali’s mercy. Ali forgave her with open heart. Aisha commented on this: there was nothing between her and Ali except what usually happens between a woman and her son in law. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 170 . Aisha however couldn’t forgive Ali whole of her life. She couldn’t hide her joy when she heard news of Ali’s murder. After defeat in Battle of Camel Aisha never participated in any political activity. She limited herself to narrating sunna of prophet Muhammad to early hadith collectors. She lived a long life. She was still alive during era of Marwan (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 354), She died in 678 CE at the age of sixty six. William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 251. She had a comfortable life money wise. She continued to owe a property in Khaybar, which she had swapped during reign of Umar in lieu of her share in annual dates from Khaybar. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad: kitāb al-Maghāzī. Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob. (London: Routledge, 2011), 354),
Ali lost another chance of forming an inclusive government. Ashtar was particularly unhappy by Ali’s decision to appoint Abdullah bin Abass as governor over Basrah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 103)
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 77.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 46, 47
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 44.
Tabri reports that Sabā’iyyah in Ali’s army had dashed all hopes of negotiated solution of the problem by pre-emptly striking the army of ‘Mecca Alliance.’ They were afraid that Ali might agree to punishing murderers of Uthman as a result of the deal. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 104, 105). Muir points out that Ali had won the war with the help of some Kufans involved in rebellion against Uthman. Thenceforward he depended upon their support. (William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 250). Ali lost the last chance of winning over Shi’a Uthman by promising trial of Uthmans murders.
At least three hundred Qurrā’ pariticipated in Battle of Siffin from Mu’awiya’s side. They were also present in Ali’s forces in the same battle. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),45, 51, 76).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 833, 839.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166
For Ali’s entry in Kufa see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 832.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 82, 83.
Ūrḍ was a place between Palmyra and Ruṣafah. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 644, Vol. III. Now it is extinct.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 143
See above.
At least this was the reading of Mughira bin Shu’ba.
See above
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166
For example, once Qays bin Sa’d opined that Ali lacks judgement (ra’y). (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 142, 143.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 149.
For example, once Amr bin As exclaimed that Mu’awiya was a genius of management and governance. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 106).
Mu’awiya’h gained supporters in Iraq and Egypt (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 183, 184
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),836. See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 160, 166).
Tabari assigns 36 AH [June 30, 656 to June 20, 657] to this event. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 191 .
For Marwan’s role in Battle of Camel see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823, 829 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 127.
For Amr bin As’s residence in Palestine see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 171. For fear of blame see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 192, 193, 194.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),833, 834, 835. 836.
Tabari reports that Amr was not going to accept Ali as caliph as he did not expect any governorship from him. He waited patiently if Talha succeeds in his attempt. After battle of Camel Amr was left with no choice. It was he who contacted Mu’awiya. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),194, 195).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 833, 834, 835. 836.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 836.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835.
Ya’qubi stresses that both Mu’awiya and Amr knew that they were the least entitled to mention Uthman as both of them had abandoned him at the time of his murder. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 836.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
Sa’d bin Waqqas did not take allegiance to Ali. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 9.
Sa’d bin Waqqas remained non-political during rebellion against Uthman. He offered his services to Uthman to defend him when he got besieged. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),166). He was never a candidate of caliphate. He did not answer request of some rebels to be a candidate for caliphate after murder of Uthman positively. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),192. He had taken retirement from active politics after serving as ambassador of Medinan Caliphate to China. He attended proceedings of arbitration between Ali and Mu’awiya as observer. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 105. This was his last political activity. He was blessed with a long peaceful life. He continued living in Medina and died there in 674 CE.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 833.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 111.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 98
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 180
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 27, 177, 179.
Muhammad bin Hudhayfah remained staunch loyal of Ali. He got killed fighing against Amr bin As. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 175.
See above
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 183.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 180
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 180
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 181
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 182, 183
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 183
Qays disliked Ali’s mistrust on him but he remained staunch supporter of Ali. Initially, after his dismissal, he returned to Medina as protest. After a few days he joined Ali in Kufa. He participated in Siffin from Ali’s side. After Siffin Ali appointed him lieutenant governor over Azerbaijan. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 864). Later, Ali appointed him chief of his forces in Kufa.
For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 189
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 104.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 5.
Citation needed
Citation needed
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),837.
Taghlib and Namir were still non Muslim. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 62, 286.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 3.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 59.
Ali had with him Ansar, Khuza’ah, Kinanah, Amir bin Sa’sa’ah, Tayy, Azd, Khath’am, Bajilah, Madhlij, Hamdan, Dibab, Kindah, Bakr bin Wa’il, Abdul Qays, etc. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 35, 37, 41, 42, 52, 53, 54, 55, 62 ). Similar tribes were on the other side. Mu’awiya had Lakhm, ‘Akk, Ash’ar, Bahila, Tamim, Himyar, Ghassan, Tanukh etc. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),35, 46, 52, 53, 59, 71, 72).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 53
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838.
For location see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),838. Siffin was located on the right bank of the Euphrates between Raqqah and Bālis. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 219, footnote 1042. Also see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46 annus mundi 6149.
For date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),838 AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46 annus mundi 6148.
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It was Hajj season
As Ali was ruling over the lands of Mecca, and he was caliph, he had to send Abdullah bin Abbas to lead the hajj. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 20).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 18
For truce of Muharram see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 20. For negotiations see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838. For restart of combat see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 29 – 33.
Julius Wellhausen, Das Arabisches Reich und sein Sturz, Berlin: George Reimer Verlag, 1902), 51
In a lighter vein: soldiers from opposite side used to gather together in the evening after the skirmishes were over and used to socialize. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 68.)
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839.
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46, annus mundi 6148.
Islamic sources report that Ali had secured water supply by fighting at the beginning of the war. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 11
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839, 840. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 2.
One example of presence of ‘neutral party’ in Ali’s army could be Ash’ath bin Qays. He led a wing of Ali’s army but he was not Shi’a ‘Ali. He served as Ali’s lieutenant government only after Ali won Battle of Camel and established himself. Ash’ath was a lieutenant governor for Uthman. He continued to serve in different positions under Ali. He was instrumental in opposing appointment of Abdullah bin Abbas, a Shi’a ‘Ali, as arbitrator. Abu Musa Ash’ari, who was known ‘neutral party’, got appointed as arbitrator only due to Ash’ath’s efforts. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 82
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839, 840.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839, 840.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839, 840.
Tabari adds that if the arbitrators failed to find a solution to the problem in Book of Allah, they were allowed to resort to the just precedent (al-sunnah al-‘ādilah), which unites and does not divide. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 86
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 843.
Citation needed
Kharijis arose during Siffin: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
None of the Khariji belonged to Mu’awiah’s army. All of them arose from ‘Ali’s camp.
Arabs used to call foreigners ‘Kharji’. For example, Nāfi’ bin Azraq was a Roman slave resident of Taif at the time of its siege by the Prophet. The name of his tribe is mentioned as al-Kharji by Baladhuri. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 86).
Tabari shows Ali using the world Khariji for Shi’a Uthman of Egypt. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 144.
William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 266,267.
Actually, they had difficulty choosing their own leader. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 115). Anybody, who would be their leader, would indirectly appear to be more meritorious than others.
The term is derived from the name of the village from where they used to oppose Ali. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 90.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),845.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 844.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 101
William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 273.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 844.
For clan affiliation of ‘Abdallāh bin Wahb see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 115.; For clan affiliation of ‘Abdallah bin Abi Awfa see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),99.; For clan affiliation of Shabath bin Rib’I see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 98.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 116
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
Citation needed
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 844.
‘Abdallāh bin Wahb was called Dhu al Thafināt by his compaions. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 116. Dhu al Thafināt means the person with marks. A person who offers ṣalāt regulary, excessively and for long term, eventually develops pigmentation on his forehead and the knees. However, everybody doesn’t get the pigmentation. To some extent it is related to the style of prostration ( سَجدَه ). Those who rub their forehead on the ground are more prone to develop pigmentation.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 844.
Ḥarūrā’ was either a village or a district either on the bank of Euphrates or one of its branches. Ya’qūt describes it very near to Kufa. Fishbein locates it roughly 3 km south of Kufa. Michael Fishbein 1990 P 92
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
For Ali’s version of being tricked into arbitration see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 79
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 849.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 143, 190.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 152, 184.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 849.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 849.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 849.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),152.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848, 849.
Tabari reports that political air in Egypt was that of boldening against Ali as they had seen Ali leaving Siffin empty handed. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 190).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 159
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 153
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848, 849. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),156.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848, 849.
It appears that support of Muhammad bin Abu Bakr had gradually decreased, even among Shi’a Ali. Amr wrote to him before the encounter that the people of this land have agreed on opposition to you and rejection of your rule; they have repented of following you and are forsaking you (hummuslimūka) for matters have come to a head. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 153). On the same lines Tabari opines that by the time of Amr’s attack on Egypt majority of the population was Shi’a Uthman. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 153, 154.
Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848, 849.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 159.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 161
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 163
Amr bin As ruled Egypt peacefully, and probably semi independently, in the name of Mu’awiya Bin Abu Sufyan until his death in 663 CE. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358) By that time Mu’awiya had gained control over all provinces of Medinan Caliphate. When Amr’s son ‘Abdallah assumed governorship of Egypt by default, after Amr’s death, in an attempt to convert governorship of Egypt into a dynastic affair, Mu’awiya ordered him to step down. ‘Abdallah had no choice but to comply. Mu’awiya appointed a man of his own choosing, Mu’āwiyah bin Ḥudaij, as governor over Egypt. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 589). This Mu’āwiyah bin Ḥudaij was from Kinda tribe. He was a prominent leader of Shi’a Uthman in Egypt. He had joined Amr’s army at the time of invasion to Egypt. He is the one who hunted down and killed Muhammad bin Abu Bakr. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),848, 849).
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46, annus mundi 6146.
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46, annus mundi 6150). See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 185. Hoyland gives this event date of 659 CE. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 104.
Theophanes the Confessor gives the amount in Nomismata. Dirhams are converted at a rate of ten Dirhams per Nomismata for convenience of reading.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 840.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 840.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 841.
Tabari adds that they could also use just precedents of Arabia (al sunnah al-‘ādilah) in case they didn’t find a solution from the Qur’an (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),85, 86). This assertion might be true because at a later date, when the decision of arbitration was known, Ali rejected it saying “they have passed judgment without any clear proof or accepted precedent (sunnah Māḍiyah). See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),119.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 842.
They selected Dūmat al Jandal being equidistance from kufa and Damascus, so observes from both sides could attend if they wished. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 86
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 843.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 842.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 842.
See some neutral names who attended delibrations of arbitrators regularly: bū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 105.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 842, 843.
This was Abu Musa’s last political assignment. He was old. He took retirement in Mecca. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 110).
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 843.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 148.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 109, 159.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 6.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 119.
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 119.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 114. The three point formula was that Ali did not prevent them from praying in the grand mosque of Kufa, he expressed his willingness to pay them from the booty if they participate in wars from his side, and he reiterated that he would not strike them unless they strike him first. The Khariji’s used to chant their slogans during the aggregation prayers in grand mosque of Kufa making delivery of khutba difficult for Ali.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
They also killed Ḥārith bin Murrah of Abdul Qays, the inspector of Ali, whom he had sent to investigate the crime. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 125, 126.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
The demand of the state was to hand over the killers of ‘Abdallah bin Khabbāb. They took a stand that each one of them was the killer and that even in future they won’t mind killing anybody attached to the government of Medinan Caliphate, including Ali himself. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 127.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847 . AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 137.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847 . AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 137.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 136
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 110.
Empty
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 2.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),772.
When Ali came to know soldiers of Basrah Cantonment were not willing to report in the camp organized to raise army against Mu’awiya after war of Siffin but before operation of Naharawan, he asked his governor Abdullah bin Abbas of taking severe action against anybody who absents himself from his post in disobedience of the government. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 121).
Citation needed
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 122
Let’s take one example. In a heated debate in Medina during his last days, Uthman said to Amr bin As, “I possess greater glory than you through my next of kin in the Time of Ignorance and before I acquired my present authority,” ‘Amr replied, “Stop this! Praise be to Allah, who honored and guided us by Muhammad. I saw [my father] al-‘Āṣi bin Wā’il and I saw your father ‘Affān, and by Allah al-‘Āṣ was nobler than your father!” Uthman was caught short and said, “why should we referring to the Time of Ignorance?” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),171).
See for example, above
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 142
For example of such arguments see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845, 846
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 130
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 64
For Ash’ath bin Qays see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),860); For Yazīd bin Qays see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),860); for Nu’mān bin al ‘Ajlān see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),861, 862); for Ziyād bin Abu Sufyān see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),868.; for ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abbas see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),869;
See, for example, activities of Khirrīt bin Rāshid (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),171 – 184.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 181. 182.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),850. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 187.
Later, after a defeat at the hands of military forces of Medinan Caliphate Bakr bin Wa’il re-converted to Islam, when they faced death panelty in case they don’t. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 188
See above.
See above.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),832. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 99.
Ja’dah’s mother was Umm Hāni bint Abu Ṭālib. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 140).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 183, 203, 204
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 850. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 171 – 184.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 183, 185, 186, 191
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 188, 192, 193, 194).
later on, a frustrated Ali commented that the maximum he would have done with Maṣqalah was to arrest him and detain for a while and raise whatever money he could get by selling his left over property. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 194. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 850).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),58, 59, 60.
Shi’a Uthman of Iraq remained adamant in their political thinking. Now, they were simply Shi’a Mu’awiya. They kept supporting Mu’awiya’s endeavors to govern the country. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 98.
For example Mālik bin Misma of Bakr bin Wa’il was open supporter of ‘Uthmāniya. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 166.)
See for this event and his name: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 166.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 166.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 166.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 167.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 168.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 168.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 168.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 169.
For Jāriyah’s clan affiliation see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 855, 856.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 170.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 170.
For details of these penetrations see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 851, 853.
Quṭquṭana was an oasis near Rahimya about 25 km from karbala
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 854.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 855, 856.
Mu’awiya ordered to avoid harassment of Meccans probably, because it was Mu’awiyah’s hometown and it had showed enmity to ‘Ali.
Date of this campaign is calculated from the fact that this was the last event in political life of Ali: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 859.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 856, 857.
Killing of minor children was a war crime in Arab traditions, even during pre-Islamic times. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 857.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 858, 860.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 208
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 201.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 209
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 879, 880.
For date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 880. See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 213 AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 47, annus mundi 6151.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 879, 880.
Ali was sixty three at the time of his murder. Hasan prayed over him and he was buried in Kufa at a place called Ghariyyān. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),880). Ghariyyān were two structures with a rich pre-Islamic history located outside Kufa. See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 506, vol I. Harun ur Rashid ordered building of tomb on Ali’s grave in 791 AD.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 880, 882.
Ali specifically forbade Hasan, his son and future caliph, to investigate anybody else in his murder except the one who physically killed him. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 222
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 879.
Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 182. See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 104.
See above.
Stories of Mu’awiya being behind murder of Ali might have been circulating among Christian intellectuals for centuries. Michael the Syrian, writing in twelfth century CE, claims that the assassins of Ali were on pay role of Mu’awiya who killed Ali treacherously. See: Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriach of the Syrians, ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, (Long Branch, N. J.: Sources of the Armenian Traditions, 2013) 125.
Previously, Abu Bakr had led small expeditions personally when main body of his army was away. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 47.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 225
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 813.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 813.
Probably Ali used to spend whatever he got. He was reduced to poverty, informs Ya’qūbī. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 813. It might be true. The time he died he left only seven hundred Dirham cash in inheritance which was owed by one of his servants. We know he had an estate in Yanbu and that one of his sons used to live there and died there. Ali is a popular figure among Muslim ascetics due to his hand to mouth living.
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 69.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 829
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 160, 166.
For the date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 880.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 218
Hasan might be thirty six years old because he was born almost two years after immigration to Medina. He was the first caliph in Islam who was born Muslim with both parents being Muslim. He might be about eight years old when Prophet Muhammad died. He did not see Prophet Muhammad in his adulthood. He was not a Companion in true sense of the word. After attaining adulthood he took job as a soldier in the army of Medinan caliphate. He served in 651 CE campaign of Khurasan in this capacity under command of Sa’id bin As. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42). He was at the side of his father from beginning of Ali’s caliphate. He participated in Siffin from Ali’s side (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 41
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 858, 860.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 218
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 2, 3.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 7.
After S.iffi.n ‘Ali transferred his services as Leutient governor of Azerbaijan, he had now joined as commander of Kufan division.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3
Abdullah bin Abbas had broken up with Ali few months ago after the later alleged him of embezzlement of money. He resigned from the office of governor of Basrah and scooted to Medina with heavy pockets. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 210, 211, 212.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 7.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 225.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 5, 7
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3, 4.
Maskin was a district along the Dujayl canal west of the Tigris River above Baghdad
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3, 4
White palace (Qas.r al-Abyaz) was official residence of Shahanshah of Sasanian Iran in Ctsephon. It was abandoned ghost house by that time.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 9.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 4, 5
Later people of Basrah refused to honor this concession. “It is our fay’” they objected (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 11).
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 5, 10
Qays bin Sa’d lived a peaceful life afterwards. He died in c. 679 CE.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 11
When the caravan reached Qadisiyyah, people halted them and criticized Hasan for dishonoring his Arabs. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 12).
Ilyās of Naṣībīn gives date of Hasan’s truce July 25, 661. See: Friedrich Baethgen, Fragmente Syrischer und Arabischer Historiker, (Lichtenstein: Kraus Preprint Ltd., 1966), 25
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Josef Wiesehofer, Ancient Persia, New York: I. B. Taurus, 1996.
Robert Browning, The Byzantine Empire, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992.
Umar was familiar with concept of body guards because Khalid bin Walid had a body guard contingent during war of Yamama for his personal protection. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 132
When Hurmuzan came in presence of Umar after his arrest he was astonished by absence of bodyguards around Umar. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 137 – 138.
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 223
(Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 5
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 223.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 766.
Citation needed
Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),185.
Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 856
Citation needed