Political Development – II

Abu Bakr appoints Umar as caliph

Sources do not record any disputes or differences of opinion in the selection of Abu Bakr’s successor.  We are informed that Abu Bakr willed Umar bin Khattab to be his successor and no one objected to it.¹  Apparently, Abu Bakr’s political appeal was across the board by that time.  His decision received a jubilant acceptance. ²  Umar was instrumental in almost all political decisions made by Abu Bakr and knew the reasons behind the decisions. The transition must have gone smoothly.

Umar, like Abu Bakr, had impressive curriculum vitae.  The last significant convert in Mecca before Immigration, he was a man of opinion.  He emerged as a hawkish advisor to Prophet Muhammad in the aftermath of the Battle of Badr when he gave his opinion to kill all prisoners of war. ³  Since then he managed to register his opinion on each and every matter of political importance until Prophet’s death. ⁴  Apparently, the Prophet gave more weightage to the opinion of Abu Bakr on domestic policy (for example who should be governor over Thaqif) and gave more weightage to the opinion of Umar on foreign policy (for example, the decision of strategic retreat after the show of power at Tabuk).⁵  Umar was, in any case, not a man of the sword.  Though he participated in all the wars in which Prophet Muhammad participated, the Prophet never gave him charge of an independent campaign except for one small campaign against a small group of Hawazin.⁶  No fighting took place even in that campaign.

Fifty-three-year-old Umar of the ‘Adi clan of Quraysh, a merchant by trade, took the oath a few days after the death of Abu Bakr.⁸, ⁹

The Muslim army fighting on the northern front of the country digested the news of the death of Abu Bakr and the appointment of Umar with integrity.  The province of Yemen complied quietly.  Even the provinces of Yamama, Bahrain and Oman, who had not contributed to the war by supplying manpower, and where the governors of the Rashidun Caliphate were managing the affairs without the presence of supporting garrisons at their disposal, accepted the appointment of Umar without hesitation.  Abu Bakr had succeeded in bringing internal political stability to the country.  Probably, people were generally happy with the news of early successes against Byzantine Rome and the incoming booty.  They wanted an uninterrupted continuation of the policy of war.

First surrender of Damascus

The change of Caliph at Medina did not bring a lull to the war for a single day.  After consolidating the occupation of newly acquired cities and their surrounding rural areas, Muslim armies converged on Damascus and laid siege to it.¹⁰, ¹¹, ¹²   The siege lingered on for four months. ¹³  Damascus, eventually, surrendered to the Muslim army on March 10, 635 CE.¹⁴

Interestingly, after reaching the environs of Damascus with the intention to lay siege, the Muslim army gathered at a place called Thanīyāt (ثَنِيات الدَمِشق).  There, Khalid unfurled the banner and the army stood underneath it for one hour.  This was the same black banner, called ‘Uqāb, which the Prophet had used.  The ceremony lived in the political memory of later Muslims and the place was still called Thanīyāt al ‘Uqāb at the time of Baladhuri’s writing. ¹⁵

The defeat at Ajnadayn and then the surrender of Damascus should have been quite shocking to Heraclius. On hearing the news of the defeat and the further advance of the Muslim army into Syria, Heraclius fled to Antakya’s state Baladhuri.¹⁶, ¹⁷  Kaegi calls it a strategic retreat.            

Umar demotes Khalid bin Walid

One of the first acts of Umar after assuming office was the demotion of commander in Chief, Khalid bin Walid, to field commander.¹⁹  He appointed Abu Ubayda bin Jarrah in his place.  Abu Ubayda of the Fihr clan of Quraysh was tipped by Abu Bakr to be the supreme commander of the army that was camping in Jurf near Medina awaiting orders to march towards Syria. But he refused to take this responsibility and rather wished to participate in the war as a common soldier.²⁰  Why Abu Ubayda did not accept the job at that time and why he accepted the same job when Umar asked him is not clear.

The army received these orders in the midst of the siege of Damascus.²¹  Abu Ubayda received his appointment orders through the same letter which demoted Khalid.  He did not disclose it immediately, fearing a drop in the moral of the army and of Khalid.²²  Umar did not write his reasons for the demotion of Khalid.  It has led to a plethora of opinions among later historians.

No doubt, Khalid was a master military tactician.  His generalship had become synonymous with success.  Khalid’s legendary march from Ayn at-Tamr to Busra across the desert with a battalion of the army remained alive in Arab political memory for generations to come.  “Khalid made his camels drink as much water as they could before he embarked onto the desert and he thrust spears in their lips to keep their mouths closed so they may not lose water.”, says Baladhuri. “On the way, his men slaughtered camels one by one to drink water from their bellies.”²³

But this brilliant general was notorious for disobeying civilian authority. ²⁴

It is also known that Khalid was not in the good books of Umar.  Umar had criticized him previously for his treatment of war criminals. ²⁵  He had also criticized him bitterly for behaviour unbecoming of a Muslim general.²⁶

Umar also felt disgusted by the way the field commanders on the Syrian front had asked for Khalid’s appointment as commander-in-chief.  Umar wished to nip the idea in the bud that a human and not Allah secured victories. ²⁷  We shall never know which of these potential reasons for demotion worked. ²⁸, ²⁹, ³⁰

First surrender of Homs

After conquering Damascus, Abu Ubayda concentrated on the management of the territory subdued so far.  He appointed Yazid bin Abu Sufyan his lieutenant in the province of Damascus, Amr bin As over Palestine, and Shurahbil over Jordan.³¹, ³²

Abu Ubayda then advanced on Homs.  On his way, he passed through Baalbek whose inhabitants agreed to capitulate. ³³, ³⁴, ³⁵, ³⁶

Homs was taken the same year in which Damascus surrendered, 635 CE.³⁸

According to the pact, the inhabitants of Homs surrendered one-fourth of St. John’s Church so it could be converted into a mosque.³⁹  Building a grand mosque as a symbol of Muslim presence in any town the Rashidun Caliphate captured was a tradition that can be traced back to Prophet Muhammad himself.  This policy continued during the conquest of Iran, as well, when Sa’d bin Waqqas built a mosque in Tyswn after its conquest. ⁴⁰

Abu Ubayda appointed Ubada bin Samit (‘Ubādah bin Ṣāmit   عُبَاده بِن صامِت) of Ansar lieutenant governor over Homs.⁴¹  This was the first and the only appointment of an Ansar over a position of authority during the tenure of the first two caliphs, albeit a middle-ranking one, and of temporary nature.⁴², ⁴³

The Rashidun Caliphate captures city after city

The Muslim conquest of various cities unfolded for a limited period. They temporarily took control of Baldah, Jabalah, Ḥamāh, and Shaizar in the north. ⁴⁵ Baldah is an unidentified town, while Jabalah, although historically significant, lacks a precise location. Ḥamāh, known as Epiphania in Greek sources, refers to Hama, which is approximately 45 km north of Homs in modern Syria. Shaizar, known as Larissa in Greek sources, is a village located about 30 km northwest of Hama in modern Syria. ⁴⁶

Additionally, they briefly held Gaza, Sabasṭiyah, Nāblus, Ludd, Yibna, ‘Amwās, and Bayt Jibrīn in Palestine. ⁴⁷ Sabasṭiyah is located approximately 10 km northwest of Nablus in modern Palestine. Nābulus, known as Neapolis in Greek sources, corresponds to Nablus in modern Palestine. Ludd, also referred to as Lydda in Greek sources, is a village situated about 15 km southeast of Tel Aviv in modern Israel. As for Yibna, please refer to the previous information. ‘Amwās, known as Emmaus in Greek sources, has several competing archaeological sites claiming its location. ⁴⁸

Battle of Yarmouk

The Battle of Yarmouk (Yarmūk يَرموك) stands as the climactic moment of the Rashidun Caliphate’s invasion of Byzantine Rome, as documented in both Muslim and Christian sources. This battle epitomized a full-scale war. ⁴⁹ It took place in August 636 CE.⁵⁰

The worst-case scenario Heraclius would have imagined was presenting his Eastern Provinces to Muslim Arabs like a cake on a plate. He was not sitting idle in Antakya, merely accepting the surrender of one city after another. Instead, he busied himself organizing a formidable army to permanently rid himself of the Arab Muslims. The exact strength of the amassed army remains unknown, but by all accounts, it was tremendous. ⁵¹ To lead this army, he appointed an Armenian named Vahan (Vahān وَهان) as the supreme commander in 547 and dispatched his brother Theodore as the lieutenant general. ⁵² Heraclius opted not to take personal command of the army. As the ruler of a vast superpower spanning Asia, Europe, and Africa, preserving his hold on power became his utmost concern. Perhaps he sought to avoid shouldering the blame in the event of defeat. Moreover, it is highly probable that he wished to not risk his own life.

As tensions escalated during the war, the Muslims made a strategic decision to evacuate Damascus and Homs, returning the collected Jizya to their inhabitants. ⁵³ Their motive was likely to prevent the presence of a large hostile population at their rear, while also aiming to elongate the Byzantine Romans’ supply line by several hundred kilometres. Eventually, the two armies established their battle lines along the River Yarmouk, an east-to-west tributary of the River Jordan that serves as the border between modern Jordan and Syria.

The Battle of Yarmouk unfolded through a series of clashes that commenced approximately five kilometres northeast of modern Nawā in Syria and concluded at the confluence of the Yarmouk River with Wādī ul Ruqqād. ⁵⁵ The defeat suffered by the Byzantines was profound, with a colossal loss of life on their side. ⁵⁶ The Byzantine soldiers, including many Armenians, fled in disarray, pursued by the Muslims as far north as Marj al Ṣuffar. ⁵⁷, ⁵⁸ Vahan, either killed on the battlefield or, as claimed by Eutychius of Alexandria, retired in disgrace to a monastery in Sinai. ⁵⁹, ⁶⁰

Stories of valour from the victorious Arab soldiers endured beyond the war. Baladhuri recounts the tale of Ḥubāsh bin Qays, a soldier who unknowingly lost his leg during the Battle of Yarmouk and later searched for it after the war’s end. ⁶¹ Conversely, stories of the defeated did not surface, as if none of them had shown bravery.

Heraclius reluctantly accepted his defeat in Syria. Baladhuri reports that upon receiving news of the defeat at Yarmouk, Heraclius fled from Antakya to Constantinople. While passing through the Darb, a pass of the Taurus Mountains, he remarked, “Peace unto thee, O Syria, and what an excellent country this is for the enemy!” ⁶²

News of the Byzantine defeat spread to distant corners of the world. The Frankish historian Fredegarius, writing around 658 CE, elaborates that “the Muslims were two hundred thousand. The army of Heraclius was smitten by the ‘Sword of the Lord,’ and fifty-two thousand Romans were slain.” ⁶³, ⁶⁴  

Soon after, individuals with political acumen began to recognize the Battle of Yarmouk as a pivotal moment in world history. A Christian observer from the late 7th century attests to the battle’s significance, referring to it as “the first and fearful and incurable defeat of the Roman [Byzantine] army, I mean the bloodshed at Gabitha [Jābiya] and Yarmouk.” ⁶⁵, ⁶⁶ Yarmouk proved to be a historic turning point, marking the expulsion of Hellenistic civilization from Asia and Africa and the rise of another civilization in its place, destined to be known as Islamic civilization.

Aftermath of Yarmouk

By the end of August 636 CE, Byzantine Rome had lost its ability to defend Syria. The towns and rural areas of Syria were at the mercy of the Arab Muslims, who could conquer them at their own choosing.

The chronology of events following the Battle of Yarmouk is estimated by Walter Kaegi. ⁶⁷ The Rashidun Caliphate recaptured Damascus in late 636 CE or early 637 CE; followed by Baalbek and nearby Wādī Biqā’ and Qinnasrin (Qinnasrīn قِنَّسرِين).⁶⁸, ⁶⁹  Homs surrendered sometimes in 637; Jerusalem yielded to Muslims also sometimes in 637 CE; so did Gaza, at the end of June or in early July 637; the first surrender of ‘Asqalān may have taken place in the summer of 637;⁷⁰, ⁷¹

In late 637 CE, Byzantine Rome and the Rashidun Caliphate agreed to a truce at Qinnasrin. At the end of the truce in 638 CE, the Muslims occupied the remaining parts of northern Syria, including Antakya, Cyrrhus, Niqābulus, Shaizar, Aleppo, Manbij, ‘Arājin, and Bālis without encountering further resistance. ⁷², ⁷³, ⁷⁴

The Rashidun Caliphate also took all cities of Jordan without any resistance, including Tabariyyāh, Baisān, Afīq, Sūsiyah, Jerash, Bait-Rās, Qadas, Jaulān, Arandal, and Sājūr.⁷⁵, ⁷⁶

Some of the cities had realized the futility of resisting the mighty Muslim army. Instead, they chose a different approach, welcoming the arrival of the Muslim forces with music and songs of peace, hoping to secure a more favourable outcome. Such was the case in cities like Homs and Shaizar, where the atmosphere was filled with harmonious melodies as the Muslims entered their gates. ⁷⁷

However, not all cities were ready to surrender without a fight. Some clung to the hope that reinforcements might arrive via the sea route, dispatched by the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius himself. Antakya, for instance, held on defiantly, refusing to yield to the advancing Muslim forces.⁷⁸ The resistance they displayed was fierce, as they valiantly defended their city against the onslaught.

The Army of the Rashidun Caliphate showed little mercy towards those who dared to resist their might. Combatant prisoners of war were faced with a grim fate, often meeting their demise unless they chose to embrace Islam as their faith. This brutal reality is vividly illustrated in the story of the sixty martyrs of Gaza, chronicled in the manuscripts preserved within the Vatican Museum.⁷⁹

The execution of prisoners of war was not uncommon in the pre-Islamic Middle East. Historical records recount an instance when Khosrow II Parviz ordered the Byzantine captives to be stripped, have their hands tied behind their backs, and be subjected to the trampling of elephants. ⁸⁰

To ensure control and maintain order in the newly conquered territories, the Army of the Rashidun Caliphate strategically deployed garrisons in towns deemed dangerous or prone to resistance. ⁸¹ However, for other conquered towns, a different administrative approach was employed. Local administrators known as ‘amils were appointed to oversee governance and act as liaisons between the conquered communities and the provincial government. ⁸²

Muslim takeover of Jerusalem

The Muslim takeover of Jerusalem in the autumn of 637 CE stands as an immensely significant event, particularly within the context of the war in Syria. ⁸³ The city of Jerusalem held profound religious and historical significance, both as a sacred site for Jews over the centuries and as a destination of Christian pilgrimage, particularly after Byzantine Roman King Constantine commissioned the construction of landmark churches on sites believed to be associated with the birth and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. ⁸⁴

Prior to the Arab Muslim attack on Jerusalem, the city had long been a source of conflict between Jews and Christians. Antiochus Strategos, an eyewitness to the sack of Jerusalem by a Sasanian Iranian army in the summer of 614 CE, recounts the horrifying events that unfolded. After a gruelling siege lasting twenty-one days, the Iranian army managed to breach the city walls and launch a brutal massacre of the civilian population. The indiscriminate killings continued until the invaders grew fatigued and decided to halt the bloodshed. The surviving inhabitants, weakened by hunger and exhaustion, returned to the city only to be captured by the Iranians and confined to a reservoir outside the town. It was at this time that the Jewish residents of Jerusalem purchased these unfortunate Christians from the invaders and proceeded to slay them.⁸⁶ While Antiochus does not implicate the Jews of the city in any other crime, his narrative raises suspicions of collusion between the Jews and the invading army. Sebeos, another historical source, offers slightly different details, indicating that there had been internal strife between the Jewish and Christian populations of the city prior to the attack. The Christians, who outnumbered the Jews, had killed many of their Jewish counterparts, and those who survived escaped by seeking refuge with the Sasanian Iranians and assisted them in capturing the city. Subsequently, they participated in a three-day massacre of Christians.⁸⁷, ⁸⁹

It seems that the killing of innocent Christians was a local event involving an Iran-Jew alliance. It was not an official policy of Sasanian Iran. According to Antiochus Stratego, Shahanshah Khosrow II Parviz did not engage in brutalities against civilian captives of war. ⁹¹  However, Sebeos and the anonymous chronicle of Khuzestan agree that Khosrow himself rebuilt the destroyed churches and returned the Christian prisoners to their town. ⁹², ⁹³

The animosity between Jews and Christians of Jerusalem, anyhow, continued.  Jerusalem used to house the Holy Cross.  Christians believed it to be the original cross on which Jesus Christ was crucified. ⁹⁴  Iranians had carried away the Holy Cross after the fall of Jerusalem to their capital, probably as a war trophy.⁹⁵  After their defeat at the hands of Byzantine Rome in the Last War of Antiquity, they returned the Holy Cross.

Heraclius had chosen to use religion to unify this shattered region and used the city of Jerusalem to boost his personal image.  In 630 CE Heraclius converted the return of Holy Cross of Jesus to Jerusalem into a political event.  He entered the city with the Holy Cross with pomp and celebration. ⁹⁶  He not only restored the Holy Cross to the city but also put the vessels of the churches back, which were temporarily removed to Constantinople to save them from the Iranians.⁹⁷  Then Heraclius reserved Jerusalem for Christians and banned the entry of the Jews into it, lest they might attempt to rebuild the third temple.⁹⁸

This was the political milieu of Jerusalem – Christians claiming it to be the most sacred place on earth and the Jews trying to reclaim it for themselves – when the army of the Rashidun Caliphate, under the leadership of Amr bin As, laid siege to Jerusalem. ⁹⁹  People of Jerusalem adhered to the policy of maximum resistance but their position became precarious when a big army under the command of Abu Ubayda reached and relieved Amr of his duties. ¹⁰⁰  Christians of the town hastily shipped the Holy Cross to Constantinople by sea for safekeeping.¹⁰¹  Then the people of Jerusalem and the Byzantine Roman garrison there surrendered within two to three days without fighting.¹⁰²

Sebeos narrates the events in Jerusalem after its surrender to Muslims.  “Now I shall speak about the plot of the Jewish rebels, who, finding support from the Hagarenes for a short time, planned to [re]build the temple of Solomon.  Locating the place called the holy of the holies, they constructed [the temple] with a pedestal, to serve as their place of prayer.  But the Ishmaelite envied [the Jews], expelled them from the place, and named the same building their own place of prayer.  [The Jews] built a temple for their worship, elsewhere. It was then that they came up with an evil plan; they wanted to fill Jerusalem with blood from end to end, and to exterminate all the Christians of Jerusalem…… they just slaughtered two pigs  ….. and put them [in the Muslim] place of prayer.  Then many [Muslims] entered the place and saw the evil, and they spread a lament throughout the city.  The Jews told the prince [lieutenant governor] that the Christians had desecrated their place of prayer.  The prince issued an order and all the Christians were gathered together.  Just as they wanted to put them to the sword, [a] man came and addressed them: ‘why shed so much blood in vain? Order all the Jews to assemble and I shall point out the guilty ones.” As soon as they were all assembled and [the man] walked among them, he recognized the three men.  Seizing them, [The Arabs] tried them with great severity until they disclosed the plot.  [The Arab prince] ordered that six of the principals involved in the plot be killed.  He permitted the other [Jews] to return to their places”.¹⁰³

By early 638 CE, a few months after the capitulation of Jerusalem, Umar had to come to Jerusalem on a state visit. ¹⁰⁴  On his way to Jerusalem, Umar first halted in Jabiyah (Jābiyah جابِيَه). ¹⁰⁵ The purpose of Umar’s visit is not clearly mentioned in the sources.  Kaegi feels it could be to dispose of conquered properties and to reorganize the Muslim administrative structure in Syria. ¹⁰⁶  Umar definitely performed some administrative tasks in Jabiyah. ¹⁰⁷ However, this explanation is far from complete.  If it was merely an administrative visit, why did he decide to go to Jerusalem, which was not an administrative hub?  Moreover, the Rashidun Caliphate conquered many countries during Umar’s tenure, including Sasanian Iran.  Why had Umar not gone there as well?  Ya’qubi emphasizes that Abu Ubayda wrote to Umar that the siege of Jerusalem was taking long and that the inhabitants have asked the caliph himself to make a peace agreement with them.  So Abu Ubayda prepared the documents of the truce and Umar departed for Syria. ¹⁰⁸  Again, this reason for the visit is doubtful.  Many cities in the region, for example, Damascus, had prolonged sieges.  Nobody called the caliph to negotiate their truces.  So, why only Jerusalem? ¹⁰⁹  Something else emerges as a cause of Umar’s visit as we analyse his activities in Jerusalem. A Muslim eyewitness of the events, who accompanied Umar to Jerusalem, has survived through the annals of Tabari.  He states, “He [Umar] set out from al-Jābiyah, leaving it behind until he came to Jerusalem.  He then went on and entered the masjid.  Then he went on toward the miḥrāb Dāwūd, while we were with him; he entered it, recited the prostration of David, [Quran 38: 21 – 25] and prostrated himself, and we prostrated ourselves with him.”¹¹⁰  Scholars interpret ‘masjid’ in this passage as the Temple Mound.¹¹¹  The meaning of miḥrāb Dāwūd is still debated without any definite outcome.  Anyhow, it could be a place very near to the Temple Mound, or who knows, on Temple Mound itself.¹¹²  Clearly, Umar’s purpose was to lay a Muslim claim to the site of Temple Mound and to broadcast to the public at large Muslim’s staunch belief in the Prophethood of David.

Islamic and Jewish sources agree with Sebeos that after a short-lived honeymoon between Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem, they broke up. ¹¹³

That must be the time Umar ordered building a mosque at Temple Mound. ¹¹⁴  In an anecdote preserved in Pratun Spirituale of John Moschus, Sophronius, the Chalcedonian Christian Patriarch of Jerusalem, who had surrendered the town to Muslim Arabs, says to one of the skilled marble workers working on the construction of the mosque, “the godless Saracens entered the holy city of Christ our Lord, Jerusalem, with the permission of God and in punishment for our negligence, which is considerable, and immediately proceeded in haste to the place which is called the Capitol.  They took with them men, some by force, others by their own will, in order to clean that place and to build that cursed thing, intended for their prayer and which they call a mosque (midzgitha).” ¹¹⁵  As we know Sophronius had died by 639 CE, presumably the construction of the mosque had started by that time.¹¹⁶

Arculf was a Gaul bishop.  He visited Jerusalem in the 670s. ¹¹⁷  In his travelogue he confirms that a mosque was built exactly on ruins of a temple: ‘In that famous place where once stood the magnificently constructed Temple, near the eastern wall, the Saracens now frequent a rectangular house of prayer (orationis domus) which they have built in a crude manner, constructing it from raised planks and large beams over some remains of ruins.  This house can, as it is said, accommodate at least 3000 people.’ ¹¹⁸  Umar deliberately kept the rock on the back of the mosque so it could not intervene between the mosque and the Ka’ba. ¹¹⁹, ¹²⁰  The mosque was called Aqṣā ( اَقصئ ).¹²¹

Byzantine provinces buy Temporary Truce

Learning from the hopeless defeats of the Byzantine army in Syria, eastern Byzantine provinces still under Byzantine rule, hastened to purchase expensive truces from the Rashidun Caliphate.  Egypt took the initiative in 636 CE at the time when the Rashidun Caliphate occupied Palestine after the Battle of Yarmouk. Its Byzantine governor, Cyrus, agreed to pay one million and two hundred thousand Dirhams annually for three years for assurance that the Rashidun Caliphate wouldn’t attack Egypt.¹²², ¹²³  Jazira followed. Its Byzantine governor, Jogn Kataias, agreed at Qinnasrin in 637 CE to pay one million Dirhams annually provided the army of Rashidun Caliphate doesn’t cross the Euphrates to invade Jazira. ¹²⁴, ¹²⁵

Truces were signed with the Muslim upper hand.  Such truces made good strategic sense for the Rashidun Caliphate at this juncture of war. The Rashidun Caliphate had quadrupled its area in the last five years.  It needed a lull in the war to establish proper authority in newly conquered areas.  Payments of money, attached to the truce agreements, were extra benefits.

When Heraclius came to know about these truces he raged with anger.  He replaced Cyrus of Egypt with Manuel with immediate effect.  Egyptians didn’t pay anything and the truce stood null and void. ¹²⁶  Jazira paid only one year’s amercement before Heraclius could find a replacement for Kataias in the form of general Ptolemaios.¹²⁷  Kaegi proposes that Heraclius’s anger stemmed from the expense of the truce which would have deprived the central government of revenue, and increased the prestige of the Muslims and enhanced their capability to build their army.¹²⁸

Completion of the conquest of Syria

Byzantine Rome lost its control over the Avars and Slavs in Europe at the same time when it lost Syria. ¹²⁹  Heraclius’s position was bleak.  Between 638 CE and 639 CE, he ordered the evacuation of all Byzantine Roman fortifications northwest of Antakya to create an empty zone, or no man land, between his country and Rashidun Caliphate.¹³⁰  Rashidun Caliphate complemented Heraclius’s efforts by destroying some fortifications in the area. ¹³¹, ¹³²

Meanwhile, when the Byzantines were regrouping in Anatolia, the Muslim Arabs completed their conquest of Byzantine Syria by occupying the coastal cities, including Qaysariyah (Qayṣariyah قَيصَرِيَه )  (640 CE), followed by Beirut, Gabala and Ladhiqiyyah.¹³³, ¹³⁴  Somewhere during this time Muslims took Yāfa, Rafaḥ,  Ṭarṭūs, Acre, Tyre, Ṣaffūriyah, Sidon, ‘Irqah, and Jubail Step by step.¹³⁵, ¹³⁶

Many coastal towns surrendered without resistance but some offered stiff resistance. ¹³⁷  A dim hope of getting reinforcement through the sea route from Byzantine Rome explains their resistance.  In the past Muslims got control of all the passes of the Taurus Mountains.¹³⁸

We can enumerate so many towns of Syria, which fell into Muslim hands after the Battle of Yarmouk quite easily.  Generally speaking, their resistance was not fierce after the Battle of Yarmouk.  Hoyland points out that the lenient conditions of terms could be one reason.¹³⁹  The people of the region had experienced deceit after entering into a peace contract in the near past.  For example, the people of Nisibayn (Niṣībayn نِصِيبَين) once rose against Khosrow II Parviz.  Khosrow’s general Nakhorgan promised safety.  The people of the city believed in him and opened the gates.  Nakhorgan then changed his mind and killed nobles of the city.¹⁴⁰, ¹⁴¹  When the Syrians observed the invading Muslims keeping their promise after the writing of a contract, they moved towards surrender.

Conditions of submission

Whichever town the Muslim army acquired in Syria, the commander of the Muslim army entered into a contract (Ṣulḥ صُلح) with the local dignitaries.  Many of these contracts have survived.  All slightly vary from each other underscoring local conditions. The foundation of all is laid on the same principles.  The contract written between Abu Ubayda and Baalbek city is preserved by Baladhuri in almost original form. It mentions that there were Romans (Greek), Persians and Arabs in the city.  All of them got the same terms.  They were allowed to keep their lives, houses, churches and businesses including pastures and mills, in lieu of payment of Jizya and Kharaj (Kharāj خَراج).  Their merchants were allowed to do business in all of the Islamic states.  If any one of them decided to accept Islam, he would have the same rights as any other Muslim. ¹⁴²

The notable aspects of this contract are that it encourages all individuals within the submitting communities to continue their regular commercial activities. They are also urged to take advantage of the opportunities resulting from the removal of borders across vast regions. These individuals are required to fulfill their tax obligations, just as they would with any other government. The Rashidun Caliphate guarantees non-interference in their personal lives, particularly regarding their religion, allowing them the freedom to practice any faith they choose. However, they have the option to lessen their tax burden by converting to Islam. In exchange for taxes, the Rashidun Caliphate assures the protection of life and property for their community, similar to any other government, employing its own military for this purpose. It was not obligatory for individuals to join the military service.

During the time of the Rashidun Caliphate, Arab polytheists were compelled to convert to Islam, with only two options following their defeat: conversion or death. However, their approach during Futuhul Buldan was entirely different. In the initial one or two years of Futuhul Buldan, when the Rashidun Caliphate was not economically strong, they encouraged defeated communities to maintain their religions while paying higher taxes. After their victory in the Battle of Yarmouk, the Rashidun Caliphate began offering tax incentives for conversion to Islam. They did not impose forced conversions, leaving the decision to individuals’ discretion.

The inhabitants of conquered towns didn’t have peace of mind, anyhow.  They had accepted the rule of the Rashidun Caliphate as a last choice.  Some of them, for example, Qinnasrin and Antakya, challenged the new rulers with civil disobedience immediately after the army of Rashidun Caliphate left the city after signing the contract. ¹⁴³  The army of the Rashidun Caliphate had to return to bring them back into the ambit of the contract.  The Muslims were not bent on bloodshed.  Whenever a town underwent civil disobedience and was re-conquered, for example, Tabaraiyah, its inhabitants were not punished like combatants.¹⁴⁴  They were given the same terms of the contract again.

New borders at Taurus mountains

Byzantine Empire shrank to the Taurus mountain zone on the south-eastern edge of Cappadocia, and to Cyprus in the Mediterranean as a result of the Futuhul Buldan. ¹⁴⁵  Iconium and Caesarea in Cappadocia became border towns of Byzantine Rome whereas Aleppo and Antakya became border towns of the Rashidun Caliphate.¹⁴⁶, ¹⁴⁷

Apparently, Heraclius and Umar both wished, at least temporarily, to create a frontier along the passes of the Taurus and Antitaurus.  This frontier became a new barrier for civilian and military movement.¹⁴⁸  Subsequently most willful contacts of a non-military kind between the Caliphate and the Byzantine passed by sea, not through the land frontiers, despite occasional famous embassies to Damascus. ¹⁴⁹

The halt of the Muslim invasion at the Taurus Range by 639 CE cannot be explained solely by the geographic barrier of high mountains. The people of Central Anatolia did not have any resident Arabs among them. Neither did the population have serious religious divisions. The Rashidun Caliphate had difficulty finding a portion of the population willing to cooperate with them.  They were left with only military choice\, and, they could not devise any solid military strategy to advance forward.¹⁵⁰

The Muslim army didn’t cross the Euphrates in the east leaving Byzantine possession there, honouring the Qinnasrin truce. ¹⁵¹

Heraclius was busy mending his political image.  He hastily erected his image on a pillar near Qinnasrin.  Probably the border between the two countries passed by this place by that time and the fleeing refugees used this route. Eutychius of Alexandria tells an interesting story in which an Arab accidentally damaged one eye of the image.  Heraclius got so touchy that he wrote to Abu Ubayda for compensation.  Abu Ubayda compensated with an apology.¹⁵²

Role of ethnicities in Syria

It is practically impossible for a small army, like twenty- four thousand Arabs, to conquer and keep occupying a thickly populated country, like Syria, which has its own army of hundreds of thousands available to defend, unless a portion of the population has a soft corner for the invaders.

It appears the Arab residents of Syria were ambivalent when Rashidun Caliphate’s attack started.  They sided with Byzantine Rome but their resistance to the invading Arabs was not stiff.  Cultural commonality with the invaders might explain it.  Jabalah bin Aiham, the last Ghassan king, joined the rank and file of Byzantine Rome in the beginning of the Battle of Yarmouk.¹⁵³  Exactly in the midst of the battle he switched sides citing his kinship with Ansar as an excuse.¹⁵⁴  It might be a pre-pondered scheme that Muslim Arabs chose Yarmouk as the battlefield by retreating from already occupied areas.  Yarmouk was in the vicinity of Jabiyah, the town of Ghassans.  Adhri’at, where Qaynuqa’ had taken refuge, was in their rear.    

The attitude of the invaders toward Arab residents of Syria was reciprocally different from that toward Greek-speaking urban dwellers.  During his official visit to Jabiyah in 638 CE, Umar negotiated with Jabalah bin Aiham to convert to Islam.  Jabalah rather opted to keep his religion and pay sadaqah.  Umar insisted on paying Jizya in case he keeps his religion.  He refused and left for Byzantine Rome along with thirty thousand of his supporters.  Ubada bin Samit, Lieutenant governor of Homs, gently reproved Umar saying ‘if thou hadst accepted ṣadaqah from him and treated him in a friendly way, he would have become Muslim.’¹⁵⁵  The incident proves that the Muslims used to go out of their way to convince the Syrian Arabs to convert to Islam, and the Syrian Arabs expected to be treated differently. Actually, Umar did not close the matter as settled. In the summer of 642 CE, he sent ‘Umayr bin Sa’d of Ansar along with an army across the border to Byzantine Rome to appeal to Jabalah through the blood relationship between them, to return to the land of Muslims with an understanding that he would keep his faith and would pay sadaqah.  Jabalah rejected the offer.¹⁵⁶

On the same note, the invading armies got their earliest converts to Islam only from Arab tribes.  For example, at the time of the surrender of Qinnasrin, many clans of the Tanukh (Tanūkh تَنُوخ) tribe, residents of the satellite town of Qinnasrin converted to Islam.  Some of them, like the Salih (Saliḥ سَلِيح) Clan, remained Christians.¹⁵⁷  None of the Greek, Persian or Jew population of the town converted during this occasion.

The Jews were definitely happy about the Muslim invasion. ¹⁵⁸  They co-operated with invading Muslim armies as much as they could. Samaritan Jews provided spying services to the Muslims and they paid them accordingly.¹⁵⁹  They might have even joined the Muslim armies planning to attack further lands. John of Nikiu mentions the presence of a Jew in the Muslim army that invaded Egypt.¹⁶⁰

The Syriac-speaking Monophysites were under hostile pressure from the central government of Byzantine Rome.  Though they did not back invaders actively, their resistance was soft.  In some places, we hear, a member of the clergy helped Muslims in reducing the town while the remaining population of the town was not in that mood.   When the siege of Damascus lingered on during the first attempt on the town, it was the bishop of Damascus who communicated with Khalid and opened the gate of the city covertly when the city was busy during a feast.¹⁶¹  As Greek-speaking Chalcedonians were bitterly opposed to the Muslim occupation of the town, he was definitely not Chalcedonian.  He might be a Monophysite.  It is on record that the Monophysite and another Christian dissident clergy limited themselves to verbal laments against invading Muslims.  They did not encourage their communicants to resist the Muslims to death.  Christians, generally, did not see this war as a war of survival for the Christian religion.¹⁶²

Some historians believe that Christian sectarian differences were not a cause of the failure of Byzantine resistance, or in any case, they surely were not the primary cause.¹⁶⁴

The great plague

Muslim army in Syria had hardly finished thrashing Byzantine Romans when in 639 CE, it faced another enemy.  This enemy was far more scowling than the Byzantine army and it killed more Arabs than the Byzantine Roman army could. It was the great plague, which lasted for almost one year. ¹⁶⁵  Plague of Amwas (‘Amwās اَمواس) – co-called because it started from the town of Amwas – killed at least twenty-five thousand soldiers of the Rashidun Caliphate.  This figure was apart from those who suffered from the debilitating effects of the disease but did not die. ¹⁶⁶, ¹⁶⁷

Most probably Arabs had no immunity against the disease which was almost endemic in the area.  According to conservative estimates, the epidemic killed about 40% of the Muslim army within a few months.  The Plague of Amwas might have prevented Arab Muslims from building a cantonment town in Syria parallel to those they built in Iraq and Egypt.

The pestilence perished almost the whole leadership of the army of the Rashidun Caliphate in Syria. The most notable death was that of commander in chief and Umar’s right-hand man, Abu Ubayda, who died at the young age of fifty-eight. ¹⁶⁸  Other notables who vanished were field commander Shurahbil bin Hasana at the age of sixty-nine, and field commander Yazid bin Abu Sufyan. ¹⁶⁹  Two noteworthy survivors were Amr bin As and Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan  (Mu’āwiyāh bin Abū Sufyān   مُعاوِيَه بِن اَبُو سُفيان ).  Apparently, the plague was most devastating in and around Damascus where most of the people died. ¹⁷⁰  Mu’awiya survived as he was busy with the campaign of coastal areas. Amr survived because he was leading his army toward Egypt. ¹⁷¹

Arabs knew conventionally that spreading out to isolate from each other controls the contagions. ¹⁷²  Their reluctance to do that, in this case, might be due to their fear of Byzantine re-emergence.¹⁷³  

Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan’s climb to prominence

Unpredictable deaths of governors and commanders one after another created a crisis of provincial leadership of the Rashidun Caliphate in Syria.  A new provincial governor would hardly take charge of his office when he would die.¹⁷⁴  The last significant death was that of governor Yazid bin Abu Sufyan by the end of 639 CE.¹⁷⁵  It paved the way for the appointment of his brother Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan as governor of Syria and commander in chief of Rashidun Caliphate’s army in Syria by Umar.¹⁷⁶

Future events proved that Mu’awiya’s appointment as governor of Syria had more far-reaching consequences for the Rashidun Caliphate than any other appointment of a governor.  Mu’awiya was a young and energetic man of thirty-seven years at the time of his appointment. ¹⁷⁷  Born in an august family of Abu Sufyan, Mu’awiya grew up in an environment of business and politics.  Though Mu’awiya participated in the Battle of Uhud from the Meccan side and had participated in the Battle of Khandaq from the side of Meccan polytheists as an ordinary soldier, he came to prominence in the history of Islam for the first time when he married a divorcee of Umar just after Peace Treaty of Hudaibiy1ah.¹⁷⁸  He was one of those chiefs who got a hundred camels at the time of Ji’ranah.¹⁷⁹  He joined the army of the Rashidun Caliphate as a soldier and participated in the war of Yamama under Khalid bin Walid in this capacity.¹⁸⁰ The Rashidun Caliphate, then, transferred his services to the Syrian sector. He proved himself an outstanding warrior and his superiors, especially his brother Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, started giving him solo campaigns confidently.¹⁸¹  He didn’t disappoint his superiors and demonstrated his military and administrative talent during those campaigns, which were mostly against coastal towns of Syria.¹⁸²

Tacit truce with Byzantine Rome at the Taurus border

War between Rashidun Caliphate and Byzantine Rome in Syria didn’t end with a formal peace treaty and mutual recognition of a new borderline.  Heraclius and Umar exchanged diplomatic notes but they did not progress beyond token contacts. ¹⁸³  None of them was serious about a formal ceasefire.  The Taurus frontier between Byzantine Rome and Rashidun Caliphate remained unstable, suspicious, and hostile.¹⁸⁴  Umar sent an expedition as late as 641 CE under the leadership of Maysara bin Masquq (Maysara bin Masqūq ميسره بِن مَسقُوق ) of ‘Abs clan of Ghatafan tribe against Byzantine Rome territory (arḍ al Rūm, Asia Minor).¹⁸⁵  According to Ya’qubi it was the first operation of its kind across Taurus into Anatolia.¹⁸⁶  The expedition reached up to Zandah facing Byzantine Roman troops and their Arab allies (musta’ribah ‘Arab) of Ghassan, Tanukh and Iyad (Iyād اِياد) tribes.¹⁸⁷, ¹⁸⁸, ¹⁸⁹  Apparently the expedition could not gain anything except the safety of their own lives.

Umar sent a second campaign, after the above-mentioned one, under the leadership of Habib bin Maslama (Ḥabīb bin Maslamah حَبِيب بِن مَسلَمه ) of the Fihr clan of Quraysh. ¹⁹⁰, ¹⁹¹  Again, no achievements of this campaign are noted.  This was the last campaign against Byzantine territory during Umar’s caliphate.¹⁹²  The target and purpose of both these campaigns are not clearly understood as Umar had already expressed his wish to make the Taurus mountains line of control and both Constantinople and Medina had taken measures to create a no man’s land there.

The Rashidun Caliphate kept a high level of fortification and military alert in the border areas as they anticipated Byzantine Rome’s counterattack. ¹⁹³

Jizya was a humiliating tax

Tax is the twin of state. It took birth the same day when the state was born. The population of Syria must have been paying taxes to the precursors of the Rashidun Caliphate. They might still be willing to pay taxes.  However, they perceived Jizya imposed on non-Muslims (virtually over the whole population), as a tax of pejorative character.

Payment of Jizya was particularly hard on Christian Arabs.  Jabalah rejected the payment of kharaj or Jizya on grounds that he was an Arab and these taxes were for peasants (‘ulūj).¹⁹⁴  Banu Taghlib bin Wa’il were Christian Arabs. The  Rashidun Caliphate wished to levy Jizya on them.  They fled to far-off lands.  Pleading to Umar on their behalf Nu’mān bin Zur’ah said, “I plead in Allah’s name for Banu Taghlib.  They are bodies of Arabs too proud to pay Jizya, but severe in warfare.  Let not thy enemy, therefore, be enriched by them to thy advantage’. ¹⁹⁵  By getting convinced by the power of economic argument that they would still pay tax to the government of far-off lands and would deprive the Rashidun Caliphate of revenues, Umar called them back.  This time Umar  ‘doubled the ṣadaqah laid on them’ meaning their tax rate was not cut but its name was changed.¹⁹⁶  Probably this kind of arrangement was made with many Christian Arabs because later Zuhri noted that none of the ‘people of book’ pay sadaqah except Christian Arabs and they pay twice what the Muslims pay.¹⁹⁷

Jazira falls to the Rashidun Caliphate

The area between upper reaches of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, currently located in northern Syria and south-eastern Turkiye, is called Jazira (Jazirah جَزِيره ) by Islamic sources.¹⁹⁸  It corresponds to the Byzantine Roman provinces of Osrhoene and Mesopotamia in sixth century CE.¹⁹⁹  River Khābour, a small tributary to River Euphrates used to make the border between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran here.  (Not to be confused with Khabur Tigris). ²⁰⁰

The Christianization of the population was complete in Jazira.  Like Syria, the population was a mixture of Greek-speaking town dwellers and Arabic-speaking tribes scattered in rural areas.   Ethnic Persians had their presence, as had Jews.

By the beginning of 639 CE, Jazira protruded into the Rashidun Caliphate, separating its Syria and Swad territories, and thus an important communication route.  This area provided access between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran in case they decided to collaborate with each other. Armenia, located to the north of Jazira was the main recruiting ground for the Byzantine Roman military.  If occupied by Arab Muslims, they could threaten Armenia easily.  Last, but not least, Jazira was a fertile agricultural region. Arabs had all reasons to occupy it and Byzantine Romans had all reasons to hold it.²⁰¹

Heraclius could smell the danger and sent military reinforcements to Jazira in 638 – 9 CE, neglecting the defence of Egypt which was exposed to aggression at any time.²⁰²

Just when the plague of Amwas was over, Umar asked Iyad bin Ghanm (‘Iyāḍ bin Ghanm عياض بِن غَنم ) of the Fihr clan of Quraysh to march on Jazira in 639 CE. ²⁰³, ²⁰⁴  His military strength was five thousand men. ²⁰⁵  The Byzantine-Rashidun truce prevented any Arab Muslim attack on Jarzirah during 638 CE.²⁰⁶  At the annulment of the truce of Qinnasrin in 639 CE, Iyad bin Ghanm’s troops crossed the Euphrates and penetrated into Jazira the way a knife penetrates a melon. ²⁰⁷  City after city the army capitulated. Starting from Raqqah, to Ruha, Diyarbakir, ‘Ayn al Wardah, Dniṣar, Mardīn, the whole region of Ṭūr ‘Abdīn, Niṣībayn, Daras, Khāūr, Sinjār, and Qarqisiya, the army reached up to Mosul in the northeast and Hīt in the southeast, until they shook hands with their colleagues active in Swad. ²⁰⁸, ²⁰⁹  Very few towns, like Tella, Daras and ‘Ayn al Wardah had the courage to resist the invading army.²¹⁰, ²¹¹  The occupation of Jazira was completed in 640 CE at a time when some coastal towns of Syria, for example, Qaysariyah, were still resisting the Muslim army.²¹²

Heraclius didn’t concede defeat aptly.  He sent Byzantine Generals Dawit’ (David), Urṭaya, and Titus, who made an abortive campaign in Jazira in the year of 640 CE.²¹³  The loss of Mesopotamia deprived the Byzantine Romans of Arab recruiting grounds for their armies.  They had to look around for new sources.  Rashidun Caliphate could practically prevent Byzantine from helping the collapsing Sasanian Iran as they had done in 590-1 CE and in 628-30 CE.²¹⁴

Rashidun Caliphate occupies Egypt

The Byzantine Rome’s province of Aegyptus, Miṣr (مِصر) of Islamic sources, was located at the confluence of Africa with Asia. ²¹⁵  Separated from Arabia by the Red Sea, the land was an alluvial plane.  The life-giving River Nile traversed it from south to north, its sluggish waters making a wide delta before emptying in the Mediterranean. ²¹⁶ On the eve of the Islamic invasion, the water of the Nile was already fully utilized by the digging of canals.²¹⁷  The network of canals had generated a fertile agricultural plane that was able to produce grain in excess of the local need.  Egypt was a net exporter of grain in Byzantine Rome. ²¹⁸  It exported three hundred million bushels of grain to Constantinople. ²¹⁹  To the south of this rich and relatively safe land was the state of Nubia. ²²⁰  To its southwest were vast wastelands of the Great Sahara desert where Blames nomads used to live.²²¹

Like Syria, Alexander of Macedonia introduced the Hellenic civilization to Egypt.  However, like Syria, it was limited to town dwellers that, by the way, spoke Greek and practiced Chalcedonian principles of Christianity.  They were the main supporters of the Byzantine Roman king, Heraclius.  The vast majority of the population, who concentrated mainly in rural areas, called themselves Egyptians (Qibtī of Arabic sources) to distinguish Greek-speaking Romans.  They spoke their own language called Coptic.  They had their own Christian Church – Coptic Church – a variation of the Monophysite sect. ²²².  From the fourth century CE onwards Arab nomads had a clear presence in Egypt. Some of them had become sedentary and had government jobs. ²²³  Others remained nomads and supplemented their income by raiding settled towns. ²²⁴

The Last War of Antiquity disturbed the relative peace of Egypt when the Iranians occupied Egypt briefly from 617 to 619 CE.²²⁵  After the departure of the Iranians, Byzantine Rome reasserted its sovereignty over Egypt.  Heraclius’s strategy to assimilate Egypt in Byzantine Rome was the same as in Syria – unifying the population around Chalcedonian Church.  His governor in Egypt, Cyrus, had to resort to ruthless persecution of Monophysites in an attempt to meet the goal.  This action of Cyrus alienated the Monophysite population of Egypt from the central government. ²²⁶  Not only this, the economic difficulties which Byzantine Rome was facing at that time were apparent in Egypt as well.  They were devising means of reducing expenses on the salary of soldiers. One suggestion was to reduce the number of soldiers. ²²⁷  Uncertainty of the job definitely doesn’t boost the morale of a soldier.  Defeats of Byzantine Rome in Syria must have demoralized the Byzantine army in Egypt further.²²⁸

After the Arab invasion started in Syria, Heraclius was clearly aware of the vulnerability of Egypt.  He knew the Arab invasion of Egypt was just a matter of time.  What he didn’t know was how to tackle the issue.  Heraclius had asked certain John of Barqa (modern northeast Libya) to defend Egypt against the Arabs.²²⁹  We don’t have any hint of John acting on the instructions.  There is evidence that the patriarch of Alexandria had made pre-emptive defence arrangements at the local level when the Arab-Muslim attack was imminent.  He deployed the army and scaled the entrances and the exits of the land and built walls along all the banks of the Nile in all regions. ²³⁰, ²³¹

Planning of attack

During Umar’s official visit to Syria in the spring of 638 CE, seventy-three years old Amr bin As met him and asked his permission to conquer Egypt.  Amr argued, ‘If we conquer it, it will be a strength for the Muslims, for it is among the richest of lands and the least capable of fighting.’ ²³², ²³³ Kaegi guesses that Amr bin As, being in Gazza area at the time of the war of Dathin, would have become familiar with Byzantine weakness in Egypt.²³⁴  In any case, Amr apparently failed to convince Umar because Jazira was in Umar’s mind.  Amr returned to supervise the siege of Qaisariyah.²³⁵  After the sudden death of Abu Ubayda, when Yazid bin Abu Sufyan came to power in Syria, Amr did not ask for anybody’s permission, lifted the siege of Qaisariyah and led his army of thirty-five hundred men to Egypt. ²³⁷  All his army belonged to the ‘Akk tribe of Yemen.²³⁸   Umar was seriously unhappy with the disobedience of Amr.²³⁹  First, he instructed Amr to halt the operation if he had still not reached the land of Egypt. Amr neglected the orders. ²⁴⁰  Then, Umar quickly raised an army of four thousand men in Hejaz and dispatched it to Egypt under the command of Zubayr bin Awwam. ²⁴¹  On the surface, this act of Umar was to reinforce Caliphate’s army in Egypt, but under the surface, it could be to counter Amr’s attempt to gain power for himself in Egypt.  The sudden attack on Egypt shattered the Rashidun Caliphate’s ambitions to push Heraclius’s army further north of the Taurus Mountains in Cappadocia. ²⁴²

Date of attack

The exact date of the Rashidun Caliphate’s invasion of Egypt is controversial. An inscription from Alexandria, written in 698 CE gives the date of invasion to be 633 CE. ²⁴³  Such an early date doesn’t fit into any scheme.  Baladhuri gives the date of the start of the invasion January as 640 CE. ²⁴⁴  Even this doesn’t fit with events well. Ya’qubi informs that Amr had conquered Alexandria and other districts of Egypt by 641 CE. ²⁴⁵  From here modern historians believe that the invasion might have started in the winter of 639 CE. ²⁴⁶  If the winter of 639 CE is the date of invasion, that was the time when Iyad was engaged in Jazira.

Execution of attack

John of Nikiu, a Coptic priest and resident of the small delta town of Nikiu in Egypt, is an eyewitness of the Arab invasion of Egypt. He gives a vivid account. ²⁴⁷, ²⁴⁸  John of Nikiu informs us that Theodore was commander-in-chief of the Roman army in Egypt by that time. ²⁴⁹  Amr’s army proceeded straight to Fajum (Fājūm فاجُوم) and occupied it. ²⁵⁰, ²⁵¹ Islamic sources differ from John of Nikiu.  Both Ya’qubi and Baladhuri assert that the first town Amr encountered was Farama (Faramā’ فَرَماء).²⁵²,  ²⁵³  The defeat of Farama was not a quick process. It took full three months for Amr to defeat the town.²⁵⁴

Then Amr laid siege to the castle of Alyuna (Alyūnah اَليُونَه ). ²⁵⁵, ²⁵⁶  It was the siege of Alyuna during which reinforcement under the command of Zubayr bin Awwam reached and joined Amr.²⁵⁷  The resistance was fierce and the conquest was slow.²⁵⁸  Army of Amr bin As could conquer the castle of Alyuna only by the summer of 640 CE.²⁵⁹

 

The surrender of Alyuna was a heartbreak for the Byzantine army present in Egypt.  They had taken all measures to protect the castle and had dug moats before the arrival of the enemy.  The news created panic in Egypt. Soldiers and civilians started fleeing toward Alexandria after the fall of Alyuna. ²⁶⁰  Amr dispatched small contingents in different directions in Egypt to subjugate the rest of the villages of the country, before tackling Alexandria. ²⁶¹  Certain villages of Egypt resisted and Amr carried away their inhabitants as prisoners. They were sent to Medina. ²⁶² The majority of villages didn’t find the power to resist and simply applied for terms. ²⁶³ The whole of Egypt came under Muslim control except Alexandria and its surroundings within a few weeks. ²⁶⁴

Amr used violence as a strategy of war to generate fear in civilian as well as military circles.  Here is a description by John of Nikiu of Arab’s taking of his native city, Nikiu, “Amr and the Muslim army, on horseback, proceeded by land till they came to the city of Kebrias ….  and on this occasion, he attacked the general Domentianus.  But when the latter learnt of the approach of the Muslim troops, he embarked on a ship and fled and abandoned the army and their fleet.  And he sought to enter the small canal which Heraclius had dug during his reign.  But finding it closed he returned and entered the city of Alexandria.  Now when the soldiers saw their commander had taken flight, they cast away their arms and threw themselves into the river in the presence of their enemies.  And the Muslim troops slaughtered them with the sword in the river, and none escaped save one man only, named Zechariah, a doughty man and a warrior.  And when the crews of the ships [in River Nile] saw the flight of the troops, they too took to flight and returned to their own country.  And thereupon the Muslims made their entry into Nikiu and took possession, and finding no soldiers, they proceeded to put to the sword all whom they found in the streets and in the churches, men, women and infants, and they showed mercy to none. ²⁶⁵   Probably, Amr wanted to create terror among those who had taken refuge in Alexandria and its surroundings.

The terms of the truce were the same as usual.  People would pay Jizya and Kharaj. Those who wished to convert to Islam would be exempt from those taxes.²⁶⁶

Amr’s strategy of violence bore fruit.  Soon, the population of Lower Egypt was divided into two parties.  Of these, one sided with Theodore, and the other wished to join the Muslims. And straightway the one party rose against the other, and they plundered their possessions and burnt their city. John of Nikiu calls it violence between ‘Blue’ and ‘Green’. ²⁶⁷, ²⁶⁸

Death of Heraclius

Egypt was yet in a state of limbo, with Muslim Arabs being the masters of the southern parts and Byzantine Romans sticking to Alexandria and its surroundings, when the residents of Alexandria heard the dismal news. Heraclius died at the age of sixty-six years after a short febrile illness on February 11, 641 CE, after thirty-one years of reign. ²⁶⁹  An anonymous author of Khuzestan Chronicle shows Heraclius grief-stricken at his deathbed due to the seizure of Egypt, Thebes, and Africa by his enemies despite their excellent defences and that by then they were in a position to march to his capital. ²⁷⁰

The sudden death of the king left Byzantine Rome with political instability at a critical time when they were facing the threat of extinction at the hands of Arabs. Heraclius had come to power as the winner of the civil war. He had not yet established a hard and fast rule of succession.  The family feud among his children over the throne was natural. It got complicated when clergy and generals started fishing in troubled waters for their own sake. ²⁷¹

Initially, Heraclius’s son Constantine (Constantine III) sat on the throne.  He died of hematemesis from poisoning by Martina after ruling for only a hundred days, and without leaving any political impact, in May 641 CE. ²⁷²  Constantine  III’s death paved the way to power for Martina (Heraclius’s second wife whom he had married after the death of his first wife and who happened to be his Father’s brother’s daughter and the Christian clergy considered it incestuous relation) and her son Heracleonas. Clergy was not willing to accept Heracleonas as king. ²⁷³  They considered the king born out of illegitimate marriage.²⁷⁴  Byzantine Rome got divided into two political parties.  One, that favoured Martina and her son and also favoured accommodation with the Arabs.  Another that favoured Heraclius’s eleven years old grandson from Constantine III, Constans (Constans II, Qusṭunṭīn قُسطُنطِين) to be a king, represented by a senior general named Valentine, who advocated a more hawkish policy towards Arabs.²⁷⁵, ²⁷⁶  Among scenes of rioting, Valentine entered Constantinople in September 641 CE and deposed Martina and her son.²⁷⁷   General Valentinus crowned young Constans, and using the latter’s tender age as a pretext, he sought to usurp the de facto military and political powers of the imperial office for himself. ²⁷⁸  As the Hawkish party had come to power, General Valentine sent his troops to fight the Arabs.²⁷⁹

Usurpation of power by General Valentinus offended popular opinion.  He was arrested and brought before Constans. The young emperor magnanimously accepted his plea that he had only acted out of a desire to save the empire from the Arabs, and appointed him head of the imperial guard. ²⁸⁰  As a result, the Byzantine internal instability continued. In early 642 CE General Valentinus tried an abortive coup. It was only after the hanging of General Valentinus by an angry mob that Constans became secure and brought political stability to the empire. ²⁸¹  This event took place after the Muslim Arabs snatched Egypt and were beginning the invasion of Barqa (Cyrenaica).²⁸²

The fall of Alexandria

After the fall of Alyuna and most of the Egyptian lands, there were still people in Egypt who believed they could defeat the invading army. The Romans and the Copts who lived to the south of Egypt decided to fight with Amr before he made any attempt on Alexandria. Some residents of far-off villages also joined the army.  The two forces met at Karium (Kariūn كَرِيُون).  Amr was victorious. ²⁸⁴, ²⁸⁵  Theodore fled to Alexandria after this defeat. ²⁸⁶

Alexandria was the most defendable city in Egypt.  It was protected by strong walls, and the water of the Nile surrounded it. ²⁸⁷ All people of Egypt, who did not want to be administrated by the Muslim Arabs, had fled to it and had fortified themselves in it. Amr advanced and laid siege to Alexandria. ²⁸⁸

All its inhabitants were ready to resist him except the Copts who were double-minded.  The Copts asked for some time to cogitate but Amr refused. The siege was prolonged for three months.²⁸⁹  After three months of siege, the Muqawqis of the town offered a peace deal. At that time Heraclius was still alive and was at the helm of affairs. He didn’t approve of Muqawqis’s proposal. ²⁹⁰  Heraclius was confident of providing reinforcements to the besieged town via the sea route which was still open. Heraclius’s sudden death at this juncture changed the schema. Like everywhere else in Byzantine Rome, the war of succession divided the Roman population of Alexandria bitterly. ²⁹¹  As Byzantine Rome remained in a state of flux due to disputes of succession, the commander in chief General Valentine was unable to commit any troops to Egypt. ²⁹²  When things started settling in Constantinople, Constans II sent troops to Alexandria, closed the gates of the city and announced to Umar his readiness for war.²⁹³ The Muslims were aware of divisions among the population of Alexandria. They were boldened by it. ²⁹⁴ Still, they did not try to recruit the dissidents as fifth columnists.  They distrusted them. ²⁹⁵ Apparently, the central government of Byzantine Rome failed to send enough reinforcements to the town to repel the besieging Rashidun Caliphate army.  Disappointed, the people of Alexandria sent Cyrus for a truce, who was re-appointed by Constans [Heraclius younger]. ²⁹⁶  The Roman soldiers in Alexandria left for Cyprus under General Theodore and Muslims entered the city without effort. ²⁹⁷  Amr took whatever was present in the town but he did not take any captives or kill anybody. ²⁹⁸  The town might have fallen to Muslim Arabs by the end of September 642 CE.²⁹⁹

Amr returned to Alyuna along with the Muslim cavalry.  The Rashidun Caliphate kept Alyuna as its administrative headquarter in Egypt.³⁰¹

The Coptic population of Egypt did not see invading Arabs as their saviours.  Neither did the Arabs see them as their allies. ³⁰²  However, Coptics were apt to accommodate the Arab rule.  After the Arab occupation of Alexandria Abba Benjamin, the patriarch of Coptics, returned to the city in the thirteenth year after his flight from Romans.³⁰³  Role of Egyptian Arabs in the conquest of Egypt is not known. Sources are quiet about them as if they were absent from the scene.  Only Ibn Abd al-Hakam mentions a Nabatean supporting the Roman side during the rebellion of Alexandria.³⁰⁴

Conquest of the Maghreb

The Rashidun Caliphate’s intrusion into Africa westwards continued after the subjugation of Egypt.  A flat coastal road connected Alexandria to the town of Barqa. ³⁰⁵  Islamic sources call the whole region surrounding this road, sandwiched between the desert to the south and the Mediterranean to the north, Barqa. ³⁰⁶, ³⁰⁷  A low-height mountain range known as Jabal Akhdar dominated the landscape of Barqa and it attracted enough rainfall to provide a fertile hinterland for agricultural settlements. A barren grazing belt replaced the agricultural land further inland, then gave way to the Sahara Desert. ³⁰⁸  Officially Barqa was a province of Byzantine Rome.  The population of Barqa followed both Coptic and Chalcedonean Christianity.³⁰⁹

After establishing administrative mechanisms in Egypt, Amr invaded Barqa in 642 CE and conquered the area up to the town of Barqa. Once Egypt was subjugated, Barqa neither had defences nor any hope of reinforcement from emperor Constans of Byzantine Rome. Its conquest was an easy affair. ³¹⁰  The inhabitants of Barqa proved to be the most docile of all the conquered lands, according to Baladhuri.  They kept paying their Kharaj without demanding notice from the governor of Egypt. ³¹¹

During his adventures in Barqa, Amr came across Berber nomads. ³¹²  To the south of the coast of Barqa, in the pre-desert grazing belt, there lived the warlike Berber tribe of Luwata (Luwātah لَواتَه).³¹³, ³¹⁴  Though they paid tribute to the Byzantine authorities, the Byzantines could never control them properly.  Amr continued the same policy of keeping them semi-independent.³¹⁵  Hoyland thinks that Baladhuri’s statement that “Amr compelled Luwātah to sell their children and wives in order to pay the jizya” is an allusion to the vibrant slave trade.³¹⁶, ³¹⁷

The Rashidun Caliphate’s defeat near Sub-Saharan Africa

The rule is ‘fittest to survive’, not ‘the mightiest to survive’.  Hare lives in the same jungle where the lion lives.  A vivid case illustration is the Rashidun Caliphate’s defeat at the hands of Nubians in 642 CE. ³¹⁸  To the south of Egypt, between Aswan in modern Egypt and Wadi Halfa in North Sudan, there lived a small country.  Its name was Nubia (Nūbah نُوبَه). ³¹⁹  Whole region was fully Christianised.³²⁰

Boldened by his successes in Egypt and Barqa, Amr sent a detachment of cavalry under the command of Uqba bin Nafi )Uqbah bin Nāfi’  عُقبَه بِن نافِع ) of the Fihr clan of Quraysh to Nubia.³²¹  The fight was unexpectedly fierce and Rashidun Caliphate’s defeat was solid.³²²  Baladhuri gives the superior military skills of Nubians as the cause of defeat.  “Nubians were masters of arrow throwing.  Their aim never missed.  They aimed at eyes.  Arabs lost 150 eyes in the raid.  Arabs were used to sword warfare”, he asserts. ³²³

Amr was reluctant to digest the defeat. ³²⁴  It was only his successor, Abdullah bin Sa’d, governor of Egypt who made a formal truce agreement with Nubia, with boundary demarcation, around 651 CE during the Caliphate of Uthman.³²⁵  An auxiliary bilateral trade agreement (mu’āhidah مُعاهِدَه) was also signed, according to which, Nubia would trade slaves with Rashidun Caliphate in return for food.³²⁶

The southward thrust of the Rashidun Caliphate halted in Africa

The resilience of Nubia, no doubt, halted the Rashidun Caliphate’s advance into Sub-Saharan Africa via an overland route.³²⁷  Relations between Ethiopia (Axum) and the Rashidun Caliphate were not at their best. We get a supporting clue from Ibn Ishaq that in 630 CE there was a fear of attack from Ethiopia and Prophet Muhammad had to take defensive measures.  We again hear that Umar had to send a defensive naval force towards Ethiopia on hearing rumours of invasion in 641 CE.³²⁸  Ethiopia (Axum) had already passed its prime and was not that strong.³²⁹  In the past Ethiopia had invaded Yemen.  Arab Muslims had all reasons to capture Ethiopia but they did not throw a single arrow in that direction.  The halt of the Arab Muslim offensive by Nubia spared the life of Axum.  By this time the Rashidun Caliphate had naval capacity.³³⁰ The sea route was open to them, but Umar was reluctant to use the navy in wars.³³¹

Fustat established

After the ill-fated expedition of Nubia, an army of the Rashidun Caliphate got busy establishing a cantonment town for themselves to administrate the newly acquired territory.  They selected Giza but Umar did not approve it.  He did not want the river a hurdle between Medina and the cantonment.    The site of the cantonment town of Fustat (Fusṭāṭ فُسطاط ) was thus selected on the right bank of the Nile just near Alyuna. ³³²  Fustat is derived from Latin Fossatum, meaning a place surrounded by a defensive ditch. ³³³

Further extension in the Maghreb

Disappointed by defeat in Nubia Amr decided to expand eastwards.  About one thousand kilometres away, there was another agricultural area very similar to Barqa.  This was the Roman province of Tripolatnia with Tripoli (Ṭarābulus طَرابُلَس ) as its main urban center. ³³⁵

In 643 CE Amr marched along the coast of the Mediterranean up to the town of Tripoli and conquered it and its surrounding districts up to Sabratah. ³³⁶, ³³⁷, ³³⁸  He wished to continue further east to conquer the Byzantine Roman province of Ifriqyia (the upper half of modern Tunis) but Umar forbade him harshly, saying, ‘It is widely dispersed and no one shall raid it as long I remain alive.’ Umar did not see any economic advantages there. ³³⁹, ³⁴⁰

Restrained by Umar in his eastwards march, Amr sent his field commander Busr bin Artat (Busr bin Abi Arṭāt بُسر بِن اَبِي أرطاة ) to the south to occupy Waddan (Waddān وَدَّان) and its surrounding Fazzan (Fazzān فَزَّان)in modern southern Libya, up to Zawilah (Zawīlah زَوِيلَه).³⁴¹, ³⁴²  None of these cities and regions had the power to resist the invading army as we don’t hear of any fierce battles there.

Amr appointed Uqba bin Nafi as lieutenant governor over Barqa, Tripoli, and Fazzan combined together in one region, which he called al-Maghrib.³⁴³  Rashidun Caliphate didn’t have any intention to create enormously big provinces.  Neither had it aspired to create numerous provinces.  Generally, the area nearer to the border of Arabia became a main province after its conquest.  The farther areas, adjacent to the main one, became a ‘provincially administered territory’ attached to it.

The highlands jammed between the southeastern portion of the Taurus Mountains and the Black Sea used to be called Armenia.  Its western boundary was arbitrarily high reaches of the river Euphrates and its tributary Yesilimak River in modern eastern Turkiye.  In the east lesser Caucasus Mountains and Zanagur range separated it from Azerbaijan. ³⁴⁴, ³⁴⁵, ³⁴⁶  Jurzan (Jurzān جُرزان) with its main town Tbilisi (Tiflīs تِفلِيس ) was a part of Armenia.³⁴⁷  It had a dry and hot summer but a short and cold winter with a lot of snow. ³⁴⁸

Armenians had developed a strong sense of nationalism by the seventh century CE.  Many of them used to live in countries and territories beyond the limits of historic Armenia.  Even they shared nationalist feelings with their country fellows living in Armenia proper. ³⁴⁹  All Armenians were Christians.  Even those Armenians living in regions other than Armenia itself were Christians.  In line with their strong nationalistic affiliations, they had their own Armenian Church.³⁵⁰  Being mainly pastureland, the core trade of Armenians was military service.  Armenia was the main recruiting ground for both Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran.³⁵¹

Pre-Islamic political state

The tiny nation of Armenia abodes at the confluence of three major powers, Byzantine Rome to their southwest, Sasanian Iran to their southeast and Khazar Empire (خَزَر)to their northwest.  This very fact became their biggest nightmare.  After the dissolution of the kingdom of Armenia in 428 CE, the area became a main conflicting point between Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran, with Turks (including Khazars) in the north trying to contribute proportionally to their stature.  And the very fact that Armenia was a highland with rugged terrain became their biggest fortitude.  Nobody could subjugate them completely.³⁵²  By the end of the 6^th century CE, Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran had divided Armenia among themselves on paper.³⁵³  Byzantine Sasanian borders ran just east of Erzurum, then south along the Gunek River, then south along the River Batman, then east along the Tigris to just beyond Hasankeyf, and then south in Mesopotamia along the Khabour River to the Euphrates at Busayrah.³⁵⁴, ³⁵⁵, ³⁵⁶

Armenians, being an independent-minded martial race, proved difficult for both Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran to control.  Once, emperor Maurice wrote to Khosrow II Parviz about the Armenians: ‘There is a crooked and disobedient people which dwells between us and causes trouble. Come now, I shall assemble mine and send them to Thrace.  Assemble yours and have them taken east.  Should they die, [our] enemies will be the ones dying, should they kill others it will be our enemies who perish, and we shall live in peace.  But should they remain in their own country, we shall have no rest’.³⁵⁷  Sebeos preserves a brave attempt on the part of Armenians to snatch independence during the reign of Khosrow II Parviz, which was crushed by joint forces of Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran.³⁵⁸  Sebeos explains that they would have succeeded in gaining independence provided Huns (Western Turks) would not have threatened them, due to which they were compelled to compromise.³⁵⁹

Byzantine Romans used their brand of religion as an ideological weapon to subjugate other nations.  In the case of Armenia, they failed bitterly.  Once Emperor Maurice issued an order for Armenians to accept Chalcedonian Christianity but few Armenians joined it.³⁶⁰  Wrangling of both, state and non-state actors, continued in Armenia even after the truce of 628 CE between Sasanian Iran and Byzantine Rome.³⁶¹  Muslim conquest of Syria, Palestine and Jazira had diverted the attention of the Byzantine Roman central government from Armenia.  Heraclius’s attempts to unify the Armenian Church with his own Monothelite church, and the crisis of succession after Heraclius’s death had created local turbulence in Armenia which had encouraged naxaras, or Armenian lords, to engage in strife among themselves.  They and their powerful and proud families were on the way to independence.³⁶², ³⁶³  Control of Byzantine Rome over its Armenia remained loose after the truce of 628 CE and apparently, Sasanian Iran was in no position to play any role in Iranian Armenia after its defeat at Qadisiyyah.

The first attack of the Rashidun Caliphate

The Rashidun Caliphate’s reason eye Armenia might not be booty as its timber was difficult to export in a cost-effective manner. ³⁶⁴  Rashidun Caliphate was struggling with Byzantine Rome and Sasanian Iran simultaneously. Desire to cut off their supply of new recruits was the main incentive.

Unlike Syria, the inhabitants of Armenia were armed.  Byzantine Rome never imposed its prohibition against the possession, sale or purchase of weapons by private individuals in its Armenian territories.  The terrain and the remoteness of the area, together with local traditions, probably hindered any such enforcement.³⁶⁵  Anyhow, the contentiousness of Armenians had made it impossible for them to organize an effective defence against Rashidun Caliphate.  Their ecclesiastical disagreements concerning Chalcedonism and Monotheletism and their internal division and strive were fundamental local impetus favouring Rashidun Caliphate.³⁶⁶, ³⁶⁷

The first Armenian raid by Rashidun Caliphate was in the late fall of 640 CE. ³⁶⁸  It originated from Jazira under the command of Iyad bin Ghanm.³⁶⁹  Kaegi guesses that Iyad’s army might be five thousand strong.³⁷⁰  That was the time when Amr’s army had held all of upper Egypt and Heraclius was still in shock at the potential loss of the whole of Egypt.  The news of the raid might have increased his sorrows as he was an ethnic Armenian. ³⁷¹

As no attempt can be traced on the part of Iyad to leave permanent garrisons inside Armenia during this campaign, it appears that the immediate purpose of the assault was to prevent Armenian raids on Jazira.³⁷²  During this invasion Iyad bin Ghanm could not penetrate further than Bidlis and Khilat (khilāṭ خِلاط), though he could enrich himself and his men by plundering Armenian towns and countryside.³⁷³, ³⁷⁴, ³⁷⁵

By 639 CE Theodore Rshtuni, an Armenian prince, had emerged stronger than others and had united the eastern and western parts of Armenia.  There is no evidence that he organized any serious resistance to Iyad bin Ghanm.³⁷⁶, ³⁷⁷  Though nothing material could be gained by this invasion, Rashidun Caliphate had laid its teeth on Armenia.³⁷⁸

The unhindered penetration of Iyad in Armenia and his unscathed return was an eye-opener for the new Byzantine emperor, Constans II.  He gave recognition to Theodore Rshtuni’s strong position in Armenia and appointed him general and patriarch in early 642 CE.³⁷⁹  Constan II’s efforts in Armenia bore fruit.  Armenia experienced the second Muslim invasion in the summer of 643 CE. ³⁸⁰  This time the invasion originated from the region of Azerbaijan under the command of Habib bin Maslama. ³⁸¹, ³⁸² He divided his army into three battalions.  They ransacked three different regions of Armenia. The army, in the end, was repulsed after losing three thousand of its soldiers due to the defensive manoeuvres of Theodore Rshtuni.³⁸³, ³⁸⁴  Thereafter, Armenia remained a semi-independent ally of Byzantine Rome for a decade or so.³⁸⁵

Mass evacuation of conquered lands

As the Rashidun Caliphate’s offensive started, developed and spread into Syria, Jazira, Egypt, and elsewhere, a significant movement of people from one region to another took place.³⁸⁶  Initially, during the conquest of Syria, the Rashidun Caliphate simply allowed those who disliked being subject (ra’iyyah) of the Rashidun Caliphate, to flee to the country of their choice. ³⁸⁷  Naturally, the Rashidun Caliphate did not wish to manage hugely hostile populations. ³⁸⁸  Allowance of the exodus was not written in the peace treaties as a term. It was a tacit understanding.  Later, when they occupied Egypt, this arrangement had to be formalized in a peace treaty.³⁸⁹  The Egyptian public did not have any route to escape except by sea, which could be astronomically expensive.

Such policies were not an original Muslim invention.  This practice can be traced to Late Romans, Byzantine Romans and Sasanian Iranians as far back as the fourth century CE.³⁹⁰  Almost all refugees of the Arab invasion fled to the lands still under the occupation of Byzantine Rome.  For example, the people of Balis and Qinnasirin fled to Ard Rum (Arḍ Rūm ارض رُوم).³⁹¹   Tribe of Iyaz bin Nazir (Iyād bin Nazīr اِياز بِن نَذِير) of Jazira took the same direction.³⁹²  Apparently, fleeing people had to leave behind their immovable property.³⁹³  Nothing is known about the social and economic status of those who left for Byzantine territories.  It can be safely assumed that they were primarily those individuals who were closely connected with the Orthodox Church and the Byzantine government, mainly ethnic Greeks and a few Arabs, most of them wealthy merchants and craftsmen.³⁹⁴  Territories controlled by Byzantine Rome should have been flooded by refugees as a result of the mass exodus.

Economic Immigration of Arabs

Another far-reaching result of the Rashidun Caliphate’s conquest of Byzantine Rome’s eastern provinces was a movement of Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula to the newly acquired areas.  Islamic sources mention on numberless occasions that Rashidun Caliphate settled Arabs in newly occupied areas.  For example, they were settled in Sinjar. ³⁹⁵  This was, actually, economic immigration on a large scale.  Probably they were members of those tribes who had not participated in the war and didn’t get booty.  The state allotted them the lands abandoned by the fleeing refugees.³⁹⁶

The population of Arabia thinned out

Arabia was devoid of its population as a result of, first the Ridda Wars, then large-scale recruitment in the army, and later mass immigration. Hejaz must be adversely affected because it was already thinly populated due to its desert-like conditions. Only the Muslims of Hejaz were expected to participate in the war.  Non-Muslims were exempt from military service in lieu of Jizya.  The population of non-Muslims surged as a result.  Umar might have seen this situation as a security threat.  Baladhuri informs us, “People of Najran [who had retained their Christian faith] increased tremendously during the caliphate of Umar.  Umar considered them a menace to Islam.  They had started usury.  He expelled them to Syria and Iraq and granted them permission to clear virgin lands there and be the owner of those lands in lieu of their lands in Najran.  So many Najranis went there that they made a new township near Kufa and named it al-Najrānīyah”.³⁹⁷  Similar arguments might be at work in the expulsion of certain Jewish groups to Syria.

Demographic changes across the region

Fleeing of refugees from occupied areas out of fear and the migration of Arabs to fill the vacuum were not the only demographic changes that took place during Futuhul Buldan. The Rashidun Caliphate generated large-scale shuffling of populations for political and security reasons as well.  This kind of reshuffling was a deliberate effort to change the demography.  Many pathways can be traced in historic sources.  One was to allure the Arab population of newly occupied areas to settle in far-off border areas. For example, Abu Ubayda settled Arabs of Syrian origin in Balis.³⁹⁸  Another was to settle in coastal cities of Syria those population groups, especially Persians, who would not be pro-Byzantine.³⁹⁹

Deporting the whole of the hostile population to far-off localities was not unusual in the Middle East.  Once King Maurice ordered thirty thousand Armenian families to be deported to Thrace in 595 CE.⁴⁰⁰  Such state policies and internal and external immigration made the populations of Syria and Mesopotamia more homogenous than before.  On the other hand, it made Anatolia less homogenous because of the resettlement of certain refugees.⁴⁰¹

Changes inside Byzantine Rome

The disgraceful defeat at the hands of people, whom they considered inferior, definitely shook Byzantine Rome to its foundations.  However, for the sake of the integrity of the remaining country, the ruling circles of Byzantine Rome kept a brave face.  They tended to deflect any responsibility from Heraclius or even from ordinary soldiers.  They used the folly of Byzantine generals as a scapegoat.  They did not admit that Muslims won due to their superior military generalship, tactics, morale, and strategy. ⁴⁰²  An eighth-century source from Spain writing in Latin, and whose sources are oriental or Byzantine, claims that ‘Saracens, influenced by their leader Muhammad, conquered and devastated Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia more by stealth than by manliness and not so much by open invasions as by persisting in stealthy raids. ⁴⁰³  This kind of political stance was to boost public morale.  The leaders knew the facts.  They had to perform now.  Muslims did not attack a static and gravely weakened Byzantine Rome.  Rather they invaded a country off balance and at a very awkward time of trying to restore and unify its borders and people. It quickly started balancing itself after the initial jolt.⁴⁰⁴

Byzantine Rome definitely faced a law and order situation inside its boundaries when the weakness of the state army became apparent to its citizens.  We hear of a chief of the un-Arab and un-Islamic name of Qanan, for example, who took some captives in Southern Anatolia and killed the Byzantine general who challenged him.⁴⁰⁵

It might have taken a few decades for the state to settle the refugees and restore law and order.  To reassess their resources and strengths Byzantine Rome re-surveyed lands between late 636 CE and January 641 CE.⁴⁰⁶  The occurrence of the census confirms that the government remained functional.⁴⁰⁷

The expenses for the unsuccessful Byzantine defence of the Eastern Provinces are unknown, but they were very substantial, in terms of salaries, stipends, provisions, arms, logistics, and shipping.  Of course, the permanent loss of Byzantine tax revenues as a result of the Muslim conquests was enormous.  It necessarily resulted in many changes in the Byzantine fiscal and administrative structure.⁴⁰⁸  As a deterrent to further invasions Byzantine Rome prohibited the sale of arms and iron to its enemies.⁴⁰⁹

Political thoughts of non-Muslim subjects of the Rashidun Caliphate

By far whichever areas Rashidun Caliphate snatched from Byzantine Rome were predominantly Christian.  Christians of ex-Byzantine eastern provinces, who chose not to leave, had to develop coping mechanisms to deal with the new situation.  Anastasius of Sinai, a Chalcedonean monk of the late seventh century is quoted in the dialogue between Papiscus and Philo to have said:

Do not say that we Christians are today afflicted and enslaved.
This is the greatest thing, that though persecuted and fought by

so many, our faith stands and does not cease, nor is our empire
abolished, nor are our churches closed.  But amid the peoples

who dominate and persecute us, we have churches, we erect
crosses, found churches and engage in sacrifices.⁴¹⁰

Anastasius is responding to a taunting Jew who cites total control of ‘Saracens’ over Christians as proof that God didn’t favour them.  Anastius takes comfort in two facts.  One, that the Christian faith still exists and prospers in the lands controlled by Muslims. Second, Byzantine Rome still exists. It is worth noting that Anastasius’s political affiliation is still with Byzantine Rome.  Probably he dreams that one day Byzantine Rome will grow strong and reoccupy the areas it lost to the Rashidun Caliphate. ⁴¹¹

Probably Jews living in conquered areas of the Rashidun Caliphate didn’t have to develop new coping mechanisms.  For them, it was just a change of masters.

Muslim Arabs extinguish Sasanian Iran

The other world power did extremely poorly in the face of Arab invasion as compared to Byzantine Rome.  A Christian eyewitness to the Arab Muslim’s conquest of the ancient kingdom of Iran summarizes the saga deftly, “Then God brought up against them [Persians] the sons of Ishmael, (banū Ismā’īl) who were [as many] as the sands on the seashore.  Their leader was Muhammad.  Neither walls nor gates stood up before them, nor did weapons or shields, and they dominated the entire land of the Persians.  Now Yazdegerd sent countless troops against them, but the Arabs destroyed all of them and killed Rustam too.” ⁴¹², ⁴¹³

The answer to the question of how did it happen requires many pages.

Geography and people of Iran

Sasanian Iran was a large country.  It lodged on all those areas which currently accommodate part of Iraq west of Euphrates, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Baluchistan portion of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, the southern half of Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.⁴¹⁴  When a country grows bigger than a certain size, it inevitably becomes multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual.  Sasanian Iran was no exception to this formula.

Pahlavi-speaking ethnic Persians made the core of the population.  They were dominant politically and socially.  The king belonged to this group.⁴¹⁵  Other ethnicities, anyhow, were not less important.  Arabs were abundant in Swad.  Kurds used to live in the Zagros Mountains. Ethnic Armenians predominated in north-western parts.⁴¹⁶  Parthians were significant in the eastern parts of the country.⁴¹⁷  Medes used to live in central areas of the country.⁴¹⁸  Ethnic Jews  (as opposed to the Jewish religion) had their presence too.⁴²⁰

Being multi-ethnic automatically means being multi-lingual.  As expected, the main language of the Persians was Middle Persian (Pahlavi).  It was the medium of almost all literary expression.  However, many other languages were widespread.  Parthian, Sogdian, Khwarizimian, Khotanese, Saka and Bactrian all had their share.⁴²¹

Religions of Iran

An inscription written on the Ka’ba-ye Zartosht, near modern Shiraz, by a Zoroastrian high priest Kartir, in the 3^rd century CE announces, “Jews, Sramans [Buddhists], Brahmins [Hindus], Nasoreans [Nestorian Christians], Christians [Gnostic Christians], Maktak [Baptisers], and Zandiks [Manichaeans] in the empire were smitten, and destruction of idols and scattering of the stores of the devs [Demons] and god-seats and nests were abandoned.”⁴²²  The inscription simply enumerates major religions in Sasanian Iran.  Iran was a multi-religious country.

Zoroastrianism maintained its supreme position as the official religion throughout the Sasanian dynasty, as is evident by the presence of its symbol, a fire altar, on all Sasanian coins.  However, Sasanian Iran was too vast a country, and open to too many currents of belief.  It was impossible for the state religion to obliterate all other creeds. ⁴²⁴

By the late Sasanian period, the religious landscape of Iran started changing dramatically.  Christianity had taken root in Iran centuries ago.⁴²⁵  Initially, they were persecuted by the majority of Zoroastrians, as is evident from the Ka’ba-ye Zartosht inscription, mentioned above. This was the situation up to the reign of usurper Bahram Chubin (Bahrām Chūbīn) when Isho’uahb, the patriarch of Nestorian Church flatly refused to accompany the fleeing king Khosrow II Parviz to King Maurice of Byzantine Rome as he was afraid that such behaviour on his part could invite the wrath of Bahram Chubin and he might prosecute the Christian minority.⁴²⁶  Christian’s situation changed conclusively during the reign of Khosrow II Parviz, who came to power with the help of Byzantine Christians.  Khosrow was not a friend to Christians by heart but he had to maintain this demeanor publically.  Conversion to Christianity speeded up.  Khosrow’s Christian wife Shirin (Shīrīn شِيرِين) established a monastery.  She used to preach the gospel of the Kingdom at the court openly.  None of the Zoroastrians at the court dared to say anything about Christians.  At the behest of Shirin, many nobles of the court had converted to Christianity during Khosrow Parviz’s tenure.⁴²⁷  Khosrow was definitely not very pleased with the situation.  He banned the conversion of religion from the paternal one, with the death penalty for it.⁴²⁸  Still, due to swollen numbers of Christians, the king had to admire them.  ‘On the great feast of Psalm Sunday, Christians went to the entrance of King’s [of Khosrow Parviz] chamber and worshipfully read the Gospel.  They received presents from the king and departed.  And no one dared to say anything to them’.⁴²⁹

The Zoroastrian clergy did not sit idle.  They kept trying to impose their religion on the Christians, for example, Armenians, with failure.⁴³⁰

Due to the ongoing tussle between the two religions, and the growing power of Christians, Khosrow ultimately had to take the position that “all are physically our servants, but as for spiritual matters, He Who judges souls knows about them.”⁴³¹

After Khosrow’s death and with the start of the Sasanian civil war, the Iranian Christians lost any fear of being persecuted.  They grew bold.⁴³²

By the 7^th century, Christian communities were present in nearly every province of Sasanian Iran, both western and eastern.  Many Christians were ethnic Persians.⁴³³  Christian presence is confirmed up to Merv, where Elijah, the metropolitan of Merv, ‘converted many people among the Turks and of other nations’.⁴³⁴, ⁴³⁵  Fragments of old testament psalms written in Pahlavi are found in Turkmenistan.⁴³⁶

Politics of Iran

A hint of civil war in Sasanian Iran came when a general by the name of Bahram Chubin, appointed by the sitting constitutional king Hormizd in the border areas of Caucasia, got ambitious to wear the crown in 590 CE.⁴³⁷, ⁴³⁸  The king did not get enough support from other parts of the army and some nobles of the court murdered Hormizd and crowned his son Khosrow II Parviz instead. ⁴³⁹  As Bahram’s main intention was to be a king by himself, he did not recognize Khosrow II Parviz’s legitimacy.  Rather he attacked the capital city as head of the rebellious army and Khosrow II Parviz had to flee to Qarqisiya, a border town of Byzantine Rome.⁴⁴⁰, ⁴⁴¹

King Maurice of Byzantine Rome approved Khosrow’s application to grant him soldiers so he could reclaim his throne.⁴⁴²  Favours carry a price.  Khosrow would have to return to the occupied Byzantine territories and treat the Iranian Christians well in case he succeeded. ⁴⁴³  Khosrow could defeat Bahram and could reclaim his throne but the damage had already been done. ⁴⁴⁴  Sasanian Iran’s constitution had shattered forever.  It happened for the first time in the history of Sasanian Iran that a king was crowned by nobles rather than by a predecessor king (Khosrow II Parviz after the murder of Hormizd).  It also happened for the first time in Sasanian Iran’s history that a king was installed by foreign troops rather than by consultation among ruling families (Khosrow II Parviz after the defeat of King Bahram).

Khosrow II Parviz proved to be an able ruler and held power for twenty-eight years.⁴⁴⁵  He could even crush some coup attempts by his generals during his reign.⁴⁴⁶  When the king got weak in the wake of defeat at the hands of Heraclius at Nineveh, the renegade generals dethroned and murdered him and crowned his son Qubad II.⁴⁴⁷, ⁴⁴⁸

This was the start of a cascade of events which are generally termed as Sasanian Civil War.  The Iranian army split into three contending fractions.⁴⁴⁹  None of them was powerful enough to eliminate the other.  Iranian masses supported the house of Sasan, even if it had weakened.⁴⁵⁰  When General Shahvarāz proclaimed himself king instead of installing a king of his own choice from the house of Sasan, he was killed by ordinary soldiers of his troops when he was attending a guard of honour ceremony in full royal costume.⁴⁵¹, ⁴⁵² Under these circumstances the mutually opposing generals were left with only one option.  Each of them had to enthrone a member of the House of Sasan provided the said member was deemed to fulfill the ambitions of the fraction which enthroned him.  Iran witnessed multiple rulers in a short span of five years, all equally weak and helpless. ⁴⁵³

Finally came the rule of Yazdegerd III (Yazdekert, Yazkert, son of Kawad, grandson of Khosrow II Parviz.⁴⁵⁴, ⁴⁵⁵  He was a feeble boy of seven years. ⁴⁵⁶

The first casualty of a civil war is the economy.  By the time of the Arab Muslim invasion, Sasanian Iran’s economy had crashed.  The central government was unable to maintain the necessary infrastructure needed for economic activities and wealth generation.  For example, they had failed to repair the breaches in the irrigation system of Swad from where the leaking water had converted fertile lands into marshes.⁴⁵⁷  When Arab Muslims conquered Tyswn they couldn’t believe their eyes.  The famed town was dirty, full of pests, and non-conducive for their living.⁴⁵⁸

Muslim Arabs invade Iran

Immediately after Umar came to power he decided to open a second front.⁴⁵⁹  The army of the Rashidun Caliphate had not yet established a secure base in Syria; even it had not inflicted the backbone-breaking injury on Byzantine Rome in the Battle of Yarmouk when troops of the Rashidun Caliphate crossed the Euphrates over a bridge opposite Hira to invade Sasanian Iran in November of 634 CE. ⁴⁶⁰, ⁴⁶¹

Umar had been observing the contracting influence of Sasanian Iran in world affairs over the last couple of years after the murder of Khosrow II Parviz. He was aware of the civil war in Iran which had crippled its economy and government machinery.  He had noted incoherent efforts on the Sasanian side, if any, to repulse the troops of Khalid bin Walid during his conquest of Iraq.  However, he dangerously underestimated the defences of Sasanian Iran when he raised a small army of one thousand men in Medina and ordered it to march towards Iran under the command of the relatively unknown figure of Abu Ubaid bin Mas’ud (Abu ‘Ubaid bin Mas’ūd اَبُو عُبَيد بِن مَسعُود ) of Thaqif tribe.⁴⁶²  Though Umar ordered Muthanna, already ruling Hira in Umar’s name, to join Abu Ubaid with his men, and according to Baladhuri, Abu Ubaid gathered many tribesmen on his way to Iraq, the number of this army is still estimated to be small.⁴⁶³

Again, the motive of the army was holy war and plunder, as far as Baladhuri knows.⁴⁶⁴

Initially, this army of Abu Ubaid had a few clashes with Sasanian Iran’s border guards in Iraq.⁴⁶⁵ Queen Buran, daughter of Qubad II, was sitting on the Iranian throne by that time.⁴⁶⁶  Generals Rustam and Firuzan (Fīruzān فِيرُوزان) were actual custodians of the affairs of the monarchy.⁴⁶⁷  Ya’qubi blames both of them for being weak and incompetent.⁴⁶⁸, ⁴⁶⁹

‘On hearing that the Arabs were massing their forces, the Iranians sent General Rustam Mardanshah (Mardānshah مَردان شاه) as head of four thousand men, armed from head to toe and supported with elephants’.⁴⁷⁰, ⁴⁷¹  (What a camel is to a lorry and a horse is to an armoured car in modern warfare, an elephant is to a tank.). The Iranian army cut the Rashidun Caliphate’s army to pieces in a few hours. Abu Ubaid was slain on the battlefield.⁴⁷²  Survivors fled for their lives.  Muthanna was one of the survivors, who escaped to Ullais from where he relayed the news to Umar.⁴⁷³

This Battle of Jisr, (معركة الجسر) which is also called the Battle of Quss and Battle of Natif (Nāṭif ناطِف), is not mentioned by any non-Muslim source.⁴⁷⁴  Muslim sources blame multiple factors for the defeat including the havoc of elephants, a difference of opinion among Muslims before the battle, the inexperience of Abu Ubaid etc. but none makes Umar responsible for it.

Umar reorganizes the affairs

The debacle was a surprise to the Rashidun Caliphate at a time when they had gotten used to the news of victory.  All of Umar’s plans for Sasanian Iran stood still for at least one year.⁴⁷⁵ The Arabs got reluctant to wrangle with Iran.⁴⁷⁶  Umar’s main dilemma was how to raise a strong army to bring Iran to its knees.  Almost all able-bodied men from loyal tribes had already been recruited in the army that was busy in Syria.  That was the main reason Umar had sent a miniature army of one thousand men to the Battle of Jisr.  Umar had to extend the olive branch to hostile tribes who had fought the Rashidun Caliphate during the Ridda Wars. Umar had already started working in this direction. One of the first steps Umar took after coming to power was returning the captives of the defeated tribes of the Ridda Wars, whom Abu Bakr had kept as hostages to guarantee their tribe’s good behaviour.⁴⁷⁷, ⁴⁷⁸

Despite odds, Umar did not lose hope of subjugating Iran.  He remained confident in his analysis of Iran’s frailty.  The news of the Byzantine Roman defeat at Yarmouk in August of 636 CE would have boosted morale of the Arabs.  Umar could re-negotiate the remuneration of the military that would attack Iran.  Jarir bin Abdullah (Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah جَرِير بِن عَبدُ اللّه ) of the Bajila tribe asked for one-fourth of the booty in case he and his men participate in the war.  Umar agreed.⁴⁷⁹, ⁴⁸⁰ The Rashidun Caliphate had not yet packed up the recruitment camp which it had established in the vicinity of Medina before the attack on Syria.  Arabs still flocked to this camp from far and near and the caliph used to dispatch them to the war sector of his choice.  This time, when a body of Azd came with intent to invade Syria, Umar could redirect them to Iran arousing their interest in the spoils to be taken from the Kisra family.⁴⁸¹  They accepted the orders hesitantly as Umar left only one option for them.⁴⁸², ⁴⁸³

Umar ordered his governor of Basrah Abu Musa Ash’ari to send reinforcement and he sent eight hundred men.⁴⁸⁴, ⁴⁸⁵  Umar also wrote to Abu Ubayda bin Jarrah in Syria to send reinforcements.  He sent Qays bin Hubairah al Makshuh of the Murad tribe with seven hundred men.⁴⁸⁶, ⁴⁸⁷  Lately, Ghatafan, Asad, Tamim, Bakr bin Wa’il, Quda’a, Tayy and Abdul Qays all joined the military.⁴⁸⁸, ⁴⁸⁹, ⁴⁹⁰

Umar definitely had a tough time choosing a commander of this army.  It was Umar’s stated policy not to appoint a Bedouin over sedentary people.⁴⁹¹  He had already demoted Khalid bin Walid.  He wouldn’t appoint Muthanna as it was not Umar’s policy to appoint a non-Companion of the Prophet over men who had accepted Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet.  Probably, he also mistrusted non-Quraysh.  The only time he had appointed a non-Quraysh so far was Abu Ubaid.  And that was a small army of one thousand mainly comprising Abu Ubaid’s own tribe – Thaqif.  Ali flatly refused to take the challenge.⁴⁹²  At one stage Umar himself desired to lead the campaign but changed his mind on the advice of Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib.⁴⁹³  At the long last Umar picked Sa’d bin Waqqas (Sa’d bin Abī Waqqāṣ       سَعد بِن اَبى وَقّاص  ) of the Zahrah clan of Quraysh, one of the earliest converts to Islam.⁴⁹⁴

Not much is known about Iranian affairs during the time period between the Battle of Jisr and the Battle of Qadisiyyah.  Most likely they buried their head in the sand after the victory of the Battle of Jisr.   Their infighting was far from over.⁴⁹⁵  Iranian Shahanshah remained as powerful as the king is in the game of chess.  Coups and counter-coups continued.  At long last, they discarded Queen Buran to give the throne to Yazdegerd III.  Tabari gives the date of this incident as January of 635 CE.⁴⁹⁶  Umar noticed this event tensely.  He suspected Iranians might have taken the first step towards national reconciliation.⁴⁹⁷

Yazdegerd might have brought little positive change. ⁴⁹⁸   Baladhuri mentions at least one Iranian attempt to dislodge Muslim Arabs from Iraq during this phase when the Rashidun Caliphate army was camping at Diār Hind, near Hira.⁴⁹⁹  The attempt ensued in July 636 CE.⁵⁰⁰  The Iranians sent Mihrān bin Mihribundādh, a resident of Hamedan at the head of twelve thousand men.⁵⁰¹  They assaulted the Muslim army after crossing the bridge but got repulsed.⁵⁰², ⁵⁰³

Battle of Qadisiyyah

Epoch-making wars are fought and won or lost long before the actual battlefield.  The battle is merely a drop scene of an epic drama played by both sides in the fields of economy, trade, culture, political organization, military preparedness and so on and so forth.  The war that Muslim Arabs and Sasanian Iranians fought at the small village of Qadisiyyah (Qādisiyyah قادِسيَه ), located on the west bank of the Euphrates, was a short one that was finished in less than a week. ⁵⁰⁴, ⁵⁰⁵  The aftereffects of the battle shaped the political history of Asia for centuries to come. The battle of Qadisiyyah took place in January 638 CE. ⁵⁰⁶

The flat area of Sasanian Iran located between the lower reaches of the Euphrates and the Zagros Mountains and separated from Byzantine Rome by the boundary between two countries at Khābūr River is called Swad (Swād سواد ) by Islamic sources.  This very fertile plane made up of alluvial gravel and irrigated by a network of canals, was a grain basket for Sasanian Iran.⁵⁰⁷  Moreover, it accommodated the most important city of Iran, its capital, Tysfwn. ⁵⁰⁸  Majority population of Swad was ethnic Persian and believed in the Zoroastrian religion.

Despite their defeat in the Battle of Jisr, Muslim Arabs continued to raid the regions of Swad between Kaskar in the east and ‘Ain at Tamr in the west from their bases in Iraq. ⁵¹⁰, ⁵¹¹

According to Baladhuri, by this time the Persians had become emaciated and weak and feeble in Power. ⁵¹²  Anyhow, they could no longer ignore the fact that the enemy was knocking at their door.  They raised an intimidating army of twenty thousand men, supported by thirty elephants. ⁵¹³ The army unfurled Derafsh Kaviani (Dirafsh Kābiyān), the royal banner of Sasanian Iran, meaning the common soldier got inspiration from nationalist sentiments. ⁵¹⁴, ⁵¹⁵  They took an oath to defend their motherland until they die in the shadow of that banner. ⁵¹⁶  The supreme commander of this gargantuan army was none other than Rustam.⁵¹⁷  He ordered the army to camp on the eastern bank of the Euphrates opposite Hira while he devised a strategy.⁵¹⁸

The army of the Rashidun Caliphate, which is reported to number between nine and ten thousand, lay camped on the western bank of the Euphrates near Qadisiyyah. ⁵¹⁹, ⁵²⁰  The two armies kept staring at each other for four months, assessing each other’s strengths and weaknesses, examining each other’s patience and guts and negotiating last-ditch peace accords. ⁵²¹, ⁵²²  Rustam offered monetary compensation for Arab withdrawal from the war.  Muslims remained obdurate that they were fighting for faith and not for worldly gains.  They insisted on their classical demands: conversion, tribute or war.⁵²³  Rashidun Caliphate utilized this time to transport all the troops from Arabia that were supposed to join their side.⁵²⁴  They established a line of ration supply from Medina.⁵²⁵

The war lasted for four days. ⁵²⁶  Rustam was slain on the battlefield. ⁵²⁷  No doubt he fought bravely.  According to Baladhuri, his body was found covered with so many blows and stabs that it was impossible to establish the fatal wound at his autopsy. ⁵²⁸  He left a legacy as a martyr in Iranian historical memory. ⁵²⁹  He is the main character of the epic Iranian story of Rustam-o-Sohrāb. ⁵³⁰

The Iranian forces didn’t perish at Qadisiyyah contrary to the Roman force at Yarmouk.  They fled. ⁵³¹  Actually, the Muslim strategy to fight against an army twelve times bigger than theirs was to target the leaders and dishearten the common soldiers.⁵³²

Aftermath of Qadisiyyah

Qadisiyyah was a decisive battle according to Islamic sources.⁵³⁴  It is true that immediately after Qadisiyyah, Sasanian Iran did not fall into the Arab’s cloak the way a fully ripe fruit falls off the tree after a little jolt to its branch. The Arabs took a hefty twenty years, full of wars, to conquer all the areas that once belonged to Sasanian Iran.  But it is also true that after Qadisiyyah all the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t put Sasan together again.  Qadisiyyah boosted the confidence of Arab Muslims, ‘Yes, they can do it!’, and it delivered a fatal blow to Iranian’s confidence to defend their country.  It proved to be a turning point from where the millennia-old locally developed Iranian civilization gave way to Arab Islamic civilization.

Iranians were left with no means to protect their Swad and its towns.  Muslim Arabs started occupying them one by one. ⁵³⁵

When the city of Bahurasir (Bahurasīr بَهُورَسِير) surrendered after a short-lived resistance of its guards, Sasanians could calculate that Muslims would target Tysfwn which was across Tigris, just opposite Bahurasir.⁵³⁶, ⁵³⁷  Sasanians withdrew all the ships and ferry boats in the River Tigris to its eastern bank and burned its bridge to halt Muslim advance.⁵³⁸  Sa’d ordered a few soldiers to swim across the river and to ride through it on horseback while Iranian guards were showering arrows on them.⁵³⁹  When they landed on the other side, the Iranians fled screaming, ‘The genies have come!” (ديو).⁵⁴⁰

Reaching the other bank of the river they compelled owners of ships anchored at the village of Ṣaiyādin, to transport baggage of the Muslim army.⁵⁴¹  When Shahanshah Yazdegerd observed the dire situation, he resolved to flee to Hulwan (Ḥulwān حُلوَان) along with the principal dignitaries of his kingdom, carrying with him the treasury of the kingdom and his precious but light (khiff) pieces of furniture, private treasury, wives and children. He was suspended in a basket from the wall of his White Palace (Qaṣr ul  Abyaḍ قَصَرُ الاَ بيَض ) in Tysfwn to facilitate escape hurriedly.⁵⁴², ⁵⁴³ The Muslims, after crossing the River Tigris, took possession of Tysfwn. ⁵⁴⁴, ⁵⁴⁵

Structure and capabilities of the military of the Rashidun Caliphate. 

How come Arab Muslims could defeat the professionally trained militaries of first Byzantine Rome and then Sasanian Iran? Two points need consideration.  One, military training was not exhaustive for the soldiers of superpowers. Theophanes gives us a glimpse of training levels.  In 622 CE, during his campaign against Sasanian Iran, Heraclius halted at the Pass in the Taurus Mountains [Gates]. There he recruited new army men and trained them in the art of war.  Theophanes describes that ‘He [Heraclius] divided his army into two battle lines and ordered them to engage each other without bloodshed. He taught them to maintain warlike cries, shouts, and paeans so that in the battle they would not be caught by surprise, but would take courage and march against their foes as into a game.  At a later date, he again formed two armed lines of battle.  The men stood in their armour; there were trumpet calls and phalanxes of shields.  After the regiments were well organized, he ordered them to engage each other: there were violent struggles and conflicts between them, and the appearance of warfare. It was like seeing the horrible, fearful spectacle without its danger, or men converging for murder without bloodshed, or the methods of force before force itself.  Thus each man got a start from this dangerless slaughter and was more secure thereafter’.⁵⁴⁶  This was the total military training for his soldiers before they practically participated in a war.

Two, the Arabs had experience serving in the imperial forces of Sasanian Iran and Byzantine Rome during the fifth and sixth centuries CE.  They had gained skills of military warfare and the use of military hardware.⁵⁴⁷  The main military equipment used in combat were the lancet, the arrow, the shield, the coat of mail and the sword. ⁵⁴⁸  All these types of equipment are well documented being used by pre-Islamic Arabs during their tribal warfare.

Battle of Jalula

Muslims had hardly spent a few days in occupation of Tysfwn when they received intelligence that Yazdegerd had amassed a large army at Jalula (Jalūlā’ جَلُولاء ).  This army was still getting reinforcements from all over including Hulwan and Jibal (Jibāl جِبال ).⁵⁴⁹, ⁵⁵⁰

Muslims decided preemptive strikes before reinforcements make them bigger.  Sa’d sent twelve thousand men under the command of his nephew Hisham bin Utba (Hishām bin ‘Utbah هِشام بِن عُتبَه).⁵⁵¹, ⁵⁵²  The Persians were led by Khurrazad (Khurrazād خُرَّزاد), brother of Rustam.  They had left their families and heavy luggage at Khaniqin (Khāniqin خانِقِين) and had pledged not to flee.  They had dug trenches and had thus fortified themselves.  The battle was fierce.  Muslims drove Persians out of their positions and compelled them to flee.  Then Muslims pursued them until darkness prevailed.⁵⁵³, ⁵⁵⁴

The battle of Jalula proved to be the Yarmouk of Iran.  Almost the whole Sasanian army was routed in the battle.⁵⁵⁵  Baladhuri assigns January of 638 CE to this battle, meaning the battle of Qadisiyyah, the surrender of Tyswn and the battle of Jalula were in quick succession.⁵⁵⁶

Muslims hurriedly occupied the remaining cities and towns of Swad.⁵⁵⁷  Though the Iranians were in the midst of civil war when Muslim Arabs invaded them, it appears that the general population was still loyal to their king and the state.  Arabs did not find any unsatisfied groups of the population in Swad as they had found in Syria or Egypt.  They had to resort to violence to subdue the population.  Anecdotal stories of the execution of a dihqan (dihqān دِهقان) on charges of treachery have survived to this date.⁵⁵⁸  It means the population over which Arabs were going to govern was hostile to them.⁵⁵⁹  The Christian minority of Sasanian Iran played neutral.  They were happy about the Arab conquest as they saw an opportunity for relief from Zoroastrian tyranny.  However, they did not welcome the invaders with open arms, nor co-operated with them.  They assumed wait and see posture.

Sa’d made Hira the administrative capital of the newly acquired territories of the Rashidun Caliphate, dumping the centuries-old capital of Tysfwn. ⁵⁶⁰

Once power consolidated over Swad, Sa’d ordered Jarir bin Abdullah to advance to Hulwan with three thousand men.⁵⁶¹, ⁵⁶²  The force capitulated Hulwan without any resistance.⁵⁶³

When Shahanshah Yazdegerd heard of the approaching Muslim army to Hulwan he slipped off to Isfahan (Iṣbaphān اِصبَفان).⁵⁶⁴, ⁵⁶⁵, ⁵⁶⁶  It was the starting point of Yazdegerd’s long and arduous journey of internal self-exile, which ultimately culminated in his assassination in 652 CE in Merv.⁵⁶⁷, ⁵⁶⁸, ⁵⁶⁹, ⁵⁷⁰            

Now, Jarir attempted on Dinavar (Dīnavar  دِينوَر ) with failure, though he could capitulate Qarsasin (Qarsāsīn قَرساسيِن).⁵⁷¹, ⁵⁷²

Mass reshuffling of the population continues

Generally, Futuhul Buldan was an era of mass displacement in the Middle East.  The people who did not wish to be subjects of the Rashidun Caliphate fled from the freshly occupied areas of Sasanian Iran on the pattern of areas snatched from Byzantine Rome.⁵⁷³  We don’t know where they fled to.  There is no evidence that the Iranians fled to Byzantine territories during the Muslim invasion.⁵⁷⁴  Apparently they fled to the areas still under Iranian control.

Similarly, Arabs continued to abandon their homeland and settle on lands evacuated by fleeing refugees.⁵⁷⁵

Not only this, but people from conquered regions also immigrated to cantonment towns, designed by the Rashidun Caliphate to lodge its forces, for better prospects of jobs.  People of Banu ‘Ami, the local Tamim of Khuzestan left their usual dwelling place and started living in Basrah after the first invasion of Khuzestan.⁵⁷⁶  As the circle of conquest enlarged so did the breadth of such reshuffling.

Re-conquest of Iraqi towns

Ya’qubi asserts that just before the battle of Qadisiyyah, Sa’d had to send Utba bin Ghazwan (‘Utbah bin Ghazwān عُتبَه بِن غَزوان ) to conquer Ubullah, Maysan (Maysān مَيسان), and Abarqubadh (Abarqubādh اَبَرقُباذ). ⁵⁷⁷, ⁵⁷⁸, ⁵⁷⁹  Khalid had already conquered this area in the summer of 633 CE and had left Suwaid bin Qutba to rule over Ubullah and its surroundings.  Our sources do not disclose what happened here between the summer of 633 CE and the fall of 637 CE.  Why the Rashidun Caliphate had to re-conquer the area after almost four years is a mystery.  Anyhow, according to Tabari the fight for re-conquering Ubullah was trivial.  The five hundred-strong Sasanian cavalry fled from the town leaving fifteen dead. ⁵⁸⁰  At the same time Umar designated Ubullah as a separate administrative unit with Utba bin Ghazwan its governor.⁵⁸¹

Founding of cantonment towns

The exact reason for the founding of cantonment towns (sin. miṣr pl. amṣār) and lodging of military men along with their families in these towns is not known.  Islamic sources give vague explanations.  For example, Tysfwn was not conducive to the health of Arabs.⁵⁸²  This reason is flawed because a horde of civilian Arabs virtually started living in occupied towns by the time cantonment towns were built, without any ill effect on their health.  Actually, Utba bin Ghazwan had already laid the foundation of the first town of this nature, Basrah, in 637 CE before the horrors of the plague of Amwas in 639 CE.⁵⁸³, ⁵⁸⁴  Spending precious tax money on building new houses at a time when it was needed for many other important projects, including financing of wars, should have a pressing reason.  One explanation could be better administration of the military, as we know troops belonging to different tribes were allotted specific neighbourhoods and their remunerations were paid to the chief of that tribe who was responsible for its distribution among members of his tribe. ⁵⁸⁵   Another possible explanation could be a need to isolate Arab elites from local subject populations so they could not exploit the miseries of subjects.⁵⁸⁶  Further, one can speculate that Umar didn’t want the army to scatter in the never-ending lands of the conquered nations, start agriculture or do some other kind of business.⁵⁸⁷  Arab soldiers had started settling in the conquered lands and had started doing business ventures there before the founding of cantonment towns.⁵⁸⁸

Whatever the reason for founding the cities, it is known that the inhabitants of these cities played a significant role in the First Arab Civil War.  Later on, these cities prospered beyond imagination and became metropolitan centers of Islamic civilization. ⁵⁸⁹

Details of the founding of Kufa in 638 CE by Sa’d bin Waqqas are well preserved and give an interesting insight into the sophisticated administrative capabilities of Arab Muslims.⁵⁹⁰

Professional town planners served to build it.  First of all, they chose a proper site with due deliberation.  Then, they built downtown with a grand mosque and governor’s house as its central feature.  All neighbourhoods and public services, like mosques for the neighbourhoods and marketplaces, got special attention.  They didn’t forget to design hostel accommodations for officers of central government and other provincial governments visiting the town for official assignments.  The importance of founding cantonment towns is evident from the fact that each and every aspect of planning and building needed approval from the provincial government and then the central government.⁵⁹¹

Military operating in Syria did not have the luxury of any cantonment town.  The reason is not known.  Rashidun Caliphate accommodated its soldiers in Homs in the houses evacuated by the fleeing inhabitants of Syria, initially, after victory.⁵⁹²  Probably, later, due to the epidemic of plague the Rashidun Caliphate had to spread them in many different towns.

Apparently, the founding of the cantonment towns proved to be counterproductive.  Political analysts of later generations had no doubt about it.  Uthman bin Hayyan (‘Uthmān bin Ḥayyān عُثمان بِن حَيَّان), Walid bin Abdul Malik’s governor over Medina in 713 CE, stated that Umar bin Khattab made garrisons thinking it was good for his subjects who want to make holy war.  He used to say that “Syria is dearer to me than Iraq.  Iraq is an incurable disease.  And they have made things difficult for me.”  Umar thought of scattering them in different territories but abstained from doing this because he was afraid that they would corrupt the other people as well by their arguments of how and why. ⁵⁹³

One possible explanation for political stability in Syria and political instability in Iraq during the latter half of the Rashidun Caliphate could be the absence of any cantonment town in the former and the presence of two such towns in the latter.

Creation of military districts

Later on, in 641 CE, Umar made further changes in the military organization of the country.  He divided the whole country into military districts (amṣār pleural of miṣr).⁵⁹⁴, ⁵⁹⁵  By doing this Umar could fix the responsibility of one specific region on one particular division.  According to Ya’qubi, the military districts, so created, were seven: Medina, Syria, Jazira, Kufa, Basrah [there is a missing lacuna in Ya’qubi’s original text here.  The editor guesses that he might have written Fustat and probably Yamama or Bahrain or Yemen at this lacuna].⁵⁹⁶  At the same time Umar established border military districts (Ajnād, pleural of Jund) on actively hot borders.  He made each of Palestine, Jazira, Mosul, and Qinnasrin a border military district.⁵⁹⁷  In practice all border military districts faced Byzantine Rome.⁵⁹⁸

A new class emerges

As cantonments got well established and the military further organized, a new class emerged in the Rashidun Caliphate.  Tabari calls them ashrāf.  (sin. sharīf, pl. ashrāf).  Ashraf were the tribal leaders responsible for military and civilian discipline of their respective tribes.  Contrary to Arab traditions of Jahilyyah, they were not tipped by their fellow tribesmen to be a sheykh.  They were appointed by the government.  They were a kind of middleman between the masses of a tribe and the government.  Along with dihqan, their non-Muslim counterparts, they were destined to be the administrative skeleton of the caliphate.⁵⁹⁹

Servitude of Khuzestan

The constitution of Sasanian Iran allowed the existence of petty kings, sometimes called shah.⁶⁰⁰  They retained extensive power over the territories they governed, including the right to maintain their own army.  Actually, the central ruler was a sovereign over the shahs, hence called shahanshah – the king of kings.  The shahs were appointed by the shahanshah but the office was hereditary in the sense that the shahanshah had to pick one member of the same family.  Many Parthian, Medean and Armenian families are known to hold the title of shah for generations.  Tabari knew seven such families.⁶⁰¹  By the time of the Arab invasion, three decades of warfare and civil war had already loosened the ties between shahs and the shahanshah.

With Yazdegerd on the run and the economic powerhouse of Swad in Arab hands, Sasanian Iran ceased to function as an integral entity.  The local chiefs and nobles of Iran, unnerved by the Arab success, began to negotiate separate agreements with the conquerors that would preserve as much of their authority and wealth as possible.⁶⁰²

The first case of its class comes from Khuzestan (Khūzestān خُوزِستان).⁶⁰³   The Shah of Khuzestan was an ethnic Media, scion of the Mihran (Mihrān مِهران) family by the name of Hurmuzan (Hurmuzān هُرمُزان).⁶⁰⁴  Anonymous Nestorian priest, the writer of the Chronicle of Khuzestan, tells that Hurmuzan had to defend his towns with the help of his own troops.  He had the blessing of King Yazdegerd but no help came from him or from any other Iranian noble. ⁶⁰⁵

The piece of flat land between the common course of the Euphrates and the Tigris and the Zagros Mountains accommodated the Sasanian province of Khuzestan.  At its heart was the mighty Karun River, which begins in the Zagros mountains and empties in the Persian Gulf right next to the River Tigris. ⁶⁰⁶  The Sasanians had invested much money and labour in the region, restoring and building canals to increase agricultural yields, in particular cereals, sugarcane, and rice.⁶⁰⁷

Rashidun Caliphate decided to open a second front in 638 CE against Sasanian Iran after the triumph of Qadisiyyah and the failure of further progress in Dinavar across the Zagros Mountains.⁶⁰⁸  The soldiers of the Rashidun Caliphate that crossed the Iraq-Khuzestan border were drawn from the divisions of Kufa and Basrah. The local Arab tribes, residents of Khuzestan, joined them en masse as they entered Khuzestan. ⁶⁰⁹, ⁶¹⁰, ⁶¹¹

Hurmuzan’s troops could not cope with the blitz and Rashidun Caliphate gained the territory up to the River Karun without any difficulty.  Hurmuzan hurriedly agreed to accept the river as a new boundary between his territory and Rashidun Caliphate.  Part of the peace deal reached between Hurmuzan and Utba bin Ghazwan, governor of Basrah, was the yearly payment of a certain amount to the Rashidun Caliphate.  ⁶¹² Hurmuzan’s main purpose for this embarrassing deal was to buy time.

Hurmuzan used the time to recruit the Kurds, swelling the number of his soldiers.  As soon as he felt confident, he withheld the yearly payments and brought his forces close to the border with the Rashidun Caliphate.⁶¹³  The Muslim party crossed the Karun River over a bridge located at Suq Ahvaz (Sūq Ahvāz سُوق اهواز) and defeated the forces of Hurmuzan in their own territory.⁶¹⁴, ⁶¹⁵

Hurmuzan again wished for peace. The Rashidun Caliphate gave him tougher conditions than before.  The caliphate made him agree to pay annual tributes.  In addition, the caliphate compelled him to give access to inspectors of the Rashidun Caliphate at Ramhurmuz (Rāmhurmuz رامهُرمُز), Tustar, Sus (Sūs سُوس), Jundaysabur (Jundaysābūr جُندَيسابُور),  Bunyan (Bunyān بُنيان) and Mihrijan Qadhaq (Mihrijān Qadhaq مِهرِجان قَذَق)  to monitor tax collection.  In return, the Rashidun Caliphate took the responsibility to protect Hurmuzan-held Khuzestan from any potential raids by Kurd tribes from Fars (Fārs فارس ).⁶¹⁶, ⁶¹⁷

The Rashidun Caliphate wishes for a boundary

By this time Rashidun Caliphate was in full control of Syria and Swad.  Umar felt that the Muslim Arabs had got enough land and money to lead their lives comfortably.  He didn’t want to risk further lives and energy to conquer the rest of Sasanian Iran.  He determined that the natural barrier of the Zagros mountains between the Rashidun Caliphate and Sasanian Iran would serve as the new boundary.⁶¹⁸  Both sides didn’t open any negotiations to formalize the boundary, though.

Third sector against Iran

In addition to the two sectors, mentioned above, through which the Rashidun Caliphate had invaded Sasanian Iran, actually, there was a third sector as well.  It was between Bahrain and Fars across the Persian Gulf. ⁶¹⁹  Contemporary source Sebeos informs us that the sector became active at the time when “[the Arabs] had militarily routed both kingdoms, seizing from Egypt to the Taurus Mountains, from the Western Sea to Media and Khuzestan”.⁶²⁰  Tabari assigns this hostility to 638 CE.⁶²¹

“Then the [Arab] King gave the order to assemble boats and many sailors and to navigate southwardly, going east to Pars, to Sagastan, to Sind, to Srman, to the land of Turan and to Makuran as far as the borders of India.  The troops swiftly prepared and implemented the command.  They burned every country, taking loot and booty.  They then turned and made expeditions on the waves of the sea, and reached their own places,” says Sebeos on the authority of men who had returned from captivity in Khuzestan and who themselves had been eye-witnesses to the events.⁶²²  Tabari renders these events a low profile.  He discloses that when Sa’d became a hero of the Rashidun Caliphate after his victories against Sasanian Iran, A’la bin Haradhrami, Umar’s governor of Bahrain got envious of him.⁶²³  He mobilized his Abdul Qays tribe into Fars by ships across the Persian Gulf without prior approval from Umar.⁶²⁴  Tabari’s account of the campaign gives the impression that Fars didn’t have any central figure to organize resistance to the attack.  The people of Fars had to arrange self-defence groups to tackle the danger.⁶²⁵ They quickly cut the Muslim intruders off their ships and blocked the road to Basrah so they could not fight their way out.  All the Arab leaders of this campaign got killed one by one.⁶²⁶  A furious Umar, on receiving the news, censured A’la.  He put A’la’s function under the supervision of Sa’d bin Waqqas and ordered the governor over Basrah, Utba bin Ghazwan, to send a reinforcement to rescue the trapped soldiers.⁶²⁷, ⁶²⁸  Utba sent an intimidating force of twelve thousand men, led by Abu Sabrah bin Abi Ruhm of ‘Amir bin Lu’ayy clan of Quraysh.⁶²⁹  The army was too big for the disorganized resistance in Fars to handle.  They travelled along the coastal road smoothly and escorted the cornered soldiers of A’la back to Basrah from where they dispersed to their hometowns.⁶³⁰  This Basran division was under strict orders not to occupy a single inch of Sasanian territory.⁶³¹  However, they left some detachments in Hurmuzan-controlled Khuzestan as a security measure.⁶³²

Hurmuzan captured and eliminated

The ethnic Persians living in Khuzestan were not very happy with the situation. Hurmuzan remained hopeful of regaining his lost territory, wealth and authority.  People of Persian descent from Fars and Jibal promised to join him in his endeavours through correspondence.  The rumours of these developments reached the ears of commanders of detachments stationed in Hurmuzan-controlled Khuzestan.  Umar decided to get rid of Hurmuzan once and for all.  He organized an army from the military divisions of Kufa and Basrah and put it under the command of Abu Sabrah Bin Abi Ruhm.⁶³³  Once the campaign started Umar ordered his governor of Basrah, Abu Musa Ash’ari, who was appointed after the dismissal of Mughira bin Shu’ba (Mughīrah bin Shu’bah مُغِيرَه بِن شُعبَه ), to join the campaign personally.⁶³⁴  The army of the Rashidun Caliphate captured Ramhurmuz, Jundaysabur, and Karka d’Ledan without much resistance.⁶³⁵, ⁶³⁶, ⁶³⁷

Hurmuzan, however, could muster troops and hold two key cities in the mountains, Sus and Tustar.⁶³⁸  He opened negotiations as a delaying tactic.  Diplomacy lasted for two years.  Finally, when his hopes were dashed, he killed the Arab ambassadors to signal all-out war.  Arabs overpowered him quickly.⁶³⁹, ⁶⁴⁰  The drop scene of this drama was in 641 CE.⁶⁴¹  Hurmuzan let himself be captured on the condition that only Umar would decide his fate.⁶⁴²  Umar gave him a choice between death and accepting Islam. He chose the latter.⁶⁴³, ⁶⁴⁴  Umar allowed Hurmuzan to settle in Medina where he became an advisor to Umar on Iran affairs.⁶⁴⁵

Umar changes his policy toward Iran

The rebellion of the people of Khuzestan and the difficulty with which it could be suppressed challenged Umar’s political acumen.  He was highly suspicious that the Arabs of Iraq might have committed atrocities on the Persians of Khuzestan and later on might have covered up their crimes.  The enquiry commission Umar set up to investigate the causes of the rebellion reported to Umar that the Arabs of Iraq had honoured the peace deals with the people of Khuzestan in words and spirit.  The people of Khuzestan were still politically attached to the Shahanshah who kept instigating them for rebellion.  Ahnaf bin Qays (Ahnaf bin Qays احنَف بِن قَيس ) of the Tamim tribe, a Sharif of Basrah and a member of the enquiry commission, could convince Umar that the Rashidun Caliphate couldn’t expect pacification of its subjects of Persian ethnicity until Yazdegerd was alive.⁶⁴⁶, ⁶⁴⁷  Umar comprehended that the war against Sasanian Iran was far from over.

Battle of Nahavand

The year of 642 CE bore the burden of another doughty battle between the waning power of Sasanian Iran and the emerging power of the Rashidun Caliphate.⁶⁴⁸  The people of Iran had not stomached the fact that Iran had lost Swad and Khuzestan.  Different shahs of remaining parts of Iran under nominal Sasanian rule might be sharing these sentiments with common people.  Shahanshah Yazdegerd might be anxious to regain his lost territory, prestige and wealth.  Moreover, neither of the sides had opened negotiations for the cessation of hostilities and mutual recognition of new borders.  The presence of the Zagros Mountains was the only hurdle preventing the two sides from clashing.  The Iranians might be assuming, quite logically, that the Arabs would attempt on the Iranian plateau after consolidating their power over the newly conquered areas.⁶⁴⁹

The Iranian plateau that extends from the Zagros Mountains in the west and the Elburz Mountains and the Kopet Dag Mountains in the north to almost the Persian Gulf in the south was a rich agricultural land with the exception of two separate deserts, Dasht – e – Lot on its eastern fringes and Dasht – e – Kavir on its northern fringes. The Arabs must have got all reasons to overrun it at a convenient time and Iran’s noble’s fears were not totally unfounded.  They were busy communicating with each other and organizing themselves to face the possible Arab attack.⁶⁵¹  “Our land has been wrested from us,” they said, “And we have been humiliated in our own homeland,” tells Ya’qubi. ⁶⁵²  The whole of Sasanian Iran shared the feelings.  Ethnic Persians, including the people of Azerbaijan, Jibal, Masabadhan, Rayy, Tabaristan, Jurjan, Damavand, Qumis, Khorasan, Sistan, Fars, Isfahan, Hamedan, the two Medias, unified at the behest of Yazdegerd. They raised an army of sixty thousand to a hundred thousand men (all imbibed with nationalistic sentiments) with Dirafsh Kābiyān unfurled over them.  Yazdegerd appointed Mardanshah Dhul Hajib (Mardānshāh dhu l Ḥājib مَردان شاه ذُوالحاجِب ) as their commander.⁶⁵³, ⁶⁵⁴, ⁶⁵⁵  Ammar bin Yasir, the newly appointed governor of Kufa, got the intelligence of the military buildup and he relayed it to Umar.⁶⁵⁶  Obviously, Umar got caught in an onerous situation.  This was the time a sizable portion of the Rashidun Caliphate’s army had perished in the great plague in Syria. Amr bin As had tied up a number of battalions for the siege of Alexandria.  Moreover, the Rashidun Caliphate had to keep garrisons in many still not quiescent cities of Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Jazira, Iraq, Khuzestan and Swad.   To make things more complicated, almost all the men whom Umar trusted were already deployed either as commanders or as governors.  Umar had already dismissed Sa’d, his trusted man in Iraq, to replace him with Ammar bin Yasir.  Deliberations started in Medina.

If Umar asks the division of the army in Syria to take the lead in the attack, the meetings in Medina pondered, there was a danger that Byzantine Romans will reoccupy their provinces.  If Umar asks Yemenites to give more recruits, the land might be totally devoid of able-bodied men and the Ethiopians could take advantage.  Hesitantly, he ordered the military division in Kufa to assign two-thirds of the manpower to this campaign and leave the remaining one-third in Kufa to manage the newly acquired territory.⁶⁵⁷  He also ordered the military division at Basrah to contribute to this force.  They sent troops under the command of Abu Musa Ash’ari.⁶⁵⁸, ⁶⁵⁹

Appointing the commander of this force was another headache.  Initially, Umar wished to lead the army personally.  This proposal was rejected on the ground that Arabs might prevail over Nejd and other places.⁶⁶⁰  After all possible considerations, Umar had to abandon his stated policy of not appointing a Bedouin over a Muslim army.  He appointed Nu’man bin Amr (Nu’mān bin ‘Amr نُعمان بِن عَمرؤ ) of the nomadic tribe of Muzainah, a companion of Prophet Muhammad and Umar’s ‘amil of Kaskar, as general of the army.⁶⁶¹, ⁶⁶², ⁶⁶³  Now, Umar had to devise a strategy.  He sought the advice of Hurmuzan if Muslims should attack from the Isfahan sector or from the Azerbaijan sector.  He advised to attack from the Isfahan side. ⁶⁶⁴

The war theatre was the highlands of Nahavand (Nahāvand نَهاوَند ) in the Jibal province of Sasanian Iran.⁶⁶⁵, ⁶⁶⁶  The Iranians had fastened themselves in chains in groups of five and ten, so they might not flee.  The commander of the Muslim army shook the standard three times to signal different positions of the army and the war started.  The ferocious war continued for the next three days.  Commanders of both sides lay dead in combat. The Muslim side carried the day.⁶⁶⁷  Iranian army got routed out completely.⁶⁶⁸

Aftermath of Nahavand

The victory of Nahavand is labelled as ‘the victory of victories’ by Islamic sources. ⁶⁶⁹  It broke the backbone of Sasanian Iran.  Sasanian Iran was permanently disabled and could never deploy a big army against the Rashidun Caliphate after it. ⁶⁷⁰  Military observers can easily analyse that the defeat of Sasanian Iran at Nahavand proves beyond doubt that their earlier defeat at Qadisiyyah was not by mere chance.  Iranians had lost the political organization to defend themselves.

Any of the Sasanian provinces were now open to military pressure from Rashidun Caliphate.  It was Rashidun Caliphate’s choice where to start from.  Yazdegerd lost his capability to correspond with different shahs to organize them in any coherent form to resist Rashidun Caliphate.  Rashidun Caliphate didn’t miss the opportunity to subjugate whole of Jibal province, including Nahavand, Diran (Dīran دِيرَن), Hamedan (Hamadhān هَمَذان), Masabadhan (Māsabadhān مَاسَبَذان), and Sirawan (Sirawān سِرَوان).⁶⁷¹, ⁶⁷²

The Rashidun Caliphate didn’t appoint its own man to govern the newly acquired territories. Instead, they installed a puppet of Persian ethnicity by the name of Dinar (Dīnār دِينار ) as governor.  He was from Sasanian nobility but not from the top strata.  The governing family of Jibal was Qarin (Qārin قارِن ).  Arabs totally neglected it.  Apparently, all Persian petty ruling families maintained their ruling status, but they had to be answerable to Dinar whose main job was to collect tax from all of them and to deliver it to Kufa personally. ⁶⁷³  In this sense Jibal didn’t achieve the status of the full province under Rashidun Caliphate.  It became a ‘provincially administered territory’.  Part of it paid tax to the province of Basrah and part to Kufa.⁶⁷⁴  Our sources are quiet as to why didn’t Arabs appoint their own man as governor over Jibal directly answerable to the central government in Medina.  One can assume that the Iranian military got defeated but the population remained belligerent.  The nobility got weak but remained inflexible.  The appointment of a Persian figurehead was a compromise between the two warring parties. He saved the face of Iranian nationalists and served as a loyal tax collector for Arabs without giving them any headache of management.  Jibal was the first ‘provincially administrated territory’.  Many others were to follow.

The appointment of a Persian figurehead was mainly to appease the Zoroastrians.  For the Christians of Sasanian Iran, it was just a change of masters. ⁶⁷⁵

Shahanshah Yazdegerd had arranged the war from his den in Isfahan.  After the Sasanian defeat of Nahavand, he fled to Istakhr (Iṣṭakhr اِصطَخر). ⁶⁷⁶  Muslim raiding parties tried to pursue him during his flight but to no avail.⁶⁷⁷

Pacification of further Sasanian territories

After the defeat at Nahavand and the installation of a puppet regime in Jibal, the demise of Sasanian Iran was written on the wall.  The only question was when and how. Taming further Sasanian territories was a logical inference for the Rashidun Caliphate from the results of Nahavand.  Iranians anticipated it well.  Umar mobilized all his men, including veterans of Nahavand, the reserves of Nahavand and the soldiers left in Basrah and Kufa into the battlefield.⁶⁷⁸  He divided his army into corps, each under the leadership of a field commander.  Each corp had to fight its way in different directions such as Isfahan, Kirman, Tabaristan or Azerbaijan.  None of the field commanders was a full general. ⁶⁷⁹  Each of them had to fight independently on occasions and on other occasions to support the neighbouring corps under the command of the neighbouring corps’ field commander as the circumstances dictated.⁶⁸⁰  As the proceeding events proved, their goal was not to bring the rest of Sasanian Iran under the direct control of the Rashidun Caliphate.  Neither had they aimed at kicking the ruling petty kings out of power.  Their task was to compel the ruling petty king to change his allegiance from Sasanian Iran to Rashidun Caliphate and to pay annual tribute.  They were not hesitant to replace any petty king who dared to resist with another one who promised obedience.  Anyhow, the advancing troops of the Rashidun Caliphate were not supposed to stick to the guidelines loosely.  They were free to bring any meek population under the direct rule of the Rashidun Caliphate.  As they were going to penetrate into Sasanian Iran as deeply as possible without consolidating the power of the Rashidun Caliphate except by entering into contracts of allegiance with the rulers, Umar had feared.  Umar suspected they might be attacked from the rear and got trapped in far-off places.⁶⁸¹

During the next two years or so these contingents reached all provinces of Sasanian Iran bordering Jibal.  Sources claim that they appointed Arab governors in many of the towns or territories they reached.  Analysis of the hierarchal standing of these ‘governors’ in the Rashidun Caliphate and the function they performed undisguised the true nature of these ‘governors’.  They were simply representatives of the Rashidun Caliphate to liaise with the local rulers who had changed allegiance from Sasanian Iran to the Rashidun Caliphate.  Rashidun Caliphate didn’t prescribe any rate of tax to all of these areas.  They could pay according to their capacity.

Isfahan

Just to the east of Jibal and neighbouring it, in the heart of the Iranian Plateau, was located the Sasanian province of Isfahan with its main town Jayy. ⁶⁸²

The army of the Rashidun Caliphate that had participated in Nahavand, after imposing Dinar over Jibal, took the road connecting Nahavand to Jayy.  The leader of the army was Abdullah bin Budhail (‘Abdallah bin Budhail bin Warqā’  عَبدُ اللّه بِن بُذَيل بِن وَرقاء ) of Khuza’ah who captured the city of Jayy in 644 CE.⁶⁸³ The surrounding smaller towns didn’t consider resisting. ⁶⁸⁴  Abu Musa Ash’ari commanded his levy during this campaign but his role was merely supporting.⁶⁸⁵

Yazdegerd had reached Istakhr by this time.  Abdullah Bin Budhail pursued him after the conquest of Isfahan but to no avail.  Abu Musa came to Istakhr and attempted its conquest but did not succeed, and likewise did Uthman bin Abu As (‘Uthmān bin abu ‘Āṣ عُثمان بِن اَبُو عاص ) of Thaqif from Bahrain. ⁶⁸⁶

Elburz Mountains

Just south of the Caspian Sea, a lofty mountain range stretches from west to east. These Elburz Mountains separate the Iranian plateau from the Caspian Sea.  The difficulty to access them can be guessed from the fact that they are home to the highest peak in the Middle East – Mount Damavand.  The inaccessible mountainous terrain had facilitated the crowding of many kinglets in a comparatively small area.  To the west, between Hamedan and the Caspian Sea was Dastaba.  On the shores of the Caspian, around its southwestern corner used to live Daylam. ⁶⁸⁷  The central part of it was Tabaristan (Ṭabaristān طَبَرِستان ).  On the southern edge of the mountains was the principality of Rayy. ⁶⁸⁸  Towards the eastern end was Jurjan (Jurjān جُرجان). ⁶⁸⁹

The grip of Sasanian Iran over the principalities of the southern border of the Caspian Sea, like Jurjan, Tabaristan etc. was weak.⁶⁹⁰  They were semi-independent.  When Umar ordered his men, who had occupied Hamedan, to take the road leading to the Elburz Mountains, the petty kings of the region were unaware of the true intentions of the army.  They presumed that they would have to fight for their political survival.  The rulers of Daylam, Rayy and Azerbaijan Joined hands to resist the invaders. ⁶⁹¹  Yazdegerd was nowhere to be involved.

The battle between forces of the Rashidun Caliphate and the combined Elburz forces at Waj Rudh (Wāj al-Rūdh واج الرُوذ ) in Daylam was, anyhow, short-lived. ⁶⁹², ⁶⁹³, ⁶⁹⁴  Muta (Mūṭā مُوطا), the overall leader of the Elburz army got killed.  Other petty kings in the army, like Zinabi (Zīnabī زِينَبى  ), started cooperating with the Rashidun Caliphate. ⁶⁹⁵

The Iranian defeat lay all of Elburz Mountains open for the Rashidun Caliphate. Obviously, Daylam was the first to surrender as the war was fought in their area. The King of Rayy tried to resist on his own.  His resistance was crushed by the help of Zinabi who secured its throne for himself and his generations. The Muslims destroyed the city of Rayy to punish the resisting ruler and Zinabi had to rebuild it. ⁶⁹⁶ The rest of the rulers of the region submitted to obedience without resistance.  Some of them, like ruler of Jilan (Jīlān جِيلان), waited for a notice to be served with forces of the Rashidun Caliphate camped outside his enclave.⁶⁹⁷, ⁶⁹⁸  Others, like the ruler of Tabaristan, initiated the process without waiting for the notice and in return got a better deal. The Rashidun Caliphate, for example, guaranteed Tabaristan that its army would never enter its territory. ⁶⁹⁹ The Rulers of Dumbawand (Dumbawand دُمبَوَند) and Qumis (Qūmis قُومِس) set terms of Ṣulḥ without a fight.⁷⁰⁰, ⁷⁰¹, ⁷⁰², ⁷⁰³

Political changes inside the Rashidun Caliphate

The Rashidun Caliphate was not a few thousand soldiers constantly risking their lives in lands unknown to them under the command of their officers.  It was a cosmos of millions of tillers, grazers, miners, slaves, teachers, traders, merchants, housewives, and of course, retirees.  A decade of holy war so far, from the first clashes in Syria in 634 CE to the alignment of Iranian petty kings with the Rashidun Caliphate by 644 CE, completely remodelled the political portrait of the Rashidun Caliphate.  The flow of wealth from the conquered nations to the triumphant, the prestige earned at the expense of the defeated, and the drastic demographic changes everywhere, collectively modulated new political ideologies within Rashidun Caliphate.  The changes in the political thinking of people were gradual and parallel with military achievements.  Each change surfaced at a specific time during Futuhul Buldan and became pervasive.  Now, we have to pause our narrative of Futuhul Buldan for a while and attend to the political changes that had crept into Rashidun Caliphate.

Caliph at odds with the military

Despite the smooth progression of Futuhul Buldan, there was a disagreement between the caliph and the military.  From the very beginning, the approach of some portions of the military towards the spoils of war contrasted with that of the caliph.  Apparently, the caliph did not express his intentions explicitly until he started getting favourable results from the war, and sections of the military did not ask for concrete commitments from the caliph at the time of their recruitment.  Soon after the first conquests, the differences between the caliph and certain quarters of the military sprang up.  Soldiers expected all booty, including the movable and immovable property of the defeated, to be distributed among them as their remuneration, after excluding the twenty percent dues of the central government.    The caliph disagreed.  He allowed only movable property of the defeated to be disbursed among soldiers after excluding twenty percent dues of the central government.  He had other plans for the immovable property.

After the triumph of Jalula, the soldiers wanted land to be considered part of booty as they were acquired as a result of war and not by means of any treaty. Umar wrote to Sa’d to “divide the spoils of the war among the troops on horses and camels after taking out the usual fifth.  And let the lands and cattle in the hands of those who work with them so that they might be used for stipends (‘āta عَطاء ) of the Muslims.  If thou divide everything among the troops nothing will be left for those who come after them”.⁷⁰⁴, ⁷⁰⁵  Hence “Umar left lands of Swad for those who were still in men’s loins and mothers’ wombs [posterity]. The inhabitants of the lands were made dhimmis.  They could not be sold as slaves and they paid jizya and kharāj”.⁷⁰⁶

Similar disputes surfaced at the time of the fall of Alyuna.  Zubayr bin Awwam demanded that all spoils, including land, should be divided among the participants.  He used the division of land by the Prophet among participants of the war, after the conquest of Khaybar, as a precedent of Sunna (Sunnah سُنّة) of the Prophet, to reinforce his point.  Amr bin As knew Umar’s policy and did not dare to challenge it.  Amr wrote to Umar, who wrote back saying, “Leave it as it is, so that the descendants of the descendants [ar ḥabal al ḥabalah] may profit by it.⁷⁰⁷

Thus Umar made the immovable property and businesses of the defeated an ongoing source of income which was to be distributed to the soldiers, their families and descendants in future as their salary for remaining enrolled in the military register.  If Umar would have distributed everything among soldiers they would have become busy managing the properties and would have absconded the army. ⁷⁰⁸  Not only this, Umar nationalized certain lands.  They were the lands that had already been designated as crown land by Sasanian Iran.  Umar added to them those lands which their owners abandoned at the time of fleeing the invading army.⁷⁰⁹  Income from these lands was at the discretion of the central government and was probably used on projects like infrastructure.

Disagreement between the caliph and some portions of the military about their remunerations continued.  Umar had given one-fourth of the revenue of Swad to Bajila as he had promised them at the time of their recruitment.⁷¹⁰  Three years later, in the winter of 641 CE, Umar told Jarir bin Abdullah, the leader of Bajila, “Had I not been responsible for what I divide, I would leave to you the share already given; but I see that the Muslims have multiplied, so ye have to restore what ye have taken.”.⁷¹¹  Jarir and his tribesmen had to obey Umar.  To reconcile with their chief, Umar offered Jarir a gift of eight hundred Dirhams. Umar assessed a stipend of two thousand Dirhams yearly for the tribe of Bajila, which was not different from what other tribes got.⁷¹²  This was the beginning of the military’s differences from the ruler in Medina.  Umar knew how to impose himself and he did.  Later caliphs had to struggle with the issue.

Generals started enriching themselves

From the early days of Futuhul Buldan, certain generals were bent on enriching themselves.  After the conquest of Bait-Jibrin Amr bin As took an estate for himself and named it Ajlan (‘Ajlān عَجلان) after the name of his freedman.⁷¹³  Zubayr marked out two lots for himself in Misr (Miṣr مِصر) and Alexandria when he went there as head of the supporting army.⁷¹⁴, ⁷¹⁵  He also built a mansion for himself in Misr, which was the talk of the town due to its extravagance and which remained in the hands of his heirs later.⁷¹⁶  Similarly, Sa’d bin Waqqas built a mansion in Kufa with a wooden door and surrounded the mansion with a fence of reeds.⁷¹⁷, ⁷¹⁸

Such activities on the part of generals were not acceptable to Umar.  He expected them to be public servants and not the public’s masters.  Umar sent his auditor general Muhammad bin Maslama (Muḥammad bin Maslamah مُحَمّد بِن مَسلَمَه ) to Kufa who set the door and fence made by Sa’d to fire. ⁷¹⁹

Here we observe a clash of interest between ordinary soldiers and the generals.  Ordinary soldiers, in line with Arab traditions, considered generals one of them.  They expected them to give themselves the same remunerations and privileges which they gave to the soldiers.  Some generals, on the other hand, didn’t consider it fair.  They honestly believed they should get better remunerations and perks than ordinary soldiers because they were instrumental in victories.  Umar sided with ordinary soldiers on this matter.  Anyhow, all generals did not indulge in such practices.  We don’t hear of any such behaviour on the part of Abu Ubayda bin Jarrah, Khalid bin Walid, Abu Musa Ash’ari or Iyad bin Ghanm.  The central government’s usual disciplinary action against unruly generals was to confiscate half of their wealth. Umar confiscated half of the wealth of, among others, Sa’d bin Waqaas and Amr bin As.⁷²⁰

The issue didn’t remain limited to remunerations.  Commanders established their own mess separate from that of common soldiers.  During his visit to Jerusalem, Bilāl complained to Umar that the commanders used to eat poultry and fine bread, but most of the men were not receiving that. Umar required the Syrian commanders to guarantee that each Muslim soldier gets two loaves of bread a day and a suitable quantity of vinegar and oil. ⁷²¹, ⁷²², ⁷²³

Caliph’s tug of war with governors

As the size of the Rashidun Caliphate increased communications between the central government and provincial governments and between the central government and the generals at borders needed a longer time.  Centrifugal tendencies started springing up among generals and governors.  No instance of outright disobedience to the center is noted by sources up to this juncture of the history of Islam.  However, examples of clandestine disobedience can be cited.  As usual, Umar was eager to nip the evil in the bud and he did whatever was in his power to discourage such behaviour.  It created a kind of cold war between the caliph and certain generals and governors.

Umar was shocked when Amr invaded Egypt without his prior approval.  Actually sending Zubayr would have served two purposes – reinforcement to Amr’s troops and clipping Amr’s ambitions.

Umar had to spy on the governors.  After the victory of Qadisiyyah Amr bin Ma’dikarib visited Umar.  Umar asked him about the conduct of Sa’d.  He praised Sa’d.  Umar did not believe in him and said, ‘As if you agreed to compensate each other with praise’ (Sa’d having commended Amr to Umar in a previous communication). ⁷²⁴

Sinful behaviour of officials

The Rashidun Caliphate was a theocracy.  It had classified its citizens strictly into religious compartments.  The moral behaviour of non-Muslims was the responsibility of their respective regulating bodies.  The central government was responsible for maintaining certain moral standards among the Muslim population.  As money poured into Arab Muslim society as a result of Futuhul Buldan, sinful behaviours kicked off among some of them.  Part of the problem stemmed from the explosive spread of Islam among Arabs during the first decade of the Rashidun Caliphate.  A lot of them were not as strongly bound to it as were the earliest converts.  This particularly applies to middle-ranking officers, almost all of whom were peripheral to the Islamic movement during its nascent days.  They indulged in sinful behaviours which were contrary to the criminal code of the country and which were seen as not befitting of an officer of the Islamic state by the central government.

Nu’man was the son of Adi bin Nadla (‘Adi bin Naḍlah عَدى بِن نَضلَه) who had immigrated to and died in Ethiopia as a Muslim.  Nu’man came back to Medina via the same boat which brought other Muslims back from Ethiopia. Umar appointed him over Maysan in the district of Basrah.  Nu’man composed some verses:

Hasn’t al-Ḥasnnā heard that her husband in Maysān
Is drinking from glasses and jars?

If I wished, the chief men of the city would sing to me
And dancing-girls pirouette on tiptoe.

If you’re my friend, give me a drink in the largest cup,
Don’t give me the smallest half-broken!

Perhaps the commander of the faithful will take it amiss
That we’re drinking together in a tumbledown castle!

On hearing these verses Umar dismissed him from the job.  He pleaded with Umar that he did not act anything like that and it was just poetic fantasy but Umar did not restore him.⁷²⁵

The presence of sinful behaviour among middle-ranking officers in the provinces and stern action taken against them on the discovery by the central government, rather than provincial governments, indicates a culture of cover-up at the provincial level and the breeding of centrifugal aspirations.

Beginning of corruption in state apparatus

Financial corruption and state machinery go hand in hand. ⁷²⁶  There has not a single county ever existed nor will ever exist which is hundred percent free of financial corruption.  We can only assess relative transparency in the government functioning of a country by comparing it with that of other countries and ranking it.⁷²⁷  Widespread financial corruption in government machinery decreases the efficacy of a government.   It largely hampers governmental capacity to deliver, attract capital and control crime.

As Muslim Arabs started collecting revenue from the defeated nations, tax collectors saw an opportunity to fill their own pockets.  The central government had to take measures to curb the practice.

Abu Hurairah gathered twelve thousand Dirhams while being governor of Bahrain.  Umar charged him with stealing money from government coffers.  He denied the charges claiming that he earned it by horse farming and shares in different business ventures.  Umar was not convinced and he confiscated the money.⁷²⁸

The usual sentence for corruption was the confiscation of half of the wealth.  Umar handed over this punishment to many of his governors including Nafi bin Amr (Nāfi’ bin ‘Amr نافِع بِن عَمرؤ ) of Khuza’a, his governor over Mecca, and Ya’la bin Munya, his governor over Yemen.⁷²⁹

Sometimes the central government had to take such action against middle-ranking officers, for example, Nu’man bin Adi ‘amil over Maysan, because apparently provincial governments were apt to neglect such infractions.⁷³⁰

The proceeding of the court was still fair.  We find some instances, for example, Abu Bakra, where an officer successfully defended his case and got acquitted.⁷³¹, ⁷³²

The appearance of politics in Medina

The most devastating side effect of the geographic expansion of the Rashidun Caliphate was the emergence of a sense in the capital Medina that whoever will take over from Umar will wield extensive political power.  The activities, actions and policies that are used to gain and hold power in a government or to influence a government are called ‘politics’ according to the classical definition of the word in the Merriam-Webster English Dictionary.⁷³³

Once upon a time, at the occasion of Hajj Abdur Rahman bin Awf and others openly discussed with Umar matters in such a way that Umar had to snub their political ambitions. ⁷³⁴  Here we see the appearance of politics among those men who had struggled for the establishment of Islam in its earliest and weakest phase.

The teamwork among the leadership of the Rashidun Caliphate eroded as a result of the appearance of politics.  When Umar appointed Mu’awiya as governor of Syria after the death of Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, Abu Sufyan did not behave as it was the appointment of one of the team members because he was most appropriate for it.  Rather he perceived it as a favour to his family at the cost of others.  “May the tie of relationship be made stronger by thy kind behavior!” wrote Abu Sufyan to Umar in his letter of thanks. ⁷³⁵ A team is the most potent social organization.  A team strives to achieve a well-defined goal, under a clear cut leader, with the help of mutually aiding members.   Teams usually build up when many people aspire to achieve a common goal, and they usually dismantle after achievement of the goal. ⁷³⁶ The team of Quraysh, which worked selflessly under the leadership of Abu Bakr, had started feeling that goals have been achieved. Cracks started appearing in that team.

Cantonments politicized

The phenomenon of ‘politics’ was not confined to the environs of Medina. It took the newly established cantonments in its spell.  The earliest converts to Islam in Medina were vying for the top job of Caliph.  Relatively later converts were lobbying for higher military posts, district or provincial governorship, or other higher offices in government service.  Ordinary soldiers living in cantonments were pushing for better salary packages from the government.  To achieve their goal, the soldiers started organizing themselves around ambitious relatively later converts, usually of non-Quraysh background.  Governing cantonments became a political quagmire.

A close examination of Kufa, as a typical example, illustrates the patterns emerging in the cantonments.  Soon after this beautiful and comfortable city became functional and Sa’d bin Waqqas established himself as governor, the harmony in the city started pulverizing.  Complaints against Sa’d started reaching the ears of Umar.  The grievances of the people of Kufa against Sa’d were purely monetary but the formal complaints lodged against him had a religious accent. ⁷³⁷  One of the complaints was that the earliest converts to Islam didn’t know the proper method of ritual prayer (ṣalāt).  Umar had to set up a public enquiry against Sa’d in Kufa.  Though Umar exonerated Sa’d in the ‘wrong prayer case’, Sa’d could not survive the contentious nature of the Kufans.⁷³⁸  Umar had to dismiss him in 641 CE.⁷³⁹, ⁷⁴⁰  Naturally, Sa’d felt insulted.  He cursed the people of Kufa saying, “May Allah not make them pleased with any commander or any commander pleased with them”.⁷⁴¹  The dismissal was sudden.  Umar had to give the charge of the governorship to Abdullah bin Abdullah (‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdallah عَبدَ اللّه بِن عَبدَ اللّه ), the deputy governor, on an ad hoc basis until he chooses a new governor.⁷⁴², ⁷⁴³, ⁷⁴⁴

After a painstaking search, Umar chose Ammar bin Yasir, a very early Meccan convert who had won his freedom from slavery with the money of Abu Bakr.⁷⁴⁵  This time he appointed Abdullah bin Mas’ud as wazīr, whose actual job appears to monitor Ammar bin Yasir.⁷⁴⁶, ⁷⁴⁷  Soon complaints against Ammar started pouring into Medina.  The grievances were again of pure monetary matters but expressed themselves in religious overtone.  “Ammar is not a good Muslim,” said one complainant.⁷⁴⁸  Though the matter that didn’t translate into a formal complaint was that Ammar didn’t favour Kufans unduly over others during the award of Jizya of Jibal.⁷⁴⁹  Hesitantly, Umar dismissed Ammar.  Obviously, Ammar didn’t feel honoured by this treatment and he expressed his sentiments well during his exit interview with Umar.⁷⁵⁰

Umar gave charge of Kufa to Jubayr bin Mut’im (Jubayr bin Muṭ’im جُبير بِن مُطعِم ) while he looked for another suitable person for the job.⁷⁵¹  Jubayr had similar problems during the short period he served as acting governor.⁷⁵²  Now, Umar brought in Abu Musa Ash’ari from Basrah, giving charge of Basrah to somebody else.  Abu Musa quickly became the victim of similar injurious complaints.  Wary of the situation, Umar asked the people of Kufa whom they wanted to be governed by.⁷⁵³  In doing so, Umar sacrificed a constitutional principle of the Rashidun Caliphate – appointing a provincial governor no longer remained a sole prerogative of the caliph.  Ironically, the people of Kufa refused to respond.   Now, Mughira bin Shu’ba, a later convert from Taif, ex-governor of Basrah, and current resident of Kufa, approached Umar and applied for the job of governor.⁷⁵⁴,  ⁷⁵⁵  Umar appointed him.  In doing so, Umar broke another precedent of the Rashidun Caliphate.  Governorship of a province no longer remained a ‘responsibility’ that the caliph would delegate to anybody in his good books.  It became a ‘privilege’ which could be contested for.  Moreover, Umar bypassed a very important doctrine of the Rashidun Caliphate in the appointment of Mughira.  The earliest Companions of the Prophet no longer had absolute preference over the very late Companions in provincial appointments.  Actually, Mughira expressed the dilemma of the timing of conversion versus competency clearly while trying to convince Umar for appointing him as governor. Mughira said that the piety of a person is for his personal help and the competence of a person helps the community.⁷⁵⁶  Umar accepted the reality unwillingly. His heart posited that one day he would find that ideal man who is a combination of piety and competence.  Farewelling Mughira to his job Umar said “Let the pious trust you and the wicked fear you.” ⁷⁵⁷  Mughira had a tarnished reputation.⁷⁵⁸  Umar’s conviction of finding a pious man for the job of Governor of Kufa persisted.  He had made up his mind to bring Sa’d bin Waqqas back to this job.  Umar was honest in admitting that the management problems of Kufa brought him tension.⁷⁵⁹  Umar kept sacrificing his men one after another but never blamed the soldiers.  He kept glorifying the people of Kufa as “the head of the Arabs”.⁷⁶⁰  The soldiers in cantonments were pillars of the Rashidun Caliphate.  Umar was not in a position to annoy them.⁷⁶¹

Not only had the soldiers in cantonments politicized around their ringleaders, the cantonments as a whole started wrestling with each other.  The reason was the same as for the friction between individuals.  Again let’s illustrate the point from the events in Kufa.  Each division of the army used to get a stipend from the revenues (jizya) which were collected from the area conquered by that particular division.  Obviously, some had conquered richer or larger areas getting more remuneration.  Soon after the battle of Nahavand divisions of Basrah and Kufa started claims and counterclaims to the right of getting tax of a particular area on the basis that it was conquered by them.  Umar had to intervene.  He negated the old rule that the body of soldiers who conquered a particular area will benefit from its taxes solely.  He divided the newly conquered areas of Sasanian Iran among soldiers of Basrah and Kufa equally.⁷⁶²

Kufa was not alone in being turbulent.  Other cantonment towns trod the same path.  The factors that shaped political air in Kufa were working everywhere in the provinces.  Results were similar to those of Kufa.

Umar confines the Companions to Medina

Political conflicts in the center and in the provinces impelled Umar to craft new domestic policies.  It is noteworthy that very few people who were among the first Muslims and who used to meet in the study circle at the house of Arqam participated in the wars called Futuhul Buldan.  During the later years of his tenure, Umar banned them from taking part in wars and settling in cantonments.  It does not mean that any person who happened to see Prophet Muhammad in the state of being Muslim was not allowed to leave Medina or participate in the wars.  Two hundred and twenty Companions of the Prophet are reported to have participated, for example, in the battle of Qadisiyyah.  Out of them one hundred and twenty were veterans of Fath Mecca and seventy were veterans of Badr.⁷⁶³  Similarly, sixty to eighty Companions settled in Basrah, and eighty settled in Kufa.⁷⁶⁴  Umar confined those who could be potential candidates for caliphate after him.  When Abdur Rahman bin Awf asked for permission to participate in the war on one occasion, Umar refused bluntly.⁷⁶⁵  Once Umar answered the request of some members of the Quraysh to participate in war diplomatically, “You have already been through that with the Messenger of God”.⁷⁶⁶  Explaining his policy of not allowing prominent members of Quraysh to leave Medina, Umar said on one occasion, “Do not go out, lest you disperse the people right and left.” ⁷⁶⁷

Umar establishes an official hierarchy

One of Umar’s actions that had far-reaching consequences was the creation of a register (dīwān) of payments (‘aṭā’).  He entered all into it all people that were entitled to payments by the state.  They ranged from Jarir bin Abdullah, the leader of Bajila who participated in Qadisiyyah to Hurmuzan, the Iranian petty king who converted to Islam after his defeat.  The register grouped people according to the number of their stipends from highest to lowest. ⁷⁶⁸  The amount of stipend paid to anybody was proportional to his services for the establishment of Islam. ⁷⁶⁹

This register unintentionally created an official hierarchy of all and sundry in the Rashidun Caliphate.  Descendants of the registrants kept claiming their superiority on the basis of the senior position of their ancestors in this register.

Umar generated this register during the conquests of Syria in 636 CE.⁷⁷⁰  He kept it upgraded as the events unfolded further.

Earliest Companions got super rich

The process of allotment of properties to the Companions of the Prophet had started during the Prophetic times.  Abu Bakr, Abdur Rahman bin Awf, Zubayr bin Awwam, Abu Dujanah, Simāk bin Kharashah and others had got lands of Nadir in 625 CE.⁷⁷¹

During the caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar, the earliest Muslims had a stronger claim for newly acquired properties by the state as compared to later Muslims. The Caliphs bestowed them generously.  For example, both Abu Bakr and Umar allotted properties to Zubayr bin Awwam, while he was already in possession of a property granted to him by the Prophet.⁷⁷²  Enriching of the earliest Muslims, who happened to belong to Quraysh exclusively, partly explains the inability of chiefs from other Muslim Arab tribes to lead any faction during the First Arab Civil War of succession.

Rashidun Caliphate establishes a police force

As more Arabs resorted to settled life, their traditional ways of countering crime became obsolete.  Security in big cities was far from perfect.  Umar continuously responded to changing situations on the ground.  Islamic sauces credit Umar for establishing a police force.  Abdullah bin Abbas (‘Abdallah bin ‘Abbās عَبدُ اللّه بِن عَبّاس ) was in charge of Umar’s security forces (Shuraṭ) in Medina.⁷⁷³  As we hear of police force only in towns, it can be safely assumed that it was a need of metropolitan areas only.⁷⁷⁴

Umar used Ansar for bookkeeping. 

As the ruling elite indulged in monetary corruption, the central government had to devise means to keep a check on them.  A group of people who were not part of the ruling elite was the best suited for this purpose.  Though Umar was apprehensive about appointing Ansar to a position of power, he didn’t mind using them to eye on his Quraysh officials.  Designation of Muhammad Bin Maslama as auditor general is mentioned above.⁷⁷⁵  Umar used Ansar for all kinds of accounting.  His chief census officer and surveyor of lands was Uthman bin Hunayf ( ‘Uthmān bin Ḥunayf عُثمان بِن حُنَيف ) of Ansar.⁷⁷⁶

Umar styles himself ‘Amir ul Mu’minin’

A few years after coming to power, in 639 CE, Umar adopted the title of Amirul Mominin (Amīr ul Mu’minīn اَمِيرُ المُؤمِنين ).  Abu Musa Ash’ari was the first to address him “to the Servant of Allah Umar, commander of the faithful.”  Then it became customary. ⁷⁷⁷, ⁷⁷⁸, ⁷⁷⁹, ⁷⁸⁰

Tabari tells us the reason why Umar had to adopt this title.  Before adoption of title of Amirul Mu’minin, Umar was called caliph to caliph to Messenger of Allah (khalīfat ar-khalīfat ar-Rasūl Allāh  خَلِيفَةُ الخَلِيفَةُ الرَسُول اَللّه ).  Obviously, this was a long title and Umar pondered if the trend continued the next caliph would be caliph to caliph to caliph to Messenger of Allah, and the title will be longer by one caliph with each new incumbent.⁷⁸¹, ⁷⁸²

Umar used to consult extensively

Like his predecessors, Umar did not govern in isolation.  He always involved early Muhajirun in important matters of the state.  This kind of advisory could be more instrumental in giving them a sense of being a power behind the power and maintaining consensus among them rather than in discovering novel ideas.  The Muhajirun had a sitting place in the mosque where Umar used to discuss with them the news he received from different regions.  One day he said, “I know not how to treat the Magians” Abdur Rahman bin ‘Awf rose and said ‘I bear witness that the Prophet said ‘Treat them according to the same law with which ye treat the People of the Book’. ⁷⁸³  Umar had made a precedent that he picked advice of only those who were steadfast Companions of the Prophet.⁷⁸⁴  According to Ya’qubi, the persons with the greatest influence on Umar were Abdullah bin Abbas, Abdur Rahman bin Awf and Uthman bin Affan. ⁷⁸⁵

The Death of Umar

Umar was stabbed on November 2, 644 CE by a poisoned dagger. ⁷⁸⁶, ⁷⁸⁷ He died on November 4, 644 CE and was buried on November 7, 644 CE.⁷⁸⁸

Umar owes his death to Futuhul Buldan to some extent.  Abu Lulua Fayruz (Abū Lu’lu’ah Fayrūz اَبُو لؤ لؤَه فِيروز ),  the assassin of Umar, was an Iranian nationalist living in Medina as a slave of Mughira bin Shu’ba. ⁷⁸⁹, ⁷⁹⁰  He was of the Christian faith.⁷⁹¹  In Tabari’s report, Abu Lulua managed to slip out of the mosque after murdering Umar, taking advantage of the crowd.  A man belonging to the tribe of Tamim chased him, killed him, and recovered the instrument of murder.⁷⁹²

Whenever big names die violently, it is always from an assassination.  A lone wolf attack is rare.  Umar himself suspected a conspiracy after being stabbed. ⁷⁹³ The Rashidun Caliphate did not have the legal resources to implicate the conspirators in the murder case.  According to the law of the land, the murderer was personally responsible for the crime and no further legal trial was needed as he was already dead.  Umar’s family was not satisfied with this scenario.  They blamed other Iranian residents of Medina as complicit in the murder and wished them to be punished.  Finding reluctance of law to act, Umar’s son, Ubaydullah (‘Ubaydallāh bin ‘Umar عُبَيدُ اللّه بِن عُمَر ) took the law into his own hands and murdered Hurmuzan, Abu Lulua’s daughter, and Jufaynah, a Christian slave of Sa’d bin Waqqas from Hira.⁷⁹⁴, ⁷⁹⁵

Umar’s murder sent shockwaves through Muslim Arabs as is evident from the Zohair inscription. ⁷⁹⁶, ⁷⁹⁷

History has produced two kinds of rulers up to now. One is those whose primary aim is to become a ruler, any public betterment by their hands is secondary.  Others are those whose primary aim is public betterment, coming to power is a secondary affair. The former are numerous and often forgotten after their rule ends.  The latter are rare and are remembered as a hero for generation after generation.  Umar belonged to the later genre.  An inscription found in Wādī al Furaysh in modern Saudi Arabia and written in 719 CE gives Umar bin Khattab the epithet of al-Faruq  (al-Fārūq اَلفارُوق ).⁷⁹⁸

Piety and religious scholarship was a dominant feature of the descendants of the first two caliphs in Islam.  Ya’qubi describes their third descendants as prominent religious scholars of their time.⁷⁹⁹.  However, the government did not return to any of their descendants.  Gradually they were lost in anonymity.

End notes

1. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 762.  See also: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 617.
2. Two traditions are worth noting here:  One, when Uthman finished writing Abu Bakr’s will, Abu Bakr advised Umar that there are people who love him [Umar] and there are who hate him.  He further advised that Umar shouldn’t be afraid of the situation as truth has been opposed for ages and often err persists.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 762).  Second, when Abdur Rahman Bin Awf visited Abu Bakr during his illness and asked about his health, Abu Bakr replied: “I have appointed a successor this morning; and now you have increased my malady over what it was by the fact that when you saw that I had appointed a man from among you, each of you woke up with his nose swollen, each seeking it for himself.” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 762).  The two traditions confirm that aspirants of the caliphate were present at the time of the death of Abu Bakr, similar to the situation at the time of the death of Prophet Muhammad but nobody had the courage to express it publicly.
3. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī,  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 54.
4. For the opinions of Umar on many different occasions see: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī,  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  London: Routledge, 2011.
5. For Abu Bakr’s advice about Thaqif see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq,  The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 616.  For ‘Umar’s advice at Tabuk see: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī.  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011). 499.
6. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī.  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011). 355.
7. A rock inscription at Al-Murakkab, near Najran. It is believed to be an autograph of Umar bin Khattab. See: F. Imbert, “Graffiti Arabes De Cnide Et De Kos: Premieres Traces Epigraphiques De La Conquete Musulmane En Mer Egee”, Travaux Et Memoires Vol 17 (2013), 757 – 758.
8. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: The An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 764.
9. Umar was sixty-three years old at the time of his death.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),793.  For Umar’s clan affiliation see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 764.  Umar was a merchant and earned enough to look after his family.  He became a full-time politician later [probably after the assumption of power].  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 204).
10. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 190.
11. Damishq ( دَمِشق ) of Arabic sources, Damascus of Greek sources, modern-day Damascus in Syria. See: Ross Burns, Damascus: A History, (New York:  Routledge,  2005).
12. Just before laying siege to Damascus, Rashidun Caliphate’s forces engaged with Byzantine Roman troops in an open battleground at Fiḥl.  The battle is said to be fierce with victory in Muslim hands. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 177).  Again it appears an attempt of Byzantine Rome to block Rashidun Caliphate’s army from reaching Damascus. Tabari dates this event to January 635 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 160).  For sequential dating of the events surrounding the first surrender of Damascus see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113.  Fiḥl ( فِحل ) of Arabic sources is Pella of Greek sources:  Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113.  Ruins of the town still stand at modern Tabqet Fahel in Jordan, about 12 km to the east of the Jordan River and about fifty km southwest of Irbid in Jordan.
13. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 190.
14. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 186.  Ya’qūbī gives this date to be August 21, 635.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),766.
15. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 172.
16. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175.
17. Antakya is located in modern southern Turkiye.  It is Anṭākiyah ( اَنطاكِيَه ) in Arabic sources, and Antioch in Greek sources.  (Downey Glanville, Ancient Antioch, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
18. Unknown artist.
19. See details on this topic: Khalil ‘Athamina, “The Appointment and Dismissal of Khalid ibn al-Walid from the Supreme Command: A study of the Political Strategy of Early Muslim Caliphs in Syria,” Arabica 41 (1994): 253 – 72.
20. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),  165, 166.
21. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 186.
22. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 115.
23. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 170.
24. Once Khalid bin Walid disobeyed the civilian authority of Prophet Muhammad.  Prophet Muhammad had sent him to the Jadhīmah clan of Kinanah after Fath Mecca to preach Islam to them with strict instructions not to fight with anybody.  Khalid killed some of them.  (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 561).  According to Waqidi, it was the Sulaym in Khalid’s contingent who had previous enmity with Jadhīmah and killed them with zest (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī,  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 431).

    Khalid, anyhow, remained in the good books of the Prophet. He appointed him a field commander at Hunayn, and later to Dumah al Jandal and Najran.   Actually, it was after the event of Jadhīmah that the Prophet asked not to curse Khalid and named him ‘the Sword of Allah’ (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī,  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 433).

    He again disobeyed Abu Bakr’s civilian authority during the war of Yamama.  He did not execute all adult males of Banu Hanifa, as ordered by Abu Bakr.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 131.).  Al Askari asserts that Khalid believed that as a general commander of the force he had the right to conduct his job according to the circumstances and not according to the view of Banu Hanifa at Medina.  That is the reason he signed the peace treaty, making an excuse that he received Abu Bakr’s instructions late. (Abdullah al- Askar,  Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),120.  See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 99.).

25. Once Khalid had burned to death some prisoners of war belonging to Sulaym during the Ridda Wars. (see above).  When this news reached Abu Bakr he endorsed the actions of Khalid saying the ‘Sword of Allah’ had been unleashed.  Umar objected to the ethics of this action.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 148).
26. During the Ridda Wars, Khalid had executed Malik bin Nuwairah of the Hanzalah clan of Tamim on charges of apostatizing.  (See above).  An eye witness to the execution, Abu Qaṭadah of Ansar, reported to Umar that Hanzalah had actually laid their arms and had made azān.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 149, 150.).  Abu Qaṭadah further maintained that Khalid killed Malik because the former was pleased to see the latter’s beautiful wife who had accompanied the latter to negotiations.  Khalid executed Malik under a false excuse to marry his widow.   (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 755).  Umar complained to Abu Bakr that “thou hast sent a man who kills Muslims and tortures with fire.”  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 149, 150.).  Abu Bakr sent Khalid a mellow show-cause notice.  Khalid replied that he had been doing both right and wrong but had been delivering results.  Abu Bakr neglected the plea of Mutammin, the brother of Malik, to investigate the matter further. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 755).   Instead, he paid blood money for Malik bin Nuwayrah from a government account.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 102.).  Actually, Umar condoled the death of Malik with his brother Mutammin bin Nuwairah during his caliphate.  He apologized to Mutammin for the death of his brother at the hands of a general of the Rashidun Caliphate.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 150.).
27. Tabari reports Umar saying that he had dismissed Khalid not because of suspicion, but because people venerated him excessively and he (Umar) was afraid that they would put their trust in him.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 179).  Umar remained sleepless for a number of nights anxiously awaiting the news of Yarmouk’s outcome.  He understood the war was a test of his decision of sacking Khalid from the rank of commander-in-chief.  As soon as he received news of victory he fell in prostration.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 767, 768).
28. Baladhuri, who is the first historian to shed light on Khalid’s demotion blames that during the time Khalid bin Walid had ruled a part of Jazira on Umar’s behalf, he daubed himself with alcohol in a public bath at Āmid [Diyārbakr].  According to Baladhuri, this was the reason for his demotion.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 278).  Baladhuri himself admits that the report is unconfirmed.  Actually, the report appears to be baseless as Khalid was appointed lieutenant governor after his demotion and reconciliation with ‘Umar.  Ya’qūbī guesses that ‘Umar’ dismissed Kahlid due to some kind of personal grudge against him. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),766).
29. Khalid bin Walid absorbed this disgrace calmly.  Umar sent Bilal, who stripped Khalid of his turban and Abu Ubayda confiscated half of his wealth as part of his punishment.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 766).  Khalid continued to serve as a field commander under Abu Ubayda.  He participated in the campaign of Homs under the orders of Abu Ubayda.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 200).  He also participated in the Battle of Yarmouk.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 91.  When Umar came to Syria on an official visit, he met Khalid.  The two men reconciled and Umar appointed him lieutenant governor over Edessa, Ḥarrān, Raqqa, Tell Mawzan, and ʾĀmid. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775).  Anyhow, he did not reinstall Khalid in his previous position.  Probably, Khalid was not content with his new position and he asked Umar after one year to relieve him of his duty.  He took retirement in Homs where he died in 642 CE. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 270).  Khalid designated Umar as the executor of his estate probably as a gesture that he still confided in Umar.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 270)   Khalid was Umar’s first maternal cousin.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),766). Umar, Ḥafṣah and Umar’s family lamented his death and wept a great deal over him.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),790). His tomb was in Homs at the time of Waqidi’s writing.  (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 434).
30. Khalid’s son, ‘Abd ar Raḥmān bin Khālid continued to serve in Rashidun Caliphate’s army (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193).  He later served as lieutenant governor of Jazira under Mu’awiya Bin Abu Sufyan.  He sided with Mu’awiya during First Arab Civil War and participated in Siffin.  ‘He died in 666 (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 245).  After his death, the family sank into anonymity.
31. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 201.
32. Islamic sources use the word ‘amīr’ for governor.  They have not coined any terminology for ‘lieutenant governor’.  However, when we look at the process of appointment and chain of command for men like Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, we can realize that actually, they were subordinate to the governor.  Unlike the governor, they did not have the power to invade foreign countries on their own.  Their appointment, though, at least during the reign of Umar, was subject to approval from the central government.
33. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 198.
34. The inhabitants of Homs initially resisted, then besieged themselves in the city. Later they agreed to pay Jizya.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 200.  See also: Theophanes Confessor, The Chronicle of TheophanesConfessor, ed. Cyril Mango and Roger Scot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 98. AND  Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 63.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 47.
35. Since the jizya of Homs was one hundred and seventy thousand dinars yearly, presumably the population of Homs was one seventy thousand. (For the amount of jizya see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 200).
36. Baalbek is located in modern western Lebanon.  It is Ba’labakk (بَعَلبَك) in Arabic sources and Heliopolis in Greek sources.  (Michel Alour, History of Baalbek, (Beirut: American Press, 1944).
37. The photo is taken in the early 20th century. The invading Arabs might have found them in similar conditions and might have used the buildings.
38. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67.
39. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 201.
40. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 449.
41. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 201.
42. Ubada bin Samit was among those Medinites who took an oath of allegiance with Prophet Muhammad at Aqabah.
43. Soon Umar replaced Ubada bin Samit with Iyad Bin Ghanm when he returned successfully from campaigns of Jazira and Armenia.  See:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 275.
44. Photographer unknown.
45. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 201, 204.
46. Baldah is an unidentified town; Jabalah is well known in history but its exact location is not known; Ḥamāh in Arabic sources is Epiphania in Greek sources. It is Hama about 45 Km north of Homs in modern Syria; Shaizar of Arabic sources is Larissa of Greek sources. It is a village of Shaizar, about 30 km northwest of Hama in modern Syria.
47. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 213.
48. Sabasṭiyah is about 10 km northwest of Nablus in Modern Palestine; Nābulus of Arabic sources is Neapolis of Greek sources, Nablus in modern Palestine (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890); Ludd of Arabic sources is Lydda of Greek sources. It is a village of Lod about 15 km southeast of Tel Aviv in modern Israel. (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890); For Yibna: see above; ‘Amwās of Arabic sources is Emmaus of Greek sources, many archaeological sites compete to claim the town.
49. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113.
50. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916). For further references, see Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66, and Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67. Kaegi supports the last day of the war as August 20, 636 CE, citing an eyewitness account of the event. (A. Palmer, with contributions from S. P. Brock and R. G. Hoylnad, The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles Including Two Seventh-Century Syriac Apocalyptic Texts, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 2, 3.) However, Tabari states that the date of the war’s final day is August 26, 634 CE. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al-Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 87.)
51. Tabari gives the figure of one hundred and sixty thousand. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al-Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 87.
52. For Vahan, refer to: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 45. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 119. Bāhān of Ya’qūbī (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson, and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 767. Baanes of Theophanes the Confessor: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 38 annus mundi 6126.

    For Theodore and his relation to Heraclius see: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 615.  Theophane the confessor tells he was not Heraclius’s brother Theodore.  He was Sakellarios Theodore, Heraclius’s general: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 38 annus mundi 6126.  See also Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 84.  AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67.

53. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 211.
54. The photo is taken from the south in modern Jordan. The dry bed of River Yarmouk is the boundary of modern Jordan and Syria. Few olive trees are visible in the foreground. Arguably the area was much greener at the time of the battle. Wars and deforestation have devastated the landscape since then.
55. For the location and field plan of the war, refer to: Walter, Kaegi E. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113, 114.
56. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson, and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 767). See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 46.
57. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),104, 132, 134). See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 197.
58. Marj al Ṣuffar, known as Melitene in Greek sources, corresponds to the present-day city of Malatya in Turkey. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 238).
59. Tabari reports his death. See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),134. Eutychius reports his retirement to Sinai. See: Eutychius, (Annales) Das Annalenwerk des Eutychios von Alexandrien; ausgewählte Geschichten und Legenden Kompiliert von Sa’īd ibn Baṭrīq um 935 AD, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium ed. and trans. M. Breydy, (Louvain: L. Durbecq, 1985).
60. Eutychius of Alexandria, also known as Sa’id ibn Batriq, was a Melkite Patriarch of Alexandria and a late historian (d. ca. 940 CE). He is recognized as the first Christian writer in Arabic.
61. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 210.
62. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 210.
63. Fredegarius, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, ed. Bruno Krusch. (Hanover: Hahn, 1886) 153, 4). Kaegi comments that the ‘sword of the Lord’ is a translation of Saif Allah, and the figures provided by Fredegarius are exaggerated. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125).
64. The actual loss of life on the Roman side may have been high, or at the very least, rumors of high losses spread far and wide. The Khuzestan Chronicle, written in the 660s, reports the Roman casualties to be one hundred thousand. (Anonymous, the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 80. Theophanes the confessor, writing in 815 CE, gives the figure as eighty thousand: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 38 annus mundi 6126. The anonymous chronicler of 741 CE mentions that there were thousands of Roman soldiers, but few survived to tell the story: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 616.
65. Anastasius the Sinaite, Opera. Sermones due in constitutionem hominis secundum imaginem Dei necnon Opuscula adversus Monothelates, Corpus Christianorum Series Gracea 12. ed. Karl-Heinz Uthemann Uthemann). . (Brepols-Turnhout: Leuven University Press, 1985), 60.
66. Jabiya (Jābiya جابِيَه) vanished from the earth by the middle of the eighth century CE, leaving no trace. Its exact location remains unknown.
67. For the dates of the captures of individual towns mentioned in this section see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146.
68. For the surrender of Qinnasrin see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 211, 223.
69. Wādī Biqā’ is known as Beqaa Valley in Modern Lebanon; Qinnasrin of Arabic sources is Chalkis of Greek sources.  It is the modern village of al-Eis about 30 Km southwest of Aleppo in Syria (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 92).
70. For the capture of Jerusalem see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) 193.  For the capture of Ascalon see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),790.
71. Jerusalem is also called Iliya in Arabic sources.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 768. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 166.  It was the name of the Roman city built on the ruins of the Jewish city destroyed in the wake of the Jewish revolt of 132 – 135 CE.  The same Arabic sources call it by another name, Bayt al Maqdis.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 768. AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),144.  The word Bayt al-Maqdis is derived from Hebrew Bayt ha-Miqdāsh, referring to the Jewish temple, literally meaning “house of sanctuary.” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), footnote 936);  ‘Asqalān of Arabic sources is Ascalon of Greek sources, and Ashkelon about 50 km south of Tel Aviv in modern Israel.
72. For the details of the truce see below.
73. For the surrender of Antakya see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 211, 227.  For the surrender of Niqābulus see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 230.  For the surrender of Shaizar see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 202. For the surrender of Aleppo see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 226, 231.  For the surrender of Manbij see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 231. For the surrender of Bālis see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232.
74. Cyrrhus of Arabic sources is Hagioupolis of Greek sources.  (Abdul Massih, Benech, Gelin, “First results on the city planning of Cyrrhus (Syria),” ArcheoSciences, revue d’archeometrie, 33 (suppl.) (2009), 201 – 203).  Its ruins are present at Khoros on the bank of River Nahr iI Fren about 20 km from the Syrian town of A’zaz at the Syrian Turkish border.  Niqābulus of Arabic sources is Nicopolis of Greek sources.  It is the village of Islahiye in modern Turkiye east of Omnaniye; Aleppo is located in modern northeast Syria.  It is Ḥalab ( حَلَب ) of Arabic sources, and Beroea of Greek sources;  Manbij of Arabic sources is Hierapolis of Greek sources.  (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), 36, 39, 42, 500).  Northeast of Aleppo about 30 km to the west of River Euphrates in modern Syria; ‘Arājin is an unidentified location; Bālis in Arabic sources is Barbalissos in Greek sources.  Its ruins are located at Qala’at Balis south of Maskanah in modern Syria near modern Maskanah.
75. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179, 193, 231.
76. Ṭabariyyāh in Arabic sources is Tiberias on the western shores of the Sea of Galilee in modern Israel. Baisān of Arabic sources is Scythopolis of Greek sources, referring to Beit She’an in northern Israel. Afīq of Arabic sources is the modern village of Afik near the eastern shores of the Sea of Galilee in modern Syria. Sūsiyah of Arabic sources is Susiya in modern Palestine. Jerash of Arabic sources is Gerasa of Greek sources, corresponding to the city of Jerash in modern Jordan. Bait-Rās of Arabic sources is Capitolias of Greek sources, located as a village north of Irbid in modern Jordan. Qadas of Arabic sources is Cydessa of Greek sources. It is Kedesh in modern Israel near the border with Lebanon, about 10 km north of Safed. Jaulān of Arabic sources is Sahem el Golan in modern Syria. Arandal is an unidentified location. Sājūr is a village in modern northern Israel in the Galilee region.
77. As recorded in the accounts of Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, these joyful welcomes can be found in the references for Homs (202, 211) and Shaizar (202).
78. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri. Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, 227
79. The detailed account of this story can be found in Hippolyte Delehaye’s work, “Passio Sanctorum Seaginta Martyrum” (Analecta Bollandiana 23, 1904, 287-307).
80. As described in Sebeos’ History, translated by Robert Bedrosian (Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985, 31).
81. As documented in Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri’s Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān (Columbia University, 1916, 231).
82. In Islamic sources, the term ‘āmil refers to a district-level government official. While their exact duties are not explicitly outlined, various traditions suggest that ‘āmils assessed and collected taxes, communicated governmental policies, and maintained law and order within their assigned communities. They were ultimately accountable to the provincial governor.
83. The precise date of the takeover can be found in Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri’s Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān (Columbia University, 1916, 214), as well as in Walter Kaegi’s Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests (Cambridge University Press, 1992, 164) and Robert G. Hoyland’s Seeing Islam as Others Saw It (The Darwin Press, 1997, 64).
84. This information can be found in the Chronicle of Khuzistan (A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D., ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi, Gorgias Press, 1916, 56).
85. Paleo-Hebrew alphabet. Observe: Shekel Yisrael (year) 1. Reverse Jerusalem (the) holy. Current location: The British Museum, Museum number 1927, 1219.1. For details see: Cecil Roth, “The Historical Implications of the Jewish Coinage of the First Revolt”, Israel Exploration Journal 12 no. 1 (1962), 33 – 46. Jews not only aspired to chase away the Romans and establish their state in Jerusalem but also considered Jerusalem a holy place.
86. For further information, refer to Antiochus Strategos’ account titled “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614)” as published in the English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502-517 by F. Conybeare.
87. For additional insights, consult Sebeos’ History as edited and translated by Robert Bedrosian in Sebeos’ History (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), pages 50, 51, 96, and 97.
89. Archaeological investigations have provided evidence confirming the siege of Jerusalem. Traces of a burnt wall and seventh-century Sasanian coins have been discovered nearby, supporting the historical accounts. Furthermore, excavations in Jerusalem have yielded numerous human skeletons, revealing a high proportion of young individuals, particularly women, suggesting that they met a sudden and violent demise. These findings support the occurrence of a massacre during that period.⁸⁸For additional information on the archaeological evidence, see the works of Doron Ben-Ami, Yana Tchekhanovets, and Gabriela Bijovsky in “New Archaeological and Numismatic Evidence for the Persian Destruction of Jerusalem in 614,” published in the Israel Exploration Journal, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2010), pages 204-222, as well as Gideon Avni’s “The Persian Conquest of Jerusalem (614 C.E.): An Archaeological Assessment” in the Bulletin of the American School of Oriental Research 257 (2010), page 36.
90. Photo Credit: Elia Kahvedjian. See: Kevork Kahvedjian, Jerusalem Through my Father’s eyes, (Jerusalem: Elia Photo Service, 1998).
91. Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517.
92. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 98.  See also: Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 56.
93. All accounts of the siege, fall and massacre of Jerusalem at the hand of Sasanian Iranians agree that the Iranians destroyed the holy churches of the Christians by burning them down.  (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 50, 51, 96, 97, 98.  AND Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 54, 55, 56.  AND Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517).  An archaeological survey of the holy churches of Jerusalem, contrary to it, doesn’t find any evidence of destruction by burning.  See: Gideon Avni, “The Persian Conquest of Jerusalem (614 C.E.): An Archaeological Assessment,” Bulletin of the American School of Oriental Research 257 40 – 45.
94. For details see: Jan Willen Drijvers, Helena Augusta: The Mother of Constantine the Great and the Legend of her Finding of the True Cross (Leiden: Brill, 1992).  Also see: Jan Willen Drijvers, “Helena Augusta: Cross and Myth.  Some new Reflections,” Millennium (Yearbook on the Culture and History of the First Millennium C.E. 8 (2011): 125 – 174.
95. Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517.
96. Anastasius the Persian, Acta Martyris Anastasii Persae, ed. Hermann Usener. (Bonn: Prgram-Utrecht, 1894), 12.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 12).
97. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115, 116, 117.
98. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 30, annus mundi 6120.
99. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214.  See also:  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 768.
100. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 213.
101. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985),  117.
102. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214.  See also:  Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 125, 126.
103. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985),131, 132, 133.
104. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214.  Ya’qūbi gives the date of Umar’s visit to Jerusalem to be August 637. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),775).
105. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775.
106. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146.  See also: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),103.
107. He unsuccessfully negotiated with Jabalah in Jabiyah.  He had one-on-one meetings with Amr bin As and Khalid bin Walid. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 209).
108. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775.  Tabari also gives a similar account.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 191.
109. The contract of the people of Jerusalem with the Muslims was not different from that with the people of other towns of Syria.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 214.
110. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 194.
111. Heribert Busse, ‘Omar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam5  (1984) 83.
112. See: Heribert Busse, ‘Omar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam5  (1984) 83 79 – 83.  Also see: Heribert Husse ‘Omar’s image as the Conqueror of Jerusalem,’ Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1986) 165 – 66 for the discussion of its location.
113. Salman ben Yeruḥim, a Jew writing in ca. 950 CE, in his Judaeo-Arabic commentary of Psalm 30, agrees with Sebeos’ story.  He writes, “The Temple remained with Byzantium for 500 or so years and Israel was unable to enter Jerusalem; whoever did so and was found out, suffered death.  Then when the Romans left it, by the grace of the God of Israel, and the kingdom of Ishmael was victorious, Israel was given leave to enter and take up residence and the courtyards of the house of God were handed over to them and they were praying there for a time.”  (Jacob Mann, The Jews in Egypt and Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs, (New York: Cornell University Library Press, 2009) Vol. I P 46.  The same source gives a reason why Muslims evicted the Jews from their place of worship.  “Then news of them went up to the Ishmaelite king, how they were engaging in shameful and riotous behavior, wine-drinking and drunkenness, and calumny; so he banished them to one of the gates.” (Jacob Mann, The Jews in Egypt and Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs, (New York: Cornell University Library Press, 2009) Vol. I P 47.
114. Umar himself ordered the construction of the mosque. See: Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriarch of the Syrians, ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, (Long Branch, N. J.: Sources of the Armenian Traditions,  2013) 126.
115. John Moskhi, Leimonarion, edition with research and glossary, ed. Ilia Abuladze  (Tbilisi: Necniereba, 1960) P 100 – 102, anecdote number 19).
116. Chrisotopher Von Schonborn, Sophrone de Jerusalem: vie monastique et confession dogmatique (Paris: Beauchesne editeur, 1972) 97, n. 136.  AND Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 64.
117. Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 220, 221.
118. Adomnan, De Locis Sanctis, in Itinera et alia geographica (Corpus Christianorum series Latina 175), tans. and ed. Ludwig Bieler, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1965), P 186 n. 1.1.14.  See also: John Wilkinson, Jerusalem Pilgrims before the Crusades (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1977) Adomnan, the holy places.
119. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 196.
120. Just as a passing remark, an early 9^th Century CE Christian source Theophanes the Confessor alleges that Umar was wearing filthy garments made from camel hair during his meeting with Sophronius, the Chalcedonian Patriarch of Jerusalem.  The Patriarch was so embarrassed that he offered him a clean lion cloth and overgarment.  Umar refused to accept them initially, and on Sophronius’s insistence accepted them for a short time while his own garments got washed.  Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 39, annus mundi 6127.
121. Aqṣā means farther, its opposite is adnā. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 359.
122. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 38 annus mundi 6126.
123. Theophanes gives the figure of one twenty thousand Dinars.  Dirhams are converted at a rate of ten Dirhams per Dinar for the convenience of the reader.
124. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 39, 40 annus mundi 6128.
125. Theophanes gives a figure of a hundred thousand Nomisma.  Dirhams are converted at a rate of ten Dirhams per Nomisma for the convenience of the reader.
126. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 38 annus mundi 6126.
127. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 39, 40 annus mundi 6128.
128. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 167, 168.
129. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257.
130. Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriarch of the Syrians, ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, (Long Branch, N. J.: Sources of the Armenian Traditions,  2013) 125.  Actually, Michael writes that Heraclius started robbing the Christians in the area from Antioch to Constantinople.  Kaegi takes its meaning that Heraclius destroyed the towns of the area.  See: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 244.  For Arabic sources on this issue see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 253.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: the State University of New York Press, 1992), 182 See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146).
131. Muslims destroyed for example Arabissus and Mar’ash.  For the destruction of Arabissus see: Baladhuri 156 – 7.  For the destruction of Mar’ash see:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 295.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 244.
132. Arabissos is the village of Yarpuz to the east of Osmaniye in modern southern Turkiye;  Mar’ash of Arabic sources is Germanicia Caesarea of Byzantine sources, Kahramanmaras in modern southern Turkiye.
133. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 203, 216, 217, 219.  See also Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146.
134. Anatolia is the mass of land which accommodates most of the Asian part of modern Turkiye.  It is bound in the north by the Black Sea, in the south by the Mediterranean, to the east by the Armenian Highlands, and in the west by the Aegean Sea. The Sea of Marmara forms a connection between the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea through the narrow Bosporus and Dardanelles straits;  Qayṣariyah (قَيصَرِيَه) in Arabic sources is Caesarea Maritima in Greek sources.  It is now Caesarea in modern Israel about 40 km south of Haifa (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890),; Bayrūt of Arabic sources is Berytus in Greek sources.  It is Beirut in modern Lebanon; Gabala in Arabic sources is Jableh in modern Syria about 30 km south of Latakia.; Ladhiqiyyah of Arabic sources is Loadicea at Mare of Greek sources.  It is Latakia in modern northwestern Syria (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890).
135. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179, 194, 205, 213.
136. Yāfah of Arabic sources is Jaffa of later times, now a neighbourhood of Tel Aviv-Yafo in modern Israel; Rafaḥ in Arabic sources is Rafah in Gaza strip of modern Palestine; Ṭarṭūs (طَرطُوس) in Arabic sources is Antradus in Greek sources.  It is Tortosa of Crusaders and Tartus in modern northeastern Syria; Acre in Arabic sources is Antiochenes in Greek sources.  It is Acre in modern Israel about 25 km north of Haifa; Tyre in Arabic sources is Tyrrus of Greek sources.  It is Tyre/Sūr in modern southern Lebanon; Ṣaffūriyah is an unidentified place;  Sidon in Arabic sources is Sidon/ Ṣayda about 40 km south of Beirut in modern Lebanon; ‘Irqah, is an unidentified place; Jubail in Arabic is Byblus in Greek sources.  It is Byblos/Jbeil in modern Lebanon about 40 km north of Beirut.
137. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 166.
138. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),244.
139. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 47.
140. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 22.
141. Niṣībayn (  نِصِيبَين ) of Arabic sources is Nisibis of Greek sources.   It is Nusaybin in modern Southeastern Turkiye.
142. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 199.
143. For Qinnasrin see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),223.  For Antakiya see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 227.
144. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179.
145. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240.
146. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240). 
147. Iconium is Konya in modern south-central Turkiye.  See: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240).  Caesarea in Cappadocia is Qaiṣariyah of Arabic sources and Kayseri in modern central Turkiye.  See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240.
148. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 242.  For Umar’s wish to establish Taurus as a border see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.
149. Walter, Kaegi E. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 240.
150. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 243.
151. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232.  See also: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160.
152. Eutychius, (Annales) Das Annalenwerk des Eutychios von Alexandrien; ausgewahlte Geschichten und Legenden Kompiliert von Sa’īd ibn Baṭrīq um 935 AD, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium ed. and trans. M. Breydy, (Louvain: L. Durbecq, 1985).  See also (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 166.
153. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),767.
154. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 208, 209.
155. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 209.  See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),776.
156. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 210.
157. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 223.
158. See the dialogues of Doctrina Jacobi: Nathanael G. Bonwetsch (ed.), “Doctrina Lacobi nuper baptizati”, in Abhandlungen der Koiglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen.  Philologisch-Historische Klasse: n.F., Band 12, Nro. 3.  (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1910) Reprint: Liechtestein: Kraus, 1970.  1 – 91.
159. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 244.
160. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  189.
161. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 186, 187.
162. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 165.
164. J. Moorhead, “The Monophysite Response to the Arab Invasions,” Byzantion 51 (1981) 579 – 91).¹⁶³  Even if we totally reject the idea that anti-Chalcedonian communities of Syria, and later Egypt, did not actively support Muslim invaders, still it is likely that prolonged persecution at the hands of the Chalcedonian authorities in the late sixth and early seventh centuries had alienated anti-Chalecedonians and made them more amenable to an accommodation with Arab rule, once the initial period of fighting and uncertainty had ended and it had become clear that the Arabs were going to leave people to practice their own faith in peace as long as they paid jizya. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 97.).
165. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219.
166. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.  For the numbers killed in Plague also see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),159.
167. For the name of the plague see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215.  For the reason of the name see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), P780, footnote 1001.
168. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215.  See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
169. For Shuraḥbīl bin Ḥassana see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.  For Yazīd bin Abu Sufyan see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
170. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219.
171. Abu Ubayda had instructed Amr bin As to capture the sea coast of the province of the Jordan after he relieved him of his duty of besieging Jerusalem.  Initially, Mu’awiya bin Abu Sufyan had gone as a reinforcement to Amr bin As.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179.
172. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),97, 98.
173. Balādhuri says that Heraclius was in Constantinople by that time and was still instigating the Greek population of the region.  See: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 179.
174. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215, 269 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
175. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 219.
176. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 216, 780.  AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 40, annus mundi 6129.
177. Mu’awiya was seventy-eight years old at the time of his death in 680 CE.  (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 92, Year 60.).
178. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī,  The life of Muḥammad:kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 103, 240, 311.
179. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 594.
180. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
181. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 166.
182. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 180.
183. For details of messages see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 27, 28.
184. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 256.
185. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 254. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.  See also: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 244.
186. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.
187. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 254.
188. Zandah is unidentified.
189. The Iyad were residents of northern Syria and western Mesopotamia.
190. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.
191. Habib bin Maslama started his military career as a soldier when he participated in the first siege of Damascus.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 172). Later, he participated in the Battle of Yarmouk.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 208.  After the Battle of Yarmouk, he got the role of battalion leader in small campaigns, like the attack and surrender of Qinnasrin. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232.).  After the completion of the capture of northern Syria, Rashidun Caliphate transferred his services to the campaign in Jazira where he also led small campaigns, like the campaign against Malaṭyah, under the supervision of Iyad bin Ghanm.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 289.  For the tribal affiliation of Habib bin Maslama see: Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750),  ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 56, Year 42.
192. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),788.
193. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 166.
194. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 768.
195. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 284.
196. For doubling the sadaqah see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 284.
197. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 285.
198. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 147.
199. Georgius Cyprius, Le Synekdemos d’Hierokles et l’Opuscule Geographique de Georges de Chypre, ed. and trans. Ernst Honigmann.  (Brussels: Editions de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et slaves, 1939), 63 – 64.  See also: Louis Dillemann, Haute Mesopotamie orientale et pays adjacents.  Contribution a la geographie historique de la region, du V siècle avent l’ere chretienne au VI siècle de cette ere (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1962).
200. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 150.
201. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 150.
202. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 158.
203. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 269, 227 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
204. Iyad bin Ghanm was the son of Abu Ubayda’s paternal first cousin.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 72.
205. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 270.
206. Walter, Kaegi E. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146.
207. For the date see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 40, annus mundi 6130.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67.  Ya’qubi informs that this army conquered Jazira without any difficulty: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.
208. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 269, 276, 277, 279 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),780.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160.
209. Raqqa in Arabic sources is Callinicum in Greek sources.  It is Ar Raqqa in modern Syria; Urfā al-Rhua or simply Ruha of Arabic sources is Edessa in Greek sources.  It is Sanliurfa in Modern Southeastern Turkiye; Diyarbakir in Arabic sources is Amida in Greek sources.  It is Diyarbakir in modern Southeastern Turkiye; ‘Ayn al Wardah in Arabic sources is modern Ras al-Ayn/Sari Kani in northeastern Syria; Dniṣar in Arabic sources is Monokarton in Greek sources. It is Kiziltepe in modern Southeastern Turkiye; Mardīn in Arabic sources is Izala in Greek sources. It is Mardin in modern Southeastern Turkiye; the region of Ṭūr ‘Abdīn of Arabic sources consisted of a hilly region of the eastern half of Mardin province of modern Turkiye; For the location of Niṣībayn see above; Daras in Arabic sources is Anastasiopolis in Greek sources.  It is the village of Oguz about 40 Km southeast of Batman, in modern Southeastern Turkiye; Khābūr in Arabic sources is Peroz-Shapur in Pahlavi sources.  It is modern Faysh Khabur in northwestern Iraq;  Sinjār in Arabic sources is Singara in Greek sources. It is the village of Sinjar in modern northeastern Iraq; Qarqisiya in Arabic sources is Circesium in Greek sources, modern Busayra in eastern Syria; Mosul in modern Iraq; Hīt in Arabic sources is Heet in the northeast of Ramadi in modern Iraq.
210. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 276, 277.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160.
211. Tella is an unidentified location.
212. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67, 160.
213. Michael the Syrian, The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriarch of the Syrians, ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, (Long Branch, N. J.: Sources of the Armenian Traditions,  2013).
214. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 175.
215. For the name Miṣr see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346.
216. Herodotus, Geography of Herodotus, ed. and trans. J. Talboys Wheeler (London: Logman Brown, 1854), 351, 352.
217. Danille Bonneau, Le regime administrative de l’eau du Nil dans l’Egypte grecque, romaine et byzantine. Probleme der Agyptologie 8, (Leiden: Brill, 1993)  Also see: Andrew Watson, Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
218. Egypt had established a sound position as a net exporter of grain by mid of fifth century CE.  During a politico-religious clash between Emperor Marcian and the Egyptian church, the emperor had to assure the smooth supply of grain from Egypt.  (Theodore Anagnostes, Epitome 362 in Gunther Christian Hansen, Sokrates Kirchengeschichte, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 102.  AND Theophanis, Chronographia. Ed. Carolus de Boor, (Leipzig: Aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1883), 106 – 107.
219. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 68.
220. For a contemporary record of the existence of the state of Nubia between Egypt and Ethiopia see inscriptions RIEth 190 and RIEth 271.  Etienne Bernand, Abrahamm J.. Drewes, and Roger Schneider, Recueil des inscriptions de ‘Ethiope des periodes pre-exoumite et axoumite. Paris: diffusion de Boccard.  1991.
221. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 68.
222. A good read on pre-Islamic Egypt can be: Roger S. Bagnall, Egypt in Late Antiquity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
223. In the fourth century CE, John the Arab was a scribe for a dromedary of a garrison stationed at Kysis, in the Kharga Oasis. (Papyrus O. Douch V 526.
224. A mid-fifth century CE papyrus from the town of Antaiopolis accuses them of being raiders and criminals.  (Archive of Dioscoros: P. Cair. Masp. I 67009, I. r 22 and v 17 – 18.
225. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 54.  See also: R. Altheim-Stiehl, “The Sasanians in Egypt – Some evidence of Historical Interest,” Bulletin de la Societe d’Archeologie Copte 31 (1992), PP 87 – 96. AND Touraj Daryaee, Middle Persian Papyri from the Sasanian Occupation of Egypt in the Seventh Century (1), (Fullerton: California State University, 2003), 1 – 7 AND Patrick Sanger, “The Administration of Sasanian Egypt: New Masters and Byzantine Continuity,” Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies 51 (2011): 653 – 665.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 69.
226. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 184.
227. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  190.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 91.
228. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 276.
229. Nikephoros, Nikephoros Patriarch of Constantinople short history ed. and trans. Cyril Mango (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1990). Paragraph 23.
230. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 106.
231. Alexandria is Iskandriyah (اِسكَندرِيَه) of early Islamic sources and still exists in Egypt with the same name.
232. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),776.
233. Amr bin As was ninety-eight years old at the time of his death in 663 CE: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 894
234. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 96.
235. Amr bin As had laid siege to Qaisariyah, the provincial capital of Palestine.  He had taken a leave of absence to see Umar during his visit to Jerusalem.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 213.
237. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335.], ²³⁶For the events of the Arab invasion of Egypt from the Muslim point of view see also: Ibn ‘Abd al Hakam, Kitāb Futuḥ Miṣr wa Akhbāraha, ed. Charles Torry, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1922. The book is in Arabic.  Ibn  Abd al-Hakam died in 870 CE at Fustat.  For critical review of the history of Ibn Abd al-Hakam see:  Robert Brunschvig, “Ibn ‘Abdallah’akam et la conquete de l’Afrique du Nord par les Arabes.” Annales de l’institu d’Etude Orientalies V. 6 (1942 – 44), 108 – 155.  AND Robert Brunschvig, “Ibn ‘Abdallah’akam et la conquete de l’Afrique du Nord par les Arabes.” Al-Andalus 40 (1975): 129 – 180.
238. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),776.
239. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 337.
240. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),776, 777.
241. Baladhuri gives the number of the army to be twelve thousand.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 336.  Ya’qūbī gives the figure of four thousand which sounds more realistic. Moreover, Ya’qubi asserts that Umar sent this army at the request of Amr when he failed to subjugate Alyunah after a prolonged siege.  Furthermore, Ya’qubi shows Zubayr bin Awwam as one of many in the army, which is also reasonable, because we don’t hear of Zubayr’s meritorious deeds in Egypt beyond the conquest of Alyunah.  See:  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.  John of Nikiu agrees with both assertions of Ya’qubi. The number of reinforcements was four thousand and that Umar sent it at Amr’s request.  See: John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),
242. The men Umar sent to Egypt were waiting in Medina for Umar’s orders to assault Antakya.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 336).
243. Steffan Timm, Das christlich-koptiche Agypten in arabischer Zeit 5, Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 1991), 2146.
244. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 336.
245. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),786.
246. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 184.  Hoyland expands it to the winter of 639/640 CE.  Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 70.
247. For dating of John of Nikiu see: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 153 AND John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), introduction.
248. Nikiu was a small town two thirds between Alexandria and Alyūnah.
249. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 178.
250. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  180.  Hoyland agrees with John of Nikiu.  He argues that Amr might be mindful of the logistics of supplies. He occupied an oasis before advancing into towns.  Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 70.
251. Fājūm of John of Nikiu is Fayyūm of Arabic sources.  It is modern Faiym, an oasis about 100 km Southwest of Cairo.
252. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 336. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.  Ibn Abd al-Hakam doesn’t give the name of the first community that fell into the hands of Amr bin As but clearly tells that the surrender of Fajum was after the conquest of Alexandria and it was attained without much resistance.  He, further, gives the impression that the oasis was not known to the invading army. They discovered it just by chance. See: Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 280 – 284.
253. Farama/Fayyum in Arabic sources is Pelusium in Greek sources.  It was located a few kilometres away from the Mediterranean on the eastern edge of the Nile Delta; its ruins (modern Tel el Farama) are about 25 km east of the Suez Canal.
254. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.
255. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 336.
256. Alyūnah is Babylon of John of Nikiu (John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  182; Umm Dunayn of Ya’qubi (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777); Bāb al Yūn of Tabari  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 163); Fusṭāṭ ( فُسطاط ) in later Islamic sources (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 335, 336); and modern-day Cairo area. (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 70).  The ruins of Fusṭāṭ are located between the center of present-day Cairo and Ma’adi, its posh neighbourhood to the south. Some remnants from the past are a Roman fortress (Babylon), a number of Christian churches including the oldest existing church in the world (al-Mo’allaqa), a synagogue (Ben Ezra), a Coptic monastery (Mar Girgis), a large number of villas and aqueducts and the mosque of Amr Bin As. It is partly excavated, partly submerged in the rising groundwater and partly covered by debris of the pottery kilns that were active in later centuries.  The site has been evacuated and fenced to protect it.  Southeast of the ruins of Fusṭāṭ are the Fatimid tombs called ‘the seven sisters’ (Seba Binaat).  Between Seba Binaat and Fustat are unfinished building projects, including a four-lane motorway, and another set of ruins contemporary with later phases of Fusṭāṭ.  After starting in the 7^th century, Fusṭāṭ was slowly abandoned as the center of power moved north, first to the city around the mosque of Ibn Tulun and later to the citadel of the walled city of Salah al-Din.
257. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 337.
258. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 338.
259. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 338.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 73.
260. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 338. 
261. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 341, 342.
262. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 340.
263. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 340, 341.
264. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 342.
265. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  188.
266. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 339.
267. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  188.
268. Blue and Green were the colours of politico-religious fractions in Byzantine Rome.  The Blues were Monophysites and generally lower classes, the Greens were Orthodox and generally upper classes.
269. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  184, 185.  See also: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 617.  AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
270. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916),
271. See details: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134.
272. See also: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 617.
273. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134, 135.
274. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 135. See also: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 618.
275. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 74.
276. Constans II is Qustintin in Arabic sources.  See: Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 312.
277. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),   196, 97, 98. AND Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985),  134.  See also: AND Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66.  Kaegi gives the date as November 641 CE for this incident.  See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67, 184.
278. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134. see also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66.
279. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 134.
280. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66.
281. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 137.  AND Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 42 annus mundi 6136.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 66.
282. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67, 184.
283. Current location: Austrian National Museum (PERF no. 556). For details see: A. Grohmann, From the World of Arabic Papyri, (Cairo: Al-Maaref Press, 1952), 115 – 116.
284. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346.
285. Location of Kariūn is unknown.  Probably it was a small village outside the city walls of Alexandria.
286. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 189.
287. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 52.
288. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346.
289. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346, 347. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.
290. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),777.
291. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 191.
292. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  199.
293. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 340.
294. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 184.
295. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  189.
296. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 193, 194.
297. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  200.  See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 344.  See also: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 617.  The anonymous chronicler of 741 CE describes Alexandria as the most ancient and prosperous city of Egypt.
298. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 347.
299. For this date see:  Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),75.  Baladhuri gives the year to be 642 CE.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 346.  Ya’qubi asserts that Alexandria had fallen to Rashidun Caliphate by end of 641 CE.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 786.  Ibn Abd al-Hakam notes that the year was either 641 or 642 CE.  See: Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 295.
300. Current location Austrian National Museum (PERF no. 556). See: P. Soucek, “Early Islamic Seals: Their Artistic And Cultural Importance” in Leaving no Stone Unturned: Essays on the Ancient Near East in Honor of Donald P. Hansen, ed. E. Ehrenberg, (Eisenbrauns: 2002), 247-248.
301. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 347.
302. Muslims released the Coptic political dissidents from the jails but they manhandled them before their release.  See: John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916), 187.
303. John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  200.
304. Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 293.
305. Barqah of Arabic sources is Cyrene of Greek sources.  The city no longer exists.  Some archaeologists believe it was located at Marj in between Benghazi and Bayda in modern Libya.  Others believe it could be Tolmeita about 110 km east of Benghazi at Ad Diriyah.
306. Greek sources called it Cyrenaica as well as Pentapolis.  For Pentapolis see:  John of Nikiu, The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu Trans. R. H. Charles (Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1916),  60.
307. The Mediterranean Sea is Baḥr al-Shām in Arabic sources.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 27.
308. Jacqueline Passon, Klaus Braun, Aniela Jeworutzki, “Across the Vast Land – some Aspects on Libya’s Geography” in Across the Sahara, ed. Klaus Braun and Jacqiueline Passon, (Cham: Springer, 2020), 1 – 22.  For the agricultural value of the land see: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 352.
309. Aziz S. Atiya, A history of Eastern Christianity, London, 1967.
310. Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 285.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79.
311. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 352.  Ibn Abd al-Hakam agrees with Baladhuri.  See: Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 285.
312. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353.
313. Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 285.
314. Luwatah of Arabic sources are Laguatan of Greek sources.  (See: D. J. Mattingly, “The Laguatan: A Libyan Tribal Confederation in the Late Roman Empire”, Libyan Studies 14 (1983): 96 – 108.  See also: Brogan O., “Inscriptions in the Libyan alphabet from Tripolitania and some notes on the tribes of the region”, in Hamito-Semitica: Proceedings of a colloquium held by the Historical Section of the Linguistics Association (Great Britain) at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, on the 18^th 19^th and 20^th March 1970, (The Hague, Mouton, 1970), 267 – 289.
315. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79.  For the Luwata being tribute payers to the Byzantine see: Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 285.
316. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79. AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353, 354.
317. Ya’qūbī ‘s statement that the inhabitants of Barqa were allowed to sell their children to pay Jizya is actually about Berber tribes of this region, made more clear in Baladhuri’s rendition. Caetani points out that it is a reference to the slave trade between tribes of Berbers and the Rashidun Caliphate, whose price was fixed.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789 AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353, 354. AND Leone Caetani, studi di Storia Orientale, (Milano University 1911), P 533, vol IV. Ibn Abd al-Hakam maintains the same tone.  He informs that Amr imposed a Jizya of thirteen thousand Dinars annually on the inhabitants of Barqa and allowed them to sell their children, as they pleased, to raise the amount.
318. For date see: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.  Ibn Abd al-Hakam produces the same scenario but with different dates.  He assigns the year 651 CE to this incident and shows Abdullah bin Sa’d himself leading the army.  He shows the peace treaty as a direct result of the defeat. He admits that Amr had sent Nafi against Nubia after capturing Egypt but assigns the defeat to a later campaign.  See: Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 284, 309.
319. Nubah of early Arabic sources, is Nobadia of Greek sources and Nubiah of later Arabic sources. For the archaeological beauties of Nubia See: Geoff Emberling, Nubia: Ancient Kingdoms of Africa, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.  For an archaeological history of the region see: David N. Edwards, The Nubian Past: An Archaeology of Sudan, London: Routledge, 2004.
320. Sydney Smith, “Events in Arabia in the 6^th century A.D,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 16 (1954): 432.  AND Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 76.
321. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 379 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
322. Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 309.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 380.
323. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 380.
324. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 380.
325. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 379, 380. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 802.  For date see: Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 309.  AND Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 77.
326. Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 309. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 802.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 379, 380.
327. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 78.
328. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 177.
329. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 78.
330. A’la bin Hadhrami had already used the navy (see below).
331. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 177.
332. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789.
333. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85.  Latin writer’s name is ‘Babylon’.  See: The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 617.
334. Photographer Robert S Plate. c. 1924. Current location: University of Chicago.
335. Tripoli is located in modern northwestern Libya.  It is Tarabulus in Arabic sources and Tripolis in Greek sources. The surrounding districts of Tripoli are still known as Tripolitania.  For geography of the area see: Barbara E. Barich, Elena A. A. Garcea, Carlo Giraudi, “Between the Mediterranean and the Sahara: Geoarchaeological reconnaissance in the Jebel Gharbi, Libya”, Antiquity 80 (309) (2015): 567 – 582.
336. Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD), in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 285, 286, 287.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 355. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789.
337. Ya’qubi puts this event in 642 CE, before the defeat of Nubia.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),789.
338. Sabartah is Sabara of early Arabic sources.  Its ruins can be seen at Sabartah in modern Libya.
339. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 355. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789.
340. Ibn Abd al-Hakam gives Umar’s arguments to halt the expansion in another way.  Umar said that it is not Ifriqiyah but mufriqiyah, betraying and betrayed.  (Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 287.).  Egypt was not Umar’s priority.  Amr bin As had dodged Umar to become master of Egypt.  Here Umar expresses his fear that further expansion would simply increase the differences between him and Amr.
341. Ibn ‘Abd el-Ḥakam, “The Mohammedan Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (643 – 705 AD”, in Yale Bicentennial Publications: Biblical and Semitic studies, ed. and trans. Charles Cutler Torrey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 285.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 789 AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353.
342. Waddān of Arabic sources is Waddan in modern Libya; Fazzān of Arabic sources is the district of Fezzan in modern southern Libya; Zawīlah of Arabic sources is Zawilah in modern southern Libya.
343. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 353.
344. Georgius Cyprius, Le Synekdemos d’Hierokles et l’Opuscule Geographique de Georges de Chypre, ed. and trans. Ernst Honigmann.  (Brussels: Editions de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et slaves, 1939), 39, 64 – 6.  See also: Ernst Honigmann, Ostgrenze des byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071. (Brussels: Editions de L’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales, 1935), 16 – 37.  For a historical and geographic introduction to Armenia see: George A. Bournoutain, A Concise History of the Armenian People, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003.
345. Modern Black Sea in English and Baḥr al Aswad of Arabic used to be Ṭarabazundah in early Islamic sources. See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 307.
346. Islamic sources of the 9^th century confuse the whole Caucasus region with Armenia.  See for example: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 305.  It is due to the fact that Arab conquerors put the whole of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia under one administrative unit.  See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 181.
347. Jurzān in Arabic sources is modern Georgia; Tbilisi is located in modern Georgia.  It is Tiflīs (  تِفلِيس ) in Arabic sources, see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi,  Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 35 – 37, 125, vol II.
348. Sisak Hakob Varzhapetean, The Armenians: From Prehistoric Times to the Present, (Chicago: Varjabedian, 1977), 27.
349. Peter Charanis, Studies on the Demography of the Byzantine Empire: Collected studies, (London: Variorum, 1972.  See also: Edmund Herzig, Marina Kurkchiyan, The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of National Identity, (London: Routledge, 2005), 1 – 22.
350. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 51, 52.
351. For recruitment of Armenians in the military of Byzantine Rome see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 54, 55. AND N. H. Baynes, “The Military Operations of Emperor Heraclius,” United Services Magazine N.S. 46 (1913) 526 – 33, 659 – 66.  AND Kaegi, “Two Studies in the Continuity of Byzantine and Late Roman Military Institutions,” Byzantine Forschungen 8 (1982) 87 – 113;  For recruitment of Armenians in the military of Sasanian Iran see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193.
352. George A Bournoutain, A Concise History of the Armenian People: from Ancient times to the present.  Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 88.
353. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 45.
354. To get an idea of Khosrow II Parviz’s advancements in Armenia see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian.  New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985.  See also: H. Hubschmann, “Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen,” Indogermanische Forschungen 16 (1904) 197 – 490.  AND  Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 191.
355. Byzantine Armenia was divided into provinces of Armenia I, II, III and IV.  See: H. Hubschmann, “Armeniens vor und wahrend der Araberzeit,” Zeitschrift fur Armenische Philologie 2 (1904) 50 – 71.  See also: Moses of Chorene, Geographie de Moise de Corene d’apres Ptolenee, ed. and trans. P. Arsene Soukry (Venice: Imprimerie Armenienne, 1881), 36 – 46.  AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 191.
356. Erzurum is located in modern eastern Turkiye.  It is Qalīqalah in Arabic sources, Theodosiopolis in Greek sources, and Karin in Armenian sources; River Gunek, also known as Gunek Sur is a small tributary to River Murat.  The old name of River Murat was River Murad. It is Arsanias of Greek sources.  See: H. M. Government, A Handbook of Mesopotamia Vol. IV prepared Intelligence Division: On behalf of the Admiralty and the War Office, 1917 AND Le strange;  River Batman is a Nymphios of Greek sources; Hasankeyf is located in modern southeastern Turkiye.  It is Ḥiṣn Kayfah in Arabic sources and Kiphas in Greek sources; Khabour is a tributary of Euphrates.  Its name in Arabic sources is Khābūr.  Not to be confused with Khabour Tigris, which is a tributary to Tigris; Busayrah is located at the confluence of the Khabour River and Euphrates in modern northwestern Syria.
357. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 45.
358. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 47, 48.
359. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 47, 48.
360. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 51, 52.
361. Armenians were religiously divided and the central government had substantial opposition there. See: La Narratio de rebus Armeniae, ed. Gerard Garitte (Louvain: L. Durbecq, 1952) 43-47, 258 – 350.
362. Cyril Leo Toumanoff, “The Heraclids and the Arsacids,” Revue des etudes armeniennes 19 (1985): 431 – 4; See also: Walter, Kaegi E., Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 189.
363. Heraclius summoned and personally attended a synod at Thodoriopolis (Erzurum) in 633 CE to unify the Armenian Church with his Monothelite one.  See: Gerard Garittle, La Narratio de rebus Armeniae, (Louvain, L. Durbecq, 1952), 43, 302 – 11.
364. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 181.
365. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 184.
366. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 183.
367. For religious divisions in Armenia at that time see: C. Toumanoff, Studies in Christian Caucasian History, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1963) 476 – 7.  See also: Karekin Sarkissian, The Council of Chalcedon and the Armenian Church (London: Society for Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1965),
368. Hoyland gives the date of October 640 CE for this attack. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 89.  Kaegi thinks it could be the late summer of 640 CE.  See: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193.  Baladhuri considers it to be December 640 CE.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 275.  According to Sebeos, it was November of 640 CE.  See:   Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130.
369. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 192.
370. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193.
371. For the Armenian ethnicity of Heraclius see: Dickran Kouymjian, “Ethnic Origins and the ‘Armenian’ Policy of Heraclius,” Revue des etudes armeniennes 17 (1983) 635 – 42.   AND Henri Gregoire, “An Armenian Dynasty on the Byzantine Throne,” Armenia Quarterly 1.1 (1946).  6 – 17.
372. For details of this raid see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 128, 129, 130.
373. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 192.
374. Baladhuri tells that Iyad reached up to Khilat but Sebeos says he went up to the region of Ararat and Dabil.  See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 129.  AND Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 275.
375. Badlis in Arabic sources is Baghesh of Armenian sources.  It is Bitlis located just to the west of the shores of Van Lake in modern eastern Turkiye; khilat in Arabic sources is Xelat in Armenian sources, modern Ahlat on the western shores of Van Lake in Eastern Turkiye; Ararat is in modern Armenia about 50 Km southeast of Yerevan;  Dabil of Arabic sources is Dwin of Armenian sources.  It is the village of Dvin located 30 km south of Yerevan in modern Armenia.  Dabil was the main town of Armenia.  See: Sergey Vardanyan, The Capitals of Armenia (Yerevan: Apolon, 19995), 109 – 121.
376. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 190,191, 193.
377. Sebeos names him Theodore Rshtuni.  See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130.; Theophanes the Confessor names him Pasagnathes, the Patrician of Armenians.  See: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 44, annus mundi 6143.
378. After the raid on Armenia Iyad Bin Ghanm returned to Homs via Raqqa where Umar appointed him governor over Jazira.  Iyad died immediately after, in 641 CE.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 275 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 780).
379. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 194.
380. For date see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 89.  See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),790.  AND Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 143. Also see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 184, 196.
381. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),790.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 196.
382. Azerbaijan in Arabic sources is Atropatene in Armenian sources and Āṭrpātakāna in Pahlavi sources.
383. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 141, 142, 143.
384. Taylor came across an inscription near Batman Su (Nympheos) in modern Turkiye.  The inscription was dim and the only thing Taylor could figure out was that it was a certain thing built by a certain ‘Uthmān in 643 CE (20 AH).  (J. G. Taylor, “Travels in Kurdistan, with notices of the Sources of the Eastern and Western Tigris, and Ancient Ruins in their Neighborhood”, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 35 (1865): 25.  No other details of the inscription are available.  Anyhow, this inscription verifies Arab presence in Armenia in 643 CE.  Interestingly, Sebeos gives the name of one of the slain Muslim commanders as Uthman. (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 141, 142, 143.).
385. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 90.
386. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164.
387. For use of word ra’iyyah see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),148.
388. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 165.
389. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 340.
390. Ammianus Marcellinus, The Roman history of Ammianus Marcellinus During the Reigns of the Emperors Constantius, Julias, Jovianus, Valentinian, and Valens. Ed and Trans. Charles D. Younge (London: Henry G Bohn, 1862), 25.7.9-13.
391. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232.
392. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 173.
393. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164.
394. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 175.
395. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 277.
396. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 271, 276, 277.
397. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 102.
398. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 232.
399. A. Elad, “The Coastal Cities of Palestine,” Jerusalem Cathedra 2 (1982).) See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 264.
400. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 79.
401. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 244.
402. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 206.
403. The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 615.
404. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
405. Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronicle and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam, trans. R. G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 109.
406.   On the basis of names provided in the source Kaegi calculates that census took place between late 636 and January 641 CE. (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257.
407. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257.
408. Michael Hendy, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 256.
409. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 250.
410. Papiscus and Philo, Dialogue between a Christian and a Jew, ed. Arthur Cushman McGiffert, New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1889.
411. For discussion see: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 78 – 87.
412. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 78.
413. The ‘Khuzistan chronicle’ was written in East Syriac language by an anonymous Nestorian Christian in ca. 660’s CE living somewhere in the eastern provinces of Sasanian Iran. The author is widely believed to be contemporary to early Arab conquests and an eyewitness to some of the events of the conquest of Iran.  (Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Piscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), Introduction: xi AND Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 182. AND Sebastian P. Brock, “Syriac Historical Writing: A Survey of the Main Sources,” Journal of the Iraq Academy, Suriac Corporation 5 (1979 – 180), 25.  The original manuscript, which was housed in the library of the Chaldean monastery in Mosul, Iraq, is missing since the taking of the town by ISIS in 2014. (Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Piscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), Introduction: xi).
414. For its boundaries see: ‘Ali bin Husayn al-Mas’udi, Kitab al-Tanbih wa l Ishraf, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Netherlands: Brill, 2013).
415. Sebeos presents the Persians as a separate ethnic group.  See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 135.
416. Sebeos was an Armenian and the whole of his ‘history’ is based on a divide between ethnic Persians and Armenians:  Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985.
417. Sebeos mentions them as a separate ethnic entity: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 135.
418. For Medes as a separate ethnic entity see: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 135.
420. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 84.  See also: Geo Widengren. ‘The status of the Jews in the Sasanian Empire’, Acta Iranica I, (1961), 117 – 162.  ⁴¹⁹Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 84.  See also: Geo Widengren. ‘The status of the Jews in the Sasanian Empire’, Acta Iranica I, (1961), 117 – 162.
421. Tafazzoli, Ahmad and A. L. Khromov, “Sasanian Iran: Intellectual life,” in B. A. Litvinsky (ed.), History of Civilization of Central Asia III: The Crossroads of Civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. (Delhi: Motilal Barsidass, 1999), 79 – 102. 
422. Erich F. Schmidt Persepolis III, (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1970), 34 – 49 AND W. B. Henning, The Inscription of Naqs-i-Rustam, (London: Lund Humphries, 1957), Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum series part III, vol. II, Portfolio II, AND Philip Huyse, Die dreisprachige Inschrift Sābuhrs I. an der Ka’ba-i-Zardust (SKZ), (London, 1999) Corpus. Inscriptionum Iranicarum III Vol. I, Text I, p 6 – 7.
423. For one of the earliest translations see: M. Sprengling, “Kartīr, Founder of Sasanian Zoroastrianism”, The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures 57 no. 2 (Apr. 1940), 197 – 228.
424. Mary Boyce, Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, (London: Routledge, 1979), 115.
425. Acts of the Apostles of the New Testament describe the acceptance of Christianity among Persians.  See: Acts 2:9.
426. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 8.
427. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 42.
428. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 42.
429. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 42, 43.
430. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 148.
431. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 148.
432. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 66.
433. Ahmad Tafazzoli and A. L. Khromov. Sasanian Iran: intellectual life, (Unesco: Silk road project), P 95 , vol II,
434. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 90.
435. Merv al Shījan (the greater Merv) of Arabic sources is Antiochia in Margiana of Greek sources.  This town was one of the capitals of Khorasan, on the River Murghāb. see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi,  Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Leipzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73),  P 112, vol. V.  Its ruins are located about forty kilometres to the west of Mary in modern Turkmenistan where the Murghab River forms a delta and disappears in marshes.  Merv went extinct in 1788/89.  However, it lost its significance after a massacre in the city at the hands of the Mongol horde in 1221.  (Fredrik T. Hiebert, Kakamyrat Gurbansāhedow and Hubert Schmidt, A Central Asian Village at the Dawn of Civilization, excavations at Anau (University of Pennsylvania) 2003:3.  See also: V A Zhukosky, Razvalinii starogo Merva (St Petersburg, 1894).
436. Mark Dickens, “The Syriac Bible in Central Asia” in The Christian Heritage of Iraq: Collected papers from the Christianity in Iraq I-V Seminar days, eds. Erica C. D. Humter (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, 2009), 105.
437. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 4.
438. All dates of important events of Sasanian history are calculated by a formula.  Sasanian kings used to mint their coins every year with the number of years they had already reigned inscribed on them.  The date of the coronation of King Yazdegerd III is definitely known to be June 16, 632.  This is calculated as the start date and inauguration of the Yazdegerdi calendar.  (W. Hartner, “Old Iranian Calendars,” in Cambridge History of Iran, ed. Ilya Gershevitch(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), P 714 – 92, vol. II).  From this point in time years of important events of Sasanian history can be calculated retrospectively.  Tabari gives the date of Yazdegerd’s coronation as 632 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 40).  Regents might have ruled in Yazdegerd’s name initially.  This assertion gets strong when we hear from Tabari that Yazdagerd’s reign lasted for twenty years.  Out of these four were in peace and quiet and sixteen were in fatigue due to the ruthless warfare of the Arabs against him.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 90).
439. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 4.
440. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 6.
441. Qarqisiya in Arabic sources; Circesium in Greek sources: Busayrah, located at the junction of Euphrates and Khabur rivers in modern Syria.
442. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 8.
443. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),
444. For the defeat of Bahram see:  Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 8 – 10.
445. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 66.
446. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 12 – 14.
447. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Poscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 62 – 64.
448. Qubād II of Pahlavi sources is sometimes referred to as Shroviah  (شىرويه)  by Arabic sources.  This was his nickname. On his coins, he is Qabād or Kavadh II (H. M. Malek, “The coinage of the Sasanian King Kavadh II (A.D. 628),” Numismatic Chronicle 155 (1995), 119 – 120.
449. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115.
450. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115.
451. Anonymous, (the Chronicle of Khuzistan), A Short Chronicle on the End of the Sasanian Empire and Early Islam: 590 – 660 A.D. ed. and trans. Nasir al-Ka’bi (Piscataway, JN: Gorbias Press, 1916), 74
452.   Shahvarāz is Shahbarāz of Arabic sources, Ferukhan of Pahlavi sources and Khorheam of Sebeos.  See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 99.  It is Shahrvaraz in certain Farsi sources.
453. The political picture of Sasanian Iran was so blurred during the civil war that even contemporary and near-contemporary sources fail to agree upon the names and sequence of the rulers during this period.
454. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115.
455. Arabic sources name him the son of Shaharyār.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),222.
456. All sources agree that he was a child and it is confirmed by analysis of his coins which show his beardless face.  (Susan Tyler-Smith, “Coinage in the Name of Yezdegerd III (A.D. 632 – 651) and the Arab Conquest of Iran,” The Nuministic Chronicle 160 (2000): 135 – 150.)  His exact age at the time of coronation is not certain.  Dinawari gives the age of Yazdegerd at the time of coronation to be sixteen.  (Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 66, 125.).  Tabari places it at seven. Seven appears to be nearer to reality as he was twenty-eight at the time of his death in 651 CE.  See: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 115.
457. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 454, 455.
458. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 437.
459. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 401.
460. Balādhuri gives the date of the Battle of Jisr (Bridge) as November of 634 CE.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 404.  However, like all other dates in the history of early Islam, this date is highly contested.  Hoyland guesses it to be the Autumn of 637 CE.  See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 52.  Tabari gives a date of October 634 CE.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: S