Political Development – IV

Sympathy for Uthman

The murder of the beleaguered Uthman started a wave of sympathy for him among Arab elites throughout the country.  Actually, the support for Uthman had not collapsed to zero in the cantonments.  Out of sixty thousand households of Kufa, for example, only six hundred to one thousand ventured out to rebel against him.  The remaining ninety-eight percent of the population was either Uthman’s supporter or at least neutral. ¹

Murder was the most heinous crime in the eyes of Muslim Arabs.  As the news of the murder spread to the far-off districts of the Rashidun Caliphate, the silent majority expected that whoever becomes the next caliph should punish the culprits according to the law of the country.  This might be the time when a certain Qays etched on a rock in Tayma, “I am Qays, the scribe of Abū Kutayr. Curse of Allah on [those] who murdered ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān and [those who] have led to the killing without mercy”.²  Qays not only curses those who murdered Uthman but also those who led to the murder.  The political rivals of the next government were all set to cash in on this wave of sympathy.  The rebels had killed Uthman in Medina, which was declared a Haram by the Prophet.  Further, they killed him during the sacred month of Dhu ‘l Hajjah.  Uthman’s sympathizers were apt to point it out as an outrageous sin. ³  Common people might have been hoping that the people who physically murdered the caliph should be brought to the book.  The political opponents of the next government, contrary to this, counted everybody who participated in the long march to Medina as the culprit.⁴  It was definitely a canny position to hound the next caliph.⁵    

Trumpets of civil war

The violent death of caliph Uthman unleashed the political turmoil that was looming over the Rashidun Caliphate for a few years but was restrained by a regard for the sitting caliph.  The events of the next five years, usually referred to as the First Arab Civil War (Fitnatal ‘Ūlā) plunged the Rashidun Caliphate into a bloody war that was free for anybody to participate.⁶   Historians might be divided on reasons of Futuhul Buldan between religion or worldly wealth but none of them is divided on the reasons for the First Arab Civil War.  All are unanimously clear that the war had nothing to do with the spread of Islam.  It was all about the re-distribution of wealth generated by Futuhul Buldan and about which of the Companions would supervise its distribution.⁷  They say uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.  Yet, there has never been a scarcity of heads who wish to wear the crown.  Managing fellow humans is such a pleasant excitement that men sacrifice their families, wealth and even lives for it.  In the case of the Rashidun Caliphate, it was understandable that whoever would govern the country after Uthman, would not only have sweeping powers over humans living in a vast land extending from Tripoli in the west to Merv in the east and from Bab in the north to Aden in the south, but he would also have access to an exorbitant amount of cash, property, and other resources.  And who that lucky one would be, the sword would decide.  No arguments would be strong enough to settle the dispute.  The winner of this gory war, that would be fought in the field of battle, in the domain of propaganda, and in the arena of religious portending, won’t be the one who is more pious or who has been closer to the Prophet of Islam, but the one who is more pragmatic, who is closer to resources.

Sebeos, who is the first to give us a glimpse of this war narrates, “Then God sent discord into the army of the sons of Ishmael.  Their unity dissolved, they clashed with each other and divided into four parts. One part was in the Indian area.  Another was that army which held Asorestan and the northern areas.  Another was the one in Egypt and in the T’etal region.  Another was in the Tachik area and at the place called Askarawn.  They began fighting with each other and destroyed each other with endless killings.  Now the troops who were in Egypt united with those in the Tachik area and they killed their king and took the multitude of treasures as loot.  They enthroned another king and returned to their places.  Now when their prince Mu’awiya, who was in Asorestan and was second to their king, saw what had happened, he united his troops and he too went to the desert.  He killed the king whom they enthroned, battling with and severely destroying the troops in the Tachik area.  He then returned to Asorestan in triumph.  Now the army that was in Egypt united with the Byzantine emperor, made peace and was incorporated.  The multitude of the troops, some fifteen thousand people, believed in Christ and were baptized.  But the bloodshed of countless multitudes increased and intensified among the Ishmaelite armies.  They engaged in frantic battles and killed each other.  Nor were they able to stop even somewhat from wielding swords, taking captives and intense battles on land and sea, until Mu’awiya grew strong and conquered all of them.  He subdued them, ruled as king over the property of the sons of Ishmael and made peace with everyone”. ⁸

Let’s sort out the details of the First Arab Civil War.  But before we start, let’s look at our modern understanding of the civil wars and their reasons.

Modern political scientists staunchly believe that like any other war, a civil war is fought over limited resources.  Yet, limited resources are a permanent feature of life but civil wars are not.   A country should meet certain social conditions for the start of a civil war.  Walter recognizes an uncertain political system, widespread political resentment, and fractionalization as crucial risk factors for the start of a civil war.  Furthermore, the presence of certain people in the society is needed who promote factionalism.  Walter calls them ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’.  They play on all factors available to fractionalize a society, including race, religion, and ethnicity.⁹

Selection of Ali as caliph and birth of the ‘ Uthman party’

Five days after the murder of Uthman, Ali took the oath of the office of caliph on June 23, 656 CE.¹⁰

Uthman had died without prescribing any mechanism to select a caliph after him.  Medina was in a state of mayhem.  The Egyptian rebels held the position of kingmaker and they were in cahoots with Ali.¹¹  The earliest converts, who were members of the Electoral College that chose Uthman twelve years ago, namely Talha, Zubayr, Sa’d and Ali did not sit together in a meeting to choose the next leader from among themselves.  We are not sure whether they wished to do so either. Ansar, who felt to be sidelined by the first three caliphs, had openly aligned with Ali.¹²  The rebels seated Ali on the pulpit of the caliphate.¹³  The Ansar were apt to accept him as caliph.¹⁴  Here, a point to note is that none of the rebels tried to snatch the caliphate for himself.  None of the Ansar claimed it for themselves.  Prominent members of tribes other than Quraysh, for example, Asad were present in Medina.¹⁵  None of them demanded the top post.  The principle that the caliph will be from one of the Quraysh and those who converted to Islam earlier will be given priority survived the murder of Uthman. Almost all the rebels returned to their homes after Ali’s oath-taking.¹⁶

None of the Muhajirun made a speech during the inauguration ceremony of Ali.¹⁷  It was addressed by a multitude of Ansar, all applauding Ali, one after another.¹⁸

It was an assumption in the population of Medina that whoever would take the oath of Caliph after the murder of Uthman would be suspected of being an accomplice in the crime.  Abdullah bin Abbas, a Shi’a Ali, had warned Ali of this hazard.  Ali didn’t pay heed and thus he was suspected of Uthman’s murder.¹⁹, ²¹, ²²  Once in the safety of their hometown, they refused to recognize Ali as caliph. ²³  They demanded Ali register a case against the murderers of Uthman and bring them to justice to prove that he was a genuine guardian of each and every Muslim before he could expect an oath of allegiance from them. ²⁴  This was the birth of another political party, known later as Shi’a Uthman (Shi’ah Uthmān شِيعَه عَثمان ) or simply Uthmaniyah (Uthmāniyah عُثمانِيَه ).²⁵

Membership of Shi’a Ali or Shi’a Uthman was not a permanent affair during First Arab Civil War.  People used to turncoat easily.  For example, Qa’qa bin Amr (Qa’qā’ bin ‘Amr قَعقاء بِن عَمرؤ ) of Tamim, the commander of Kufan military garrison, was pro-Uthman.  He even organized a force to protect Uthman from murder.²⁶  When Ali camped at Dhu Qar he changed sides to Ali and participated in the Battle of Camel from his side.²⁷  Worth noting is that prominent members of the Uthman party were not merely power seekers.  Some of them were afraid that Ali would confiscate their wealth on a charge of corruption during Uthman’s era.²⁸

In his speech of acceptance, Ali pledged his agenda to run the government according to the Book of Allah and the Sunna of His Messenger.²⁹  He shifted away from the tradition of the Rashidun Caliphate that the sitting caliph was further obliged to follow the precedents set by his predecessor caliphs.  This was the old stance he took during deliberations of the Electoral College that picked Uthman as caliph. ³⁰  He further made it clear that he won’t mind if anybody doesn’t join his camp because he disagrees with his agenda, a veiled hint towards Shi’a Uthman. ³¹ The speech might have given emotional consolation to Shi’a Ali but it might have left a wider audience perplexed about how was he going to fix the pressing problems of lawlessness in the country, political dissent among Muslims, and uneven distribution of wealth in the society. ³²  He did not touch any of them in his inaugural speech.  His speech strikingly lacked a reconciliatory tone which was a need of the hour for the rifting country.

Ali in an awkward situation

Ali was a man of the sword.  His martial career started at the Battle of Badr where he was the first respondent of the dual challenge extended by Utba bin Rabi’a (‘Utbah bin Rabī’ah عُتبَه بِن رَبِيعَه ).³³  However, we don’t hear of any big campaigns led by Ali during the Prophetic times.  His campaigns against Banu Bakr, Fuls, and then Yemen were minor engagements by any standard.³⁴  He did not serve as a political advisor to Prophet Muhammad. The only time when we hear the Prophet sought his opinion was his family matter of event of ifk.³⁵  Probably he was too young to participate in such advisory meetings during the Prophetic times.  Or maybe the Prophet did not see his presence necessary as the clan of Banu Hashim was represented by the Prophet himself.  Later on, during the Rashidun Caliphate, he served as an advisor to Abu Bakr and then to Umar.³⁶  He was head-to-head with Uthman from the beginning of the latter’s caliphate.  That explains why Uthman never consulted him on any matter.³⁷  Ali did not get a chance to serve as a governor or a general under any of the previous three caliphs.  By looking at Ali’s curriculum vitae it becomes apparent that he did not have extensive managerial experience.  It became his weakest point immediately after his ascent to power.³⁸

With little managerial experience in his credentials, Ali took the reins of a country in his hands that was in shambles. The public exchequer of Medina had been looted by the rebels and the caliph didn’t have a single penny to run his administration.  The central government faced the task of re-asserting its authority over provinces. Ali had come to power after remaining twelve years in opposition and his supporters had high expectations from him in terms of personal benefits like governorship of provinces.  Ali was primus inter pares like his predecessor and anybody could criticize him at any time, at any place and in any way.  The precedent of organizing opposition to the sitting caliph was already present in the country, this time Ali was going to face it.  Last but not least, Muhajirun of Medina demanded the immediate arrest of the murderers of Uthman and their execution.³⁹, ⁴⁰  Ali responded that he was not in a position to do that as the rebels were ruling over Quraysh and not vice versa at that particular point in time.  He insisted that investigations into murder cannot be started before people of cantonments calm down and come to their senses.⁴¹  Ali’s reluctance to even denounce the murder encouraged the Shi’a Uthman to blame him as an accomplice to the murder.⁴²

The first shot of the civil war

When the rebels gave Uthman a choice between death and abdication, the latter chose death.  Explaining his decision he said, “By Allah, I would rather be brought out and beheaded than remove a shirt [of the caliphate] that Allah has placed upon me.  [In that case] I would be abandoning Muhammad’s community to civil war.”⁴³  Uthman’s death removed the last hurdle from the path to civil war.

The first step towards any civil war is sustained disobedience towards the government by one faction. This step was accomplished by Mu’awiya within weeks of Ali being sworn in.  The first decree Ali could issue was the dismissal of all provincial governors appointed by Uthman, except Abu Musa Ash’ari, (who was governor of Kufa).⁴⁴  It could be his attempt to re-enforce the central government’s authority over provinces.  All obeyed except Mu’awiya.

Mu’awiya had been governing Syria for the last sixteen years.  He was one of the longest-serving governors of the country. ⁴⁵  Arab settlers of Syria consisted of the earliest recruits of the Rashidun Caliphate.  They had more reverence for the Quraysh as compared to Arab settlers of other areas.⁴⁶, ⁴⁷ Anti-Quraysh sentiments never ripened in Syria.  Mu’awiya had another special advantage over other governors of the Rashidun Caliphate.  All new provinces of the Rashidun Caliphate had cantonments. Governors had to struggle to keep the residents of cantonments satisfied.  Mu’awiya’s province didn’t have any cantonment.  It relieved him of the headache of managing a community of privileged class and reduced any chances of complaints against him with the central government.  He withstood Umar’s scrutiny of his governors successfully.  When Uthman came to power he, being his distant cousin, bestowed Mu’awiya with further benevolence.  During Umar’s time, Jazira was a province in its own right.  Uthman amalgamated Jazira and all the frontier districts with Byzantine Rome into Syria and gave its charge to Mu’awiya.⁴⁸  Later on, he did the same with the province of Jordan (‘Urdun).⁴⁹, ⁵⁰  He not only had hands-on experience in management, but he was also a recent war veteran.  From the War of Yamama to the assault on Constantinople, a lot of campaigns were on his credentials.  In a nutshell, Mu’awiya had a curriculum vitae that was superior to that of Ali and others in the field.  His only setback was that he did not associate himself with Islam until Fath Mecca and he was conscious of his setbacks.⁵¹  He knew his name was far down in the hierarchy of the Rashidun Caliphate when compared to Ali and others.⁵²  He didn’t demand that he should have been proclaimed caliph instead of Ali.  He simply said that obedience to any sitting caliph was a constitutional duty of the subjects only if the caliph himself withheld the constitution.  By neglecting the murder case of Uthman, Ali had not abided by the constitution of the land.  (By that time, Ali had already announced that he didn’t have the power to punish the culprits).⁵³

Ali asked Sahl bin Hunayf (Sahl bin Ḥunayf سَهل بِن حُنَيف) of Ansar to proceed to Syria and take over the governorship from Mu’awiya.⁵⁴  When he reached Tabuk, at the border between Hejaz and Syria, the horsemen of Syria turned him back.⁵⁵  Ali sent to Mu’awiya a show cause notice for disobedience.  After weeks of wait a messenger of Mu’awiya appeared in Medina on August 28, 656 CE.  When Ali opened the letter it was a blank scroll meant to ridicule Ali.⁵⁶

Shi’a Ali in Medina was perplexed.  Either the central government had to leave the matters as they were or use force against Mu’awiya to remove him.  It essentially meant the use of force against a Muslim and the possibility of killing him in the process.⁵⁷  Ali vowed to use force.⁵⁸  Something that Ali’s processor avoided at all costs was at the long last a reality.⁵⁹

August 28, 656 CE was the date when First Arab Civil War formally started.  And this was the date when the great schism between Shi’a and Sunni among Muslims was born. ⁶⁰

Ali fails to make a government of national unity

After dismissing existing governors, Ali had to replace them.  Shi’a Ali had been blaming Uthman for nepotism.  Now, all eyes were fixed on Ali on whom he appoints governors.  This time milieu was not that the aspiring candidates would wait for someone to propose their name.  They were themselves presenting their names and to some extent manipulating the caliph for their appointment.  For example, Malik bin Harith al-Ashtar, the Kufan rebel who had chased Uthman’s governor away and was now in Medina in regard to the killing of Uthman, took allegiance on the condition that he will be in charge of securing the oath of allegiance of the people of Kufa.⁶¹  Here a request is hidden.  It was usually a governor of cantonment who took a pledge of allegiance from its people for the caliph.  When the list of governors was out, many people might have got disappointed.  Ali nominated two members of his own clan, Banu Hashim, for key posts.  He appointed Qutham bin Abbas (Qutham bin ‘Abbās قُثَم بِن عَبّاس ), son of Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, over Mecca and Ubaydullah bin Abbas, Qutham’s brother, over Yemen. He gave, for the first time in the history of the Rashidun Caliphate, ample representation to Ansar.  Qays bin Sa’d bin Ubada (Qays bin Sa’d bin ‘Ubādah   قَيس بِن سَعد بِن عُباده ) got governorship of Egypt; and Uthman bin Hunayf got governorship of Basrah.⁶², ⁶³, ⁶⁴.  He didn’t give a representation of any Muhajirun clans in his government except his own clan.  Lack of managerial experience led Ali to the recipe of isolation.

At that time Ali’s government was fragile.  The rebels who had risen against the government of Uthman were unanimous in one thing – getting rid of Uthman.  They were bitterly divided over who should take over after Uthman.  Rebels from Egypt predominantly favoured Ali.  There were groups of Kufan rebels who favoured Zubayr and there were groups in Basrah who favoured Talha.⁶⁵, ⁶⁶ The differences among rebels had compelled them to camp separately three nights away from Medina when they started their long march.⁶⁷  Failure to nominate Zubayr or Talha for any governorship proved an expensive political mistake on Ali’s part.  Both these members of the Electoral College had clear-cut political ambitions and some support in the cantonments.     

This must be the time when Mughira bin Shu’ba advised Ali to give Talha governorship over Yemen and Zubayr over Bahrain (two insignificant provinces) and to confirm Mu’awiya in his current post.  He further advised that once things fall into line with Ali, he can do with them what he liked. Ali snubbed him rudely.⁶⁸  Probably Ali didn’t wish to be perceived as naïve accepting suggestions of men from the outer circle (and of dubious reputation), but in doing so, he definitely lost the support of a skilled politician.⁶⁹

The country divides into three factions

The murder of Uthman and Ali’s reluctance to punish the murderers soon became a burning issue in the country.  The military and civilian Arab elite of the country divided into three factions.  One faction demanded quick justice for Uthman and won’t accept Ali as a legitimate ruler until he acts in this direction.  The other faction considered Uthman’s murder a justified homicide.  They lined up behind Ali and expected him to sideline the murder case.  Both factions wrote verses and propaganda material in their favour.

Look at the verses composed by Hassan bin Thabit (Ḥassān bin Thābit حَسّان بِن ثابِت ):

We are well-pleased with the Syrians as they made haste [to aid us]
And with the amīr [Mu’awiya] and [our] brothers

Verily I will be among them, whether they are absent or present.
So long as I live and am called Ḥassān

Very soon you will hear in their lands
“Allah is most great! Vengeance for ‘Uthmān!”

Would that I knew, would that the birds would inform me
What went on between Ali and ibn ‘Affān.⁷⁰

Now another kind of verse composed by Fadl bin Abbas:

Do you seek a vengeance to which you have no right
What is Ibn Dhakwān al Ṣafūri next to ‘Amr?

Just as the ass’s foal claims descent from her mother
and forgets her Father when she vies with those possessing rightful pride

Verily the best of men after Muḥammad is
The executor of the Chosen Prophet in the sight of Allah

The first who prayed, the twin of His Prophet
And the first to strike down the sinners at Badr.⁷¹, ⁷²

Yet, there was a third faction, probably the biggest.  They were the neutrals.  They took the position of wait and see and are usually referred to as Ma’shar al-Mu’tazilah.⁷³, ⁷⁴  They were willing to be governed by anybody who succeeds in providing an effective government.  Sympathizers of Uthman in Kufa, Basrah and Fustat were open to any leader who wished to use this as a slogan.  Syria, anyhow, didn’t divide into factions.  It remained united, a sympathizer of Uthman and loyal to Mu’awiya. ⁷⁵

Ali didn’t have any force in Medina to send along with his nominated governors to take over.  He had to bank upon anti-Uthman elements in provincial capitals.  Sabaiyyah in provincial capitals were afraid of a crackdown in case a caliph opens Uthman’s murder case.  Ali’s failure to denounce the murder of Uthman gave Sabaiyyah a clear hint.  All of them shifted their political weight to Ali’s side.

Banners of civil war unfurl – the Battle of Camel

During the last month of 656 CE, the environs of Basrah witnessed a gloomy scene from the Rashidun Caliphate’s point of view.  Those swords that have been being unsheathed against non-Muslims in the name of Islam up to now, clashed with each other.  “Either I join Ali and fight those two men and the Mother of the Faithful or else I disobey the Commander of the Faithful.  What a sorry state of affairs!” says a pious Muslim, Ṭāriq bin Shihab of the Bajila tribe on the eve of the Battle of Camel. ⁷⁶

Talha and Zubayr had given allegiance to Ali halfheartedly. ⁷⁷  Now, they were expecting the new government to compensate them by giving them a government position. ⁷⁸  When Ali announced the final list of his governors, Talha and Zubayr both rejected it on the grounds that they were sidelined. ⁷⁹, ⁸⁰  Both these gentlemen knew that residents of Medina were generally in favour of Ali.  They sneaked out to Mecca with the excuse of a lesser pilgrimage. ⁸¹  Mecca was beaming with opposition to Ali.  It had always remained a powerhouse of Umayyads since Fath Mecca.⁸²  The three founding members of Shi’a Uthman were already there.  When Ali’s newly nominated governor Uthman bin Hunayf, reached Basrah, Uthman’s governor there Abdullah bin Amir gave him the charge of the province quietly and left the place.  Instead of reporting back to Ali, he retired to Mecca.⁸³  Ya’la bin Munya, Uthman’s governor over Yemen, did the same thing when Ubaydullah bin Abbas, Ali’s nominee reached Sana’a.  On top of that, he brought four hundred thousand Dinars from the public treasury.  This money was collected by taxes and was awaiting transfer to the central government and other provincial expenses.  Ali’s designated governor to Mecca, Qutham bin Abbas, had still not taken charge of his office.  The governor of Mecca from Uthman’s era sided with the Umayyads.⁸⁴  When Talha and Zubayr reached Mecca, in addition to meeting with Shi’a Uthman bubbling with anger there, they also met an unexpected supporter –Aisha (‘Āʾishah عاأِشَه).⁸⁵

Aisha had left Medina when the rebels reached there.  She was not on good terms with Uthman because the latter had decreased her stipend and had put her on the same footing as other widows of the Prophet. ⁸⁶  She looked forward to returning to Medina with the expectation that her clansman Talha would be elected the new caliph.  She changed her mind when hearing news of Ali’s nomination.⁸⁷  Aisha’s dislike for Ali was not a secret.⁸⁸  Early Islamic sources trace it to the incident of ifk (ḥādithah tal ifk حادِثةَ الِافك). ⁸⁹  During that incident, according to Waqidi, the Prophet had asked for the opinion of Ali and the latter had advised him to divorce Aisha and get a new wife.⁹⁰  Whatever the reason for Aisha’s reservations with Ali, she joined hands with Talha and Zubayr instantaneously.  The stated official aim of the ‘Mecca Alliance’ was to ‘mend the situation of Muhammad’s community’ and the means to achieve the aim was to bring the culprits of Uthman’s murder to justice.⁹¹

Talha and Zubayr were both rich. ⁹²  They had got resources to fund a military campaign.  Further funds came from the tax money of Yemen brought by Ya’la bin Munya.⁹³  Abdullah bin Amir also contributed lavishly out of his own pocket.⁹⁴  The ‘Meccan Alliance’ was aware that a majority of the cantonment of Basrah, which had predominantly Hejazi and Nejdi tribesmen, had opposed Ali.⁹⁵  They raised an army of Meccans, came in full rebellion against Ali, and proceeded straight to Basrah.⁹⁶

This army didn’t appoint anybody overall commander.  Aisha took up the duty of maintaining discipline.⁹⁷  This army reached the town of Basrah unopposed.⁹⁸  Ya’qubi states that the army of ‘The Meccan Alliance’  entered the town of Basrah simply by negotiating with Uthman bin Hunayf, Ali’s governor there.  Tabari presents a scene of street fighting with a pro-Ali faction under the command of Uthman bin Hunayf, Uthman bin Hunayf’s expulsion from the town and execution of those deemed to have rebelled against Uthman, before the army of ‘Meccan Alliance’ could settle in the city.⁹⁹  The pro-Ali faction of the town was apt to protest that the people who got killed by the ‘Mecca Alliance’ being dubbed as Uthman’s killers were actually rebels and not murderers of Uthman.¹⁰⁰, ¹⁰¹  Next, the ‘Mecca Alliance’ quickly clutched the provincial public treasury. ¹⁰²

By October 21, 656 CE they were in full control of the town.¹⁰³  None of them proclaimed to be caliph.  Probably their aim was to take up management of a revenue-generating province and its capital.  From there they wished to extend their circle of influence.  They had not proceeded to Medina from Mecca to persuade Ali to step down.  Their meeting in Mecca in which the alliance took its final shape was of the view that Medina was a difficult target. ¹⁰⁴, ¹⁰⁵

Ali found himself in a difficult situation.  Mu’awiya had captured the province of Syria and Talha and Zubayr had captured the province of Basrah. Kufa still had a governor who was appointed by Uthman.  Mecca had already shown its political opinion, which was not in favour of Ali.  Ali’s appointed governor to Egypt Qays bin Sa’d had reached Egypt by dodging Mu’awiya’s security guards appointed at Aylah.¹⁰⁶  However, on reaching Egypt he found an unexpected scene.  Uthman’s sympathizers had grown strong and had gathered at Kharbita to oppose him. Sabaiyyah was willing to obey him only on the condition that Ali assures him he won’t execute the murderers of Uthman. ¹⁰⁷, ¹⁰⁸  Ali had to bring provinces back to the ambit of the central government, otherwise, he would have remained caliph of Medina and its environs.

Ali had already resolved to use force rather than diplomacy to bring disobedience under his authority. ¹⁰⁹  He decided to tackle the ‘Meccan Alliance’ first before he takes any action against Mu’awiya.  Ali, after analyzing the situation on the ground, degraded the status of Medina to a provincial capital and appointed Tamim bin Abd Amr (Tamīm bin ‘Abd ‘Amr تَمِيم بِن عَبد عَمرو) of Najjar clan of Ansar as its governor. ¹¹⁰  This was the last day Medina ever served as the capital of any country.  Neither had it ever acted so in eight hundred years of its existence before Islam.¹¹¹ The axis of all political, economic and social activities of the country shifted northwards.

Ali left Medina with a force of four hundred mounted men belonging to Ansar, on October 25, 656 CE, four days after ‘Mecca Alliance’ occupied Basrah.¹¹², ¹¹³  His aim was to dislodge the ‘Mecca Alliance’.  ‘To set things right is what we are after, so that the community may revert to being brothers,’ Ali explained.¹¹⁴  Ali was particularly bitter against Talha and Zubayr because they had withdrawn their allegiance to Ali as caliph after giving it – a first in Rashidun Caliphate.¹¹⁵, ¹¹⁶  Probably Ali had never imagined that anybody could do it.  This could be the reason he left Mu’awiya on his own for now and decided to confront the ‘Mecca Alliance.’ ¹¹⁷  On the way to Basrah Ali picked up all the possible support he had in the country.  A few hundred Asad and Tayy joined him halfway to swell the number of his army to one thousand.  The army camped at Dhu Qar without entering the town of Kufa.¹¹⁸, ¹¹⁹  Ali had an impression that Kufans would join him in their hordes as its majority were Yemenis, who generally supported Ali.¹²⁰, ¹²¹Ali had been once governor of Yemen for Prophet Muhammad.¹²²  Ali sent his son Hasan along with Ammar bin Yasir to recruit inhabitants of Kufa.¹²³  Ali had confirmed Uthman’s governor over Kufa, Abu Musa Ash’ari in his position.  He tried to play neutral in the dispute and discouraged the Kufan masses to join Ali’s army.¹²⁴, ¹²⁵, ¹²⁶

According to Ya’qubi, Hasan could hardly get six hundred soldiers to make the total strength of Ali’s army to be sixteen hundred. ¹²⁷  Tabari differs widely.  He claims that nine thousand people of Kufa joined Ali’s forces.¹²⁸  People of Abdul Qays, who were Shi’a Ali in Basrah, left the town to join Ali’s forces in Dhu Qar.¹²⁹  Lastly, Ali’s governor over Basrah, Uthman bin Hunayf, whom the ‘Meccan Alliance’ had chased away, joined Ali with a few companions.¹³⁰, ¹³¹.  In addition, Ali’s camp had thousands of non-Arabs and non-Muslims.¹³²  Tabari informs that Zutt (Zuṭṭ زَطٌّ) and Sayabijah (Sayābijah سَيَبِجَه) Joined Ali’s side.¹³³  Final strength of the army that marched towards Basrah with Ali was twenty thousand.¹³⁴

The ‘Meccan Alliance’ decided to come out of the town to confront Ali at Khurayba. ¹³⁵  Their strength is said to be thirty thousand. ¹³⁶  There is no doubt that Muslim Arab society was still tribal and each tribe of both armies carried its own flag.¹³⁷  Each of the participating tribes had taken a bet on one of the armies. ¹³⁸  However, explaining the whole conflict on the basis of tribal rivalry alone, would be an oversimplification.  Many important factors, like the new religion of Islam, the new place of abode, and new economic conditions, had crept into Arab society since pre-Islamic times.  All of them had become important to the people and reflected in their decision-making.  According to Tabari, some tribes were completely divided between the two armies.¹³⁹  The battle, that took place on the sands of Khurayba on December 24, 656 CE, is called the Battle of Camel in the annals of history. ¹⁴⁰  It was as ferocious as could be Yarmouk or Qadisiyyah.¹⁴¹  Tabari admits that both of them hated each other from the bottom of their hearts.¹⁴²  Death toll on both sides in a short span of four hours was thirty thousand.¹⁴³

Ali carried the day. Talha was killed on the battlefield. ¹⁴⁴  Zubayr got killed by a Bedouin of Tamim when escaping from the battle, about eight kilometres away from the battlefield.¹⁴⁵, ¹⁴⁶  Aisha got captured.¹⁴⁷  Ali didn’t treat the defeated army as that of a non-Muslim foe or a foreign country.  He didn’t kill the wounded survivors of the war.  He didn’t open a case of high treason against the survivors.  He absorbed them in his camp by forgiving them.¹⁴⁸  Most of the army of the ‘Meccan Alliance’ perished in the battle.  Some remnants of the ‘Meccan Alliance’ fled to the surrounding towns.¹⁴⁹, ¹⁵⁰

After entering Basrah triumphantly, Ali captured the remaining part of the public treasury.  He paid his soldiers from the booty of the war (captured movable property of his opponents) and from the public treasury. ¹⁵¹  He strictly forbade his soldiers from disgracing any woman of the town. ¹⁵²  The neutral faction in the great political divide, living in Basrah, did not have any problem with accepting Ali as their caliph.  Prominent among them were Ahnaf bin Qays and Ziyad bin Abihi / Abu Sufyan (Ziyād bin Abīhi /Abu Sufyān   اَبُو سُفيان/ زِياد بِن اَبيه   ).  Basrans took allegiance to Ali.¹⁵³, ¹⁵⁴, ¹⁵⁵  Ali not only gained control over the cantonment of Basrah but over the whole province of Basrah up to Khorasan.¹⁵⁶  He appointed Abdullah bin Abbas governor of the vast province of Basrah.¹⁵⁷, ¹⁵⁸, ¹⁵⁹, ¹⁶⁰

The participation of Aisha in the political affairs of the Rashidun Caliphate is unique for a woman.  Criticism of her active participation in politics from this angle started before she departed to Basrah with the army.  Umm Salama, a widow of Prophet Muhammad, refused flatly to side with her saying “religions’ pillar is not raised up by women.  The praiseworthy things about women consist of their lowering their eyes, casting down their extremities, and dragging the trains of their garments.  Allah has relieved me and you of this thing.  What would you say if Allah’s Messenger encountered you on the outskirts of the deserts having ripped off the veil which he imposed on you?”¹⁶¹  Abdullah bin Abbas, who escorted her back to Medina, entered the house she was staying in Kufa without her permission.  It angered Aisha.  Ibn Abbas said in return, “This is not your house; your house is the one in which Allah’s messenger left you, and in which the Qur’an ordered you to stay.  [Quran 33:33]”.¹⁶²  This kind of criticism continued later when Sa’d bin Waqqas commented on her actions saying, “May Allah forgive the Mother of Faithful”. ¹⁶³  She herself was doubtful whether she should behave like that and actually, she wished to go back from the middle of the journey to Basrah.¹⁶⁴  Talha and Zubayr kept her convincing that her actions were right.¹⁶⁵, ¹⁶⁶

The ‘Meccan Alliance’ was not founded on any sincere political principle.  It was an alliance of mutual benefit.  They used to quarrel over who would lead the prayer in the grand mosque of Basrah.¹⁶⁷  Tabari suspects that they would have fought a war between themselves if they would have won the Battle of Camel.¹⁶⁸  Sa’id bin As departed from them on their way to Basrah due to disagreement over the caliphate.  Both Zubayr and Talha were candidates for Caliphate and Sa’id wanted Uthman’s son.¹⁶⁹, ¹⁷⁰

The aftermath of the Battle of Camel

The battle of Camel, apparently, once more united almost the whole of the Rashidun Caliphate under one central government except the amalgamated provinces of Syria, Jordan and Jazira, which remained in the grip of Mu’awiya.  The institution of the caliph emerged to be strong physically.  Ali had a free hand to implement his agenda and had achieved enough resources to carry it out.  However, the country Ali was going to preside over remained bitterly divided on political matters. The Shi’a Uthman maintained its political stance. The Shi’a Ali disliked them as before.  A large group of neutrals didn’t perceive Ali’s government as stable.  They kept the attitude of wait and see. ¹⁷¹

Caliph’s position on the ideological front, as well, remained bleak.  Islam had been well-established among Arab elites by that time.  Thousands of people were called Qurra (Qurrā’ قُرّاء ) as they were full-time Qur’an readers.¹⁷², ¹⁷³  Islam had become the principal ideological expression of political motives.  Though Ali had established his authority over the rebellious alliance by the sword, he still had to emphasize that his subjects should obey him due to his spiritual authority, which Islam had bestowed on him as a caliph to Prophet Muhammad.  Ali’s official political position was that he was on the right way of religion (ḥaq) while those who opposed him were on the wrong way of religion. (buṭl).¹⁷⁴

Giving purely religious dimensions to social, economic, and constitutional issues of the time didn’t favour Ali in the long run.  This policy generated schismatic religious debates.  Instead of uniting all Muslims behind the religious authority of the Prophet’s caliph, the debates, in turn, produced further divisions.  As Ali sank further and further into religious controversies, the basic principle of the Rashidun Caliphate that a caliph is the supreme religious authority was eroded.  A group of pious people could challenge the caliph’s monopoly over religious rulings (fatwa فَتوئ).  Just after the Battle of Camel, pious men in Ali’s own camp started asking Ali how would he explain his call to fight against and kill people of the ‘Meccan Alliance’ on the grounds that they had abandoned the true path of Islam and then forbid his soldiers from capturing their property and women, which should have been done in case they had really abandoned Islam.¹⁷⁵  Ali’s regime remained bogged in religious debates throughout its life.  His supporters kept splitting away from him citing religious differences as cause.

Ali takes Kufa as the capital of the Rashidun Caliphate  

In January 657 CE, about six months after taking oath as caliph,  Ali entered the city of Kufa triumphantly to establish himself there as the fourth caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate. ¹⁷⁶  Tabari notes that Ali granted Abu Musa Ash’ari security of life and he retired to Urd (‘Urḍ عُرض).¹⁷⁷, ¹⁷⁸  This development closed the doors of the governorship of Kufa on al-Ashtar or any other non-Quraysh.  Ali’s government didn’t accommodate Ahl al Ayam in senior government posts.

This cantonment was the epicentre of discord.  People were not only divided into three main political views, Shi’a Ali, Shi’a Uthman and neutral, there were many petty political groups hankering for power.  Ali’s decision to use Kufa as the capital of the Rashidun Caliphate didn’t bring stability to the central government.  It actually increased impediments for Ali.

Mu’awiya attains leadership of Shi’a Uthman

Mu’awiya had got totally convinced during the governor’s conference convened by Uthman that the selection of a new caliph was on the corner. ¹⁷⁹ Since then he started passing orders in his domain without consulting Uthman but claiming that the orders were from the caliph.¹⁸⁰  On Ali’s assumption of power, he abandoned even that formality after sending a blank scroll to him.¹⁸¹  He might be content with the status quo if Ali could have allowed him to govern his provinces under Ali’s name.¹⁸²  Ali was not in the mood to pretend, even for a single day, that everybody was obedient to the caliph while it was not true.  He was a man of the sword.  He had shunned Mu’awiya’s veiled threat that the latter had got sixty thousand warriors when Mu’awiya’s envoy saw Ali on August 28, 656 CE.¹⁸³  The success of the Battle of Camel boosted Ali’s confidence.  “You will be paid more when you conquer Syria,” he assured his soldiers while paying them for participating in the Battle of Camel.¹⁸⁴

Mu’awiya knew one thing. Ali might be a man of the sword, he was not a man of management.  Ali’s own Shi’a held a similar opinion about him. ¹⁸⁵  On the other hand, Mu’awiya was confident of his capacities as manager.  Once boosting in the governor’s conference convened by Uthman to ponder over the issue of rebellion, Mu’awiya had said that his province had no rebellion.  Other governors should take his administration as a template.¹⁸⁶  Members of his camp held similar opinions about him. ¹⁸⁷, ¹⁸⁸  Mu’awiya calculated that one day Ali will definitely admit his incapacity to manage the mess called the Rashidun Caliphate.  He started promoting himself as an alternate leader for the country. In doing so he made sure that he avoids pitch battles.  They say you don’t show your biceps to your foe if you have got tiny ones.  This strategy saved the formidable reputation that he had got sixty thousand soldiers and spared him any blame for the bloodshed of fellow Muslims.

The elimination of two champions of Uthman’s cause at the Battle of Camel was a blessing in disguise for Mu’awiya.  Now, the Shi’a Uthman living in Kufa, Basrah, Egypt and elsewhere looked forward to Mu’awiya as an alternate leader.  Mu’awiya also started canvassing them. ¹⁸⁹

Prominent members of Shi’a Uthman, living in the Rashidun Caliphate started defecting to the areas administrated by Mu’awiya.  One of them was Marwan bin Hakam.  This founding member of the Uthman party moved to Medina after participating in the Battle of Camel.  From there, after a while, he went to Syria.¹⁹⁰, ¹⁹¹, ¹⁹²

Mu’awiya started soliciting prominent men of Quraysh towards his side.  Amr bin As had taken up residence in Palestine when he was sure that the rebels would kill Uthman and blame for his murder would extend beyond those who would kill him physically. ¹⁹³ Mu’awiya invited Amr bin As to join him.¹⁹⁴, ¹⁹⁵  After many deliberations, in which Ya’qubi notes that Amr weighed worldly gains against gains afterward, he decided to join Mu’awiya’s camp.¹⁹⁶   Mu’awiya promised Amr to help him regain the governorship of Egypt provided the latter becomes answerable to Mu’awiya and not to Ali.  The deal got sealed. ¹⁹⁷  Both knew that Mu’awiya was junior to Ali in ranking and any attempt from him to claim caliphate won’t attract the hearts and minds of Arabs.¹⁹⁸  Both were also aware that defeating Ali on a battlefield would not be child’s play.  He had established his reputation in the Battle of Camel.¹⁹⁹  After examining the situation astutely they decided to make the issue of justice for Uthman’s murder a focal point of their strategy, instead of demanding the caliph’s office.  ²⁰⁰  It might make their opposition to Ali justifiable in the eyes of fellow Arabs. Moreover, this was Ali’s weakest point and he didn’t have any readymade solution to it.  He had come to power with their help.²⁰¹  After finalizing this matter, Mu’awiya contacted Sa’d bin Waqas in Medina.²⁰²  Mu’awiya didn’t ask him to join his camp, as he was aware of Sa’d’s senior ranking in Islam.  He asked him to champion the issue of the murder of Uthman as, apart from Ali, he was the only surviving member of the Electoral College that had selected Uthman.²⁰³  Trying to convince Sa’d, Mu’awiya argued that Talha and Zubayr had raised this issue in their capacity as members of the Electoral College.  And now, when they were dead, it was incumbent on Sa’d to take up their role.²⁰⁴  Sa’d answered to Mu’awiya that all people who had served on the Electoral College had an equal right to be chosen as caliph in Umar’s vision. None of them had any seniority over the other.  They had selected Uthman unanimously.  Now, if Ali is selected, how can any other claim seniority over Ali?  Furthermore, Sa’d didn’t endorse the way Talha and Zubayr opposed Ali.²⁰⁵  Sa’d’s answer might have delighted Mu’awiya.  He probably wanted to make sure that the most senior surviving Companion of Prophet Muhammad doesn’t have any political ambitions.  The fact that Sa’d had not yet taken allegiance to Ali would have generated suspense in Mu’awiya. ²⁰⁶, ²⁰⁷

Concern about losing everything

The First Arab Civil War distressed many neutral Arab leaders.  Jarir bin Abdullah was lieutenant governor of Hamedan for Uthman.  When Ali dismissed him, Jarir reached Mu’awiya and begged the Syrians in Mu’awiya’s presence ‘such a fierce battle has taken place in Basrah that if a scourge like it is repeated, there will be no survival of Islam.  Therefore fear the people of Syria, and view Ali and Mu’awiya charitably (wa-raw fī Ali wa-Mu’āwiyah khayran). Look to yourselves, and let no one be more attentive to yourselves than you’.²⁰⁸, ²⁰⁹  Fear of losing revenue generating a non-Muslim population of the Rashidun Caliphate was on the head of everybody.  ‘Meccan Alliance’ had blocked the bridge over the river to stop any traffic from Basrah to ex-Sasanian provinces to censure the news of war from them.²¹⁰

Ali’s ambassador to ‘Meccan Alliance’ just before the start of combat says, “Don’t lay either us or yourselves open to disaster, lest it throws us all down.  I swear to Allah, I say this and call you to it in a state of fear that this won’t end until Almighty and Glorious Allah has taken what He wants from this community whose provisions [matā’] are diminishing with these events.  The damage that has occurred from this affair is incalculable.” ²¹¹

Ali and Mu’awiya fight a proxy war in Egypt

Mu’awiya was nervous that Ali’s primary purpose in choosing Kufa as capital was to organize an expedited attack on Syria.²¹²  Mu’awiya, being a provincial governor, was militarily weak.  He knew challenging Ali’s authority on an open battlefield would be an arduous task.  What scared him more was the fact that Ali’s loyal Qays bin Sa’d held Egypt.  In case Ali attacks him from Iraq, Qays would complement it from the rear.

When Qays bin Sa’d reached Fustat in August 656 CE after deceiving horsemen at Alyah, with an escort of seven men, he did not have any difficulty taking charge of the province from Muhammad bin Abi Hudhayfa.²¹³, ²¹⁴  Soon after he found himself in trouble.  Like everywhere else Egypt had divided into three factions, Shi’a Uthman, Shi’a Ali and the neutrals.  Shi’a Uthman were passionately antagonists to accept Ali’s nominated governor until there was some progress on Uthman’s revenge.  Sabaiyyah, on the other hand, demanded from Qays an assurance that Ali wouldn’t execute their members in charges of Uthman’s murder before they give any kind of allegiance. ²¹⁵ Qays was a person of exceptional managerial skills.²¹⁶  He could control the situation by pacifying both parties.²¹⁷  He entered into an agreement with Shi’a Uthman that he would keep paying their stipends even if they don’t accept Ali as caliph and in return, they would postpone their demand for justice temporarily.²¹⁸  Sources don’t express what kind of assurances did he give to the Sabaiyyah.

A stable Egypt in the hands of Ali was a threat to Mu’awiya’s life.  Initially, Mu’awiya tried to win Qays over by offering him the governorship of Kufa and Basrah and appointment of his nominee over Hejaz until he lives.²¹⁹  (Mu’awiya had started giving an impression that he would be the next caliph and would be in a position to distribute governorships to his favourites). Qays rejected the proposal politely.²²⁰  Now, Mu’awiya utilized his superlative diplomatic capabilities.  He spread rumours everywhere in Syria that Qays had entered into a secret deal with Mu’awiya.  Part of the deal was not to touch Shi’a Uthman of Egypt.  Ali, who didn’t have even a fraction of the political skills Mu’awiya possessed, got trapped in the contrivance. When his spies in Syria picked the intelligence, Ali impatiently ordered Qays to attack the Uthman sympathizers in Egypt to test his loyalty.  Innocent Qays wrote back that he did not have the capacity to fight against the ten thousand-strong parties.  Ali took the answer as proof of Qays’s disloyalty and immediately dismissed him.  Ali, in panic, asked Muhammad bin Abu Bakr to hasten Egypt to take control. ²²¹, ²²²  Thus, Ali dismissed Qays on February 21, 657 CE just before the battle of Siffin, taking pressure away from Mu’awiya.²²³

Moreover, in doing so, Ali rewarded a person with the governorship of an important province, who had earned notoriety in the murder of Uthman.  Just before the battle of Camel, Ali had denounced the murder of Uthman for the first time. Delivering a speech to his army, standing on a makeshift podium of sacks, he had announced that no murderer of Uthman had any place in his army. ²²⁴  After this lip service, he didn’t purge reputed murderers of Uthman from his rank and file.  Masses might have given Ali the benefit of the doubt. They could have understood his limitations before the war.  Now, he had favoured one of them with the governorship of the most important province. Actions speak louder than words. This appointment would have sent a signal throughout the Arab community that Ali was not serious about investigating the murder of his predecessor and that his official position that he doesn’t have the power to fight against the accused was a false excuse.  It would have further strengthened the hands of Mu’awiya who had based his opposition to Ali on one demand only – justice for the murder of Uthman.

Ali challenges Mu’awiya’s defiance

Ali knew his military superiority over Mu’awiya and decided to hunt him down.  Mu’awiya knew that this day would inevitably come and was prepared for it with all Syrians cemented with him.²²⁵

Ali marched out of Kufa with a host of Ansar and a number of Muhajirun.²²⁶  The whole division of Kufa was with him. ²²⁷  A group of soldiers from Basrah joined him.  On the way, he picked the non-Muslim tribes of Taghlib and Namir bin Qāsit. ²²⁸, ²²⁹  Hired slaves made a big contingent of Ali’s army.²³⁰  Total number of fighters in his army might be in tune of seventy thousand.²³¹  Individual tribes carried their own banners as usual for Rashidun Caliphate.²³²  However, by this time, merely tribal affiliations do not explain all political alignments. ²³³ The consistency of Mu’awiya’s army might not be fundamentally different from that of Ali.  A contingent of Shi’a Uthman had joined Mu’awiya from Iraq.²³⁴  Amr bin As was present in Mu’awiya’s camp.²³⁵  We don’t know how Ali and Mu’awiya paid their soldiers who fought at Siffin.  Probably all of them were on the payroll of their respective territories.

The second battle of the civil war – Siffin

The two armies came face to face at Siffin (Ṣiffīn صِفِّين ) and camped near the banks of the Euphrates in May of 657 CE. ²³⁶  It was a hajj season but none of them bothered to leave for Mecca.²³⁷  The armies lay camped opposite each other for a month or so without a pitched battle.  Each day a few brave people challenged each other, fought a few rounds and returned to their camps.²³⁸  Then they agreed to observe the traditional truce during the sacred month of Muharram and utilize this time to negotiate any possible way to avoid war.  Combat re-started in July 657 CE and lasted for forty days. ²³⁹  Again, the war didn’t intensify more than a series of lethargic skirmishes.²⁴⁰  Welhhausen has pointed out that all surviving accounts of this war have come from the mouths of those who favoured Ali and were part of his army. Exaggeration in Ali’s favour is expected.²⁴¹, ²⁴²  A prominent Muslim who died in Siffin was Ammar bin Yasir.  He fought from Ali’s side.²⁴³  The battle remained indecisive.  No army could annihilate the other.  Theophanes the Confessor insists that Mu’awiya’s faction could keep control over water and Ali’s force remained comparatively thirsty losing their ability to fight.²⁴⁴, ²⁴⁵  All Islamic sources report internal discord in Ali’s camp.²⁴⁶  Huge representation of a ‘neutral party’ in Ali’s forces explains internal discords, failure of an all-out attack on Mu’awiya’s men and threats to Ali of rebellion in case he fails to agree with the arbitration. ²⁴⁷ No surprise Ali’s huge army couldn’t bring Mu’awiya’s puny squad to its knees. Ya’qubi insists that Ali’s side had the upper hand when Mu’awiya asked to take arbitration on the matter as a trick to avoid defeat. (Arabic: ḥukūmā.  Some sources name the arbitration taḥkīm). ²⁴⁸  Arranging one man as arbitrator and abiding by his ruling was a pre-Islamic Arab tradition.  This time there was a difference.  The parties won’t agree to a neutral man whose decision would be binding. Each antagonizing party would appoint its own man as arbitrator. ²⁴⁹ The arbitrators would decide in light of the Qur’an, not according to Arab traditions.²⁵⁰, ²⁵¹  How could two men, representing two adversaries, award one verdict?  The process of arbitration was flawed from the onset.  Actually, it was a face-saving recognition of the fact that war was a stalemate and the status quo would prevail.  Arbitration was, for all intents and purposes, a saunter negotiation process. None awaited the decision of arbitrators.  Ali returned to Kufa and Mu’awiya headed to Damascus. ²⁵²  Siffin was a turning point in First Arab Civil War.  Citizens of the Rashidun Caliphate realized that Caliph Ali can’t oust Mu’awiya by force and that Mu’awiya had hidden tricks in his sleeves.  Mu’awiya gained equal footing with Ali after the Battle of Siffin.

The advent of a new grouping – Khariji

The time is ripe to introduce ourselves to the phenomenon of ‘socio-political group’.  Every human being associates himself with a social group.  It gives him a group identity.  Family name, gender, neighbourhood, ethnicity, religion, sect, economic class, nationality, race, and political ideology all play a role to constitute a social group.  Anyhow, based on social circumstances, one of these identifying factors takes precedence over the others.  The same individual, when asked, may introduce himself as Qandhari, Afridi, Pathan, Afghan, Shiite, Muslim or man, depending upon who asked about him.  The rationale behind social grouping is poorly understood.  It could primarily be a psychological pleasure that one feels by mingling with individuals of similar tastes and cultures.  However, once a social group grows big and achieves a recognizable identity, it strives for collective political favours and demands special socio-economic quotas.  In this way, big social groups transform into political groups.  Socio-political grouping is universal. When the demise of one socio-political group is in sight, for example, White Americans, another social group pops in, for example, Hispanic Americans. ²⁵³, ²⁵⁴

Early Muslims were divided on tribal lines.  The establishment of the state loosened tribal affiliations.  The tribe was no longer needed for the protection of life, property and honour.  Expansion of the state further downgraded tribes.  Individual members of a tribe scattered so widely in the country that the tribe ceased to function as an effective socio-political group.  The emerging social identities among Muslims were based upon religion – religious sects.

By the time of Siffin, a new socio-political group arose in the Rashidun Caliphate. It was Khariji (Khārijī  خارِجِي  ; sin. Khārijī, pl. Khwārij). ²⁵⁵.  Obviously, Khariji is not a self-designation.  As the name indicates, they were considered ‘outsiders’ by mainstream Muslims. ²⁵⁶  Apparently, Khariji was not a single well-defined group.  Many Khariji groups sprang up during the last years of the Rashidun Caliphate. ²⁵⁷  One thing was common among all Khariji groups.  They did not buy the argument that the birth of Prophet Muhammad among Quraysh had granted them a right to be caliph. ²⁵⁸  Any meritorious Muslim could be caliph to Prophet Muhammad, in their vision.²⁵⁹

This particular group of Khariji, that split itself away from Ali’s camp at Siffin is called Hururyah (Ḥurūryah حُرورِيَه ).²⁶⁰  They argued that Ali had lost his right to be a caliph of Prophet Muhammad.  By subjecting himself to the decision of arbiters, he had recognized in principle that either he or Mu’awiya could be a caliph.  In case the arbitrators decided in favour of Mu’awiya, where would stand Ali’s claim that he had the Divine right to be a caliph? ²⁶¹

Their religiopolitical slogan was ‘“Judgment belongs to Allah alone.” (lā ḥukma illā Li-llāh) (Qur’an 6:57. 12:40).²⁶²  Only Allah can be the arbitrator.  The only guide to Allah’s judgment is the Qur’an. Does the Qur’an prescribe that a caliph should be from Quraysh?  Extending the same argument they said if Qur’an doesn’t prescribe something, who is a caliph to impose it?  On this basis, they bitterly opposed the stoning of adulterers and the flogging of alcohol drinkers. ²⁶³  Khariji was the first religion-based socio-political group among Muslims.  Muir labels them religious fanatics. ²⁶⁴  Their paradigm, that mainstream Muslims have diverged from the actual tenants of Islam and that the actual tenants of Islam should be re-discovered and practiced, has sustained its existence throughout the history of Islam.  It has been, and still is, the basis of many religio-political movements in Islam.

Hururyah Kharijis drew their leadership from a number of tribes.  Abdullah bin Wahb (‘Abdallāh bin Wahb al Rāsibī عَبدُ الله بِن وَهَب الراسِبِي) was from Bajila1.  Abdullah bin Abi Awfa  (‘Abdullah bin Abi Awfā عَبدُ اللَّه بِن اَبِي أوفئ ) was from Yashkur.  Shabath bin Rabi’a (Shabath bin Ribī’ah  شَبَث بِن رَبِيعَه ) was from Tamim.²⁶⁵  The movement actually divided families into religiopolitical lines.  Adi bin Hatim of Tayy tribe remained Shi’a Ali while his son Tarafa bin Adi (Ṭarafah bin ‘Adi  طَرَفَه بِن عَدِى ) became a khariji.²⁶⁶  Hururyah Kharijis are said to number between eight thousand to twelve thousand.²⁶⁷

Ali did not have any objection to using the Qur’an as a guide.  His viewpoint was that it would be finally a human being who would take decisions according to Qur’an and his fellow humans will have to depend upon his judgment.  The political motive of the Khariji was clear.  They rejected the process of arbitration.  They didn’t want either Ali or Mu’awiya as the ruler.  The ruler could be any Muslim, including Ahl al Ayam. Instead of bringing forward their candidate for the caliphate, they kept chanting “Judgment belongs to Allah alone.”  Ali rejected this slogan, dubbing it, “A true saying by which falsehood has been intended!” ²⁶⁸  Actually, they chose their own leader, ‘Abdullah bin Wahb, a non-Quraysh, extremely pious Muslim.²⁶⁹ As Abdullah bin Wahb did not declare himself caliph, either there was a lack of consensus among the Kharijis over the candidate of the caliph or they perceived themselves as too weak at this stage to express their true intentions.

Kharijis did not return to Kufa along with Ali after Siffin.  They chose a village by the name of Harura (Ḥarūrā’  حَرُوراء) near Kufa to make their abode. ²⁷⁰, ²⁷¹  Ali convinced them back to Kufa with a promise to keep the doors of dialogue open to them.²⁷²  Sooner or later the dialogue broke up and they stood firm on their political slogan, “Judgment belongs to Allah alone.”  An irritated Ali responded, ok “It is Allah’s judgment about you what I await!”.²⁷³

All the Kharijis and their leaders were Ahl al Ayam.  No Quraysh joined them.  One can argue that they would not have been born if Ali would have chosen Basrah as his seat of government and would have appointed one of Ahl al Ayam governors over Kufa.  They loathed all the Quraysh leaders of their time, Uthman, Ali and Mu’awiya. During the negotiations with Ali, they kept lambasting him but shied from avowing that they wished one of them to be a caliph.

After the failed negotiations the Kharijis left Kufa to disperse into rural areas around it.²⁷⁴ Their ideology started spreading among the Muslims of the Swad and they got disciples up to Basrah.²⁷⁵  They resorted to terrorist attacks in all of Swad to bring Ali’s government to its knees.  Probably their income was from looting the villagers.

Mu’awiya wins Egypt

Mu’awiya knew about the futility of arbitration.  He didn’t wait for the verdict.  He wished Egypt to be out of Ali’s hands as soon as possible.  Any government in Egypt was acceptable to him that would not be hostile to him.  He knew Ali would again attempt on him militarily because the latter had a misconception that he was on the verge of victory in Siffin when he got tricked by Mu’awiya in arbitration. ²⁷⁶

Egypt was the province that had brought Ali to power.  Later on, this province proved his real nightmare.  His appointee there, Muhammad bin Abu Bakr, couldn’t handle the turbulent province well.²⁷⁷  In keeping with the instructions of Ali, he attacked the Shi’a ‘Uthman concentrated at kharbita but they defended themselves well.²⁷⁸

Mu’awiya quickly assured Shi’a Uthman of his support.²⁷⁹  The main source of resistance to Muhammad bin Abu Bakr was the Yemeni soldiers.²⁸⁰  Ali had an idea to replace him with a man from Yemen, Malik bin Harith al-Ashtar, in the hope to win the loyalty of Yemeni troops.²⁸¹  Mu’awiya was keenly observing the direction of the wind.  He took two actions simultaneously. One, he foiled the attempt of al Ashtar to reach Fustat and take charge of the province. Al Ashtar stayed in a bed and breakfast at Iylia on his way to Fustat.  The owner of the facility gave him a honey-based drink mixed with poison in his breakfast. Ashtar died on the spot. ²⁸²  Second, he provided Amr bin As with cavalry to intrude into Egypt.²⁸³ The local Shi’a Uthman from Egypt joined Amr.²⁸⁴, ²⁸⁵  His total strength after Shi’a Uthman joined him was six thousand men.²⁸⁶

Amr issued death warrants to Muhammad bin Abu Bakr for the murder of Uthman. ²⁸⁷  Muhammad came out of Fustat to meet the invaders with four thousand men.²⁸⁸  After a sham encounter his troops, mainly Yemeni, deserted.²⁸⁹, ²⁹⁰  He had to hide in a ruined house from where one of Amr’s soldiers dragged him out.  He killed him, put his corpse in a donkey’s skin and set it on fire.²⁹¹  Amr didn’t have any difficulty in declaring himself governor of Egypt and Maghreb in the name of Mu’awiya in July 658 CE.²⁹²

Egypt was larger than the amalgamated province of Syria in terms of production and revenue. ²⁹³  Damascus plunged into jubilation on the news, while Kufa submerged into bereavement.²⁹⁴, ²⁹⁵

Mu’awiya enters into a truce with Byzantine Rome

Byzantine Rome was playing on the back foot since Futuhul Buldan started. They never had a moment of relief to reflect on themselves. Now, taking advantage of the lull at his eastern borders, Emperor Constans decided to flex his muscle.  The weakest in his neighbourhood were the Slavs.  He carried out a successful campaign against them in 658 CE.²⁹⁶  Mu’awiya was vigilant and foresaw a veiled threat in the Roman’s actions.  He rushed to conclude an expensive truce agreement with Emperor Constans in the fall of 658 CE.  Mu’awiya had to pay ten thousand Dirhams, one horse and one slave per day to Byzantine Rome in return for their promise not to muddle with Mu’awiya militarily. ²⁹⁷, ²⁹⁸

Verdict of Arbitrators – no solution

Ali wished to appoint Abdullah bin Abbas, a Shi’a Ali, as his arbitrator.²⁹⁹  Under pressure from members of the ‘neutral party’, like Ash’ath bin Qays, he had to appoint Abu Musa Ash’ari, a known neutral, as an arbitrator representing his side.  Mu’awiya had appointed his partisan Amr bin As.³⁰⁰  After preliminary meetings of the two sides they wrote a mutually binding document detailing the rules the arbitrators were supposed to follow.  The two arbitrators would base their decision only on Qur’an and won’t go out of it, otherwise, their judgment would be null and void.³⁰¹, ³⁰², ³⁰³.  The two arbitrators had their first meeting in Dumat al Jandal in August 658 CE along with four hundred supporters on each side.³⁰⁴, ³⁰⁵  After six months of comprehensive deliberations the arbitrators announced their verdict in February 659 CE.³⁰⁶

The decision astounded everybody present who had travelled from far and wide to hear the verdict.  Abu Musa Ash’ari first came to the pulpit and announced that his client, Ali would step down to give Muslims a chance to select a new caliph.  Then came Amr who announced that his client Mu’awiya would remain firmly fixed to his position.³⁰⁷  Public started ranting about foul play.³⁰⁸  Actually, the neutral party had taken a keen interest in the arbitration process.³⁰⁹  They expected both arbitrators to dismiss their respective clients to pave the way for the selection of a new caliph. The audience ended up in quarrel with each other with whips and pulling each other’s hair and the two arbitrators ended up exchanging choice words. ³¹⁰, ³¹¹  The Kharijis present on this occasion was particularly upset.  They proclaimed “the arbitrators had committed unbelief (Kufr).³¹²

Arbitration was a formality.  It is true that people, mainly the Neutrals and the Kharijis, were anxiously waiting for the verdict, but it was highly unlikely that Ali and Mu’awiya intended to lose power as a result of arbitration.  We don’t know who paid the arbitrators for their work.

Aftermath of Arbitration 

Tabari observes that after arbitration Mu’awiya’s strength increased day by day and Ali’s position weakened continuously.³¹³  Mu’awiya didn’t waste any time in declaring himself an independent ruler. He gathered his Arab allies including Amr bin As in the ceremony.  He pledged to work according to the Book of Allah and Sunna.³¹⁴  He still did not take up all prerogatives of a caliph.  He called himself Amir (Amīr امِير), not Amir ul Mu’minin.³¹⁵

Ali rejected the arbitration.  His argument was that each of the arbitrators had followed his own political inclinations rather than getting any guidance from [the book of] Allah.  They differed widely so the decision was not binding on him.³¹⁶  Ali’s refusal to step down as his arbitrator had suggested, tarnished his political image. The Kharijis had already floated the idea that Ali had lost his argument of Divine right to govern the country by accepting arbitration.  Now, citizens of the Rashidun Caliphate might have perceived Ali as sticking to power just for the sake of power.  Shi’a Ali was only one group among his own subjects.  A lot of others were Shi’a Uthman and Kharijis.  Still, many others were neutrals.  They asked him the pinching question of ‘why did he agree to an arbitrator if he was not going to abide by his decision?’  Probably, this was the time when ‘The Neutral Party’ started throwing its weight toward Mu’awiya’s pan of the scale.  Ali’s support was limited to Shi’a Ali.

Ali on a downhill path

Ali had not struck the fantasy of dislodging Mu’awiya militarily out of his mind.  He ordered his army to prepare for an attack.³¹⁷  Khariji terrorists had played havoc in rural areas of the Swad by this time.  Ali kept neglecting them.  His main focus was to get rid of Mu’awiya.  He designed his three-point formula about the Kharijis. ³¹⁸  The three-point formula was that Ali would not prevent them from praying in the grand mosque of Kufa, he would be willing to pay them from the booty if they participate in wars from his side, and he would not strike them unless they strike him first.  The Kharijis used to chant their slogans during the aggregation prayers in the grand mosque of Kufa, making delivery of khutba difficult for Ali.

Incidentally, kharijis killed Abdullah bin Khabbab (‘Abdallah bin Khabbāb عَبدُ اللّه بِن خَبّاب ) of the Tamim tribe, a prominent partisan of Ali, along with his pregnant wife in an ambush.³²⁰  Killing a woman was not tradition.  The incident filled people’s hearts with horror all over the district.³²¹  Ali was compelled to shelve the attack on Mu’awiya for now and take notice of the deteriorating law and order situation in his own domain.³²²

Ali sent Abdullah bin Abbas to negotiate surrender with the Kharijis as a last-ditch effort before an all-out assault on them. ³²³  Two thousand of them surrendered under amnesty from prosecution, and four thousand remained adamant. ³²⁴, ³²⁵  Ali’s forces surrounded them around the canal of Naharawan (Nahrawān نَهَروان ) and killed each of them without mercy.³²⁶, ³²⁷  Only ten or so out of them would have survived.³²⁸  Loss of life in Ali’s forces was just ten souls.³²⁹  This operation, known as the Battle of Nahrawan in annals of history, took place in the summer of 659 CE. ³³⁰  Ali paid his army from the booty.³³¹

Ali had gathered this army to invade Syria according to his original plans.  When he ordered them to march towards Syria after the operation of Naharawan, they started making excuses like they were tired, their armaments were blunt or broken, etc.  Ali gave them a grace period to take a rest in the camp before further march.  Soldiers started disappearing overnight.  The whole camp vanished under the nose of Ali.  He had to return to Kufa empty-handed.³³², ³³³

This was the time when Ali realized that he could not dislodge Mu’awiya by use of blunt force and that he didn’t possess any other means except blunt force.  In other words, he got convinced that the country would have two rulers.  Heartbroken, he started cursing (Tabarrah) Mu’awiya and his associates in his Qunūt during ritual prayer (ṣalāt).  Mu’awiya responded by tit for tat.³³⁴

The only time soldiers fought with their full vigour for Ali was during the Battle of Camel.  He had difficulty convincing them to participate in Siffin. ³³⁵  He could not even march against Mu’awiya the second time.  The question is why the army was reluctant to fight.  The exact answer is not known.  A clue comes from the payment of the army after the Battle of Camel.  The soldiers were disappointed when each of them got only five hundred Dirhams. ³³⁶   It was peanuts compared to the remuneration of Qadisiyyah.  Each cavalryman had got fourteen thousand Dirhams and each infantryman got seventy-one hundred Dirhams from the booty of Qadisiyyah. ³³⁷  A big portion of soldiers’ remuneration used to come from the booty.  Ali had forbidden taking booty from his opposing forces, except for a few things his soldiers could grab on the battlefield.  His opponents were Muslims.  The state used to pay stipends to all registered soldiers irrespective of war or peace.  Ali expected them to fight on the ruler’s order in lieu of stipends. ³³⁸  None of them flatly refused to fight.  They used to express their reluctance by disappearing from the scene whenever called to fight.

Islam remained the ideological umbrella for politics

During the First Arab Civil War, references to pre-Islamic and early Islamic tribal politics became a common occurrence.  When Ali asked for allegiance from Walid bin Uqba, he refused on the grounds that Ali had killed his father on the battlefield after Badr.  Ali was apt to point out that the ancestors of Mu’awiya had opposed Islam as much as they could.  Similarly, Mu’awiya never got tired of praising the nobility of his ancestors during pre-Islamic times.³³⁹  Such references were not limited to the leaders of the conflicting factions.  Almost everybody was involved in it. ³⁴⁰

Despite references to pre-Islamic and early Islamic politics, we don’t hear anybody taking pride in his pre-Islamic religion.  All antagonizing parties were unanimous that they were ignorant (jāhil) before Islam and Prophet Muhammad guided them to the path of truth (ḥaq).³⁴¹  All political arguments stemmed from the religion of Islam.

The political arguments before the murder of Uthman were mainly around the factual position of Sunna of Prophet Muhammad about different matters.  For example, the arguments of Uthman with Ali.³⁴²  Later on, during the caliphate of Ali, political arguments were around the interpretation and understanding of the Qur’an. For example, arguments between Ali and the Kharijis.³⁴³

The reason for any person to die in the First Arab Civil War from any side never became money or loyalty to the leader he was fighting for.  It always remained to get favour from Allah. When Kharijis faced Ali’s forces at Naharvan they shouted out, “Prepare to meet the Lord, hasten, hasten to paradise.”³⁴⁴  Ammar bin Yasir declared before his death in Siffin, “Oh Allah, you know that, if I knew that Your pleasure was that I should put the point of my sword against my breast and then lean on it until it came out of my back, I would do so.  But today I do not know of any deed more pleasing to You than jihad against those evildoers (fāsiqīn). If I did not know of any deed more pleasing to You, I would do it”.³⁴⁵

Rashidun Caliphate totally disorganized

Indiscipline in the military was not the only trouble the Rashidun Caliphate had during Ali’s tenure.  Matters of civil bureaucracy were in jeopardy.  Chronic monetary corruption at middle-level officials kept harming the economy.  Ya’qubi notes that Ali had to reprimand Ash’ath bin Qays, lieutenant governor over Azerbaijan, Yazid bin Qays (Yazīd bin Qays يَزِد بِن قَيس ), Lieutenant governor over Isfahan, Rayy and Hamedan, Nu’man bin Ajlan (Nu’mān bin al ‘Ajlān نُعمان بِن عَجلان ), Governor of Bahrain,  Ziyad bin Abihi  / Abu Sufyan, lieutenant governor over Fars, and Abdullah bin Abbas, governor of Basrah at different occasions during his tenure for embezzling public money.³⁴⁶

The law and order situation didn’t improve either.  People got wearier when many different bands, called collectively Khariji, started petty crimes like looting property, highway robbery and sometimes even murder. ³⁴⁷

The general deterioration of governance had a negative impact on the propagation and conservation of Islam.  Many events of apostasy are documented during First Arab Civil War. Sebeos mentions the conversion of thousands of Muslims in Egypt to Christianity during this period.³⁴⁸  Both Ya’qubi and Tabari document the apostasy of a certain Bakr bin Wa’il who had reverted to their original religion of Christianity.  One of these apostates cited his reason for apostasy that Islam fails to prevent its adherents from fighting among themselves.³⁴⁹, ³⁵⁰

Attitude of the defeated nations

Astonishingly, the defeated nations remained mainly pliant during the whole of the Arab Civil War.  Initially, the Arab elite wished that the jizya-paying defeated nations wouldn’t know about their discord. ³⁵¹  Later on, the news of dissonance spread slowly by word of mouth throughout the country.  Naturally, the defeated nations would have been apt to take advantage of this situation.  The first district to stop paying tax was Nishapur in Khorasan.³⁵²  Merv followed suit.  It happened just after the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE.  Ali sent a small force under Ja’da bin Hubayra (Ja’dah bin Hubayrah  جَعدَه بِن هُبَيرَه ) that besieged Nishapur.  The town swiftly returned to its previous tax treaty.  Merv didn’t need any action.  The threat of besiege was enough for them.³⁵³, ³⁵⁴

Then Fars and Kirman tried their luck.  Ali sent Ziyad bin Abihi / Abu Sufyan with four thousand soldiers.  They didn’t have to fight.  Ziyad utilized the time-honoured technique of divide and rule to re-assert the authority of the Rashidun Caliphate over them.³⁵⁵  It appears that the defeated districts were in political isolation from each other.  They didn’t have the means to communicate and organize any coordinated uprising.  Probably, they didn’t have a serious appetite for an uprising.  The taxes they were paying were within their capacity.

One wonders why the same soldiers of the Rashidun Caliphate who were reluctant to fight against Mu’awiya were happy to march to far-off places to suppress any potential uprising.

A brand new phenomenon occurred in the Rashidun Caliphate during the tenure of Ali.  For the first time in the history of Islam, Muslims joined hands with non-Muslims to fight against a Muslim government. According to the details, a power-mongering splinter group of three hundred Kufan Arabs belonging to the Najiyah clan under the leadership of Khirrit bin Rashid (Khirrīt bin Rāshid خِرِّط بِن رَاشِد ) left Kufa.  They proceeded straight to Khuzestan.  There a number of non-Muslims (ulūj) were weary of paying taxes.  They joined them instantly.  Some local Kurds, a lot of Banu Najiyah and Abdul Qays joined them as well. The whole of Khuzestan burnt in flames of rebellion. Ali had to send Ma’qil bin Qays (Ma’qil bin Qays al Riyāḥi  مَعقِل بِن قَيس الرِياحِى ), his superintendent of police, to the province.  He successfully killed Khirrit and his supporters.  According to the government policy, he pardoned Muslims and took all non-Muslims captive.³⁵⁶  We don’t hear of any tax disobedience from non-Muslims in the provinces of Swad, Jazira, Syria, or Egypt, during First Arab Civil War.  They all had one thing in common.  They were managed directly by Arab elites.

Mu’awiya provided safe haven for Ali’s fugitives

Mu’awiya was bent on creating all possible hurdles for Ali to manage his territories. One of them was an open invitation to law fugitives of Ali’s side to escape.  An event will illustrate the situation.

After defeating the rebellion of Khuzestan, the Rashidun Caliphate had taken non-Muslim combatants into captivity. ³⁵⁷  Masqala bin Hubayra (Maṣqalah bin Hubaryrah  مَصقَلَه بِن هُبَيرَه ) of Shayban tribe was Ali’s amil over Jur district in Fars.  He felt pity for the slaves and bought their freedom for one million Dirhams from Ali. He freed the slaves immediately after but could pay only five hundred thousand Dirhams out of his pocket.  Ali knew that Masqala was nearly bankrupt.  He demanded money to be paid urgently.  Masqalah fled to Basrah where Abdullah bin Abbas asked him to raise money from the districts under his command. Masqalah could pop up only two hundred thousand more.  He wished that Ali’s government should write off the remaining debt as Uthman’s government would have done in this situation.  When pressed further Masqalah absconded to Mu’awiya.  Mu’awiya accepted him with fervor.³⁵⁸, ³⁵⁹

The charisma of Mu’awiya was such that Ali was always suspicious of the loyalty of his supporters. He was doubtful about whom to trust and whom not.  Just before the Battle of Siffin, he thought Khalid bin Mu’ammar (Khālid bin Mu’ammar خالِد بِن مُعَمّر ), one of his field commanders from the tribe of Taym, might have joined hands with Mu’awiya secretly.  He raised the matter with his tribe in his presence.  They all reassured his loyalty.³⁶⁰

Mu’awiya keeps teasing Ali

By this time, Mu’awiya’s political slogan of revenge for Uthman’s blood must have lost popular appeal. ³⁶¹  All known murderers were already dead.  He might be inclined towards peace with Ali.  After his army’s refusal to fight against Mu’awiya, Ali accepted peaceful co-existence with Mu’awiya mentally.  However, he didn’t declare it formally.  Mu’awiya lodged a harassment campaign against the Rashidun Caliphate.  Probably, his aim was to bring the Rashidun Caliphate to the negotiating table.  From the summer of 659 CE to the end of 660 CE, in almost eighteen months, Mu’awiya sent a lot of teasers to irritate Ali.

Mu’awiya knew of the presence of Shi’a Uthman in Basrah. ³⁶²  He sent Abdullah bin Amr bin Hadhrami (‘Abdullah bin ‘Amr ibn Ḥadhrami  عَبُد اللّه بِن عَمرؤ بِن حَضرَمِى ), his intelligence operator to Basrah.³⁶³  That time Abdullah bin Abbas was away from the town for a meeting with Ali, leaving behind  Ziyad bin Abihi /Abu Sufyan as acting governor.³⁶⁴  Abdullah bin Amr could make a significant following among Tamim.³⁶⁵  Ziyad got so afraid that he shifted away from the governor’s house taking the public treasury with him. He took a lodging, with the treasury on his side, in the mosque of the Huddan (Ḥuddān حُدّان ) clan of Azd who had undertaken to protect him and the treasury. ³⁶⁶  Ziyad informed Ali that the majority of people in the town appear to be supporting Abdullah bin Amr.³⁶⁷  Ali was upset and sent A’yan bin Dibay’a (A’yan bin Ḍubay’ah اَعيَن بِن ضُبَيعَه) of Tamim to counter the efforts of Abdullah.³⁶⁸  The supporters of Abdullah bin Amr managed to kill A’yan.³⁶⁹  Next, Ali sent Jariya bin Qudama (Jāriyah bin Qudāmah al Sa’di السَعدِى جارِيَه بِن قُدامَه) of Tamim with fifty men of Tamim.³⁷⁰, ³⁷¹  Jariya could break some men of Abdullah away from him.³⁷²  He, then, locked Abdullah along with his staunch supporters in a house and burnt them alive.³⁷³

The painful death of his man in Basrah might have pinched Mu’awiya.  He, afterwards, made a policy to send a squadron to the areas held by Ali with instructions to withdraw immediately when Ali mobilizes his forces to tackle.  Mu’awiya had gained mastery of such tactics through his endeavours against the Byzantines.  Each time Ali startled in panic, overreacted by sending a bigger army to halt the perceived invasion and consoled himself on news of withdrawal.

The penetration of Mu’awiya’s men into Ayn al Tamr, Qutqutana (Quṭquṭānah قُطقُطانَه) and Anbar produced desired results for him.³⁷⁴, ³⁷⁵  Emboldened by the success of the pilot project, Mu’awiya extended the circle of such attacks to Hejaz. ³⁷⁶  During such raids the Mu’awiya’s party would interrogate the villagers and nomads, kill those found to be Shi’a Ali, loot their property and vanish in the desert on the approach of guards belonging to the Rashidun Caliphate.  The last of such campaigns was quite extensive.  Mu’awiya knew Hejaz, Yemen and other parts of Arabia were devoid of fighting men. In the fall of 660 CE  Mu’awiya sent a bigger force of three thousand men under the command of Busr bin Abi Artat (Busr bin Abī Arṭāt بُسر بِن اَبِى اَرطاة ) of ‘Amir bin Lu’ayy clan of Quraysh.  This time the army marched up to Medina without any resistance, harassing the Bedouins on the way.  Ali’s governor over Medina, Abu Ayyub (Abū Ayyūb اَبُو اَيّوب ) of Ansar, withdrew in horror.  The army found the city in shambles.  The army forced the civilians of Medina into allegiance to Mu’awiya, who were otherwise Shi’a Ali.  Busr demolished a few houses in Medina, as a show of power, before proceeding to Mecca.  Mu’awiya had ordered Busr beforehand to avoid harming anybody in Mecca.³⁷⁷, ³⁷⁸, ³⁷⁹  Bypassing Mecca, Busr took the road to Yemen.  Ubaydullah bin Abbas was still governing Yemen in Ali’s name.  When the news reached Ali that Busr had created havoc in Medina and now was on his way to Yemen he organized an army of four thousand under the command of Jariya bin Qudama.  By that time Ubaydullah bin Abbas took to heels, leaving his two minor sons behind.  Busr killed both of them by slaughtering them.³⁸⁰, ³⁸²  Busr was terrorizing civilians in towns of Yemen, like Najran and Sana’a when Jariya reached with his army. Busr raced back to Syria, burning everything he came across on the way.³⁸³  The inhabitants of Yemen paid the price. Initially, Busr killed a large number of Shi’a Ali and then Jariya killed a lot of the Shi’a Uthman.³⁸⁴, ³⁸⁵.  The purpose of these sorties was not to dislodge Ali from power but to keep Rashidun Caliphate insecure.

Mu’awiya’s teasing tactics finally exhausted Ali.  He had to pay his soldiers fifty Dirhams per person each time he sent them out.³⁸⁶  The constant threat was preventing him from attending to more pressing issues, like the deteriorating law and order situation in his country and the financial health of his government.  Pressed from all sides, Ali had a grudging acceptance of Mu’awiya.  He entered into a truce agreement with Mu’awiya.  Both sides agreed on no aggression policy, recognition of borders and acceptance of each other’s government. ³⁸⁷

Assassination of Ali

On January 26, 661 CE,  when Ali entered the grand mosque of Kufa to offer morning prayer, his assassin was hiding in the doorway.³⁸⁸, ³⁸⁹  He was Abdur Rahman bin Muljam (‘Abd ar Rehmān bin Muljam عَبدُ الرَحمن بِن مُلجَم) of Murad tribe.  He injured Ali on his head and Ali fell down.  Two days later Ali succumbed to his injuries. ³⁹⁰, ³⁹¹  Abdur Rahman bin Muljam was arrested and tightened with a fetter on the spot.  Soon after, he served the death sentence for the murder.³⁹²  Law of the Rashidun Caliphate considered the murderer the sole responsible for the crime. Accomplices of murders were not interrogated.³⁹³

Islamic sources depict the murder of Ali as part of a wider conspiracy masterminded and executed by the Kharijis. They construe that they were three people in all who were at the throats of Mu’awiya, Ali, and Amr.  Both Mu’awiya and Amr survived the attempts on their lives miraculously on the same day when Ali got fatally wounded.³⁹⁴

We know that Kharijis had resorted to terrorism.  We also know that the Battle of Naharawan had not eradicated them from their roots.  It is plausible that they would have planned to carry out this act of sabotage at three different capital towns simultaneously.  But is it the only possibility?  How come only Ali paid the price and two others escaped unhurt?  How come the Kharijis, who were active only in and around Kufa, could execute such a sophisticated operation in far-off foreign cities of Damascus and Fustat?  Who financed the scheme?

A contemporary Christian source, Sebeos, writing in the 660s, doesn’t credit any conspiracy theories.  He tells us, “He [Mu’awiya] killed the king whom they had enthroned [in place of Uthman]”.³⁹⁵  We know Mu’awiya had physically eliminated his political opponents in the past.  He was the mastermind behind the cold-blooded murder of Malik bin Harith al-Ashtar.³⁹⁶  We also know that he was the prime beneficiary of Ali’s death.  Could Mu’awiya really do that?  Did Sebeos blame Mu’awiya in the flow of speech or really he meant it?  Were there any speculating stories circulating in masses at the time of the murder which later got lost?³⁹⁷  The riddles of Ali’s murder are still unsolved.

Ali has survived in the history of Islam due to other reasons than his governance.  He was the only ruler of the Rashidun Caliphate who had personally led an army in a big war like the Battle of Camel while in office. ³⁹⁸  A piece of poetry written about him by one of his Khariji enemies and preserved by Tabari gives him the honoraria of Ḥaydar – the lion-hearted.

You upon whom be blessings, we have struck Ḥaydar
Abu Ḥasan with a blow to the head and he was split apart.

We have removed kingship from his concerns,
With the blow of a sword, since he waxed high and mighty.³⁹⁹

Ali is mainly known for his religious eminence.  Ya’qubi puts in the mouth of Abu Dharr that Ali was a trustee (waṣi) of the Prophet and heir to his knowledge.⁴⁰¹ On another occasion Ya’qubi puts in the mouth of Abu Dharr Ghifari that Ali was walī Allah.⁴⁰², ⁴⁰³

By the middle of the ninth century CE, about four thousand sermons attributed to Ali used to circulate in Muslim society.  People used them as quotations in their own sermons and speeches.⁴⁰⁴

It is worth noting that both Tabari and Ya’qubi allocate full chapters to discuss the caliphate of Ali.  However, in the eyes of contemporary non-Muslims, it was non-existent.

Aftermath of the civil war

The first Arab Civil War virtually finished with the assassination of Ali, though few events were pending.  The first Arab Civil War had a profound impact on Muslim society and religion. It facilitated the rise of three distinct groups among Muslims.  One was the mainstream group, Sunni Muslims, who based their religious beliefs not only on the teachings of the Qur’an but also on the Sunna of the Prophet as available to them.  The other was minority Shi’a Muslims, who believed in the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet but emphasized that Ali was heir to the knowledge of the Prophet.  The third group was purist Muslims.  Though technically part of Sunni Islam, they always emphasized purging out those practices which they deemed were later innovations (bid’ah).  No doubt these sects matured and formalized during later decades and centuries, their origin can be traced in political thoughts of those five bloody years that the First Arab Civil War covers.

The first Arab Civil War was a test of the strength of the nascent religion of Islam. Each of the warring groups hired non-Muslims to fight for them but none gave them any leadership position.  They maintained it as a fight among Muslims and disallowed it to become a fight among everybody irrespective of religion.  On top of that, they restricted public expression of their differences within the bounds of Islam.   Islam successfully survived the onslaught of the First Arab Civil War.

The first Arab Civil War has an embarrassing effect on the religiopolitical psyche of later Muslim generations.  They tend to downplay that a fierce war was fought between dignitaries of Islam.  Ammar bin Yasir got killed in the Battle of Siffin fighting from Ali’s side.  Both Ya’qubi and Tabari fail to give the name of their killer.  Tabari gives only a hint that later on, people blamed Amr bin As for killing Ammar, but Mu’awiya quickly tackled the situation by saying, “Nay!  They were his own people who dragged him into the war.” ⁴⁰⁵  Talha bin Ubaydullh died fighting against Ali in the Battle of Camel. Ya’qubi gives a funny story about his death. According to his version Marwan bin Hakam killed Talha and then claimed that he had killed one of the murderers of Uthman. ⁴⁰⁶  Tabari produces a similar story. ⁴⁰⁷  One wonders that Marwan travelled to Basrah from Mecca along with Talha and others of the ‘Meccan Alliance’ to take vengeance on Uthman.  During the battle, he killed his own soldier.  He didn’t apologize that it was an identification mistake, rather he boasted about it.  None of his commanders court marshalled him.  After the war, Ali didn’t even interrogate him for the murder.  Ali rather missed a golden chance to physically eliminate one of his opponents and permitted him to go back to Medina and reappear against him at Siffin. Amazing!

End of the Rashidun Caliphate

28^th January 661 CE, the date of death of Ali, the last Rashidun caliph, triggered the sirens of the final disintegration of the Rashidun Caliphate. ⁴⁰⁸  Election of thirty-seven-year-old Hasan bin Ali (Ḥasan bin ‘Ali حَسَن بِن عَلى ), the firstborn of Ali, was a local affair of Kufa.⁴⁰⁹, ⁴¹⁰  We don’t hear of any attempt from his camp to get allegiance from any of the governors of the provinces, except in Hejaz, where Jariya forced people into allegiance.⁴¹¹  Neither they attempted to get the blessing of the prominent names for Hasan’s caliphate. Sa’d bin Waqqas, the only surviving member of the Electoral College was living in Medina, for example.  Nobody bothered to approach him and get a kind of ‘go ahead’ for the new caliph.  Shi’a Ali of Kufa had confirmed Hasan in the office without any wider consultation.  Ali was fully aware of Hasan’s nomination when he lay on his deathbed. ⁴¹² Generally, citizens of the Rashidun Caliphate adopted the attitude of wait and see.

The Rashidun Caliphate had forty thousand registered soldiers just in the cantonment of Kufa by this time.⁴¹³  Soldiers registered in Basrah and stationed in other far-flung places were extra. However, their capacity to fight on orders of the caliph was doubtful.  The very first political decision Hasan took was to reestablish the authority of Mu’awiya over the territories he was already governing.  ‘I want peace’ was his slogan.⁴¹⁴  He rather wished to bring back order and discipline in the remaining territories of the Rashidun Caliphate. ⁴¹⁵  He demoted Qays bin Sa’d, the hawkish Shi’a Ali and the commander of the Kufan army from Ali’s time.⁴¹⁶  Instead, he called Abdullah bin Abbas from Mecca to take charge of the Kufan army. ⁴¹⁷, ⁴¹⁸ Die-hard Shi’a Ali of Kufa abhorred Hasan’s plans.  They wished Hasan’s first step would be sending a notice of war to Mu’awiya.⁴¹⁹  They suspected Mu’awiya’s hand in the murder of Ali.  They were already writing propaganda poetry regarding this.  Here is a piece of poetry written by Abu Aswad al Duali, qadi (qāḍi قاضى) of Basrah and a known Shi’a Ali:

Indeed, say to Mu’āwiyah bin Harb
And may those who goat not rejoice:

“Do you afflict us in the month of fasting
With the loss of the best of all men?”

You have killed the best of those who ride mounts
And put the saddle upon them, the best of those who sail the seas.⁴²⁰

Differences of opinion between Qays bin Sa’d, the demoted commander of the army, and Hasan increased to an irreparable extent. ⁴²¹  One day, a commoner attempted on the life of Hasan.  The stab wound proved to be non-fatal. ⁴²² Compelled by circumstances, Hasan ordered twelve thousand of his soldiers to march out of Kufa and camp near Tswyn with the intention to prepare for an attack on Mu’awiya.  Mu’awiya was not inattentive about the developments in Kufa.  He swiftly moved into the territory of the Rashidun Caliphate with his Syrian army and camped at Maskin to counter any untoward commotion.⁴²³, ⁴²⁴  All of a sudden, a rumour spread in Hasan’s army camp in Tyswn that Qays bin Sa’d had got murdered. The disillusioned soldiers plundered Hasan’s pavilion.  They even quarrelled to get the carpet underneath Hasan.  Hasan had to flee to the White Palace for his life.  This incident disheartened Hasan completely.  He realized the government was getting out of his grasp. ⁴²⁵, ⁴²⁶

It was apparent to Shi’a Ali that Hasan was not in a position and mood to fight against Mu’awiya’s force that had intruded inside Rashidun Caliphate.  A race started in Hasan’s camp to contact Mu’awiya and get a deal from him at the best possible terms.  First was Abdullah bin Abbas who got indemnity against any future prosecution and confiscation of his property. ⁴²⁷  Hasan was the next.  He got a concession to transfer five million Dirhams from Kufa’s public treasury into his account.  In addition, he won revenue from Darabjird as his ongoing pension. ⁴²⁸, ⁴²⁹  Initially, the twelve thousand troops camping at Tyswn wowed to continue their fight under Qays bin Sa’d without any leader, but they quickly changed their standpoint.  Each of them got immunity against any future prosecution and confiscation of property.⁴³⁰, ⁴³¹

Hassan, along with his brother Husayn and his paternal cousin Abdullah bin Ja’far left for Kufa.  After his stab wound healed, the three departed to Medina after an emotional farewell at the grand mosque of Kufa.⁴³², ⁴³³, ⁴³⁴

Mu’awiya entered Kufa triumphantly.  All and sundry accepted him as the new caliph.

July 25, 661 CE is the date of death of the Rashidun Caliphate. ⁴³⁵  This is the date on which Hasan signed the deal to transfer power to Mu’awiya. The Rashidun Caliphate lived for twenty-nine years, one month, and seventeen days.  A new kind of caliphate arose on its ruins.  This was the Damascus Caliphate.

Causes for the demise of the Rashidun Caliphate

The Rashidun Caliphate was short-lived compared to many other political entities in history.  Sasanian Iran, for example, survived for four hundred and thirty years. ⁴³⁶  Byzantine Rome flourished even longer.  It lasted for almost eleven hundred years.⁴³⁷ The Rashidun Caliphate utilized only three decades out of the history of mankind to surge and crash.  What hastened its demise?

Non-Muslim sources on the Rashidun Caliphate are too brief to shed any light on the reasons for its crash. Muslim sources, on the other hand, are preoccupied with events and personalities.  They have no craving for analysis.  Modern historians, anyway, have their own theorem.  They wish to dig out the reasons behind the events.  A host of historians have written on the question, but nothing final is concluded. ⁴³⁸  Here, a few observations are worth noting.

The Rashidun Caliphate couldn’t chalk out a workable constitution for the state.  Particularly, guidelines about the selection of a new ruler after the death of the previous one were ambiguous.  Furthermore, any legal arrangements for the abdication of an incompetent ruler were non-existent.  Resultantly, the country suffered from chronic political instability and plunged into a political crisis each time a ruler died.  Ad-hocism often took precedence over any other statute.  The absence of hard and fast rules for the selection of a ruler encouraged many people at the upper echelons of the government to try to grab power by hook or by crook.  The absence of hard and fast rules for appointments also enhanced the hopes of many people at upper levels that they could bag superior jobs with proper efforts.  The country was divided into many antagonizing fractions, each of them striving to hinder the development of a workable constitution, lest it may damage its own interests.

The laws and rules of the Rashidun Caliphate had to be in line with the Qur’an and the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad.  The generation who received guidance from the Prophet himself survived throughout the years of the Rashidun Caliphate.  This generation knew exactly what the Sunna was.  The rulers found it hard to introduce any modification which was not practiced by the Prophet. Let’s take a look at an example.  Three out of four rulers of the Rashidun Caliphate were murdered – a whopping 75% violent fatality rate among them.  Early Islamic sources suggest that Prophet Muhammad used to mingle with people freely in the mosque.  The timings of his routine in the mosque were publicly known.  He didn’t hire full-time personal guards.  Abu Bakr didn’t make any changes around the security issues of a ruler of the Rashidun Caliphate.  He didn’t wish to be perceived as deviant from the practice of the Prophet.   It worked out well during his reign.  Arabs constituted the core of the population of Medina at that time.  Visitors to the town were Arabs as well.  Arabs had their own strict tribal traditions and values around murder.  The demography of Medina changed significantly during Umar’s reign.  A big chunk of the Arab population left the town to participate in Jihad.  The number of non-Arab slaves swelled.  Arabs were reduced to a visible minority.  The visitors to the town were as much non-Arabs as were Arabs.  There was a palpable need to enhance security around the caliph, whose decisions affected the fate of thousands of people, sometimes in a negative way.  Umar did not pay any attention to the issue of the caliph’s security during his sweeping reforms. ⁴³⁹  He kept mingling with people freely in the mosque in pursuance of the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad and Abu Bakr.  His routine was precisely known to people.  He created the police of the town (Shurṭ) but they were rarely hired for the security of dignitaries.⁴⁴⁰  He paid the price of neglecting the issue of security with his own life.  Then came Uthman.  Nobody in his government attended to the security of the ruler, despite the murder of his processor due to lack of it.  Rebels could easily stone him to near death when he mingled people freely in the mosque.  Later, they killed him.  He did not have any official security guards at that time.  The only people who tried to save him were his personal friends and servants.  Ali’s story is not much different.  The only piece of information his assailant knew about him was that he doesn’t use bodyguards while coming to the mosque. ⁴⁴¹  Hasan was stabbed within a few months after coming to power.⁴⁴²  It was his good luck that he survived.  The first thing Mu’awiya did after attaining the title of Amir ul Mu’minin was to introduce maqsūrah in the mosque.  This was a separate enclosure for the dignitaries.  He also introduced the presence of guards near him during public prayers.  He also made a night guard available at his residence.⁴⁴³  Here we see a classical case where rulers of the Rashidun Caliphate didn’t even mention about deviating from the norm of Prophet Muhammad out of fear that their subjects might find a point to criticize them.  Rulers who came after them were bold to take such a decision.

Social, economic and political changes in the society of the Rashidun Caliphate evolved briskly.  The state remained sluggish in legal and administrative reforms matching with social changes.  Let’s take a look at an example. The Caliph’s authority in the Rashidun Caliphate did not stem from any military force at his disposal or any monetary supremacy over others.  It stemmed from his spiritual power.  Initially, when people were newly attached to Islam and were enthusiastic, it worked very well.  All of the military was in Khalid bin Walid’s favour, only Umar was not. Umar’s decision prevailed, and he did not have to explain his reasons for demoting him to anybody. ⁴⁴⁴  It is known whenever a person attaches to a new religion he is excited about it.  Things changed drastically when attachment to a new religion became a ‘routine’ for many citizens of the country.  By the end of Uthman’s tenure people could easily blame Uthman for not following the Sunna of the Prophet to justify their disobedience to him.  While writing to Yazid bin Asad (Yazīd bin Asad bin Kurz  يَزِد بِن اَسَد بِن كُرز ) and to the Syrians for military aid, Uthman stresses his rightful claims upon them and mentions that it is Almighty Allah’s commandment to obey the caliphs.⁴⁴⁵  By mid of his term, when things were going from bad to worse for him, Uthman should have created an army in Medina at his personal disposal to put force in his orders. He kept using his spiritual status to coerce people into obedience. The orders of Umar’s time deteriorated into requests during Uthman’s time and further degenerated into pleas during Ali’s time.  Here is a piece of speech Ali once delivered to encourage the garrisons of Kufa and Basrah to fight under his orders.  “People! The beginning of your decline was the disappearance from among you of the people of intellect and judgment, those who tell the truth when they speak and who do what they say.  I have called on you again and again, in secret and in public, by day and by night, but my call has only increased you in flight. The exhortation is of no use to you, nor is the summons to right guidance and wisdom.  By Allah, I know well what would settle things for you, but therein would be my ruin.  So give me a little time; for, by Allah, there has come to you one who will make you grieve and afflict you, but whom Allah will afflict by you.  To the humiliation of Islam and destruction of religion, the Son of Abu Sufyan summons the base and wicked and they answer, while I summon you and you do not accept and take fright”.⁴⁴⁶

The caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate was primus inter pares.  Constant crude criticism hounded the caliph.  Explaining each smallest action and decision exhausted the creative energy of a caliph, which could have been used for planning and reforms.

The story of the Rashidun Caliphate can be summed up in a few words.  It was born with a doctrine that the one with an undisputed record of serving Islam will rule the country but gave way to another doctrine that whoever could manipulate will rule the country.  It was born with a doctrine that the most competent man picked from a pool of leaders will serve as a ruler.  It died with a doctrine that the one born to a ruler has the first right to rule. The Rashidun Caliphate was a crude democracy.  It gave way to ordered governance.

1. For some prominent names who kept supporting Uthman in Kufa, Basrah, and Medina see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),164, 165, 166, 185, 186.
2. F. Imbert, “Califes, Frinces et Poetes Dans Les Graffiti du Debut de l’Islam”, Romano-Arabica 2015 volume 15 pp 65 – 66 and P 75 (fig. 3).  The discoverer guesses this inscription to be written in 656 CE.
3. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 38, 57.
4. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 38, 57.
5. Tabari states that all killers of Uthman met a violent death ultimately. Their killings started minutes after the murder.  A freedman of Uthman killed Sūdān bin Ḥumrān on the spot. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 216).  Amr bin Hamiq was captured in Mosul during Mu’awiya’s tenure and was executed on orders of Mu’awiya.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 137).  The vengeance continued.  ‘Umayr bin Ḍābi’ got caught and punished when Ḥajjāj bin Yusuf, the Umayyad governor of Kufa, ordered conscription [against Khariji] in Kufa and Umayr had to produce his CV.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 233.  The Umayyad caliphate actually witch-hunted anybody who had participated in the political agitation as Uthman’s murderers.  Many of them didn’t consider themselves actual murderers.  The last person to be executed on this ground was Kumayl bin Ziyād of the Nakha clan.  He was arrested for avoiding military service.  Hajjaj labelled the charge of the killing of Uthman on him before killing him.  He said to Hajjaj before his execution: carry out your pre-decided judgement but Allah will be your judge.  Hajjaj answered that the decisive proof would be against Kumayl there.  Kumayl said only if Hajjaj will be sitting in judgment.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 45.)
6. For the name see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),36).
7. The leaders of the Rashidun Caliphate with foresight had been afraid that one day the conquerors would fight against each other for the re-distribution of wealth.  When Umar saw the booty of Julala heaped in the courtyard of the Prophet’s mosque, laden with rubies, chrysalides, peridotites and other gems he burst into tears.  Abdur Rahman bin Awf, the guard of the booty, asked him why he cried on this auspicious occasion.  He said, “by Allah, He never gave this to any people without that giving rise to mutual envy and hatred.  I pray Allah that they won’t quarrel over it; otherwise fighting will be their lot.” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),46).
8. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 181. 182.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 128.
9. Barbar F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start and How to Stop them,” (New York: Crown, 2022).
10. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 821.
11. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160.
12. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5.  Some, like Muhammad bin Maslama and Hassan bin Thabit, remained neutral in the dispute: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 6.  This is the last mention of Muhammad bin Maslama in the history of Islam.  He died in May of 663 CE peacefully.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 57, Year 43. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 32).
13. According to Tabari Malik al-Ashtar played a major role in assuring that prominent members of Muhajirun pay allegiance to Ali:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5, 12, 14.
14. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5.
15. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
16. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 15.
17. See the names of people who spoke on this occasion:  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
18. For contents of their speeches see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823, 824.
19. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 238.
21. Actually, many prominent Quraysh left the town when the rebels besieged Uthman in his house.  Their purpose was to clear their name from the murder trial which was going to take place in future history books.  The list includes Aisha, Amr bin As, Sa’d bin Waqqas, Zubayr bin Awwam and Talha bin Ubaydullah.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 12.  Some of the Ansar who were not opposed to Uthman also left the town.  The list includes Maslama bin Muhammad, Hassan bin Thabit, and Zayd bin Thābit.

    Three prominent men of Banu Umayyah fled from Medina to Mecca after the murder of Uthman, before anybody took the oath of the caliphate.  They were Marwan bin Hakam, Sa’id bin As, and Walid bin Uqba. ²⁰Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 12.

22. Walid bin Uqba participated in Siffin from Mu’awiya’s side.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 15.  Then he disappeared in anonymity.
23. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
24. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),822, 823.
25. For the name Shi’a Uthman see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 479.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),150.   For the name ‘Uthmāniyyah.  See:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 187.
26. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 207, 256.
27. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 98.
28. The three founder members of the Uthman party asked Ali to let them keep their wealth, but Ali refused it: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
29. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
30. See above.
31. For Ali’s statement see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
32. A section of Arab elites had amassed astronomical wealth. They were the ones who took the risk of attacking superpowers at a time when the outcome of the war was uncertain.  The amount of booty they could gather was more than what others could gather after them.  Two factors helped them grow richer.  One, all military personnel were tax-exempt.  Second, the traditional norm of voluntarily sharing the wealth with poor fellows had dwindled due to urbanization and the availability of stipends for many poor from the government side.  The problem of unequal wealth distribution among Arab elites was first noticed during Umar’s tenure.  Umar is on the record that he wished to snatch wealth from the rich and give it to the poor.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 141).  Umar’s wish never materialized.  We don’t know what were Umar’s limitations in this regard.  We do know that Uthman considered any such legislation against the constitution of the county – Islam.  He stressed that any such transfer of money should be on a voluntary basis.  (See above)g
33. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī.  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011). 35, 36.
34. For the details of these campaigns see:  Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī.  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011). 482,528.
35. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī.  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 210.
36. Ali advised Umar to nationalize the land of Swad for later generations:  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 423.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),782.
37. Tabari asserts that Ali’s criticism of Uthman was so relentless that Uthman decided to conduct affairs without him.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 236).
38. We don’t know exactly how Ali earned his livelihood before immigration.  He might be a poor person at the time of his immigration and marriage to Fatima.  Anyhow, as time passed he no longer remained poor.  We hear that he was a beneficiary of estates which the state used to allot to its leading citizens time and on.  Both Prophet Muhammad and Umar bestowed his estates.  (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 21). 29).  One of his estates was in Yanbu  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 22.
39. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 18.
40. The Muhajirun were apt in demanding the arrest, though none of the Muhajirun of Medina had shown up at the oath-taking ceremony of the new caliph to support him.
41. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 18.
42. Ali’s opponents could point out that it was only Ali out of all members of the Electoral College who did not leave the town at the time of the murder of Uthman.  Mu’awiya blamed, later on, in a letter to Qays bin Sa’d that Ali secretly urged the rebels to kill Uthman  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 181).
43. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 190.
44. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 824.
45. Only Ya’la bin Munya of Yemen had served longer than him.  Abu Bakr appointed Ya’la on a part of Yemen after Ridda Wars and he continued to govern it until his dismissal at the hands of Ali (see above and below).
46. William Muir, The Caliphate; its Rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 256.
47. As a matter of fact sources don’t report any clash of interest among fighters of Syria from the start of Futuhul Buldan to the end of it.  The participants of Qadisiyyah, who later settled in Kufa and Basrah, started quarrelling with each other for leadership immediately after Qadisiyyah.  Sa’d bin Waqqas had to cast lots to choose the leader of the prayer when they quarrelled with each other on this issue so rabidly that Sa’d feared that they would use swords.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 126).  Not only this, they had criticized Sa’d’s behaviour during the battle.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 141.  On the same line, when Amr ordered his men to attack Egypt, one of the soldiers from Yemen said, “We are not made of stone or iron.”  Amr said, “Shut up, you dog,” that man retorted, “In that case, you are the upper dog” [commander of dogs].  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 174.
48. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 287.
49. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 72, 73, 74.
50. This was not an isolated case of amalgamation of provinces.  Rashidun Caliphate didn’t need many governors responsible directly to the caliph.  It incorporated all newly conquered and newly subjugated areas of Sasanian Iran into Basrah and Kufa.  It also amalgamated the Maghreb in Egypt.
51. Actually, those who had converted to Islam after Fath Mecca were recognized as a distinct entity.  They were called Muhājirat al-Fath.  ( Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 133) and ahl al-fath.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 200).
52. The ten dissident exiles raised this issue with Mu’awiya during their debates with him.  He agreed with them that others surpass him in standing in Islam.  That time he boasted about his capabilities and claimed that Umar would have dismissed him if he didn’t see any capability in him.  He appraised them that he is not the one who brings any innovations into Islam.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 123, 124.
53. See above.
54. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 26, 43.
55. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 27.
56. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 30, 31.
57. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 32.
58. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 32.
59. Probably Ali had not anticipated this scenario.  He might have had a wrong perception that, just like in the cases of his predecessors, the provinces would follow suit once Medina takes oath with a caliph.
60. Ali had his supporters from the beginning of Uthman’s caliphate.  Their basic argument was that Ali was better suited to be the caliphate as compared to Uthman.  Uthman, on his part, had not encouraged anybody to counter Ali.  Now, two groups evolved in the Muslim community who strived to quash each other.
61. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823.
62. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 824.
63. For Qays bin Sa’d’s tribal affiliation see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 176.  Qays had the honour of being a Companion of the Prophet and he held the banner of Ansar during Prophetic times.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 183. Qays was the son of Sa’d bin Ubadah who had demanded a caliphate for Ansar after the death of Prophet Muhammad.
64. Ansar used to get minor jobs, for example, as ad hoc governor of a minor province, but they never got governorship of a major province.  Uthman gave the governorship of Jazira to ‘Umayr bin Sa’d of Ansar after coming to power for a few months while he was amalgamating Jazira with Syria.  He worked under Mu’awiya for this job.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 287.
65. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160.
66. Each and every rebel was not impressed by the teachings of Ibn Saba.
67. For different sites of their camps see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 160, 161.
68. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825.
69. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825.
70. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161.
71. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 161, 162.
72. ‘Amr was first born of Uthman.  Dhakwān seems to be a son of Walid bin Uqba from a Jewish woman from Ṣaffūriyyah, a village near Nazareth.  The point is that a person with such a dubious descent could hardly claim to be the avenger of his lineage.
73. See for their name: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 91.
74. It was not merely apathy towards the political process on their part.  They deliberately kept themselves aloof from any dispute.  They used to call themselves ‘those who have removed themselves from the conflict’.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 91.
75. Ali’s envoy to Mu’awiya and Mu’awiya’s envoy to Ali both agree that there was no political discord in Syria.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 30, 31.
76. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 48.
77. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5, 12, 14.
78. Zubayr wished for the governorship of Kufa and Talha wished for the governorship of Basrah:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 5.
79. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825.
80. Ali had tactfully refused Talha and Zubayr any governorship.  He first promised to Talha governorship of Yemen and to Zubayr governorship of Yamama and Bahrain.  Then he took back their commissions citing their manifest greed as a cause.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825.).
81. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825, 826.
82. Governor of Mecca had always been a scion of the Umayyad family.  After the long tenure of Aṭṭāb bin Asīd, which ended with his death, Uthman appointed Khālid bin ‘Āṣ, another Umayyad to the post.  He was still governing Mecca at the time of Uthman’s death.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 238). Mecca did not produce a single dissident to rebel against Uthman.  Uthman appointed Abdullah bin Abbas leader of pilgrimage for the last pilgrimage during his caliphate because he was afraid that the pilgrims from cantonments might harass his governor of Mecca Khālid bin ‘Āṣ in case Uthman gives him authority over the pilgrimage.  In that case, Uthman feared bloodshed in the sanctuary.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 238).
83. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 40.
84. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 39.
85. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826.
86. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 819.
87. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 825, 826.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 238.
88. See: The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 110.
89. The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 94.
90. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī.  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 211
91. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826, 829.
92. Zubayr bin Awwam had built four houses at different provincial headquarters to get a place to stay and to promote his politics.  They were located at Basrah, Kufa, Fustat and Alexandria.  All of them were richly designed.  He possessed half a million Dirhams in cash.  The number of his horses and slaves was one thousand each.  His real estates located in Egypt, Alexandria, Kufa, and Basrah were extra.  Talha bin Ubaydullah was on equal footing with Zubayr in wealth.  He had built houses and estates valued at one million Dirhams.  His daily income from his estates located in Iraq was ten thousand Dirhams, and his income from his Syrian property was a hundred thousand Dirhams yearly.  He had a big stockpile of gold and silver.  His house in Medina made up of baked bricks and stuccoed with gypsum and decorated with imported teak wood was the talk of the town.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), Vol. I, P 35.
93. Ya’qubi asserts that Ya’la joined the army with his funds on the way to Basrah.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 827.
94. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 43.  Abdullah bin Amir had amassed wealth during his governorship over Basrah.  Ya’qubi says that he had dug canals, erected houses, built palaces, and acquired estates, property, and gardens in Basra, Mecca, and Taif.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), Vol. I, P 38.).
95. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826.
96. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 827.
97. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826, 827, 828.
98. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
99. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),63 – 72.
100. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 77.
101. They killed a total of six hundred men in retaliation for the murder of Uthman.  None of Uthman’s rebels survived in Basrah except one person who escaped to his tribe.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 97.
102. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
103. For the date see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 76.
104. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 43.
105. After consolidating their grip on Basrah Aisha wrote a letter to the people of Kufa warning them not to harbour Uthman’s rebels among themselves.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 75).  It gives a hint that their next aim was Kufa.
106. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 27.
107. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 27.
108. Kharbitā was a town in Nile Delta near Alexandria.  For its location in ancient sources see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Leipzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 416, Vol. II.  It is now extinct. 
109. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 32.
110. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
111. Actually, when Ali abandoned Medina as the capital of the Caliphate, the whole Hejaz became a backyard of the Rashidun Caliphate.  All Medina retained during later years was its law school. Mecca, inflamed again by the uprising of Abdullah bin Zubayr, had only one raison d’etre left, pilgrimage.  Hejaz remained part of the country because caliphs had to go on pilgrimage.  Mansur (754 – 75) did it five times and was fortunate enough to die and get buried there. Harun al-Rashid (786 – 809) did it nine times.  (Julien Loiseau, in Arabia and the Holy Cities in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhīm Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010) 409).
112. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
113. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 81.
114. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 82.
115. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 52, 86.
116. Talha and Zubayr maintained that they were not bound by the allegiance because they had given it under pressure.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),45, 57).
117. Otherwise, it is also possible that Ali perceived the ‘Meccan Alliance’ as a softer target, Mu’awiya’ had already communicated to him that he had got sixty thousand fighting soldiers.  For Mu’awiya’’s communication see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 31.
118. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
119. For the location of Dhū Qār see above.
120. See: M. Hinds, “Kufan Political Alignments” International Journal of Middle East Studies. 2 (1971).
121. Muir observes that inhabitants of Kufa were predominantly Yemeni Arabs and those of Basrah were predominantly north Arabians.  William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 125.
122. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī.  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011). 531.
123. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
124. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
125. Tabari claims that Ali had nominated ‘Umārah bin Shihāb as his governor over Kufa to replace Abu Musa at the time he fired all the governors, but a band of Uthman’s sympathizers blocked his entry into the town and hence the town remained in Abu Musa’s hands.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),26, 28).
126. Abu Musa was of the opinion that the question of who should rule the Rashidun Caliphate should be resolved amicably inside Medina by the Companions of the Prophet.  They should not pull the non-Companions into the dispute and should not fight with each other for it.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),87, 88).  He was a ‘neutral party’.
127. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
128. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 93.
129. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 96.
130. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828.
131. This is the last entry of Uthman bin Hunayf in the history of Islam.  He apparently took retirement from active politics.  He died in 679 CE.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 86, Year 59.).
132. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 832.
133. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 121.
134. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 121.
135. Khurayba literally means little ruin.  It is said to be ruins of the old Sasanian city of Marzpān near the town of Basrah.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), P 829, footnote.
136. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 121.
137. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 142.
138. Tabari mentions tribes of Quraysh, Kinanah, Asad, Tamim, Ribab, Muzaynah, Abdul Qays, Bakr bin Wa’il Taghlib, Madhhij Bajila and Azd who came from Kufa to join Ali’s camp (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 114.). Abdul Qays defected to Ali before the war.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 120).  Tribes of Hawazin, Sulaym, Amir, Ghatafan, factions of Bakr bin Wa’il, Azd, Quda’a, Ghassan, Najiyah, Dabbah, and some other Yamani tribes took part from Meccan Alliance’s side.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),120, 130, 135,136).
139. Yamani tribes fought from both sides.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),134.).  Tribes of Rabi’a, Mudār, and Yaman, all fought from both sides.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 133).
140. For the date, place and name of the battle see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 829.
141. For ferocity of the battle see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 829.
142. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 136.
143. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 831.
144. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 829.
145. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 830.
146. Tabari paints it as a planned event of Tamim rather than an accident.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 112.
147. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 127.
148. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 831.
149. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 160.
150. The reputed tombs of both Talha and Zubayr still exist in Basrah.
151. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166.
152. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 165.
153. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166.
154. 2021.Ziyad bin Abihi/Abu Sufyan was one of those who re-conquered Ubullah under the command of Utba bin Ghazwan.  He was fourteen years old at that time. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 172.).  He participated in the Battle of Jalula.  There he was assigned one important job.  He entered the names of participating soldiers in the official register and it was he who transmitted this record from the border to Umar.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),45.).  Despite his low birth, Ziyad quickly got him recognized as a competent man.  He retained his position as secretary to Sa’d bin Waqqas (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),19).  When he settled in Basrah, its governor of the time Abu Musa Ash’ari considered him deputy governor.  This relationship actually raised complaints which were swiftly dismissed by Umar.  When Abdallah bin Amir left for his campaign of Khorasan in 651 CE, he left Ziyad as his deputy in Basrah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),90.).  He was destined to play a pivotal role in future politics.
155. Ahnaf lead a long life.  He became a leading Sharif of Basrah.  In this capacity, he met Mu’awiya in 679 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 201.)  He was one of the dignitaries who attended the introductory Khutba of Ziyad on taking charge of Basrah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 81.)  He led the Tamim during mobocracy in Basrah during Second Arab Civil War.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 30).  When Ibn Zubayr gained power, like everybody in Basrah, he sided with Mus’ab bin Zubayr and was part of the army that visited Kufa to kill Mukhtar.  It was there when he died in 687 CE.  Mus’ab prayed over him. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 201.  AND  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 123, Year 67.).
156. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 832.
157. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 102.
158. We don’t know why he did not re-appoint his previous governor Uthman bin Hunayf.
159. Abdullah bin Abbas had good relations with Umar bin Khattab and was his confidant.  (see above).  He took a job in the military and in this capacity, he participated in the campaign of Tabaristan under the command of Sa’id bin As during Uthman’s tenure in 651CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42.)  Later he sided with Ali clearly.
160. Appointment of Abdullah bin Abbas was not a good political decision. Ali lost another chance of forming an inclusive government.  Ashtar was particularly unhappy about Ali’s decision to appoint Abdullah bin Abbas as governor over Basrah. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 103)
161. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 826.
162. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 831.
163. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
164. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 827.
165. Probably Zubayr wished to make his case strong in the eyes of common Muslims by demonstrating that he was the brother-in-law of the Prophet through Aisha.  Wasn’t he facing the son-in-law of the Prophet?  Actually, people also criticized Zubayr for inciting Aisha to take such an action. Ahnaf bin Qays commented about Zubayr, “Never I have seen anything like this.  He brought the wife of Allah’s Messenger, driving her on, and ripped from her the veil (ordained) by Allah’s Messenger.  Yet he concealed his own wife in his house.” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),830).
166. After being captured in the Battle of Camel, Aisha was at Ali’s mercy.  Ali forgave her with an open heart.  Aisha commented on this: there was nothing between her and Ali except what usually happens between a woman and her son-in-law.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 170 .).  Aisha however couldn’t forgive Ali the whole of her life.  She couldn’t hide her joy when she heard the news of Ali’s murder.  After defeat in the Battle of Camel, Aisha never participated in any political activity. She limited herself to narrating the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad to early hadith collectors.  She lived a long life.  She died in 678 CE at the age of sixty-six.  Abu Huraira prayed over Aisha.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 84, Year 57.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 919, 920).  Some traditionalists believe she survived up to the government of Marwan bin Hakam.  (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī,  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 354).  She had a comfortable life money-wise.  She continued to owe a property in Khaybar, which she had swapped during the reign of Umar in lieu of her share in annual dates from Khaybar.  (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī,  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 354),
167. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 828 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 77.
168. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 46, 47.
169. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 44.
170. After Mu’awiya became caliph he sidelined Sa’id bin As as governor over the minor province of Medina from 669 CE to 674 CE.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 61, Year 48.  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 94).  He died in 679 CE.  (  Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 87, Year 59.).  Later on, his son ‘Amr bin Sa’id bin As played a role in the politics of the country.
171. Tabri reports that Saba’iyyah in Ali’s army had dashed all hopes of a negotiated solution to the problem by pre-emptively striking the army of the ‘Mecca Alliance.’  They were afraid that Ali might agree to punish the murderers of Uthman as a result of the deal.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 104, 105).  Muir points out that Ali had won the war with the help of some Kufans involved in a rebellion against Uthman.  Thenceforward he depended upon their support.  (William Muir, The Caliphate; its Rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 250). Ali had a chance to win over Shi’a Uthman by simply promising the trial of Uthman’s murderers just before the Battle of Camel.  He lost the last chance of winning over Shi’a Uthman by not doing so.
172. At least three hundred Qurra’ participated in the Battle of Siffin from Mu’awiya’s side.   They were also present in Ali’s forces in the same battle. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),45, 51, 76).
173. Islamic sources of history keep notifying the presence of Qurra on different occasions in history.  Lately, some scholars have suggested that the word denotes ‘villagers’.  They emphasize on similar sounds of qurra’ and qiriyah.  The surviving evidence suggests that the qurra were not village dwellers.  In March of 701 CE, there was a fight between Hajjaj bin Yusuf and Abdur Rahman bin Ash’ath.  Many qurra’ were killed in this fight.  Tabari tells that one of them Uqbah bin Abd al Ghafir was a Companion of the Prophet.  He further gives the names of others slain in the fight.  All of the names were residents of Basrah, none of them was a villager.  See:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Martin Hinds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),15.
174. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 833, 839.
175. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166.
176. For Ali’s entry in Kufa see:  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 832.
177. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 82, 83.
178. Urd was a place between Palmyra and Ruṣafah.  See: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi,  Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73),  P 644, Vol. III.  Now it is extinct.
179. See above.
180. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 143
181. See above.
182. At least this was the reading of Mughira bin Shu’ba.
183. See above.
184. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166.
185. For example, once Qays bin Sa’d opined that Ali lacks judgement (ra’y).  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 142, 143.
186. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 149.
187. For example, once Amr bin As exclaimed that Mu’awiya was a genius of management and governance.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 106).
188. Hawting summarizes Mu’awiya’s qualities in one sentence – Mu’awiya had got ḥilm.  Hilm is a sought-out quality of tribal leaders in pre-Islamic Arab tradition, according to Hawting, by virtue of which a man can subtly but cunningly manage people and affairs.  (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 42).
189. Mu’awiya gained supporters in Iraq and Egypt  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 183, 184.
190. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),836.  See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 160, 166).
191. Tabari assigns 36 AH [June 30, 656 to June 20, 657] to this event.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 191.
192. For Marwan’s role in the Battle of Camel see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 822, 823, 829 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 127.
193. For Amr bin As’s residence in Palestine see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 171.  For fear of blame see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 192, 193, 194.
194. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),833, 834, 835. 836.
195. Tabari reports that Amr was not going to accept Ali as caliph as he did not expect any governorship from him. He waited patiently if Talha succeeds in his attempt.  After the battle of Camel Amr was left with no choice.  It was he who contacted Mu’awiya.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997),194, 195).
196. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 833, 834, 835. 836.
197. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 836.
198. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835.
199. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835.
200. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835.
201. Ya’qubi stresses that both Mu’awiya and Amr knew that they were the least entitled to mention Uthman as both of them had abandoned him at the time of his murder.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 835.
202. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 836.
203. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
204. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
205. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.
206. Sa’d bin Waqqas did not take allegiance to Ali.  See:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 9.
207. Sa’d bin Waqqas remained non-political during the rebellion against Uthman.  He offered his services to Uthman to defend him when he got besieged.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),166).  He was never a candidate for the caliphate.  He did not answer positively to the request of some rebels to be a candidate for the caliphate after murdering of Uthman.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),192.)  He had taken retirement from active politics after serving as ambassador of the Rashidun Caliphate to China.  He attended proceedings of arbitration between Ali and Mu’awiya as an observer.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 105.)  This was his last political activity.  Ya’qubi insists that he ultimately took allegiance to Mu’awiya with a dissenting note.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 885.). He was blessed with a long, peaceful and comfortable life. He continued living in Medina and died there in 674 CE.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 919).
208. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 833.
209. Jarir bin Abdullah retained his position as sharif for his Bajila tribe until his death in 671 CE.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 74, Year 51.).
210. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 111.
211. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 98.
212. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 180.
213. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 27, 177, 179.
214. Muhammad bin Hudhayfa remained staunchly loyal to Ali.  He got killed fighting against Amr bin As. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 175.
215. See above.
216. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 183.
217. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 180.
218. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 180.
219. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 181.
220. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 182, 183.
221. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 183.
222. Qays disliked Ali’s mistrust of him but he remained a staunch supporter of Ali.  Initially, after his dismissal, he returned to Medina in protest.  After a few days, he joined Ali in Kufa.  He participated in Siffin from Ali’s side.  After Siffin Ali appointed him lieutenant governor of Azerbaijan. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 864). Later, Ali appointed him chief of his forces in Kufa.
223. For the date see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 189.
224. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 104.
225. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.  An interesting reading about the conflict between Ali and Mu’awiya could be: Ladewing E. Petersen, ‘Ali and Mu’āwiya in early Arabic Tradition: Studies on the genesis and growth of Islamic Historical writing until the end of the ninth century, trans. P. Lampe Christensen, (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1974.
226. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 837.  The point to note is that Muhajirun doesn’t mean Quraysh.  Everybody who had started living in Kufa or Basra was a Muhajirun.
227. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 5.
228. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),837.
229. Taghlib and Namir were still non-Muslim.  See:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 62, 286.
230. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838.
231. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 3.
232. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 59.
233. Ali had with him Ansar, Khuza’ah, Kinanah, Amir bin Sa’sa’ah, Tayy, Azd, Khath’am, Bajila, Madhlij, Hamdan, Dibab, Kindah, Bakr bin Wa’il, Abdul Qays, etc. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 35, 37, 41, 42, 52, 53, 54, 55, 62 ).  Similar tribes were on the other side.  Mu’awiya had Lakhm, ‘Akk, Ash’ar, Bahila, Tamim, Himyar, Ghassan, Tanukh etc.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),35, 46, 52, 53, 59, 71, 72).
234. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 53.
235. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838.
236. For the location see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),838.  Siffin was located on the right bank of the Euphrates between Raqqah and Bālis.  See:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 219, footnote 1042.  Also see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46 annus mundi 6149.  For the date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),838 AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46 annus mundi 6148.
237. As Ali was ruling over the lands of Mecca, and he was caliph, he had to send Abdullah bin Abbas to lead the hajj.   (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 20).
238. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 18.
239. For the truce of Muharram see:  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 20.  For negotiations see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838.  For the restart of combat see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838.
240. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 29 – 33.
241. Julius Wellhausen, Das Arabisches Reich und sein Sturz, Berlin: George Reimer Verlag, 1902), 51.
242. In a lighter vein: soldiers from opposite sides used to gather together in the evening after the skirmishes were over and used to socialize. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 68.).  Mutual hatred was absent among the soldiers.
243. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839.
244. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46, annus mundi 6148.
245. Islamic sources report that Ali had secured a water supply by fighting at the beginning of the war.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 838. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 11.
246. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839, 840.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 2.
247. One example of the presence of a ‘neutral party’ in Ali’s army could be Ash’ath bin Qays.  He led a wing of Ali’s army but he was not Shi’a ‘Ali.  He served as Ali’s lieutenant governor only after Ali won the Battle of Camel and established himself.  Ash’ath was a lieutenant governor for Uthman.  He continued to serve in different positions under Ali.  He was instrumental in opposing the appointment of Abdullah bin Abbas, a Shi’a ‘Ali, as arbitrator.  Abu Musa Ash’ari, who was known as a ‘neutral party’, got appointed as an arbitrator only due to Ash’ath’s efforts. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 82.
248. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839, 840.
249. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839, 840.
250. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 839, 840.
251. Tabari adds that if the arbitrators failed to find a solution to the problem in the Book of Allah, they were allowed to resort to the just precedent (al-sunnah al-‘ādilah), which unites and does not divide. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 86.
252. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 843.
253. For the formation of social groups and group identification see:  Platow, M.J., Grace, D. M., Smithson, M. J., ‘Examining the Preconditions for Psychological Group Membership: Perceived Social Interdependence as the Outcome of Self-Categorization’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3 (1) (2011); Reicher, S. D. “The determination of collective behaviour” in Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, ed. Tajfel H., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 41 – 83; Gurin, Patricia, Miller, Arthur and Gurin, Gerald, ‘Stratum Identification and Consciousness’, Social Psychological Quarterly, 43 (1985),14 3 – 63; Brigham, John C., ‘Ethnic Stereotypes’, Psychological Bulletin, 76 (1971), 15 – 38;
254. For transformation of social groups into socio-political groups see:  Pamlea Johnston, ‘The influence of Group Identifications on Political Perceptions and Evaluations’, American Journal of Political Science, 46 (1984), 760 – 85;  Feldman, Stanley, ‘How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model’, American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1984), 617 – 45; Lau, Richard R. and Sears, David O., ‘Social Cognition and Political Cognition: the Past, the Present, and the Future’; Rhodebeck, Laurie A., ‘Group Deprivation: An Alternative Model for Explaining Collective Political Action’, Micropolitics, 1 (1981), 239 – 67; Miller, Arthur, Gurin, Patrician, Gurin, Gerald and Malancuk, Oksana, ‘Group consciousness and Political Participation’, American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981), 494 – 511;  Sears, David O., Lau, Richard R., Tyler, Tom R. and Allen, Harris M. Jr, ‘Self-interest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting’, American Political Science Review, 73 (1979), 369 – 84; Lau, Richard R. ‘Reference Group Influence on Political Attitudes and Behaviour: A preliminary Report on the Importance of Social, Political and Psychological Contexts’ a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1983.
255. Kharijis arose during Siffin: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.  None of the Khariji belonged to Mu’awiya’s army.  All of them arose from ‘Ali’s camp.
256. Arabs used to call foreigners ‘Khariji’.  For example, Nāfi’ bin Azraq was a Roman slave resident of Taif at the time of its siege by the Prophet.  Baladhuri mentions the name of his tribe as al-Khariji. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 86).
257. Tabari shows Ali using the world Khariji for Shi’a Uthman of Egypt.  See:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 144.
258. William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 266,267.
259. Actually, they had difficulty choosing their own leader.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 115). Anybody, who would be their leader, would indirectly appear to be more meritorious than others.
260. The term is derived from the name of the village from where they used to oppose Ali.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 90.
261. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
262. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 844.
263. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 101.
264. William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 273.
265. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 844.  For clan affiliation of ‘Abdallāh bin Wahb see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 115.;  For clan affiliation of ‘Abdallah bin Abi Awfa see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),99.; For clan affiliation of Shabath bin Rib’a see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 98.
266. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 116.
267. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
268. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 844.
269. Abdullah bin Wahb was called Dhu al Thafināt by his companions.  See:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 116.  Dhu al Thafināt means the person with marks.  A person who offers salat regularly, excessively and for the long term, eventually develop pigmentation on his forehead and the knees. However, everybody doesn’t get the pigmentation. To some extent, it is related to the style of prostration ( سَجدَه ).  Those who rub their forehead on the ground are more prone to develop pigmentation.
270. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 844.
271. Harura was either a village or a district, either on the bank of Euphrates or one of its branches.  Ya’qut describes it as very near to Kufa.  Fishbein locates it roughly 3 km south of Kufa.  Michael Fishbein 1990 P 92.
272. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
273. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
274. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
275. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 118.
276. For Ali’s version of being tricked into arbitration see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 79.
277. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 849.
278. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 143, 190.
279. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 152, 184.
280. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 849.
281. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 849.
282. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 849.
283. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848. AND  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),152.
284. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848, 849.
285. Tabari reports that political air in Egypt was that of boldening against Ali as they had seen Ali leaving Siffin empty-handed. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 190).
286. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 159.
287. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 153.
288. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848, 849.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),156.
289. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848, 849.
290. It appears that support for Muhammad bin Abu Bakr had gradually decreased, even among Shi’a Ali.  Amr wrote to him before the encounter that the people of that land had agreed on opposition to him and rejection of his rule; they had repented of following him and were forsaking him (hummuslimūka) for matters had come to a head.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 153).  On the same lines, Tabari opines that by the time of Amr’s attack on Egypt, the majority of the population was Shi’a Uthman. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 153, 154.
291. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848, 849.
292. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 848  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 159.
293. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 161.
294. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 163.
295. Amr bin As ruled Egypt peacefully, and semi-independently, in the name of Mu’awiya Bin Abu Sufyan until his death in 663 CE. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 358.).  Ya’qubi changes his date of death to January 5, 664 CE: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 894). According to his deal with Mu’awiya, he did not send a penny from Egypt’s tax to the central government.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 893). Sources don’t mention any occasion when the central government dictated Amr on any matter.  Sources do mention slight friction between Amr and Mu’awiya during his governorship of Egypt.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 217.
296. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46, annus mundi 6146.
297. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 46, annus mundi 6150). See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 185.  Hoyland gives this event the date of 659 CE.  See:  Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 104.
298. Theophanes the Confessor gives the amount in Nomismata.  Dirhams are converted at a rate of ten Dirhams per Nomismata for convenience of reading.
299. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 840.
300. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 840.
301. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 841.
302. Tabari adds that they could also use just precedents of Arabia (al sunnah al-‘ādilah) in case they didn’t find a solution from the Qur’an (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),85, 86).  This assertion might be true because, at a later date, when the decision of arbitration was known, Ali rejected it saying “They have passed judgment without any clear proof or accepted precedent (sunnah Māḍiyah).  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),119.
303. From the survey of historical sources it is not clear what question were the arbitrators pondering on.  Was it merely the legitimacy of Uthman’s murder or the choice of caliph?  (G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, (London: Routledge, 2000), 29.).
304. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 842.
305. They selected Dumat al Jandal as being equidistance from Kufa and Damascus, so observers from both sides could attend if they wished.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 86.
306. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 843.
307. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 842.
308. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 842.
309. See some neutral names who attended deliberations of arbitrators regularly: bū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 105.
310. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 842, 843.
311. This was Abu Musa’s last political assignment.  He was old.  He took retirement in Mecca.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 110).  He died in 670 CE in Kufa.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 62, Year 50.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 103).
312. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 843.
313. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 148.
314. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 109, 159.
315. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 6.
316. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 119.
317. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 119.
318. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 114.
319. Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Amurath to Amurath (London: William Heinemann, 1911), photo opposite P 213.
320. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
321. They also killed Ḥārith bin Murrah of Abdul Qays, the inspector of Ali, whom he had sent to investigate the crime.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 125, 126.)
322. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
323. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845.
324. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
325. The demand of the state was to hand over the killers of Abdullah bin Khabbab.  They took a stand that each one of them was the killer and that even in future they won’t mind killing anybody attached to the government of the Rashidun Caliphate, including Ali himself.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 127.).
326. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
327. Nahrawan was a town about 230 km north of Kufa in modern Iraq (Ludwig W. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Islam (Lanham: Scarecrow, 2009), 235) both Ya’qut and Le Strange describe the canal.  It was on the east bank of River Tigris running almost parallel to it but at a distance, between Samarra and Baghdad.  Jisr Nahrawān was almost midway through the canal.
328. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
329. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.
330. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 846, 847.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 137.
331. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 134.
332. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 136.
333. It appears that Ali’s soldiers were willing to kill the Kharijis because their terrorist activities had threatened each and every soul in Kufa, but they had the least incentive to fight against Mu’awiya whom they did not perceive a threat.
334. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 110.
335. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 2.
336. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 166.
337. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),772.
338. When Ali came to know that soldiers of Basrah Cantonment were not willing to report to the camp organized to raise an army against Mu’awiya after the war of Siffin but before operation of Naharawan, he asked his governor Abdullah bin Abbas to take severe action against anybody who absents himself from his post in disobedience of the government.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 121).
339. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 122.
340. Let’s take one example.  In a heated debate in Medina during his last days, Uthman said to Amr bin As, “I possess greater glory than you through my next of kin in the Time of Ignorance and before I acquired my present authority,” ‘Amr replied, “Stop this! Praise be to Allah, who honoured and guided us by Muhammad.  I saw [my father] al-‘Āṣi bin Wā’il and I saw your father ‘Affān, and by Allah, al-‘Āṣ was nobler than your father!” Uthman was caught short and said, “Why should we refer to the Time of Ignorance?” (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),171).
341. See for example, above.
342. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 142.
343. For an example of such arguments see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 845, 846.
344. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 130.
345. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 64.
346. For Ash’ath bin Qays see:  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),860); For Yazīd bin Qays see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),860); for Nu’mān bin al ‘Ajlān see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),861, 862); for Ziyād bin Abu Sufyān see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),868.; for ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abbas see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),869;
347. See, for example, activities of Khirrīt bin Rāshid (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),171 – 184.
348. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 181. 182.
349. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),850.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 187.
350. Later, after a defeat at the hands of military forces of the Rashidun Caliphate Bakr bin Wa’il re-converted to Islam when they faced the death penalty in case they refused.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 188.
351. See above.
352. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 99.
353. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),832. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 99.
354. Ja’dah’s mother was Umm Hāni bint Abu Ṭālib.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 140).
355. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 183, 203, 204.
356. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 850. AND  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 171 – 184.
357. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 183, 185, 186, 191.
358. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 188, 192, 193, 194).
359. later on, a frustrated Ali commented that the maximum he would have done with Masqalah was to arrest him and detain him for a while and raise whatever money he could get by selling his leftover property.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 194. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 850).
360. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),58, 59, 60.
361. Shi’a Uthman of Iraq remained adamant in their political thinking.  Now, they were simply Shi’a Mu’awiya.  They kept supporting Mu’awiya’s endeavours to govern the country.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 98.
362. For example Mālik bin Misma of Bakr bin Wa’il was an open supporter of ‘Uthmāniya.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 166.)
363. See for this event and his name: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 166.
364. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 166.
365. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 166.
366. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 167.
367. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 168.
368. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 168.
369. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 168.
370. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 169.
371. For Jariyah’s clan affiliation see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 855, 856.
372. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 170.
373. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 170.
374. For details of these penetrations see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 851, 853.
375. Qutqutana was an oasis near Rahimya about 25 km from present-day Karbala in Iraq.
376. For the raid on Hejaz see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 854.
377. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 855, 856.
378. Mu’awiya ordered to avoid harassment of Meccans probably because it was Mu’awiya’s hometown and it had shown enmity to ‘Ali.
379. Date of this campaign is calculated from the fact that this was the last event in the political life of Ali. See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 859.
380. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 856, 857.
382. This is the last entry of Ubaydullah bin Abbas in the history of Islam.  He died in 678 CE. Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 85, year 58.] The first Arab Civil War was a guerre sans merci.³⁸¹Killing of minor children was a war crime in Arab traditions, even during pre-Islamic times.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 857.
383. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 858, 860.
384. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 208.
385. Busr bin Artat remained a field commander in Mu’awiya’s service.  He led many winter and summer campaigns against Byzantine Rome every year.  His last traceable campaign was in 672 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 96, 122, 164).  Probably he died afterwards.
386. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 201.
387. For the details see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 209.
388. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 879, 880.
389. For the date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 880.  See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 213 AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 47, annus mundi 6151.
390. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 879, 880.
391. Ali was sixty-three at the time of his murder. Hasan prayed over him and he was buried in Kufa at a place called Ghariyyān.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),880).  Ghariyyān were two structures with a rich pre-Islamic history, located outside Kufa.  See:  Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi,  Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Leipzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 506, vol I.  By 687 CE, when Mukhtar’s regime got defeated in Kufa, the site of Ali’s burial was already known as Najaf.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 113).  Harun ur Rashid ordered the building of a tomb on Ali’s grave in 791 AD.
392. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 880, 882.
393. Ali specifically forbade Hasan, his son and future caliph, to investigate anybody else in his murder except the one who physically killed him.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 222.
394. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 879.
395. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 182.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 104.
396. See above.
397. Stories of Mu’awiya being behind the murder of Ali might have been circulating among Christian intellectuals for centuries.  Michael the Syrian, writing in the twelfth century CE, claims that the assassins of Ali were on the payroll of Mu’awiya, who killed Ali treacherously.  See: Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriarch of the Syrians, ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, (Long Branch, N. J.: Sources of the Armenian Traditions,  2013) 125.
398. Previously, Abu Bakr had led small expeditions personally when the main body of his army was away.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 47.
399. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 225.
400. Edward Lewis “He alluded to the city of Najaf as ‘he’, as though it were some strange kind of being”, Architectural Review 98 (July 1945).
401. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 813.
402. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 813.
403. Probably Ali used to spend whatever he got.  Ya’qubi tells us that he did not amass wealth.  He used to give his income in alms to the poor.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), Vol. I, P 37.).  He was reduced to poverty, informs Ya’qūbī.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 813.)  It might be true.  At the time he died, he left only seven hundred Dirhams cash in inheritance which was owed by one of his servants.  We know he had an estate in Yanbu Bughaybigha.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), Vol. I, P 37.).  Later on, his grandson used to live in Yanbu at that estate.  Probably Ya’qubi is counting only his personal disposable money when he tells he had reduced to poverty.   Anyhow, Ali is a popular figure among Muslim ascetics due to his hand-to-mouth living.
404. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), Vol. I, P 37.
405. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 69.
406. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 829.
407. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 160, 166.
408. For the date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 880.
409. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 882 AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 218.
410. Hasan was born in 624 CE. (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 53, Year 41).  He was the first caliph in Islam who was born Muslim with both parents being Muslim.  He was likely around eight years old when Prophet Muhammad died.  He did not see Prophet Muhammad in his adulthood.  He was not a Companion in the true sense of the word.  After attaining adulthood, he took a job as a soldier in the army of the Rashidun Caliphate.  He served in the 651 CE campaign of Khorasan in this capacity under the command of Sa’id bin As. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 42).  He was at the side of his father from the beginning of Ali’s caliphate.  He participated in Siffin from Ali’s side (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 41.
411. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 858, 860.
412. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 218.
413. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3.
414. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 2, 3.
415. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 7.
416. After Siffin Ali transferred his services as Lieutenant governor of Azerbaijan, he had now joined as commander of the Kufan division.
417. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3.
418. Abdullah bin Abbas had broken up with Ali a few months ago after the latter accused him of embezzling money.  He resigned from the office of governor of Basrah and scooted to Medina with heavy pockets.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 210, 211, 212.
419. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 7.
420. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 225.
421. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3.
422. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 5, 7.  Ya’qubi identifies the person but shuns from noting the motive behind the attack.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 883.
423. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),882, 883.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3, 4.
424. Maskin was a district in Swad, near Anbar.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), p 53, Year 41.
425. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 883.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 3, 4.
426. The White Palace (Qaṣr al-Abyaz) was the official residence of Shahanshah of Sasanian Iran in Ctesiphon.  It was an abandoned ghost house by that time.
427. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 9.
428. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 4, 5.
429. Later, the people of Basrah refused to honour this concession.  “It is our fay’,” they objected (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 11).  Still, Hasan might have retained some of the perks he got out of the deal.  Baladhuri notes a fishing spring by the name of ‘Ain As Said located in Iraq which Hasan could retain and his son could sell it later.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 463.
430. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 5, 10.
431. Qays bin Sa’d took allegiance to Mu’awiya under protest.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 884, 885.).  He then left for Medina where he lived a peaceful life afterwards.  He died in c. 679 CE.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 86, Year 59.)
432. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 11.
433. When the caravan reached Qadisiyyah, people halted them and criticized Hasan for dishonouring his Arabs. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 12).
434. Hasan lived an uneventful life in Medina where he died in 670 CE at the young age of 49.  Mu’awiya’s governor over Medina, Sa’id bin As prayed over him.  Ya’qubi reports poisoning as the cause of death but doesn’t mention the hands behind the poisoning. See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 53, 62 Year 41, 49 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 898.
435. Ilyās of Naṣībīn gives the date of Hasan’s truce July 25, 661.  See: Friedrich Baethgen, Fragmente Syrischer und Arabischer Historiker, (Lichtenstein: Kraus Preprint Ltd., 1966), 25.  Tabari gives a date of July 31, 661 CE for this event.  See:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 211.  Khalifa gives months of August or September 661 CE for this event.  See: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 53, Year 41.  Ya’qubi gives March 661 CE for the event.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),884.
436. Josef Wiesehofer, Ancient Persia, New York: I. B. Taurus, 1996.
437. Robert Browning, The Byzantine Empire, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992.
438. It is obvious that the First Arab Civil War led to the demise of the Rashidun Caliphate.  What the root cause of this civil war was is still being debated.  Wellhausen sees the conflict between leading circles of Muslims in Medina and between Muslims of Medina and Mecca and between early and pious converts and late and opportunistic converts as a root cause of the civil war.  (see: Julius Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, (Calcutta: 1927), Introduction).  Gibb gives importance to the clash of interest between tribes and the central government on the use of agricultural land in conquered areas as the basic issue.  (See: H. A. R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, (London: 1962), 6 – 8, 39 – 44.).  Hinds and Shaban emphasize on the conflicts between those tribesmen living in cantonments who participated in early conquests and got rich and those who immigrated late and remained poor.   (See: Martin Hinds, “Kufan Political Alignments and their background in the mid-seventh Century A.D.” IJMES 2 (1971) AND M. A. Shaban, Islamic History: A New Interpretation, I. ad 600 – 750 (AH 132), (Cambridge: 1971), 60 – 78).
439. Umar was familiar with the concept of bodyguards because Khalid bin Walid had a bodyguard contingent during the war of Yamama for his personal protection.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 132.)
440. When Hurmuzan came in the presence of Umar after his arrest he was astonished by the absence of bodyguards around Umar.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 137 – 138.
441. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 223.
442. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 5.
443. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 223.
444. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 766.
445. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),185.
446. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 856.