Political Development – I

Prophet Muhammad dies

No other single day is more important in the political history of Islam than the day on which Prophet Muhammad died.  And events of no other single day are as censored as the events of that day. ¹  According to Ibn Ishaq, the Prophet did not nominate any successor. ²  None of the early Islamic sources hold a dissenting opinion from that of Ibn Ishaq. ³, ⁴  Ibn Ishaq’s rendering of the events of the death of the Prophet, anyhow, gives an impression to the reader that question of succession was already in the air when he was hopelessly sick. ⁵

Prophet Muhammad’s funeral prayer had still not been offered when Ansar (Anṣār Helper اَنصار) gathered around Sa’d bin Ubada (Sa’d bin ‘Ubādah سَعد بِن عُباده) in the Community Hall of Banu Saida (Saqīfah Banū Sā’idāh, سقيفه بنو ساعده) and Ali bin Abu Talib (‘Alī bin Abu. Ṭālib عَلى بِن ابُو طالِب), Zubayr bin Awwam (Zubayr bin ‘Awwām     زُبَير بن عوّام), and Talha bin Ubaydullah (Ṭalḥah bin Ubaydallah طَلحَه بِن عُبَيد اُللّه) separated themselves in Fatima’s (Fāṭimāh فاطِمَه) house.  The rest of the Muhajirun (Muhājirūn مُهاجِرُون) gathered around Abu Bakr. ⁶, ⁷  The only clan of Ansar who gathered around Abu Bakr was Abdul Ashhal (‘Abdu’l Ashhal عبدالاشهل) of Aws under their leader Usayd bin Hudayr (Usayd bin Ḥuḍayr اُسَيد بِن هُضير). ⁸  Air of Medina was partisan. Prophet’s family locked their door with the body of the Prophet inside.⁹

Prophet Muhammad had insisted on the army of Usama bin Zayd (Usāma bin Zayd اُسامَة بِن زَيد) to leave Medina on the first day of his illness, but they pitched camp one stage outside Medina awaiting the outcome of the Prophet’s illness.  This army contained many early Muhajirun.  When the illness got more serious, the army returned the next day of the illness. ¹⁰  So almost the whole population of the town was in Medina on the day of the Prophet’s death.

Abu Bakr selected as caliph

On hearing the news that all clans of Aws and Khazraj, except Abdul Ashhal of Aws, were in a meeting at the Community Hall of Banu Saida, a group of Muhajirun rushed to them.¹², ¹³  They could be many in number, but those who spoke on the occasion were Abu Bakr and Umar bin Khattab (‘Umar bin Khaṭṭāb عُمَر بِن خَطّاب). ¹⁴, ¹⁵   The Ansar present there wished to proclaim Sa’d bin Ubada of Saida clan of Khazraj as caliph (Khalīfah خَلِيفَه) of the Prophet. ¹⁶, ¹⁷  At that moment Sa’d was acting not only as a leader of Khazraj but of almost all of Ansar. ¹⁸  As soon as the group of Muhajirun confronted them they changed their stance. They asked for two separate caliphs, one for the Muhajirun and the other for the Ansar. ¹⁹  This development gives a clue to Donner that actually they just wanted ‘home rule’. ²⁰  The arguments that ensued between supporters of Sa’d bin Ubada and the Muhajirun under the leadership of Abu Bakr, Umar bin Khattab and Abu Ubayda bin Jarrah (Abū Ubaydah bin al Jirrāḥ اَبُو عُبَيده بِن اَلجِراح ) were so heated that, according to Ibn Ishaq, the two could plunge into violence. ²¹  In any case, violence did not take place.  The strength of logic subdued the passions.  The most powerful reason floated that day came from the tongue of Abu Bakr, “Arabs will recognize authority only in this clan of Quraysh, they being the best of Arabs in blood and country”.²² Guillaume opines that the Ansar could quickly assess that they were not in a position of war and that they would have to assume a subordinate role.²³, ²⁴, ²⁵

Obviously, Medinite Quraysh had joined hands with the Meccan Quraysh just two and half years ago.  They were rich and willing to support a candidate from Quraysh.²⁶  Point to note is that Abu Bakr did not say that Quraysh should be rulers as the Prophet was born among them.  Rather they should rule because other Arabs would respect their superior genealogy.  Abu Bakr’s words proved to be predictive.  For many centuries to come the caliph was from Quraysh.

The bitterness that aroused in Umar’s mind that day against Ansar, never subsided.  It is only Umar who is reported to have used rough language against Sa’d bin Ubada during the debate.²⁷  Later on, none of Ansar ever got any high office in the government until Umar’s death.  None of them became a general or a governor.  They could get jobs in the army as ordinary soldiers or at the maximum field commanders.  They never were promoted higher than middle-ranking officials in the civil services. ²⁸  The bitterness can be traced on the Ansar’s side as well.  They took part in the Ridda Wars but used to undermine the authority of the supreme commander of the force who always happened to be one of the Quraysh. For example, they objected strongly to fighting under Khalid bin Walid (Khālid bin Walīd خالِد بِن وَلِيد) against the Tulayha. Abu Bakr had to appoint one of them as commander over them instead of Khalid.²⁹  Umar never divulged his policy of excluding Ansar from high-profile jobs publicly.  Instead, he used diplomacy to avoid appointing an Ansar, whenever any such situation arose.  For instance, when he sent a small army to fight in the Battle of Jisr, he appointed Abu Ubaid bin Mas’ud of Thaqif (Thaqīf  ثَقِيف ) as its commander.  Salit bin Qays (Saliṭ bin Qays   سَلِط بِن قَيس) of Ansar, a veteran of Badr, was in this army.  Umar said to him, “Had it not been for the fact that thou art too hasty, I would have put thee in chief command. But warfare is a stubborn thing, and only the cautious man is fit for it.³⁰

After curtailing the aspirations of the Ansar, the group of Muhajirun aptly presented its own candidate from one of the Quraysh.  He was sixty-one-year-old Abu Bakr of the Taym clan of Quraysh, a merchant by vocation.³¹  All present there diligently committed allegiance to him except Sa’d bin Ubada.³², ³³

While seconding Abu Bakr’s candidacy Umar established another principle that dominated Muslim politics throughout the life of the Rashidun Caliphate.  He convinced everybody (or at least the Muhajirun who were present there) that Abu Bakr was ‘the best’.³⁴  Now, sources are quiet about what exactly did Umar mean by this phrase.  We are left on our own to compare all those present on that occasion with Abu Bakr and to find out what was ‘the best’ in him.  Abu Bakr had an impressive curriculum vitae.  He associated himself with Islam from the very beginning. ³⁵  He financed the Islamic movement in Mecca at a time when the resources of Muslims were meagre. ³⁶  He used his purse to finance the Immigration of the Prophet and he paid for the land of the mosque of the Prophet. ³⁷  During later years the Prophet provided Abu Bakr with some financial resources. Abu Bakr got an estate from the lands of Nadir in 626 CE.³⁸  Prophet Muhammad always remained thankful to Banu Hashim (Banū Hāshim بَنُو هاشِم) and Banu Muttalib (Banu al-Muṭṭalib بَنُو المُطّلِب) for their support during the boycott. Defending his decision to allocate permanent shares from his fifth of the booty of Khaybar to members of Banu Hashim and Banu Muttalib, the Prophet expressed his thankfulness to them vividly.  The only person who did not belong to either of these two clans but still got a share was Abu Bakr.³⁹  Abu Bakr was the most trusted advisor to the Prophet.  From Badr to Fath Mecca (Fathe Makkah, the conquest of Mecca, فَتِح مكّة) there is not a single occasion of political importance when the Prophet did not seek his opinion. ⁴⁰  Anyhow, the Prophet did not appoint him a general or a field commander during any of the campaigns.  The Prophet used to choose comparatively young men for this kind of job.  The only known expedition during which Abu Bakr led a small Muslim battalion was that towards Nejd.⁴¹ This campaign had no significance in propping up Islam as a leading force in Hejaz.  None of those present at the Hall of Banu Saida was associated with Islam longer than Abu Bakr and none of them was as steadfast with Islam as was Abu Bakr.  Umar established ‘earlier acceptance of Islam and deep commitment to it’ as ‘the best’ in Abu Bakr. ⁴²

Humans are naturally hierarchical. ⁴³  In theory, Islam considered all its adherents equal.  Practically, hierarchy was well entrenched among Muslims at the time of the death of Prophet Muhammad.  Once Prophet Muhammad sent Mu’adh bin Jabal (Mu’ādh bin Jabal مُعاذ بِن جَبَل) as his messenger to Zur’ah bin Dhi Yazan, a Himyar who had accepted Islam. In his paper of credentials, the Prophet introduces Mu’adh as one of the righteous among his immediate companions. ⁴⁴, ⁴⁵  It means some companions of the Prophet were ‘his immediate’ – his inner circle.  And even in that inner circle there was a hierarchy, some were ‘righteous’.  Umar did not have to argue with those present at the Hall of Banu Saida that Abu Bakr was the most senior in the hierarchy.  They understood it.  This is the only reason, although Abu Bakr had floated the idea that the caliph would be only from the Quraysh, none of the prominent Quraysh contested with Abu Bakr for leadership.  It includes those men of Quraysh who were still in Mecca and could have challenged Abu Bakr later on if they wished, like Abu Sufyan (Abū Sufyān اَبُو سُفيان ).⁴⁶

Ibn Ishaq doesn’t report any overt political discord among the Muhajirun at the time of the selection of the first caliph. Though, according to Ibn Ishaq’s rendition of the events, ambitions ran high among the two surviving male relatives of Prophet Muhammad.  During the final illness of Prophet Muhammad, Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib (‘Abbās bin ‘Abdul Muṭṭalib عَبّاس بِن عَبدُالمُطَّلِب), paternal uncle of the Prophet suggested to Ali bin Abu Talib to ask the Prophet “if authority is to be with us, we shall know it, and if it is to be with others we will request him to enjoin the people to treat us well” but Ali refused, saying, “if it is withheld from us none after him will give it to us”. ⁴⁷  Ya’qubi claims that when the group of Muhajirun returned to downtown Medina, where the mosque of the Prophet stood, the group of people who were present in the house of Fatima, probably mourning the death of the Prophet as his household members, denied taking an oath of allegiance with Abu Bakr. Here Ya’qubi gives a list of people who refused to take an oath of allegiance, including both Quraysh and Ansar.  They were Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, Fadl bin Abbas (Faḍl bin ‘Abbās  فَضَل بِن عَبّاس ), Zubayr bin Awwam, Khalid bin Sa’id (Khālid bin Sa’īd خالِد بِن سَعِيد ), Miqdad bin Amr (Miqdād bin Amr مِقداد بِن عَمرؤ ), Salman Farsi (Salmān al  Fārsi سَلمان الفارسى ), Abu Dharr Ghifari (Abu Dharr al Ghifari اَبُو ذَرّ الغِفارى ), Ammar bin Yasir (Ammar bin Yasir عَمّار بِن ياسِر ), Bara bin Azib (Barā’ Bin ‘Āzib بَراء بِن عازِب ) and Ubayy bin Ka’b.^{46, 47}  [Conspicuous absence from this group is that of Usama bin Zayd.].  Ya’qubi also asserts that Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, Fadl bin Abbas and ‘Utba bin Abu Lahab openly demanded that the caliph should be one of Banu Hashim. However, Ya’qubi insists that Ali forbade all of them from saying so. ⁴⁸, ⁴⁹  Tabari, who is chronologically four decades after Ya’qubi, also reports such events but in a softer tone.⁵⁰

Meticulous examination of Islamic sources establishes a diagnosis of difference in opinion among early Muhajirun rather than a row.  The group in Fatima’s house expected the caliph to be from the Hashim clan of Quraysh rather than from Taym.  This group was not in a position to make demands due to insufficient support from other clans of Quraysh.⁵¹  Ya’qubi reports that the majority had accepted Abu Bakr as caliph.⁵²

The matter was settled amicably.  Tabari shows Ali, Zubayr, Talha and Abdullah bin Mas’ud (‘Adballah bin Mas’ūd عَبداُللّه بِن مَسعُود) participating in the defence of Medina against intruders under orders of Abu Bakr just a few days after his selection.⁵³  Ya’qubi informs us that the people who refused to take the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr on the first day of the death of the Prophet, gradually started taking the oath,  the last being Ali, six months down ‘Abu Bakr’s tenure.⁵⁴, ⁵⁵

The change of mind among ‘Mensheviks’ of Muhajirun could be due to victories in Ridda Wars which Abu Bakr started securing one after another.  Tabari asserts that by the time of the death of Fatima, six months after the selection of Abu Bakr, Ali had lost the attention of people, which he used to get.  Hesitantly, he sought a one-on-one meeting with Abu Bakr. In this meeting, they discussed the matter of Prophet Muhammad’s inheritance and Ali’s perception that the Hashim clan had a right to the caliphate.  Abu Bakr didn’t inch back from his position on both of these matters.  After that meeting, all of Banu Hashim took the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr.⁵⁶  Actually, Ya’qubi shows Ali to be in the post of advisor to Abu Bakr as early as the beginning of 634 CE when the Rashidun Caliphate invaded Byzantine Syria.⁵⁷

Reports of deviating meetings and debates around the selection of the first caliph tend to strengthen the authenticity of Abu Bakr’s later statement, ‘I took caliphate (khilāfat) because I knew that people were in dispute and I feared that they would be destroyed.⁵⁸  And contradictions in those reports of meetings and debates strengthen our suspicion that the events of the day the Prophet died are highly censored.

Leader of prayer

The leader of ritual prayer (ṣalāt) earns a stamp of seniority among Muslims. ⁵⁹  Though the Prophet used to appoint others to lead a prayer on occasions when he was not physically present, the only occasion when he himself offered prayer under the lead of another person was on the way to Tabuk (Tabūk تَبُوك).  The Prophet was late while performing ablutions (wuzū) and the Muslims tipped Abdur Rahman bin Awf (‘Abd ar Reḥmān bin ‘Awf عَبد اُلرَحمان بِن عَوف) to lead the prayer.  The Prophet later joined them, giving a nod to Abdur Rahman to continue with the lead.⁶⁰  Traditions from many different sources mention that Prophet Muhammad ‘ordered’ Abu Bakr to lead the prayer during his final days. ⁶¹  Abu Bakr might have got a token of seniority in religion by this act of the Prophet, he definitely didn’t get an emblem of political leadership. ⁶²  After the Prophet’s death, the Muhajirun didn’t use the honour Abu Bakr earned by leading the prayer during the lifetime of the Prophet as an argument that the Prophet had tipped him as a potential caliph.⁶³

Abu Bakr takes oath

On June 8, 632 CE, the next day of bickering in the Hall of Banu Saida, Umar asked everybody present in the Prophet’s mosque to swear fealty to Abu Bark and everybody present did it.  In his acceptance speech, Abu Bakr said, “Obey me as long as I obey Allah and His Apostle, and if I disobey them you owe me no obedience.” ⁶⁴  Abu Bakr effectively defined the governing principle of the theocracy he was going to preside over.  Obedience to the caliph (and state) was not unconditional.  It was subject to a condition that the caliph (and the state) would function within the limits of religious doctrine.

It appears that the powers and responsibilities of a caliph were similar to those of Prophet Muhammad with one exception.  The caliph was not receiving revelations.  In this sense, he was caliph to the Prophet and not caliph to Allah.  The concept of a caliph to Allah was a late development. ⁶⁵

What Abu Bakr had accepted, was not a glamorous position at that point in time.  It was the most difficult job.  Muslims were internally divided.  Tribes previously loyal to the Islamic state of Medina were perplexed.   People in many parts of Arabia were discarding the older form of organization – tribal confederation.  Instead, they were organizing themselves in newer forms – religious fraternities. In this scenario, Abu Bakr desperately needed to generate support at a grass-root level for his caliphate.  Aisha says, “After the death of the Prophet, what befell my father would have softened the firm mountains if it had befallen them.  Hypocrisy in Medina exalted itself, and the Arabs apostatized from their faith.  By Allah, not a point they disagreed upon, which my father did not cause to disappear as something without which Islam could do.” ⁶⁶

Abu Bakr picks a deputy

The army of Usama had returned to Medina due to the illness of Prophet Muhammad.  When it was ready to depart after the death of the Prophet, Abu Bakr asked Usama to spare Umar from military duty so he could assist Abu Bakr in running the affairs of the state.⁶⁷  Abu Bakr didn’t create an office of deputy caliph formally.  Still, we don’t hear of a single decision of political significance taken by Abu Bakr in which Umar had not given inputs.  Moreover, on many occasions, Umar alone registered his dissent from the decisions of Abu Bakr.  Furthermore, we don’t hear of other inputs that might have helped Abu Bakr in changing his mind.  Umar was effectively deputy to Abu Bakr throughout his reign.  Islamic sources knew it.  Ya’qubi informs us that the only person who had a great influence on Abu Bakr was Umar. ⁶⁸  Tabari also writes many traditions expressing this theme. ⁶⁹

Rashidun Caliphate is born

Mainstream Islamic historians and scholars of the mid-9^th century gravitate towards the idea that there was a ‘just golden rule’ at the beginning of Islam, followed by a ‘tyranny’.  They named that just golden rule, the era of rightly guided caliphs – khulafa ur Rāshidūn  (خُلَفاءُالراشِدون).⁷⁰  Mid-9^th century Islamic historians and scholars unanimously believe that the process of revelation had stopped by the death of Prophet Muhammad.⁷¹  However, they believe, that somehow Allah was guiding the Rashidun caliphs directly.  Baladhuri puts words in Abdullah bin Mus’ud’s mouth, “Allah ordered Abu Bakr to fight with them [apostatizing tribes].” ⁷²

The debate about who should be included in Rashidun caliphs and who should be excluded was finally settled when a highly respected Baghdadi scholar Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 855 CE) agreed that Ali was one of Rashidun caliphs.  He had been excluding Ali from the list in his earlier views. When questioned by his colleagues about his change of heart, he replied that since caliph Umar bin Khattab “was satisfied with the idea of Ali as caliph of the Muslims . . .  and since Ali called himself commander of the faithful, who am I to say that he was not?”⁷³

The final list drawn by mainstream Islamic historians and scholars included the first four caliphs, Abu Bakr (632 – 634 CE), Umar (634 – 644 CE), Uthman (644 – 656 CE) and Ali (656 – 661 CE) as rightly guided caliphs.⁷⁴  A small number of Muslim historians and scholars disagreed.  For them, the rightful caliphate had started with Ali and got interrupted quickly by Ali’s assassination.⁷⁵

For most of its life, Medina served as the capital of the Rashidun Caliphate, also called Medinan Caliphate.  During the last four years of the Rashidun Caliphate, Kufa served as its capital.  The ruler of the Rashidun Caliphate held wide-ranging powers – all the powers that Prophet Muhammad had.  He was the head of the executive branch of government, he was the sole lawmaker of the country, he was the supreme commander of the army, he was the chief justice of the land and he was the final religious authority over Muslims living anywhere in the world.

Abu Bakr picks administration

Never does a ruler rule all alone.  It is always a team effort.  As a bottom line, it is derogative of the ruler to appoint a government of his choice after attaining power.  He strives to appoint his trusted people who usually have been supporting him before his elevation to power. It guarantees the smooth functioning of his government.  All the governors and generals Abu Bakr appointed during two years and two months of his tenure were members of Quraysh.  Some of them had converted to Islam after Fath Mecca.⁷⁷  The fact gives indirect evidence that in addition to the Quraysh of Medina, who went to the Hall of Banu Saida with him, it was the Quraysh residents of Mecca who supported his appointment as caliph.

Inheritance of the Prophet and the case of Fadak

The first legal case Abu Bakr had to judge as chief justice of the country was the inheritance of Prophet Muhammad.  The Prophet had four daughters and three sons from Khadija.⁷⁸, ⁷⁹  He had one son from Maria the Coptic (Māriah Qibṭiya ماريةُ القبِطيه), the slave girl gifted to him by Muqawqis (Māqūqus مَقُوقَس) of Egypt. ⁸⁰, ⁸¹  All of the Prophet’s children had died in his lifetime except Fatima.⁸²  He was also survived by nine of his wives.⁸³  They were all heirs to the Prophet’s property.⁸⁴

The Prophet had three properties.  Agricultural land in Medina from Nadir; agricultural land in Fadak, received as fay’; and share from Khaybar.  He reserved income from the land of Nadir for any unforeseen misfortunes, reserved income from Fadak for wayfarers and divided income from Khaybar into three parts.  He used one part for provisions to his family and gave leftover in alms to needy Muhajirun.  He divided the other two parts among Muslims.⁸⁵

The Prophet, along with his wives, and Ali along with his wife and children, used to live in the Prophet’s mosque.   Abu Bakr had bought its land and the community as a whole had provided labour and material to build it. ⁸⁶  In this sense it was not the Prophet’s personal property.  Still, Caliph Abu Bakr allowed his widows to continue living in it without paying rent.

The Prophet used to get cash income from ṣadaqah and jizyah.  In addition, he used to get his fifth share from the booty.  As he did not have any cash saved at the time of his death, it is apparent that he considered all that money state property and spent it on state expenditures, like winning chiefs of tribes towards Islam, giving subsidies to the tribes, propagation of Islam, and other activities.

Disputes about the disbursement of the Prophet’s income had started during his own lifetime after the conquest of Khaybar. ⁸⁷  Apparently the dispute lingered on, as Waqidi notes that during his caliphate Umar withheld certain funds from portions of Banu Hashim because they refused to use that money to marry off widows and salvage indebted from this amount.⁸⁸

The most well-known dispute about the Prophet’s estate is not that of Khaybar but it is that of Fadak.  And this is the civil suit that Abu Bakr had to decide early during his caliphate.  At the time of its surrender, the People of Fadak had given half of their land to the Muslims.  The Prophet kept half of it for himself.⁸⁹  The widows of the Prophet wished for their inheritance from Khaybar and Fadak.  (Islamic sources don’t mention lands gained from Nadir in any dispute of inheritance).  They delegated Uthman bin Affan (‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān عُثمان بِن عَفّان) as their attorney to plead their case with Abu Bakr.  Later on, Aisha dropped the civil suit on behalf of everybody saying that they were sadaqah lands whose income was used for the benefit of the people of Muhammad and should be used for the same purpose by the one who is in charge after the Prophet.⁹⁰  Fatima Bint Muhammad brought her sole claim for Fadak pleading that Prophet Muhammad had assigned it to her.  She presented Ali bin Abu Talib, her husband, as her witness.  Abu Bakr demanded another witness.  So she brought Umm Ayman.  Abu Bakr dismissed the case on the grounds that either two male witnesses or one male and two female witnesses were required to establish the claim.⁹¹  Abu Bakr wrote in his judgement that the Prophet wished that the sadaqah established by him will continue for the benefit of Muslims after his death.⁹²

Seemingly, each party involved accepted the ruling.  The Prophet’s wives continued to get their rations from Khaybar.  The rest of the income continued to be spent as sadaqah as Waqidi mentions that income generated by Prophet’s property was given to orphans, the poor and wayfarers by Abu Bakr, Umar and Ali.⁹³, ⁹⁴

First things first

Abu Bakr was determined to demonstrate that he started his political mission from exactly where the sudden death of Prophet Muhammad had interrupted it and that his tenure was a continuation of Prophet Muhammad’s policies.  He sent Usama with three thousand men to invade Yibna, as was planned by the Prophet.⁹⁵, ⁹⁶

Usama ambushed Yibna’s residents, killing some people and taking some prisoners.  He plundered the town and then burnt it.  Not a single Muslim was wounded.  Heraclius, the king of Byzantine Rome, who was in Homs at that time, was upset at the news that the Bedouins raided after one month’s journey, and left without being hurt.  Consequently, he strengthened his borders at Balqā’.⁹⁷, ⁹⁸  Actually, Yibna was twenty night’s journey from Medina but Heraclius counted it thirty day’s journey.⁹⁹  This was the level of Heraclius’s knowledge about the geography of Arabia.  As people had warned Abu Bakr not to send Usama in the wake of apostasy and Waqidi notes that the expedition took place almost one month after the death of the Prophet, we can calculate that it would have taken place in July 632 CE.¹⁰⁰

The narration of battle – ambush, no Muslim wounded, Heraclius takes it as Bedouin raid – validates that it was a political gimmick.  It was merely a show of power by Abu Bakr.  It was his effort to demonstrate that his manifesto was to toe the line of action of Prophet Muhammad.  It was his endeavour to seal the cracks that had appeared in the Muslim community of Medina after the selection of the caliph and to establish his authority firmly over them.¹⁰¹

By the time the military was away from Medina, changes in the political climate of Arabia had already convinced Abu Bakr that it was time to shelve Prophet’s northern policy and attend to more pressing issues nearby.  During the absence of the army of Usama, Abu Bakr met a tribal delegation confirming that they won’t pay tax though they didn’t mind praying ṣalāt.¹⁰²  Simultaneously, the hostile tribes in proximity to Medina began harassing Rashidun Caliphate, exploiting the fact that its military was away.¹⁰³

Ridda Wars (Ḥurūb ar-Riddah)

Just after the death of Prophet Muhammad, a massive war engulfed the whole of Arabia in its flames – a war that killed more people than those killed in all the Prophetic Wars combined.¹⁰⁴  The series of battles, that lasted for almost one year, is called Ridda Wars (Ḥurūb ur Riddah حُرُوب اُلرِدّه ), or ‘War on Apostasy’ (Fitnah tul Irtidād فِتنَةُ الاِرتِداد ) by Islamic sources.¹⁰⁵  Modern historians consider it a misnomer.¹⁰⁶  They believe the war was not about fighting against apostates (sin. murtadd, pl. murtadīn).  Watt rejects the notion of apostasy on logical grounds.  He is of the opinion that the nature of Arab society during the Prophetic times was such that public declaration meant far more to an Arab.  Once anybody converted, his faith was genuine.¹⁰⁷  Apostasy was contrary to Arab’s murūʾah.

Baladhuri, who is the first historian to record the events of the Ridda Wars, describes the problem: “When Abu Bakr was proclaimed caliph, certain Arab tribes apostatized from Islam and withheld ṣadaqah.  Some of them, however, said, ‘We shall observe prayer but not pay zakāt.’” ¹⁰⁸  Even if we take Baladhuri’s statement at face value it is evident that some, not all, of the tribes apostatized but all of the rebel tribes refused to pay tax to Abu Bakr.

Let’s examine the issue closely.  Explaining the start of the Ridda War against the Kindah tribe, Baladhuri writes that Ziyad bin Labid (Ziyād bin Labīd زياد بِن لَبِيد) was Prophet’s zakat (zakāt زَكوٌة) collector to Hadarmaut.  Abu Bakar extended his tax circle to the tribe of Kindah.  He was resolute and sturdy in his manners.  He developed a dispute with the Kindah over the assessment of sadaqah.  Ash’ath bin Qays (اَشعَث بِن قَيس) of ‘Amr bin Mu’āwiyah clan of Kindah approached him to reconsider his assessment of sadaqah.  Ziyad refused to change his mind.  It resulted in a general revolt of Kindah against him.  The only Kindah clan that did not take part in the revolt was Sakun.¹⁰⁹  Here, Baladhuri clearly demonstrates that the party, whom he calls apostates, was willing to pay tax if it was reasonable.  The dispute was economical, not religious.  As Baladhuri is writing this event in the context of apostasy in Yemen, evidently he confuses tax evasion and resistance to tax collectors with apostasy.  Actually, all Islamic sources collectively fail to point out a single tribe in Arabia who had been praying salat and refused to do so after the death of Prophet Muhammad.  We don’t know the reasons why some tribes refused to pay taxes.  As in the above example, some perceived it to be high.  It is also possible that some of them didn’t feel obliged to pay tax to Abu Bakr, as they had entered into an agreement with Prophet Muhammad, not with an invisible state.  We know Abu Bakr asked them to renew the contracts and some of them did it on the same terms as they were with Prophet Muhammad without any resistance, for example, the people of Najran.¹¹⁰  Furthermore, it is also possible that some tribes did not perceive Abu Bakr to be capable of providing them with ‘protection’ which Prophet Muhammad had guaranteed in lieu of paying tax.  Lastly, so many tribes against whom forces of the Rashidun Caliphate fought during the Ridda wars are not heard of paying any tax to Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime.  A vivid example is Bakr bin Wa’il. (Bakr bin Wā’il بَكر بِن واءِل).

Actually, Rashidun Caliphate had two goals in mind to launch the Ridda Wars.  Firstly, it was a campaign to bring those tribes back under government authority who had started thinking of self-rule after the election of Abu Bakr.  Secondly, after attaining the first goal, to bring all other tribes and polities in Arabia under the administration of the Rashidun Caliphate, and to eliminate all bastions of resistance.  Then, why does Baladhuri, and all other Islamic sources, call it a war against apostasy?  It is because they toe the line of Ibn Ishaq who claims that all and sundry accepted Islam during the last two years of Prophet Muhammad’s life.  If Rashidun Caliphate had to fight against them under the leadership of Abu Bakr, naturally, they had to be shown as apostates.¹¹¹

Tribal affiliation was the guiding principle of those who opposed the Rashidun Caliphate in the Ridda wars, though some had started galvanizing around a religion.  Caetani classifies the Arab tribes into four categories according to their relations with Prophet Muhammad by the time of his death; (i) tribes that submitted to Prophet Muhammad and converted to Islam (ii) tribes that submitted to Prophet Muhammad and made progress in Islam: Hawazin (Hawāzin هَوازِن ), Amir, Tayy (Ṭāʾī طاءِى ) and Sulaym (iii) tribes which lived on the periphery of the state of Medina which submitted politically to Islam and were euphemistically called Muslim (iv) tribes which kept their independence from Medina, among whom a small minority sought the help of the Prophet against adversaries: Hanifa (Ḥanīfāh حَنِيفَه ), Asad, and the tribes of Oman and Hadarmaut among others.¹¹²  Tribes that supported Abu Bakr in achieving his goals of the Ridda Wars seem to include Aslam, Ghifar (Ghifār غِفار ), Muzainah, Ashja’, Juhaynah, Ka’b bin Amr, parts of Sulaym (all from Hejaz), parts of Tayy  (perhaps only Jadīla and Ghawth clans), parts of Tamim (Tamīm تَمِيم ), and perhaps sections of Asad and Ghatafan (Ghaṭafān غَطَفان), (all from Nejd), and probably Bajila (Bajīlah بَجيله ) and various sections of Yemeni tribal groups that remained loyal to Rashidun Caliphate, such as Sakun (Sakūn سَكُون ) of Kindah.  Tribes of Northern Hejaz, Syria and Iraq had not participated in Ridda Wars.  They included Bali, Udhra (Udhrah عُذ ره), and perhaps parts of Quda’a (Quḍā’a قُضاعه), such as Kalb.¹¹³  Not to mention, Quraysh, Khazraj, Aws and Thaqif were Abu Bakr’s main strengths.¹¹⁴

All tribes supporting Abu Bakr fought under the command of individuals who belonged to the Quraysh.  As the Quraysh came out triumphant in Ridda Wars they attained the position of political elite among Arabs and played a vital role in the future extension and management of the Islamic empire.¹¹⁵  The defeated and hence conquered tribes like the Hanifa and the Asad remained in their traditional territory pursuing pastoralism, agriculture, artisanry or trade, and played no active part in the management and expansion of the Rashidun Caliphate.  They remained the administered population of Arabia, subject to the Islamic ruling class, to which they paid taxes in return for the regime’s protection against external interference and its services in adjudicating their tribal disputes.  As former rebels, they were deemed untrustworthy, and in order to keep them under control, Abu Bakr appears to have taken prisoners from these subjected tribes to hold hostage as a guarantee of the tribe’s continued good behaviour.¹¹⁶

Rashidun Caliphate did not have funds to pay its soldiers fighting in the Ridda Wars.  Their salary was their booty (ghanīmah غَنِيمَة).¹¹⁷  Abu Bakr sent his field commander Ikrima bin Abu Jahl (‘Ikrimah bin abu Jahl عِكرِمه بِن اَبُو جهل ) to reinforce his agents Ziyad bin Labid and Muhajir bin Ummayah (Muhājir bin Umayah مُهاجِر بِن اُميّه) in Yemen after Ikrima had finished his job in Oman.  Ziyad and Muhajir had already reduced the fort of Nujair by the time Ikrima reached.  They had to share their booty with Ikrima at Abu Bakr’s request.¹¹⁸

Realignment of Tribes of Nejd and Hejaz

The first events of the Ridda Wars took place by the end of July 632 CE, a few weeks after Abu Bakr took office.¹¹⁹, ¹²⁰  By that time Abu Bakr had decided to get rid of vestigial resistance to Rashidun Caliphate in Hejaz and Nejd, and then subjugate the whole of Arabia before he pursues any northern policy.

The force that went to Hejaz, Nejd and later, Yamama appears to be drawn mainly from Muhajirun of Medina, Quraysh of Mecca, Ansar, and Thaqif.¹²¹

Most of the tribes based in Hejaz and Nejd or at least part thereof, had paid tax to Prophet Muhammad during the last two years of his lifetime.¹²²  They were the fundamental groups who refused to pay a dime.  During the first month of his caliphate, Abu Bakr received delegates of Asad, Ghatafan, Hawazin, Tayy and Quda’a in Medina one by one.  All of them presented their petition to Abu Bakr to get tax exemption.¹²³  All of them were Bedouin.  As all of them promised to pray salat as prescribed, it is evident that they represented only Muslim clans of their respective tribes and that they didn’t apostate in the true meanings of the word.¹²⁴  Many of the leading figures of the Rashidun Caliphate, cognizant of the sinister situation, urged Abu Bakr to yield to their petition.  Abu Bakr took a resolute stance against them.¹²⁵  “If they refuse me a hobble [iqāl, the rope worn by the camel], I shall fight them for it,” reiterated Abu Bakr.¹²⁶  Thus Abu Bakr crafted the blueprint for the survival of the feeble polity he was presiding over.

Fazara (Fazārah فَزارَه) clan of Ghatafan and Khuzayma bin Asad were two tribes who had been switching parties during Prophetic times and were still buddies with each other.  During the last months of Prophet Muhammad’s life, Tulayha bin Khuwailid (Ṭulayḥah bin Khuwailid طُلَيحَه بِن خُوَيلِد) of Asad bin Khuzayma had declared himself a prophet.¹²⁷, ¹²⁸  He not only posed a tribal but also an ideological threat to Rashidun Caliphate.¹²⁹

The first encounter with the Ghatafan-Asad tribal confederation was trivial.  Kharija bin Hisn (Khārijah bin Ḥiṣn خارِجَه بِن حِصن), who was brother of Uyayna bin Hisn (‘Uyaynah bin Ḥiṣn عُيَينه بن حِصن) and Manzur bin Zabban (Manẓūr bin Zabbān مَنظُر بِن زَبّان), both of Fazara clan of Ghatafan showed up near Medina.¹³⁰  Abu Bakr’s field commander Talha bin Ubaydullah of the Taym clan of Quraysh chased them away.¹³¹, ¹³²   Then Abu Bakr sent his commander-in-chief, Khalid bin Walid, against Tulayha.   Tulayha came with his brothers Hibal (Ḥibāl حِبال) and Salamah.  Uyayna bin Hisn of the Fazara tribe had joined him with seven hundred men.¹³³  Khalid’s army included some clans of Asad, though the main body of Asad was in Tulayha’s camp.¹³⁴  Tayy generally supported Tulayha.¹³⁵ Ashja’s clan of Ghatafan was pro-Rashidun Caliphate.¹³⁶  In the middle of the fight Uyayna withdrew his men blaming Tulayha to be a false prophet.  After routing the enemy, Muslims captured Uyayna bin Hisn and took him to Medina.  Abu Bakr spared his life and set him free.  Tulayha fled from the scene but was caught later.  He was sent to Medina where he converted to Islam.¹³⁷, ¹³⁸Islamic sources don’t mention if Uyayna bin Hisn accepted Islam or not.  ¹³⁹

  During the same campaign, Khalid sent a battalion under Hisham bin As (Hishām bin ‘Āṣ هِشام بِن عاص), brother of Amr bin As, of the Sahm clan against Amir bin Sasa’a (‘Amir bin Ṣa’ṣa’ah     عامِر بِن صَصَعه) but they did not resist and professed their belief in Islam.  Their leader Qurrah bin Hubairah was arrested and sent to Abu Bakr on charges of reinforcing Tulayha.  Qurrah pleaded not guilty, and Abu Bakr accepted it.¹⁴⁰  Kharija bin Hisn was still on the run.  Khalid could kill him in an encounter, but his companions fled.¹⁴¹

Tulayha’s and Uyayna’s decisive defeat was a game-changer in Hejaz.  Many other tribes of Hejaz, like Hawazin, portions of Amir Bin Sasa’a and portions of Sulaym had withheld tax.  They were watching the match between Abu Bakr and Tulayha vigilantly.  The outcome convinced them to enter into a tax agreement with Rashidun Caliphate without further defiance.¹⁴², ¹⁴³   Abu Bakr’s lenient demeanour towards the arrested leaders of Ghatafan, Asad and Amir Bin Sasa’a would have contributed to alleviating their ambivalence.

Very few clans of Sulaym had rebelled.¹⁴⁴  After finishing off Ghatafan, Asad and the rebel portions of Tayy, Khalid advanced on disobedient sections of Sulaym who had gathered under their leader Amr bin Abdul Uzza (‘Amr bin ‘Abd al ‘Uzza abu Shajarah اَبُو شَجرَه عَمرؤ بِن عَبدُ العُزّئ).  Khalid defeated them and burnt some of them.¹⁴⁵   Amr accepted Islam.¹⁴⁶  All encounters mentioned up to now were small-scale scuffles. Baladhuri doesn’t mention any casualty on the Muslim side.¹⁴⁷

How did Tamim behave during Ridda Wars is obscure.  It is partly due to the reason that the main transmitter of the Ridda Wars, Sayf bin Umar, was from Tamim and he would have covered it up.¹⁴⁸  They were predominantly Christian.¹⁴⁹  Apparently they were indifferent to Rashidun Caliphate initially.  Later, when Rashidun Caliphate defeated Hanifa decisively, they started cooperating with Muslims.  A name of a woman of Tamim surfaced during the Ridda Wars.  She was Saja Bint Aws (Sajāh. bint Aws Umm Ṣādir سَجاح بِنت اَوس اُمّ صادِر) from the Hanzala (Ḥanẓalah  حَنظَله) clan of Tamim.  Her mother was from Taghlib.  She used to claim to be a kāhin and a Prophetess.  She had appointed her own muazin.  Few clans of Tamim and Taghlib believed in her, mainly her own relatives.  She asked her supporters to invade the town of Ribāb after claiming that the Lord of Heavens had advised her so.  Her force got defeated.  She then came to Musaylima in Hajar and married him, conjoining her religion with his.  After Musaylima’s defeat, Saja disappeared into anonymity.  Some say she returned to her brothers, others say she accepted Islam and started living in Basrah where she died.¹⁵⁰, ¹⁵¹

Baladhuri is not very sure about any of Khalid’s campaigns against Tamim.  According to some reports that reached Baladhuri, Khalid fought with Tamim at Buṭāh and Ba’ūḍah.  In other reports, it was Dirar bin Azwar (Ḍirār bin Azwar ضِرار بِن اَزوَر) of Asad who fought against Malik bin Nuwaira (Mālik bin Nuwairah مالِك بِن نُويره) of Hanzala clan of Tamim.  Dirar captured Malik and brought him to Khalid.  Khalid ordered Malik to be beheaded.  Malik was Prophet Muhammad’s ‘āmil for collecting sadaqah from the Hanzala clan.  Baladhuri reports that at the death of the Prophet, he withheld the money and asked Hanzala to keep their money.  But in any case, at the time of execution, he claimed that he had not apostatized.¹⁵², ¹⁵³

False Prophets

Before we proceed further on events of the Ridda Wars let’s acquaint ourselves with the phenomenon of ‘false Prophets.’

Islamic sources have preserved names of at least four people living in Arabia during the Prophetic times and during Abu Bakr’s tenure as caliph, whom they call ‘false Prophets’.  Aswad, Tulayha and Saja have already been discussed.  The only one remaining is Musaylima.

Many historians identify the rise of various persons claiming prophethood at the same time as Prophet Muhammad as a social phenomenon.¹⁵⁴  Askar, the Saudi scholar who has studied Musaylima and the war of Yamama in detail, calls the seventh century a century of prophets for Arabia.¹⁵⁵  The social organization of people no longer remained purely tribal by the time of the death of Prophet Muhammad.  It was an early form of religious-tribal organization.

All the ‘false Prophets’ failed to attract any significant followership except one.  He was Musaylima.  We shall discuss him briefly below.

War of Yamama

In the spring of 633 CE, a fierce battle took place on the plains of ‘Aqraba – a battle that was the most horrible of all the battles the Islamic army had taken part in up to now, including the Prophetic Wars.¹⁵⁶, ¹⁵⁷  The size of the opponents is said to be forty thousand, the largest an Islamic army had ever faced.¹⁵⁸  The size of the Muslims is reported to be four thousand only.¹⁵⁹  The death toll on the Muslim side alone could be in tune of seven hundred to seventeen hundred, which makes a hefty forty percent of the whole army.¹⁶⁰  Similar magnitude of loss is estimated on the opposite side – thirty-five percent.¹⁶¹  The war, though considered part of the Ridda Wars by Islamic sources, has its own name – the War of Yamama.¹⁶²

As mentioned earlier, Yamama was a geographic and political entity of Arabia on its own in pre-Islamic times.¹⁶³  It was located around the mountains which are now called Jabl Tuwayq.¹⁶⁴  Yamama was completely sedentary.  The main inhabitant of the region was the tribe of Hanifa, though some clans of Tamim had settled in the region as well.¹⁶⁵  Hanifa were the dominant social group and were owners of the best and richest resources.  Agriculture was the main activity in Yamama. Wheat and dates were major crops.  Handicrafts and mining industries are also said to be flourishing.¹⁶⁶  The main town in the region and its capital was Hajar (Ḥajar حَجَر).¹⁶⁷, ¹⁶⁸

It appears that the Hanifa were strong under the leadership of Hawdha bin Ali and that Prophet Muhammad had contacted them when he was looking for a community for protection just after his visit to Taif.¹⁶⁹  The first contact between the Islamic state of Medina and Yamama was in the late spring or early summer of 628 CE just after the Peace Treaty of Hudaibiyah when Prophet Muhammad wrote a letter to Hawdha inviting him to Islam.¹⁷⁰  Baladhuri states that the people of Yamama sent a delegate to Medina in response to the letter.¹⁷¹  Islamic sources are thoroughly contradicting each other about the details of this delegation but one thing is sure, no concrete outcome emerged from this ambassadorial exercise.  Hawdha was, however, an old man and he soon died around 630 CE.¹⁷², ¹⁷³    

Musaylima bin Habib (Musaylimah bin Ḥabīb مُسَيلِمه بِن حَبِيب) of Hanifa better known as Musaylima, the arch liar (Kadhāb كَذّاب) succeeded the late King of Yamama, Hawdha bin Ali and within four years he transformed Hanifa into a single religious and political agglomeration under his leadership.¹⁷⁴, ¹⁷⁵  Previously, Hawdha had organized them around tribal affiliations.  As we don’t hear of any Sasanian presence in Yamama during Musaylima’s tenure, we can assume that either he had asked them to leave or they had left themselves.¹⁷⁶

Why did Musaylima succeed Hawdha and how did he transform the region into a powerful polity is not known exactly.  Caetani asserts that it was very likely that Musaylima had already achieved renown for his religious ideas during the lifetime of Hawdha and that after Hawdha’s death, he had come to power, without any sort of revolution, as the most worthy and popular individual in Yamama.¹⁷⁷  Baladhuri confirms that Hanifa and others in Yamama followed Musaylima.¹⁷⁸  So, we can see there was the formation of a state around religion, a process that appears to be very similar to state formation in Medina.

It is known that Musaylima had proclaimed prophethood during the lifetime of Hawdha.  Waqidi reports him to have claimed prophethood at the time of the battle of Badr.¹⁷⁹  It is also known that Musaylima came to Medina along with the delegation of Hanifa, which they had sent in response to the letter of the Prophet to Hawdha.¹⁸⁰  According to Ibn Ishaq he did not meet Prophet Muhammad.¹⁸¹

Very little is known about the religion Musaylima carried.  Ibn Ishaq tells that he had an imitation of the Qur’an called saj’ which had rhymes like, “Allah has been gracious to the pregnant woman; He has brought forth from her a living being that can move; from her very midst.”  He permitted his followers to drink wine and to fornicate and let them dispense with ritual prayer.¹⁸²  Baladhuri tells us that Ḥujair was muezzin of Musaylima.  He used to call to prayer chanting: I testify that Musaylima claims to be the prophet of Allah.¹⁸³  As Musaylima has survived only through the agency of Islamic sources, Askar argues that it is difficult to judge Musaylima and his mission objectively from the accounts that are hostile to him.¹⁸⁴

Bitter hostilities between the Islamic state of Medina and the religious state of Yamama erupted during the Prophetic times as soon as the boundaries of both came nearer.  Prophet Muhammad labelled him ‘the arch liar’ (Kadhāb كَذّاب).¹⁸⁵  As Ibn Ishaq mentions this in the same tradition where the Prophet also used similar words for Aswad al Ansi of Yemen, we can safely assume it happened only after Musaylima came to power.  Musaylima wrote a letter to Prophet Muhammad saying, “From Musaylima the apostle of Allah to Muhammad the Apostle of Allah.  Peace upon you. I have been made partner with you in authority.  To us belongs half the land and to Quraysh half, but the Quraysh are a hostile people.”¹⁸⁶, ¹⁸⁷  Or in other words let’s recognize each other’s authority over whatever we possess.  According to Ibn Ishaq, the Prophet got so enraged to read the letter that he wished he could have beheaded the two heralds who brought the letter if they were not envoys.¹⁸⁸  Then the Prophet replied, “The land belongs to Allah and He gives it to any of His servants He is pleased with.”¹⁸⁹  Ibn Ishaq gives the date of this correspondence spring of 632 CE.¹⁹⁰  Musaylima had strengthened his position in Yamama by that time.  He cut off the hands and feet of Habib bin Ziyad (Ḥabīb bin Zyād حَبِيب بِن زياد) of Najjar clan, the Prophet’s envy to Yamama and sent him back with his fellow envoy Abdullah bin Wahb of Aslam.¹⁹¹  This event might have taken place just before the death of Prophet Muhammad.

The only person from Hanifa who accepted Islam during Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime was Thumama bin Athal (Thumāma bin Athāl ثُمامه بِن اثال).¹⁹²  Askar considers him a leader of semi-nomad clans of Hanifa.¹⁹³

As there is no clue that Musaylima opposed pre-existing religious beliefs nor there is any clue that he opposed those who did not believe in his prophethood, one can assume that he was simply eager to establish a state in Yamama independent of Medina, Iran or Hira (Ḥīrah حِيرَه ).¹⁹⁴

In the end, the Hanifa were defeated at the War of Yamama in the spring of 633 CE and were ruled by the Rashidun Caliphate.  According to Baladhuri’s report Abu Bakr sent Khalid bin Walid to Yamama a few months after his caliphate when he had already subdued the people of Nejd who had apostatized.¹⁹⁵  After getting rid of the hostile clans of Ghatafan and Asad and the like, Abu Bakr attacked Yamama with full vigour.

Khalid had three main encounters.  In the first one, he captured Mujja’a bin Murara (Mujjā’ah bin Murārah مُجّاعه بِن مُراراه) and bound him in chains.¹⁹⁶, ¹⁹⁷  Then Khalid faced Banu Hanifa in the second encounter which was particularly harsh and in which a number of prominent Muslims fell.  Ultimately, Banu Hanifa was defeated and their commander Rajjal bin Unfuwa (Rajjāl bin ‘Unfuwah رَجّال بِن عُنفُواه) was killed.¹⁹⁸, ¹⁹⁹  The surviving troops of Hanifa retreated to Ḥadīqah where, in the final encounter, a lot of them lay dead including Musaylima.²⁰⁰, ²⁰¹  Wahshi bin Harb (Waḥshi bin Ḥarb al Ḥabshi وَحشى بِن حَرب الحَبشى) was the one who killed Musaylima.²⁰², ²⁰³

People of Yamama negotiated through the mediation of Mujja’a bin Murara the terms of truce (Ṣulḥ صُلح) which were acceptance of Islam and payment of sadaqah.²⁰⁴  They were not treated as ‘people of the book’.  The first Muslim governor of Yamama was Samurah bin Amr of the ‘Anbar clan of Tamim.²⁰⁵, ²⁰⁶

Though defeated physically and converted to Islam socially, the Hanifa could not attach to Islam emotionally for a while. They did not participate in the wars in Iraq and Syria.  Some of them continued to believe in the prophethood of Musaylima though they had announced their conversion to Islam. Abdullah bin Mas’ud, assistant governor of Kufa during Umar’s caliphate, executed a group of Hanifa on charges of believing in the prophethood of Musaylima.²⁰⁷, ²⁰⁸, ²⁰⁹, ²¹⁰, ²¹¹, ²¹²

The battle of Yamama was a turning point in Ridda Wars.  It was only after this victory of the Rashidun Caliphate that all Arabs got convinced that Muslims, under Abu Bakr, were invincible and resistance to them started dying out.  Arabs got less reluctant to accept Muhammad as Prophet.  Muslim army participated only in small battles afterwards in Bahrain, Oman or Yemen to establish the authority of the Rashidun Caliphate over Arabia.    

Rebellion of Bahrain

The region of Bahrain had witnessed a mini rebellion against local Muslim leaders after the death of Prophet Muhammad.  Abu Bakr had to dispatch Khalid bin Walid to Bahrain at the request of A’la bin Hadrami (Ā‘lā bin Ḥaḍrami اَعلئ بِن حَضرَمى ) after Khalid finished the business of Yamama.²¹⁴  Abu Bakr had appointed A’la bin Hadrami governor over Bahrain after the death of Mundhir bin Sawa (Mundhir bin Sāwah    مَنذِر بِن ساوَه ).²¹⁵  A’la could not establish his authority from the very beginning.

Mundhir bin Sawa remained the staunchest supporter of Prophet Muhammad in Bahrain.²¹⁶  He died after the death of Prophet Muhammad but before the rebellion of the people of Bahrain.²¹⁷  Watt points out that the almost simultaneous death of Prophet Muhammad and Mundhir bin Sawa would have given an opportunity to the pro-Sasanian party in the region to establish an independent local principality under the patronage of the Sasanians.²¹⁸  They wished to return the kingship of Bahrain to the family of Mundhir of Hira.²¹⁹  Their candidate for kingship was Gharur bin Mundhir bin Nu’man (Gharūr bin Mundhir bin Nu’mān غُرُور بِن مَنذِر بِن نُعمان).²²⁰, ²²¹  We do not hear of any personality of Bakr bin Wai’l who converted to Islam during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad.  It gives the impression that Bakr bin Wa’il remained the royal party and they could organize an uprising when they got the first chance.

Bakr bin Wa’il raised the banner of rebellion under their military leader Hutum bin Dubaya (Ḥuṭum bin Ḍubay’ah حُتُم بِن ضُبَيعه).²²²  Some clans of Abdul Qays (‘Abd al Qays   عَبدُ القَيس) joined the rebellion.²²³  Majority of Abdul Qays remained loyal to Islam, along with their leader Jarud (Jārūd جارُود), though.²²⁴, ²²⁵  All rebellious groups joined hands with each other to form an alliance against the Muslims.²²⁶  Muslim party had both Arabs and non-Arabs in their folds.²²⁷  After an initial fight A’la besieged himself in the fortress of Juwātha along with his troops. ²²⁸, ²²⁹

Later, when gaining a chance, A’la and his men ambushed an enemy at night, killing Hutum.²³¹  Gharur, along with the clans supporting him, retreated to Khatt.²³², ²³³  The Muslim party was still not strong enough and had to call for external help.²³⁴  A’la marched upon Gharur, killing him, albeit with the help of Khalid bin Walid.²³⁵

The main rebellion of Bahrain ended in 633 CE.²³⁶  Yet, unrest and resistance in Bahrain persisted during Abu Bakr’s reign.  During pre-Islamic times the Shahanshah had sent Fairuz bin Jushaish (Fairūz bin Jushaish al Muka’bar فَيروز بِن جُشيش المكعبّر), an ethnic Persian, to annihilate Tamim for raiding Shahanshah’s caravan.  He had settled in Bahrain.  He fortified himself in Zārah along with his Zoroastrian supporters from the town of Qaṭīf and the surroundings.  They refused to pay taxes.  A’la could subdue them only during the early years of Umar’s caliphate.²³⁷, ²³⁸  The Zoroastrian insurrection must be widespread because A’la had to conquer Sābūn, Ghābah and Dārīn one by one to suppress it.²³⁹, ²⁴⁰  This state of affairs is noted by a contemporary Armenian source of Christian belief, Sebeos, who informs us that only after the Arabs had invaded Syria and Iraq did they then penetrate with royal armies into the original borders of the territory of Ishmael.²⁴¹  As Sebeos mentions this in the context of the later Arab invasion of Iran by sea, it is assumed that he is talking about East Arabia.²⁴²  This Zoroastrian refusal to pay tax was the first non-Muslim civil disobedience which the Rashidun Caliphate faced.  It faced many others in later years.

A’la continued to govern over Bahrain until Umar fired him around 638 CE.  Then Umar appointed Abu Hurairah of the Daus tribe of Yemen as governor.²⁴³, ²⁴⁴

Disobedience of Oman

Oman’s situation was similar to that of Bahrain.  The Islamic State of Medina had established links there but Oman had never sent any tax to Medina.  Just after the death of Prophet Muhammad, in the fall of 632 CE, the Azd tribe of Oman rebelled under their leader Laqit bin Malik (Laqīt bin Mālik dhu-at-Tāj   لَقِيت بِن مالِك ذُوالتاج) and gathered in Dibba.²⁴⁵, ²⁴⁶   The rebellion was against Julanda (Julāndah جُلاندَه) brothers who had to take refuge in the mountains.²⁴⁷  Laqit had pre-Islamic enmity against the Julanda brothers and lately, he had claimed prophethood.²⁴⁸  Abu Bakr asked a local by the name of Hudhaifa bin Mihsan (Ḥudhaifah bin Miḥṣan  حُذَيفه بِن مِحصن) to sort the matter out.²⁴⁹, ²⁵⁰   Hudhaifa alone was not powerful enough to eradicate the rebellion.  Abu Bakr had to send a reinforcement under his field commander, Ikrima bin Abu Jahl.²⁵¹  Combined troops of Ikrima, Hudhaifa, Julanda brothers and many other local clans met Laqit in the environs of Dabba.²⁵²  Laqit got killed by his own companions during the war.  Muslim army won the day and sent many captives from Dabba to Abu Bakr.  Thus Azds returned to Islam.²⁵³

As Abu Bakr did not have to send his Commander in Chief Khalid bin Walid to subdue Oman, we can assume that the rebellion was not vigorous.  We don’t hear about the Julanda brothers anymore.  Probably they were weakened enough to resign from active politics.  After these skirmishes, Oman remained calm.²⁵⁴  Abu Bakr could appoint his man Hudhaifa bin Mihsan as governor of Oman and he served in this position until the death of Abu Bakr.²⁵⁵, ²⁵⁶

Unrest at Yemen

The matter of Aswad al Ansi’s power grab in Sana’a was still in limbo when Abu Bakr came to power.  Qays bin Hubayra al-Makshuh (Qays bin Hubayrah al-Makshūh قيس بِن هُبيره المَكشُوه) had already assassinated Aswad but its news reached capital Medina on 23^rd June, 632 CE, almost two weeks after Abu Bakr’s oath-taking ceremony.²⁵⁷  Death of Aswad did not necessarily clear the way for Rashidun Caliphate to assimilate Yemen.  Qays bin Hubayra gathered around him all fractions and troops that had supported Aswad and tried to consolidate his own power in Sana’a by expelling Abna’ (Abnā’ اَبناء) out of it.²⁶⁰  Abna’, Himyar (Ḥimyar حِميَر) and some other Arab clans who did not support Qays had to look forwards to Abu Bakr for their protection.  The situation of the Rashidun Caliphate was fragile at this time due to the disobedience of tribes in Hejaz and Nejd.  Abu Bakr wasn’t in any position to send an army.  He used local loyal groups to form an alliance against Qays.²⁶¹  In the long last, Abu Bakr’s appointed governor, Muhajir bin Umayyah (Muhājir bin Umayyah مُهاجِر بِن اُمَيَّه) could arrest Qays after entering Sana’a.  Muhajir sent Qays to Medina where he was tried for the murder of Dadhawaih (Dādhawaih داذَوِيَه), the leader of Abna’.²⁶², ²⁶³, ²⁶⁴, ²⁶⁵  The affair of Yemen might have taken a few months to resolve.²⁶⁶, ²⁶⁷

By the time Khalid finished his job in Bahrain, Yemen was ready to provide recruits for war in Iraq, and later in Syria.

Hadarmaut was sandwiched between Yemen and Oman.  It manifested rebellious tendencies, too.  The cases of the two tribes are well known.  One is Kindah and the other is Mahra.

The beginning of the rebellion of Kindah has already been discussed.   Baladhuri reports on the authority of ‘Abd ar Razzāq that after assuming office, Abu Bakr wrote to both Ziyad bin Labid, Prophet’s zakat collector in Hadarmaut and Muhajir bin Umayyah, Prophet’s zakat collector in Sana’a, ordering them to work hand in hand in order to secure for him the caliphate and to fight against him who refrains from paying sadaqah and that they should get the help of the believers against unbelievers and of the obedient against the disobedient and transgressors.”²⁶⁸  From this statement of Baladhuri it is apparent that Abu Bakr wrote the said letter after Muhajir had taken control of Sana’a.  The letter instructed that Ziyad and Muhajir had to canvass for the appointment of Abu Bakr, had to reinforce his authority as caliph and had to get help from local Muslims if there was any resistance.

After the dispute started on the assessment of sadaqah, the Kindah tribe raised the banner of rebellion under its leader Ash’ath bin Qays.  Ziyad’s party ambushed Ash’ath’s party at night killing four brothers and a sister of the same family.  In retaliation, Ash’ath bin Qays inflicted heavy losses on Ziyad’s party.  Ziyad was compelled to write to Abu Bakr for reinforcement.  Abu Bakr instructed Muhajir bin Ummayah to help.²⁶⁹, ²⁷⁰, ²⁷¹  After a brief encounter in the field Ash’ath and his men besieged themselves in the fort of Nujair.  Ultimately, when the besieged could no longer hold, Ash’ath surrendered on condition that all his companions would be guaranteed of safety and only he himself would be arrested.  After his arrest, Ziyad sent him to Medina.²⁷², ²⁷³  He was therefore brought to Abu Bakr who pardoned him and gave his sister to him in marriage.²⁷⁴, ²⁷⁵, ²⁷⁶

The matter of Mahra was the most painless.  Some tribes in their neighbourhood had gathered at Shiḥr after apostatizing.  Ikrima bin Abu Jahl, on his way to Yemen from Oman, overpowered them, killed many of them, and got booty from them.  Actually, Mahra needed only a threat to pay sadaqah after other tribes were defeated at Shiḥr.²⁷⁷, ²⁷⁸

Another tussle we hear about is from Khaulan (Khaulān خَولان) tribe.  Abu Bakr directed Ya’la bin Munya (Ya’lā bin Munyah يعلئ بِن منيه) against Khaulan and they yielded and agreed to pay sadaqah after a brief fight.²⁷⁹, ²⁸⁰, ²⁸¹

When pockets of resistance got eliminated in Yemen and Hadarmaut, Abu Bakr divided its administration among four men.  He assigned the land between Najran and Hejaz to Abu Sufyan.  He appointed Muhajir governor of Sana’a.  He gave Ziyad what he already held (Hadar1maut).  He assigned some parts of southern Yemen to Ya’la.²⁸²  Since that day Yemen became a permanent part of Islamic civilization.  Yemen had a proud tradition of one millennium-old civilization at the time Islam reached there.  Very little of its long traditions of literature and history became a part of the Islamic worldview beyond the haziest of recollections.²⁸³

Though Yemen was a major supplier of troops to the Arab armies during Futuhul Buldan, Yemenis contributed very little to the higher echelon of the Rashidun Caliphate.  Only two men from Yemen stepped into Rashidun Caliphate’s top-level state apparatus.  They were Abu Huraira and Abu Musa Ash’ari – both Prophet’s Companions. (Abū Mūsā al-Ash’ari  اَبُو موُسئ الاشعَرى  ).

Tackling of Dumat al jandal

Baladhuri reports that Ukaider bin Abdul Malik (Ukaider bin ‘Abd al Malik اُكيدَ ر بِن عَبدُ المَلِك), ruler of Dumat al Jandal, violated his contract with the Prophet after his death and stopped payments.  Later, he had to abandon his place and property and went to Hira where he built a palace.  His brother Huraith bin Abdul Malik (Ḥuraith bin ‘Abd ul Malik عَبدُ المَلِك حُريس بِن) embraced Islam and took possession of his property.²⁸⁴  Baladhuri doesn’t give the reasons why Ukaider abandoned his property.

Abu Bakar later sent Khalid bin Walid from ‘Ain at Tamr in Iraq to kill Ukaider before Khalid left for Syria.²⁸⁵  This report of Baladhuri gives the impression that Ukaider was still in Hira at the time of his murder.

The attitude of the Northern tribes

Arab tribes of the north were under the influence of Christianity.  We overhear a few battles between Khalid bin Walid and some tribes of the north.  Khalid fought against Taghlib bin Wa’il at places of Muḍaiyaḥ and Ḥuṣaid.  Their leader was Rabi’a bin Bujair.  Khalid put them to flight and took captives and booty from them.  Khalid sent captives to Medina.²⁸⁶, ²⁸⁷   In another encounter Khalid killed Hurqus bin Nu’man (Ḥurqūṣ bin Nu’mān حُرقُوص بِن نُعمان) of the Quḍā’ah clan of Bahra tribe.²⁸⁸

Baladhuri notes these events after the subjugation of Hira and when Khalid was on his way to Syria.²⁸⁹  Donner doubts the timings and believes that Khalid cannot be proven to have enough time to fight on his way during his journey. Donner proposes that Baladhuri confuses these events with earlier ones.²⁹⁰  Whatever the timings of these events, the events are non-significant and it appears that the armies of the Rashidun Caliphate did not clash with northern tribes on a large scale.  Tabari reports that Bahrā’, Kalb, Salīḥ, Tanūkh, Lakhm, Judhām, Balqayn, Bali, ‘Amilia and Ghassan (Ghassān غَسّان) were all under Byzantine Roman’s influence at the time of the invasion of Syria by Rashidun Caliphate.  Romans mobilized them to fight against Rashidun Caliphate.  They accepted Islam later when an attack on Syria was underway.²⁹¹

Invasion of Iraq

The area of modern Iraq west of River Euphrates is geographically part of the Arabian Peninsula and is called Iraq (‘Irāq عِراق) by Islamic sources.  It is a stony plain interspersed with rare sandy stretches.  With rain as little as fifteen millimetres in a year, it is mostly arid.  It gets extremely hot and dry during summer.  The little rain that the area receives comes in winter and spring, helping with the growth of vegetation and converting the land into steppes rather than pure desert – ideal for grazers.  The land nearer to the west bank of the river Euphrates, though geographically contiguous with the rest, had availability of water from the river.  It had been being cultivated for millennia.²⁹³

In pre-Islamic times main residents of Iraq were Arab tribes both sedentary and nomads.  Persian presence was prominent in the towns of this region as it had been governed indirectly by them through their Lakhmid allies for centuries.  All Arabs of this region were Nestorian Christians.²⁹⁴

Unlike Syria, Iraq was a region that had not particularly attracted the attention of the Islamic state of Medina created by Prophet Muhammad.  There is no evidence to suggest that Prophet Muhammad or the early Muslims had any special ambitions in Iraq, whether rooted in a religious tradition or in commercial interest, comparable to their aspirations in Syria.²⁹⁵  Abu Bakr’s decision to interfere in Iraqi politics by sending forces under Khalid bin Walid, sprang from his desire to complete the process of state consolidation over the tribes of Arabia that had been undertaken during the Ridda Wars, rather than from some specific commercial, religious, or even military interest in Iraq itself.²⁹⁶  The invasion was against Arab tribes.  Clashes between Rashidun Caliphate’s army and the Iranian border guards, the first of their nature between the two armies, were a byproduct of the invasion.²⁹⁷  Baladhuri gives a clear impression that the invasion of Iraq was part of the Ridda Wars, not part of the invasion of Sasanian Iran. ²⁹⁸  Shoufani agrees with him.²⁹⁹

Baladhuri reports that Muthanna bin Haritha (Muthanna bin Ḥārithah مُثَنّئ بِى حارِثه) of Shayban (Shaybān   شعبان) tribe used to lead insurrections with some of his men against Swad (Sawād سواد), the region of modern Iraq between Euphrates and Tigris in their lower reaches.  Having heard of it, Abu Bakr made inquiries regarding him and learned that this man was of reputation, known origin and good support.  Then Muthanna presented himself before Abu Bakr and said to him, “Caliph of the Prophet of Allah, make me your lieutenant over those of my people who have accepted Islam that I may fight against those foreigners, the Persians”.  Abu Bakr wrote him a covenant to the fact.  Muthanna went to Khaffan (Khaffān خِفَّان) and invited his people to Islam.³⁰⁰, ³⁰¹  So allure was from both sides.   

According to Baladhuri, Abu Bakr ordered Khalid to go to Iraq.  He also wrote to Muthanna to receive him and obey his orders.³⁰²  Muthanna was far needier for Rashidun Caliphate’s support than Rashidun Caliphate was for his.  The combined forces were to be led by Abu Bakr’s general.³⁰³  Previously, Madh’ur bin Adi (Madh’ūr bin ‘Adi مَدهعُور بِن عَدى) of Ijl tribe had written to Abu Bakr presenting his case and the case of his people, asking to be put in charge of the campaign against the Persians.  Abu Bakr ordered him to join Khalid and obey him.³⁰⁴  Muthanna met Khalid on his arrival at Nibaj (Nibāj نِباج).³⁰⁵, ³⁰⁶  Thence the combined forces of Khalid and Muthanna proceeded to Ubullah.³⁰⁷, ³⁰⁸  Suwaid bin Qutba (Suwaid bin Quṭbah adh-Dhunhli سُويد بِن قطبَه الذُنهلى) of Bakr bin Wa’il had same designs regarding Ubullah as Muthanna had for Hira.³⁰⁹  He joined the Arab army with a band of his followers.³¹⁰

The army that appeared in Iraq, hence, consisted of remnants of Khalid’s force from Yamama, mainly Quraysh, Ansar and Thaqif. ³¹¹  Some of Hawazin, Asad, Tamim, and Bajila of Yemen were in his company as well. ³¹²  Ijl, Shayban and Bakr bin Wa’il reinforced them. ³¹³  Abdul Qays of Bahrain did not join them.  Seemingly, they were content with the governorship of Bahrain.  Nor any of the tribes of other regions, newly assimilated in the Rashidun Caliphate, like Oman, Yamama or vast parts of Yemen joined the army.  Basically, it was a military alliance of north-western tribes with core tribes of Rashidun Caliphate residents around Mecca and Medina.  The only tribe from Yemen which supported the endeavour was the Bajila.  Scholars doubt that all participants in the army were Muslims.  We know northern tribes were Christians and, for example, no explicit record of the conversion of Suwaid bin Qutba and Madh’ur bin Adi to Islam is present in sources.  Donner calculates the strength of the original force of Khalid to be about one thousand.  After Iraqi tribes joined them, they could have increased to around two thousand.³¹⁴

The date of Khalid’s debut in Iraq cannot be precisely calculated.  We are told that Khalid left for Iraq from Bahrain and that he had already sent his first booty from the Iraqi campaign to Abu Bakr in Medina before the caliph wrote to the people of Mecca, Taif and Yemen asking them to join an expedition against Syria. ³¹⁵  As the armies left Medina for Syria in the middle of autumn of 633 CE, we can assume Khalid was already in Iraq by this time.  The tentative date of his departure for Iraq can be later spring to early summer of 633 CE. ³¹⁶

The first encounter took place at Ubullah.  The battle was significant.  Many Ubullah residents were killed, with many of them drowned in Dijlat al-Basrah (Dijlat al-Baṣrah دِجلَةُ البصرَه.) After subduing small towns in the vicinity of Ubullah like Khuraibah, Mar’ah and Madhār, Khalid occupied the whole district and presented it to Suwaid bin Qutba to rule over it saying “We have crushed the Persians in thy district in a way that will humiliate them before thee.”³¹⁷, ³¹⁸, ³¹⁹

From there Khalid left for Hira.  After reducing small towns on the way, like Zandaward, Durna and Hurmuzjarad, Khalid reached Ullais. ³²⁰, ³²¹  Here the Muslim Arab army encountered Iranian border guards for the first time.  It was their captain Jaban (Jābān جابان) who was defeated by Muthanna.³²²  All clashes with Iranian troops at this juncture of Arab history appear to be with border guards because sources don’t report the use of elephants from the Sasanian side in these battles, which was an essential piece of arsenal for Sasanian Iranian armed forces.  By this time Sasanian Iran had plunged into civil war after the murder of Khosrow II Parviz in 628 CE. His son, Qubad II (Qubād قُباد) was in power and fractioning nobles used to control his policies.³²³  Nobody would have thought of raising a huge army to fight against two thousand horsemen of Khalid who had not crossed Iranian borders.  Before the army of the Rashidun Caliphate could take control of Ullais, it had another encounter with the Iranian border guards at the border post of Mujtama’ al-Anhar (Mujtama’ al Anhār مُجتَمعَ الانهار).  Captain of Iranians, Azadhbih (Azādhbih ازادهبِيه) got defeated.³²⁴, ³²⁵

After a brief sojourn at Khaffan Khalid reached Hirah. ³²⁶  Initially, on hearing the appearance of an army, the people of Hirah fortified themselves in the three fortresses they had.  But the maximum they needed to surrender was a show of power.  Muslims went around them on horseback in open spaces around their buildings.³²⁷  They quickly sent their three dignitaries to meet Khalid.  They were Abdul Masih bin Amr (‘Abd al Mashīḥ Bin Amr   عَبدُ المَسيح بِن عمرؤ) of Azd tribe, Hani bin Qabisa (Hāni bin Qabiṣah هانى بِن قَبيصَه) of Shayban tribe, and Iyas bin Qabisa (Iyās bin Qabiṣah اِياس بِن قَبيصه) of Tayy tribe.  This Iyas was a representative of Khosrow II Parviz over Hira after Nu’man bin Mundhir (Nu’mān bin Mundhir نُعمان بِن مَنذِ ر ).  The three men made terms with Khalid stipulating that the people of Hira would pay a hundred thousand Dirhams per year and that they would act as spies for Rashidun Caliphate against Iranians and that Khalid won’t destroy any of their churches and citadels. ³²⁸, ³²⁹  They also agreed not to speak evil of Muslims.³³⁰  The money so generated was the first to be sent to Medina from Iraq.³³¹  Muslim Arabs took control of Hira in 633 CE.³³²

After the surrender of Hira, the Muslim army bumped into two different border guards.  One was Iranians in Baniqiya (Bāniqiyah بانِقِيَه) whose captain Farrukhbanda (Farrukhbaundāth   فَرّخ بَنده) was killed in the encounter and his troops fled. ³³³, ³³⁴  Then Muslims capitulated Baniqiya without a fight.³³⁵  The other was Byzantine Romans in Falalij (Falālij فَلالِج).  Both Muslims and Romans avoided encounters.³³⁶, ³³⁷  Kaegi suggests that they could be Roman soldiers whom Heraclius had deliberately not withdrawn after the Roman-Byzantine treaty of 628 CE.³³⁸  Or this could be a sortie sent by the Romans.

After sorting out administrative hitches in Hira, Khalid proceeded to Anbar (Anbār اَنبار), whose people fortified themselves.  Muslims then investigated the inhabitants of Anbar and set up some fires in the environs to threaten them.    The inhabitants of Anbar made terms with Khalid that satisfied him and he left them in their homes.³³⁹, ³⁴⁰

Then Khalid advanced to Ayn at-Tamr (‘Ayn at-Tamr عَين التَمر) and invested in its fort where a big frontier guard of Persians was stationed.  The guards initially fought then they confined themselves to the fort.  Khalid besieged them until they begged for peace.  Khalid refused to promise them security.  He reduced the fort by force, slaughtering and carrying away captives.³⁴¹, ³⁴², ³⁴³  Here Hilal bin Aqqa (Hilāl bin ‘Aqqah هِلال بِن عَقّه) was the head of the tribe of Namir bin Qasit (Namir bin Qāsiṭ نَمِر بِن قاسِط) in the vicinity of Ayn at-Tamr.  He gathered an army at Ayn at-Tamr and fought against Khalid.  He was defeated, killed and crucified.³⁴⁴

Settled clans of Taghlib used to live near Ayn at-Tamr.  Khalid surprised them with a raid, killing many and enslaving others.  He also raided the settled clans of Rabi’a in the district of Ayn at-Tamr. ³⁴⁵  Then Khalid sent small parties to Tikrīt, ‘Ukbarā’, Baradān, and Mukharrim, up to the bridge near Qaṣr Sābūr.³⁴⁶, ³⁴⁷  They all appear to be merely scout parties.

As we look at the account of the conquest of Iraq, given by Baladhuri and Dinawari, we can easily see some salient features.  First, Arabs of Iraq had no contact with Rashidun Caliphate beforehand as we don’t find any Muslim group there awaiting to co-operate with the invaders as was in other parts of Arabia.  The first reaction of the residents towards the invasion was that of fear, not of joy.  No city welcomed the Muslim army with garlands in its hands.  Some resisted, and others initially closed the doors.  Second, soft resistance from Arab residents of Iraq points out the lack of effective leadership on their part.  Byzantine Romans had withdrawn from the region and the Iranians had still not re-occupied it completely.  Individual cities and towns of the land had to defend themselves on their own. Four main towns of the region, namely Ullais, Hira, Baniqiya and Anbar surrendered absolutely without any fight.  Those who decided to resist, like Ubullah and Ayn at-Tamr, could not give a tough time to the invaders.  The casualties on the Muslim side in these battles were limited to one or two each.  Casualties on the opponent’s side were not numerous either.  The only time when the opponents were killed in large numbers was during the campaign of Ubullah.  The other times they were killed were during encounters with Iranian border guards.  Third, decades of lawlessness and war had damaged the regional economy.  It is evident from the fact that Muslims found the castles of Mundhir in Hira in ruins.  They used their material to build the Grand Mosque of Kufa. ³⁴⁸  Fourth, the conditions of surrender were not uniform for each town.  Hurmuzjarad surrendered with the promise of security.³⁴⁹  Ullais surrendered stipulating that they act as spies, guides and helpers of Muslims against Persians.³⁵⁰  The leader of Baniqiya, Busbuhra bin Saluba (Busbuhra’ bin Ṣalūbah بُسبُهرَاء بِن صَلُوبَه),  refused to fight and made terms on hundred thousand Dirhams and one mantle. ³⁵¹, ³⁵²  Baradan and Mukharrim both offered the promise of security and food to the Muslims and their animals. ³⁵³  It appears that Khalid, as a general on the ground, had the freedom to take decisions independently on day-to-day matters.  For example, he refused to make a truce with the Iranian border guards at Ayn at-Tamr. But he had to take approval on important decisions from Abu Bakr.  For example, he wrote to Abu Bakr for approval of the terms of surrender of Hira and Ayn at-Tamr. ³⁵⁴  Apparently terms of surrender were not pre-determined by this phase of conquests and had to be negotiated on an individual case basis.  Fifth, Rashidun Caliphate had in mind by that time to use Iraq as a springboard to attack Sasanian Iran in case they decide to do so.  The condition of surrender in many towns was that its inhabitants would act as spies against Iranians or would provide food to Muslims.  The Arab army did attack some towns located on the left bank of the Euphrates, like Fallujah and Anbar.  That could be simply due to the convenience of operation against them.  Mainly, the purpose of the whole campaign was to subjugate the Arab tribes of Iraq.  Only three towns, Ulais, Hira, and Baniqiya, entered into any kind of permanent contract (Ṣulḥ) with Rashidun Caliphate.³⁵⁵

The Army of Rashidun Caliphate did enslave people.  Khalid, took all the inhabitants of Khuraibah into captivity, according to Baladhuri.³⁵⁶  When Baladhuri says ‘all,’ naturally, it means all, men, women and children.  We don’t know what criteria they used to decide who should be enslaved.

Looting did take place during the raids.  Khalid came to know about Suq Baghdad (Sūq Baghdād سُوق بَغداد) on his way to Anbar.  Khalid sent Muthanna, who raided the market and the Muslims filled their hands with gold, silver and commodities light to carry.  They spent the night nearby and the next day joined Khalid in Anbar. ³⁵⁷, ³⁵⁸  Similarly, somebody pointed out to Khalid that there was a market to the north of Anbar in which the people of Kalb, Bakr bin Wa’il and others from Quda’a used to meet.  Khalid dispatched Muthanna, who raided it and carried as booty whatever he found.  Muthanna slaughtered people and took captives in the process.³⁵⁹

Not a single soul in Iraq converted to Islam as a result of the invasion.  The whole population kept their religion, which was Nestorian Christianity.  As a matter of fact, if we look at the account given by Baladhuri closely, Islam was not even offered to anybody.  A provision to convert to Islam to save property, life, family, career or future tax burden was not included in any of the truce agreements signed.  Rashidun Caliphate wanted its soldiers to get rich from this war so that more people could be allured in the business of war.

When Khalid received instructions from Abu Bakr to march towards Syria in the early summer of 634 CE, he left Muthanna bin Haritha in charge of Hira.³⁶⁰, ³⁶¹

The aftermath of the Ridda Wars

Ayn at-Tamr was the last town to surrender in Iraq.  Its surrender symbolized the end of the Ridda Wars.  The Ridda Wars produced two very significant results.

For the first time in the history of Arabia, the whole land united under one state.  Arabs had achieved sovereignty.  The rulers of the neighbouring countries no longer had the pains of instructing the Arabs how to run their country.

Arab polytheism came to an end.  All polytheists either died or converted to Islam.  The Rashidun Caliphate didn’t give them the option to pay Jizya.  As polytheists were the largest religious group in pre-Islamic Arabia, we may assume that Islam became the religion of the majority in Arabia.

Nobody took personal credit for the victories in the Ridda Wars. The victory was attributed to Allah.  Abu Bakr emerged undisputed political leader of the Rashidun Caliphate.  Dissident Muhajirun got convinced that Allah was pleased with the election of Abu Bakr.

Historians have a habit of dividing history into eras.  They generally consider the end of polytheism in Arabia as the end of late antiquity and the beginning of the medieval ages in the Middle East. ³⁶²

Improvement in the law and order situation

While pushing the borders of the Rashidun Caliphate outwards, Abu Bakr didn’t neglect domestic issues.  The crummy condition of law and order in Arabia was a basic menace of the nomadic zone during pre-Islamic times.  One of the early achievements of Abu Bakr was an improvement of law and order.  He tackled the criminals harshly.  Once he punished Iyas bin Abdullah (Iyās bin ‘Abdullah bin Fujā’a    اِياس بِن عَبدُ اللّه بِن فُجاعَه) of Sulaym for highway robbery by burning him to death. ³⁶³, ³⁶⁴  It might be this time about which Adi bin Hatim (‘Adi bin Ḥaṭim  عَدى بِن حاتِم ) said, “A woman could travel safely from Syria to Mecca.” ³⁶⁵

Treasury separates from the personal property of the ruler

Abu Bakr made himself busy with financial reforms in the country from day one of his tenure.  We know Prophet Muhammad had many sources of income but he did not build his personal house.  Neither had he left any cash behind for his heirs.  It means he had budgeted a capped amount from his income for the use of his wives, which was enough for day-to-day expenses but not enough for saving.  He spent all the remaining income on state affairs.  The State exchequer was, anyhow, not officially separate from the personal portfolio of the ruler, though the ruler spent money from the state exchequer judiciously.  Abu Bakr took steps to clearly demark the state exchequer from the personal estate of the ruler.  He used to draw a fixed salary of three Dirhams per day from the state exchequer.³⁶⁶  (Approximately eleven hundred Dirhams per annum).  He, furthermore, did not touch the one-fifth of the booty that used to pour in Medina periodically.³⁶⁷.  He considered it as one hundred percent government property.  He distributed each penny of it equally among the population of Medina including black and red, free and slaves.³⁶⁸

Conquests at a larger scale (Futūḥ ul Buldān  فُتوح البُلدان  )   

The invasion of Iraq was still unaccomplished when Abu Bakr started raising the army for another invasion.  These invasions, which were temporarily halted by First Arab Civil War, resulted in almost half of Byzantine Rome and all of Sassanian Iran being occupied by the Rashidun Caliphate.  The events of Futuhul Buldan (conquest of countries), also called ‘The Arab Conquests’ started in 634 CE and almost completed by 654 CE. ³⁶⁹

Humans have been awe-stricken by the magnitude of Arab conquests.  Such colossal victories in such a short period had been attained only once in human history before this.  That was about one Millennium ago by Alexander, the king of Macedonia.³⁷⁰, ³⁷¹

In Sebeos’ words, “the armies of the Ishmaelites unexpectedly moved forth and, in a moment’s time, overthrowing the might of both kings seized from Egypt to this side of the great Euphrates river and to the border of the Armenians, from the shores of the great sea in the West to the court of the Iranian Kingdom, all the cities of Mesopotamia of the Syrians, and Ctesiphon, Veh Artashir, Marand, Hamatan as far as the city of Gandzak, and the great Hart which is located in the district of Atrapatakan.”³⁷³

Before we proceed to survey the invasions and the wars that ensued let’s look at some basic questions around the invasions.

Who were the invaders?

Generally speaking, the invaders were Arabic-speaking tribes, at least at the beginning of the conquests.  Military cadre predominantly consisted of Bedouins but top brass came from sedentary Quraysh. ³⁷⁴  We are not sure if all of them were Muslims.  Yet, they were predominantly Muslims.

Those people of Arabia who kept their religion and paid Jizya were exempted from military services, for example, the people of Najran. ³⁷⁵  It is unlikely that non-Muslim Arabs might have participated in the risky business of war in their hordes because they did not face any social pressure to do that.

Still, some non-Muslims participated in the Futuhul Buldan from the Muslim side.  As the Islamic state of Medina during Prophetic times, and later Rashidun Caliphate during the Ridda Wars, did not tolerate the survival of polytheists, they were non-existent by the end of 633 CE.  Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians managed to survive.  Jews became much less important by this time and Christians much more so.³⁷⁶  Out of the three surviving religious groups in Arabia, only Christians participated in Futuhul Buldan.  It is evident from Tabari’s description where he shows Namir and Taghlib fighting from the Muslim side while they were Christians. ³⁷⁷  Tabari also documents people of Daylam (Daylām دَيلام) participating in the battle of Qadisiyyah from the Muslim side without converting to Islam. ³⁷⁸, ³⁷⁹  Hoyland argues that all the conquering forces throughout history have welcomed extra manpower from any quarter.³⁸⁰  So, why would the Muslim Arab army have declined such help?

Reasons for invasions

Modern historians are divided on political lines about the reasons for the Arab Conquests.  On one extreme is the view that the sole reason for the invasions of neighbouring countries was to spread and establish Islam.  On the other extreme is another view that Arab tribes did it solely to enrich themselves at the expense of the conquered people.³⁸¹  Arguing in favour of ‘Islam the only motivation’ Donner remarks: ‘It is my conviction that Islam began as a religious movement – not as a social, economic or ‘national’ one.’³⁸²  Hoyland differs, saying, ‘Yet even a cursory study of religious movements practicing violence, whether Christian (e.g. the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda) or Muslim (al-Qa’ida, etc.) or Buddhist (Burma’s 969 group), makes it clear that one cannot separate religion from socioeconomic issues and identity in such movements.  If there were nothing material at stake, one would not need to fight.³⁸³

The history of Wars is a messy affair.  The composition of the opposing sides and the reasons for which they are fighting are often diverse and shifting.  However, those who wage the Wars and those who document them have a strong interest in portraying the situation as black and white; believers against infidels, good against evil, justice and freedom against tyranny and oppression.³⁸⁴  An impartial analysis of the surviving accounts of any war points out more than one reason behind it.

The Arab Conquests, referred to as Futuhul Buldan by Islamic sources, might have multiple causes, all working simultaneously.  The easy availability of plunder due to the weakness of the Byzantine Roman and Sassanid Iranian empires and economic/environmental impoverishment in Arabia were definitely factors. ³⁸⁵  But the factor that Arabs had gathered around concepts of ummah and jihad ( Jihād  جِهاد ) for the sake of Allah cannot be neglected. ³⁸⁶, ³⁸⁷

In the face of equivocal results of the debate on the issue, let’s take Baladhuri’s statement at face value: “Abu Bakr invited people of Mecca, Taif, whole of Hejaz and Nejd and Yemen to Jihad arousing their desire in it and in obtaining booty from the Greeks [Byzantine Rome].  Accordingly, people, including those actuated by greed as well as those actuated by the hope of divine remuneration, hastened to Abu Bakr from all quarters, and flocked in Medina.”³⁸⁸

By the way, fighting for booty alone was not a taboo among Muslims even during Prophetic times.  Waqidi shows the Prophet arguing “Abu Wahb, when you come out with us for this battle, perhaps you must bring back Byzantine girls with you” when trying to convince a reluctant follower to participate in the campaign of Tabuk, who was apparently not impressed by appeal of Jihad.³⁸⁹

Two points are worth noting here.  One, whatever the root cause of Futuhul Buldan, the official position of the Rashidun Caliphate leadership was, anyhow, the spread of Islam – the export of their revolution.  When the two armies encamped opposite each other before the Battle of Qadisiyyah and started a round of last-ditch peace deal negotiations, Umar bin Khattab, then caliph of Rashidun Caliphate, insisted on Sa’d bin Waqqas, the general of Rashidun Caliphate, to send a delegate to the Shahanshah to invite him to Islam, before Muslims kicked off the war.³⁹⁰  Here, we can note that the Islamic delegation presented Islam to the Shahanshah in a fashion that they were securing a ‘no’ answer.  First, they built up a military on his border before sending the delegation, so he should take the invitation to Islam as a threat.  Second, the deputation was discourteous to him so he shouldn’t have any option but to decline it.³⁹¹  Rashidun Caliphate had made up its mind to conquer his realm but only after documenting that a notice to convert to Islam was duly served and it was he who rejected the offer.³⁹², ³⁹³  Use of religion to justify the war was a norm in the Middle East in the seventh century CE.  In an official victory bulletin from the field, after the defeat of Sasanian Iran in 628 CE, Heraclius claimed that his victory was a certain proof of the truth of Christianity.³⁹⁴  ‘Spread of Islam’ as an official reason for the Rashidun Caliphate for Futuhul Buldan is not surprising.

Two, war is the most gruesome social invention of humans.  It obviously ruins the defeated but ostensibly inflicts on the victor as well.  Those who have the potential to die in a war won’t buy the promise of being rich as an exclusive rationale to participate in it.  From the war of Hamoukar, which was fought in the Jareerah area of modern northwest Syria around 3500 BC to the war on ISIS, fought in this century, we fail to find a single example where soldiers were fighting solely for the sake of money. ³⁹⁵  A soldier needs a passion to console himself in the face of death.  It can be tribal honour, nationalism, a sense of duty or anything above and beyond money.  In the case of Futuhul Buldan, the dominant driver for Muslim soldiers was religion.  Look at the way Sa’d bin Waqqas encouraged his soldiers before Qadisiyyah.  He addressed them with an aim to increase a desire for Jihad in them and told them of what Allah promised His Messenger by way of victory and making the religion triumphant. (iẓhār al-dīn).³⁹⁶  At the same time, no army from the war of Hamoukar to the war against ISIS, has ever fought without remuneration.  In the case of the forces of the Rashidun Caliphate, the state did not have any money to pay them.  They were promised booty as their remuneration.

Rashidun Caliphate conquers Syria

The whole chunk of land to the northwest of the Arabian Peninsula, extending eastwards from the Mediterranean to the River Euphrates in the north and the Iraqi steppe in the south is generally called Syria (Shām شام ) by early Arabic sources.  It was also sometimes referred to as the Levant. ³⁹⁷  Syria of Arabic sources accommodates modern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Israel and the northwestern corner of Saudi Arabia. ³⁹⁸  Just like now, this region was not a single political entity in pre-Islamic times.   Byzantine Rome had created administrative provinces of Palestina III, Palestina I, Palestina II, Arabia, Phoenice Paralia and Phoenice Libanensis. ³⁹⁹  Islamic sources divide the region into Palestine, Jordan, Ḥawrān and Syria Proper.⁴⁰⁰

Topography and people

Syria is a geographic extension of Arabia.  The topographical configurations that characterize the Arabian peninsula – that great slab of limestone, lifted up at its western and southern edges to form the stoop coastal ranges of the Hejaz and Yemen, and sloping gradually down toward sea level at the Persian Gulf – are repeated in Syria’s parallel ranges of mountains running along the Mediterranean coast, and in the flatter expanses of the Syrian steppe, sloping gradually downward toward Iraq.  Within this basic topographical pattern, there is, of course, considerable local variation.  The Mediterranean coastal range, which rears up along the central Syrian Littoral to form the towering barrier of Mount Lebanon, is much lower along the northern coast of Syria in the Jabal Ansariyya area and becomes little more than a set of rolling hills in Palestine.  In general, however, the mountain folds become lower and less dramatic as one moves inland from the Mediterranean coast, across the Lebanon range, the Anti-Lebanon, the Jabal al-Ruwāq, and so on, until the ridges finally give way to form the essentially level Syrian Steppe.  The main exception to this pattern, the massive pyramid known as Mount Hermon which rises out of the southern end of the Anti-Lebanon, does not alter the general picture.⁴⁰²

Though Syria’s topography is a continuation of that of Arabia, however, its landscapes are tempered and made more gentle than Arabia’s by their more northerly location and, particularly, by the proximity of the Mediterranean Sea, whose moist breeze leaves rain in quantities unknown to the Arabian Peninsula itself.  This gift of moisture is not bestowed equally on all parts of Syria, of course.  As the prevailing westerly winds carry the moisture-laden clouds eastward, over the successive chains of mountains and hills, the water is increasingly coaxed out of them, so that by the time they reach the central Syrian steppe there is relatively little moisture left.  Thus the coastal ranges receive several months of heavy rainfall, mainly during the winter and spring, whereas the central steppe is favoured only with a few centimetres during the course of the year and begins to display, during the driest summer months, the truly desert conditions found farther south in Arabia proper.  In areas where rainfall is sufficient, however, it has permitted the cultivation of crops by dry-farming, something virtually unknown in northern and central Arabia (though practiced in limited measure in Yemen).  The green hills of Palestine, the tangled thickets and dense, wooded ravines of Lebanon, and the fertile open basins of the Litani, Orontes, and Jordan rivers, carrying the runoff of mountain springs and seasonal rain and snow, all give Syria a general aspect of verdure and moisture unknown to Arabia.  It is little wonder that the Arabs viewed Syria as a kind of paradise on earth, a land of prosperity and plenty and of blessed relief from the heat and aridity of the peninsula.⁴⁰³

Alexander of Macedonia introduced Hellenistic culture in Syria.  Syria remained dominated by it for more than a millennium under Roman and Byzantine rule. ⁴⁰⁴  This assertion holds particularly true for the towns and cities that ranged up and down the coast and in the fertile, rain-fed districts a short distance inland.  These towns, which drew their economic support from the high productivity of Syria’s valleys and cultivated hillsides, received cultural sustenance from a steady flow of intellectual currents and stylistic tastes that pulsated from the West together with more mundane articles of commerce along the arteries of international maritime trade.  These urban centers were not only major Syrian cities; they were also great centers of Greco-Roman civilization.⁴⁰⁵  The Hellenistic impact on Syria was, however, always a bit superficial.  It could not make root to the great masses of Syria. Syrians never embraced the Greek tongue to the extent that some other groups – the diverse people of Asia Minor, for example – certainly had.  With the exception of the city elite, settled Syrians in 600 CE still spoke some form of Aramaic, the language of Jesus and of Palestinian Talmud; and one dialect of this language, Syriac, had become by this time the medium of an extensive and growing Christian literature.⁴⁰⁶  Third important element of the population in Syria was nomads and semi-nomad pastoralists.  They were the least affected by Hellenism and used to speak Arabic.  Culturally they were more akin to the nomadic population of northern Arabia than to the settled communities of Syria.  Rigours of life left little room for them to adopt elements of high culture that we call Hellenism (like literature and art). ⁴⁰⁷

Christianity was almost universally adopted in Syria. The majority of the Syrian population, who spoke Aramaic, believed in Monophysite Christianity and so did the Arabic-speaking nomads and semi-nomads.  The Chalcedonian church (Byzantine) was essentially restricted to the Greek-speaking urban elite.⁴⁰⁸  A significant element of the population in Syria was Jews.  They stuck to their Hebrew language. A subgroup of Jews, the Samaritans, was particularly noticeable.  They themselves were divided into two groups – Dustān (Dositheans) and Kūshān.⁴⁰⁹

The presence of Iranians in pre-Islamic Syria has been attested by sources.  The inscription of Kartir confirms Zoroastrians’ presence in Antakya and Qaysariyah in Syria, Tarsus in Cilicia, and in Cappadocia to Balatia and in Armenia, Georgia and Albania and from Balaskan to Alans’ pass.⁴¹⁰  Baladhuri verifies the presence of a significant Iranian population in the Roman town of Sinjār.⁴¹¹  Most probably they spoke Pahlavi and retained their Zoroastrian religion.⁴¹²

The different population groups were not uniformly scattered all over. The Syrian steppe was dominated by Arabic-speaking nomads. ⁴¹³ Greek-speaking Chalcedonians were concentrated in the towns.  Syriac-speaking Monophysites formed a major part of the populations in the towns and settled rural areas.  Jews diffused all over.  Iranians were limited to a few towns only.    

We don’t know the exact proportion of each population group.  It is guessed that nomads were nearly as ubiquitous (if not as numerous) in many inland districts of Syria as they were in Arabian Peninsula itself.⁴¹⁴  Arabs formed the principal part of the local population.⁴¹⁵  Sources verify their presence in as far-off cities as Sinjār and Baalbek.⁴¹⁶ Greek-speaking Chalcidonians appear to be a medium-sized group of the population.  Probably their numerical strength increased from south to north, away from the border of Arabian Peninsula towards border of Anatolia.  Jews were definitely a minor group.  Iranians were insignificant. ⁴¹⁷

Many nomadic and semi-nomadic groups living in Byzantine provinces of Palaestina II, Palaestina III, Arabia, Phoenicia ad Libanum and perhaps northern Syria were under the management of the Ghassans. ⁴¹⁸, ⁴¹⁹

Pre-war political situation

By the summer of 629 CE, the last Sasanian soldier had left Syria in the wake of Heraclius Shahrbaraz’s treaty of Arabissos.⁴²⁰  The Romans had only five years to reassert their authority in the region.  And their difficulties were plenty.

First and foremost, Byzantine Rome was strained by austerity measures.  They had difficulty paying the army.  Evidently, when a group of Arabs duty-bound to defend the desert passages from Arabia into Syria, demanded their subsidies, the paymaster answered, “The emperor pays his soldiers with difficulty; with how much more to such dogs as you!” ⁴²¹  Second, the population of Syria was politically divided.  They used religion as a proxy for political differences.  Being a theocracy, the Byzantine state was bent upon imposing its state religion – Chalcadonian Christianity – on other religious groups.  It could be a part of Heraclius’s strategy to reassert government writ in these areas.  Jews were particularly under pressure.  The Jews had openly joined hands with the Iranians during the Sasanid Iranian attack of the Last War of Antiquity.  Sebeos notes that they had the zeal to make their own homeland. ⁴²²  Theophylact Simocatta, the Heraclian court historian, expresses contemporary hostility to the Jews: “They are a wicked and most untrustworthy race, trouble-loving and tyrannical, utterly forgetful of friendship, jealous and envious, and most implacable in enmity.” ⁴²³  Antiochus, a monk of Palestine active in the 7^th century, informs us that under pressure from Chalcedonian clergy, Heraclius had ordered a massacre of Jews around Jerusalem and in the mountains of Galilee.⁴²⁴  Presumably it happened in 630 CE.⁴²⁵, ⁴²⁶  Christian (most likely Chalcedonian) petitioners claimed that they feared that if another enemy people came against them, the Jews might side with them against the Christians as the Jews had done when the Persians came.⁴²⁷, ⁴²⁸

The country had been under the Sasanian administration for twenty years in the recent past.  A whole generation had grown up during the occupation and it might be struggling to familiarize itself with Byzantine Rome.  A number of factions in the Syrian populace were antagonists to Heraclius’s efforts of nation-building.

The region had its economic woes on top of everything. The region was devastated by plagues from 550 CE onwards.  Plagues affected thickly populated towns and agricultural lands more than pastoral lands where contagion thinned out.  That is the reason the worst affected were the coastal towns of Syria and the towns of Iraq.  Steppe dwellers got abundant.  It is evident from the fact that Heraclius could gather only five thousand men while the Turk Khagan, who came for his help, brought forty thousand men in his 627 CE campaign.⁴²⁹

Despite all odds, it appears that Byzantine could reassert and lose control over the area after the retreat of the Iranian army.  Reports of the Battle of Mu’ta suggest that there was a Byzantine presence as far south.    They swiftly hired Arabs to help guard against incursions by other Arabs. ⁴³⁰  Still they did not have undisputed mastery of the region.  Different deals reached between Prophet Muhammad and the city administrations of Ayla and Udhruh during the campaign of Tabuk suggest that the Byzantines left these towns on their own.⁴³¹, ⁴³²             

A particular problem for Byzantine Rome and a favourable scenario for Rashidun Caliphate was that there were no organized local self-defence units in Byzantine towns.  Byzantine Rome prohibited its civilians from possession of arms.⁴³³  The civilian population totally depended on the military for defence.  The Byzantine policy was not to depend upon self-defence by the local population, rather it depended upon professionals and highly paid soldiers.⁴³⁴

A study of Byzantine sources reveals that the Romans did not have any solid intelligence reports about Muslim military build-up and their intentions.⁴³⁵  Kaegi argues that Heraclius was in Jerusalem in March 630 CE, just a few months after the Battle of Mu’ta.  He might have heard of military build-up on his southern borders.⁴³⁶  Late Byzantine historians, like Nicephoros (d. 828 CE),  confirm this hypothesis.⁴³⁷  Still, no contemporary Christian source reports any preparations against a possible Arab attack.⁴³⁸  Either Romans simply lacked the ability to draw on adequate resources to meet the challenge or they simply underestimated the challenge. ⁴³⁹, ⁴⁴⁰  Under these circumstances it is very likely that the Byzantine Roman government considered news of Tabuk or Mu’ta another nomadic raid.  Actually, the Byzantine government even didn’t warn the population of imminent danger.  Writing in 634 CE Sophronius of Jerusalem reports that the attack was ‘unexpected.’ ⁴⁴¹  On the other hand, Muslims knew Heraclius well and they could have predicted his moves.⁴⁴²

Muslim Aspirations in Syria

“The Prophet gave the fief of Ḥibra, Bait-‘Ainūn and Masjid Ibrāhīm to Tamim bin Aws and Nu’aym bin Aws, two brothers of the Lakhm tribe.  When Syria got subdued, those fiefs were given to them”, proclaims Baladhuri.⁴⁴³  Talks of conquering Syria were already in the air during the Prophetic times and tribes bordering Syria were being enticed to participate.  The sudden death of Prophet Muhammad and, later on, the Ridda Wars hindered progress on this front.  No surprise that ‘when Abu Bakr was done with the case of those who apostatized, he saw fit to direct his troops against Syria’.

Date of the attack

The chronology of Futuhul Buldan is the weakest point of our sources. ⁴⁴⁴  In the absence of any universally agreed dates in the sources, modern historians pick up a few dates from the literature, which they deem accurate.  Then they schematize all other events of Futuhul Buldan around those dates.  Baladhuri gives the date armies left Medina to be April 6, 634 CE.⁴⁴⁵  Tabari gives a little earlier date of March 634 CE.⁴⁴⁶  Kaegi feels that these dates don’t fit well with other data and that the attack on Syria could have already been started by late 633 CE or early 634 CE.⁴⁴⁷  Non-Muslim sources mention February of 634 CE.⁴⁴⁸    

Constitution of the army

Abu Bakr invited only the people of Mecca, Taif, the whole of Hejaz and Nejd and Yemen to Jihad.⁴⁴⁹  He didn’t bother to ask the people of Yamama, Bahrain and Oman etc. to participate in the war.  He particularly excluded the former apostate tribes and clans from recruitment.⁴⁵⁰  The army, so raised, had a large number of Yemenis.  Modern population estimates demonstrate that Yemen, despite its relatively small area, still supports a disproportionately large percentage of the population of the Arabian peninsula; four to five million out of an estimated total population of ten to thirteen million.⁴⁵¹  Donner uses this argument to support the idea that Yemen might be thickly populated in pre-Islamic times.⁴⁵²  The overrepresentation of Yemen in this army might be a reflection of its overall populous status.

The aspirant soldiers gathered in Medina. Abu Bakr organized them in three divisions led by Yazid bin Abu Sufyan (Yazīd bin Abu Sufyān يَزِيد بِن اَبُو سُفيان ), Shurahbil bin Hasana (Shuraḥbīl bin Ḥasanah شُرَحبِيل بِن حَسَنه ) and Amr bin As   ( ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ  عَمرؤ بِن عاص ).⁴⁵³  Total strength of the army that ultimately reached the borders of Syria was twenty-four thousand.⁴⁵⁴  Each participant tribe in the army flew its own banner, while there was one overall banner for each of the divisions.⁴⁵⁵  The three divisions were to take three different routes and attack three different sectors.  Amr’s division was to attack Palestine, Shurahbil’s to Jordan and Yazid’s to Damascus.  They were supposed to liaise with each other when a need arose.⁴⁵⁶  Abu Bakr’s commander-in-chief, Khalid bin Walid had still not finished his job in Iraq by that time.  Apparently, each soldier arranged his own armaments and transport.

The Rashidun Caliphate was going to attack the most feared superpower of the world. Pre-war nervousness was natural.  Apparently, there was a difference of opinion between Abu Bakr and Umar on the appointments of the commanders.  Analysis of Umar’s opposition to Abu Bakr’s decision to appoint Khalid bin Sa’id (Khālid bin Sa’īd  خالِد بِن سَعِيد ) as commander of one of the three armies and the weak reason given by Umar that he is “a vain-seeking man who tries to make his way through dispute and bigotry,” delineates difference in managerial principles of the two leaders.⁴⁵⁷  Abu Bakr was bent upon appointing the same men blindly who were once appointed by Prophet Muhammad.  Umar wished to base their appointment on merit as well.  Khalid bin Sa’id’s failure to contain Aswad’s issue in Yemen might have compelled Umar to make a negative opinion about him.⁴⁵⁸  There was absolutely no difference between the two leaders, anyhow, in avoiding the appointment of any non-Quraysh to a position of authority.

The army commanders were not very confident of their success.  On his arrival in the first district of Palestine, Amr bin As wrote to Abu Bakr about the great number of the enemy, their great armaments, the wide extent of their land and the enthusiasm of their troops. So Abu Bakr instructed Khalid bin Walid to move to Syria from Iraq and to take supreme command of the whole army in Syria.  The army accepted this appointment with satisfaction due to Khalid’s proven strategic abilities.⁴⁵⁹

First military encounter – Dathin

The first encounter between the army of the Rashidun Caliphate and that of Byzantine Rome took place at Dathin (Dāthin داثِن ).⁴⁶⁰  Dathin was a village near Gaza.⁴⁶¹  The event happened before Khalid bin Walid had joined as supreme commander.⁴⁶²  Thomas the Presbyter gives the date of February 4, 634 CE.⁴⁶³, ⁴⁶⁴  Kaegi agrees with it.⁴⁶⁵, ⁴⁶⁶

The Arab division under the command of Amr bin As fought against a Roman battalion of three hundred men led by Sergios, a Candidatos.⁴⁶⁷  Muslims were victorious.⁴⁶⁸

A small number of Romans in the battle strengthens the hypothesis that at first, the Byzantines underestimated Arabs, assuming them to be merely Bedouin raiders, the likes of which they had experienced for centuries.⁴⁶⁹  Kaegi points out that though Dathin was a small battle, its psychological impact was great.⁴⁷⁰  Victories in earlier clashes gave a psychological moral boost to the Muslim Arabs and the reverse to the Byzantines. ⁴⁷¹

As soon as the first encounter between the established power and the emerging power took place a new level in the historiography of Islam dawned.  This is the first event in the history of Islam that is reported by a contemporary source.⁴⁷²  Interestingly, this source, Thomas the Presbyter, calls the invaders ‘Ṭayyāye of Mhmt’ It means from the very onset invaders introduced themselves as Muslims, fighting for the religion of Muhammad and not unified Arab tribes fighting for Rashidun Caliphate.

As a rule of thumb, when armies move into the enemy’s territory, unnecessary violence, murder, rape and looting abound.  And as a rule of thumb, the victim party cries foul loudly and the perpetrator party tries to play it down.  It is quite intriguing to read two different descriptions of the Battle of Dathin.  One is by Thomas the Presbyter, the contemporary Christian source. Another is by Baladhuri, the first Muslim source who described the war in the 9^th century:

In the year 945, indiction 7, on Friday, 4 February, at the ninth hour, there
was a battle between the Romans and the Ṭayyāye. of Mḥmt in Palestine

twelve miles east of Gaza.  The Romans fled, leaving hind the patrician
Bryrdn, whom the Ṭayyāye killed.  Some 4000 poor villagers of

Palestine were killed there, Christians, Jews and Samaritans.
The Ṭayyāye ravaged the whole region.⁴⁷³

The first conflict between the Muslims and the enemy took place in Dāthin,
one of the villages of Ghazzah, which lay on the way between the Muslims

and the residence of the Patrician (biṭrīq) of Ghazzah.  Here the battle raged
furiously, but at last Allah gave victory to His friends and defeat to His

enemies whom he dispersed.  All this took place before the arrival of Khalid Ibn
al Walid in Syria.⁴⁷⁴

Anyhow, war has never been a pleasant event.  Describing a war that was fought a few decades earlier during the reign of Hormizd IV [c. 579 – 590], Sebeos writes: ‘Byzantine departed for Atrpatakan [Azerbaijan].  They ravaged the entire country, putting all men and women to the sword.  Taking all the loot, captives, and booty, they returned to their country.⁴⁷⁵  The Arab Futuhul Buldan was going to be havoc for the Middle East.

First city captured

It is almost impossible to establish with certainty which Syrian city the Rashidun Caliphate captured first. It was either Busra or Rabba.⁴⁷⁶  Baladhuri reports that Khalid occupied Busra on his way from Iraq to Damascus.⁴⁷⁷  He further reports that Abu Ubayda conquered Rabba and finished it with the same conditions as were for Busra, meaning Rabba was conquered after Busra.⁴⁷⁸  Sebeos, writing before Baladhuri, reports a major battle near Rabba in the earlier part of his version of events.⁴⁷⁹  Later Tabari confirmed that Rabba was the first Syrian city taken.⁴⁸⁰  Kaegi agrees with Tabari and calculates the event to have taken place in late 633 CE or early 634 CE.⁴⁸¹

Regardless of which was the first, both Busra and Rabba surrendered on exactly the same conditions, according to Baladhuri.⁴⁸²  One of them – a contract with Busra – has survived.  ‘At last its [Boṣra’s] people came to terms stipulating that their lives, property and children be safe, and agreeing to pay the poll-tax. According to some reporters, the inhabitants of Boṣra made terms agreeing to pay for each adult one dīnār and one jarīb of wheat.  In return, they were given security of their lives, property and children’.⁴⁸³  The contracts, at this stage of invasion, didn’t have any provision for avoiding tax by converting to Islam.

The same contract entered into by two different divisions of the Muslim army with two different communities suggests that it was a well-conceived, well-coordinated and well-planned attack.  The attackers were instructed in detail beforehand by their caliph on what to do and how to do it.  It was not merely a plundering campaign, modifiable by local opportunities as they arise.

Agreement for the safety of lives and possessions with the defeated party, anyhow, was not a Muslim invention.  Such agreements were part of ancient Middle Eastern military traditions and can be traced back to as far as the third millennium BC.  The dominant model at the time of Arab conquests was Roman/Byzantine deditio in fidem, whereby a community offered its surrender (deditio) in anticipation of a promise from the victors to act in good faith (fides), usually safeguarding the lives, possessions, and laws of the community in return for the fulfillment of certain conditions, all of which was set out in a treaty (Pactum) accompanied by binding oaths.  Although the fate of the conquered was now in the hands of the conquerors, there was an expectation of justice and mercy.⁴⁸⁴  “Not only must we show consideration to those whom we have defeated by force,” acknowledges the Roman statesman Cicero, “but we must also receive those who, having laid down their arms, have made recourse to the good faith (fides) of our generals, even though their battering rams have struck against our walls.”⁴⁸⁵  This kind of principle was also applied by Sassanian Iran.  Emperor Khosrow II Parviz urged his generals to “put to the sword all those who offer resistance,” but he also instructed them to “receive in a friendly way those who will submit and keep them in peace and prosperity.” This was in connection with the Iranian assault on Eddesa, which after initial resistance, sued for peace and requested for an oath that the Iranians would not destroy their city.⁴⁸⁶  Here Hoyland adds that Arabian terms aman and dhimma equate to the Latin fides, and Muslims Lawyers also employed the Roman/Byzantine categories of voluntary surrender and forced surrender.  The point here is not that the Arabs borrowed these concepts from the Romans/Byzantines, but rather that the Arabs belonged to the same world and so shared many of its presuppositions.⁴⁸⁷

Muslims did not occupy many cities in Syria during the early phase of the attack.  It gives Kaegi the impression that their strategy was to consolidate their power over the steppes of Syria and its inhabitants before advancing further.

Battle of Ajnadayn

The site of the Battle of Ajnadayn (Ajnādayn  اجنادَين ) has been identified about thirty-seven kilometres southeast of modern Jerusalem, near Beit Gurvin on the Wādī ‘l Samt.⁴⁸⁹  Both Muslim and Christian sources describe a fierce battle at Ajnadayn.⁴⁹⁰  Ya’qubi gives the date of the battle to be July 30, 634 CE.⁴⁹¹, ⁴⁹²

Apparently, Heraclius was in Homs overseeing the integration of his eastern provinces in Byzantine Rome when the Muslim attack started.⁴⁹³  Initially, Heraclius had mistaken the Muslim attack for a typical nomadic infiltration that could be dealt with by his Arab allies. However, he eventually began to recognize the true situation on the battlefield. He got compelled to raise a force to defend his territory, despite his economic woes.  Kaegi comments that part of a Byzantine strategy was to counter the enemy in their previous wars with deceit, bribe, promises and false information, hence the creation of division among the enemy.  This time the Byzantines failed to use bribery, guile, and emissaries to break up the cohesion of the invading army.  They reluctantly joined the battle with the Muslims.⁴⁹⁴  Actually, the Byzantines never took the initiative throughout the war in Syria.  They merely reacted to Muslim initiatives.⁴⁹⁵

‘In this battle about hundred thousand Greeks [Romans] took part’, Baladhuri alleges, ‘majority of whom were massed one after the other by Heraclius (Hiraql هِرقَل ), the rest having come from the neighbouring districts…..  against this army, the Muslims fought a violent battle … at last, by Allah’s help, the enemies of Allah were routed and shattered into pieces, a great many being slaughtered’.⁴⁹⁶  Ajnadayn was definitely a big and decisive war which shattered the Byzantine army.⁴⁹⁷  It created such panic and fear that both Byzantine soldiers and civilians escaped to the walled cities of Syria to protect themselves.⁴⁹⁸

Khalid joins the army

The three Muslim army divisions active in Syria joined hands at Busra and received the battalion which Khalid bin Walid brought along with him from Iraq.   On this occasion, they accepted Khalid as their commander-in-chief.⁴⁹⁹, ⁵⁰⁰

Fight for Busra took place after the union of all Muslim forces under the command of Khalid bin Walid.⁵⁰¹  Now they started eying big and prosperous cities of Syria.

As an army of the Rashidun Caliphate started capturing cities one by one, they sent twenty percent of the booty to Medina without delay.  Sending part of the booty to the sitting king and dividing part of it among soldiers was not a Muslim invention.  It was known to the Middle East before Islam.  Sebeos mentions, when the force of Theodore Rshtuni defeated the army of the Rashidun Caliphate in Armenia in 643 CE, Theodore sent emperor Cosntas gifts from the booty, including one hundred most select horses.⁵⁰²  Even before that, in Sebeo’s compendium, ‘an Iranian general by the name of Vahramn [Bahram] fought against the king of the Mazk’ut’during reign of Shahanshah Hormizd IV[ c. 579 – 590].  After his victory Vahhram ‘sent to the Iranian king only an insignificant part of the loot from the very great treasures he captured – the insignia of the [fallen] kingdom and some honoured goods.  He dispensed all the [rest of the] treasure among his troops according to each one’s merit.’ The King felt betrayed by this action of his general.⁵⁰³  Muslims were more disciplined in this regard.  They knew exactly how much would be the portion of the central government.

Routing of the Byzantine Roman army at Ajdnadayn had rendered many areas defenceless.  Muslims quickly took control of the whole district of Ḥaurān [Auranitis] around Busra.⁵⁰⁴  Then Khalid dispersed small battalions in different directions.  They advanced to Palestine and Jordan and occupied their cities and districts.  Most of them, like Adhri’at (Adhri’āt اذرِيعات ) and Amman (‘Ammān Balqā’ عَمَّان بَلقاء) surrendered without fighting.⁵⁰⁵, ⁵⁰⁶

Death of Caliph Abu Bakr

A gloomy event took place in Medina from the Rashidun Caliphate’s point of view at the time when the Muslim army was busy imposing the Caliphate’s administration onto now occupied districts and towns of Syria.  Almost one month after the battle of Ajnadayn, Abu Bakr died on August 13, 634 CE.⁵⁰⁷  The army of the Rashidun Caliphate in Syria was combating at Yaqusah (Yāqūṣaḥ ياقُوصَه) when the news reached them.⁵⁰⁸, ⁵¹¹, ⁵¹²

Abu Bakr, the founder of the Rashidun Caliphate, proved to be a successful statesman.  From the humble beginning of the Caliphate, limited to parts of Hejaz at the time of his inauguration, he converted it into a potent state, master of the whole of Arabia and powerful enough to test its muscle with Byzantine Rome.  The careers of Prophet Muhammad and Abu Bakr together form a single phase in the continuing story of the rise of the Islamic state to power in Arabia and beyond.  This continuity is marked not only in the process of consolidation itself but also in the methods employed.⁵¹³  Abdullah bin Mas’ud, an early Meccan Muslim, said in his obituary, “After the death of the Prophet we found ourselves in a state in which we would have perished had not Allah favoured us with Abu Bakr.”⁵¹⁴

End Notes

1. Stephen J. Shoemaker, “The Death of a Prophet: The End of Muhammad’s Life and the Beginning of Islam. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.  See also: Madelung Wilferd, The Succession to Muhammad: a Study of the Early Caliphate.  Cambridge University Press, 1997.
2. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad,  ed. and trans. Alfred Guillaume  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 681.
3. In a tradition narrated by Abdullah bin Abbas and preserved by Zuhri, during his final ailment once the Prophet had asked his prominent Companions to draw near him so he could write a kitāb for them lest they go astray after he dies. But Umar said, “The Messenger of Allah has been overtaken by pain, and you all have the Qur’an. That kitāb is sufficient for us”.  The household of the Prophet started disagreeing among themselves.  Some took the position of Umar, others wished to follow what the Prophet had said.  Ultimately the Prophet said, “Leave, all of you!” Later on Ibn Abbas used to say that it was a disaster! (Ma’mar ibn Rashīd, The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, trans. Sean W. Anthony (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 116).  As the tradition comes from the mouth of a forefather of the caliph at the time of writing of tradition, and as the Abbasid caliphs claimed their right to govern through the kinship of the Prophet and as it blames only Umar for interference who is otherwise not shown by any other tradition to be inside Prophet’s house during his final illness, the authenticity of the tradition remains dubious.
4. Ya’qubi, the earliest extant Shi’ite historian, notes an incident according to which, on March 16, 632 CE, on his way back from Mecca after the Pilgrimage of Farewell, Prophet Muhammad “came to a place in the lowland of al-Juḥfa called Ghadīr Khumm.  He stood to deliver an address, took the hand of ‘Ali bin Abu Ṭālib, and said, “Am I not close to the believers than they are to themselves?” They said, “Yes, that is so, Messenger of Allah!” He said, “To whomever I am protector (maulā), ‘Ali is a protector.  O Allah! Be the friend of whoever helps him, and be the enemy of whoever treats him as an enemy.” (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 730, 731).  We don’t find its parallel in any other Islamic historians, neither in Ya’qubi’s predecessors nor in his contemporaries. Even if this event is true, the language used here doesn’t clearly establish that the Prophet had nominated ‘Ali as his caliph.
5. See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 678 – 683.
6. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 683.
7. The Prophet had appointed ‘Ali as a tax collector to Najran.  (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 649).  He met the Prophet in that capacity during the Pilgrimage of Farewell when the Prophet was still in iḥrām to discuss some important matters.  He had travelled from Najran for this meeting.  (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 650).  A few weeks later, he was present in Medina during the illness of the Prophet. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 678).  Islamic sources don’t know under which circumstances and for what reasons did he return to Medina from Najran. Generally, they report that all tax collectors of Prophet Muhammad had to leave Yemen under pressure from Aswad (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 160.).
8. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 683.
9. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 683.
10. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 680.
11. Note the small size of the town, the Mosque of the Prophet being the most prominent building, and the presence of the Ottoman city wall. Photographer unknown.
12. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685.
13. Differences between Ansar and Muhajirun were present during the last years of the Prophet. He was aware of them. Such differences could have hindered the Prophet from naming his caliph.  In a tradition of Zuhri, preserved by Ibn Ishaq, when the Prophet was on his deathbed he asked the Muhajirun to behave kindly with the Ansar, ‘for other men increase but they, in the nature of things, cannot grow more numerous’.  He admitted that they were his constant comfort and support.  He asked them to treat their good men well and forgive those of them who were remiss. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 680).
14. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685, 686.
15. Tabari shows Abu Ubayda talking on this occasion as well. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 7).
16. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685.
17. Caliph is an Anglicization of Khalīfah of Arabic.  The word simply means deputy. Tabari uses it in the sense of a deputy to a ruler. (See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Carole Hillenbrand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 173.). Tabari also uses this word in this sense for people other than rulers.  (See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. R. Stephen Humphreys (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 50.  The pre-Islamic existence of this word is evident from the pre-Islamic inscriptions where the root of the word khalf is used. See: Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum. (Paris: e Reipublicae Typograhpeo, 1881), Part IV, no. 541.
18. Montgomery W. Watt, Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 168.
19. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 686.
20. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 82.
21. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685 – 687.
22. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 680.
23. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 685, footnote 2.
24. Tabari reports two points.  One, Usayd bin Hudayr of Aws, who had already supported Abu Bakr, warned his fellow tribesmen that if they allow the Khazraj to dominate, they will never be able to get any share in the government from them.  Second, a big group of Aslam reached Medina and filled the streets.  They started taking the oath with Abu Bakr without any preconditions.  The Umar later admitted that the Aslam were a decisive factor that day. (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 8).
25. At least one of the Ansar present in the saqifa, who changed his mind and supported Abu Bakr’s candidacy was Bashīr bin Sa’d, father of Nu’mān bin Bashīr.  He requested Ansar to support Abu Bakr.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 7,8.  Nu’mān bin Bashīr later became high ranking government officer during Mu’awiya’s reign.
26. Attab bin Asid, the governor of Mecca was the first of all governors to announce support to Abu Bakr.  See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 160.
27. See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 686.
28. Sa’d bin Ubada and Usayd bin Hudayr both got portions of the land of the Khaybar when the Umar expelled the Jews from there.  (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī.  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 353, 354).  The only reason they got the land was that Umar gave the lands of Khaybar to all those who had participated in the Hudaibiyah march and the campaign of Khaybar. (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 45.  Usayd is reported to have died in 641 CE (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),177.
29. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 751.  Check out the Ansar’s behaviour before the war of Yamama vis a vis Khalid: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 136.
30. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 401.  Saliṭ Bin Qays was a veteran of Badr.  See:  Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 82.
31. Abu Bakr was sixty-three at the time of his death: (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763).  For Abu Bakr’s clan and his vocation in Mecca see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 115.
32.   Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 686.
33. Sa’d bin Ubada never took an oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr.  He broke away from the rest of the Muslims.  He stopped attending the daily prayer and congregate prayer with them.  He performed hajj all alone.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 10).  He died soon afterwards in 637 CE.
34. “By Allah! I (Umar) would rather have come forward and have had my head struck off – if that were no sin – than rule over people of whom Abu Bakr was one,” said Umar.  (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 686).
35. Ibn Ishaq considers Abu Bakr one of the earliest Muslims.  See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 115.
36. For Abu Bakr’s financial contributions see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144.
37. For expenses at the time of Immigration see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 224.  For expenses of the mosque see: Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 19.
38. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 186.  AND Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 34,35.
39. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 342.
40. For details on all these occasions see: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  London: Routledge, 2011.
41. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 355.
42. Umar did not claim that Abu Bakr was the most pious of all who were present.  As a matter of fact, piety cannot be measured.  Neither Umar seconded Abu Bakr on the grounds that he was father-in-law to Prophet Muhammad. Actually, the Prophet had many fathers in law including Abu Sufyan, many Jews and Umar himself.
43. Jim Sidanius and Pratto Felicia, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 33, 55 AND Jim Sidanius and Pratto Felicia, ‘Social Dominance Theory: A New Synthesis’ in Political Psychology: Key Readings in Political Psychology, ed. John T. Jost, (Psychology Press, 2004), 438 AND Pratto Felicia, Jim Sidanius and S. Levin, ‘Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of Intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward’, European Review of Social Psychology. 17 (1) (2006): 271 – 320.
44. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 107.
45. Mu’adh bin Jabal was from Khazraj.  He returned from Yemen during the caliphate of Abu Bakr.  He participated in the war in Syria.  There, he died of the plague in 639 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),97).
46. Abu Sufyan was the most influential resident of Mecca.  Though Attab bin Asid was Governor of Mecca by this time, Abu Sufyan was the power behind the power.  Ya’qubi says that Abu Sufyan did not give allegiance to Abu Bakr, rather he offered it to Ali.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 746).  Tabari gives similar tradition about Abu Sufyan (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 196).  As Meccan Quraysh recruited themselves in the war of Ridda that followed immediately after, including Mu’awiya Bin Abu Sufyan, it is unlikely that there was any opposition to Abu Bakr in Mecca.  Abu Sufyan might be double-minded about obeying Abu Bakr as a leader in the beginning.
47. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 682.  See also: Ma’mar ibn Rashīd The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 114.
48. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 744.
49. Fadl bin ‘Abbas died in Palestine in 639 CE.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 215 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 780);  Khalid bin Sa’id was from the Abd Shams clan of Quraysh.  He immigrated to Ethiopia and returned from there after the Peace Treaty of Hudaibiyah. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 526).  The Prophets gave him a small campaign to subdue some clans in the vicinity of Mecca after Fath Mecca.  (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 429). Then he appointed him as a tax collector in Yemen. (see above, Muslims in Mecca).  He was chased away from Yemen by rebels of Aswad.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 156); Miqdad bin Amr of the Kindah tribe was originally from Yemen.  He used to live in Mecca where he was an ally to the Zuhra clan of Quraysh. He accepted Islam while in Mecca and participated in Badr.  (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 281, 293, 487, 767).; First and last mention of Abu Dharr Ghifari in Ibn Ishaq’s monograph is regarding the practice of brothering in the early days of Immigration to Medina.   (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 234).  Waqidi doesn’t mention him at all in any of the maghazi.  It gives the impression that he converted to Islam at the time of Immigration and probably returned to his tribe.  Ammar bin Yasir was a born slave in Mecca.  Polytheists killed his mother for accepting Islam.  (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145).  He won his freedom due to the effort and funds of Abu Bakr.  He immigrated to Medina where he participated in the construction of the mosque of the Prophet and many Prophetic wars including the final one, Tabuk.  (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 229, 607. AND Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 14, 29, 43, 70, 75., 76, 78, 162, 194, 195, 199, 213, 423, 433, 492, 511, 522); Bara’ Bin Azib was inconspicuous figure from Khazraj; Ubayy bin Ka’b was an inconspicuous figure from Khazraj, see: (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 425).
50. See:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 183 – 196.
51. This group didn’t have any candidate as strong as Abu Bakr.  Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib was a very late entrant into Islam.  On which grounds could he oppose Abu Bakr?  Ali was only twenty-eight years old by this time.  (Ali is reported to be sixty-three at the time of his death.  See: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 880). Forty was the minimum age required in Qurayshite traditions to be a voter on matters of political importance.   (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53 AND Muhammad bin ‘Abdullah Al – Azraqi.  “Kitab Akhbar Makka wa ma ja’a fiha min al-athar” in Die Chroniken der stadt Mekka, Vol I. Ed. Ferdinend Wustenfeld.  (Leipzig: F. A. Grockhaus, 1858; reprint Beirut), 64).  The issue of age was already hot in Medina.  When the Prophet appointed Usama bin Zaid as commander of the last expedition, ‘Ayyāsh bin Abī Rabī’a of the Makhzum clan of Quraysh protested that the Prophet had appointed a youth over the first Muhajirun (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 547).  The issue of age was, anyhow, not an absolute hindrance to being a leader in pre-Islamic Arab traditions.  We sometimes find people of young age leading tribes and armies.  For example, Malik bin ‘Awf, the leader of Hawazin at Hunayn was thirty years old.  His strength was in his money, not wisdom, according to Waqidi. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 435).  In any case, both Abbas and Ali didn’t appear appealing to the majority of early Muhajirun as a candidate of the caliph.  Muir categorically rejects the notion that there was any difference of opinion among Muhajirun on the occasion of the selection of the first caliph.  He insists that there is nothing during the lifetime of the Prophet which could suggest Ali’s rift with any of his other companions.  Muir suggests that Umar projected Ali as a candidate for the caliphate at the time of his death.  Even at that time, Ali’s inclusion in the list of possible caliphs was due to his companionship with Prophet Muhammad rather than due to his marriage with Fatima.  In Muir’s opinion traditions of Ali’s candidature for caliphate at the time of death of Prophet Muhammad on the basis of Divine right have been invented by Alids.  See: William Muir, The Caliphate; its Rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 5, 6.
52. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 744.
53. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 46.
54. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),747.
55. There are reports that Umar physically manhandled Ali or Zubayr to compel them for allegiance to Abu Bakr.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 747).  Such reports are unconvincing.  How could Umar manhandle Ali who was otherwise younger and is reported to be a man of sword? Umar might have exerted social pressure on them to compel them into compliance.
56. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 196, 197.
57. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 756.
58. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 380.
59. The privilege to lead the prayer was very important to the early Muslims.  We hear, Amr bin As had serious arguments with Abu Ubayda bin Jarrah during the campaign of Dhāt al Salāsil during Prophetic times about who out of them was the leader of the army.  When both agreed that Amr bin As was the leader of the army, he automatically became the leader in prayers.  (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 379).
60. Mus’ab bin ‘Umayr used to lead prayers in Medina when Prophet Muhammad had still not immigrated. See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 199.  For leading of prayer by Abdur Rahman Bin Awf see: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 496.
61. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 681,682.  See also: Ma’mar ibn Rashīd The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 111, 112.
62. Leading prayers in the lifetime of the Prophet could have generated jealousy in others.  Zuhri’s tradition preserved by Ibn Ishaq informs us that Aisha was afraid for her father that people would never like a man who occupied the apostle’s place, and would blame him for every misfortune that occurred. (Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 681).
63. It was not the first occasion that the Prophet had asked Abu Bakr to lead the prayer.  He had led the prayers at the camp that was established in Medina to accommodate those who were flocking to Medina to participate in the campaign of Tabuk.  (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 488).
64. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 680.  See also:   Ma’mar ibn Rashīd The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, Trans. Sean W. Anthony. (New York: New York University Press, 2015) 115, 16.
65. See below politics in the establishment of Islam.  Yazid bin Muhallab, governor of Khorasan for caliph Sulayman, states that all the Caliphs after Umar and Uthman were Caliphs of Allah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. David Stephan Powers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 59.).
66. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 144.
67. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 548.
68. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763.
69. For example, during the Ridda Wars two chiefs of Tamim asked Abu Bakr to appoint them to collect tax from Bahrain.  They guaranteed that their tribes would not repudiate Islam in return.  Abu Bakr wrote an agreement regarding this.  The middleman of the treaty was Talha bin Ubaydullah.  The parties decided to appoint Umar as a witness to the agreement.  When the document reached Umar he looked at it and rejected the treaty without witnessing it.  Talha angrily asked Abu Bakr, “Are you the commander or is ‘Umar?”  Abu Bakr replied, “’Umar is, except that obedience is owed to me.” See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 98.
70. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 134.
71. Ya’qubi reports that when Prophet Muhammad finished his Pilgrimage of Farewell he received this revelation: Today I have perfected your religion for you, and I have completed My blessing upon you, and I have approved Islam for your religion. [Qur’an 5:3].  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 730).  After this event, Ya’qubi doesn’t report any further revelations.
72. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),143.
73. Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abi Ya’la’, Tabaqat al-Hanabilah Ed. M. Hamid al-Fiqi (Cairo: Matba’at al-sunna al-Muhammadiya, 1952), Vol I, P 243, 393.
74. For dates of governance of Rashidun Caliphs see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 98.
75. Actually, Shi’a Muslims believed in Imam, not the caliph.  An Imam could be a caliph, and if so, he was rightly guided.  A caliph was not necessarily Imam.  Imam and caliph were two separate designations in the thought process of 9th-century Historians.  Imam was a leader, while the caliph was the ruler.  For use of these words in this sense see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XXI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990),199.  For mainstream Muslims, Imam was the person who lead people in religious rituals.  However, In Shi’a traditions, an Imam only had a right to lead the people because he was guardian of Prophet Muhammad’s religion.  He could only be a direct descendant of Ali and Fatima.
76. The mosque had the green dome built in 1483 and minarets built in 1840. Photographer unknown.
77. For example, Ikrima bin Abu Jahl.
78. Earlier historians record the names of all children of Prophet Muhammad but Ya’qubi is the first one to give their exact sequence.  See Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 614.
79. Arabs usually called a person by his kunya only on formal occasions.  Kunya was derived from the name of the firstborn male, even if he had died.  Muslims used to call the Prophet formally ‘Messenger of Allah’ – Rasūl Allah.  It was only Jews who called him by his kunya – Abu ‘l Qāsim.  The first time we hear Jews calling the Prophet ‘Abu ‘l Qāsim’ was the invasion of Nadir, after the Battle of Uhud. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 178).  The last time the Prophet was called by his Kunya was at the time of Mu’ta. (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 372).
80. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 339.
81. On a lighter note, the name of the son of Maria the Coptic was Ibrāhīm.  He was babysat by a male by the name of Barā’ Bin Aws (Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 339).
82. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 734.
83. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 695, 696.
84. Powers, D. S. Muhammad is not the father of any of your men: the making of the last prophet. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
85. Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 37.
86. Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 19.
87. See details: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 343.
88. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011),343.
89. Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 50.  See also: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011),348.
90. Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 51.
91. Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 52.
92. Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 53.
93. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 187.
94. Ali did not overturn the decision of Abu Bakr’s court during the former’s caliphate and continued to use income from Fadak as sadaqah as his predecessors Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman had done.  It was Mu’awiya Bin Abu Sufyan who no longer kept it as a government-run charity and allotted it to Marwan bin Hakam to keep it as private property. Ya’qubi says that Mu’awiya did it deliberately to gall the family of Allah’s Messenger.  Umar bin Abdul Aziz, Marwan’s grandson, got it in on the inheritance.  When he came to power, he announced that the private use of Fadak was in violation of Prophet Muhammad’s wishes and restored it to its previous use as a government-run sadaqah.  (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 54.  AND  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 92 AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 897).  Somewhere down the road, probably at the time when Mu’awiya allotted Fadak to Marwan, descendants of Fatima bint Muhammad became particularly touchy about the way it was used.  The matter got such a political dimension that ultimately caliph Ma’mun ur Rashid gave it back to Muhammad bin Yahya and Muhammad bin Abdullah, two descendants of Fatima bint Muhammad in 825 CE.  Writing reasons for his decision Ma’mun mentioned that there was no disagreement among the relatives of the Prophet that the Prophet had assigned Fadak to  Fatima as sadaqah and that they have not ceased to lay claim on it.  (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 55).  He did not write categorically that he was overriding the decision given by the court of Abu Bakr.  He also didn’t write in his decision that there was consensus among all groups of Muslims about the use of this land.  When Mutawakkil came to power he restored Fadak to its previous condition – a government-run charity.  (Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 56.).
95. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 548.
96. Yibna (يِبنئ) of Arab sources is Jabneh or Jabneel of Biblical times.  (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), 553).  It is Yavne in modern Israel.
97. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 549.
98. Homs is located in modern eastern Syria, see: Walter, Kaegi E. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 92.  It is Ḥimṣ (حِمص) of Arabic sources and Emesa of Greek sources, See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 174.  Also see: Capt. C. R. Condor, R.E, and Capt. H. H. Kitchener, The Survey of Western Palestine: Memories on Topography, Archaeology, Manners and Customs, eds. Walter Besant and Edward Henry Palmer, (London, The Committee of Palestine Exploration Fund, 1881), P 119 Vol 4).  These days Balqā’ is a region consisting of the eastern plateau of Jordan Valley, just to the northwest of Amman.
99. For the distance between the two towns see: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 549.
100. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 548, 550.  According to Tabari, the expedition left Medina in the last week of June 632 CE.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 38.
101. William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 9, 10, 11).
102. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 40.
103. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 46.
104. Death toll on the Muslim side just in the war of Yamama was between seven hundred and seventeen hundred.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 140).
105. For the length of the war see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 38.  For the name of the war see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 143.  [Apostate = murtadd].
106. For the discussion on this point see: Elias S. Shoufani, Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 1 – 9.  See also: Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),106.
107. Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Mecca Oxford University Press London 1953 (repr. 1965) 152.
108. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 143.
109. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 153.  Ibn Ishaq also mentions Ziyad bin Labid’s name as a Zakat collector.  See: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
110. For renewal of the contract with the people of Najran see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 102.
111. It is also possible that the definition of apostasy in the minds of Islamic sources of history was different from our modern understanding of apostasy.  Modern historians take apostasy as reverting from Islam.  Islamic sources consider disobedience to a lawful caliph as apostasy.  Shi’a traditions do not consider the rebel tribes as apostates.  The reason is simple, the Shi’a traditions don’t consider Abu Bakr a lawful caliph.
112. Leonard Caetani, Studi di Storia Orientale, (Milano University, 1911), 346 – 49.  See also: Elias S. Shoufani, Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 10 – 47.
113. Elias S. Shoufani, Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 71 – 106.
114. For Quraysh and Thaqif see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 41.
115. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 88.  Donner names the Thaqif as junior partners to the Quraysh in the political combo.
116. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 89.
117. For use of the word ghaīmah in this sense see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 190.
118. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 155.
119. For the date see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 38).  See also: Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 548, 550.
120. Many historians, including Muir, have observed that the traditions pertaining to Ridda Wars are curt, obscure and disconnected.  See: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 18.
121. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 144, 145, 146, 147.  See also: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 88.
122. See above, Muslims in Medina.
123. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 69.
124. For their promise to pray salat see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 69.
125. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 69.
126. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 45.
127. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 144, 145, 146, 147.
128. Tabari gives the date of Tulayha’s claim to prophethood to be April 632 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 164, 166).
129. Tabari notes that the Common people of Tayy and Asad and all Ghatafan except the clan of Ashja’supported Tulayha.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42.
130. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 144.
131. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 145.
132. Tabari shows Abu Bakr to be personally commanding the troops in the field.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 51).
133. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 145.
134. For Asad’s overwhelming support to Tulayha see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. IX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Ismail K. Poonwala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 166.   For some clans of Asad joining Khalid’s army see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 145.
135. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42.
136. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42.
137. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 146.
138. After accepting Islam Tulayha took residence with the tribe of Kalb.  From there he once went to Umrah.  Abu Bakr just neglected him when he was on his way to Mecca.  Tulayha needed a job.  He visited Medina to see Umar during his reign.  Initially, Umar taunted him for being a false prophet.  Then he allowed him to participate in the battle of Qadisiyyah.  He participated in the war of Nahavand as well from the Muslim side.  He took retirement in Kufa.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),146. AND Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 126.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 74). He was a supporter of Uthman during the First Arab Civil War (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Adrian Brockett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 28.).
139. See: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),146.)  After Abu Bakr spared his life, he probably took retirement from politics and disappeared in anonymity.
140. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 147.
141. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 148.
142. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 67.
143. Hawazin remained ambivalent, they withheld the sadaqah but didn’t fight against Rashidun Caliphate.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42.
144. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 42.
145. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 148.
146. Umar never forgave Amr from the heart.  He used to insult and physically beat him during his reign.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 148).
147. Tabari denotes a few casualties.  For example, of two casualties see: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 63.
148. Montgomery W. Watt, Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 139.
149. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq.  The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013). 629.
150. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 151.  See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 753.
151. Ribab is an unknown location.
152. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 149, 150.
153. For the genealogy of Malik bin Nuwairah see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 151.
154. See, for example: William Muir, The Caliphate; its rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 20.
155. Abdullah al-Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 97.
156. For the date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 137.  AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 753.  See also: Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 88.
157. ‘Aqraba is an unknown location.
158. For the figure of forty thousand see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 106.
159. Shihab al-Din Ahmad bin ‘Ali ibn Hujr al-Asqalani, Al-Isaba fi Tamiz al-Sahaba, ed. Muhammad al-Bijawi, (Cairo: Dar Nazhat Misr, 1970), 20.  None of the earlier Islamic sources have given the strength of the forces of the Rashidun Caliphate.  Though Asqalani is a very late source, his estimate appears to be reasonable as a similar number of men participated in other combats of the Ridda Wars.  Asqalani died in Cairo in 1449 CE.
160. For the figure see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 140.
161. Death toll of the war of Yamama on Musaylima’s side is estimated to be fourteen thousand.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 128.).
162. For details of the war see: M. J. Kister, “The Struggle against Musaylima and the Conquest of Yamama,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 27 (2002): 1 – 56.
163. Yamama is the region between Bahrain and Mecca. For the location of Yamama in ancient geographic sources, see: Yāqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Leipzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 506, vol I.
164. Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 11.
165. Hasan bin Ahmad al-Hmdani, Kitab sifat jazirat al-‘Arab, ed. Muhammad bin ‘Ali al-Akwa, (Riyadh, Dar al-Yamama 1974), 307 -8.
166. Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al Muqaddisi, Ahsan al-Taqsim fi al-Ma’rifat al-Aqalim, ed. M.J.de Goeje (Leiden 1836 – 1906) 94.  For archaeological evidence see: J. Schiettecatte (dir.), Preliminary Report. The fifth season of the Saudi-French Mission in al-Kharj, 5 January-5 February 2016, P90 – 101.
167. Hasan bin ‘Abd Allah Al Isfahani Lughdah, Bilad al-‘Arab, ed. Hamad al-Jasir et al. (Riyadh, Dar al Yamama 1968), 357.
168. Hajar’s ruins still exist near modern Riyadh that need archaeological investigation.  (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 20).  See also: Hamad al-Jasir, Medinat al-Riyadh Abra Atwar al-Tarikh, (Riyadh, Dar al Yamama 1966), 9).  Hajar was situated at a crossroads of trade routes between Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain and Mecca (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 21).
169. For Prophet Muhammad’s contact with Hanifa see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq.  The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013). 194.
170. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 636.  See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.  Salīt. bin Qays of the Khazraj tribe carried the letter (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.
171. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.
172. Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 89,90.
173. Hawdha led his fraction in the war of Nuta which is estimated to be fought before 579 CE.  By the time of his death, he was ruling Yamama for at least half a century.
174. Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),89,90. Few tribes other than Hanifa, for example, clans of Rabi’a were in league with Musaylima: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),753.
175. For Musaylima’s full name and tribal affiliation see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 636. Baladhuri gives Musaylima’s actual name to be Thumāmah bin Kabīr bin Ḥabīb.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.
176. Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),127.
177. Leone Caetani, studi di Storia Orientale, (Milano University 1911), P 26, vol III.
178. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.
179. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 42.
180. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 636.  See also: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 132.
181. Ibn Ishaq gives a vague hint in this tradition of his, which has only one source – a shaykh of Hanifa – that Musaylima accepted Islam but immediately after returning to Yamama he apostatized.  Modern scholars doubt this assertion of Ibn Ishaq.  Askar, the Saudi scholar, who is the main biographer of Musaylima, argues that the very fact that Musaylima could muster up forty thousand men to fight for his religion proves that he was consistently working in one direction for years.  (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 99). The story of his acceptance of Islam and quick apostasy could be an attempt to fit the war of Yamama in the broader frame of the Ridda Wars.
182. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 636.
183. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 138.
184. Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 91.
185. Ibn Ishaq, the life of Muhammad, ed. and trans. A. Guillaume (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013, 648.
186. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
187. Baladhuri gives clearer wording.  According to him, Musaylima said, “Half of the land belongs to Quraysh and half to Ḥanīfāh.  But Quraysh do not act equitably.”  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133).
188. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
189. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.  See also: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
190. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.
191. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 140.
192. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 676.
193. Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 95.
194. Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002), 89, 90.
195. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
196. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
197. Baladhuri reports that this Mujja’ah bin Murarah was one of the delegates sent to the Prophet by Hawdha bin Ali and he had not accepted Islam.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.),
198. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
199. This Rajjal was one of the delegates sent by Hawdha bin Ali to Medina.  Baladhuri blames that he accepted Islam initially but later apostatized.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.
200. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
201. Exact location of the last encounter of the war of Yamama was ‘Ubād.  It came to be known as Ḥadīqah al Maut.  Caliph Ma’mun ur Rashid built a mosque (jami’ah masjid) at the site to commemorate the dead.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 141).  The modern village of ‘Uyayna in Saudi Arabia about 30 km from Riyadh preserves some graves claimed to be of those who fell in the war.
202. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135.
203. Later on many Muslims claimed credit for killing Musaylima (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 135) but Tabari gives full credit of killing Musaylima to Wahshi.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 116.).  Askar is confident that it was Wahshi who killed him. (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),116).
204. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 137.
205. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 137.
206. Probably Samurah bin ‘Amr was from Tamim, the arch-rivals of Hanifa.  ‘Anbar is a clan of Tamim. The only time Samurah is mentioned again in Islamic sources is when he participated in the battle of Qadisiyyah.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),223).  In any case, his governorship over Yamama was short-lived.  Soon Rashidun Caliphate derecognized the status of Yamama as a separate administrative unit and conjoined it with an administrative unit of Bahrain.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),7.
207. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133.
208. One among the executed was ‘Ubādah bin Ḥārith bin Nauwāḥah of ʾĀmir clan of Ḥanīfāh.  He was the envoy through whom Musaylima had conveyed to the Prophet that half of the land belongs to Quraysh and half to Hanifa.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 133).
209. When Umar got compelled to recruit tribes who had opposed the Rashidun Caliphate in the Ridda Wars to fight in the war of Nahavand, he allowed Hanifa to do so.  Still, he didn’t allow them to combat in the field.  He kept them among reserves.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIV, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 18, 19.).  It was only during Damascus Caliphate that they seamlessly assimilated into Muslims.  It is during Mu’awiya’s caliphate when we find the first Hanifa to be a lieutenant governor, in a far-off border area of Marv.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Michael G. Morony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 163, 170).  It is during the Caliphate of Yazid I that we see a Hanifa being Shi’a Ali and dying fearlessly along with Husayn.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIX, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 25, 26, 29, 116, 144, 145).
210. The battle of Yamama and its leader Musaylima occupied Arab political consciousness for a long period of time.  Proverbs using the name of Musaylima continued to circulate among Arabs for centuries.  For examples of proverbs see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 138.
211. The war changed the demography of Yamama.  The Tamim became the majority in Yamama after the Ridda Wars as the Rashidun Caliphate settled them preferably into the vacant villages of Hanifa (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),37). Banu Hanifa still lived in Yamama though. (Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 20).  The Iranian population stayed in Yamama even after Ridda Wars as Tabari notes that an Iranian from Yamama was sent to Hormuz the Sassanid petty king with a letter (Abdullah al- Askar, Al-Yamama: in the Early Islamic Era. (Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2002),56).
212. The present Saudi ruling family belongs to Hanifa (Fahd A. Al-Simari, in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Roads of Arabia ed. ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhīm Ghabbān, Beatrice Andre-Salvini Francoise Demange, Carine Juvin and Marianne Cotty (Paris: Louvre, 2010), 565.)
213. Photo credit Arab News. For details see: Jeremie Schiettecatte, Anais Chevalier, Christian Darles, Fabien Lesguer, Laetitia Munduteguy, et al. Preliminary Report. Fifth season of the Saudi-French mission in al-Kharj, Province of Riyadh. 5 January – 5 February 2016. (Paris: Commission for Tourism and National Heritage; Universitie Paris Sorbonne, 2016), 90 – 101.
214. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128, 129, 137.
215. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 124.
216. Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 131.
217. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 636.  See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
218. Montgomery W. Watt  Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 132.
219. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 137.
220. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 636.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 137.
221. Gharur bin Mundhir bin Nu’man’s actual name was Mundhir.  Gharur was his nickname.  He belonged to Rabi’a, the common ancestor of all rebellious tribes.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128.
222. Actual name of Hutum bin Dubay’ah was Shuraiḥ Bin Ḍubay’ah.   Hutum was his nickname. He belonged to the Qays bin Tha’labah clan of Bakr bin Wa’il.  See:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.  See also:  Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 132.
223. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
224. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 636.  See also: (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
225. There was a theoretical doubt in the minds of Abdul Qays that a prophet could die.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 135).
226. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
227. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
228. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127.
229. Juwātha (جُواثَه) of Arabic sources is the village of Kilabiyah 12 Km from Hofuf in modern eastern Saudi Arabia.
230. Photographer unknown. The ruins have been restored to the original shape in 2007 and no longer look as they are in this photograph. For details see: M. Sharif Zame, “Conservation of architectural heritage in Saudi Arabia: The case study of Jawatha Mosque” in Vernacular Heritage And Earthen Architecture: Contributions for Sustainable Development, Eds. Mariana Correia, Gilberto Carlos, Sandra Rocha. (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 189 – 194. AND Roger Wood, An Introduction to Saudi Arabian Antiques, (Saudi Arabia: Department of Antiquities and Museums, Ministry of Education, 1975), 130.
231. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 127, 128.
232. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128.
233. Khatt is an unidentified place.
234. Montgomery W. Watt Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 136.
235. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128, 129.
236. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 128, 129.
237. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 130.
238. Qaṭīf (قَطِيف) of Arabic sources is the village of Qatif north of modern Dammam in Saudi Arabia.  The exact location of Zarah is not known.  Medieval geographers report its location on the seashore just to the northwest of Qatif.  The town was burnt down during the Qaramatian conquest of Bahrain.  See: Michael Lecker, “The Levying of Taxes for the Sassanians in Pre-Islamic Medina”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 27(2002): 109 – 126.
239. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 130.
240. Dārīn is a small neighbourhood of modern Qatif.  Sābūn and Ghābah are unidentified places.
241. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 130.
242. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 39.
243. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 124).
244. This is the last entry of Abu Huraira in the history of Islam in a significant way.  Abu Huraira died in 677 CE.  He was serving as deputy to Marwan bin Hakam, the governor of Medina at the time of his death.   (Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Khalifa ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty (660 – 750), ed. and trans. Carl Wurtzel, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2015), P 84, 87 Year 57, 59. AND Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 920.).  For Abu Hurairah’s somewhat uncritical biography see: Helga Hemgesberg, Abū Huraira, der Gefahrte des Propheten, Frankfurt/Main, 1965.  AND for his alleged role in Hadith transmission see: Juynboll, G. H. A., The Authenticity of the Traditional Literature. Discussions in Modern Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1969), 190 – 206.
245. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 116.
246. Dibba in modern United Arab Emirates / Oman:  see: Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13.
247. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 152.
248. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 152.
249. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 116, 117.
250. Baladhuri informs that Hudhaifa bin Mihsan was from Makhzum  (See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 116, 117) but Tabari identifies him a local Ḥimyār. See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 152). Casey-Vine Paula believes he was from the Bāriq clan of Azd.  (Casey-Vine, Oman in History, (Oman: Immel Pub., 1995) 37.
251. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 153.
252. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 154.
253. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 116, 117.
254. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 117, 118.
255. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 117.
256. This Hudhaifa was later transferred to Yemen.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 117).
257. For the date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 162.
260. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 165, 166, 167.²⁵⁸  He fanned xenophobia against the Abna’, calling them foreigners.²⁵⁹Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 166.
261. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 165, 166, 167.
262. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),162.
263. Abu Bakr acquitted Qays of murder charges and ordered him to join the Muslim army in Syria.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 162).
264. Muhajir bin Umayyah bin Mughīrah was of the Makhzum clan of Quraysh.  He was a full brother of Umm Salma, the wife of Prophet Muhammad.  See: (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 175).  Prophet Muhammad had appointed him in a managerial capacity in Yemen.  He could not take the charge due to his illness.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 20.  See also: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 156, 107.).
265. This is the last meaningful entry of Abna’ in the history of Islam.  Sources don’t mention their participation in Futuhul Buldan.  They are nowhere in further political developments in Yemen.  Probably Qays bin Hubayra’s enmity was the last blow to their survival as a group.
266. Tabari informs that Abu Bakr sent Muhajir bin Abi Umayyah against Qays bin Makshuh after his first raid towards Rabadhah, which was in July 632 CE.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 53).  Muhajir might have reached Sana’a by August 632 CE.
267. Baladhuri claims that one month after the death of Aswad the Companions of the Prophet returned to their governates one by one and the Muslim party chose Mu’adh bin Jabal their prayer leader.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 33).
268. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157.
269. For the appointment of Ziyad bin Labid as tax collector by the prophet and his tribal affiliations see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.  For the appointment of Muhajir bin Umayyah as a tax collector by Prophet Muhammad see: Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 648.  Muhajir had failed to take charge due to his illness.  Ziyad remained stable in his tax territory during the Aswad uprising in Sana’a.
270. Actually Muhajir had already advised Ziyad to accommodate the Kindah’s demands, it was Ziyad who refused to adjust.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157).
271. Ash’ath bin Qays had gone to Medina to accept Islam at the hand of Prophet Muhammad.  (See above cultural change in Advent of Islam).  He had not sided with Aswad though he did not participate in his downfall.
272. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 154.
273. For possible ruins of the Fort of Nujair near Tarim in Yemen see: Frya Stark, A Winter in Arabia: A journey through Yemen (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002), chapter IV.
274. Ash’ath had to pay a ransom of four hundred Dirhams each for all his seventy companions who were set free at the time of Ash’ath’s arrest. He received a loan from merchants of Medina for the funds.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157, 158).
275. Ash’ath got engaged with the sister of Abu Bakr during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad.  The marriage was withheld on condition that he should come to Medina a second time to take his wife.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 188.
276. Ash’ath took residence in Medina during Abu Bakr’s reign (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 155).  Umar allowed him to join the army that had invaded Iran.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 413.  AND Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 126.).  After the war, he made Kufa his abode where he became partisan of Ali during the First Arab Civil War.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 801).  Ali promoted him to the rank of lieutenant governor of Armenia and Azerbaijan.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 321).  He received Ali’s reprimand for monetary embezzlement during his service as governor.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),860).   It is he who is reputed to have created a dispute in Ali’s army during Siffin.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),839, 840).  After Ali’s caliphate was over he retired to Kufa where he died during the caliphate of Mu’awiya.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 155).
277. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 118.
278. Shiḥr (شِحر) of Arabic sources is Shihr in modern Yemen.  See: Claire Hardy-Guilbert and Sterenn Le Maguer “Chihr de L’encens (Yemen),” Arabian Archaeology and Epigraphy, 21 (1) (2010): 47.
279. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157.
280. We hear about another civil disobedience of Khaulan during Umar’s time, which was again defused by Ya’la bin Munya without resistance on Khaulan’s part.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 152).
281. Ya’la bin Munya was a local Yemenite guy. Munyah is his mother’s name.  While their father’s name is also known, he was better known by his mother’s name. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 152).
282. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 157.
283. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 35.
284. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 96.
285. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 96.
286. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 169.
287. both Muḍaiyaḥ and Ḥuṣaid are unknown locations.
288. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 170.
289. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 170.
290. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 120, 121.
291. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 76, 77, 132.
292. Photo credit: Muddafar Salim.
293. For pre-oil geography of the region see: A Handbook of Mesopotamia, Great Britain Admiralty and the War Office, 1918.  See also: Fuat Sezgin et. al. Texts and Studies on the Historical Geography and Topography of Iraq (Frankfurt: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang University, 1993) Vol 83.   AND Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 157).
294. Jerome Labourt, Le Christianisme dans l’empire perse sous la dynastie sassanide (Paris: V. Lecoffre, 1904), 306, 314 – 317, 326 – 329.  See also: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 169.
295. Fred McGraw. Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies and Muhammad’s Boycott,”  Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. Vol 20, No 3 (Oct, 1977), 255.
296. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 177.
297. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 89.
298. Baladhuri narrates that Abu Bakr saw fit to direct his troops against Syria when he was done with Ridda Wars. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165).
299. Elias S. Shoufani, Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 147).
300. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 387.  See also: Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 116, 117.[/
301. Khaffan was the hometown of Muthanna bin Haritha.  Its exact location is not known.
302. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 387.
303. Dinawari notes that Muthanna was aggrieved.  He had presumed that Abu Bakr would send soldiers and entrust the command to Muthanna.  (Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 117.
304. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 387.  AND Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 117.
305. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388).
306. Nibāj is an unidentified location.
307. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.
308. Ubullah (أبُّلَه) of Arabic sources is Apologos in Greek sources.  See: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179.  It was the main port of the region for ships from Bahrain, Oman, India and China.  See:  Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 123.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 168.  After the Rashidun Caliphate found Basrah, Ubullah was absorbed in it and it ceased to exist.  See: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 66.
309. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.
310. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.
311. The presence of Ansar in the army is proven by Bashīr bin Sa’d of Ansar who fought against Farrukhbundadh, the Iranian border guard at Bāniqiya.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392).
312. Presence of Hawazin is apparent from the name of Shuraiḥ Bin ʾĀmir of Sa’d bin Bakr clan of Hawazin whom Khalid left with a garrison in Khuraibah.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.; Ḍirār bin Azwar of Asad wrote a verse on the capitulation of Bāniqiya. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 393, 394); the presence of Tamim in the army is confirmed by Ḥanẓalah bin ar Rabi’ al kātib who faced Jadan, the Iranian border guard (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394).; Jarīr bin ‘Abdallah of the Bajila tribe showed up at Bāniqiya for a show of power.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392, 393).
313. For details of the consistency of the army see: (Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 178, 179.
314. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179).  Tabari gives the number of troops Khalid took with him to Syria from Hira as five hundred to eight hundred.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),109).  He further tells us that Khalid left half of his army in Hira.    (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 112).  These statistics help us in calculating his total strength.
315. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 129.  AND Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179). 178).
316. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179). 178.
317. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388, 389.  For detail of the Iraqi campaign from Donner’s point of view see: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 179 – 190.
318. Khalid’s words give a clue that Swaid and his Bakr bin Wa’il didn’t accompany Khalid’s army anymore.
319. Dijlat al Baṣrah (دِجلَةُ البصرَه) of Arabic sources is the united course of Tigris and Euphrates before they empty into the Persian Gulf.   It is also called Dijlat al-‘Aura.  In Pahlavi’s sources, it is referred to as Arvand Rūd.  These days its Arabic name is Shatt al-Arab (Shaṭṭ al-‘Arab شَطَّ العَرَب).  For its description in ancient geography see:  Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 745, vol III; Madhār was a town on route between Kufa and Basrah along a tributary of Tigris.  It lies about 320 km southeast of Kufa and 65 km from Basrah; Khuraibah and Mar’ah are unidentified locations.
320. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 389.
321. For the location of Ḥīrah see above.  Ḥīrah got absorbed in Kufa during Umar’s caliphate.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XIII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Gautier H. A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 2.;  Zandaward was near Wāsit, as Hajjaj bin Yusuf used its iron doors in building Wāsit.  See: P Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 450.  Wāsit was midway between Basrah and Kufa at the bank of Tigris, hence its name.  See:  Ibn Battutah, the Travels of Ibn Batutah. (London: Picador, 2002), 59, 303.  Ruins of Wāsit are said to be present about 54 km from Kut along Um Adejail Road and are in a state of neglect.  UNESCO site.  Durna, Hurmuzjarad, and Ullais are unidentified locations.
322. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390, 394.
323. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),405.  AND Parvaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran.  (New York; Tauris & Co, 2008), 173,174, 175.
324. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390.
325. Mujtama’ al Anhār is an unidentified place.
326. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390.
327. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391.
328. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390.  AND Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 117
329. This ‘Abd al Masīḥ was an aged man.  He talked to Khalid jokingly on the occasion. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391).  It gives a clue that the atmosphere of the meeting was genial. Interestingly, excavations of the ruins of Hira in the 2011 season have produced an inscription bearing the name of ‘Abd al Masīḥ (Naṣir al-Ka’bi, “Report on the excavations on Ḥīra in 2010 – 2011,” Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies 12 (2012), 60 – 68.
330. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391.
331. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391.
332. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 391.
333. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392.
334. Bāniqiyah is an unidentified location.
335. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392, 393.
336. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394.
337. Falālij is the plural of Fallujah.  It is modern Fallujah, about 69 km from Baghdad on the west bank of the Euphrates.  For its description in ancient geography see: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73) P 908, Vol III.
338. Walter, Kaegi E. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 155.
339. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394, 395.
340. Anbar in Arabic sources, Peroz-Shapur in Pahlavi sources, and Pirisabora in Greek sources was a city on the Euphrates about 45 Km west of modern Baghdad.  See: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 257,2 58, Vol. I.  Also see: Le Strange, Guy (1905) The lands of the Eastern Caliphate: Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia, from the Moslem Conquest to the Time of Timur.  New York: Barnes & Noble Inc.  The ruins of Anbar are located near modern Ramadi in Iraq on the left bank of the Euphrates.  Anbār was named so because the Persian granaries were in it and the friends of Sasanian protégés Nu’mān, used to get their subsistence allowance from it. See:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394, 395.
341. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 396.
342. One of these captives was Yasār, the grandfather of Ibn Ishaq, our main source on the life of Prophet Muhammad. See (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 396).
343. ‘Ayn at Tamr was a small town on the edge of the desert between Anbar and Kufa.  See: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi, Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), P 759, Vol III.  It is the modern village of Ayn al-Tamr about 80 km to the west of Karbala.
344. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 398.
345. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 399.
346. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 400.
347. Tikrit of Arabic sources is modern Tikrit on the west bank of River Tigris about 140 km northwest of Baghdad;    Ukbara’ of Arabic sources is Vuzurg-Shapur of Pahlavi sources.  The ruins of Ukbara’ are in Tel Akbar, located between the villages of Shabab and Mansuriya on the western bank of Tigris.  They used to be on the east bank of the river until it changed its path; Baradan was on the east bank of Tigris near Samara.  See: Guy Le Strange, The lands of the Eastern Caliphate: Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia, from the Moslem Conquest to the Time of Timur Lang.  New York: Cosimo Classics, 2010), P 32 chapter II; Mukharrim was a small village.  Later on, it was absorbed into Baghdad and became one of its neighbourhoods; the exact location of the bridge near Qaṣr Sābūr is unidentified.  Richards guesses that it could be on the Jalūla River, northeast of Baghdad See:  Athir, The Annals of the Saljuq Turks: Selections from al-Kamil fil-Ta’rikh of ‘Izz al Dīn al-Athir Trans and ed. D. S. Richards, (London: 2002), Routledge P 64, footnote 103.
348. For the reuse of material from the ruins of the palace see:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 444.  According to this tradition, Baladhuri Muslims gave the residents of Hira a tax cut as a price for using their materials.
349. For surrender of Hurmuzjarad with the promise of security see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 389.
350. For conditions of surrender of Ullais see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 390.
351. For the conditions of surrender of Bāniqiya see:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 392, 393.
352. The Arabic word used for mantle is ṭailasān (طَيلَسان).  It was a Persian apparel of dark wool.  Khalid sent the mantle to Abu Bakr who gifted it to Husain bin Ali.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 393).
353. For conditions of surrender of Baradān and Mukharrim see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 399.
354. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 398.
355. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 400), 393.
356. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 388.
357. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394.  AND Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 123.
358. Baghdād was a small town of Persian character in Pre-Islamic times.  For its existence during Rashidun Caliphate see:  Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XVII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. G. R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 116.  Later on, Abbasids built their capital at this site, called Medina al-Salam (Madīnat al Salām مَدِينَةَ السَلام).  The new city kept the flavour of the old town and the old name survived.  See: Yaqūt, Ibn Abdallah al-Hmawi,  Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān, Ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Liepzig; Borckhaus, 1866 – 73), 235.  At the time of Baladhuri’s writing, the market on which Khalid’s army plundered was called Suq al Atiq (Sūq al-‘Atīq سُوقُ العَتِيق) meaning the old market and lay near Qarn as-Sarat (Qarn aṣ Ṣarāt قَرَنَ الصَرات), the point where Ṣarāt canal disembogued to the Tigris. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 394).
359. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 395.
360. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 169.  For the date see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 400.  AND Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 109.
361. Dinawari adds that Khalid left Amr bin Hazm to monitor Muthanna. (Abū Ḥanīfah Aḥmad bin Dāwūd al-Dīnawri, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888), 117).  It means Muthanna had failed to develop trust in the Rashidun Caliphate.
362. See: Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Aomar Boum, A Concise History of the Middle East, (Avalon Publishing, 2015), 53.  AND Robert Hoyland, ‘Early Islam as a Late Antique Religion’, in The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity, ed. Scott F. Johnson, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2012)  1053 – 1077.
363. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 149.  See also: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 758, 759.
364. Burning a criminal to death was not a norm in Arab society at the time.  At his deathbed, Abu Bark is reported to be repentant of his action.  He admits that he should have killed him by a swift method.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763).
365. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq,  The Life of Muhammad.  Ed. and Trans. Alfred Guillaume.  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 639.
366. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),762.
367. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),763.
368. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 758, 762.  The Arabic words used are aswad wa aḥmar.
369. Chris Wickham Framing the Early Middle Age: Europe and the Mediterranean 400 – 800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 130.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 38.
370. Diodorus Siculus, Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes. Ed. Francis R. Walton, Trans. C. H. Oldfather (London: Cambridge, 1933 – 1967).  Also see: Diodorus Siculus, The Library, Books 16 – 20:  Pillip II, Alexander the Great, and the Successors, ed. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
371. The romance about Alexander’s victories had lingered on among the nations conquered by him by the time of Futuhul Buldan.  See:  Ciancaglini, Claudia A. “The Syriac Version of the Alexander Romance.” Le Museon. 114 (1 – 2) (2001): 121 – 140 AND Emeri Van Donzel and Andrea Schmidt (2010). Gog and Magog in Early Syriac and Islamic sources: Sallam’s Quest of Alexander’s Wall.  (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
372. Photo credit Nahum Slapak. Current location: Israel Museum, Jerusalem (IAA: 1931 – 7). Existence of Alexander’s busts long after his conquests in the lands he conquered point out existence of Alexander romance.
373. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 3,4.
374. Henry L. Rosenfeld, “The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State Formation in the Arabian Desert.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 95 (1965): 75 – 86 and 174 – 194.  See also: Talal Asad, “The Bedouin as a Military Force: Notes on Some Aspects of Power Relations between Nomads and Sedentaries in Historical Perspective.” In The Desert and the Swon – Nomads in the Wider Society. ed. Cynthia Nelson, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973.
375. People of Najran didn’t participate in Futuhul Buldan as they were exempt.  See:  Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 101.
376. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 58.
377. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 204.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 58.
378. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 127.
379. Daylam was the highlands of modern Gīlān.
380. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 58.
381. For the ‘motivated by Islam’ view see: Howard-Johnston, witness to a World Crisis (Oxford, 2010) 464 AND Henri Pirenne Muhammad and Charlemagne (English tans.; London, 1939) 150 – 151.  For the ‘motivated by greed’ view see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).  21, 62.
382. Fred M. Donner Muhammad and the Believers: at the Origin of Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) Introduction xii.
383. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), introduction 5.
384. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), introduction 4.
385. For these factors working behind the Arab conquests see: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 62.
386. For the unification of Arab tribes in one ummah as a basic factor behind Arab conquests see: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 56, 57, 295.
387. Lately scholars are implicating non-traditional factors into The Arab Conquests, for example, compulsions created by environmental changes. For this concept see: J. Haldon, “The Resources of Late Antiquity,” in Robinson ed., New Cambridge History of Islam 1 22 – 25.  For further discussion on the topic see: John Joseph Saunders, “The Nomads as Empire Builder: A Comparison of the Arab and Mongol Conquests,” 79 – 103.
388. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165.
389. Muhammad bin ‘Umar al-Wāqidī,  The life of Muḥammad:  kitāb al-Maghāzī.  Ed. Rizwi Faizer, Trans. Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob.  (London: Routledge, 2011), 431).486.
390. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 413.
391. See details of delegation: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 413.
392. The purpose of the invitation was not to convert them but, as Tabari reports words of Umar, ‘Allah will render this invitation a cause of weakness and defeat for them’.  (Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XII, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 29.
393. One may argue that Islamic sources writing in the 9^th century would have injected the story of deputation to the Kisra in the war events to justify a war in the eyes of their 9th-century readers, which was otherwise waged only for booty.  The traditions about the delegation to Kisra appear to be genuine on the basis that the use of religion as an excuse for war and violence was already prevalent in the Middle East when Arabs appeared on the scene.  (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 63).  When a band of Christians attacked a Jewish synagogue in the city of Callinicum [modern northern Syria] in 388 CE, the emperor thought of applying Roman law and punishing the culprits, but Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, dissuaded him, pointing out that the pious should not have to defer to the impious.  (Thomas Sizgorich, violence and Belief in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 81).  Similarly, when in the 620s the emperor Heraclius wished to rally his troops to fight the Sasanian Iran, he emphasized that “death in battle opens the way to eternal life” and so urged them to sacrifice themselves to God for the sake of their compatriots and “to seize the martyr’s crown.” (J. Howard-Johnston, “The Official History of Heraclius’ Persian Campaigns,” in The Roman and Byzantine Army in the East, ed. E. Dabrowa, (Krakow: Uniwersytet Jagiellonskiego, 1994), 85.
394. Chronicon Paschale, ed. L. Dindorf (Bonn: Impensis ed. Webebi, 1832) 1: 729 lines 6-8) (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 210).
395. For details of evidence for the war of Hamoukar see: Clemens Reichel, “Hamoukar 2005 – 2010: Revisiting the Origins of Urbanism in Syria,” The Oriental Institute News and Notes 211 (Fall 2011): 4.  For details of war on ISIS see: Dana J. H. Pttard and Wes J. Bryant, Hunting on Caliphate, (New York: Post Hill Press, 2019).
396. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 771.
397. Ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Rūmi al-Yāqūt, Irshād al-Arīb ilāma’rifat al-Adīb: Mu’jam al-Buldān, (Beirut: Sār al Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2001) P 488, vol II).
398. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 775, Footnote 973.
399. Georgius Cyprius, Le Synekdemos d’Hierokles et l’Opuscule Geographique de Georges de Chypre, ed. and trans. Ernst Honigmann.  (Brussels: Editions de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et slaves, 1939).
400. Baladhuri mentions these regions through his depiction of the conquest of Syria: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, New York: Columbia University, 1916.
401. Photographer unknown.
402. For geography of Syria see: Geography of modern Syria: Eugen Wirth, Syrien: Eine Geographische Landeskunde, Band 4-5,  (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 301.  See also: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 91.
403. For example, Abu Bakr promises to Muslims that Syria will provide them plenty to eat: Ibn Asākir ta’rīkh madīnat Dimashq, I. ed. Ṣalāh. al-Dīn al-Munajjid.  Damascus: Al-Majma’ al-‘Illmi. Al-‘Arabi,. 1951) (Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 92.
404. For the study of urban life in pre-Islamic Syria see: Arnold Hugh Martin Jones, The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) 226 – 294.
405. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 92.
406. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 94.
407. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 94, 95.
408. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 94, 95.
409. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 244.
410. Erich F. Schmidt Persepolis III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 34 – 49 AND W. B. Henning, The Inscription of Naqs-i-Rustam, (London: Lund Humphries, 1957), Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum series part III, vol. II, Portfolio II.  AND Philip Huyse, Die dreisprachige Inschrift Sābuhrs I. an der Ka’ba-i-Zardust (SKZ), (London, 1999) Corpus. Inscriptionum Iranicarum III Vol. I, Text I, p 6 – 7.
411. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 277.
412. Kaegi suggests that Persians living in Syria might not be Iranian immigrants who had permanently settled in Syria, rather they might represent those soldiers who were not withdrawn by Iran after the Roman-Iran peace deal of 628 CE or they might be those soldiers who avoided going back to home country because of their support to short-lived king Shaharbaraz.  (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 153).  Kaegi’s interpretation is unlikely to be true as the presence of Iranian elements in Syria and beyond is documented long before the events of 628 CE.
413. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 95.
414. Alexander Alexandrovich Vasiliev, “Notes on Some Episodes concerning the Relations between the Arabs and the Byzantine Empire from the Fourth to the Sixth Century,” Dumbarton Oaks papers (Dumbarton Oaks: Trustees for Harvard University,1956), Vol 9/10 P 309.
415. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 95.
416. For the presence of Arabs in Sinjār see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 277.  For the presence of Arabs in Baalbek see:   Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 199.
417. For example, there were only ninety-eight Persian families in Sinjār.  See: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 277.
418. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 95) 43.
419. The Syriac sources use the term ‘Arabi for the semi-nomads and Tāyyi for full nomads, a word derived from the North Arabian tribe of Tayy. (Judah B. Segal, Edessa: ‘The Blessed City’, (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias, 2001), 22.).
420. Walter, Kaegi E. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 72,73.
421. Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: the University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), P 36 anuus mundi 6123.  See also: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 41.  AND Walter, Kaegi E., Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 90.
422. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 96.
423. Theophylact Simocatta, The History of Theophylact Simocata,  5.7.9, Tans. Michael and Mary Whitby (Oxford: Claredon, 1986) 142.
424. Antiochus, Expugnationis Hierosolymae A.D. 615; recensiones arabicae, trans. Gerard Garittle, (Louvain, Secretariat du Corpus SCO, 1973), 149, 50.
425. Walter, Kaegi E. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 117.
426. Chalcedonians celebrated the event by fasting.  (Antiochus, Expugnationis Hierosolymae A.D. 615; recensiones arabicae, trans. Gerard Garittle, (Louvain, Secretariat du Corpus SCO, 1973), 149, 50).
427. Antiochus, Expugnationis Hierosolymae A.D. 615; recensiones arabicae, trans. Gerard Garittle, (Louvain, Secretariat du Corpus SCO, 1973), 149, 50.
428. Kaegi guesses that the petitioners might be referring to the Muslims.  (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 117).
429. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 94.
430. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 73.
431. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 39.
432. Udhruh in modern Jordan, about 12 km east of Petra.  See: (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), 384.  Also see:  Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 39.
433. Priscus, Historici Graeci Minores (volume I), ed. Ludovicus Dindorfius, (Leipzig, B. B. Teubneri, 1870), 306.  Also see: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 260.
434. Procopius, Secret History of Procopius, trans. Richard Atwater, (New York: Pascal Covici Publishers, 1927).
435. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 60.
436. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 74,75.  For the date of Heraclius’ visit to Jerusalem see: Antiochus Stratego: F. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem (614),” English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502 – 517.
437. Nicephorus, Short History, ed. C. Mango (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1992) 68, 69.
438. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 75.
439. For discussion see: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 79.
440. Actually, raids of Arab nomads to the settled areas of Syria were a usual occurrence from 610 CE onwards.  Theophilus of Edessa (d. 785 CE) records a raid in which ‘a band of Arabs came out of Arabia into the regions of Syria; They pillaged and laid waste many lands, committed many massacres of men and burned without compassion or pity.’ (Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronicle and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam, trans. R. G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 63 – 64).  A monk of Mar Saba monastery in the Judean desert tells us that two months after the ransacking of Jerusalem by the Persians in 614 CE, the monks were still unwilling to return to their monasteries in the desert … for fear of Saracens. (Epistola ad Eustathium,” Patrologia Graeca 89, Ed. J. P. Migne (Paris: Imprimerie Catholique, 1865) col. 1424.
441. Sophronius Epistola Synodica, Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus, ed. J. P. Migne, (Paris 1857 – 1866), Vol 87.   III, 3197D – 3200A.  Also see: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 69 AND Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 75).
442. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 65.
443. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 198.
444. Tabari states that the events of Futuhul Buldan were so fast that later people got confused about their exact dates and sequence.  Albrecht points out that the primary theme of Futūh literature of early Islamic traditionalists was to document conquests of countries for jurisprudence purposes.  Annalistic style and caliphal arrangement were secondary themes which offshoot from the primary theme.  (Albrecht North, The Early Arabic Historical Tradition: A Source Critical Study, Princeton, 1994, Second edition with Lawrence I. Conard, translated by Michael Bonner 39 – 48).  The same applies to early Christian sources whose main goal was to document church history.
445. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),165.
446. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 74.
447. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 674.
448. See below Battle of Dathin.
449. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),165.
450. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. X, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 191.
451. P.G.N. Peppelenbosch, “Nomadism on the Arabian Peninsula: A General Appraisal,” Tijdschr Voor Economische en Socicale  Geografie., 59, (1968), 341.
452. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 12.
453. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165.  Yazid bin Abu Sufyan had converted to Islam before Fath Mecca.  The Prophet had appointed him ‘āmil over Tayma.  See: Al-Imām abu-l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 58.
454. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167.
455. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 165, 167.
456. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167.
457. For the difference at the time of appointments and for the argument of Umar see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),166.
458. Ya’qubi asserts that Umar opposed the appointment of Khalid bin Sa’id on the basis that he had initially not taken an oath to Abu Bakr. (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 756.).  One wonders, why would Abu Bakr, who is said to be well-versed in tribal politics, was bent on appointing his adversary and would desist from it only on others’ advice!
459. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167.
460. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),167, 213.
461. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 168.  Ghazzah (غَزّه) of Arabic sources is Gaza in the modern Gaza strip of Palestine (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890),
462. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),168.
463. Thomas the Presbyter, Chronica minora II.  Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium.  Vol 3 (Scriptores Syri) Ed. Ernest Walter Brooks.  (Paris: Peeters Publishers, 1940) 147 – 48.
464. Thomas the Presbyter was a Syriac Orthodox priest from Mesopotamia (Jazira) who wrote the Syriac Chronicle of 640.  It records events up to 640 CE.  (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 42, 43).
465. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67.
466. It could be this event that triggered Amr to request Abu Bakr’s appointment of Khalid.
467. For the commander of the Arab force see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),213.  For other details see: Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 37 annus mundi 6124. AND Nathanael G. Bonwetsch (ed.), “Doctrina Lacobi nuper baptizati”, in Abhandlungen der Koiglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenchaften zu Gottingen.  Philologisch-Historische Klasse: n.F., Band 12, Nro. 3. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1910) Reprint: Liechtestein: Kraus, 1970.  86.  See also: (Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 86, 93.
468. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 168.
469. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 270.
470. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 95.
471. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 167.
472. Hoyland has recognized this description of Thomas the Presbyter to be the battle of Dathin as the description tells the site of the battle twelve miles east of Gaza and Baladhuri informs that battle of Dathin took place near Gaza.  Hoyland considers Thomas the Presbyter a contemporary source. See: Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 42, 43.
473. Thomas the Presbyter, Chronica minora II.  Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium.  Vol 3 (Scriptores Syri) Ed. Ernest Walter Brooks.  (Paris: Peeters Publishers, 1940) 147 – 48.
474. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 167, 168.
475. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 16.
476. Boṣrā ( بَوصرئ ) of Arabic sources is Nova Trajana Bostra of Greek sources, and is Busra in modern southern Syria;  Ma’āb ( مَعاب ) of Arabic sources is Rabbath Moab of Armenian sources (Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985),124), Areopolis of Greek sources (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), and modern Rabba in Jordan, 15 Km north of Karak (Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 43).
477. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 110. Theophanes agrees with Balādhuri:  Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 37 annus mundi 6125.
478. For Baladhuri’s statement see: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),173.
479. Sebeos, The Armenian History, Trans. Robert. Thomson (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,1999), 96 – 97. See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85.
480. Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 108.
481. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85.
482. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
483. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
484. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 262.
485. Paul J. Burton, friendship and Empire: Roman diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353 – 146 BC) (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2011), 118.
486. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 63.
487. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: the Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 262.
488. Discovered during an archaeological mission from southwest corner of the Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem in 1968. It reads: In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful…….. the protection (dhimmah) of Allah and the guarantee (ḍamān) of His Messenger. …… and witnessed it Abdur Rahman bin Awf al-Zuhri, and Abu Ubayda bin al Jarrah and its writer is Mu’awiya …. The year thirty-two. Unfortunately, the discoverers broke the stele accidentally. Its photographs still exist. For details see: M. Sharon, “Witnessed By Three Disciples of the Prophet: The Jerusalem 32 Inscription From 32 AH/ 652 CE”, Israel Exploration Journal Vol 68 no. 1 (2018), 100 – 111. AND M. Sharon, Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarium Palaestinae, Vol. I. (Leiden: Brill, 1997) p xiii.
489. For the location of the war see: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 126.  Beit Gurvin in modern Israel is Bayt Jibrīn of Arabic sources and Eleutheropolis of Greek sources (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890).  The ruins of the ancient site can be seen to the southeast of the modern village.
490. For example: Fredegarius, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, ed. Bruno Krusch.  (Hanover, 1886) 153. AND Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s chronicle, trans. Robert G. Hoyland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 93 – 94.
491. Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 758.  Tabari agrees with him: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 128).  Kaegi doesn’t differ either:   Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67.  Baladhuri gives the year of Ajnadayn as 634 CE but gives three different dates for it: Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175.
492. Battle of Ajnadayn coincides with the writing of Doctrina Jacobi.
493. Heraclius was overseeing integration personally: Sebeos, Sebeos’ History ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985.),116.
494. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 269.
495. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 262.
496. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 174.
497. Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 100.
498. Tabari’s notation that “The Romans fortified themselves in every place.”: Abū Jā’far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The History of al- Ṭabarī. Vol. XI, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993),172.  See also: Walter, Kaegi E.. Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 100, 101.
499. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
500. Khalid brought a total of eight hundred men from Iraq.  (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 169).
501. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
502. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985), 143.
503. Sebeos, Sebeos’ History  ed. and trans. Robert Bedrosian, New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1985.) 14, 15.
504. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 173.
505. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 193.
506. Adhri’āt ( اذرِيعات ) of Arabic sources is Adraa of Greek sources and Daraa in modern southwestern Syria; ‘Ammān Balqā’ of Arabic sources is Philadelphia of Greek sources, modern Amman in Jordan.  (Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (Boston: Houghton, 1890), 391.
507. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916),  175.  Ya’qubi gives the date to be August 22, 634: Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763.  Theophanes gives the year of 634 CE:  Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes, trans. and ed. Harry Turtledove, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 37 annus mundi 6125.  Earlier writers don’t give the date:  The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of 741 in: Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw it (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1997), 717.  See also: Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 130.
508. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175.
511. Yāqūṣah is a valley about 150 Km south of Damascus, to the east of the Sea of Galilee in the Quneitra region of southwestern Syria.  One of the modern villages located in this valley is Meitsar.  Here Romans and Muslim Arabs had a skirmish in which some Romans died and the remaining took refuge in Syrian towns. (Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 175).  It was apparently an attempt to halt a column of the Rashidun Army from advancing toward Damascus.⁵⁰⁹ The exact cause of Abu Bakr’s death is not known but he is reported to suffer from a short illness that lasted twenty days.⁵¹⁰  Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018),762, 763.
512.   Abu Bakr was sixty-three years of age at the time of his death.  He was buried in the house of Aisha where Prophet Muhammad lay buried.  (Ya’qūbī, Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-, The Works of Ibn Wāḍīḥ al-Ya’qūbī: An English Translation, Eds. and Trans. Matthew S. Gordon, Chase F. Robinson, Everett K. Rowson and Michael Fishbein, (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 763).
513. Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981),  87.
514. Aḥmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.  Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. and trans. Philip Khūri Ḥitti, (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 143.